North Korea Nuclear Chronology

Last update: March 2013

This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time.

In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here. Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

2013

7 March 2013
The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 2094 in response to North Korea’s third nuclear test. Based on previous resolutions, UNSCR 2094 imposes additional restrictions targeting North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs, including new financial and export control restrictions, sanctions on new individuals and entities, and increasing states authority to inspect suspicious cargo or deny over-flight. North Korea responds by calling the new sanctions “a crime.”


5 March 2013
The spokesman for Kim Jung Un announces on Korean Central TV that North Korea will abandon the 1953 Korean armistice agreement and Panmunjom hotline starting 11 March 2013 when U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises known as Key-Resolve begin.


12 February 2013
North Korea announces that it successfully conducts a third nuclear test. The CTBTO Preparatory Commission measures the seismic activity at approximately 5.0 in magnitude, originating near Punggye-ri, Gilju-gun, North Hamgyeong Province. This seismic reading is almost double that recorded from the 2009 test. Similar to the 2009 test, no radionuclides are detected. The Punggye-ri nuclear test facility has three tunnels. While the CTBTO’s margin of error indicates the test was conducted either from the west or south tunnels, satellite imagery analyzed by Jane’s shows evidence of heavy traffic near the western portal on 13 February 2013.

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22 January 2013
The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 2087 condemning North Korea’s 12 December launch in violation of previous UN Security Council resolutions. The resolution demands North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons program and all activities based on ballistic missile technology. It calls upon states to strengthen reporting and implementation of previous sanctions including UNSCR 1718 and the UNSCR 1874.


2012

2 October 2012
North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister tells the UN General Assembly that U.S. hostile policy makes the Korean Peninsula the most dangerous place in the world, and that this could lead to the detonation of a thermonuclear weapon.


21 August 2012
IHS Jane’s publishes satellite imagery from 8 August 2012 showing that North Korea made significant progress on the construction of the light water reactor at Yongbyon including placing the reactor dome over the core.


2 July 2012
Japanese newspapers Tokyo Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun report that they have acquired a document from Pyongyang indicating that Kim Jong Il instructed North Korea officials to mass produce highly enriched uranium for “nuclear bombs” in 2010. The newspapers assert that this overturns North Korea’s official position of only using low enriched uranium for civilian electricity production.


31 May 2012
According to North Korea’s Naenara website, the state proclaimed itself a nuclear weapon state in a revision to its constitution earlier this year. The preamble states that Kim Jong Il “protected the achievements of socialism,” and changed North Korea into a country with a strong political ideology, nuclear weapons, and an invincible military. North Korea established its constitution in 1945, made a complete revision in 1972, and partial revisions in 1992, 1998, 2009, and 2010. This is the first instance North Korea made the contents of its revisions public since 1998.

— Kim Soo-jung, “North Korea Proclaims Itself as a Nuclear Weapon State in Their Constitution,” Joongang Daily,

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16 May 2012

*38North* reports progress in the construction of North Korea’s light-water reactor at Yongbyon based on analysis of commercial satellite imagery from DigitalGlobe and GeoEye. *38North* compares images from 24 December 2011, 3 February 2012, 25 March 2012, and 30 April 2012 concluding that the reactor containment building may be near completion. The domed roof remains adjacent to the facility ready for installation. 38 North estimates that it may take an addition 1-2 years to install heavy components, pushing the operation date to 2014 or 2015.


17 April 2012

North Korea declares that it will no longer abide by the 29 February (Leap Day) agreement, to suspend nuclear and missile tests and uranium enrichment in exchange for food aid, blaming the “blatantly hostile action” by the U.S. in the aftermath of its 12 April long-range rocket launch.


12 April 2012

North Korea’s three-stage rocket crashes into the sea approximately 1 minute after its launch from the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground. It is timed to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the birth of late North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung. Because the rocket is comprised of military technology, the outside world largely condemns the launch as a violation of UN Security Council resolutions. North Korea unusually admits the rocket failure on state-run television, saying “scientists, technicians and experts were looking into the cause of the failure.” The UN Security Council calls an emergency meeting on 13 April and condemns the launch.


8 April 2012

A South Korean government spokesman reports that North Korea appears to be preparing for a third nuclear test simultaneously with its preparations for a long-range rocket launch. The spokesperson says satellite images of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site – the site of two previous underground tests in 2006 and 2009 – show a growing pile of spoil at one tunnel entrances. South Korea’s main opposition party accuses the government’s National Intelligence Service of leaking the information for political ends with the parliamentary elections just days away.

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16 March 2012
North Korea announces plans to launch a satellite in April 2012, earning swift condemnation from the U.S. and other countries that say the move is a violation of UN Security Council resolutions and the recently agreed upon long-range missile test moratorium. Six-Party Talks members urge North Korea to cancel the launch. The Korean Central News Agency says the country’s satellite launch “has nothing to do with the deal with the US” calling a long-range missile and a satellite launch “two separate things.”

5 March 2012
Commercial satellite images acquired by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) show progress on the construction of the light-water reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear site in North Korea. Taken on 3 February 2012, the imagery shows that the turbine building appears to be complete, while the dome for the reactor building remains on the ground next to the facility.

29 February 2012
North Korea announces an agreement with the U.S. to suspend nuclear testing, uranium enrichment programs, and allow IAEA inspection of nuclear activities at its main nuclear complex. A moratorium on long-range missile launches is also part of the agreement. The U.S. will supply North Korea with 240,000 metric tons of food as part of the agreement. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton states that she “still has profound concerns” but expresses optimism. Because the agreement falls on 29 February it is known as “The Leap Day Deal” among Americans.

24 February 2012
North Korea and the U.S. meet for the first time since the death of Kim Jong Il. The meetings, held at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing between Glyn T. Davies, the new American envoy, and Kim Kye Gwan, the North Korean envoy, are “serious and substantial.” Mr. Davies assesses the “exploratory talks” as neither “positive nor negative but instructive.”

3 February 2012
*Nature* reports on a study by Swedish scientist, Lars-Erik De Geer which concludes that “North Korea carried out two small nuclear tests in April and May 2010 that caused explosions in the range of 50–200 tons of TNT equivalent.” De Geer’s paper is published in *Science & Global Security* on 7 March 2012. His hypothetical May test comes just days before the North Korea’s KCNA claims that the DPRK’s scientists achieved nuclear fusion, which was met with general disbelief (see 14 May 2010 entry). De Geer, an atmospheric scientist at the Swedish Defense Research Agency, analyzed radioisotope data from Russian and Japanese monitoring stations close to North Korea and compared them with South Korean reports as well as meteorological reports to reach his conclusions. However, De Geer’s opinion is a minority view, and the South Korean government is deeply skeptical about his findings.

2011
17 December 2011
North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-il dies of a heart attack at age 69 while traveling by personal train, ending his 17-year rule. The news of his death is not announced until two days later on 19 December 2011. KCNA reports that “humankind’s greatest heart has stopped beating” and that the people of North Korea were “engulfed in

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indescribable sadness.” Kim’s youngest son Kim Jong Un is presumed successor, and the South Korean government puts its armed forces on high alert.


10 November 2011
North Korea’s state media agency, Korean Central News Agency, reports that “the day is near at hand” for its independently-developed light-water reactor to become fully operational. Days later, 38North publishes commercial satellite imagery showing “significant progress” on the construction of the new reactor. Although the plant may be completed in 6-12 months, it said the operation of the plant could be further 2-3 years away.


24-25 October 2011
A North Korean delegation headed by Kim Kye Gwan, Vice Foreign Minister, meets with a U.S. team headed by Stephen Bosworth, special envoy for North Korea policy, for two days of talks in Geneva. Meetings end inconclusively, but North Korea’s spokesman describes the meetings as having “deepened the understanding of each other’s positions.” Bosworth characterizes them as “positive and constructive” and “moving in a positive direction.”


19 October 2011
Kim Jong-il says that the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula was a long-held dream of his father and former leader, Kim Il-Sung, and that his current administration continues to pursue this goal. He adds that his country has a right for independence, and that its nuclear program is a direct result of the continuing threat from the U.S. and its hostile policies towards North Korea. Kim further adds that there is no change in his government’s willingness to return to the Six-Party Talks without precondition.


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21 September 2011
North and South Korean chief nuclear envoys meet in Beijing, but fail to reach agreement. The North continues to insist that its uranium enrichment activities are ‘peaceful nuclear use,’ while the South maintains its insistence on the suspension of the North’s uranium enrichment program, the return of IAEA inspectors, and a moratorium on missile testing. Nevertheless, the South Korean envoy, Wi Sung-lac, pronounces the talks ‘constructive’ and expresses optimism that future talks will pave the way for restarting the Six-Party Talks.

24 August 2011
North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-il meets with Russian President Dimitri Medvedev during a rare 7-day visit to Russia. North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency reports that Kim and Medvedev agree that the Six-Party Talks should be reconvened without precondition.

28-29 July 2011
North Korean officials meet with U.S. counterparts for two days of talks in New York. The meeting was arranged at Hillary Clinton’s invitation during the ASEAN meeting in Bali. The U.S. team, headed by Stephen Bosworth, reiterates the conditions put forth by the South Korean government which includes the suspension of all of the North’s nuclear activities and the return of IAEA inspection teams in return for economic aid. North Korea, represented by Kim Kye Gwan, the vice foreign minister of North Korea, counters by stating that North Korea’s “uranium enrichment activities are peaceful for electricity generation.” The meetings end without agreement, however Kim Kye Gwan calls the meeting “constructive.”

22 July 2011
Chief nuclear negotiators for North and South Korea meet on the sidelines of the ASEAN conference in Bali, Indonesia in their first meeting since 2008. Although there are no specific agreements, the North Korean chief negotiator Ri Yong Ho remarks to reporters that both sides agree “to make efforts to reconvene the Six-Party talks as soon as possible.”

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26 April 2011
Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, along with three other former European leaders, visits Pyongyang. Although unable to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, they receive written assurances of the North Korean government’s willingness to restart the Six-Party Talks without pre-condition.

8-9 February 2011
The first military discussion between North and South Korea since the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010 is held at the border village of Panmunjom. Talks end abruptly when the North Korean delegation walks out of the talks. The meeting was intended to set the ground for further higher-level talks.

2010

1 January 2010
North Korea used outlets throughout the state media to call for ending the hostilities with the U.S. and to make the Korean Peninsula "nuclear-free through dialogue and negotiations." Coordinated efforts through KCNA, KCBC, Rodong Sinmun, Josoninmingun and Chongnyonjonwi, expressed a desire for peace, however also lauded, "the successful launch of man-made satellite Kwangmyongsong-2 and the successful second underground nuclear test." There is no mention of a potential start date for the resumption of talks.

11 January 2010

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North Korea's Foreign Ministry called for bilateral talks with the United States, focusing on an eventual peace treaty, according to state media KCNA. The following day, North Korean Ambassador to China Choe Jin Su reiterated, "To bring about trust between the DPRK and the United States, it is necessary to sign a peace accord first so as to remove the root cause of hostile relations and the state of war." Japanese media took the offer as "just North Korea's way of scheming to "delay" progress on the nuclear issue by first pushing for a peace treaty." The U.S. largely dismissed the statements.


18 January 2010
North Korea stated that it will not return to the Six Party Talks until UN-imposed sanctions are removed. South Korea dismissed the demand responding, "neither the forum nor its participants have the authority to lift the punishment."

6-9 February 2010
Wang Jiarui, head of the International Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, led a delegation to North Korea in an attempt to restart the Six-Party Talks. Wang met with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, where he delivered a letter from President Hu Jintao. According to Chinese state media, Kim assured Wang that Pyongyang is committed to a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. In a further sign of thawing relations, North Korean senior envoy to the Six-Party Talks, Kim Kye-gwan, returned to Beijing with Wang on the 9th for additional meetings.

10 February 2010
Former Vice Minister Wu Dawei was appointed Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs, including representing China in the Six-Party Talks. Wu had been expected to retire from his Vice Ministry position. He has represented China at the Six-Party Talks since 2005.

9-13 February 2010
North Korean envoy Kim Kye-gwan met with China’s newly re-appointed chief nuclear negotiator Wu Dawei on the subject of resuming the Six-Party Talks.

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9-12 February 2010
U.N. political chief B. Lynn Pascoe met with North Korean officials including North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Uichun. It was the first high-level visit of a UN official since 2004. Pascoe delivered a gift and message from UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon; the content was not revealed. Pascoe said the North Koreans were, "certainly not eager, not ruling out, but not eager to return to six-party talks," upon his arrival in Beijing.

23-27 February 2010
On the 23rd, North Korean Communist Party official Kim Yong-il met with his Chinese counterpart Wang Jiarui and President Hu Jintao in Beijing, delivering a message from North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. The same day, Wi Sunglac, South Korea's delegate to the Six-Party Talks, also arrived in Beijing to meet with his Chinese counterpart Wu Dawei to discuss China's plans for returning to the Six-Party Talks. American envoys Stephen Bosworth and Sung Kim arrived in the city and met with Wu Dawei the following day. Stephen Bosworth continued to Seoul where he met with Wi Sung-lac, as well as South Korea's National Security Advisor and the Minister of Unification. Special Envoy Bosworth then traveled to Tokyo where he met Japan's Foreign Minister and the Japanese delegate to the Six-Party Talks. Meanwhile also on the 26th, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Sung Kim met with South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan in Washington. This group of meetings were held to discuss ways to restart the Six-Party Talks.

9 March 2010
In response to annual U.S.-ROK Key Resolve/Foal Eagle military exercises, North Korean state media quoted a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry as saying "the DPRK is fully ready for dialogue and war. It will continue bolstering up its nuclear deterrent as long as the U.S. military threats and provocations go on."

9 March 2010
South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met in Beijing; they discussed the North Korean nuclear issue, the Six-Party Talks, and agreed to step up efforts to restart the stalled Six-Party Talks.

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21-22 March 2010
In February 2010, when China's Special Representative for Korean Affairs Wu Dawei met with U.S. and ROK, China detailed a three-step proposal on the resumption of the Six-party Talks. The three-step plan included a resumption of bilateral talks between North Korea and the U.S., followed by a preparatory meeting of six parties, and ending with the formal resumption of the Six-Party Talks. On the March 21, the U.S. accepted the plan to hold a preparatory meeting of the delegations, opening the way for bilateral talks between the U.S. and North Korea. Washington also indicated that it was possible to discuss rolling back sanctions and requirements for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. By March 22 all parties except North Korea had agreed to hold a preparatory meeting.


26 March 2010
North Korea announced that, "Those who seek to bring down the system in the DPRK, will fall victim to the unprecedented nuclear strikes of the invincible army." The statement referred to a 19 March news report in South Korea's Dong-a Ilbo that the U.S. Pacific Command and think-tanks in South Korea and China will meet in April to discuss possible contingency plans for weapons of mass destruction in case of regime collapse in North Korea.


29 March 2010
State-run North Korean news agency KCNA announced that "the DPRK will witness the appearance of a light water reactor power plant relying on its own nuclear fuel in the near future in the 2010s." The remark was made in a lengthily article renouncing reports that the North Korean economy is weak or that the regime is in danger.


9 April 2010
North Korea's Foreign Ministry called the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, "nothing different from the hostile policy pursued by the Bush administration." In the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, the United States renounced the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, but left its options open in the case of North Korea. North Korea claims it needs a nuclear deterrent against the United States and promised to "increase and update" its nuclear weapons.


14 April 2010
Pyongyang renewed its calls for a peace treaty before returning to the Six-Party Talks. State-run Rodong Sinmun stated that the government called for an end to "the vicious cycle of distrust between the DPRK and the U.S." before the "denuclearization process to be pushed forward through confidence-building" could begin. Washington argued that a peace treaty should be put on hold until after North Korea has begun disarming.

"North Korea Renews Call for Peace Treaty with the U.S. before Denuclearizing", Yonhap, 14 April, in Lexis-Nexis.
21 April 2010
North Korea released a memorandum stating that it would limit the number of nuclear weapons it produced to rejoin the denuclearization efforts in exchange for being recognized as a nuclear arms state. The U.S. refused its demands.


5-6 May 2010
Kim Jong-Il met with President Hu Jintao of China, in part, to discuss the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Kim said that the DPRK was willing "to provide favorable conditions for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks," according to state-run KCNA. No timetable or demands for the return to the Talks were made public. There was also no public discussion of the sinking of Cheonan, an ROK navy vessel, which has been an impediment to the resumption of the Talks.


14 May 2010
Unusually high levels of xenon gas were detected along the North-South Korean border. The gas could be due to a nuclear test, leakage from a nuclear plant, or rare industrial processes. According to an anonymous science and education ministry official, "the amount of xenon detected in the air at the Geojin monitoring site in Goseong county on May 14 was eight times more than normal." There was no sign of a tremor, which normally accompanies a nuclear test. There is no public evidence of the origin of the gas. Wind patterns were blowing north to south, indicating it could have come from Russia, northern China or North Korea. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization did not detect any unusual readings. On 12 May 2010, North Korea announced that it had achieved nuclear fusion, which has been dismissed by scientists around the world.


24 May 2010
The DPRK Foreign Ministry gave a statement to state-run KCNA regarding the ongoing 2010 Review Conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The statement defended North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 and said that North Korea had never violated the agreement while a member. Further, it claimed that the DPRK does not feel a need to be recognized a nuclear weapons state, and that "it is capable of reliably defending the sovereignty of the country and the security of the nation with its own nuclear weapons."


30 May 2010
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 2010 Review Conference unanimously adopted a 28 page declaration that, "strongly urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fulfill commitments under the six-party talks, including the complete and verifiable abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in accordance with the September 2005 Joint Statement." The declaration also called for North Korea to return to NPT membership and adhere to IAEA safeguards.

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28 June 2010
Citing the United States' recent disclosure of previously classified documents indicating it considered using nuclear weapons on North Korea in 1954 and 1969, state-run KCNA reports that the North's foreign ministry wants "the DPRK to bolster its nuclear deterrent in a newly developed way to cope with the U.S. persistent hostile policy toward the DPRK and military threat toward it." The report does not provide details on how the DPRK plans to accomplish this goal.

26-30 August 2010
Kim Jong-il makes his second trip to China in 2010, and meets with President Hu Jintao in Changchun on 27 August. According to Chinese state-run media, Kim tells Hu that "the DPRK’s stance on adhering to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula had remained unchanged, and the country 'is not willing to see tensions on the peninsula.'"

30 September 2010
The Institute for Science and International Security releases a DigitalGlobe image from 29 September showing that North Korea recently constructed two buildings near the location of the demolished cooling tower at Yongbyon. Construction and excavation equipment remain at the site, and activity is ongoing. [Note: In November 2010, the construction is revealed to be related to a new light-water reactor.]

8 October 2010
The Institute for Science and International Security releases a report stating the likelihood that North Korea "has moved beyond laboratory-scale work and has the capability to build, at the very least, a pilot-scale gas centrifuge plant." The report is based on procurement data, and does not show a clear indication that North Korea is ready to produce a significant amount HEU for weapons.
21 October 2010

Conservative South Korean newspaper *Chosun Ilbo* cites an unidentified ROK government source as saying that a U.S. satellite detected personnel and vehicle movements at Punggye-ri, the site of North Korea’s 2006 and 2009 nuclear tests. Washington warns North Korea against conducting a third test, and North Korea responds by saying its nuclear arsenal "serves as a treasured sword" against the United States.


9-13 November 2010

Siegfried Hecker, John Lewis, and Robert Carlin of Stanford University visit the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex during their 9-13 November trip to North Korea. There, they view an experimental 25-30 MW(e) light-water reactor (LWR) under construction, and a completed industrial-scale uranium enrichment facility. The scientists are told that the enrichment facility has 2,000 centrifuges and is already producing low-enriched uranium for the LWR, ostensibly for civilian power generation. Hecker estimates that the 2012 completion date of the LWR is "much too optimistic."


8-9 December 2010

Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo travels to Pyongyang, where he meets Kim Jong-il and holds "frank and indepth talks" reaching a "consensus" according to Chinese media. Further details are not revealed until later, when an unidentified government source states that Kim Jong-il will accept IAEA nuclear inspections, should certain preconditions be met. The preconditions are not released publicly.


16-20 December 2010

Governor of New Mexico Bill Richardson visits North Korea as a private citizen at the DPRK's invitation. Upon his return, Richardson confirms the rumored willingness of North Korea to allow IAEA inspectors into its new uranium enrichment facility, and also says that Pyongyang will agree to set up a new military-to-military hotline, and discuss the creation of a joint military commission on the Yellow Sea with South Korea and the U.S. State Department. U.S. officials remain skeptical.


2009

18 January 2009

According to Selig Harrison who visited Pyongyang and met North Korean officials including a senior Foreign Ministry official and a general of the military, North Korea claimed that they had "weaponized" their stockpiles of plutonium of 67.8 pounds, which is sufficient to build four or five nuclear warheads. He also said that "the North

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North Korea announces that it will rebuild the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, which Pyongyang previously began dismantling as part of an agreement with its Six-Party Talks partners. Pyongyang also kicks out IAEA and U.S. inspectors. This will allow the facility to be reconstructed and commence the development of plutonium for nuclear weapons. North Korea's action follows the UN condemnation of the April 5 missile test, which Pyongyang views as an infringement on their sovereignty.


26 April 2009
North Korea begins reprocessing thousands of spent nuclear fuel rods at the Yongbyon site, extracting plutonium from the rods to develop fissile material for nuclear weapons. However, reconstructing the Yongbyon site to full capacity will require several months. Specialists in Seoul argue that North Korea reopened the reprocessing plant to produce plutonium from thousands of spent fuel rods. These rods could yield enough plutonium for one or two bombs.


25 May 2009
North Korean Central News agency announced the DPRK had conducted a nuclear test. The DPRK described the test as contributing to safeguarding their sovereignty, and guaranteeing peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. The USGS estimated a seismic activity of 4.7 on the Richter scale at coordinates of 41.331°N, 129.011°E. The activity was shallow and located in the same vicinity as the October 2006 nuclear test. That test had a seismic activity of 4.3 on the Richter scale. Martin Kalinowski of the Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Center for Science and Peace Research at the University of Hamburg the explosive yield of the test ranged from 3-8 kilotons of TNT with a likely yield of 4kt. In 2006 the yield was 0.5-0.8kt of TNT.


12 June 2009
The UN Security Council passed resolution reprimanding North Korea for the 25 May nuclear and 26 May missile tests. The resolution imposes new sanctions, expands arms embargos, and authorizes ship searches on the high seas. The resolution aims to deprive North Korea of the means for financing its nuclear and missile programs, and bans DPRK arms exports, especially missiles. The resolution calls on countries to refrain from providing financial support to industries that could contribute to North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs.


13 June 2009
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Korea issued a statement in response to UNSC Resolution 1874. Pyongyang states the second nuclear test was an exercise of self-defensive to counter U.S. hostility. The DPRK rejects the UNSC resolution 1874 and will adopt countermeasures to protect their sovereignty and national dignity. Ministry of Foreign Affairs also states they will weaponize all of their newly extracted plutonium, commence the processing of uranium enrichment, and regards any attempt by the United States or its allies to blockade North Korea as an act of war which will be met with decisive military response.


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15 June 2009
The North Korean Foreign Ministry stated, "The processing of uranium enrichment will be commenced." This draws considerable criticism of North Korea since it has stated achieved considerable success in developing and experimenting with uranium enrichment technology. Uranium enrichment will provide North Korea with another method to build nuclear weapons other than reprocessing plutonium.

16 July 2009
Kim Yong-nam, the president of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK, declares that the Six Party Talks are over. Kim states that dialogue cannot proceed "where the principles of respect for sovereign rights and equality are denied." Kim emphasized the need to strengthen the DPRK’s nuclear deterrence. The statement was made at a Non-Alignment Movement meeting at the Egyptian resort Sharm el-Sheikh.

17 July 2009
In keeping with UNSCR 1718, which was adopted in 2006 after North Korea’s first nuclear test, the UN Security Council imposes new sanctions on high ranking North Korean nuclear officials. The Council’s sanctions committee imposes an asset freeze and a travel ban on officials from the General Bureau of Atomic Energy — the Bureau’s directory Ri Je Son, Hwang Sok Hwa, head of the Bureau’s Scientific Guidance Department — along with Ri Hong Sop, former director of Yongbyon nuclear research center. The sanctions also targeted Yun Ho Jin and Han Yu Ro, the heads of North Korean trading companies — Namchonggang, Korea Hykosin, and Korea Tungun — that are suspected of acquiring and transporting nuclear and missile parts for North Korea. The General Bureau of Atomic Energy, Namchonggang Trading Corp, Korea Hykosin Trading Corp, and Hong Kong Electronics (an Iranian based entity) were also placed on the UN blacklist.

27 July 2009
North Korea issued a statement calling for direct talks with the United States. The Obama administration responded that the Washington will engage in direct negotiations with North Korea in the Six-Party framework.

31 July 2009
U.S. Treasury Department places the Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation, a North Korean entity, under sanctions pursuant to Executive Order 13382. The North Korean firm owned by Korea Ryonbong General Corporation was blacklisted for their involvement in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The order effectively freezes the assets of WMD proliferators and prohibits U.S. persons from financial transactions with the entity.

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12 August 2009
The U.S. blacklisted a North Korean bank under Executive Order 13382 for its affiliation with firms sanctioned under the UNSCR 1874. The Department of Treasury identified the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation for providing financial services to Tanchon Commercial Bank and Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation.

25 August 2009
North Korea invites U.S. envoys to Pyongyang for bilateral discussions on the DPRK's nuclear activities. North Korea reportedly extended the invitation during former U.S. President Bill Clinton's 4 August visit to Pyongyang to secure the release of two detained American journalists.

3 September 2009
North Korea informs the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that: "Experimental uranium enrichment has successfully been conducted and entered into the completion phase," and "Reprocessing of spent fuel rods is at its final phase and extracted plutonium is being weaponized." Included in a letter issued to the UNSC sanctions committee, the DPRK announcement is also broadcast on the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). The DPRK letter was in response to the committee's inquiry into a North Korean arms shipment seized by the United Arab Emirates in mid-July 2009.

8 September 2009
The U.S. State Department imposes restrictions targeting two North Korean entities—the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE) and Korea Tangun Trading Corporation. Designated under Executive Order 13382. The restrictions freeze any assets owned by the entities within U.S. jurisdiction and prohibit U.S. persons "from conducting any transactions with these entities." The announcement of the designation also emphasizes that the action is in uniformity with UNSCR1718 and UNSCR1874.

18-24 September 2009
ROK defense officials indicate that locations of North Korean nuclear weapons are known to the South Korean military. Additionally, these locations are included among "major targets" in DPRK territory identified for early attack in the event of a military conflict. The statements made by chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, Kim Tae-young, and General Lee Sang-eui during their confirmation hearings before the ROK National Assembly for defense minister and chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman respectively.

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21 September 2009
ROK President Lee Myung-bak proposes a "grand bargain" as a means to "fundamentally resolve the North Korean nuclear issue." According to the South Korean proposal, the DPRK would dismantle key elements of its nuclear program. In turn, the countries participating in the Six-Party Talks would "simultaneously provide security guarantees and international assistance to North Korea."

24 September 2009
At a rare summit-level meeting chaired by U.S. President Barack Obama, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously passes resolution 1887 (UNSCR 1887) in an effort to reinforce the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Based on a draft resolution introduced by the United States, UNSCR1887 "reaffirms" prior DPRK-related resolutions UNSCR1718 and UNSCR1874 and discourages any withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Additionally, various speakers at the meeting - most notably French President Nicholas Sarkozy - criticize North Korea's record on efforts to denuclearize the Korean peninsula.

5 October 2009
In a meeting with visiting Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, North Korean leader Kim Jong II signals a possible DPRK return to the Six-Party Talks, but conditioned it on the result of "bilateral talks" with the United States. Kim’s remarks at the meeting were carried by the state-run Korean Central News Agency. The Kim-Wen meeting was held in the context of a North Korean celebration of the 60th anniversary of official PRC-DPRK relations, and Kim’s statements are later reconfirmed in official comments from China’s Foreign Ministry. Kim also made reference at the meeting to an "unchanged" North Korean "commitment to realizing the denuclearization of the peninsula."

6 October 2009
The South Korean news agency Yonhap reports that North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facility is in the "final stage" of restoration. Yonhap's report is based on "a South Korean defense source who referenced intelligence data from a parliamentary audit. The intelligence data was apparently drawn from "South Korean and U.S. intelligence authorities" following an analysis of approximately 10 nuclear facilities."

6 October 2009

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
Defense Minister Kim Tae-young advises the ROK National Assembly the North Korean military may not yet be able to attach their nuclear warheads to their delivery systems. Kim notes that while "it is not clear whether North Korea has nuclear arms," South Korean forces "have sufficient information on the locations where items related to the nuclear program are stored and where the delivery means are placed."


2 November 2009

North Korea demands direct talks with the United States on its nuclear program, warning in a Foreign Ministry statement carried by the state-run Korean Central News Agency, that if the U.S. is not ready to "sit down at a negotiating table", then the DPRK "will go its own way." However, the DPRK's demand also indicates a willingness to return to the Six-Party Talks.


3 November 2009

North Korea announces that reprocessing of 8,000 spent fuel rods was completed in August. According to the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the reprocessing was "part of the measure taken to restore the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon to their original state." The KCNA report also asserts "noticeable successes have been made in turning the extracted plutonium into weapons-grade for the purposes of bolstering up the nuclear deterrent of the DPRK." A senior South Korean defense official confirms that, based on satellite imagery analysis, the reprocessing facility at Yongbyon "appears to have been restored to its earlier condition." Commenting on the North Korean announcement, the U.S. State Department states that the DPRK's action "violates UN Security Council resolutions."


