Nuclear disarmament and security assurances

Working paper submitted by the Republic of Korea

1. Nuclear disarmament is of vital importance as one of the three pillars of the NPT. This extraordinary Treaty has been effective in reducing the threat of nuclear weapons through a broad yet delicate bargain between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. However, given the wide gap between the records of nuclear-weapon States and the expectations of non-nuclear-weapon States, it would be hard to maintain that nuclear disarmament has been as successful as expected.

2. This is not to undervalue the significance of the progress achieved thus far in the reduction of nuclear arsenals by nuclear-weapon States. It should be noted that the 2000 NPT Review Conference welcomed the significant progress achieved in nuclear weapons reductions under the START process. The Moscow Treaty was a further achievement reflecting the continued commitment of nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament.

3. Yet progress has been limited, given that an estimated 27,000 nuclear weapons still exist in the world. In order to rekindle the global effort to achieve nuclear disarmament, the Republic of Korea believes it necessary to restore trust and nurture a spirit of cooperation between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. While non-nuclear-weapon States should strengthen their commitment to non-proliferation, nuclear-weapon States must do their part by making real progress on nuclear disarmament. The commitment of non-nuclear-weapon States to non-proliferation should be supported by the faithful implementation of nuclear disarmament by nuclear-weapon States. The Republic of Korea therefore calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to implement article VI in good faith by complying with the decision on principles and objectives adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and carrying out the 13 practical steps contained in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference.

4. Concerning recent announcements by a couple of nuclear-weapon States of plans to replace or modernize their nuclear arsenals, it should be noted that such steps might trigger a new type of nuclear arms race among the nuclear-weapon States to create nuclear weapons that outlive and outperform those of the others in spite of the decrease in the total number of warheads.
5. The Republic of Korea is of the view that decisions on the nature and characteristics of nuclear disarmament cannot be made in a vacuum, but must be taken in the context of the security environment at the national, regional and global levels. It is imperative that the international community make every effort to foster a favourable environment for nuclear disarmament. Taking into account these realities, the Republic of Korea believes that the nuclear-weapon States should take practical steps to pursue systematic and progressive efforts to achieve deeper cuts in nuclear weapons as well as reductions in their deployment and operational status. At the same time, the nuclear-weapon States should marginalize and devalue the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies with a view to minimizing the risk of their use. In addition, the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to report disarmament progress to the international community on a regular basis, preferably at each stage of a review cycle.

6. Bearing in mind that well over half of existing nuclear weapons belong to the United States of America and the Russian Federation, the Republic of Korea welcomes any concrete progress in the talks between these two major nuclear powers as a follow-up to the START I Treaty, which expires in 2009. The Republic of Korea urges them to fully implement their bilateral commitments under the Moscow Treaty to further reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and ensure respect for the principles of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability.

7. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the proposed fissile material cut-off treaty are two essential building blocks to complement and strengthen the NPT regime. They would indeed represent significant steps forward, as they would place qualitative and quantitative caps on the further expansion of nuclear arsenals.

8. An early entry into force of the CTBT is essential for the eventual total elimination of nuclear arsenals. By prohibiting testing, the CTBT has the potential to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons, both vertically and horizontally. It is now 11 years since the Treaty was concluded, yet the prospects for its entry into force in the near future remains bleak. In this regard, the Republic of Korea strongly calls upon those States that have yet to ratify the Treaty, in particular the 10 remaining annex II States, to do so without further delay. Those States that have already ratified the treaty should continue to build up the worldwide monitoring network and engage in outreach activities at the bilateral and multilateral levels. This will be constructive in enabling the Treaty to enter into force as soon as possible.

9. The negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty is indeed the next logical step after the CTBT, not only for nuclear non-proliferation, but also for nuclear disarmament. The Republic of Korea believes that the time is ripe for negotiations on such a treaty in the Conference on Disarmament and attaches high priority to the launching of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty at the earliest possible date.

10. In this regard, the Republic of Korea welcomes and supports the draft proposal made by the six Presidents of the Conference on Disarmament on the substantive work of the Conference on Disarmament. It also calls upon all members of the Conference on Disarmament to show maximum flexibility and creativity vis-à-vis the adoption of the presidential draft decision as proposed, so that negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty can begin in the second part of this year’s session.
the meantime, given the urgent need to curb the production of fissile materials, the Republic of Korea urges all States with nuclear capabilities who have not already done so to voluntarily declare, without delay, moratoriums on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes.

11. At the outset of a new NPT review cycle, the international community needs to confirm and renew its determination to achieve the objectives of the NPT — nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It is faced with the urgent task of reversing the recent disappointments and ongoing deadlock in the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation machineries. It is the political will of the States parties that will determine whether or not we can take advantage of this opportunity. For its part, the Republic of Korea remains committed to multilateral efforts in pursuit of the goal of making the world free from existing and future nuclear threats.

12. The Republic of Korea strongly believes that the non-proliferation regime will work most effectively when the root causes of proliferation are adequately addressed. Insecurity, real or perceived, is one of the key motives or justifications for the development of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this connection, it is quite natural that the international community should seek ways to alleviate these security concerns in order not to give certain States, either States parties or non-States parties to the NPT, any motive or justification for the pursuit of nuclear weapons programmes.

13. The Republic of Korea supports the concept of negative security assurances as part of a practical means of reducing this sense of insecurity. As stated on previous occasions and in other international forums, the Republic of Korea believes that nuclear-weapon States should provide strong and credible security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that faithfully meet their NPT and other safeguards obligations.

14. Security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States would further strengthen the non-proliferation regime per se, as they would further dissuade States from acquiring nuclear weapons and would be conducive to building confidence among States parties. In this regard, Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995) and related elements in the 1995 and 2000 Final Documents should be noted. In addition, it would be desirable to provide enhanced security assurances and other incentives to those States that voluntarily accept additional non-proliferation commitments beyond the parameters of the NPT.

15. Considering the evolving nature of the current international political environment and the divergence of views on negative security assurances, it would be more realistic to take a pragmatic and step-by-step approach to the issue.

16. In this connection, the Republic of Korea underlines the unique value of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a practical means of obtaining security guarantees from the nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear-weapon-free zones have become an essential part of global non-proliferation efforts by prohibiting the development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, possession and control of any nuclear explosive devices within the zone, while also providing negative security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States to the acceding parties. The Republic of Korea believes that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be further encouraged and calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to ratify the relevant protocols to ensure the existence of the nuclear-weapon-free zones.