First session
Vienna, 30 April-11 May 2007

Implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”

Report submitted by the Republic of Korea

Introduction

1. As stated in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in the section entitled, “Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12”, paragraph 15, subparagraph 12, the Conference agreed on the submission of regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996. In this regard, the Republic of Korea hereby submits its report to the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT.

2. The Republic of Korea firmly believes that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament is an indispensable part of the core bargain founded on the three pillars of the NPT. The disarmament obligations by nuclear-weapon States laid out in article VI of the Treaty are fundamental to the full implementation of the Treaty. Faced with the unprecedented challenges from the cases of non-compliance with the Treaty and its safeguards systems, the revelation of a clandestine nuclear black market network led by A. Q. Khan, and the potential nexus of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, it is imperative that the international community maintain and strengthen all three pillars of the NPT.

3. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, the Republic of Korea continues to abide by its commitment, pursuant to the Treaty, not to receive the transfer of, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

4. The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference marked a significant achievement in the field of nuclear disarmament. The guidelines laid out in the
Document, particularly the 13 practical steps therein, serve not only as a measuring stick to gauge progress in this field, but as a road map toward achieving the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament.

5. Since the adoption of the Final Document in 2000, there have been ever-increasing expectations for progress in the implementation of disarmament and transparency measures, particularly on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. The five nuclear-weapon States should put their unequivocal commitment to disarmament into action by making systematic and progressive efforts. The Republic of Korea welcomes the significant progress made thus far in the reduction of nuclear arsenals and the commitments to further reductions under the Moscow Treaty.

6. Nevertheless, the Republic of Korea hopes for deeper cuts and further engagements by nuclear-weapon States. The Republic of Korea recognizes that there is a perception gap between the record of nuclear-weapon States and the level of expectations held by non-nuclear-weapon States. Closing this perception gap will certainly provide nuclear-weapon States with the moral authority and the political legitimacy to strengthen non-proliferation norms while maintaining the delicate balance among the three pillars of the Treaty.

7. It was disappointing that the 2005 NPT Review Conference could not produce a substantive document. It was also regrettable that the 2005 United Nations World Summit could not agree on a disarmament and non-proliferation chapter in the Outcome Document. The Republic of Korea strongly hopes that the first Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2010 NPT Review Conference to be held in Vienna from 30 April to 11 May 2007 will yield fruitful results.

Implementation of the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” included in the Final Document adopted by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review Conference

Step 1: The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

8. The Republic of Korea has attached great importance to the achievement of an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Republic of Korea ratified the Treaty on 24 September 1999. The Republic of Korea calls for the early signing and ratification of the Treaty by those States that have not yet done so, particularly those 10 remaining annex 2 States whose ratification is necessary for its entry into force.

9. The Republic of Korea supports the biennial Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT and the Final Declarations adopted at each Conference. Preparations are under way for the fifth one in Vienna in September 2007. These article XIV conferences are intended to review ways and means to promote the Treaty’s entry into force at the earliest possible date. We also support the CTBT Ministerial Meeting that has been held during the intervening period between the above-mentioned conferences. The Republic of Korea Foreign Minister attended these meetings and signed the Joint Ministerial Statement, thereby
contributing to strengthening the momentum towards the early entry into force of the Treaty.

10. As part of its efforts to promote the early entry into force of the Treaty, the Republic of Korea hosted a regional workshop on CTBTO International Cooperation for States of South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East in Seoul in October 2005, in cooperation with the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBTO.

**Step 2: A moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty**

11. It is our considered view that all countries, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, should maintain a moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, particularly in the aftermath of the nuclear test carried out by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 9 October 2006.

12. It is the view of the Republic of Korea that such a voluntary moratorium cannot replace the legally binding commitments through the signing and ratification of the CTBT. The Republic of Korea has therefore continued to urge those States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty at the earliest possible time.

13. The Republic of Korea has continued to support the work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat and its efforts to establish the international monitoring system for the verification of the Treaty. We note that, as of the end of 2006, more than two thirds of the 321 stations required by the Treaty have been built. The only monitoring station (primary seismic) of the Republic of Korea was certified by the Provisional Technical Secretariat in October 2006.