8-10 December 2009

U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth visits North Korea and meets with DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sokju, to explore restarting the six-party talks. North Korea's Korean Central News Agency later describes the meeting as "businesslike and candid", saying that the two sides "deepened the mutual understanding, narrowed their differences and found not a few common points." Bosworth later told the press that he urged the North not to conduct a third test, and promised "a vision of the future which would be a lot different than the present or the past", should the North abandon its nuclear programs. The DPRK lobbied for a loosening of sanctions, which Bosworth said was not possible until they returned to nuclear negotiations and dismantling of their atomic programs. No clear conclusion emerges from the meeting regarding the Six-Party Talks or next steps.


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2008

4 January 2008
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement in which it claims that Pyongyang had submitted a nuclear declaration in November 2007 and had "sufficient consultation with the U.S. side" on the contents. If further states that North Korea has allowed the United States to inspect military facilities that used imported aluminum tubes to address U.S. suspicions regarding their use in a uranium enrichment program. In addition, while the disablement process has entered its last phase of unloading the spent fuel, Pyongyang is slowing down disablement work in response to the delay in the delivery of heavy fuel oil and other rewards promised by the members of the Six-Party Talks.

In response to North Korea's statement, U.S. officials disputed North Korea's claim that it had submitted a declaration. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill states that the United States does not regard North Korea's account a final declaration and furthermore urges North Korea to submit and a "complete and correct" declaration on all its nuclear programs as required by the October 3, 2007 agreement. However, Hill acknowledged that U.S. officials were granted access to the sites that used the imported aluminum tubes.


7 January 2008
South Korean President-elect, Lee Myung Bak's transition committee asks the Ministry of Unification to link inter Korea economic cooperation projects to progress on North Korea's nuclear disarmament. During the Ministry's policy briefing, a key member of the committee stated that while humanitarian projects can continue, "economic cooperation projects should be carried out in parallel with the pace of North Korea nuclear talks." As a result, large-scale cross-border projects to reconnect the cross-border railways and expand the Kaesong industrial complex may be placed under review.


30 January 2008
In a meeting with Wang Jiarui, head of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party, in Pyongyang, Kim Jong Il says that North Korea remains fully committed to implementing the agreements reached during the Six-Party Talks. He adds that the other parties should fulfill their commitments under the principle of "action for action."


Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
31 January - 2 February 2008
Sung Kim, director of the U.S. State Department's Office of Korea Affairs visited Pyongyang to discuss ways to move the Six-Party Talks process forward. During his visit, he met with North Korean Foreign Ministry officials and told them that the nuclear declaration must be complete and accurate.

12 February - 16 February 2008
A U.S. team of experts make a trip to North Korea to assess progress in disablement of the key facilities in Yongbyon and discuss the possibility of implementing a U.S. program in the dismantling of North Korean nuclear weapons, a program resembling that of the 1991 Nunn-Lugar program. The team, which traveled in an unofficial capacity, consisted of Sigfried Hecker, the former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Joel Wit, a former State Department official and Keith Luse, an aide to U.S. Senator Richard Lugar. Upon return from the trip, Sigfried Hecker says that they enjoyed broad access to North Korea's nuclear facilities and that North Korea is serious about the denuclearization process as well as willing to consider a Nunn-Lugar type program in North Korea. However, Hecker says that North Korea is unwilling to move further unless the United States and other parties meet their end of the bargain. He also added that North Korea has slowed down the removal of the spent fuel rods at the Yongbyon reactor site.

19 February 2008
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and North Korean Vice Minister Kim Kye Kwan hold unannounced bilateral talks in Beijing. In his brief to reporters Hill says that Kim Kye Kwan was careful not to characterize the current situation as a stalemate and indicated North Korea is prepared to work towards moving the denuclearization process forward. According to Hill, Kim Kye Kwan "wanted to make it very clear that they are not at present having any nuclear cooperation with any other country and they will not in future."

26 February 2008
The New York Philharmonic orchestra makes a historic performance in Pyongyang. It is reported that former Defense Secretary William Perry and former U.S. Ambassador to Korea Donald Gregg met North Korean Vice Minister Kim Kye Kwan and director-general of the North American division at the Foreign Ministry, Ri Gun, the day of the concert. In their meeting, the two former U.S. officials reportedly conveyed the message from U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill urging for a quick resolution.
—Yoon Won-sup, "Can NY Phil Concert in NK Resolve Denuclearization?" Korea Times, 27 February 2008, in Lexis-

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13 March 2008
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and his North Korean counterpart Kim Kye Gwan meet in Geneva. Despite what is described by Hill as “substantive” discussions, they fail to reach a deal to move past the disagreement over the submission of a full nuclear accounting of North Korea's entire nuclear program. Hill says that they made considerable progress on discussing the format of the nuclear declaration, however, that the "really problematic element is that, we don't have a commitment from the DPRK to provide and complete and correct declaration."

26 March 2008
The new, conservative South Korean administration signals a tougher stance with North Korea by warning that it will speak out against human rights abuses in North Korea and that it improving economic ties will be contingent on North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons program. In his policy briefing to President Lee Myung Bak, Minister of Unification, Kim Ha Joong links inter-Korean engagement to progress in dismantling North Korea's nuclear program. He states that "the speed and scope of as well as ways to push for any development in inter-Korea relations will be decided according to progress in the North Korean nuclear issue."

1 April 2008
Breaking a long silence, North Korea's state-run Rodong Shinmun vehemently criticizes the new, conservative South Korean President Lee Myung Bak and his North Korea policies. The commentary criticizes President Lee's North Korea policy for attaching "complete nuclear abandonment" of Pyongyang as a precondition to improving North-South relations and accuses Lee of "making a complete mess of the process to denuclearize the peninsula."

8 April 2008
U.S Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and North Korean Vice Minister Kim Kye Gwan hold bilateral talks in Singapore where they report "important progress" in working towards breaking the current impasse in the Six-Party Talks. Furthermore, it is reported that the two parties reached a tentative agreement in which they would side-step the dispute over how much information North Korea is required to provide about any past uranium enrichment related activities and its suspected nuclear cooperation with Syria. This allows for the parties to focus on addressing North Korea's plutonium production capability, past and present. The agreement reportedly

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requires North Korea to finish the disablement process at Yongbyon and also to provide a full accounting of its stockpile of plutonium while "acknowledging" U.S. allegations regarding the uranium enrichment program and nuclear cooperation with Syria. In return, the United States will move toward lifting sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act and removing North Korea from U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism.


22 April - 24 April 2008
A U.S. interagency delegation, led by Sung Kim, director of the U.S. State Department's Korean Affairs office, visited North Korea to follow up on a provisional agreement reached between Kim Kye Gwan and Christopher Hill in Singapore earlier in the month. A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson told the Korean Central News Agency that "technical matters for winding up the implementation of the October 3 agreement, including the contents of the nuclear declaration" were discussed with the U.S. delegation.


24 April 2008
In its first public statement since the Israeli bombing of a Syrian site on 6 September 2007, the White House confirms that Syria has been clandestinely engaged in building a nuclear reactor capable of plutonium production with the assistance of North Korea. The White House says that North Korea's covert nuclear cooperation with Syria is a "dangerous manifestation" of Pyongyang's proliferation activities which poses a serious concern. The Bush administration also released photographs taken inside the reactor before it was destroyed to support its assertion. However, Washington reaffirms its commitment to the Six-Party Talks framework "to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." The White House issued its statement shortly after Central Intelligence Agency Director Michael Hayden, White House national security advisor Stephen Hadley, and Director of National Intelligence J. Michael McConnell briefed congressional committees about the North Korea-Syria connection.


8 May 2008
North Korean officials turn over 18,000 pages of documents related to its plutonium program to Sung Kim, director...
of the U.S. State Department's Korean Affairs office on his follow-up visit to Pyongyang. An unnamed senior U.S.
onofficial says that the documents contain information about North Korea’s three major campaigns to reprocess
plutonium in 1990, 2003 and 2005. However, the document does not include information about its alleged
uranium enrichment program or its nuclear proliferation to other countries.


27 May - 29 May 2008
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and North Korean Vice Minister Kim Kye Gwan meet in Beijing to
discuss filling the remaining gaps in North Korea's nuclear declaration as well as the timeframe for its submission.

web.lexis-nexis.com.

10 June - 11 June 2008
Sung Kim, director of the U.S. State Department’s Korean Affairs, meets with North Korean officials in Pyongyang
to discuss the remaining tasks for disablement, including how to deal with the used fuel rods. South Korea had
previously offered to purchase the fresh fuel rods to use in its power reactors. North Korean Ministry of Foreign
Affairs spokesperson says that the discussions focused on "technical and practical ways of rounding off the
disablement of the DPRK nuclear facilities and the issue of winding up the political and economic compensation for
it."

—"U.S., N.K. to Discuss Disablement," Korea Herald, 10 June 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "DPRK
Foreign Ministry's Spokesman on DPRK-U.S. Experts Negotiations," Korean Central News Agency, 12 June 2008,
www.kcna.co.jp.

26 June 2008
North Korea submits its long-awaited nuclear declaration to China almost seven months past the deadline. The
United States welcomes this development and vowed to "respond to North Korea's actions by lifting the provisions
of the Trading with the Enemy Act, as well as announcing our intent to rescind North Korea's designation as a
States Sponsor of Terror in 45 days."

—Yonhap News Agency, "USA Hails North Korea Nuclear List - Yonhap," in BBC Monitoring, 26 June 2008, in Lexis-
Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Norimitsu Onishi and Edward Wong, "U.S. to Remove North Koreans From Terror List;
Nuclear Declaration is Rewarded as Disarmament Efforts Advances," International Herald Tribune, 27 June 2008, in
Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Jonathan Watts, "Bush Hails Korean Breakthrough as Pyongyang Delivers
Inventory of its Nuclear Activities: State to be Taken Off Terror List and Given Financial Aid: Atomic Plan’s Most

27 June 2008
North Korea demolishes the cooling tower at its Yongbyon nuclear reactor site. The event was broadcasted by
international media at Pyongyang’s invitation.

—"N. Korea Destroys Reactor Cooling Tower," Korea Times, 27 June 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Barbara
demick, "The World; Demolition of Nuclear Tower Symbolic for N. Korea, U.S.; The Televised Event is
Meant to Demonstrate That Pyongyang is Cooperating With the Bush Administration," Los Angeles Times, 28 June
2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Blaine Harden and Stella Kim, "N. Korea Razes Cooling Tower In Show of

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
1 July 2008
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill said, at the Center for International and Strategic Studies in Washington on July 1, that the North Korea deal is "a partially finished product." He also stated that "We have to keep working on issues that have not been fully disclosed, although not denied by the North Koreans." However, he emphasized that even though there are the unanswered questions about a uranium-enrichment program, the administration has succeeded in shutting down North Korea's nuclear reactor.

2 July 2008
According to a source close to the Six-Party Talks, North Korea said it extracted a total of about 30 kilograms of plutonium in three different years in 1990, 2003, and 2005 and used 2 kilograms in the experiment conducted in October 2006. The U.S. government believed North Korea may be able to extract approximately 8 kilograms of plutonium from unprocessed spent nuclear fuel rods stored at nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, the source said. There are about 4 kilograms of residual plutonium inside components of the nuclear facilities and another 2 kilograms in nuclear waste stored at the facilities. The United States believes the plutonium extracted by North Korea plus an additional 8 kilograms of the substance yet to be removed, totals about 44 kilograms.

4 July 2008
According to sources from the participants of the Six Party Talks, North Korea revealed in the declaration submitted to China that it used 25.5-26 kilograms of plutonium for manufacturing nuclear weapons. The sources said that the above amount does not include the 2 kilogram which North Korea acknowledged in the report as the amount used for its first nuclear test in October 2006.

10-12 July 2008
After a nine-month hiatus, the six countries convened the Heads of Delegation Meeting of the Six Party Talks in Beijing from 10 to 12 July in 2008. The two main issues of the talks were the verification and monitoring system of North Korea's nuclear program and energy assistance to North Korea. Six countries reached an agreement to set a verification mechanism consisting of experts of the six parties to verify the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. They agreed that the verification measures would include visits to facilities, review of documents, interviews with technical personnel and other measures. As for the Yongbyun nuclear facilities, North Korea agreed to work to complete the disablement of the facilities by the end of October 2008. Despite the agreement the principle of verification mechanism, six countries failed to agree on a number of details including scope and subjects of verification which were deferred to working-level discussions. No agreement was reached on a timetable for a verification protocol and Washington remained critical of the North Korea's 26 June declaration, arguing that it did not cover its alleged uranium-enrichment program and foreign weapons deals.

17 July 2008
According to sources close to the Six Party Talks, North Korea has pulled 4,000 nuclear fuel rods from the reactor in Yongbyun and put them into a water pond. Reportedly this discharge was a result of the most recent round of the Six Party Talks, where North Korea committed to try to complete the disablement of Yongbyun nuclear complex by end of October 2008.

22 July 2008
After meeting with his US counterparts Christopher Hill in Singapore on 22 July, Kim Sook, the South Korean delegation to the Six Party Talks said reporters that North Korea has already received the draft of a verification protocol. He added that "The ball is actually in North Korea's court because they already received the draft of a verification protocol." According to Christopher Hill, the U.S. top negotiator on the North Korean nuclear issue, the draft includes ways to verify North Korea's claims about nuclear past but does not contain a timeline.

23 July 2008
Foreign Ministers of the Six Party Talks countries had an informal meeting in Singapore on 23 July on the sidelines of the annual ASEAN Security Forum. After a 90-minute discussion, the ministers released a six-point agreement declaring their commitments. The ministers agreed that there had been achievements made so far in the six-way talks and reaffirmed their determination to ensure each country's obligations were met. In addition, they emphasized that a complete and balanced conclusion was crucial for the second denuclearization phase and that a verification mechanism must be promptly prepared. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated the meeting was "very good," adding that "it wasn't a standoff with people just stating their positions." According to the North Korean delegation's spokesman, Ri Dong Il, North Korean Foreign Minster Pak Ui Chun said North Korea was willing "to implement its own obligations," including verification, "closely following the implementation by other parties on the principle of action-for-action." Mr. Ri also said that "what's important is for the U.S. to fundamentally and entirely withdraw its hostile policy."

30 July 2008

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
A senior official in the U.S. government said that Washington might suspend its removal of North Korea from the list of terror-sponsoring nations if the verification regime for verifying North Korea's nuclear program is not established. On 25 July, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned North Korea of a possible postponement of the removal unless the verifying mechanism is set up.

"The State Department described the announcement as a "step backward.''


31 July-1 August 2008
Sung Kim, the US State Department's special envoy for the six-party talks and Li Gun, head of the North Korean Foreign Ministry's American affairs bureau met two times in Beijing from 31 July to 1 August to talk about the verification protocol. Even though there was no elaboration from them, it is reportedly said that there was no progress in the verification issue. According to a senior South Korean official in background briefing, "North Korea is still refusing to agree some basic stuff."

"The 45 days are a minimum period, and what we need from North Korea is a strong verification regime."

12 August 2008
The Bush administration continues to delay the removal of North Korea from its terrorism list although the deadline for removal had passed. North Korea knows "what they need to do on a verification package, and we're continuing to work with them," US State Department spokesman Kelley Osterthaler said. State deputy spokesman Robert Wood also said "The 45 days are a minimum period, and what we need from North Korea is a strong verification regime."


26 August 2008
North Korea released a statement saying that it halted disablement process at the Yongbyon site, its main nuclear facility, and was considering restoring and restarting operations at the facility. North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) quoted the North Korean Foreign spokesman as saying: "we have decided to immediately suspend disabling our nuclear facilities. This measure has been effective on Aug. 14, and related parties have been notified of it." The State Department described the announcement as a "step backward."


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4 September 2008
The Foreign Ministry of South Korea confirmed that North Korea took measures to restore its nuclear facilities at Yongbyun, officially expressing regret over North Korea’s activities. Meanwhile, Christopher Hill, the top U.S. negotiator, said that it was not still clear that North Korea was attempting to restart operation at the Yongbyun facilities, adding North Korea’s real intention was still unclear. After meeting with his counterparts of South Korean, Japan and China in Beijing, he urged North Korea to agree on the verification regime.

22-24 September 2008
North Korea asked the IAEA to remove seals and surveillance equipment at a nuclear reprocessing facility at Yongbyun to conduct tests. North Korea then ordered inspectors of the IAEA to leave the country and notified the agency that it would reintroduce nuclear material into the nuclear complex. According to a spokesperson for the agency, all the agency seals and surveillance equipment were removed from the Yongbyun facilities on 24 September.

1-3 October 2008
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill visited Pyongyang and had talks about the disputed verification regime for the North Korea’s nuclear program with his counterpart Kim Kye-gwan. Hill reportedly proposed a new approach to North Korea, under which North Korea would submit its list of nuclear site to China and still have to permit inspections from the U.S. as well as Chinese officials. According to U.S. government sources, the proposal would be limited to North Korean nuclear activities and facilities that are reported to China in June, and in turn, the United States would provisionally remove North Korea from its terrorism-sponsoring states list. As for weapon program and undeclared other activities, North Korea would declare its intention to cooperate with the comprehensive verification by the IAEA.

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11 October 2008
The United States removed North Korea in its list of states sponsoring terrorism after North Korea agreed to resume disabling its nuclear plant and allow inspectors access to the declared nuclear sites. The State Department issued a statement saying that "North Korea has agreed to a series of verification measures," and "North Korea has also stated it will assume disablement of its nuclear facilities." As for the verification protocol, the department said it would be "finalized and adopted by the six parties in the near future." In response to the U.S. decision, North Korea announced it was resuming the disablement of its nuclear program and would allow international monitors back to the site.

12 November 2008
North Korea refused to allow inspectors to take soil and nuclear waste samples from a nuclear site, claiming that it had never agreed to allow sampling in its territory. The U.S. State of Department said that such a step would violate the agreement between them, adding that "it was basically agreed that experts could take samples and remove them from the country for testing."

8-11 December 2008
Six-Party Talks are held in Beijing and the parties negotiate a draft of a document on ways to verify North Korea’s nuclear information. The negotiation ended without a document.

2007
16-18 January 2007
In an unusual bilateral meeting, top U.S. envoy to the Six-Party Talks Christopher Hill and his North Korean counterpart Kim Kye-gwan discuss ways to revive the Six-Party Talks. Without disclosing any further detail, North Korea’s KCNA website issues a Foreign Ministry statement noting that a "certain agreement" was reached during the meeting. Meanwhile Hill declares that North Korea is willing to return to the Six-Party Talks.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
8-13 February 2007
The third session of the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks is held in Beijing, where the participant countries reach an agreement. The adopted "Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement" commits North Korea to shutting down and sealing nuclear facilities at Yongbyon within 60 days and allowing IAEA monitoring and verification in exchange for 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil.

19 March 2007
U.S. Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary Daniel Glaser announces that Washington would authorize the transfer of US$25 million in frozen North Korean funds that had been held in an account with the Macao-based Banco Delta Asia. Glaser says the money will be transferred to a North Korean bank account in Beijing. Pyongyang had cited the frozen funds as the reason for the DPRK not beginning to shut down its Yongbyon nuclear facility in accordance with the 13 February agreement. At the same time as the financial dispute between the United States and North Korea is being resolved, another round of the Six-Party Talks begins.

22 March 2007
North Korean envoy to the Six-Party Talks Kim Kye-gwan leaves Beijing as the DPRK refuses to discuss implementing the 13 February agreement to shut down its Yongbyon nuclear facility until after it receives the US$25 million dollars from its Banco Delta Asia account.

25 June 2007
A spokesman for the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs says that it has finally received the funds from its Banco Delta Asia account and it will begin implementing the 13 February agreement. The announcement comes over two months past the 14 April deadline to enact the agreement made in February.

14 July 2007
IAEA inspectors arrive in North Korea in order to confirm that the DPRK has shut down its Yongbyon nuclear facility. In the meantime the first shipment of heavy fuel oil aid to North Korea arrives from South Korea.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
18 July 2007
IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei confirms that North Korea has shut down all of its five main nuclear facilities which include the 5 MW experimental reactor, the reprocessing plant and the nuclear fuel rod fabrication plant at Yongbyon. Meanwhile, as a new round of Six-Party Talks begins, South Korea’s nuclear envoy Chun Yung-woo indicated that North Korea expressed its intention to declare and disable all of its nuclear facilities by the end of the year.

20 July 2007
The Six-Party Talks end without North Korea giving a hard deadline for when they will completely dismantle all of their nuclear weapons programs. However, U.S. envoy to the Six-Party Talks Christopher Hill says that even without setting a deadline the goal of North Korea disarming its nuclear weapons by the end of the year is "doable."

2 September 2007
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill says that North Korea has for the first time offered a timeline to declare and disable all of its nuclear weapons programs by the end of the year. Hill’s announcement comes after meeting with North Korea nuclear envoy Kim Kye-gwan in Geneva.

6 September 2007
Israeli warplanes destroy suspected nuclear facility in Syria while concerns are raised about a potential nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Syria.

11 September 2007
A team of nine experts from the United States, Russia and China, headed by Sung Kim, director of the U.S. State Department’s Office of Korea Affairs, arrive in North Korea to examine and discuss the disabling of nuclear facilities at Yongbyon with North Korean officials. The team is expected to report its findings to the next session of the Six-Party Talks.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
27 September 2007 - 3 October 2007
The second session of the sixth round of Six-Party Talks is held in Beijing. At the close of the session, the parties adopt the "Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement," which calls on North Korea to declare by 31 December 2007 its entire nuclear program and to disable its main nuclear facilities that had been shut down and sealed under the 13 February accord. The United States pledges to start the process of removing the designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism while all parties reaffirm their commitment to deliver the remaining 900,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea in return for nuclear disablement.

4 October 2007
At the close of the inter-Korean summit, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il sign the "Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Relations, Peace and Prosperity," in which the two leaders reaffirm their commitment to the denuclearization process.

11-18 October 2007
A working group of U.S. experts led by Sung Kim, director of the U.S. State Department’s Office of Korea Affairs, visit North Korea to map out a plan for disabling North Korea's nuclear facilities.

27-29 November 2007
A fact-finding team composed of ten officials from China, South Korea, Russia and the United States visit North Korea to follow up on the progress in the disablement of the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. The KCNA reports that the officials witnessed the "processes of disabling the 5 MW test reactor, the reprocessing plant and fuel rod plant including the cooling tower and confirmed that the disabling operation is making proper progress."

3-5 December 2007
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill makes a trip to North Korea to discuss with his North Korean counterpart Kim Kye-gwan the disablement progress and declaration of all nuclear programs. Hill states that the disablement process is going smoothly and that North Korea has "done a lot of work in preparation of discharging
the fuel in the reactor.” He also said that North Korea is “pretty close to providing a declaration.” During his visit, Hill also delivered a letter from U.S. President Bush addressed to Kim Jong-il. In his first direct communication to the North Korean leader, President Bush urges Kim Jong-il to fully disclose all nuclear programs before the end of the year.


2006

10-18 January 2006
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il travels to China and meets with President Hu Jintao. At the unofficial summit meeting, Kim Jong-il reaffirmed North Korea’s commitment to the Six-Party Talks. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that the two countries "agreed to continue to the peaceful resolution of the Korean Peninsula's nuclear issue by continually pursuing the six-way talks process."


18 January 2006
Chief nuclear envoys to the Six-Party Talks from North Korea, China and the United States meet in Beijing to discuss ways to revive the Talks. The trilateral meeting is held between U.S. Assistant Security of State Christopher Hill, North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan and China’s Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei.


4 March 2006
U.S. and North Korean officials hold a meeting in New York where U.S. officials provided a briefing on the punitive financial actions the United States had taken against Banco Delta Asia (BDA). Ri Gun, director of American affairs in the North Korean Foreign Ministry, pressed Washington to cease such efforts threatening that "under such pressure, we cannot return to the six-way talks."


5 July 2006
North Korea test fires multiple ballistic missiles over the Sea of Japan including a long-range Taepodong-2 that apparently failed or was aborted 42 seconds after it was launched according to U.S. White House and Pentagon officials. The other missiles launched are a mix of short-range Scud-C missiles and intermediate-range Rodong

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missiles. In reaction to the test, the Bush administration strongly condemns North Korea's activities as "provocations"; however North Korea's Foreign Ministry states that the missile tests were "irrelevant to the sixparty talks."


15 July 2006
The United Nations Security Council adopts a resolution condemning North Korea's missile launches and imposing limited sanctions. Resolution 1695 demands that North Korea suspend its ballistic missile program, and calls on all countries to prevent North Korea from receiving or transferring missile-related items. Furthermore, the resolution "strongly urges" North Korea to abandon its nuclear program and to return to the Six-Party Talks.


19 August 2006
The director of South Korea's National Intelligence Service, Kim Seung-kyu, stated that North Korea was capable of conducting an underground nuclear test. Speaking at a closed-door briefing to the National Assembly, Director Kim said that "North Korea is believed to have facilities for a nuclear test" and that "the possibility of [a] nuclear test is always open as soon as Kim Jong-il makes a decision."


24 September 2006
After meeting with North Korea officials in Pyongyang, U.S. scholar Selig S. Harrison states that North Korea intends to unload fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor and extract plutonium earlier than had been expected. Harrison quotes North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan as saying that the fuel rods would be unloaded this fall.


3 October 2006
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement declaring that it plans to conduct a nuclear test. The statement cites "the extreme threat of a nuclear war and U.S. sanctions and pressure" as the reason for North Korea having to bolster its nuclear deterrent. The statement did not specify when the test would take place.


6 October 2006

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
The United Nations Security Council issues a statement urging North Korea not to carry out a planned nuclear weapon test saying that such action would "jeopardize peace, stability and security in the region and beyond."

9 October 2006
North Korea conducts an underground nuclear test. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) releases a report confirming the nuclear test and states that the test was "conducted with [100 percent] indigenous wisdom and technology." The U.N. Security Council holds an emergency meeting, strongly condemning North Korea's test, and vows to enact a "strong and swift" response.
—"DPRK Successfully Conducts Underground Nuclear Test," KCNA website, 9 October 2006, www.kcna.co.jp;

11 October 2006
In a meeting with Kyodo News delegation at Pyongyang's Mansudae Assembly Hall, Kim Yong-nam, president of the DPRK Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, stated that "the issue of future nuclear tests is linked to U.S. policy towards our country." He also stated that North Korea's return to the Six-Party Talks will also depend on U.S. policy towards North Korea.

14 October 2006
The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopts a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter condemning North Korea's nuclear test of October 9, 2006. Resolution 1718 bans the transfer of nuclear or ballistic missile materials and imposes an embargo on luxury goods to North Korea. It further demands that no further tests or ballistic missile launches take place and calls on North Korea to immediately return to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

31 October 2006
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and his North Korean counterpart Kim Kye-gwan hold secret talks in Beijing under the auspices of the Chinese government, where North Korea agrees to return to the Six-Party Talks. After the meeting, U.S. officials downplay the suggestion that North Korea's recent nuclear test would now make negotiations more difficult. According to a statement by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice: "Nobody accepts that [North Korea is] a nuclear power."

18-22 December 2006
The second phase of the fifth round of Six-Party Talks resume in Beijing after a 13-month break. After holding five days of negotiations, the talks recess without achieving any tangible progress. North Korea insists that the issue of

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the frozen funds at Banco Delta Asia (BDA) needs to be resolved. The Chairman's Statement at the close of the session states that the six parties "agreed to recess to report to capitals and to reconvene at the earliest opportunity."


2005

5 January 2005

Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, says the United States should not even "dream" of North Korean disarmament while the two nations have hostile relations.


5 January 2005

International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei tells Reuters that the North Korean nuclear program poses the greatest proliferation threat to the world and is worsening.


6 January 2005

White House spokesman Scott McClellan says at a press briefing that "it is in North Korea's interest" to resume the Six-Party Talks as soon as possible.


8 January 2005

U.S. Congressman Tom Lantos (D-CA), the ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Committee, visits Pyongyang to discuss the DPRK's nuclear program and human rights issues. Lantos sponsored the North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004.


8 January 2005

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
A DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman says the United States, which has a "hostile policy" towards the DPRK, is wholly responsible for the nuclear issue deadlock.


11 January 2005
U.S. Congressman Tom Lantos returns from his visit to Pyongyang and says he told North Korean officials that it is in their country's interest to return to the Six-Party Talks. Included among the officials Lantos met with were Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan.


13 January 2005
Japanese Defense Agency Director General Yoshinori Ono meets with South Korean Minister of Defense Yun Kwang-ung and both reaffirm their commitments to continue to work towards resuming the Six-Party Talks at an early date.


11-14 January 2005
A congressional delegation led by U.S. Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA), vice chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, visits Pyongyang to discuss North Korea's nuclear weapons program with the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly Kim Yong-nam, Foreign Minister Paek Nam-Sun, and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan. Weldon states that he and his delegation emphasized to the North Koreans the United States' commitment to a peaceful resolution of the nuclear crisis.


14 January 2005
The DPRK's official Korean Central News Agency says North Korea will return to the Six-Party Talks if U.S. President George W. Bush pursues a more friendly policy towards the DPRK.

—"N.K to Treat U.S. as "Friend' If It Ceases to Intervene: KCNA," Yonhap News Agency, 14 January 2005, in Lexis-
14 January 2005
U.S. Department of State spokesman Richard Boucher says the United States hopes that North Korea's recent statements about returning to the Six-Party Talks "do, indeed, presage a return to the talks."

18 January 2005
U.S. Congressman Curt Weldon reportedly says to Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda and Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi that North Korea will return to the Six-Party Talks in early February, provided that U.S. government leaders refrain from "inflammatory rhetoric."

18 January 2005
Newly appointed U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says the DPRK can receive multinational security assurances in exchange for abandoning its nuclear weapons.

24 January 2005
According to Japan's Nihon Keizai Shimbun, China is encouraging the DPRK to admit the existence of its uranium enrichment activities for nuclear weapons development.

26 January 2005
Libyan President Moammar Gadhafi (Mu'ammar al Qadhafi) urges North Korea and Iran to follow Libya's example and give up nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction programs.

27 January 2005
Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda says Japan "will make a strong appeal" to address the issue of abductions of Japanese nationals at the next round of the Six-Party Talks.
27 January 2005
Japan's TV Asahi airs part of an interview with Hwang Chang-yŏp, the highest ranking North Korean defector in South Korea. Hwang reportedly says that before leaving North Korea he heard from a senior official in the military industry department of the Korean Workers' Party Central Committee that North Korea had reached an agreement with another country to build nuclear weapons by producing enriched uranium.

