

**Security Council**

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**Letter dated 29 August 2005 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Singapore to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)**

Please refer to the letter dated 29 June 2005 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). We would like to express our appreciation to the Committee for its efforts to ensure transparency and for sharing the matrix with us. We have no objection to the additional information included in the matrix, which was not included in the first national report of Singapore.

In response to the queries raised in its letter of 29 June 2005, we are pleased to inform the Committee that:

(a) The Strategic Goods (Control) Act, the Regulation of Imports and Exports Act, the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act, the Arms Offences Act and the Arms and Explosives Act adequately prohibit non-State actors from carrying out activities that would contravene Security Council resolution 1540 (2004);

(b) Singapore has the legal means to penalize violators and has taken enforcement action against several companies;

(c) Singapore's existing legislation adequately provides for sufficient export control to regulate the transport, transfer and brokering of weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems and related material;

(d) Under the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act, the word "assists", which is found in section 8 (1) (f) and is preceded by the word "knowingly", also covers "to participate as an accomplice in";

(e) Development of nuclear weapons is also prohibited in the Arms and Explosives Act. In that Act, the prohibited activity is "manufacture of explosives". The word "manufacture" includes the preparation of any component parts of an explosive, the admixture or other treatment of the same, the breaking up or unmaking of any explosive, and the process of remaking or making fit for use any damaged explosive, and the process of remaking, altering or repairing any explosive.

We would like to inform the Committee that since the submission of our national report on 21 October 2004, the distinction between core group and non-core group members of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) has not been applied.

Singapore hosted a maritime interdiction exercise, code-named Exercise Deep Sabre, from 15 to 19 August 2005, which involved a number of PSI countries as participants and observers. The exercise simulated the interdiction of a merchant vessel carrying dual-use chemicals destined for an entity of proliferation concern. The Committee may wish to update the matrix accordingly.

We would like to assure the Committee that Singapore takes its obligations under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) seriously and will continue to work with like-minded countries to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.

(Signed) **Tan** York Chor  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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