**Step 3: The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years**

14. The Republic of Korea attaches great importance to the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral forum for negotiating disarmament agreements. It is regrettable that the Conference on Disarmament has not yet been able to agree on the programme of work. As a next logical step toward nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, it is imperative that the Conference on Disarmament immediately begin negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

15. The Republic of Korea believes that a FMCT is the issue ripe for negotiations among the core issues, given the strong support for it expressed for several years in the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament should start negotiations on a FMCT immediately and without preconditions, keeping in mind the 1995 Shannon mandate without prejudice to the outcome on verification. Pending the conclusion of the FMCT, all States should declare or observe a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.
Step 4: The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

16. The Republic of Korea hopes that the breakthrough in the Conference on Disarmament will pave the way for the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to address nuclear disarmament, as agreed in this step. In this regard, appointment of a coordinator for substantive discussion on nuclear disarmament, as suggested in the draft decision of the six Presidents of the Conference on Disarmament, would be a good start. The Republic of Korea has been actively participating in the structured, intensive discussions on all substantive issues on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, including nuclear disarmament issues.

Step 5: The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures

17. It is the view of the Republic of Korea that irreversibility is one of the fundamental principles for nuclear disarmament measures. It is only irreversible reductions in nuclear weapons that can ensure that redeployment will not be possible. The Republic of Korea shares the view that the principle of irreversibility should be applied to all disarmament and arms control measures.

Step 6: An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI

18. The Republic of Korea continues to highlight the importance of reaffirming commitments on the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. The Republic of Korea considers the unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to achieve the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI, as one of the major achievements of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. While acknowledging the efforts made thus far by the nuclear-weapon States for a reduction of their nuclear arsenals, the Republic of Korea has been encouraging them to further continue these efforts in this respect.

Step 7: The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (“the ABM Treaty”) as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reduction of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions

19. The Republic of Korea welcomes the entry into force of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (the Moscow Treaty) between the Russian Federation and the United States in June 2003. While the Moscow Treaty represents a positive step, we encourage the nuclear-weapon States to further engage in reductions in nuclear stockpiles.
Step 8: The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency

20. The Republic of Korea supports the completion and full implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States, the Russian Federation and the IAEA. Efforts could be made to expand this initiative to all nuclear-weapon-capable States, as an important step in the direction of international control of excessive stocks of fissile material and deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals.

Step 9: Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all

21. The implementation of these steps is primarily the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States. The Republic of Korea is of the view that transparency measures are an important voluntary confidence-building measure and, as a matter of principle, transparency should be applied to all disarmament and arms control efforts. There should be progress toward reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons, as part of overall nuclear disarmament. And the nuclear-weapon States should diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their nuclear doctrines.

Step 10: Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes

22. The Republic of Korea supports and encourages such arrangements by the nuclear-weapon States.

Step 11: Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control

23. The Republic of Korea is actively participating in international efforts towards the control over or dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, as well as conventional weapons. The Republic of Korea is a State party to all major disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and conventions, including the NPT, CTBT, CWC and BWC. The Republic of Korea believes that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Step 12: Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996

24. The Republic of Korea believes that national reporting on the implementation of nuclear disarmament measures enhances transparency and builds confidence, and therefore should be encouraged. The Republic of Korea encourages both nuclear-
weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to submit regular reports to the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference. While there is no consensus on the content and format of national reports, more detailed information contained in them will instil greater confidence in the States’ nuclear policies and disarmament efforts.

**Step 13: The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world**

25. The Republic of Korea fully supports the essential role of the IAEA as a competent authority responsible for the verification and assurance of compliance with the NPT obligations. The Republic of Korea continues to urge those States which have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA to do so. To strengthen the Agency’s effectiveness in verifying compliance and detecting non-compliance, it is crucial to promote the universality of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and make it the verification standard of today. The Republic of Korea supports the further development of the verification capabilities of the nuclear disarmament agreements.