28 January 2005
Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko denies media reports that North Korea may have purchased nuclear weapons from states of the former Soviet Union.

2 February 2005
U.S. President George W. Bush says the United States is working "to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions" during the State of the Union Address. The statement, which marks the beginning of his second term as president, is perceived to be less confrontational than previous statements.

2 February 2005
According to articles in the New York Times and Washington Post, scientific tests conducted at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory have led U.S. officials to conclude that nearly two tons of uranium hexafluoride sold to Libya, which can be enriched and used in a nuclear device, most likely originated from North Korea.

2-3 February 2005
Michael Green, U.S. Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, visits Seoul to meet with Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon, Deputy Foreign Minister Song Min-soon, and Deputy Secretary-General of the National Security Council Lee Jong-seok to discuss resuming the Six-Party Talks and the two tons of uranium hexafluoride believed to have been transferred from North Korea to Libya.

3 February 2005
The Washington Post reports that unnamed U.S. and IAEA officials say evidence linking North Korea to uranium sold to Libya is inconclusive and Pakistan instead may have been the real source of proliferation.
9 February 2005
Michael Green, U.S. Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, travels to Beijing and delivers a letter from U.S. President George W. Bush to Chinese President Hu Jintao that urges China to apply greater diplomatic pressure on North Korea to disarm its nuclear weapons program.

10 February 2005
A North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman announces that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons for "self-defense" and will be suspending its participation in the Six-Party Talks indefinitely due to the U.S. administration's hostile policy towards the DPRK. The spokesman specifically mentions U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's reference to the DPRK as an "outpost of tyranny" and President George W. Bush's State of the Union Address that includes the ultimate objective of "ending tyranny in our world."

10 February 2005
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan urges North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks to resolve the nuclear issue.

10 February 2005
U.S. Whitehouse Spokesman Scott McClellan says the United States will continue to pursue "a peaceful, diplomatic solution" to the nuclear crisis, and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice urged North Korea to return to negotiations rather than risk "further international isolation."

10 February 2005
South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon says he is disappointed with North Korea's announcement that it is suspending its participation in the Six-Party talks. Ban says he expects China to play a more "positive" role in persuading the DPRK back to the negotiating table.

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10 February 2005
Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Alexander Yakovenko says Russia "regrets" the DPRK's decision to suspend the Six-Party Talks but still feels that the nuclear issue should be resolved through the six-way forum.

11 February 2005
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi says bringing North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks will still be first priority for Japan to deal with the nuclear crisis.

11 February 2005
North Korea's Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Han Sŏng-ryŏl says a U.S. decision to conduct direct bilateral negotiations with the DPRK would be perceived as "a signal that the United States is changing its hostile policy," giving North Korea the necessary impetus to rejoin the Six-Party Talks.

11 February 2005
U.S. White House Spokesman Scott McClellan states Washington will not negotiate bilaterally with North Korea but adds that "there's plenty of opportunity for North Korea to speak directly with us in the context of the Six-Party Talks."

12 February 2005
Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing tells U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice via telephone that Beijing will work with all relevant parties to resume the Six-Party Talks as soon as possible.

14 February 2005
South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reaffirm their commitment to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis within the Six-Party Talks and to increase diplomatic efforts to bring North Korea back to the negotiations as soon as possible "without any preconditions."

14 February 2005
South Korean Unification Minister Chōng Dong-yŏng says to the National Assembly that North Korea's 10 February statement of possession of nuclear weapons "does not make North Korea a nuclear armed state."

16 February 2005
A bipartisan six-member delegation of the U.S. Congress, which was led by Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) to the January 2005 visit to Pyongyang, sends a letter to the DPRK Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly Kim Yŏng-nam urging North Korea to reconsider its decision to suspend its participation in the Six-Party Talks.

17 February 2005
Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing and Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura consult and agree that both countries should work together to convince North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks. Machimura says he expects "a significant role by China" to help bring North Korea back to the negotiations.

17 February 2005
South Korean Ambassador to China Kim Ha-chung says that China has much greater leverage over North Korea than is currently employed or realized.

18 February 2005
At a Korea University breakfast, U.S. envoy to the Six-Party Talks Christopher Hill says China and the United States are in absolute agreement in the goal of bringing North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks.

19 February 2005
North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Han Sŏng-ryŏl says the DPRK will return to the Six-Party Talks if Washington promises peaceful coexistence and noninterference in Pyongyang's internal affairs.

**19 February 2005**

Following a meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura and Japanese Defense Agency Chief Yoshinori Ono (also known as the "two plus two" talks), Rice says the group urges North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks to end its nuclear programs. Rice says North Korea should return to the talks "so that people don't have to contemplate other measures."


**19-22 February 2005**

China's special envoy to North Korea Ning Fukui and other officials travel to Pyongyang to discuss resuming the Six-Party Talks with the DPRK Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly Kim Yong-nam and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il. North Korean officials say they will return to the Six-Party Talks if the United States shows "trustworthy sincerity."


**24 February 2005**

South Korea's National Intelligence Service says in a report to the National Assembly's Intelligence Committee that they believe North Korea does not possess any nuclear bombs made with highly enriched uranium (HEU), and that North Korea has not reached the stage of building a large-scale uranium enrichment plant.


**26 February 2005**

Top negotiators to the Six-Party Talks Christopher Hill of the United States, Kenichiro Sase of Japan and Song Minsun of South Korea meet in Seoul to discuss the resumption of negotiations and ways to urge North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks.


**28 February 2005**

The Kyodo News Service reports that North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il gave four conditions for North Korea's return to the Six-Party Talks to the head of the Chinese Communist Party's International Department Wang Jiarui during the talks.

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the 19-22 February meeting in Pyongyang. The four conditions for the United States are a security guarantee, reasons for labeling North Korea an "outpost of tyranny," willingness to negotiate on an equal basis, and the ability to demonstrate trustworthiness through its actions.

1 March 2005
According to the Kyodo World Service North Korean leader Kim Jong-il tells Chinese Communist Party International Department head Wang Jiarui that the DPRK has produced nuclear weapons and that North Korea possessing them is "not something new that happened yesterday or today." The Chinese Foreign Ministry declines to comment on the matter.

2 March 2005
South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon says during his weekly press briefing that if North Korea returns to the Six-Party Talks, the DPRK will be able to negotiate one-on-one with the United States within the framework of the multilateral discussions.

2 March 2005
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a rare memorandum outlining the DPRK's position on the Six-Party Talks. The memorandum explains why North Korea feels that currently there are "no grounds whatsoever to sit face to face with the United States, whether it is at the Six-Party Talks or DPRK-U.S. bilateral talks." The memorandum outlines what the United States must do in order to resume the multilateral negotiations over North Korea's nuclear issue. A spokesperson for the DPRK says that North Korea "will go to the talks any time if the U.S. takes a trustworthy sincere attitude and moves to provide conditions and justification for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks."

2 March 2005
Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf says that former nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan "may have given some centrifuges or know-how [to North Korea] but they developed their nuclear programs from Western technology."

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6 March 2005
Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing says that while China remains committed to the peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula it also believes that "the legitimate concerns of the DPRK should be addressed." Li also says that the North Korean leadership has stated that they are "ready and willing to continue to participate in the Six-Party Talks." Li remains noncommittal on China’s stance towards the existence of a secret North Korean uranium enrichment program, only saying to reporters "I don’t know anything more than you do."

7 March 2005
An article in the Asahi Shimbun cites unnamed Japanese government officials who say that the United States handed over to the Japanese government significant test result evidence that allegedly proves North Korea exported uranium hexafluoride to Libya. The article also says that during his meeting with Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Hosoda Hiroyuki and other officials that the U.S. National Security Council’s Asia director Michael Green revealed that North Korea had exported the uranium to Libya through Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan nuclear black market.

8 March 2005
White House Spokesman Scott McClellan reiterates the U.S. position that Washington will not have bilateral negotiations with North Korea outside of the Six-Party Talks framework.

9 March 2005
According to newly appointed South Korean ambassador to the United States, Hong Seok-hyon, U.S. President George W. Bush said in a meeting with Hong that Washington would like to see China take on a larger role in resolving the Korean Peninsula nuclear crisis because the PRC has "lots of leverage" with which to persuade North Korea. Hong says that Bush also indicated a willingness on the part of the United States to reach a "give and take" deal with North Korea.

9 March 2005
Newly appointed U.S Assistant Secretary of State and lead U.S. envoy to the Six-Party Talks Christopher Hill says during a policy discussion at the National Strategy Institute in Seoul that North Korea will have to make a fundamental decision between giving up its nuclear weapons or facing international isolation. Hill states that the United States will not negotiate bilaterally with North Korea outside the Six-Party Talks framework, but should the DPRK return to the discussions that Washington will engage Pyongyang’s concerns with "passion and creativity." Hill also says that the Six-Party Talks could serve as the basis for a multilateral relationship between the Northeast

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Asian countries once the nuclear issue has been resolved.

10 March 2005
The European Union (EU) Parliament passes a resolution calling on the EU to be included as a seventh member in the Six-Party Talks.

11 March 2005
In response to the European Union's 10 March resolution to join the Six-Party Framework, an unnamed government source tells the Yonhap News Agency that both the South Korean and U.S. governments have reservations about EU participation in the talks.

11 March 2005
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says in an interview with Reuters news service that North Korea is "throwing up smoke screens" in reference to North Korea's decision to stall returning to the Six-Party Talks until Washington gives up its "hostile policy" towards Pyongyang. Rice says in an interview with the Washington Times that the United States has to be careful about "front-loading incentives" with North Korea since Pyongyang "took the carrots... and started breaking their obligations," under the 1994 Agreed Framework.

11 March 2005
A spokesperson for the Russian Embassy in Seoul says that Russian Atomic Energy deputy head Sergei Antipov 10 March statements about North Korea not possessing nuclear weapons is Antipov's personal opinion and does not reflect Russia's official position. However the spokesperson did not go so far as to say that Russia believes that the DPRK possesses nuclear weapons.

15 March 2005
A spokesperson for the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs says that North Korea will bolster its nuclear arsenal in response to the "hostile" joint U.S.-ROK military exercises planned for the weekend.

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17 March 2005
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director, Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, tells a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that the DIA has assessed that the DPRK is not likely to surrender all of his nuclear weapon capabilities.

18-21 March 2005
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice goes on a tour of Northeast Asia to coordinate efforts to resume the Six-Party Talks with Japan, South Korea and China. While in Tokyo, Rice meets with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura where the two top diplomats agree on the need for China to play a greater role in persuading North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons. While in Seoul Rice meets with ROK Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon and Unification Minister Chung Dong-young. Ban praises Rice's description of North Korea as a "sovereign state" and her assurance that the United States has no intention to attack the DPRK, saying that he believes those statements are "good in creating an atmosphere for resuming the Six-Party Talks." In a joint news conference with Ban, Rice reiterates the U.S. position that North Korea can talk directly with the United States within the framework of the multilateral negotiations. In Beijing, Rice meets with Chinese President Hu Jintao. Hu emphasizes China's firm commitment to solving the nuclear issue. Rice expresses to Hu the importance of China's role for making progress on the negotiations. At a press conference in Beijing at the end of her Asia tour, Rice says that the U.S. will use "other means" for pressing North Korea to disarm its nuclear weapons should the Six-Party Talks fail.

20 March 2005
An article in the Washington Post rebuts the 2 February news story that cited U.S. intelligence officials claiming that North Korea had sold uranium hexafluoride to Libya. The news article says that it was Pakistan not North Korea who directly sold the uranium to Libya. The article further alleges that U.S. officials misled South Korea, Japan and China about North Korea's role in the transaction in an effort to get those countries to step up their pressure on the DPRK.
23 March 2005
Despite increasing domestic political pressure to impose sanctions on North Korea due to the DPRK's lack of cooperation on the abductee issue, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi says he will hold off on imposing sanctions on Pyongyang because he believes North Korea will come back to the Six-Party Talks.

22-27 March 2005
North Korean Premier Pak Pong-ju travels to China for six days where he meets with top Chinese officials including President Hu Jintao, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and Jia Qinglin, Politburo member and chairman of the People's Political Consultative Conference. On the first day of his visit Pak tells Wen that the DPRK has never opposed nor abandoned the Six-Party Talks and that North Korea will return when the conditions are right. Wen encourages North Korea to rejoin the talks, calling it "the realistic choice" for resolving the current standoff.

31 March 2005
An unnamed spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry tells the Korean Central News Agency says that the DPRK believes the Six-Party Talks should be converted to a forum for arms reduction.

1 April 2005
Top U.S. envoy to the Six-Party Talks Christopher Hill calls North Korea's recent statement about making the multilateral negotiations into arms reduction talks "not serious."

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2 April 2005
An editorial in the North Korean government's official paper, the Minju Joson restates the DPRK's opposition to Japanese participation in the Six-Party Talks.

2-5 April 2005
According to anonymous sources North Korean Vice Minister Kang Sok-ju arrives in Beijing with four other DPRK officials on a secretive visit to discuss resuming the Six-Party Talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, vice foreign ministers Ning Fukui and Dai Bingguo, and senior Communist Party official Wang Jiarui. During the visit Kang reportedly asked for a face-saving gesture from the other five parties in order to return to the negotiations.

4 April 2005
An editorial in the Rodong Sinmun, the official publication of the Korean Workers Party, says that "the state of confrontation between the [DPRK] and the United States is becoming extremely volatile," and that North Korea also has "the right to choose a preemptive attack option."

5 April 2005
At the start of a seven day visit within the United States, South Korean Vice Minister for Unification Yi Pong-cho says that U.S. is at fault for creating Pyongyang's anxiety that Washington is planning to overthrow the North Korean regime. Yi also says that American distrust of North Korea is not supported with specific evidence.

6 April 2005
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian affairs and top U.S. envoy to the Six-Party Talks, Christopher Hill, says that the United States has evidence that uranium that ended up in Libya originated in North Korea. Hill explains that the uranium made its way to Libya through the A.Q. Khan nuclear black market.
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newspaper *Asahi Shimbun* cites unnamed sources who claim that U.S. satellite images of the North Korean nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and other intelligence have lead U.S. officials to believe the facility has been shut down.


18 April 2005

In light of speculation that North Korea may begin reprocessing spent fuel, Whitehouse spokesperson Scott McClellan says at a press briefing that the United States would talk with its regional allies and that referring North Korea to the U.N. Security Council is "certainly one possibility."


19 April 2005

South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon responds to recent remarks from the Whitehouse about referring North Korea to the U.N. Security Council by saying that he felt that the comments were intended "to remind that there is such a procedure" not to imply "there is such a possibility."


21 April 2005

Responding to a growing perception that the U.S. is moving towards more coercive options to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, Whitehouse spokesperson Scott McClellan reaffirms the U.S. "focus on getting North Korea back to the talks."


21 April 2005

Pyongyang's AP Television News quotes a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying that if Washington refers North Korea to the U.N. Security Council and sanctions were imposed, the DPRK would regard this as a "declaration of war."


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23 April 2005
At the Asia-Africa summit held in Jakarta, Indonesia, South Korean Prime Minister Lee Kang-jin meets with chairman of North Korea's Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly Kim Yong-nam. During the meeting Kim is quoted as saying that North Korea will return to the multilateral negotiations over its nuclear weapons program "if the environment of the six-nation talks is fully matured."

26-29 April 2005
Amid speculation that North Korea may soon perform a nuclear test, the United States senior negotiator to the Six-Party Talks Christopher Hill meets with South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and top nuclear envoy Song Minsoo, in order to discuss resuming the negotiations. After his visit to Seoul, Hill travels to Beijing and then to Tokyo. In China Hill meets with Chinese Vice foreign ministers Dai Bingguo, Yang Jiechi and Wu Daiwei and reiterates the U.S. commitment to the Six-Party Talks. In Japan Hill meets with Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi and both officials agreed on the need to get North Korea back to the talks and invigorate the process. Hill also meets with Tokyo’s top envoy to the Six-Party Talks, Kenichiro Sasae and Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda. After traveling to Japan and China, Hill returns to South Korea where he meets with Unification Minister Chung Dongyoung and later at a news conference warns that North Korea may be preparing for a nuclear test.

29-30 April 2005
At a press conference U.S. President George W. Bush labels North Korean leader Kim Jong-il "a dangerous person." Bush goes on to say that while the Six-Party Talks is the ideal venue for resolving the nuclear crisis he would not rule out pursuing U.N. sanctions or other options. In response, the North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement which labels Bush a "hooligan bereft of personality" and declares that "the DPRK does not expect any solution to the nuclear issue...during his term."

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4 May 2005
South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon says at a weekly press briefing that the situation surrounding the currently stalled Six-Party Talks has "reached a level that is worthy of considerable concern" and that North Korea needs to resume the negotiations "without sticking to unreasonable arguments."


4 May 2005
Kyodo World Service reports that unnamed sources say that U.S. envoy to the Six-Party Talks Christopher Hill was told during his April trip to China, Japan and South Korea that North Korea would return to the talks if the United States referred to North Korea as a sovereign state and treat the DPRK as an equal negotiating partner.


4 May 2005
At a speech at the 2005 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference South Korean deputy foreign minister for policy planning Chun Young-woo states that North Korea must make a "strategic decision to dismantle once and for all its entire nuclear weapons program" in order for there to be a "breakthrough in the Six-Party Talks."


6 May 2005
After meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing during a ministerial session of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon says of resuming the Six-Party Talks that "it's important that China continues to exert efforts. China is aware of its role." The two foreign ministers said that they would work to quickly resume the currently stalled Six-Party Talks.


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8 May 2005
International Atomic Energy Agency head Mohamed ElBaradei says that he estimates North Korea has developed as many as six nuclear weapons.

9 May 2005
During a trip to Moscow U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice repeats her earlier statement that the United States recognizes North Korea as a sovereign state.

10 May 2005
Osaka University Professor of Economics and Law Yasuhiko Yoshida tells ROK newspaper JoongAng Ilbo that during a recent trip to North Korea that he was told by the DPRK deputy head of the Institute for Disarmament and Peace Pak Hyo'chae that a "plutonium-based nuclear test is unavoidable."

10 May 2005
The DPRK's Rodong Sinmun, the official publication of the Korean Worker's Party, issues a statement calling U.S. reports of a possible North Korean nuclear test "one-sided."

10 May 2005
U.S. envoy to the Six-Party Talks Christopher Hill says in an interview that the United States does not note "question North Korea's status as a sovereign state" and has "no intention of attacking North Korea."

11 May 2005
A spokesman for the North Korean Ministry of Foreign affairs announces that the DPRK has finished removing 8000 fuel rods from its 5 megawatt nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lee Kyuhyung responds by saying that the DPRK announcement aggravates the current Korean Peninsula crisis. Whitehouse spokesperson Scott McClellan calls the DPRK claim "provocative statements" which "only further
isolates North Korea." Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi calls North Korea's remarks "gamesmanship" and says the most important thing is to convince North Korea it is in its own best interest to dismantle its nuclear weapons program.


11 May 2005
In an interview, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice refers to North Korea as a "terrible regime" and says the U.S. administration is going to "shine a light" on the starvation of its people and the prison labor camps in the DPRK.


12 May 2005
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Kong Quan responds to U.S. calls to exert greater pressure on North Korea to get Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party Talks by saying that Beijing "in principle...is not in favor of exerting pressure" or "resorting to sanctions to resolve international conflicts."


12 May 2005
South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon says in a telephone interview with ROK cable news channel YTN that "the government has grave concerns about the worsening situation," with respect to North Korea's recent announcement that it has removed 8000 fuel rods from its Yongbyon nuclear reactor.


13 May 2005
A U.S. government official (believed to be U.S. special envoy to the Six-Party Talks Joseph DeTrani) meets with a DPRK government official at North Korea's permanent mission to the United Nations in New York. According to White House National Security Council spokesperson Frederick Jones the purpose of the meeting was to tell Pyongyang "that it is time for [the North Koreans] to return to the Six-Party Talks."


16 May 2005
During talks between the ROK and the DPRK, chief South Korean delegate Yi Pong-cho says that Seoul told

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Pyongyang that South Korea will "make important proposals for practical gains in talks aimed at resolving the nuclear issue," if North Korea returns to the Six-Party Talks.


18 May 2005
An editorial on North Korea's Urinimjokkkiri website states that because the DPRK has withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) "it is nobody's concern but ours to decide on what to do with the spent fuel rods extracted from the experimental nuclear reactor."
— Ch'oe Ch'ang-il, "Dog's Tail Cannot Turn into a Weasel's Tail Even in Three Years," Urinimjokkkiri website, 18 May 2005, in OSC Document ID KPP20050518000047.

21 May 2005
According to Radio Free Asia, U.S. Republican congressman Curt Weldon says that North Korea "will come to the nuclear talks if the U.S. lowers its level of denunciation" against Kim Jong-il and "conveys a message ... that Washington will recognize the North's system and is willing to hold talks with the North." Weldon led a congressional delegation that visited North Korea in January 2005.

23 May 2005
South Korean Grand National Party (GNP) spokesperson Chun Yu-ok says that Wang Jiarui from the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee told GNP chairperson Pak Ku'n-hye the content of his January meetings with North Korean officials in Pyongyang over the DPRK's nuclear weapons program. Wang told Pak that he attempted to persuade the North Koreans to return to the Six-Party Talks and told Pyongyang there would be rewards if it dismantled its nuclear weapons.

24 May 2005
An editorial in Minju Joson, North Korea's cabinet newspaper, argues that the DPRK's "possession of nuclear weapons is the best option to safeguard our dignity from the escalating U.S. nuclear maneuver to crush the Republic (North Korea) and realize a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula."

24 May 2005
According to South Korea's Yonhap News Agency, a high level ROK Foreign Ministry official was told that China will

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veto taking North Korea to the United Nations Security Council if the Six-Party Talks are unsuccessful. Meanwhile Japan's Kyodo World Service reported that Chinese officials warned Pyongyang of "grave consequences" if the DPRK performs a nuclear test.


25 May 2005
South Korean Grand National Party Representative Pak Chin says that China has told the United States that South Korea's appeasement policy is undermining attempts to bring North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks.

26 May 2005
During testimony to a House International Committee top U.S. envoy to the Six-Party Talks, Christopher Hill, says in reference to China's role in bringing North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks that Beijing "should be able to convince their very close friend to come to the table. And they haven't done it."

30 May 2005
In an interview on U.S. television, U.S. Vice-President Richard Cheney calls on China to exert greater leverage in bringing North Korea back to the negotiating table, saying that "the Chinese need to understand that it's incumbent upon them to be major players here."

30 May 2005
Sources tell Japan's Jiji Press that during his visit to Beijing in April 2005, North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju told Chinese officials that the DPRK had made a major decision with regards to its nuclear program.

1 June 2005
Kenichiro Sasae and Christopher Hill, top envoys to the Six-Party Talks for Japan and the United States, meet and agree to deal with North Korea flexibly if the DPRK returns to the multilateral negotiations.

2 June 2005
Amidst much speculation that North Korea may perform a nuclear test, sources reveal to the Japan Economic Newswire that China has warned the DPRK it will consider stopping food aid if it goes through with the test.

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6 June 2005
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi says to reporters in Aichi prefecture that he believes that North Korea wants to resolve the nuclear issue through the Six-Party framework "by all means."

7 June 2005
An editorial in the Rodong Sinmun, the official publication of the Korean Workers' Party, says that now that North Korea has become a nuclear power the purpose of the Six-Party Talks should be changed to nuclear disarmament by all parties.

6-8 June 2005
On 6 June North Korean ambassador to the United Nations Pak Gil Yon and U.S. special envoy to the Six-Party Talks Joseph DeTrani meet in New York to discuss resuming the multilateral negotiations. U.S State Department spokesperson Sean McCormack says that Pak informed the DeTrani that the DPRK would come back to the Six-Party Talks but did not specify a particular date. The Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun cites anonymous U.S. and DPRK sources who disclosed that Pak told DeTrani that North Korea deserves "treatment as a nuclear nation" during their meeting. Meanwhile, on 8 June, top Chinese envoy to the Six-Party Talks Wang Guangya says that the negotiations could begin again within weeks.

8 June 2005
North Korea's top envoy to the Six-Party Talks, Kim Kye-kwan, says in an interview with a U.S. television network that the DPRK has enough nuclear bombs to defend against a U.S. attack. Kim answered "yes" when he was asked if North Korea was building additional nuclear weapons.

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9 June 2005
Speaking in regards to the North Korean nuclear weapons program, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Jianchao states that Beijing "is not aware of the situation." Liu also goes on to say China hopes that "all relevant parties will make constructive efforts at once to promote the resumption of the Six-Party Talks as soon as possible."

10 June 2005
U.S. President George W. Bush meets with South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun at the White House. After their meeting Bush tells reporters that "South Korea and the United States share the same goal, and that is a Korean Peninsula with no nuclear weapons." Roh notes that "there are one or two minor issues, but I'm certain we will be able to work them out with dialogue." However, he goes on to say that the two presidents had "reconfirmed that we have no basic differences on the issue, and we completely agreed to the basic principles, and are continuously discussing various problems that occur in the process of negotiations."

14 June 2005
South Korean National Security Council senior official Yi Chong-so'k clarifies a statement that South Korean President made to reporters on 10 June 2005 after his summit meeting with U.S. President George W. Bush. At the time Roh said that there were minor issues between the U.S and the ROK. Yi explains to a parliamentary defense committee that the differences Roh was referring to were on U.S. plans for its troops stationed in South Korea, not differences over how to resolve the Korean peninsula nuclear crisis.

15 June 2005
The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee holds a hearing entitled "North Korea: An Update on the Six-Party Talks and Matters Related to the Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis." U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Christopher Hill and Special Envoy to the Six-Party Talks Joseph DeTrani both provide testimony. Hill testifies that diplomacy is the best way to resolve the current nuclear crisis but acknowledged that the United

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States is also considering other options. Hill and DeTrani say that Washington has received support from the other participant countries in bringing North Korea back to the negotiations. Hill, however, also says that China is not exerting all the leverage that it could on Pyongyang.


17 June 2005

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il meets with South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong-young and says that the DPRK will return to the Six-Party Talks if the United States recognizes and respects the North Korean government. According to Chung, Kim says that North Korea does need to possess nuclear weapons and that Kim "has a friendly feeling towards the United States." U.S State Department spokesperson Adam Ereli responds to Kim's announcement that the DPRK could return to the Six-Party Talks in July by saying that the United States is looking for "actually getting back to the talks and engaging substantively."


18 June 2005

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is skeptical of Kim Jong-il's statements about returning to the Six-Party Talks in July noting that it could be a diplomatic strategy.


20 June 2005

In an interview on U.S. television, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice states that "the North Koreans love to make excuses for why they can't come back to the Six-Party Talks. The reason they don't want to come to the Six-Party Talks is they don't like facing China and Russia and Japan and South Korea and the United States telling them in a concerted fashion that it's time to get rid of their ... nuclear weapons."


21 June 2005

U.S Under Secretary of State Paula Dobriansky calls North Korea "an outpost of tyranny" during a forum speech arranged by the Hudson Institute. Meanwhile at an international conference in Brussels U.S Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice makes a similar comment about the DPRK. South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon responds to the Rice and Dobriansky's comments noting that they would not "help create an atmosphere of dialogue."


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22 June 2005
According to a report by South Korea's Yonhap News Agency, on 3 November 2002 former Washington Post reporter Don Oberdorfer and former U.S. ambassador to Seoul Donald Gregg received a letter to give to U.S. President George W. Bush on behalf of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. An excerpt of the letter reads: "If the United States recognizes our sovereignty and assures non-aggression, it is our view that we should be able to find a way to resolve the nuclear issue in compliance with the demand of a new century." Oberdorfer and Gregg reportedly passed the letter onto National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley on 7 November who then replied that the Bush administration would not "reward bad behavior." On 13 November 2005 the Bush administration declared that it would suspend all of its shipments of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK.

29 June 2005
U.S. President George W. Bush issues an executive order that freezes assets of North Korean entities that have been implicated in developing or spreading weapons of mass destruction. DPRK firms Tanchon Bank, Korea Mining Development Trading Corp. and Korea Ryonbong are designated under the executive order.

30 June 2005
The Japanese newspaper Nihon Keizai Shimbun reports that North Korea has resumed construction on a 50-megawatt and a 200-megawatt reactor located in Taechon. Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda says to reporters that Tokyo has not confirmed the newspaper’s report.

9-10 July 2005
North Korea agrees to return to the Six Party Talks to after, according to DPRK media, the United States agreed to recognize North Korea as a sovereign nation and not threaten North Korea. Washington also agreed to hold bilateral talks within the Six-Party framework. The fourth round of talks is set to begin on 26 July.

26-27 July 2005
North Korean delegate to the Six Party Talks rejected a U.S.-sponsored nuclear dismantlement proposal. North Korean delegate Kim Kye Gwan argued dismantling their nuclear weapons without assurances of regime security is unreasonable. North Korea calls on the other participants in the talks to lift economic sanctions and provide multilateral security assurances; after that DPRK would dismantle their nuclear program. The U.S. delegation persisted that North Korea must verifiably and irreversibly dismantle their nuclear program—both the plutonium and the uranium based programs. North Korea appears to be concerned about the sequencing of dismantlement—

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not wanting to lower their "deterrent" capability until they are assured that Washington does not plan to attack the North Korean regime. North Korea also wants normalization of relations between itself and the United States and Japan, and withdrawal of the nuclear umbrella over South Korea.


7 August 2005
The Six Party Talks will take a three week recess for the participating delegations to return to their capitals, assess positions, and formulate resolutions. The main challenge to a resolution is whether North Korea should be allowed to keep nuclear programs for peaceful civilian energy; namely, to develop light water reactors, which the United States and other talks participants opposed. Washington wants North Korea to cease all nuclear programs, and fears that a civilian nuclear energy program will be used to restart nuclear weapons. Other members were willing to accept their peaceful nuclear program on the condition that the DPRK rejoins the Nonproliferation Treaty.


14 August 2005
North Korea’s Chief Nuclear Negotiator Kim Gye Kwan reiterated that North Korea was not willing to give up their pursuit of non-military nuclear energy. However, they would accept international supervision of their nuclear energy program and were willing to return to the NPT.


21 August 2005
North Korea restarted their nuclear reactor in Yongbyon in July before they re-entered the Six Party Talks. U.S. spy satellites detected steam rising from the boiler connected to the nuclear reactor building.


13 September 2005
The Six Party Talks resume but remain in stalemate, with the North Koreans continuing to uphold the right to peaceful nuclear energy. The DPRK delegation also requested the construction of light water reactors previously promised under the 1994 Agreed Framework. The U.S. delegation refuses to agree to this. The North Korean side states that they would dismantle their graphite moderated reactors in return for the construction of light water reactors and oil shipments.


15 September 2005
US Treasury Department designates Banco Delta SARL a money laundering pawn for North Korea. The bank has supported North Korea multimillion dollar cash deposits and withdrawals. The bank facilitated criminal activities of the DPRK government and front companies including circulating counterfeit currency and handling bank transactions for drug trafficking. The U.S. Treasury prohibited U.S. financial institutions from business transactions in the U.S. or for the Banco Delta bank.

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19 September 2005
The six delegations agree to the Statement of Principles. In this agreement, North Korea will abandon nuclear weapons and their existing nuclear programs. According to the agreement, "The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy." The DPRK also agrees to return to the Non Proliferation Treaty, abide by IAEA safeguards and inspections. In return North Korea will receive concessions including steps to normalize relations with Japan and the United States, and assurance that the United States will not attack North Korea conventionally or with nuclear weapons. North Korea will also receive economic aid and large amounts of energy assistance from South Korea. The six nations will meet again in November to discuss how they will reach the aims of the agreement. The terms of the agreement are to be carried out in a commitment for commitment, where all parties provide their concessions on a step by step basis.

20 September 2005
After North Korea agreed to the Six Party Talk's agreement, North Korea demands the construction of a civil nuclear power reactor before they begin dismantling their civil and military nuclear facilities.

4 October 2005
Chief negotiator at the Six Party Talks, Christopher Hill, met with North Korean officials at the UN Mission in New York. This is the first time since North Korea agreed to dismantle their nuclear arsenal that the two nations representatives have spoken. North Korea states it will dismantle its nuclear weapons program after it receives Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) for their civilian energy programs. The U.S. Delegation maintains that a peaceful nuclear energy program will receive assistance only after North Korea dismantles their nuclear weapons arsenal. The issue of sequencing of various obligations was set on the agenda of issues to discuss at the upcoming fifth round of negotiations.

20 October 2005
Governor Bill Richardson visits North Korea and tours the Yongbyon nuclear facility. Richardson speaks with the plant director and learns that the reactor was refueled in April and had reprocessed 8000 spent fuel rods. The North Koreans tell Richardson that they were willing to rejoin the NPT. The governor states that the North Korean appeared to be promoting transparency and was hopeful for the next round of the Six Party Talks.

9 November 2005
The fifth round of the Six Party Talks begins. The fifth round of negotiations are held in two stages. The first stage held from Wednesday to Friday where the actors will outline their recommendations. Bilateral meeting will follow. Challenges that emerge during the first stage of the talks will be discussed at the informal APEC summit in Pusan.

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South Korea. DPRK emphasized simultaneous action and renunciation of nuclear weapons programs in exchange for light water nuclear reactor. The US would not supply light water reactors until the Korean Peninsula is denuclearized, DPRK rejoins the NPT and accepts IAEA inspections.


11 November 2005
The fifth round of Six Party Talks will recess for diplomats to attend the APEC summit in South Korea. No progress has been made in negotiating on the denuclearization of North Korea. U.S. and North Korean negotiators agreed to meet again but do not set another date to resume talks. Structural challenges emerged over U.S. sanctions on North Korean firms accused of proliferating weapons of mass destruction, and counterfeiting U.S. dollars. North Korea requested a removal of sanctions placed on these firms, while U.S. was pushing for North Korea to halt plutonium production.


14 November 2005
North Korea proposed a five stage plan for dismantling their nuclear weapons. North Korea would suspend nuclear testing, transfer of nuclear technology, and shut down the production of nuclear weapons. They would allow outside inspections and dismantle nuclear weapons before returning to the NPT and accept IAEA safeguards. North Korea agreed to end their nuclear program in exchange for energy assistance and other benefits. However, North Korea has refused to dismantle their nuclear program until the US supplies a Light Water Reactor.


29 November 2005
U.S. government decides to finally terminate the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) project to build two light water reactors as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework. After the U.S. government and KEDO officially cancelled the project, North Korea demands compensation for the political and economic losses. North Korea claims the United States is violating the Agreed Framework which promised to build the light water reactors; the U.S. government countered that the North Koreans were covertly developing a uranium enrichment program which was contrary to the Agreed Framework.


11 December 2005
North Korea suspends its participation in the Six Party Talks for an indefinite period of time due to U.S. financial sanctions. The US blacklisted eight North Korean firms suspected of WMD proliferation.


12 December 2005
The North Korean government orders the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to withdraw all employees from the nuclear power reactor construction site by January 2006. KEDO is also told they are not allowed to repatriate the equipment and materials on the construction site.

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21 December 2005
North Korea announces the intended construction of light water reactors. They were also increasing the production of two graphite moderated reactors meant to extract weapons grade plutonium.

2004

1 January 2004
North Korea's three major newspapers, Rodong Sinmun, Chosŏn Inmin'gun and Ch'ŏngnyŏn Chŏnwi, release a joint editorial that says North Korea is willing to hold six-nation talks early this new year. But the editorial also warns that "we will always react with the toughest policy to the US hard-line policy."

1 January 2004
South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun says in his New Year's message to the nation, "I will do my best to lay a new foundation for peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula by peacefully resolving the North Korean nuclear problem."

1 January 2004
US Secretary of State Colin Powell says in a New York Times op-ed that the Bush administration will continue to pursue diplomacy within the six-nation framework to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. He also writes, "We seek peace and reconciliation on the Korean peninsula, but we will not reward threats from Pyongyang or provide incentive for blackmail."

6 January 2004
The Korean Central News Agency says the US should "de-list the DPRK as a sponsor of terrorism, lift political, economic and military sanctions," as well as "supply heavy oil, power and other energy resources to the DPRK" based on the principle of simultaneous actions. In return the DPRK "is set to refrain from testing and production of nuclear weapons and even stop operating the nuclear power industry used for peaceful purposes as first-phase

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measures in the package solution."

6 January 2004
US Secretary of State Colin Powell calls North Korea's offer to freeze its nuclear program a positive step for implying "that they would give up all aspects of their nuclear program, not just the weapons program."

6 January 2004
South Korea's Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Yoon Young-kwan *Yun Yŏng Gwan* says, "We positively evaluate the North Korean statement [released today to freeze nuclear activities] because it stated specifically what measure it would take, and confirmed once again its willingness to tackle the issue through dialogue."

6-10 January 2004
An unofficial delegation of five Americans visits North Korea. During the five-day trip, the group, which includes former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Siegfried S. Hecker and John W. Lewis of Stanford University, visits the nuclear complex in Yŏngbyŏn-kun, but they stress that their objective is not to inspect or negotiate on behalf of the US government. The North Koreans show Hecker a piece of metal that Hecker describes as having all the visible properties of plutonium, but Hecker does not have diagnostic equipment to completely verify that it is. The group also checks a few containers in the temporary storage pond containing 8,000 canned spent fuel rods, but the rods are empty.

7 January 2004
US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher responds to a Washington Post report that Fu Ying, head of the

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Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Asian Affairs Bureau, stated on 29 December 2003 that China did not believe North Korea has a clandestine uranium enrichment program by reiterating, "We certainly know North Korea has a highly enriched uranium program, and when confronted with that fact, North Korea admitted it."


9 January 2004
A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman dismisses Libya’s decision to abandon nuclear program as having nothing to do with the DPRK, stating that "to expect any 'change' from the DPRK [would be] foolish." He adds the decisions to allow intrusive inspections in Libya and Iran "only reinforce the DPRK's firm belief in the validity and vitality of its Sŏngun *military first* policy."


10 January 2004
A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says the DPRK showed the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex to Professor John W. Lewis and the American delegation to "ensure transparency as speculative reports and ambiguous information about [North Korea's] nuclear activities are throwing hurdles in the way of settling the pending nuclear issue."


10 January 2004
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan tells reporters that Chairman of the National People’s Congress Wu Bangguo offered economic aid to North Korea during a visit to Pyongyang in October 2003. While Kong declines to give details of the economic package, Japan’s Asahi Shimbun reports, "Beijing dangled the equivalent of $50 million in grant aid for North Korea to attend multilateral talks on its nuclear standoff [that took place in December 2003]."


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12 January 2004
An unidentified US source says a senior North Korean Foreign Ministry official expressed the DPRK’s intentions to address its nuclear weapons development and the issue of abductions of Japanese nationals separately. The intentions were reportedly expressed to the two Senate foreign policy aides of Sen. Richard Lugar and Sen. Joseph Biden, two of the five members of the unofficial US delegation that visited North Korea during 6-10 January.

20-21 January 2004
South Korea’s National Security Advisor Ra Jong Il meets with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi during a two-day visit to discuss the Six-Party Talks and bilateral issues. The two agree to continue seeking a peaceful solution under the six-way framework to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue.

21 January 2004
Siegfried Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, testifies before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and says that he spoke with several scientific, military and economic officials but did not see an actual weapon during his five-day visit to North Korea. He says he did observe a restarted 5MW(e) reactor [capable of yielding approximately 5.5 kg of plutonium per year], empty spent fuel canisters in pond for perhaps 8,000 fuel rods, and what appeared to be a plutonium metal sample.

21 January 2004
Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, attacks the US National Nuclear Security Administration’s decision to resume research into smaller nuclear weapons, saying, "The world is now on the verge of being embroiled in the second global arms race [due to the NNSA’s decision]."

21-22 January 2004
Mitoji Yabunaka, director general of the Asian and Oceanic Affairs Bureau in the Japanese Foreign Ministry, South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Su Hyŏk, and US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly meet in Washington

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to discuss the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, North Korea's proposal to freeze its nuclear weapons program in exchange for the resumption of heavy fuel oil supplies, and Japan's desire to include the abductions issue in the multilateral talks.


29 January 2004
Pakistan's Interior Minister Faisal Saleh Hayat denies that Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan is suspected of transferring nuclear technology or know-how to North Korea, Iran, or Libya, saying, "Dr. Khan is neither a suspect, nor in custody." The statement comes following the interrogation of nuclear scientists and officials that have linked Khan to nuclear proliferation.


30 January 2004
Australia sends a delegation of government officials to Pyongyang to urge the DPRK to restart the Six-Party Talks. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer says Australia is in a good position to persuade North Korean officials because it is one of the few countries that maintains diplomatic relations with North Korea even though Canberra is a close ally of Washington. Downer also says he believes the Six-Party Talks are "the most viable mechanism for finding a peaceful and a lasting solution to the nuclear issue."


31 January 2004
Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, referred to as "the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb," is removed from his position as advisor to the Pakistani government on nuclear affairs to "facilitate the ongoing investigations" into alleged nuclear proliferation to Iran, Libya and North Korea. The decision followed a meeting of Pakistan's Nuclear Command and Control Authority, headed by President Pervez Musharraf. Khan held his position as advisor since 2001.


1 February 2004
A Pakistani official says Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan admitted to having transferred nuclear technology to North Korea, as well as to Iran, Libya, and Malaysia. Between 1986 and 1997, Khan allegedly provided centrifuge machines and technical drawings to North Korea and allowed North Koreans to visit the Kahuta Research Laboratory where a uranium enrichment program exists.


2 February 2004

3 February 2004
The Korean Central News Agency reports that the second round of the Six-Party Talks will begin on 25 February 2004.

3 February 2004
After a meeting with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, US Secretary of State Colin Powell confirms that the next round of Six-Party Talks will resume on 25 February 2004 in Beijing.

3 February 2004
An unidentified Japanese Foreign Ministry official says Japan will raise the issue of Japanese nationals abducted to North Korea at the next round of Six-Party Talks. However, Japan may not raise the issue if North Korea agrees to hold separate bilateral talks to address the issue before the Six-Party Talks.

4 February 2004
Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon states that ROK officials "fully understand the Japanese government's position and concern regarding the abduction issue and support Japan's position." However, he adds Japan should exclude the issue from the next round of Six-Party Talks and address the issue in bilateral discussions between North Korea and Japan.

4 February 2004

Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong tells Tomiichi Murayama, former Japanese Prime Minister and current honorary adviser to the Japan-China Friendship Association, that Japan should not address the issue of Japanese abductions by North Korean spies at the second round of Six-Party Talks.  

8 February 2004

Hwang Chang-yŏp, a former Korean Workers Party secretary who defected to South Korea, says that North Korea has been working covertly to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons since 1996. Hwang says he learned of this directly from Chŏn Pyŏng-ho, a party secretary overseeing munitions industries and a member of the National Defense Committee. Hwang states Chŏn went on a month-long trip to Pakistan in 1996 and learned that North Korea no longer needed plutonium because uranium-235 can be enriched and used in nuclear weapons.  

10 February 2004

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says the DPRK did not receive nuclear technology from Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. The statement is in response to Pakistan's announcement that Khan had admitted to proliferation of nuclear technology to North Korea, Iran, Libya and Malaysia. The spokesman instead accuses the US of attempting to derail the second round of Six-Party Talks scheduled for 25 February. He also says the announcement was made to give credibility to claims that North Korea had a covert weapons development program through "groundless propaganda."

14 February 2004

A DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman states that a Japanese Foreign Ministry delegation, while visiting North Korea's Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sŏk-chu during 11-14 February, was told that "if the Japanese side

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raises again the 'abduction issue' at the next round of the Six-Party Talks, the DPRK side will resolutely shut out Japan's participation in the talks."

19 February 2004
A US State Department official voices low expectations for the next round of Six-Party Talks and says the Bush administration does not expect a breakthrough but that "If the talks are less than completely successful, we'll continue to try to work along that line."

24 February 2004
CIA Director George Tenet testifies during a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing that he believes the DPRK "is pursuing a production-scale uranium enrichment program based on technology provided by [Pakistan's] A. Q. Khan." Tenet adds, "[North Korea] is trying to leverage its nuclear programs into international legitimacy and bargaining power, announcing its withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty and openly proclaiming that it has a nuclear deterrent."

24 February 2004
A Japanese delegate to the Six-Party Talks says Japan will raise the issue of abductions at the negotiations and all parties would be informed of Tokyo's position. However, North Korea's chief delegate Kim Kye-gwan has stated he has no intention of discussing the issue in Beijing.

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The second round of Six-Party Talks begin in Beijing six months after the conclusion of the first round in August 2003. The delegations are headed by James Kelly of the United States; Kim Kye-gwan of the DPRK; Lee Su-hyŏk of South Korea; Wang Li of China; Mitoji Yabunaka of Japan; and Alexander Losyukov of Russia.


25 February 2004

Delegates from the United States and North Korea meet in a bilateral "informal chat" on the sidelines during the first day of Six-Party Talks in Beijing.


25 February 2004

On the first day of Six-Party Talks, South Korea's lead negotiator Lee Su-hyŏk proposes the creation of a working group and calls for the six delegations to meet regularly every two months to address the North Korea nuclear issue.


25 February 2004

North Korean and Japanese delegates hold bilateral consultations on the sidelines of the Six-Party Talks to discuss the issue of Japanese abductions by North Korea. The two sides fail to achieve progress but agree to continue discussions. North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan has repeatedly insisted that the kidnapping issue should not be a part of the six-way negotiations.


26 February 2004

The United States delegation to the Six-Party Talks reportedly rejects North Korea's offer to freeze its nuclear arms

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programs as part of a "package deal" presented at the previous round of talks in August 2003. The US side says the offer falls short of "complete dismantlement" and fails to mention Pyongyang's covert uranium enrichment program. North Korea's proposal, which is offered again during this round of talks, contains three stages, but the Bush administration has proposed that the deal could enable North Korea to resume nuclear activities in the future. The DPRK is still denying the existence of uranium enrichment facilities.


26 February 2004
Lee Su-hyŏk, South Korea's lead delegate to the Six-Party Talks, offers to provide energy aid to North Korea in exchange for freezing its nuclear weapons development. Russia and China offer to join South Korea in providing energy aid while US and Japanese delegations respond coolly and DPRK delegates offer no immediate official reaction.


26 February 2004
United States and Japanese officials say they will not accept the draft joint statement that China presented because it failed to mention "complete, verifiable and irreversible" dismantlement of all North Korean nuclear programs and not just "weapons programs." Russia's head delegate Alexander Lusyukov says North Korea is showing "readiness" to dismantle its nuclear weapons programs while "retaining a nuclear program for peaceful purposes." Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao, however, tells reporters that the Six-Party Talks did not discuss civilian and military uses of North Korea's nuclear programs.


27 February 2004
Pakistan's Foreign Ministry spokesman Masood Khan strongly rejects a report in the New York Times that Pakistan may have conducted joint nuclear tests with North Korea as being "wild, mischievous and irresponsible speculation."


28 February 2004

The second round of Six-Party Talks in Beijing ends with agreement to hold more talks by July 2004 and to form a working-group, but without achieving a significant breakthrough. North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kyegwan insists, "We don't plan to include our civilian nuclear program for peaceful purposes in the freeze and dismantlement." Washington has demanded that North Korea admit and include uranium enrichment, which Pyongyang denies exists, in the nuclear negotiations.


29 February 2004

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman blames the United States for failing to reach significant progress at the Six-Party Talks in Beijing saying, "The settlement of the nuclear issue will entirely depend on the change in the U.S. attitude." Concerning future talks, he says," It is difficult to expect that any further talks would help find a solution to the issue.


29 February 2004

The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers Party, accuses US plans for redeployment of troops in South Korea as being "intended to finally complete the military operational preparations for the second Korean war against the DPRK, pursuant to its 'strategy for preemptive attack' and 'new operation plan 5026'."


1 March 2004

South Korea President Roh Moo-hyun says in a holiday speech that he is confident the North Korean nuclear issue will be resolved peacefully through the Six-party Talks. Roh also reiterates his call for reducing dependence on the United States in foreign affairs and military support.


2 March 2004

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
U.S. President George W. Bush tells visiting South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon that the second round of Six-party Talks was fruitful because the six nations have clearly demonstrated that North Korea should dismantle its nuclear program.


2 March 2004
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell says that the Six-party Talks last week produced "a good deal of progress" and that the United States will be patient in pursuing the current negotiations with diplomacy. Powell adds "whatever they [North Korea] are doing or not doing they will not force us or pressure us into any kind of a deal that is anything short of CVID [complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement]."


2 March 2004
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan praises the outcome of the latest Six-party Talks, citing "progress" and a "noticeable step forward" toward a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. Annan also promises to support the six nations "on ways to mobilize the support of the international community to [the denuclearization] end."


3 March 2004
South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun says his government will continue dialogue and exchanges with North Korea despite a request from U.S. officials to sever ties and press North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions.


4 March 2004
Russian Ambassador to Seoul Teymuraz O. Ramishvili says the six nations participating in the Six-party Talks need to utilize flexibility with the North Korea nuclear issue because the international community may not have the legal authority to stop North Korea's peaceful nuclear activities. He argues, "According to international law, it is impossible to stop such programs. But it could be considered in a diplomatic and political context."

—Seo Hyun-jin, "Russia Urges 'Flexibility' on N.K. Nukes," Korea Herald, 5 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis,

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
4 March 2004
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell tells reporters that the United States is in no hurry to find a solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis, saying, "We will be patient in pursuing this policy. The president strongly believes that a diplomatic solution is possible and we are not in any urgency to achieve that solution. We want a good solution." — "Powell Says U.S. in No Hurry over North Korea Nuclear Crisis," Channel NewsAsia, 5 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

4 March 2004

4-5 March 2004

7 March 2004

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
8 March 2004
A commentary by North Korea's *Rodong Sinmun* criticizes South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ban Ki-moon for his recent remarks made in Washington regarding inter-Korea economic exchanges. Ban said it would be difficult to conduct economic exchanges between the two Koreas unless the current nuclear issue is settled. The commentary argues that the North's desire to have a nuclear deterrent force to "defend its right to existence and sovereignty" is natural and the statement by Ban corresponds to "anti-national and anti-reunification criminal acts."

8 March 2004
A *Rodong Sinmun* commentary calls for a "verifiable and complete withdrawal" of U.S. forces stationed in South Korea as well as a "complete, verifiable and irreversible security assurance" guaranteed by the conclusion of a peace agreement and normalization of relations. It also demands that the United States stop its demand for "nuclear renouncement."

9 March 2004
The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, warns that any U.S. economic sanctions as part of an effort to settle the North Korea nuclear crisis would amount to a "military operation aimed at staging a large scale war" against North Korea.

10 March 2004
Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson visits South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, and the two leaders issue a joint statement that "a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue through dialogue is essential for the maintenance of peace and stability not only in Northeast Asia but globally." Persson announced yesterday that he may visit Pyongyang to address North Korea's nuclear ambitions and issues concerning past abductions of Japanese citizens.

10 March 2004

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
A DPRK foreign ministry spokesperson says that the country's reluctance to abandon its nuclear program is a response to U.S. hostile policies against North Korea. The spokesperson adds, "If [the U.S.] persists in demanding a 'verifiable, irreversible and complete abandoning' of [North Korea's] nuclear program it should first promise a verifiable, irreversible and complete abandoning of its hostile policies against it."


12 March 2004
Mitchell Reiss, director of Policy Planning at the U.S. State Department, says that the U.S. is willing to pursue a "normal relationship" with North Korea as long as the latter "accepts international demands for complete elimination of its nuclear weapons program."


12 March 2004
South Korea's National Assembly passes an unprecedented impeachment bill that strips President Roh Moo-hyun of all executive powers until the Constitutional Court rules on the impeachment case. According to the ROK Constitution, Prime Minister Goh Kun assumes power as acting president.


12 March 2004
White House spokesman Scott McClellan tells reporters that impeachment of South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun will not adversely impact the Six-party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program. U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says that Secretary Colin Powell spoke with South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ban Ki-moon, and the two officials confirmed to continue "to work together on issues of mutual concern, including things like the Six-party Talks and the Korean forces that are going to Iraq."


Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
14 March 2004
A spokesman for North Korea's Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland says the impeachment of South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun has "pushed the political situation in south [sic] Korea to an unpredictable phase and brought an unbearable insult and disgrace to the south Korean people." The spokesman holds the United States responsible saying, "The U.S. had hatched such plot for 'impeachment' in south [sic] Korea since October last year."
—"Spokesman for CPRF on 'Motion on Impeachment against S. Korean President,'" Korean Central News Agency, 14 March 2004, www.kcna.co.jp;

Mid March 2004
According to the Tokyo Shinbun, US special envoy Joseph DeTrani and North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Pak Kil-yŏn secretly met in New York to discuss ways to resolve the nuclear crisis.

16 March 2004
North Korea's Korean Central News Agency states that Pyongyang was forced to cancel the 15 March meeting of the North-South Committee for the Promotion of Economic Cooperation because the impeachment of South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun has created a "state of anarchy and is making it impossible for both sides to have safe contacts."

16 March 2004
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao says, "The Chinese side has completed a concept paper [on the creation of working groups for the Six-party Talks]. We have submitted the paper to the other five parties concerned for opinion." Concurrently, South Korea's Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Su-hyŏk arrives in Beijing to discuss the setup of working groups and the Six-party Talks.

17 March 2004
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei says he wants IAEA inspectors to return to North Korea "as early as possible" with "comprehensive" rights to examine nuclear facilities. Speaking after a meeting with U.S. President George W. Bush and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, he refers to the previous limits on IAEA inspectors prior to being expelled by Pyongyang at the end of 2002.

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19 March 2004
Referring to combined U.S.-South Korean military exercises, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson says that North Korea is forced to boost its nuclear arsenal in "quality and quantity" because the U.S. continues its "increased military threat."

19 March 2004
In a report to Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party, the Japanese Foreign Ministry calls on North Korea to abandon its nuclear program "in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner." The report also expresses concerns about North Korea’s ballistic missile program.

24 March 2004
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il meets with visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing to coordinate and discuss the prospects of a third round of Six-party Talks.

27 March 2004
Radio Pyongyang reiterates that the DPRK will never accept the demand for "complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling" of its nuclear weapons programs first. The broadcast insists the United States must provide economic aid and written security guarantees first and that North Korea has the right to keep civilian nuclear programs.

29 March 2004
South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon visits Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing and Assistant Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo in Beijing to discuss the creation of a working group for the Six-party Talks framework. Ban also asks Li, who visited Pyongyang to discuss the Six-party Talks 23-25 March, to work to grant asylum to North Korean defectors detained in China for humanitarian reasons.
5 April 2004
Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, argues in an editorial for North Korea's nuclear development as "a legitimate self-defense measure" against a possible "US preemptive nuclear attack." It cites the preemptive strike on Iraq and military exercises with South Korea as evidence of US intentions to "provoke a war against the North."

6 April 2004
A commentary by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency condemns the "1-4-2-1 defense strategy worked out" by the US Department of Defense. The 1-4-2-1 strategy refers to the US force-sizing construct that can "defend the homeland, deter forward in and from four regions, and conduct two, overlapping 'swift defeat' campaigns."

6 April 2004
South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon confers by telephone with his Japanese counterpart Yoriko Kawaguchi to discuss the standoff over North Korea's nuclear program and other issues. They agree to discuss ways to convene a working group session of Six-Party Talks at their upcoming meeting in San Francisco.

7-8 April 2004
US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Yi Su-hyŏk and Japanese Foreign Ministry Director General Mitoji Yabunaka hold "information trilateral consultations" in San Francisco. They conclude that the six-party working group should be convened as soon as possible, ideally by the end of the month.

8 April 2004
Kim Il-ch'ŏl, North Korean Minister of the People's Armed Forces, argues that the US military threat will force North Korea to increase its "nuclear deterrent force." Kim spoke at a celebration to mark the 11th anniversary of Kim Jong Il's election as chairman of the National Defense Commission.

10 April 2004
South Korea's Deputy Foreign Minister Yi Su-hyŏk reiterates that North Korea's nuclear program should be dismantled in accordance with CVID [complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement].

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
12 April 2004

The New York Times reports that Abdul Qadeer Khan told interrogators he made a trip to North Korea five years ago and was shown three nuclear devices in a secret underground nuclear facility.


15 April 2004

While visiting Fudan University in Shanghai, US Vice President Dick Cheney says he hopes the negotiations at the Six-Party Talks will result in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. Cheney insists on complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea's nuclear development programs.


16 April 2004

US Vice President Dick Cheney tells South Korean officials that the Six-Party Talks need to reconvene at an early date and end the nuclear standoff. During his discussions with South Korea's Prime Minister Ko Kŏn, Cheney also voices concerns that North Korea could proliferate nuclear weapons technology to terrorist groups.


18 April 2004

A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry assails US Vice President Dick Cheney's remarks demanding that North Korea dismantle its nuclear programs completely. The spokesman adds that North Korea will not consider complete dismantlement (CVID) and will not tolerate economic sanctions.

—"Chosŏnwoemusŏngdaeb'yŏn'în konghwaguk'ŭl mohahan'ŭn migukpudaet'onngyo'ng ch'ein'i'ui mangbal'ŭl kyu't'an," Korean Central News Agency, 19 April 2004.

19-21 April 2004

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il visits Beijing for three days and tells Chinese President Hu Jintao and other Chinese leaders that North Korea seeks to resolve its nuclear issue peacefully. Kim is accompanied by members of his cabinet and the National Defense Commission.


Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
28 April 2004

*The Washington Post* reports that the United States is preparing to raise its estimate of the number of nuclear weapons held by North Korea from "possibly two" to at least eight.


29 April 2004

Chinese special envoy Ning Fukui arrives in Seoul and says that countries should be more flexible and take a realistic approach so progress can be made. He also urged for in-depth talks at the working group talks to be held in May.


29 April 2004

A DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman demands that the US abandon its "hostile policy" in exchange for dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapon program under the principle of "reward for freeze."


29 April 2004

Adam Ereli, deputy spokesman of the US Department of State, denies knowledge of a new US government estimate that raises North Korea’s nuclear devices to eight or more. Ereli confirms that six party working group meetings will begin in Beijing on May 12, 2004.


30 April 2004

US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says the United States will not "pay [North Korea] not to do things [nuclear development] it shouldn’t have been doing in the first place."


2 May 2004

A North Korean radio broadcast accuses the United States of preparing for a preemptive nuclear attack, citing combined military exercises with South Korea as well as the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.


3 May 2004

U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says China's special envoy to North Korea Ning Fukui met with
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to discuss how to proceed with the first working group meeting for the Six-Party Talks. Ning also met with U.S. special envoy to the Six-Party Talks Joseph DeTrani and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly.


4 May 2004

The Financial Times publishes Selig Harrison's feature story based on his April 2004 two-hour discussion with North Korean leaders. North Korea's Kim Yong-nam, president of the Supreme People's Assembly, reportedly stated that Pyongyang "would never allow such transfers [of nuclear material] to al-Qaeda or anyone else."


4 May 2004

Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, cites Israel's nuclear weapons program and attacks the United States for what it views as an "unfair and unjustifiable double standard."


4-7 May 2004

A South Korean delegation led by Minister of Unification Chŏng Se-hyon visits Pyongyang to discuss the upcoming Six-Party Talks working group meeting and inter-Korean exchanges. The DPRK abruptly ends the meeting without reaching an agreement, demanding instead a cessation of U.S.-ROK combined military exercises.


12-14 May 2004

The six-party talks working group meets in Beijing to discuss the North Korea nuclear issue. The stalemated meeting ends with the North Korean delegation vowing to never accept US' demands for complete dismantlement.


18-22 May 2004

United Nations Special Envoy Maurice F. Strong visits Pyongyang to discuss ways to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue, as well as other issues. Strong says North Korea will continue to develop its nuclear program.

—"UN Envoy Arrives in N. Korea for Talks on Nukes," Japan Economic Newswire, 18 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis,

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
19 May 2004
Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, accuses the United States of preparing for a preemptive nuclear attack on North Korea and creating "a dangerous situation on the Korean peninsula in which a nuclear war may break out." The paper cites U.S. combined military exercises with South Korea and Japan as evidence that an attack is imminent.

19 May 2004
U.S. State Department deputy spokesman Adam Ereli tells reporters that the United States will not provide lightwater reactors to North Korea in exchange for nuclear dismantlement.

22 May 2004
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visits Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang to discuss the nuclear issue, as well as other security and bilateral issues. The summit ends without significant breakthroughs in resolving the nuclear stalemate.

22 May 2004
According to a New York Times report, the International Atomic Energy Agency found strong evidence that two tons of enriched uranium secretly delivered in 2001 to Libya for its covert nuclear program came from North Korea. The evidence is attributed to interviews with members of the secret supplier network set up by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.

24 May 2004
An unidentified South Korean official says the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade is searching for other terminology to replace "complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement." The official believes the phrase commonly referred to as CVID, which North Korea has objected to in the past, is perceived as threatening by North Korea.
—"Han'guk, 'CVID' taech'e yong'ŏ kusangjung," Maeil Kyŏngjae TV, 24 May 2004, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "S

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.

24 May 2004
The Korean Central News Agency in Pyongyang accuses the United States of attempting to pressure North Korea on nuclear issues by launching a "human rights offensive" with false reports on North Korean human rights violations.

25 May 2004
Stephen Rademaker, acting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, refuses to confirm that North Korea supplied Libya with uranium in 2001 and whether it was enriched.

25 May 2004
A commentary by the DPRK's Korean Central News Agency claims that the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and related U.S. efforts aimed at North Korea "compels the DPRK to maintain and increase its nuclear means."

29 May 2004
North Korea's Central News Agency denies the alleged illegal sale of uranium to Libya as a "false story" and "sheer fabrication."

29 May 2004
U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says the United States sees "absolutely no future" in the KEDO light-water reactor project. The project, part of the 1994 Agreed Framework, was suspended in November 2003.

1 June 2004
Wŏlgan Chosŏn, a South Korean monthly newsmagazine, quotes an unidentified U.S. intelligence source as saying that A. Q. Khan provided North Korea with key equipments related to uranium enrichment. The magazine also reports that A. Q. Khan allegedly offered a nuclear bomb design to North Korea.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
1 June 2004
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Japan’s Senior Vice Foreign Minister Ichiro Aisawa meet to coordinate their approaches to the Six-party Talks.

3 June 2004
South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon says he expects a new round of Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear program to take place by the end of this month.

3 June 2004
William Perry, Former U.S. Defense Secretary, criticizes the Bush administration saying that they have taken no action to stop the North Korean nuclear program. He also warns South Korea of the misconception that a North Korean nuclear program does not threaten the South.

3 June 2004
A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry blames the Bush administration for the halt of light water reactor (LWR) construction in North Korea. The spokesman says the U.S. administration “threw away the Agreed Framework, whose core issue is the provision of LWRs, like a pair of old shoes.”

5 June 2004
Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers’ Party, publishes a commentary that says North Korea’s self-defense capabilities are justified and the right choice. The article also accuses the U.S. Defense Department of increasing its budget for research and development of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator [RNEP] to stifle North Korea.

5 June 2004
U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld warns in his speech in Singapore that protracted diplomatic negotiation is giving North Korea time to develop their nuclear weapons, which raises the risk of the weapons falling into terrorist hands.

6 June 2004
Lee Soo-hyuck, South Korean Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, urges China to play a more substantive role in the next round of the Six-Party Talks to solve the long-running standoff over North Korea’s nuclear program.

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7 June 2004
Rodong Shinmun, the official daily of the Korean Worker's Party, criticizes a sub-critical nuclear experiment conducted in Nevada on May 25th as U.S. defiance and a threat to world peace. The commentary argues that the DPRK has the right to consolidate its nuclear deterrent in response to the U.S. nuclear preemptive strike against the DPRK.

7 June 2004
Junichiro Koizumi, Japanese Prime Minister says in a press conference that North Korea's leader Kim Jong Il is sincere about verifiably dismantling his country's nuclear program. Introducing his summit meeting with Kim on May 22, he adds that "I told him face to face that, if you compare what you gain from nuclear weapons with what you gain from dismantling them, it is like that difference between heaven and earth."

8 June 2004
Zhou Wenzhong, China's Deputy Foreign Minister, says in an interview with the New York Times that he has doubts about the Bush administration's claim that North Korea has a secret uranium enrichment program.

10-11 June 2004
At the G8 summit on Sea Island, Georgia reconfirms that member countries of the G8 support a comprehensive solution by diplomatic means to the DPRK nuclear issue. While G8 leaders conclude that North Korea's weapons activities are a "serious concern," Japanese Prime Minister says that North Korea doesn't want nuclear weapons.

11 June 2004
The Japanese Trade Ministry announces it will ban a trading company in Nigata Prefecture from exporting goods for four months because the firm illegally exported to North Korea an inverter that could be used in nuclear weapons development.

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11 June 2004
A South Korean official says that South Korea is considering the provision of extraordinary energy aid to North Korea if it commits to the "complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement [CVID]" of its nuclear program.

11 June 2004
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell meets with Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing to discuss the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

13-14 June 2004
Senior officials from the United States, South Korea, and Japan hold preparatory talks ahead of a multilateral meeting over ending North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

15 June 2004
In a speech marking the anniversary of the North-South summit meeting in 2000, South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun offers to extend "comprehensive and concrete" economic aid to North Korea if it scraps its nuclear program.

15 June 2004
U.S. Department of States spokesman Richard Boucher renews the call for the "complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement" (CVID) of North Korea's nuclear programs at a press briefing.

15 June 2004
A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry rejects the call for "complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement." The [North] Korean Central News Agency repeats a similar argument in its commentary.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
15 June 2004
Kyodo News Service cites an unidentified Japanese source and reports that North Korea will be able to produce enough highly-enriched uranium in three years to make two to four nuclear devices.

16 June 2004
Governor of New Mexico Bill Richardson calls for a shift of strategy against North Korea’s nuclear program.

16 June 2004
South Korea’s Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon downplays the principle of "complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement" of North Korea’s nuclear program, saying that the terminology is not important.

17 June 2004
Senior South Korean officials review a plan to provide North Korea with energy and other economic assistance if it agrees to dismantle its nuclear program.

21 June 2004
Six-party Talks officials hold a second working-group meeting to prepare the third round of six-party talks.

22 June 2004
Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasizes that North Korea’s nuclear issue must be solved peacefully through dialogue.

23 June 2004
Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the [North] Korean Workers' Party, denounces the United States' demand for North Korea to "scrap" its nuclear program first and without assurances and benefits.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
23-26 June 2004
At the third round of six-party talks, the U.S. delegation presents comprehensive proposals including energy provision and security guarantee in exchange for dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program. North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan warns his U.S. counterpart Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly that North Korea will test a nuclear weapon unless the United States accepts its proposal of reward for nuclear freeze.


28 June 2004
A spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry welcomes Washington's willingness to consider rewarding North Korea in exchange for freezing its nuclear program. However, he dismisses the proposed U.S. timetable of three months to shut down and seal its nuclear facilities, labeling the proposal as "unrealistic."


1 July 2004
North Korea's ambassador to China Ch'oe Chin Su says that Pyongyang's recent Six-Party Talks proposal to freeze plutonium reprocessing only applies to those reprocessed after 10 January 2003. Plutonium excluded from this freeze proposal would leave enough fissile material for one or two nuclear warheads.


2 July 2004
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell briefly talks with North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun in Jakarta, Indonesia. Paek says that the only way to resolve the current standoff is through simultaneous actions by both the United States and North Korea. Powell tells Paek that North Korea must declare all of its nuclear activities and that if Pyongyang commits to disarming its nuclear weapons, the U.S. would make very quick progress on a comprehensive deal.


5 July 2004
James A. Kelley, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the chief U.S. negotiator to the

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
Six-Party Talks, reconfirms the CVID principle in a U.S. Senate hearing, emphasizing that "the threat can be dealt with through multilateral diplomacy.


6 July 2004

The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers’ Party, argues that the U.S. proposal for "a three-month preparation period for nuclear disarmament" is "unrealistic" because it requires that Pyongyang freeze and dismantlement its nuclear program first before it can get any rewards.


6 July 2004

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell says North Korea should not receive a reward for dismantling a nuclear weapons program that it should not have started in the first place.


9 July 2004

U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice tells South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon in Seoul that North Korea will be surprised at how much is possible if it gives up all of its nuclear weapons programs.


11 July 2004

A broadcast on North Korea's state radio accuses the United States of developing a new type of nuclear weapon and only pretending to be interested in resolving the nuclear issue. The reference to the new type of nuclear weapon is the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), commonly referred to as "bunker busters."


12 July 2004

Japan's Asahi Shimbun quotes an unnamed U.S. official as stating that the United States would insist on North Korea giving up its ballistic missiles as well as its nuclear weapons for the United States to provide the DPRK with security assurances under a deal to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.


13 July 2004

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
The DPRK Deputy Ambassador to the UN Han Sŏng-yŏl replies to U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice's offer of a surprising reward in exchange for DPRK renunciation of its nuclear weapons programs by saying that North Korea is not interested in any deal that calls on the DPRK to give up its nuclear weapons now for the promise of an American reward later.


14 July 2004
A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry says Pyongyang will verifiably give up its nuclear weapons and return to the NPT after the United States drops its "hostile policy" towards the DPRK. The spokesman also says that while the DPRK's ultimate goal is denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea will continue to retain the right to nuclear activities for peaceful purposes.


15 July 2004
An editorial on a North Korean website says that recent statements by a U.S. official saying that the DPRK will also have to give up its ballistic missiles as well as its nuclear weapons in order to receive security guarantees from the U.S. creates an artificial obstacle to progress within the Six-party Talks.


20 July 2004
Park Kil-yŏn, North Korea's ambassador to the United Nations, says that Pyongyang is prepared to freeze its nuclear weapons programs in exchange for Washington's lifting of economic sanctions and providing two million kilowatts of electric power. Park also denies the existence of a uranium enrichment program and the admission of such a program to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly.


21 July 2004
South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun says the time will not be right for an inter-Korean summit with North Korea until sufficient progress is made in the Six-Party Talks to resolve the nuclear crisis.


21 July 2004

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton states that if Pyongyang makes the same "strategic decision" to give up its nuclear weapons that Libya did, then the North Korean regime will be able to stay in power.


21 July 2004

After meeting in South Korea, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun promise that they both will work to bring a quick end to the current North Korea nuclear standoff.


27 July 2004

Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hatsuhisa Takashima says Russia and Japan share the same goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and that Russia is in a good position to provide energy aid to North Korea following North Korea's nuclear disarmament.


1-2 August 2004

The heads of the Chinese and South Korean delegations to the Six-Party Talks meet to discuss a working-level meeting for the next round of negotiations in September. Both Ning Fukui and Cho T'ae-yŏng say the dispute over North Korea's uranium enrichment program is the key to resolving the nuclear crisis.


2 August 2004

An editorial in North Korea's Minju Chosŏn, a publication of the DPRK cabinet, argues that recent U.S. threats to refer North Korea to the United Nations Security Council for economic sanctions are designed to suffocate the DPRK.


3 August 2004

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly and South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Su-hyŏk meet to prepare for the next round of the Six-Party Talks.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.

4 August 2004
The Korean Central News Agency denies claims that top nuclear scientist Kim Kwang-bin has defected from North Korea and subsequently testified that Pyongyang has developed nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium.

9 August 2004
Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, says that U.S. statements about leaving "all options on the table" undermine efforts to resolve the nuclear crisis diplomatically. Meanwhile South Korean officials argue the U.S. statements do not represent a change by the United States.

10 August 2004
According to an unidentified South Korean Uri Party member, President Roh Moo-hyun told U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice that South Korea should work closely with the United States, not China in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis.

15 August 2004
Yang Xiyu, China's Korean Peninsula Affairs Director within the Foreign Ministry, says the resolution of the Korean nuclear crisis depends on the United States and North Korea as China can only play a mediating role.

16 August 2004
An unidentified South Korean Foreign Ministry official accuses North Korea of "foot-dragging" on working group meetings. A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says the DPRK will not be able to continue Six-Party Talks if the U.S. continues its "hostile policy" towards North Korea, citing the North Korean Human Rights Act being passed by the U.S. House and Senate and U.S.-ROK joint military efforts as two examples.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
17 August 2004
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell says North Korea is a more "troublesome country to deal with" than Iran.

17 August 2004
The Korean Central News Agency, citing a report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service, argues that U.S. accusations of illegal drug trafficking by the DPRK reveal a lack of U.S. interest in resolving the nuclear crisis.

18 August 2004
North Korea's Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, criticizes the U.S. position against providing aid in exchange for simply freezing North Korea's nuclear weapons program. It also adds that the United States is fabricating or distorting the issues of human rights, defectors, and drug trafficking in order to undermine the DPRK regime.

24 August 2004
South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Su-hyŏk meets with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei in Beijing to discuss how to break the current deadlock surrounding North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

23 August 2004
A DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman criticizes U.S. President George W. Bush's call for South Korea, Japan, Russia and China to work together to unite and resolve the North Korea nuclear issue. He adds that the "U.S. hostile policy towards North Korea" makes it "quite impossible" for North Korea to negotiate with the United States.

26 August 2004
South Korean Prime Minister Lee Hae-ch' an argues a summit between North and South Korea could help ease the tensions surrounding the nuclear crisis.

2 September 2004
U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Christopher Hill says North Korea must make the decision to give up its nuclear weapons even before receiving compensation.
— O Nam-sŏk and Park Su-kyun, ''Sin'imjuhan mi taesa yŏyaŭiwon 30myŏnggwa taehwa 'hanmi FTA chogi ch'egyŏlhaeya','' Munhwa Ibo, 2 September 2004, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; ''Time for N. Korea to Give up Nuke
8 September 2004

9 September 2004

11 September 2004

11 September 2004

11-14 September 2004
During British Foreign Office Minister Bill Rammell’s visit to Pyongyang, North Korea tells the British delegation it

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will not negotiate its nuclear issues until South Korea’s past nuclear experiments are "fully probed" and the United States drops its "hostile policy" towards the DPRK.


12 September 2004
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell says on NBC's "Meet the Press" television program that he does not believe the explosion on 9 September in North Korea was a nuclear test.

12 September 2004
South Korean Foreign Ministry Spokesman Lee Kyu-hyŏng denies North Korea's accusation of Seoul's laboratory nuclear experiments having a military objective as "absolutely untrue." Lee also says that he hopes the experiments issue should not have any bearing on the upcoming round of the Six-Party Talks.

14 September 2004
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell says he doubts North Korea will return to the Six-Party Talks before the U.S. presidential election race concludes.

17 September 2004
Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Kong Quan says South Korea's nuclear experiments will be discussed at the upcoming round of the Six-Party Talks since the purpose of the negotiations is to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

21 September 2004
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi tells the United Nations General Assembly that Japan will continue to work to "comprehensively" resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula in line with the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
23 September 2004

Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, says Japan would be turned into a "nuclear sea of fire" if the United States strikes North Korea.


23 September 2004

Chŏng U-sŏng, the foreign policy advisor to South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, says the ROK's recently revealed secret nuclear experiments will not be on the agenda for the upcoming Six-Party Talks.


27 September 2004

North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su-hŏn tells the United Nations General Assembly that North Korea has "weaponized" 8,000 spent fuel rods and already possesses a nuclear deterrent against the United States.


27 September 2004

North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su-hŏn says the U.S. double standard on North and South Korean nuclear issues, as well as the U.S. hostile stance towards the DPRK, are holding up the resumption of the Six-Party Talks.


30 September 2004

China's Assistant Foreign Minister Shen Guofang says the Six-Party Talks mechanism should be maintained even if the talks are not held in September.


3 October 2004

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei visits South Korea and says the North Korean nuclear crisis needs to be resolved quickly and peacefully.


Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
3 October 2004
The Chinese Six-Party Talks delegation reportedly confirms to other participants that North Korea "at least attempted to enrich" uranium, one of the key contentions of the ongoing negotiations.

4 October 2004
North Korea's Central Broadcasting Station reports that the DPRK will increase its nuclear arsenal "a thousand times" if the United States does not drop its hostile policy towards the DPRK.

5 October 2004
South Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choe Yŏng-jin tells the ROK National Assembly that North Korea probably has enough plutonium to make two or three nuclear weapons.

6 October 2004
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei urges the United Nations Security Council to take action against North Korea saying the Council's lack of response concerning North Korean NPT violations "may be setting the worst precedent of all."

7 October 2004
According to White House spokesman Scott McClellan, U.S. President George W. Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao discuss the North Korea nuclear crisis over the telephone and renew their commitment to resolve the issue through the Six-Party Talks.

13 October 2004
A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says Pyongyang is committed to resolving the nuclear issue through the Six-Party Talks but blames the U.S.'s hostile policy towards the DPRK for holding up negotiations.

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13 October 2004
China special envoy for Korean affairs Ning Fukui visits Seoul to discuss the deadlock in the Six-Party Talks. Ambassador Fukui says it seems unlikely that the negotiations will be held before November.

14 October 2004
According to unidentified diplomatic sources, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) Executive Board decides to extend the suspension of the two light water reactor construction project in North Korea for another year. South Korea's Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon says KEDO should resume constructing the light water reactors if the Six-Party Talks "yield tangible results."

15 October 2004
Ning Fukui, head of the Chinese delegation to the Six-party Talks, meets with Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly, and special envoy for negotiations with North Korea Joseph DeTrani in Washington to discuss how to move the Six-Party Talks forward.

17 October 2004
Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda says North Korea has developed a plutonium-based nuclear weapon and is "close to developing" a uranium-based weapon. Hosoda also says Japan is considering referring the nuclear issue to the United Nations Security Council in the absence of progress through the Six-Party Talks.

18 October 2004
Kim Yong-nam, the DPRK's president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, travels to Beijing to meet with Chinese President Hu Jintao, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, and Chairman of the National People's Congress Wu Bangguo to discuss the current deadlock in the Six-Party Talks.
18 October 2004
The DPRK’s Korean Central News Agency criticizes IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei for his "biased attitude" towards the North Korea nuclear issue and "downplaying" South Korea's secret nuclear experiments.

22 October 2004
A DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman says North Korea will return to the Six-Party Talks if the United States drops its "hostile policy" towards the DPRK, and that Pyongyang is ready to “freeze for a reward.” The spokesman also says the talks should discuss "South Korea's nuclear issue before anything else."

23 October 2004
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell says North Korea's preconditions demanded on 22 October for resuming the Six-Party Talks should be raised at the negotiations and not before.

23-26 October 2004
To discuss and gather support for the resumption of Six-Party Talks, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell travels to East Asia and meets with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura, Chinese President Hu Jintao and Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon.

25 October 2004
Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing reportedly tells U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell that China shares the U.S. objective of bringing North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks but feels the United States is not doing its utmost to adopt "a flexible and practical attitude on the issue."

26 October 2004
Following a talk with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon calls for members of the Six-Party Talks to make "more creative and realistic proposals" to bring North Korea back to the

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talks.

30 October 2004
North Korea's Urnimjokkkiri website says U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell's visits to Japan, China and South Korea were part of attempts by the United States to blame North Korea for holding up the Six-Party Talks while ignoring South Korea's secret nuclear experiments.

1 November 2004
Japanese Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Shinichi Kitaoka tells the UN General Assembly that North Korea's nuclear weapons development threatens regional peace and stability, while North Korea's Deputy Ambassador to the UN Kim Ch'ang-guk accuses the United States of having deployed nuclear weapons in Japan. Kim asserts that U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan and South Korea's secret nuclear experiments pose greater threats to the DPRK.

3 November 2004
North Korea's Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Han Sŏng-ryŏl says the U.S. must repeal the recently passed North Korean Human Rights Act and cease its "hostile policy" towards North Korea to resume Six-Party Talks.

5 November 2004
South Korea's presidential office spokesman Kim Chŏng-min says President Roh Moo-hyun has spoken with reelected U.S. President George W. Bush via telephone and agreed to resume the Six-Party Talks as soon as possible.

6 November 2004

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura visits Seoul to meet with South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon to discuss the North Korean nuclear issue. Both parties agree to resume the Six-Party Talks as early as possible and to work to extend the suspension of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development project rather than abandoning the project entirely.


9 November 2004
Yomiuri Shimbun reports an unidentified high-level U.S. official as having stated that the United States would take immediate action if North Korea were to transfer any nuclear material to another country and that a military strike could not be ruled out.

9 November 2004
The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, says South Korea has no right to discuss North Korea's nuclear issue because Seoul conducted secret nuclear experiments in the past.
—Cho'n Chong-ho, "The Nuclear Criminal Has No Right to Talk About the Nuclear Issue," Rodong Sinmun via Uriminjokkkiri website, 9 November 2004, in "DPRK Daily Decrees ROK Authorities as 'Nuclear Criminals', Have 'No Right' To Discuss Nuclear Issues," OSC Document KPP20041109000027.

12 November 2004
Responding to the 9 November report that the United States would not rule out military options in the case of North Korea passing nuclear material to another state, North Korea's Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland and the Uriminjokkkiri website criticize the "U.S. hostile policy" against North Korea and argue that the DPRK is justified in developing and strengthening its "nuclear deterrent."

12 November 2004
South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun says during a speech in Los Angeles that a hard-line policy to resolve the nuclear crisis would endanger the lives of South Koreans and risk another war. Roh also argues that North Korea would give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees.

17 November 2004

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
United Nations General Assembly President Jean Ping visits DPRK Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun and President of the Supreme People’s Assembly Presidium Kim Yong-nam in Pyongyang to discuss ways to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis.

**2003**

**January 2003**

US satellite imagery analysts observe covered trucks repeatedly transporting material away from the facility temporarily storing 8,000 spent fuel rods in Yongbyon-kun. US intelligence analysts suspect that the trucks are transporting the fuel rods to a reprocessing facility where they could be converted into weapons-grade plutonium.  

According to US and Japanese government sources, North Korea begins preparing to reactivate the nuclear reprocessing facility located in the Yongbyon nuclear complex. US and Japanese intelligence reportedly detect shipments of coal arriving at the heat supply boiler facility that is adjacent to the reprocessing facility. The boiler, which is used to maintain the temperature of a nitric acid solution used in reprocessing, becomes active by early February as reconnaissance satellites detect smoke billowing from the facility.

**1 January 2003**

The last two members of the three-member IAEA inspection team leave North Korea.

**2 January 2003**

US President George W. Bush reaffirms his intention to address North Korea's decision to restart its previously frozen nuclear facilities diplomatically. Speaking to reporters on his ranch in Crawford, Texas, Bush says that the situation with North Korea is not a military problem but rather a diplomatic problem.

**4 January 2003**

US Secretary of State Colin Powell and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi agree to continue using diplomatic means to pressure North Korea into reversing its decision to abandon the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

**Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.**
6 January 2003
The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution that "deplores in the strongest terms the DPRK's unilateral acts to remove and impede the functioning of containment and surveillance equipment at its nuclear facilities and the nuclear material contained therein, including the expulsion of IAEA inspectors, which renders the Agency unable to verify, pursuant to its safeguards agreement with the DPRK, that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the DPRK." Addressing the Board of Governors, IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei states that the Agency is "regrettably at present unable...to verify that the DPRK is not diverting nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and it is also at present unable to verify that the DPRK has declared to the Agency all the nuclear material that is subject to the safeguards."

6 January 2003
In an interview with Interfax News Agency, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov states that North Korea must readmit IAEA inspectors. However, Ivanov adds, "it is necessary to provide North Korea with security guarantees, otherwise the situation could become unpredictable."

6 January 2003
US President George Bush states that the United States has no intention of invading North Korea. Speaking at a cabinet meeting, Bush says, "We have no intention of invading North Korea. I believe this will be resolved peacefully and I believe it can be resolved diplomatically."

6-7 January 2003
Representatives from the United States, Japan and South Korea hold a meeting of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) in Washington to discuss North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program. On 7 January, representatives from the three nations issue a joint statement urging North Korea to eliminate its nuclear program while reiterating their intention to "pursue a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the issue."

7 January 2003
The Korean Central News Agency states that US claims of a missile threat from North Korea are merely attempts to justify the establishment of a missile defense system. According to a KCNA report, the United States' desire to deploy a missile defense system further illustrates its attempts at global supremacy. The report also claims that North Korea "has increased its self-defensive military capability to cope with the US intensified policy to invade and stifle it with nukes." The report concludes, "If the US unleashes a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula, it will not escape its destruction."

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
7 January 2003
The Korean Central News Agency reports that any attempt US to impose economic sanctions on North Korea would mean war. The report states, that "the US should opt for dialogue with the DPRK, not for war, clearly aware that it will have to pay a very high price for such reckless acts." The report also includes a demand for an apology from the US for what it refers to as the "piracy" against the North Korean ship Sosan in December 2002.

8 January 2003
KCNA accuses the United States of increasing the threat of nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula. According to the news agency, the US has created the rumor of North Korea's clandestine nuclear weapons program in order to prevent reconciliation of North and South Korea and keep tensions on the peninsula high.

9-11 January 2003
Han Song Ryol and Mun Jong Chol, two representatives of North Korea's permanent mission to the UN, travel to Santa Fe, New Mexico and meet with New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, a former US ambassador to the UN. The two sides discuss ways in which to resolve the conflict between the US and North Korea over North Korea's nuclear program. According to Bush administration officials, the meetings are unofficial, and Richardson is only authorized to reiterate the message that the administration has already stated publicly. Speaking to reporters after the talks, Richardson announces that Han informed him that "North Korea has no intention of building nuclear weapons." Richardson adds that he believes the talks were successful in conveying to the North Korean representatives "the depth of international concern over this issue." Commenting on the high level of inflammatory rhetoric coming from North Korea, Richardson says that North Koreans "don't negotiate like we do. They don't have our same mentality. They believe in order to get something they have to lay out additional cards, step up the rhetoric, be more belligerent."

9 January 2003
Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan says that the best way to resolve the dispute between the US and North Korea is through direct dialogue. Speaking at a meeting with his French counterpart Dominique de Villepin, Jiaxuan also says, "The framework agreement reached by the two sides in 1994 should be maintained and continue to be carried out."

10 January 2003
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei meets with US Secretary of State Colin Powell in Washington to discuss...

10 January 2003

Responding to Pyongyang's announced decision to withdraw from the NPT, US Secretary of State Colin Powell states that in withdrawing from the treaty, "North Korea has thumbed its nose at the international community. It is a very serious situation," says Powell, adding, "We are not going to be intimidated." — Barry Schweid, "Richardson Says North Korean Diplomat Says His Country Does Not Intend to Build Nuclear Weapons," Associated Press, 11 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

10 January 2003

Yun Kuk Hui, deputy general director of North Korea's General Department of Atomic Energy states that the atomic energy industrial sector fully supports Pyongyang's decision to withdraw from the NPT and establish a "chuch'e oriented nuclear power industry." Yun adds that North Korea's atomic energy sector will "thoroughly implement the policies of our party and the republic government" and continue "using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the future as we did in the past." — Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 10 January 2003, in "North Korean Atomic Energy Bureau Chief Expresses 'Full Support' for Policy," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 10 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 January 2003

Lee Che Son, director general of North Korea's General Department of Atomic Energy, sends a letter to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei stating that North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT is now in effect. In the letter, Lee states, "Under the prevailing situation where the United States seeks to destroy the DPRK by force, and the IAEA is incapable of observing the principle of impartiality, the DPRK government issued a statement on

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January 10, 2003 declaring an automatic, immediate and effectual withdrawal from the NPT on which it declared a moratorium."


11 January 2003
Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Yukio Takeuchi and Im Song Chun, South Korean presidential envoy, meet in Japan and agree that Japan, South Korea and the United States should work together to end the North Korean nuclear crisis. The two officials reportedly agree to use their respective diplomatic channels to urge Pyongyang to engage in dialogue. They also agree that tough economic sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council could do more harm than good.


12 January 2003
Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, prints a commentary accusing the United States of responding to North Korea's "sincere proposal for concluding a nonaggression treaty" by threatening a blockade and military action. The commentary continues, "If the US evades its responsibility and recklessly challenges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the army and people of the DPRK will never miss the chance but certainly make them pay for the blood and turn the stronghold of the enemy into a sea of fire." The commentary continues, "It is the unshakeable revolutionary principle and stand of the DPRK to respond to a hard-line with a super hard-line. It has nothing to be afraid of even under the worst situation." The commentary also asserts that North Korea pulled out of the NPT because the US threatened it with nuclear war, thus openly violating the treaty. However, North Korea's decision to restart its indigenous nuclear program, according to the Rodong Sinmun commentary, was based on the country's energy needs, not security concerns.


13 January 2003
South Korean President-elect Roh Moo Hyun meets with US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly and informs him that South Korea will play a "leading role" in resolving the North Korean nuclear standoff. Roh also reiterates his belief that the nuclear issue should be resolved through peaceful dialogue. Speaking to reporters after the meeting, Kelly states that the US is willing to talk to North Korea. Kelly says, "Once we get beyond nuclear weapons, there may be opportunities with the US, with private investors, with other countries to help North Korea in the energy area."


13 January 2003
Pak Ui Ch'un, North Korean ambassador to Russia, dismisses as "hypothetical" the allegations made by US
Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly that North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons. Pak claims that Kelly is responsible for raising tension on the peninsula by making such an allegation. In addition, Pak calls any efforts by the US to adopt UN sanctions against North Korea a "declaration of war." Speaking to an ITAR-TASS reporter, Pak states that if the United States agrees to a nonaggression treaty, North Korea will consider allowing IAEA inspectors to return. However, Pak stresses, the IAEA "must stop working as a protégé of America and the United States must stop trying to use the IAEA as an instrument for pressuring North Korea." According to Pak, North Korea is willing and ready to prove that it has not developed nuclear weapons if the US drops its hostile policy.


13 January 2003
Andrew Natsios, head of the US Agency for International Development, says that the United States is withholding food aid until monitors can verify that it is not being diverted to the North Korean military. Natsios denies that the US is withholding food aid in order to pressure North Korea into giving up its nuclear weapons program, claiming that the demand to monitor aid distributions dates from 7 June 2002, before the most recent nuclear crisis.


14 January 2003
US President George W. Bush announces that the US would consider giving energy and food aid to North Korea if Pyongyang gives up its nuclear weapons program. But on 15 January, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman dismisses Bush’s offer, calling it "a deceptive drama" that is meant "to mislead world public opinion." The spokesman says that Washington’s "loudmouthed supply of energy and food aid is like a painted pie in the sky as they are possible only after the DPRK is totally disarmed."


14 January 2003
US Secretary of State Colin Powell says that the 1994 Agreed Framework cannot sufficiently prevent North Korea from pursuing a nuclear weapons program. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Powell says that the United States needs "a new arrangement" by which the United States may meet North Korea’s energy needs by means other than building light-water nuclear reactors. [Note: Many critics of the 1994 Agreed Framework,
including those in the Bush Administration, have suggested providing North Korea with coal burning power plants instead of light-water reactors."

14 January 2003
The Korean Central News Agency reports that the nuclear crisis will only be resolved through bilateral talks between North Korea and the United States. Another KCNA report claims the United States is responsible for the current nuclear crisis by placing North Korea on a list of potential targets for a preemptive nuclear strike in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review.

14 January 2003
A commentary in published in *Rodong Sinmun*, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, warns the United States not to pursue a policy of stifling North Korea. The commentary warns that North Korea "has so far shown the utmost self-control and patience," but if US provocations continue, North Korea will exercise its secret "options."

14 January 2003
The *Rodong Sinmun* warns Japan not to support the US in provoking North Korea over the ensuing nuclear crisis. A *Rodong Sinmun* commentary broadcasted on Pyongyang Radio states that North Korea has made clear its position on Japan: "For Japan to seek to crush us by following in the footsteps of the United States would lead to its own self-destruction."

14-18 January 2003
A delegation of Australian diplomats travels to Pyongyang to convey the international community's concerns over steps taken by North Korea to reactiviate its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. The delegation led by Murray McLean, chief of the North Asia division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, reportedly delivers a letter from Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer to his North Korean counterpart Paek Nam Sun. During the meetings, North Korean officials reportedly deny that Pyongyang is pursuing a uranium enrichment program. North Korean officials also reportedly tell the Australian delegation that they are concerned that the United States will push for regime change in North Korea after it has disarmed Iraq. Upon returning to Australia, members of the delegation inform the press that Pyongyang's concern of becoming a US target of counter-proliferation efforts has overshadowed concerns about economic aid and trade. Members of the delegation subsequently inform officials in Washington, Seoul and Tokyo about the results of the diplomatic trip.
A commentary printed in the North Korean newspaper *Minju Joson* claims that North Korea withdrew from the NPT because of the hostile policies of the US. The commentary says that North Korea will not compromise on issues related to its "sovereignty and dignity." The commentary adds that in order to protect its sovereignty and dignity North Korea is prepared to take "self-defensive measures" stronger than withdrawing from the NPT.


White House spokesman Ari Fleisher says that the United States will not agree to a nonaggression pact with North Korea until Pyongyang complies with earlier agreements and gives up its nuclear weapons program. "The issue is not: what is the United States going to do? The issue is: what is North Korea going to do?" Fleisher says. "North Korea needs to begin by dismantling its nuclear programs in a verifiable and irreversible way. That comes first."


Pyongyang Radio broadcasts a bellicose commentary warning the United States not to underestimate North Korea's resolve and capability to fight and win a war. The commentary warns that "the US imperialists should not by any means listen absentmindedly to the warning of our army and people that there is no limit to our target range and that we would make the entire United States into a sea of fire." Claiming that these threats are not merely "empty words," the commentary states that if the United States forces a war on the Korean Peninsula, "we will blast the entirety of your land off the face of the earth with powerful attack capabilities beyond anything the world can imagine – a frightful attack beyond anything ever seen or heard."


South Korean President-elect Roh Moo Hyun meets with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi and says that while he will not tolerate North Korea's attempts to develop a nuclear weapons program, "the issue should be resolved through dialogue." Roh says that "cooperation between South Korea and Japan is very important in solving the North Korean nuclear issue." Later in the day, Roh tells reporters that he believes once North Korea escapes its status as a rogue state, it should abandon its nuclear weapons program. Roh also says that he would not consider a military strike against North Korea even if it was found to be reprocessing nuclear fuel for use in a bomb.

16 January 2003

Speaking before the National Assembly's National Defense Committee, South Korea's Defense Minister Lee Jun says that a war between North and South Korea would be "unavoidable" if the United States carried out a preemptive attack on the North's suspected nuclear weapons facilities. Lee says that while South Korea is not certain that the North is developing uranium-based nuclear weapons, the probability is high. Lee also claims that US and South Korean forces are prepared for a "worst-case scenario." [Note: On 18 January, a spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense says that Lee's statements did not indicate that the security situation on the peninsula was becoming increasingly precarious, but rather the statements were meant to reiterate the readiness of South Korea's armed forces to handle any contingencies that might arise.]


16 January 2003

A Korean Central News Agency commentary once again blames the United States and the IAEA for North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The commentary claims that "the DPRK can no longer be bound by the NPT and the IAEA now that they are being used for the US moves to stifle the DPRK."


16 January 2003

A commentary appearing in Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, blames the United States for the current nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. According to the commentary, "the DPRK was compelled to withdraw from the NPT as a self-defense step taken after careful consideration to cope with the grave situation where its supreme interests are most seriously threatened by the US." The commentary continues, "The nuclear issue surfaced on the Korean Peninsula as the US has posed a nuclear threat to the DPRK for scores of years by massively deploying and stockpiling nukes in and around South Korea, pursuant to its hostile policy towards Pyongyang in line with its strategy to dominate the world."


16 January 2003

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei criticizes North Korea for practicing "nuclear blackmail". Speaking to reporters in Moscow, ElBaradei says, "The international community is ready to look favorably at North Korea's security concerns and economic needs, but not under nuclear blackmail."

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
16 January 2003
Son Chun Yong, South Korea's ambassador to the UN, says that the North Korean nuclear crisis will eventually be resolved through dialogue, but he speculates that a peaceful resolution will take at least two years. Son claims that while both the US and North Korea are using strong rhetoric, both sides have stressed a desire to resolve the issue through dialogue. However, Son points out that the 1993 nuclear crisis required over a year and half before it was resolved, and since the current crisis involves nuclear, missile and biochemical weapons, "it will take at least two years for the issue to be resolved."

17 January 2003
US Ambassador to Japan Howard Baker meets with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, and the two agree that the United States, Japan and South Korea should cooperate in finding a peaceful solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis. According to Baker, the two discuss the nature of Pyongyang's intentions and try to anticipate what Pyongyang might do next.

17 January 2003
US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage tells reporters that President George Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell "have spoken out that we have no hostile intentions to North Korea." However, Armitage states that the United States has no intention of concluding a nonaggression pact with North Korea since Congress would certainly fail to pass such an agreement. Armitage also says that the United States has no intention of changing Kim Jong II's regime in North Korea.

18 January 2003
North Korean Ambassador to China Ch'oi Chin Su tells reporters that the current nuclear standoff can be resolved through dialogue if the United States first pledges not to invade the North, recognizes North Korea's sovereignty, and does not impede the North's economic development.

18 January 2003
A commentary appearing in the North Korean publication Minju Joson warns Japan not to support the United States' hostile policy toward North Korea.

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18 January 2003

*Choson Sinbo*, a newspaper published by the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, reports that North Korea’s Ministry of Power and Coal Industries is taking actions to resume nuclear activities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and to build additional nuclear facilities.


19 January 2003

US Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard says that if North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable way, the United States would consider economic cooperation with North Korea that goes beyond food aid.


19-20 January 2003

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov meets with North Korean officials in Pyongyang and presents a "package plan" for resolving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Losyukov also reportedly meets with Kim Jong Il for six hours to deliver a message from Russian President Vladimir Putin and discuss the proposed "package plan." The "package plan" reportedly calls for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, security guarantees for North Korea and the resumption of economic aid in exchange for North Korea’s abandoning its nuclear weapons program.

[Note: Before and after the trip to Pyongyang, Losyukov stops in Beijing to discuss the trip with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Yang Wenchang.]


19 January 2003

US Secretary of State Colin Powell meets in New York with Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, and the three agree that North Korea’s nuclear program is an international problem and should be resolved accordingly. Later in the day, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Chu issues a statement condemning the United States for attempting to "internationalize" the issue and trying to get the UN involved. Kang says, "The DPRK and the US should sit face-to-face to solve the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula."


19 January 2003

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says that while the Bush administration is committed to resolving the nuclear standoff with North Korea peacefully, it has not ruled out the use of force if the crisis escalates.

19 January 2003
White House National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice says that the Bush administration has not ruled out any options in dealing with North Korea's nuclear program but remains committed to resolving the issue diplomatically. Rice also says that the nuclear crisis is an international issue, not a bilateral issue between the US and North Korea.

19 January 2003
US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly meets with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi in Tokyo to discuss issues related to North Korea. During the meeting, Kelly describes US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's proposal to offer a written non-aggression statement in exchange for a pledge from North Korea that it will end its nuclear weapons program. Kawaguchi expresses support for this new proposal and the two officials agree that Japan and the US will cooperate with South Korea, China and Russia to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis.

20 January 2003
US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton meets with Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Wang Guangya in Beijing to discuss various issues related to strategic security, multilateral arms control and nonproliferation. The two reportedly discuss in depth how best to address North Korea's decision to withdraw from the NPT and its decision to re activate nuclear facilities in Yongbyon-kun. After the meeting, Bolton tells reporters that the two did not discuss the possibility of imposing economic sanctions against North Korea. However, Bolton adds that he did not detect any opposition to bringing the issue of North Korea's nuclear program before the UN Security Council.

20 January 2003
Speaking before the UN Security Council, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan says that China is committed to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and a peaceful resolution of the current crisis. He states that China does not rule out any option for resolving the issue diplomatically, but he adds that China has learned from past experiences that direct dialogue between North Korea and the United States is key to resolving any crisis on the peninsula.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
20 January 2003
Pakistani Foreign Minister Khursheed Mehmood Kasuri denies that Pakistan has ever assisted North Korea in developing a nuclear program. Kasuri states that there has been no cooperation in the field of nuclear energy with North Korea either under current Pakistani President Musharraf or his predecessors.

20 January 2003
The Korean Central News Agency calls the Bush administration’s claim that it has no intention to invade North Korea "no more than a hypocritical farce to mislead the world public. The report warns that "the Bush administration is well advised to act with discretion, mindful that the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula can be settled only when the US provides security to the DPRK by law through the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty."

20 January 2003
A commentary read over Pyongyang Radio claims that withdrawing from the NPT was in the best interest of North Korea. The commentary also states that the United States is fully responsible for bringing the Korean Peninsula to the brink of war by designating North Korea as possible target for a preemptive nuclear strike.

20 January 2003
Lee To Sop, North Korean consul-general in Hong Kong, tells the Ming Pao Daily News that North Korea will view economic sanctions as a declaration of war by the United States, and North Korea will react accordingly. Lee also claims that the current standoff over North Korea's nuclear program can only be resolved through bilateral US North Korean negotiations, stating that "the role of mediators...is basically not important." He also adds that North Korea will not attack South Korea in order to fight against the United States.

20-22 January 2003
Carl Ford, US Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, travels unannounced to Seoul. Ford reportedly meets with President-elect Roh Moo Hyun, opposition leaders and members of the National Intelligence Service to discuss ways in which to resolve the crisis over North Korea's nuclear program.

20 January 2003
Georgiy Mamedov, Russian deputy foreign minister, meets with Alexander Vershbow, US ambassador to Moscow,

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to discuss various issues, including the situation on the Korean Peninsula. After the meeting, the Russian Foreign Ministry issues a statement confirming that "despite considerable nuances in the approaches, the mutual efforts towards solving these issues in the spirit of the new Russian-American partnership prevail."


21-23 January 2003
US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton meets with high ranking South Korean officials to discuss ways of resolving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Bolton meets with Foreign Minister Ch’oi Song Ho, Deputy Foreign Ministers Lee T’ae Shik and Defense Ministry officials in an attempt to coordinate US and South Korean policies concerning North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship diplomacy. On 21 January, Bolton tells members of the press that even though the United States is aiming to bring the issue of North Korea’s nuclear program to the UN Security Council, "the issue of imposing sanctions against North Korea is a very different question." Following talks on 22 January, Bolton tells members of the press that the Agreed Framework had run its course and the United States was unlikely to attempt to re-implement it during the course of negotiations with North Korea.


21 January 2003
North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, runs a commentary accusing the United States of giving rise to the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. According to the commentary, the United States has infringed on North Korea’s sovereignty by listing it as a possible target for a preemptive nuclear strike. The commentary also claims that Washington’s stated intention to resolve the issue through dialogue is merely a "deceptive act" since Washington first requires North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program, an "unfair" precondition, according to the commentary, to which Pyongyang is not willing to agree. The commentary concludes that the only way of resolving the crisis is for the United States to first provide legally binding security assurances.


21 January 2003
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan "strongly urges" North Korea to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the NPT. Speaking before the Conference on Disarmament, Annan says, "Recent challenges to the existing nonproliferation regimes, in particular the announcement by the government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of its withdrawal from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, raise serious concerns."

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21 January 2003
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue says that China remains open to any suggestions for maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, but "at the present stage...dialogue is the only effective way."

22-24 January 2003
North and South Korea hold the ninth round of inter-Korean ministerial talks in Seoul. The five-member North Korean delegation is headed by senior cabinet member Kim Yong Song, and the South Korean delegation is headed by Unification Minister Chong Se Hyun. In his keynote speech at the opening of the talks, Kim states that North Korea's nuclear program is only for generating electricity, and accuses the United States of politicizing the nuclear issue in an attempt to gain control over both North and South Korea. The South Korean delegation demands that North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons program and retract its decision to withdraw from the NPT, but according to delegation spokesman Lee Bong Jo, the South Korean delegation is disappointed that North Korea refuses to make any concrete commitments during the meeting. The two sides agree to continue cooperating in order to resolve peacefully the conflict over North Korea's nuclear program, and at the conclusion of the talks, they agree to meet again in April. [Note: The tenth round of talks is scheduled to take place from 7 to 10 April in Pyongyang, but since North Korea fails to confirm that it will participate in the talks and does not invite the South Korean delegation to Pyongyang, the talks are postponed until 27 April.]

22 January 2003
US Secretary of State Colin Powell tells reporters that while "negotiating with North Korea is a very difficult, arduous process," there has been some progress in talks aimed at bringing North Korea into compliance with multilateral and bilateral nonproliferation agreements.
In an interview published in *Choson Sinbo*, North Korean Minister of Power and Coal Industries Shin Yong Son claims that North Korea is just a few weeks away from reactivating its graphite moderated nuclear reactors. However, Sin reiterates that the reactors will only be used to generate electricity.


22 January 2003
The *Rodong Sinmun*, official newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, denounces the IAEA, claiming that it "has been totally reduced to a shock brigade and a henchman executing the U.S. policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK."


23 January 2003
US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says that North Korea's nuclear program is a matter "of concern to the entire international community," and thus should be referred to the UN Security Council. Boucher says, "We do think the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors needs to report the issue to the Security Council. That's one of their responsibilities under their charter, and certainly the issue, as it affects international peace and security, is something the Security Council needs to have on its plate."


23 January 2003
Russian President Vladimir Putin calls US President George W. Bush to brief him on Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Losyulov's recent diplomatic trip to Pyongyang. Putin tells Bush that based on Losyulov's visit he believes there is a good chance to resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula peacefully.


24 January 2003
Former US Secretary of Defense William Perry claims that North Korea has begun reprocessing 8,000 nuclear fuel rods that had been sealed and monitored under the 1994 Agreed Framework. Perry, speaking at the Brookings Institute, states that by reprocessing the fuel rods and pursuing a uranium enrichment program, North Korea poses an imminent threat to the United States. [Note: Other sources state that North Korea has made preparations for reprocessing the fuel rods but has not actually begun reprocessing.]


25 January 2003
A North Korean Foreign Ministry official says that North Korea will not address its nuclear program in any multilateral forum, insisting that the issue can only be resolved through bilateral talks with the United States.


Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org).
25 January 2003
US Secretary of State Colin Powell announces that talks with North Korea will come "eventually," but he adds, "We will work out what the proper manner and form is." Speaking in Zurich, on his way to the World Economic Forum, Powell says, "There is a strong desire on the part of the North Koreans to talk directly to us." However, Powell adds, "We believe that the problem that exists in North Korea is not a US-DPRK problem. Other nations are involved."

26 January 2003
US Secretary of State Colin Powell criticizes North Korea for violating the Agreed Framework pursuing a clandestine uranium enrichment program. However, speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Powell says that the United States has "no intention of attacking North Korea."

27-29 January 2003
Im Tong Won [Lim Dong Won], special envoy of South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, travels to Pyongyang in an attempt to diffuse mounting tensions on the Korean Peninsula. North Korean officials reportedly tell Im that North Korea does not possess a uranium-enrichment program. [Note: North and South Korea had reportedly agreed that Im would meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong II, but after waiting for three days, North Korean officials inform Im that Kim will not be able to meet with him.]

27 January 2003
The New Yorker publishes a story by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh detailing the nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and North Korea. Citing a former high level Pakistani official, Hersh reports that by 1997 Pakistan had "no more money" to pay for North Korean missile imports. The former Pakistani official tells Hersh that in 1997 Pakistan began paying for North Korean missiles by providing "some of the know-how and the specifics" of a nuclear weapons program based on uranium enrichment. In addition to actual uranium enrichment technology, Pakistan reportedly helped North Korea conduct several "cold tests," simulated nuclear tests using natural uranium used to test the effectiveness of warhead designs. According to the former Pakistani official, Pakistan also provided North Korea with information on how to hide a uranium enrichment facility from international inspectors and foreign intelligence services. Hersh also quotes a US intelligence official who, referring to the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate’s assessment of the source of North Korea’s uranium enrichment program, says, "It points a clear finger at the Pakistanis. The technical stuff is crystal clear – not hedged and not ambivalent."

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27 January 2003
Delegates of the North and South Korean militaries meet in Panmunjom for working level talks. The two sides agree to provide military assurances to each other while making preparations for the construction of a temporary road which would traverse the demilitarized zone and connect North and South Korea.

28 January 2003
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement saying, "We oppose all attempts to internationalize the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula and are authorized to state that we shall not take part in any 'multilateral talks,' whatever the format." The Foreign Ministry adds, "The only way to reach a peaceful and fair settlement of the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula is direct and equitable talks between North Korea and the US. No other options are possible."

28 January 2003
US President George W. Bush delivers the annual State of the Union address, in which he claims that the United States will not be blackmailed by North Korea into giving concessions based upon the threat of developing nuclear weapons. President Bush says, "America is working with the countries of the region—South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia—to find a peaceful solution, and to show the North Korean government that nuclear weapons will bring only isolation, economic stagnation, and continued hardship." President Bush also labels the ruling regime in North Korea an "oppressive regime" that "rules a people living in fear and starvation." "The gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world," President Bush continues, "is outlaw regimes that seek to possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons."

28 January 2003
The Korean Central News Agency reports that contrary to the wishes of the North Korean government, the situation on the Korean Peninsula has reached a level at which war may be inevitable. The KCNA report claims that the United States has begun making preparations for a preemptive attack.

29 January 2003
A commentary broadcasted on Pyongyang Radio condemns the Bush administration's recent calls for a peaceful resolution to the nuclear crisis as "a mere deceptive trick aimed at covering up its sinister war plot to invade our Republic and mislead the world's public opinion."
29 January 2003
A Korean Central News Agency commentary denounces the United States for adopting a policy of "tailored containment" toward North Korea, by which the United States hopes to "escalate the economic and political pressure to the extremes and push North Korea to collapse."

29 January 2003
Pakistani Minister of for Information and Media Development Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed claims that Pakistan has never assisted North Korea in developing its nuclear program. Speaking to reporters in Qatar, Ahmed says, "We have our own scientists and technology and there are no relations whatsoever with North Korea in this regard."

30 January 2003
Chang Jun Shik, North Korea's ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament, says that North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) because of the United States' "hostile policy," and the 6 January "impartial and unilateral resolution adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which encroached upon our sovereignty and dignity." Jang also reiterates that North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT became effective on 11 January, one day after it was announced.

30 January 2003
The EU Parliament adopts a resolution condemning North Korea for withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The resolution also condemns Pakistan for helping North Korea with uranium enrichment technology.

31 January 2003
The New York Times, citing US intelligence officials, reports that US spy satellites have observed trucks transporting material from a nuclear storage facility, part of the Yongbyon nuclear complex. Intelligence officials suspect that the trucks, which have been observed for the past month, are transporting 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods to a reprocessing facility where they will be converted into weapons-grade plutonium. In this case, according to intelligence officials, North Korea could begin producing weapons-grade plutonium by March. In addition to the increased truck traffic around the storage facility, one defense official, without elaborating, says that the United States has detected other activities "you'd associate with an active weapons facility." Some US officials remain skeptical about the interpretation of the satellite imagery. "There's still a debate about exactly what we are seeing..."
and how provocative it is," one senior official is quoted as saying. "The North Koreans made no real effort to hide this from us."


31 January 2003
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei says that North Korea could have a "significant" amount of weapons grade nuclear material within six months. He also calls the recent discovery of increased activity around a storage facility in Yongbyon-kun "a matter of grave concern."


31 January 2003
Ch'oi Chin Su, North Korea's ambassador to China, announces that the only way to resolve the growing nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula is through bilateral negotiations between the US and North Korea. Ch'oi says, "If the United States will sign a nonaggression treaty that will have binding force after being ratified by Congress, North Korea has a willingness to prove that it is not producing nuclear weapons." Ch'oi disregards the assertion by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly that during his October 2002 visit to Pyongyang North Korean officials admitted to pursuing a nuclear weapons program based on enriched uranium. According to Ch'oi, the assertion is merely "a sinister plot invented by the extreme warmongers in the United States." The ambassador adds that Kelly had taken "an arrogant attitude during his visit to our country, groundlessly urging us to admit" to the clandestine program. Thus, according to Ch'oi, "we took the attitude of neither denying it nor confirming it."


February 2003
A former North Korean spy, Kinki Aoyama (pseudonym), tells the Japanese government that North Korea has nuclear weapons and has an "information sharing alliance" with Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. Aoyama claims that he learned of the nuclear weapons program and the cooperation with Pakistan, Iran and Iraq while he was an industrial spy in China during the 1990's.


Early February 2003
According to South Korean and Japanese government officials, KEDO executive board members unofficially agree to slow down the project to construct two light-water reactors in North Korea by postponing the purchase of equipment necessary in order to proceed with the construction. The executive board, consisting of the United States, Japan, South Korea and the European Union, also reportedly agreed to halt air services between South Korea and the construction site in North Korea, and freeze a training program for North Korean engineers in South Korea.


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1 February 2003
The Washington Post reports that in November 2001 intelligence analysts at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory sent a classified report to President George W. Bush in which they determined that North Korea had begun constructing a uranium enrichment facility. The Washington Post also quotes a "senior US official" as saying that Pakistan provided some of the new intelligence on North Korea after the United States dropped economic sanctions against Pakistan.


2-9 February 2003
Chung Tae Chol, South Korean President-elect Roh Moo Hyun's special envoy, travels to the United States and Japan to meet with top government officials and convey President-Elect Roh's intention to resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula peacefully, as well as strengthen the US-South Korean alliance and South Korean-Japanese relationship. During 3-5 February, Chung is in Washington D.C. and meets with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell. While meeting with Rumsfeld, Chung reportedly conveys President-elect Roh's desire to make the South Korean-US alliance a "true partnership." While meeting with Vice President Dick Cheney, Chung and Cheney agreed to establish a bilateral forum in which the United States and South Korea could discuss important issues of mutual concern such as North Korean nuclear program. While in Tokyo, Chung meets with Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and the two agree to remain committed to resolving issues related to North Korea's nuclear program peacefully.


3 February 2003
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld orders twelve B-52 and twelve B-1 bombers on alert for possible deployment from bases in the United States to Guam. [Note: A few days earlier, Admiral Thomas Fargo, commander of US forces in the Pacific, reportedly requested additional air and naval forces as a deterrent against North Korea as the crisis over North Korea's nuclear program escalates. The bombers are deployed in early March and arrive in Guam on 6 March.]


3 February 2003

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
The Korean Central News Agency claims that the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula cannot be settled unless the United States accepts North Korea's demands for "direct and equal negotiations and the conclusion of a nonaggression treaty."


3 February 2003
The US State Department releases its proposed budget for fiscal year 2004 and does not earmark any funds for the administrative costs of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) or heavy-fuel oil shipments to North Korea. [Note: The State Department earmarked $3.5 million for KEDO administrative costs in fiscal year 2003.]


4 February 2003
US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Bush administration is committed to resolving the nuclear standoff with North Korea peacefully. Armitage also says that even though the administration will consider all options in dealing with matters of national security, the situation with North Korea dictates that diplomacy is the best option "at this time." When committee chairman Richard Lugar urges the administration to begin direct talks with North Korea, Armitage replies, "Of course we are going to have direct talks with the North Koreans—there is no question about that."


5 February 2003
Following a hearing of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld tells reporters that the United States has assessed that North Korea possesses one or two nuclear weapons, and, given the rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea might soon declare itself a nuclear power.


5 February 2003
The Korean Central News Agency quotes a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying, "The DPRK is now putting the operation of its nuclear facilities for the production of electricity on a normal footing after their restart." The spokesman adds that the nuclear program would be limited to peaceful uses "at the present stage." [Note: The North Korean Foreign Ministry later denies that North Korea has restarted its nuclear facilities, claiming that the Western media misinterpreted its 5 February statement.]


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5 February 2003
Lee Pyong Gap, a deputy director in the North Korean Foreign Ministry, tells the British daily Guardian that North Korea reserves the right to launch a preemptive attack on US forces stationed in South Korea. However, Lee also urges the British to encourage the US to hold direct talks with North Korea.

6 February 2003
The Rodong Sinmun, official newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, claims that a US preemptive attack on its nuclear facilities would trigger "all-out war." A commentary published in the paper and broadcasted on Pyongyang Radio states, "It is foolish for the US to think that we sit idle with folded arms to wait until it gives orders for a forestalling attack to be started. We will answer a forestalling attack with a powerful counterattack and all-out war with all-out war."

6 February 2003
US Secretary of State Colin Powell, speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, says that while the United States is committed to resolving the issue of North Korea's nuclear program peacefully, the US is "still looking for the right formula" to provide North Korea with the security guarantees they are demanding. However, Powell says that the United States is "not going to just say you've got these guarantees and then hope they will satisfy our concerns and the world's concerns about what they have been doing with respect to plutonium activities and uranium enrichment." Powell reiterates that the best way to resolve the issue is through a multilateral framework that consists of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council as well as Australia, the European Union, Japan, South Korea and North Korea. Powell also tells the committee that the Bush administration has not taken any options off the table in dealing with North Korea.

7 February 2003
US President George W. Bush claims that the United States is committed to resolving the nuclear crisis with North Korea diplomatically, but adds that "all options are on the table," inferring that the United States has not ruled out military force or economic sanctions.

7 February 2003
The Korean Central News Agency claims that the United States is attempting to avoid its responsibility of resolving
the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula by insisting on multilateral talks. KCNA also claims that the current nuclear crisis on the peninsula is a result of the United States' hostile policy toward North Korea.

7 February 2003
A commentary appearing in the Rodong Sinmun, official newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, claims that the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s decision to place 24 bombers on standby for redeployment to Guam proves that the United States is not interested in resolving the nuclear crisis peacefully. The commentary says, "This situation compels the DPRK to take due precaution and a counter-measure."

7 February 2003
The Joongang Ilbo reports that US reconnaissance satellites have detected steam billowing from North Korea's 5MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon-kun, indicating that the reactor has been reactivated on what US and South Korean officials believe to be a test basis. Another Seoul official, who said he was not familiar with the imagery, said the reactor could have been put into operation because the loading of the 8,000 fuel rods is probably complete. He added, however, that because the plant has been idle since 1994, it is probably not operating at full capacity.

8 February 2003
A Rodong Sinmun commentary states that North Korea will never participate in multilateral talks to resolve issues related to its nuclear program.

8-11 February 2003
Indonesian presidential envoy Nana Sutresna travels to Pyongyang in order to convey to North Korean officials that Indonesia is opposed to North Korea's nuclear weapons program and wants to help resolve the issue peacefully. North Korean officials reportedly reply that its nuclear program is an issue to be discussed only between the United States and North Korea.

10 February 2003
South Korean Prime Minister Kim Sok Su says that he does not believe that North Korea has nuclear weapons.

10-12 February 2003
Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, travels to Seoul and meets with high ranking South Korean government officials, including President Kim Dae Jung and President-elect Roh Moo

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Hyun, to discuss ways to resolve issues related to North Korea's nuclear program peacefully. Solana says that the EU remains committed to resolving the crisis through dialogue and plans to send a high level delegation to Pyongyang to help defuse the growing tension on the Korean Peninsula. Speaking at a press conference in Seoul following the meetings, Solana says that economic sanctions against North Korea would be counterproductive and serve only to inflame the already high tensions.


11 February 2003

In testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, CIA Director George Tenet says, "Kim Jong Il's attempts this past year to parlay the North's nuclear weapons program into political leverage suggest he is trying to negotiate a fundamentally different relationship with Washington—one that implicitly tolerates the North's nuclear weapons program." Tenet also states that profits from missile exports are necessary for North Korea to continue funding its missile, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs.


11 February 2003

Chung Tae Chol, a South Korean politician and recently returned envoy to the United Stated of President Kim Dae Jung, says that intelligence authorities believe North Korea possesses three plutonium based nuclear weapons.


11-14 February 2003

Representatives from North and South Korea meet for the fourth round of inter-Korean economic talks. During the talks the South Korean delegation stresses that economic cooperation between the two countries is hindered mainly by suspicions of a North Korean nuclear weapons program. The North Korean delegation refuses to comment on its nuclear program, stating only that it is a matter to be resolved through direct talks with the United States.


12 February 2003

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CIA Director George Tenet states that North Korea "probably" has one or two plutonium-based nuclear warhead. When asked by Senator Evan Bayh (D-IN) if North Korea currently possesses the capability of striking the West Coast of the United States with a ballistic missile, Tenet replies, "I think the declassified answer is yes, they can do that." When asked to clarify whether or not North Korea currently has the capability to couple a nuclear warhead to an ICBM, Tenet says that he will address the issue in the closed session.


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12 February 2003
The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution finding North Korea "in further non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement." Noting North Korea's continuing non-compliance and the IAEA's inability to verify that North Korea has not diverted nuclear material to a nuclear weapons program, the Board of Governors decides to report the issue to the UN Security Council.

13 February 2003
US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly tells the House International Relations Committee that North Korea's nuclear weapons program may prompt Japan to pursue a nuclear weapons program.

13 February 2003
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, says that North Korea poses a larger threat as a proliferator of nuclear weapons than as an aggressor in Northeast Asia. Rumsfeld also says that the United States is working with South Korea to redeploy US forces further south on the peninsula away from Seoul and the demilitarized zone. Rumsfeld says that he would like to see US forces "more oriented toward an air hub and a sea hub with the ability to reinforce so that there is still a strong deterrent, and possibly with our improved capabilities of moving people, some of those forces come back home."

13 February 2003
US Secretary of State Colin Powell tells the House Budget Committee that US-North Korean bilateral talks are not an acceptable way to address issues related to North Korea's nuclear program, saying that North Korea poses such a threat to neighboring countries, such as China, Japan, Russia and South Korea, that a multilateral talks, incorporating all concerned states, is the only option.

13 February 2003
South Korean Prime Minister Kim Sok Su tells the National Assembly that North Korea has extracted enough plutonium to make two nuclear weapons, but Kim adds that the South Korean National Intelligence Service cannot confirm whether or not North Korea has actually succeeded in construction nuclear weapons.

13 February 2003
North Korean ambassador to the UN Pak Kil Yon says the only way to resolve the current standoff over North...
Korea’s nuclear program is for the United States to sign a nonaggression pact. Claiming that North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT was a self-defensive maneuver, Pak says, "It is a big mistake if the United States thinks North Korea will sit idle while the United States is recklessly moving to overthrow the North Korean regime."

13 February 2003
Delegates from the United States and North Korea hold unofficial talks in Berlin on ways to resolve the standoff over North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program. Official representatives from the United States and North Korea do not participate in the talks, but the experts on each side reportedly have close ties to their respective governments. At the 10 hour meeting, the North Korean delegation reportedly asked the US experts about the specifics of how the US government planned to verify the dismantlement of North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons program.

14 February 2003
The Korean Central News Agency condemns the IAEA for referring the issue of North Korea’s nuclear program to the UN Security Council. KCNA states that since North Korea officially withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on 11 January, the IAEA, which it denounces as merely a tool of the United States, has no authority to discuss North Korea’s nuclear program.

Mid February 2003
Kim Tae Ho, a North Korean defector who reportedly worked at North Korean nuclear facilities from 1985 to 1992, tells Japanese media that, in preparation for a special IAEA inspection in 1992, North Korea concealed the full amount of nuclear activities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex by using lead boards to eliminate radiation traces emanating from secret underground levels dedicated to a nuclear weapons program. Kim also reports second hand that missile base located in Musudan-ri was constructed at that location to launch nuclear missiles at US forces stationed in Japan in the event of a war with the United States. [Note: In early 2003, Kim, who reportedly worked at the April Enterprise in the Yongbyon nuclear complex and the Namch'on Chemical Complex in North Hwanghae Province, published a book in Japan entitled, The Truth about the North Korea Nuclear Plants That I Saw, in which he details his eight years working for North Korea’s nuclear industry.]

16 February 2003
White House National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice says that the United States will not hold bilateral negotiations with North Korea over its suspected nuclear weapons program. Speaking on "Fox News Sunday," Rice says, "I know that the North Koreans would like nothing better than this to become a bilateral problem between

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the United States and North Korea." However, Rice says, "We cannot allow the North Koreans to step back into a bilateral discussion with the United States."

16 February 2003
In an interview with the Sunday Telegraph, Kim Chae Rok, North Korean government official, says that North Korea is planning to construct four new nuclear power plants to meet the energy needs of the country. Kim says that the new nuclear power plants will be able to produce up to 200MW of power.

17 February 2003
The New York Times, citing senior US government officials, reports that the United States is developing a plan to impose sanctions on North Korea aimed at encouraging North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program and halt its export of weapons of mass destruction, including ballistic missiles.

17 February 2003
A spokesman for the Korean People's Army (KPA) declares that North Korea will abandon the 1953 Armistice Agreement that ended the Korean War if the United States imposes economic sanctions or sets up a naval blockade, actions which North Korea would view as acts of war. [Note: On 26 March, the KPA sends a message to the United Nations Command (UNC) stating that North Korea would no longer send delegates to meet with US and UN officers for routine meetings at the liaisons office in the truce village of Panmunjom. In the official message delivered to UNC Deputy Chief of Staff Major General James Soligan, the KPA reiterates its claim that economic sanctions or a naval blockade would be viewed as an act of war and North Korea would react accordingly.]

19 February 2003
The UN Security Council considers the issue of North Korea's nuclear program for ten minutes and then decides to refer the issue to a group of experts before discussing it further.

19 February 2003
Shin Kon, chief of South Korea's National Intelligence Service, tells the National Assembly's Intelligence Committee that although North Korea has prepared to reactivate its 5MW(e) reactor located in the Yongbyon nuclear complex, the reactor has not yet been reactivated.

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19 February 2003

A Rodong Sinmun commentary claims that the United States' talk about resolving the dispute over North Korea's nuclear program peacefully is "nothing but a deceptive trick to mentally disarm us and guarantee a pre-emptive strike." The commentary warns the United States that if it continues on its current path of aggravating North Korea, it will lead to a "disastrous explosion."


20 February 2003

A North Korean MiG-19 fighter jet crosses the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea and temporarily flies about 13km into South Korean airspace. The incursion lasted only two minutes, as the North Korean jet retreated to North Korean airspace after several South Korean jets were scrambled to intercept it. South Korean Defense Ministry spokesman Brigadier General Hwang Yong Su states that the incursion, the first North Korean penetration of South Korean airspace since 1983, could have resulted in "very serious consequences in the current situation on the Korean Peninsula. [Note: North Korea has repeatedly stated that it does not recognize the NLL, thus instigating several naval clashes in South Korean waters, including a confrontation in June 2002 that resulted in the deaths of six South Korean sailors and an unknown number of North Korean sailors.]"


20 February 2003

The Korean Central News Agency warns that "the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia is so alarming that a nuclear war may break out any moment."


20 February 2003

Ra Jong Il, Senior Advisor for National Security to South Korean President-Elect Roh Moo Hyun, meets with Chon Kum Ch’ol, vice chairman of North Korea’s Korean Asia-Pacific Peace Committee. Ra reportedly initiated the contact in Beijing to propose an inter-Korean summit soon after Roh takes office.


22 to 25 February 2003

US Secretary of State Colin Powell travels to Japan, China and South Korea on a diplomatic mission to coordinate policies with the East Asian nations regarding Iraq and North Korea. After meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi on 22 February, Powell says that both agreed that talks to resolve North Korea’s nuclear issue should be held in a "multilateral forum." On 23 February, Powell meets with Chinese President Jiang Zemin and his successor Hu Jintao in Beijing, and according to Powell, the two Chinese leaders insist that the North Korean issue should be resolved through bilateral talks between Washington and Pyongyang. Powell then travels to South Korea on 24 February to attend the inauguration of President Roh Moo

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Hyun, who reportedly tells Powell that Seoul supports resolving the issue of North Korea's nuclear program in a multilateral setting.


25 February 2003
US Secretary of State Colin Powell announces that the United States will send 100,000 metric tons of food aid to North Korea in 2003 beginning with an initial delivery of 40,000 metric tons. [Note: The United States did not send any food aid to North Korea for the first two months of 2003, but Secretary of State Colin Powell claims that the suspension was merely due to congressional delays, not in order to exert pressure on North Korea.]


25 February 2003
Addressing the 13th Conference of Heads of State of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Kim Yong Nam, president of the Presidium of North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly, says that North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was a self defensive measure and North Korea's "nuclear activities at this stage would be confined only to peaceful purposes such as the production of electricity."


25 February 2003
US reconnaissance satellites detect suspicious plumes of smoke emitting from North Korea's 5MW(e) reactor located in the Yongbyon nuclear complex, prompting US intelligence officials on 26 February to announce that North Korea has reactivated the nuclear reactor. [Note: Pursuant to the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to freeze operations at several nuclear facilities, including the 5MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon-kun. Therefore, by reactivating the reactor, North Korea directly violated the agreement.]


Late February 2003
The Chinese government closes an oil pipeline to North Korea for three days, reportedly as a warning to Pyongyang not to provoke the United States and escalate the crisis over North Korea's nuclear program.

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28 February 2003
A South Korean government official tells the Yonhap News Agency that the South Korean government, after studying intelligence provided by the United States, has confirmed that North Korea has reactivated the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor located in the Yongbyon nuclear complex. In 1994, North Korea agreed to freeze operations at the reactor as part of the Agreed Framework. Yet despite North Korea's latest violation of the agreement, the government officials says, South Korea will not halt construction of two light-water nuclear reactors being constructed in Kumho-chigu [Shinp'o], North Korea as part of the Agreed Framework.


28 February 2003
South Korea's Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry issues a statement expressing "deep concern and regret" that North Korea decided to reactivate the reactor. In the statement, the ministry also "urge(s) North Korea to comply with our efforts, as well as those of the international community to find a peaceful resolution to the nuclear problem."


28 February 2003
The *Los Angeles Times* quotes a US government source as saying that North Korea has been conducting activities at a plutonium reprocessing plant located in the Yongbyon nuclear complex. [Note: The "activities" referred to by the anonymous source could be a reference to the deliveries of coal and plumes of smoke emitting from the boiler detected by US and Japanese intelligence in January. The boiler, adjacent to the reprocessing facility, is used to maintain the temperature of the nitric acid solution used in plutonium reprocessing.]


March to May 2003
According to an 11 June *Sankei Shimbun* report that cites "an informed source on Korean Peninsula issues," Iranian nuclear specialists visit North Korea three times from March to May. According to the "informed source," a delegation of Iranian officials from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran visit North Korea on 1 March for several days, and subsequently return to North Korea in April and May. The Iranian delegations reportedly seek advice from North Korean officials on how to manage IAEA inspections of a suspected nuclear weapons program.


Early March 2003
According to Japanese government sources, North Korean and Japanese government officials hold several informal telephone conversations during which the North Korean officials indicate that Pyongyang would be willing to participate in multilateral talks to resolve issues related to its nuclear program, backing off from its earlier demand that only bilateral talks with the United States would resolve the crisis.

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2 March 2003
North Korean radio broadcasts a commentary stating, "Should war break out on the Korean Peninsula due to the US imperialists, it will escalate into a nuclear war." The commentary continues, "Then, not only the Korean people in the North and South but the people in Asia and many countries around the world will suffer from a frightful nuclear catastrophe."

2 March 2003
Four North Korean MiG-29s intercept a US reconnaissance plane over international waters 150 miles from the North Korean coast. The MiGs, one of which flew within 50 feet of the RC-135S reconnaissance plane, reportedly attempt to force the US plane to land in North Korea. Following the incident, the United States suspends reconnaissance flights over the Sea of Japan, but flights resume ten days later. [Note: Due to heightening tension on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea's test-launch of anti-ship missiles into the Sea of Japan on 24 February, the United States had been conducting routine reconnaissance flights in anticipation of a ballistic missile launch by North Korea.]

3 March 2003
In an interview with Sankei Shimbun, North Korean defector Kim Tae Ho says that North Korea's nuclear industry relies heavily on machinery and equipment imported from Japan via an unnamed Southeast Asian country. Kim says that materials and equipment used in the Yongbyon nuclear complex, from high acid resistant stainless steel liquid waste tanks and pipes, drainage pumps, hydraulic boring machines, to transportation trucks, were all of Japanese origin.

4 March to 2 April 2003
US and South Korean forces conduct the annual Foal Eagle combined military exercises simulating a repelled invasion from North Korea. On 19 March, US and South Korean forces begin the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) combined military exercises integrating it with the second half of the Foal Eagle exercises. The United States deploys the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson and six F-117 stealth bombers to participate in the RSOI exercises. [Note: North Korea repeatedly condemns the military exercises as a rehearsal for a preemptive nuclear attack and subsequent invasion of North Korea.]

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
5 March 2003
The Washington Post, quoting a Senate source familiar with the Bush administration’s evolving North Korea policy, reports that the United States is resigned to North Korea becoming a nuclear power and is now focusing on preventing North Korea from exporting nuclear material. However, Ari Fleisher, White House press secretary, denies the report, claiming, "It is important to make certain that there is a denuclearized peninsula. And that's why we're working so hard on this and why we have called directly and publicly for North Korea to dismantle its nuclear programs."

6 March 2003
In a televised news conference, US President George W. Bush says that the only way to resolve the nuclear issue with North Korea is through multilateral talks, and thus the United States must convince nations with vested interests that "they must stand up to their responsibility."

6 March 2003
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says that the United States is currently considering moving US forces stationed in South Korea away from the DMZ. Speaking at a Pentagon town hall meeting, Rumsfeld says, "We still have a lot of forces in Korea arranged very far forward, where it's intrusive in their lives, and where they really aren't very flexible or usable for other things." Rumsfeld adds that while the United States remains committed to maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea "has all the capability in the world of providing the kind of up-front deterrent that is needed."

7 March 2003
South Korea's Prime Minister Ko Kun tells US ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard that "the role of the US troops as a tripwire must be maintained." Responding to US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's statements on 6 March that US forces should be redeployed away from the demilitarized zone, Ko tells Hubbard that it would be "inappropriate to talks about redeploying US troops at this time, given the tension surrounding the nuclear issue."

7 March 2003
The Korean Central News Agency says that the nuclear standoff between the United States and North Korea "can surely be solved if the US has a will to settle it through dialogues and negotiations with the DPRK."

8 March 2003
Kim Myong Ch'ol, executive director of the Tokyo-based Center for Korean-American Peace, a group with ties to the North Korean government, says that North Korea will test-fire a missile capable of "splashing down off Los
Angeles or New York" if the Bush administration refuses to participate in bilateral talks. Kim also warns that if the United States carries out a preemptive strike on the Yongbyon nuclear complex, North Korea will retaliate with missile attacks that will "leave Washington, New York and Chicago aflame."


9 March 2003

A Minju Joson commentary claims that the United States is currently planning a preemptive attack on North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear complex. The commentary says that the US Department of Defense has developed plans to use not only air raids and cruise missile attacks, but also tactical nuclear weapons. The piece concludes that North Korea's "army and people will take every possible self-defensive measure to cope with the US forces' new war moves."


10 March 2003

The Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, says that the combined military exercises currently being conducted by US and South Korean forces are merely preparations for a preemptive nuclear strike on North Korea in the summer. The commentary also claims that North Korea will not sit by idly while it is just a matter of time before a nuclear war erupts on the Korean Peninsula.


11 March 2003

The Rodong Sinmun calls on the United States to participate in bilateral talks to resolve the standoff over North Korea's nuclear program, saying "negotiations are neither a sort of reward to be given by one party to the other party nor a business dealing in which one party makes a profit while the other party suffers a loss."


11 March 2003

The US Department of Defense announces that the United States is deploying six F-117 stealth bombers to South Korea to participate in joint military exercises. [Note: The bombers arrive at Kunsan Air Base on 14 March.]


12 March 2003

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, says that North Korea's uranium enrichment program is becoming a serious threat to international security, claiming it is "only probably a matter of months and not years behind the plutonium [program]."


12 March 2003

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Speaking before the US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, General Leon LaPorte, commander of US Forces Korea, says, "According to estimates by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea has an untested ballistic missile capable of delivering a payload the size of a nuclear weapon to parts of the continental United States." General LaPorte also states that according to US military assessments, "the Kim regime believes possession of nuclear weapons will guarantee survival."

12 March 2003
North Korean radio quotes Kim Jong Il as saying that the United States is solely to blame for the current nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula since it has continuously threatened North Korea with nuclear weapons located in South Korea.

13 March 2003
The Rodong Sinmun, the newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, quotes Kim Jong Il as saying that the United States' recent deployment of two dozen bombers to Guam is "none other than a part of their military adventure maneuvers aimed at suddenly launching a preemptive strike against our republic with nuclear weapons." Kim is also quoted as saying, "The US imperialists are trying to provoke a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula by all means and expand it into a global thermonuclear war."

13 March 2003
US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton claims in an article published in the Far Eastern Economic Review that the United States was surprised that when it confronted North Korea with evidence of a clandestine uranium enrichment program in October 2002, North Korean officials broke with tradition and "brazenly admitted to developing a uranium-enrichment program (sic)."

14-15 March 2003
Representatives from over forty nations participate in track-two talks in Berkeley, California aimed at resolving the standoff over North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons program. While the talks are unofficial, many of the delegates, including three North Koreans, have close ties to their respective governments. The three participating North Koreans are Han Song Ryol, North Korean ambassador to the UN, Cho Kil Hong and Kim Sam Ch’ong, respectively deputy director and senior researcher at North Korea’s Institute for Disarmament and Peace. During the talks, Kim reportedly says that North Korea’s nuclear program is not intended to threaten anyone but is only intended to defend North Korea from the United States.

15 March 2003

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
A commentary appearing in the Rodong Sinmun, official newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, claims that the current combined military exercises being conducted by the United States and South Korea—Foal Eagle and Reception, Staging Onward Movement and Integration—are aimed at preparing for an invasion of North Korea using nuclear weapons. The commentary states that by integrating the two military exercises, the United States is "trying to once and for all complete preparations for a nuclear war for northward aggression and launch a nuclear preemptive strike against [North Korea] at any given moment."


16 March 2003
Japan's Yomiuri Weekly, citing an anonymous military authority, reports that North Korea successfully developed a nuclear warhead triggering device in 1990.


17 March 2003
Ra Jong Il, Senior Advisor for National Security to South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun, says that North Korea has not made any apparent preparations to begin reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods.


18 March 2003
South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun calls for multilateral talks to resolve the current standoff over North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program. Speaking at the commencement ceremony of the Korea Air Force Academy, Roh says, "Not only dialogue with the North and cooperation with the United States and Japan, but also a cooperative framework involving China, Russia and the European Union should be activated. [Note: This is the first time that President Roh has explicitly called for multilateral talks to resolve issues related to North Korea's nuclear program.]


19 March 2003
Robert Gallucci, special envoy to the Korean Peninsula during the Clinton administration, says that the Clinton administration knew of North Korea's uranium enrichment program. Speaking at Korea University, Gallucci says that the Clinton administration had planned to bring up the matter with North Korea but never had the opportunity.


21 March 2003
In an interview with the Mainichi Shimbun, US Ambassador to Japan Howard Baker says that the United States would not consider a preemptive attack on North Korea until first consulting with Japan and South Korea. Baker

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reiterates Washington's position that it seeks a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula.


24 March 2003

The United States imposes economic sanctions on Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories and North Korea's Ch'anggwang Shinyong Corporation for "engaging in proliferation activities." The sanctions, imposed pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act and Executive Order 12938, prevent the US governmental or private sector from conducting business with either of the named entities for two years. Since the United States did not conduct business with either entity in Pakistan or North Korea, the sanctions are mainly a symbolic protest of missile technology transfers from North Korea to Pakistan. [Note: Khan Research Laboratories is primarily responsible for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and Ch'anggwang Shinyong Corporation is the financial institution that processes payments for North Korean missile-related exports. While Pakistan is suspected of transferring uranium enrichment technology to North Korea through the Khan Laboratories, a US State Department spokesman claims that the sanctions "were for a specific missile-related transfer." The US embassy in Islamabad issued a statement following the implementation of the sanctions, claiming that the Khan Laboratory is charged with "material contribution to the efforts of a foreign country, person or entity of proliferation concern, to use, acquire, design, develop and or secure weapons of mass destruction." However, in the purposefully vague statement the embassy does not mention whether the Khan Laboratory is being sanctioned because of transfers of nuclear technology or receipt of missile technology.]


Late March 2003

Cho Myong Rok, first vice chairman of North Korea's National Defense Commission, travels to China to receive treatment for chronic kidney problems. [Note: In 2002, Cho, the highest ranking military official after Kim Jong Il, reportedly received a kidney transplant at the same Beijing hospital.]


Late March 2003

According to South Korean Defense Ministry officials, Washington informs Seoul of its intention to relocate the Army's 2nd Infantry Division south of the Han River in the latter half of 2003. This move would put the 2nd Infantry Division out of range of North Korean long-range artillery.


26 March 2003

The Korean People's Army sends a message to the United Nations Command (UNC) stating that North Korea would no longer send delegates to meet with US and UN officers for routine meetings at the liaisons office in the truce village of P'annunjom. The message is reportedly delivered by Lee Chan Bok to UNC Deputy Chief of Staff Major General James Soligan by telephone. The Korean Central News Agency reports that Lee informed Soligan that any

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economic sanctions imposed on North Korea would be viewed as a breach of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, and if sanctions were imposed, North Korea would respond by abandoning all commitments made under the Armistice Agreement.


26 March 2003
Speaking before the US House Appropriations Committee, Secretary of State Colin Powell says that the United States has no intention of launching a preemptive military strike against North Korea. Powell also claims that while the administration does not want to withdraw all US forces stationed in South Korea, officials from Washington and Seoul have been discussing the possible redeployment of US troops in South Korea.


27 March 2003
North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly allocates 15.4 percent of the annual budget for defense expenditures, an increase from 14.9 percent for 2002. The increase in defense expenditures is part of a 14.4 percent increase in the overall expenditures. In order to fund the budgetary increases, the Supreme People’s Assembly announces that it will sell government bonds for the first time since the Korean War. The Supreme People’s Assembly also adopts a new military service law by which government officials who have not previously served in the military must join the Korean People's Army for at least three years. [Note: North Korean military budget figures are opaque, but the announced figures can be interpreted as a trend.]


28 March 2003
US Secretary of State Colin Powell informs South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Yong Kwan that China has proposed three-way talks between the United States, China and North Korea in order to discuss the ways of resolving to rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Yun, considering the "seriousness of the situation," accepts the three-party talks that exclude South Korea with the understanding that South Korea would participate in subsequent rounds of talks. [Note: The three-party talks are held in Beijing 23-24 April.]


29 March 2003
A commentary appearing in the Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers Party, states that North Korea "would have already met the same miserable fate as Iraq's had it compromised its revolutionary principle and accepted the demand raised by the imperialists and its followers for 'nuclear inspection' and disarmament."


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31 March 2003
During talks with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, Thomas Fargo, commander of the US Pacific Fleet, says that a strong deterrent is necessary in dealing with North Korea. Fargo adds that while North Korea should not be provoked, the international community must demonstrate that North Korea's nuclear weapons program is intolerable.

1 April 2003
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov says that the US-led war against Iraq is pushing North Korea to improve its defenses. Losyukov claims that it "is absolutely clear" that North Korea will pursue nuclear weapons more vigorously as a result of perceived threat of a US-led war against Iraq.

1 April 2003
Pakistani Information Minister Sheikh Rashid, responding to recent US sanctions on Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories, claims that Pakistan has never imported nor exported nuclear weapons technology. [Note: The United States imposed the sanctions on 24 March pursuant to Executive Order 12938. While Pakistan is suspected of transferring uranium enrichment technology to North Korea through the Khan Laboratories, a US State Department spokesman claims that the sanctions "were for a specific missile-related transfer."]

6 April 2003
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement saying that US military actions against Iraq "suggest that even the signing of a nonaggression treaty with the US would not help avert a war." The Foreign Ministry says that the only way to avert war is for North Korea to develop a "tremendous military deterrent force."

Early to Mid April 2003
North Korea attempts to import three direct-currency stabilizers from Japan. The stabilizers are seized before they are unloaded in Thailand, where they were reportedly to be diverted to North Korea. On 8 May, Tokyo police raid Meishin, the Japanese company that exported the stabilizers. [Note: Direct-currency stabilizers, also called frequency converters, can be used for gas centrifuges.]

9 April 2003
The UN Security Council meets to discuss ways to resolve the growing nuclear crisis in North Korea but is unable to reach agreement reportedly due to China's refusal to support even a non-binding statement by the Security Council president condemning North Korea's recent moves to reactivate its nuclear weapons program. [Note: The five permanent members of the UN Security Council had met many times leading up to the 9 April meeting, but on
8 April, the Chinese representative expressed strong opposition to any statement or resolution condemning North Korea. Speaking at an 8 April press conference in Beijing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said, "We think intervention by the UN Security Council now cannot help resolve the North Korean nuclear issue." Russia also did not support the resolution and reportedly informed the United States of its belief that if the Security Council adopted a resolution denouncing North Korea, Pyongyang would retaliate by officially declaring itself a nuclear power.


10 April 2003
South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Yong Kwan meets with Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing in Beijing. The two agree to work together to persuade North Korea to participate in a multilateral dialogue in order to resolve issues related to its nuclear weapons program in a multilateral forum.


10 April 2003
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officially recognizes that North Korea has withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). [Note: On 10 January, Pyongyang issued a statement announcing its withdrawal from the NPT, but the IAEA claimed that North Korea had to wait 90 days from the time of notification before the withdrawal would be official. North Korea is the first country to withdraw from the NPT since it came into force in 1970.]


12 April 2003
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement saying that since North Korea is no longer a signatory to the NPT, there is no reason to resolve issues related to its nuclear program in a multilateral forum. The spokesman adds that North Korea seeks direct bilateral talks with the United States in order to confirm whether or not Washington has the political willingness to abandon its hostile policy toward North Korea. However, the spokesman states that North Korea is prepared to resolve the crisis without sticking "to any particular dialogue format."


12 April 2003
The Korean Central News Agency reports that at the 9 April UN Security Council meeting addressing North Korea's nuclear program, only the United States and one other country supported a resolution calling on North Korea to retract its withdrawal from the NPT.


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12 April 2003
French and German authorities board the French ship Ville de Virgo and seize 214 aluminum tubes bound for North Korea. The aluminum tubes, made of a special alloy called 6061-T6, could have been used in the construction of up to 3,500 gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment.

15 April 2003
US President George W. Bush meets with Secretary of State Colin Powell and reportedly approves a negotiating strategy for the upcoming trilateral talks with China and North Korea by which the United States will not settle for a freeze on North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Instead, the United States will demand that North Korea completely dismantle its nuclear weapons program. Senior administration officials announce the negotiating position on 16 April, adding that they had low expectations for the first round of talks scheduled to begin on 23 April.

15 April 2003
Speaking at a meeting of Japanese and Iranian lawmakers, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohsen Aminzadeh says that Iran will not export nuclear or missile-related technology to North Korea.

16 April 2003
Japanese government officials announce that Japan and South Korea will participate in the second round of multilateral talks aimed at reducing tension on the Korean Peninsula and resolving issues related to North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The first round of talks, scheduled to begin on 23 April, will only involve delegations from the United States, North Korea and China.

18 April 2003
The Korean Central News Agency quotes a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying, "as we have already declared, we are successfully reprocessing more than 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods at the final phase as we sent interim information to the US and other countries." [Note: Many observers believed the statement to be an admission by the North Korean Foreign Ministry that North Korea had not only begun reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods but had also informed other nations when it did so. However, officials from the United States, South Korea and Japan deny having been informed by North Korea that it had commenced reprocessing the fuel rods. On 19 April, the US government Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS) determined that the Foreign Ministry spokesman had not stated that North Korea had begun reprocessing spent fuel rods, but instead, KCNA had mistranslated an ambiguous statement. The FBIS translation is as follows: "We are successfully completing the final phase to the point of the reprocessing operation for some 8,000 spent fuel rods." On 21 April, KCNA posts a revised version of the English translation which states that North Korea has progressed "to the point of reprocessing fuel rods.”]
19 April 2003

19 April 2003
Kim Ryong Song, chief North Korean delegate to the inter-Korean ministerial talks, sends a message to South Korean Unification Minister Chong Sae Hyon proposing that the next round of talks be held on 27-29 April in Pyongyang. On 21 April, South Korea agrees to participate in the delayed talks. [Note: The tenth round of ministerial talks were originally scheduled for 7-10 April, but North Korea failed to respond to South Korea's requests for preliminary talks and never invited the South Korean delegation to Pyongyang, the scheduled venue.] —Jong Heon Lee, "N. Korea Proposes Talks with South," United Press International, 19 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, http://web.lemis-nexis.com; "Further on Inter-Korean Agreement to Hold 10th Cabinet-Level Talks 27-29 April," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 21 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, http://web.lemis-nexis.com.

22 April 2003
The *Australian Report*, citing "well-informed sources close to US thinking," reports that the US Department of Defense has developed a detailed plan to carry out precision strikes against North Korea's nuclear facilities and selected artillery units located near the demilitarized zone if North Korea begins reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods.

22 April 2003
South Korean Defense Minister Cho Yong Kil tells the National Assembly that he believes that even though North Korea has completed preparations to reprocess 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods, it has not actually started

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reprocessing.

22 April 2003
Thomas Hubbard, US ambassador to South Korea, tells the South Korean press that the United States will not compensate North Korea for merely placing a freeze on its nuclear activities. However, Hubbard says the United States is prepared to implement a new "bold approach" in dealing with North Korea if it abandons its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible manner.

23-24 April 2003
China, the United States and North Korea hold trilateral talks in Beijing aimed at resolving the standoff over North Korea's nuclear program. The Chinese, US and North Korean delegations are headed respectively by Fu Ying, director general of the Asian Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs, and Li Gun, deputy director general of the American Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry. During the first day of talks, Li reportedly claims that North Korea has almost completed reprocessing 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods. Li also reportedly tells Kelly on the sidelines of the talks that North Korea already possesses nuclear weapons and threatens to conduct a nuclear test or export nuclear material. According to the Washington Times, Li tells Kelly, "We can't dismantle them. It's up to you whether we do a physical demonstration or transfer them." However, according to other accounts of Li's statement, Li did not explicitly threaten that North Korea would conduct a nuclear test or sell nuclear material, stating vaguely that North Korea might take "physical actions." At the talks, the North Korean delegation also presents a proposal for resolving the nuclear standoff by which the United States would offer diplomatic recognition and provide security assurances and economic assistance in return for North Korea's pledge to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. The North Korean proposal also reportedly calls for US-North Korean bilateral talks to be followed shortly by multilateral talks including China, Japan and South Korean. The talks, originally schedules for 23-25 April end a day early. [Note: The exact meaning of Li's claim that North Korea has almost completed reprocessing 8,000 nuclear fuel rods is not clear since sources present at the talks contend that Li used the same ambiguous language as the 18 April Foreign Ministry statement which sparked diplomatic tension due to an apparent mistranslation by KCNA.]

24 April 2003
Kim Il Chol, minister of the North Korea People's Armed Forces, claims that the North Korean army is "equipped

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with powerful offensive and defensive means capable of defeating any formidable enemy at one swoop."

24 April 2003
US President George W. Bush, commenting on the recently concluded Beijing talks, tells NBC News that North Korea is "back to the old blackmail game." On the same day, Secretary of State Colin Powell says that North Korea should not walk away from the Beijing talks "with the slightest impression that the United States and its partners will be intimidated by bellicose statements or by threats."

25 April 2003
The North Korean Foreign Ministry releases a statement saying that at the recently concluded Beijing talks the North Korean delegation offered a "new bold proposal" to settle the nuclear standoff. However, the Ministry claims the US delegation replied only be saying that it would not continue dialogue until North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable manner.

27-30 April 2003
North and South Korea hold the tenth round of ministerial-level talks in Pyongyang. The North and South Korean delegations are respectively headed by North Korean Senior Cabinet Councilor Kim Ryong Song and South Korean Unification Minister Ch'ong Sae Hyon. During the talks, the South Korean delegation demands that North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons program, but the North Korean delegation reportedly dismisses the demand, refusing to clarify the reported admission at talks with the United States and China in Beijing, and claiming that its nuclear program is an issue to be discussed only in bilateral US-North Korean talks. In a joint statement released at the conclusion of the talks, the two sides agree to "cooperate in resolving the nuclear standoff peacefully through dialogue."

28 April 2003
In a daily press briefing, US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher confirms that at talks held in Beijing on 23-24 April the head of the North Korean delegation stated that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons.

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29 April 2003
White House spokesman Ari Fleisher says that the United States "will not reward North Korea for bad behavior." Commenting on the proposal presented by North Korea to the United States at trilateral talks held in Beijing on 23-24 April, Fleisher says, "We will not provide them (North Korea) with inducements for doing what they always said they were going to do anyway."

30 April 2003
A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman states that even though North Korea supported denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, "the reality requires the DPRK to deter the escalating US moves to strike the DPRK with a physical force, compels it to opt for possessing a necessary deterrent force and put it into practice."

Late April to Early May 2003
US reconnaissance satellites reportedly discover increased human activity at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and plumes of smoke coming from the Radiochemistry Laboratory, which indicates that North Korea has likely begun reprocessing its 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods. However, commenting on the reports, White House spokesman Ari Fleisher says that intelligence analysts have come to "no hard conclusions" on whether or not North Korea has begun reprocessing the fuel rods.

3 May 2003
According to the New York Times, US President George W. Bush informs visiting Australian Prime Minister John Howard that the United States may refocus its strategy from trying to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons to preventing North Korea from transferring nuclear material to other states or non-state actors. The New York Times quotes an anonymous official present at the talks as saying, "The president said that the central worry is not what they’ve got, but where it goes. He’s very pragmatic about it, and the reality is that we probably won’t know the extent of what they are producing. So the whole focus is to keep the plutonium from going further.” However, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, speaking to reporters on 5 May following the New York Times report, denies that the US has shifted its North Korea policy, stating that the US is still committed to impressing upon North Korea that it should eliminate its nuclear weapons program.

7 May 2003
South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Yun Yong Kwan says, "Only the verifiable and irreversible
scraping of North Korea's nuclear programs can lead to security guarantees and economic aid for the North." Yun adds, "The United States and the international community will not reward North Korea for its bad behavior."

8 May 2003
Tokyo police raid Meishin, a Japanese company run by pro-Pyongyang Korean residents in Japan, for reportedly attempting to export to North Korea frequency converters that could be used in a uranium enrichment program. Hong Kong authorities reportedly seize the devices after being alerted by Japanese officials. [Note: In mid-1999, the US Department of Energy issued a report stating that North Korea's Taesong Yushin Trading Company had recently ordered two frequency converters from a Japanese company, but the transfer was not confirmed.]

11 May 2003
The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers Party, claims that the United States' hostile policy has forced North Korea to arm itself with "the necessary deterrent and translate it into action."

12 May 2002
The Korean Central News Agency reports that the 1992 North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has been reduced to a "dead document" because of the hostile US attitude against North Korea. The report also states that North Korea will arm itself with a "physical means of deterrence" in order to cope with hostile US intentions.

13 May 2003
Germany's Interior Minister Otto Schily presents a report of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution stating that North Korean diplomats in Germany are involved in "intelligence service activities," and have been attempting to procure "sensitive goods" for North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

14 May 2003
South Korean Unification Ministry spokesman Kim Chong No says that despite Pyongyang's admission that it possesses nuclear weapons and has begun reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods, construction of the two KEDO light-water nuclear reactors continues. According to Kim, 605 South Koreans, 353 Uzbeks and 99 North Koreans are currently working on the reactors. Kim also announces that as of April 2003, South Korea has spent $850 million on the project.

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14 May 2003

US President George W. Bush and South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun meet in Washington. After the meeting the two leaders issue a joint statement in which they state that they "will not tolerate" nuclear weapons in North Korea and will continue to work toward "the complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program through peaceful means based on international cooperation."


20 May 2003

At inter-Korean economic cooperation talks held in Pyongyang, South Korean Vice Finance and Economy Minister Kim Kwang Lim tells the North Korean delegation that if North Korea continues to raise tension on the peninsula with its nuclear weapons program, South Korea will not be able to promote inter-Korean business projects. In response, Pak Ch'ang Ryon, head of the North Korean delegation, warns that South Korea will suffer an "unspeakable catastrophe" if it continues to support US efforts to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program.


20 May 2003

Testifying before the US Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee, North Korean defector Lee Bok Koo (pseudonym) says that ninety percent of the equipment used in North Korea's nuclear weapons program has been imported from Japan. [Note: This figure is not credible or reliable.]


23 May 2003

US President George W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi meet at the president's ranch in Crawford, Texas. Immediately following the meeting, Bush says at a joint press conference that the two leaders remain confident that the standoff over North Korea's nuclear weapons program can be resolved diplomatically, but "further escalation of the situation by North Korea will require tougher measures from the international community."


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30 May to 1 June 2003
Curt Weldon, vice chairman of the US House Armed Services Committee, leads a group of six US congressmen to Pyongyang to meet with North Korean officials including Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun, and Ch'oi Tae Bok, chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly. After the trip, Weldon tells reporters in Seoul that senior North Korean officials confirmed that North Korea currently possesses nuclear weapons and is in the final stages of reprocessing 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods. Despite the admission, Weldon claims that the "extensive and lengthy meetings" with senior North Korean officials were amicable, leading him to believe that there is "a window of opportunity" to resolve the crisis peacefully before it erupts into military conflict.

31 May 2003
US President George W. Bush announces a plan to interdict ships and planes suspected of transferring weapons of mass destruction. Bush announces the plan, called the Proliferation Security Initiative, at a speech in Krakow, Poland.
—US President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President to the People of Poland, Krakow, Poland, 31 May 2003, www.whitehouse.gov.

June 2003
In an interview with Gendai, a Japanese monthly, An Yong Chol (pseudonym), a former general in the Korean People's Army, claims that North Korea imported four intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads from the Soviet Union in 1983. According to An, the nuclear missiles, which have a range of 8,000km and are targeted at the US mainland, are located at an underground facility in P'odae-ri, Samjiyon-kun, Yanggang Province. In addition to the four Soviet origin nuclear missiles, An claims North Korea has indigenously developed dozens of nuclear missiles with a range of 4,000km. These missiles are reportedly targeted at US military bases in Okinawa. An also states that North Korea, under the guidance of the Soviet Union, built a secret nuclear base in Cuba in the 1970s. [Note: An's claims are highly suspect. Many North Korean defectors exaggerate claims and distort information in order to inflate their personal value to the countries to which they defect. Hideshi Takesada, a professor at Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies, tells Agence France Presse that An "may possibly be a defector who has been sent by the North or wants to whip up fear as a gift for the North."

2 June 2003
Time reports that in May the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recruited a foreign nuclear scientist who had worked on North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Citing two anonymous US officials and a "foreign government source," Time reports that the scientist has provided information on the "location, degree of development in capabilities, where they are, how far along they are in developing multiple-weapons capabilities." The scientist reportedly tells the CIA that North Korea's nuclear weapons program is much further along than it had thought.

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4 June 2003
Speaking before the House International Relations Committee, John Bolton, US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, says that because many rogue states seeking weapons of mass destruction "are nearly immune to conventional diplomatic dialogue," the United States is considering other "robust techniques" to combat WMD proliferation such as economic sanctions, interdiction and preemptive attacks. With regard to North Korea, Bolton says, "While all options remain on the table, the United States has made clear repeatedly and at the highest levels that we seek a peaceful, diplomatic end to North Korea's nuclear weapons program."

7 June 2003
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun meet in Tokyo to discuss various bilateral issues including how to deal with North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The two leaders agree that North Korea must dismantle its nuclear weapons program in a "verifiable and irreversible manner," and they also agree that the issue should be resolved in a "peaceful and diplomatic manner."

9 June 2003
The Korean Central News Agency reports that if the United States does eliminate its hostile policy toward North Korea, Pyongyang "will have no option but to build up a nuclear deterrent force." According to KCNA, North Korea's intention to build up a nuclear deterrent is based on a desire to reduce the size of conventional forces while maintaining the same level of military deterrence. The report also claims that since North Korea is no longer a party to the NPT, it is as entitled under international as the United States to possess nuclear weapons.

12 June 2003
Delegates from eleven countries meet in Madrid to discuss a program of interdicting vessels from "rogue states" suspected of shipping weapons of mass destruction technology or missile technology. The eleven countries that participated in the meeting are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Australia and the United States. [Note: The meeting is part of the Proliferation Security Initiative, which was first introduced by US President George W. Bush during a 31 May speech in Poland.]

12-13 June 2003
Representatives from the United Stated, Japan and South Korea meet in Hawaii for a meeting of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group aimed at coordinating policies on North Korea. In a joint statement issued at the conclusion of the talks, the delegations state that while North Korea's nuclear weapons program will not be tolerated, the conflict should be resolved peacefully and diplomatically through five-party talks that include Japan, South Korea and China. At the talks, the US delegation reportedly suggests halting the project to build two light water nuclear reactors in August and beginning talks to dissolve KEDO, the consortium in charge of the light water

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reactor project.

13 June 2003
South Korean Unification Minister Chong Se Hyon says that if North Korea "worsens the nuclear situation, it will inevitably affect exchanges and cooperation between South and North Korea."

18 June 2003
A commentary appearing in the Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers Party, claims that the United States' insistence that North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons program before commencing negotiations is merely "intended to contain (North Korea) with ease after forcing it to disarm itself."

18 June 2003
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement saying that North Korea "will put further spurs to increasing its nuclear deterrent force for self-defense as a just self-defense measure to cope with the US strategy to isolate and stifle (North Korea)."

19 June 2003
At the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, US Secretary of State Colin Powell and North Korean Ambassador Ho Jong meet informally for three minutes. Powell reportedly reiterates the United States desire to resolve the standoff over North Korea's nuclear program through multilateral talks that include China, Japan and South Korea.

24 June 2003
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf tells US President George W. Bush that Pakistan will have no military cooperation with North Korea in the future. Speaking to reporters the following day, Musharraf says, "It is an issue of the past, there is no linkage whatsoever between Pakistan and North Korea."

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24 June 2003
Minju Choson, a North Korean publication, reports that aggressive moves by the United States compel North Korea "to increase its nuclear deterrent."

Late June 2003
Charles Kartman, executive director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), travels to Japan and South Korea to discuss the future of KEDO. On 27 June, Kartman meets with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi and Katsunari Suzuki, the Japanese official in charge of KEDO issues. Kawaguchi reportedly warns Kartman that suspension of the KEDO project at this time could seriously hinder the proposed upcoming multilateral talks. On 30 June, Kartman meets with South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Yong Kwan and warns that the future of KEDO depends on the amount of progress made in talks with North Korea regarding its nuclear weapons program. [Note: During a meeting of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group held in Hawaii from 12 to 13 June, the United States representative suggested abandoning the KEDO project in August if no progress had been made in urging North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program.]

27 June 2003
US Ambassador to Japan Howard Baker warns North Korea that the international community could easily grow impatient "in the face of serial provocations" by North Korea, adding that the United States has not taken any option off the table.

Early July 2003
Park Kap Tong, a North Korean defector currently living in Japan, meets with the US National Security Council and advises high ranking Bush administration officials that Kim Jong Il has made the decision to develop nuclear weapons and will not stop even if the United States tries to implement a system of verifiable inspections. Warning that North Korea will use nuclear weapons against South Korea, Japan and the United States if given the time to develop a miniaturized nuclear warhead, Park advises the administration officials to carry out preemptive strikes against "selected targets" in North Korea in order to destroy Kim Jong Il's regime. [Note: Park is the head of the National Salvation Front, a group of high ranking military and civilian defectors from North Korea.]

1 July 2003
The New York Times reports that in recent weeks the US Central Intelligence Agency has discovered a new high explosive test site in Yongdok-dong, Kusong, North P'yong'an Province, North Korea. According to US intelligence officials cited in the report, the test site is could be used to develop high-explosive triggering devices necessary for miniaturizing nuclear warheads. [Note: The site is not new.]

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1 July 2003
The chief of the P'Anmunjom mission of the Korean People's Army (KPA) warns the United States that any type of economic sanctions or blockades will be met with "merciless retaliatory measures" as the KPA will no longer be bound by the Armistice Agreement.


2-3 July 2003
Representatives from the United States, Japan and South Korea meet in Washington to discuss how to diplomatically resolve the standoff over North Korea's nuclear weapons program. All three delegations agree to call on North Korea to resolve the nuclear standoff through five-party talks that would include representatives from the United States and North Korea as well as China, Japan and South Korea. According to sources close to the talks, the three sides agree to discuss suspending the KEDO light water reactor project if negotiations with North Korea do not produce any results by the end of August. [Note: US officials reportedly want to make a decision on the suspension or cancellation of the KEDO project before Congress begins debate in early September on the budget for fiscal year 2004.]


3 July 2003
South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Yun Yong Kwan says that there is no evidence that North Korea has begun reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods.


4 July 2003
Hwang Chang Yop, the highest ranking North Korean ever to defect to the South, tells the South Korean National Assembly that in 1996 Kim Jong Il and Chon Pyong Ho, one of Kim’s top aides on national security, told him personally that North Korea had developed nuclear weapons. Hwang also says that by the time he defected in 1997, North Korea had concluded a deal to obtain uranium enrichment technology from Pakistan. In addition, Hwang claims, North Korea had plans to conduct an underground nuclear explosion in 1991 or 1992.


5 July 2003
A South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade official says that North Korea has not begun full-scale reprocessing of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel cells in its possession. Instead, the official claims, North Korea conducted limited tests of its reprocessing facilities between late April and Early May.

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6 July 2003
Colonel Shin Chae Kon of South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) says that following the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea diverted all of its top scientists from working on its plutonium-based nuclear weapons program to a uranium-based nuclear weapons program. In an article published in the JCS magazine, Shin also claims that North Korea is most likely developing a "gun-type" uranium bomb instead of a more technologically complicated implosion device.

8 July 2003
During an unannounced meeting at the UN in New York, North Korean representatives to the UN reportedly tell Charles "Jack" Pritchard, a State Department official, that on 30 June North Korea completed reprocessing 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods and is currently using the plutonium to make additional nuclear weapons.

9 July 2003
South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) reports to the National Assembly Intelligence Committee that according to NIS estimates, "North Korea has recently reprocessed a small number of the 8,000 fuel rods it was keeping in Yongbyon-kun." The NIS also reports that North Korea has conducted over 70 tests of suspected nuclear triggering devices in Yongdok-dong, Kusong, North P'yon'an Province.

9-10 July 2003
Representatives of eleven nations meet in Brisbane, Australia to support a US plan to intercept North Korean shipments of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The eleven nations involved in the plan, called the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), are Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Britain and the United States. In a statement adopted on 10 July, the participant nations of the PSI voice support for the initiative and also agree to increase the level of intelligence sharing regarding suspect shipments. [Note: North Korea has stated on numerous occasions that it would consider any interdiction an act of war.]

10-12 July 2003
Representatives of North and South Korea meet in Seoul for the eleventh Inter-Korean Ministerial Meeting. The North and South Korean delegations are headed by Kim Ryong Song and Chong Se Hyon respectively. In his opening speech, Kim blames the United States for the current nuclear standoff and says that North Korea is prepared for both dialogue and war. The South Korean delegation urges North Korea to accept a multilateral forum for discussing the issue with the United States, but the North Korean delegation remains recalcitrant, insisting that bilateral US-North Korean talks are the only way of resolving the standoff and thus must precede any multilateral talks.

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11 July 2003
South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Yun Yong Kwan, referring to North Korea's refusal to participate in multilateral talks on resolving the current nuclear standoff, tells that National Assembly that "if the North continues to refuse to abandon its existing policy and does not agree to negotiations, it will affect the way the (South Korean) government pursues the 'peace and prosperity policy' or the contents of the policy itself."

Mid July 2003
US and South Korean intelligence sources discover evidence suggesting that North Korea might possess a second plutonium reprocessing plant. According to US officials, sensors set up on North Korean borders have detected elevated levels of krypton-85, a signature emission released when the cladding of spent fuel rods is cut. While the levels of krypton-85 do not indicate that North Korea has reprocessed all 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods as North Korean officials have claimed, computer analysis of wind direction and the path of the krypton-85 gas indicates that it did not originate from the known reprocessing facility in Yongbyon-kun. In addition, a South Korea intelligence agent reports the existence of a second reprocessing plant northeast of the Yongbyon nuclear complex. [Note: Several scholars and South Korean officials dispute the conclusion that elevated levels of krypton-85 indicates that North Korea has a second reprocessing plant or has even begun reprocessing plutonium at the Radiochemistry Laboratory in Yongbyon-kun. These skeptics contend that the krypton gas could have originated from Russia, China or Japan, or North Korea could have deliberately released krypton gas that had been stored from earlier reprocessing in an attempt to exaggerate its nuclear progress. However, it might not be possible to "store" krypton-85 emissions for later release.]

15 July 2003
In an interview with the Washington Post, former US Secretary of Defense William Perry says that the nuclear standoff on the Korean Peninsula is spiraling out of control. Perry says, "The nuclear program now underway in North Korea poses an imminent danger of nuclear weapons being detonated in American cities."

18 July 2003
Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the IAEA, calls North Korea "the most serious threat to the nuclear nonproliferation regime."

18 July 2003
China's Deputy Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo meets with high ranking US officials in Washington to discuss ways to resolve the nuclear standoff with North Korea diplomatically. Bush administration officials reportedly tell Dai that

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the United States will participate in another round of trilateral talks with North Korea and China if the talks are immediately followed by multilateral talks that incorporate South Korea, Japan and possibly Russia. The officials also reportedly claimed that at the latter of the two meetings, the United States will present a plan for resolving the nuclear standoff.


21 July 2003
U.S. News and World Report, citing anonymous Bush administration officials, reports that senior officials in the Department of Defense are drafting a new war plan for a possible future military conflict with North Korea. The new plan, called Operation Plan 5030, reportedly calls for provocative pre-war maneuvers by US forces in Korea in order to deplete North Korean military resources before an actual confrontation. Such pre-war maneuvers would include flying RC-135 reconnaissance planes closer to the North Korean border in order to encourage North Korea to send fighter jets to intercept the plane and thus deplete limited supplies of jet fuel. Operation Plan 5030 has not been approved yet.


23 July 2003
Reuters, citing a source with close ties to the North Korean government, reports that North Korea is prepared to declare itself a nuclear power on 9 September if the nuclear standoff is not resolved by then.


31 July 2003
North Korean ambassador to Russia reportedly tells Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Yuri Fedotov that North Korea supports resolving the nuclear standoff on the Korean Peninsula through multilateral talks that would involve delegates from North Korea and the United States as well as China, Japan, Russia and South Korea.


31 July 2003
Representatives from the United States and North Korea meet in New York to discuss the format of future highlevel talks aimed at resolving North Korea's nuclear weapons crisis. According to the North Korean Foreign Ministry, the North Korean representative proposes a six-party format at which the United States and North Korea will hold bilateral meetings on the sidelines of talks that incorporate representatives from China, Japan, Russia and South Korea.


4 August 2003
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement that says six-party talks aimed at resolving the standoff over North Korea's nuclear program will soon be held in Beijing.

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4 August 2003
The Los Angeles Times reports that North Korean "military scientists were recently monitored entering Iranian nuclear facilities." The report cites "people inside Iran and foreign intelligence officials" as having asserted that the North Koreans are assisting Iran develop a nuclear warhead. According to the report, so many North Koreans are residing in Iran working on its missile and nuclear weapons programs that a resort on the Caspian Sea has been set aside for their personal use.


11 August 2003
During a meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing announces that China will host six-party talks in Beijing aimed at resolving the standoff over North Korea's nuclear crisis. The talks will take place over three days in late August.


13 August 2003
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement that says the upcoming six-party talks will amount to nothing if the United States insists upon North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons program before first signing a nonaggression treaty, normalizing diplomatic relations, and removing all economic sanctions. Until the United States takes these steps, the Foreign Ministry says, North Korea "will not abandon its nuclear deterrent force."


13 August 2003
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov tells reporters that "it would be fair to provide some security guarantees for North Korea." He questions whether the United States is ready to provide them, adding that the main goal of the six-party talks is to overcome the differences between the US and North Korea.


14 August 2003
China's Foreign Ministry announces that it will host six-party talks in Beijing 27-29 August in an effort to resolve the North Korean nuclear standoff. The participants will include representatives from the US, China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Russia.


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22 August 2003
Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi states that her South Korean counterpart, Yun Yong Kwan, supports Japan’s plans to raise the issue of North Korea’s past abductions at the upcoming six-party talks. North Korea admitted in September 2002 that it abducted 13 Japanese nationals decades earlier.

22 August 2003
Mitoji Yabunaka, head of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Asian and Oceanic Affairs Bureau, requests that the United States not withdraw its extended nuclear deterrence for Japan, regardless of the outcome of the six-party talks. Reflecting fears that Japan may lose the protection of the US nuclear umbrella after North Korea obtains security guarantees from the US, Yabunaka states that such guarantees should not ban the use of nuclear weapons in return for North Korea’s nuclear disarmament.

22 August 2003
North and South Korea agree on details to reconnect railways that have been severed since 1950. South Korea, which will provide all of the equipment, materials, and construction expertise, will be sending several teams of engineers to the North.

23 August 2003
A senior official of the US State Department, speaking on condition of anonymity, says the US would consider establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea but would not concede to North Korea’s demand for a nonaggression pact at the six-party talks.

24 August 2003
North Korea discloses details of a four-phase solution to the nuclear problem. The four phases are: 1) North Korea would announce its intention to abandon its nuclear program; 2) the United States would resume supplying fuel oil to North Korea; 3) the US and North Korea would sign a nonaggression treaty; and 4) North Korea would dismantle its nuclear facilities in exchange for the completion of a light-water power reactor. The proposal, which fails to address nuclear weapons, extracted plutonium, ballistic missiles, and Japanese abductions, is expected to be rejected by the US, Japan, and South Korea. [NOTE: The proposal was verbally presented during the US-DPRK-PRC trilateral talks in April 2003.]

27 August 2003
The first round of six-party talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue begin in Beijing. Heads of the

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27-29 August 2003
A North Korean delegate tells diplomats at the Six-Party Talks that the DPRK has "no choice but to declare its possession of nuclear weapons" and "conduct a nuclear weapons test." North Korean diplomats, however, reiterated that the DPRK would be willing to dismantle its nuclear programs if the United States "changed its hostile policies, stopped obstructing North Korea's economic growth, and aided the energy needs of North Korea." The US voiced optimism and called the Beijing meeting a "positive session." The six delegations maintained their respective positions and failed to make progress but agreed to continue talks and meet again in Beijing within two months.


30 August 2003
A North Korea Foreign Ministry spokesman, commenting on the Six-Party Talks that concluded yesterday in Beijing, says that the North Korean delegation "made clear its consistent stand on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and set out reasonable and comprehensive ways to realize it." However, the spokesman also accuses the US delegation as having "raised undisguised brigandish demands." He says the US rejected "a package solution and the order of simultaneous actions," and that according to the US side, a wide range of issues could only be discussed after North Korea dismantles its nuclear program in a verifiable and irreversible manner. He concludes that "there is no other option for us but to further increase the nuclear deterrent force as a self-defense measure to protect our sovereignty."


3 September 2003
North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly, during its first session of the 11th term, reelects Kim Jong Il as the chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC). This position is considered to be the highest post in North Korea. Kim is also the general secretary of the Korea Workers Party and commander of the Korea People's Army. Other elected members of the NDC are: Cho Myong Rok, First Vice-Chairman; Yon Hyong Muk and Ri Yong Mu, Chairmen; Kim Yong Ch'un, Kim Il Ch'ol, Chon Pyong Ho, Ch'oe Ryong Su, and Paek Se Bong, Members.

— "DPRK'S New Premier Gives 'Oath' in First Session of 11th SPA," Korean Central News Agency, 3 September 2003,
3 September 2003
North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly passes a resolution supporting the Foreign Ministry's handling of the nuclear standoff with the US. The resolution blames Washington's "hostile policy" for the current nuclear crisis, and criticizes the Bush administration for having "termed the DPRK 'part of an axis of evil' and 'a target of preemptive nuclear attacks'." The resolution also supports the Foreign Ministry's view that North Korea "would have no other option but to keep and increase its nuclear deterrent force."

4 September 2003
Chong Ha Ch’ol, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korea Workers Party, says the DPRK will continue to increase its military deterrent force because the US has not abandoned its "hostile policy" towards the DPRK. Chong made the remarks in a speech delivered to congratulate Kim Jong Il on his reelection as the chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC).

8 September 2003
Mohamed ElBaradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) says North Korea's nuclear buildup poses a "serious and immediate challenge" to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In his introductory statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, ElBaradei says that "the Agency has been unable to implement fully its comprehensive NPT safeguards agreement with the DPRK."

9 September 2003
Vice Marshal Kim Yong Ch’un, chief of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), says the DPRK will continue to increase its nuclear deterrent force. Kim makes the remark in a speech to celebrate the 55th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK.

10 September 2003
"A US official" says North Korea has halted activities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. According to the Los Angeles Times, the official says, "various sensors and imagery and other things we have don't show activity." The official also says that North Korea easily start and stop activities at the site and that it would be very hard to conceal activities there.

12 September 2003
North Korea agrees in principle to hold a second round of the six-nation talks in early November. The first round was held on 27-29 August 2003 in Beijing.

23 September 2003
The Korean central News Agency dismisses the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution to rejoin the NPT, citing that the "hostile" US government is using the IAEA and that the DPRK is not bound to the NPT.

30 September 2003
A spokesman for North Korea’s Foreign Ministry says the DPRK is "taking practical measures to steadily beef up the nuclear deterrent force as a just self-defensive means to repel the US nuclear preemptive attack." The spokesman says the measures are necessary because of the US "hostile policy."

30 September 2003
North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Ch’oe Su Hon tells the UN General Assembly in New York that his government may not participate in the next six-party talks. Ch’oe says the DPRK is driven to lose "interest in or expectations on such talks" due to Washington’s "hostile policies."

1 October 2003
North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Ch’oe Su Hon tells reporters that while North Korea is committed to a peaceful

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resolution of the nuclear issue, Washington's "hostile policy" and the lessons from the Iraq war force the DPRK to defend itself with a "nuclear deterrence force." Ch'oe also says that North Korea will only use its "nuclear force" for deterrence and will not proliferate.


2 October 2003
A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman declares North Korea has successfully completed the reprocessing of 8,000 spent fuel rods that can be used to produce nuclear weapons, and more spent fuel rods may be reprocessed in the future. He also states that, contrary to rumors, the DPRK has not made any commitments to resume the six-party talks in Beijing.


7 October 2003
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, and South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun release a joint statement while attending the summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Bali, Indonesia. Among several issues, the statement addresses the North Korean nuclear issue, stating, "The three countries [China, Japan, and South Korea] reaffirm their commitment to a peaceful solution of the nuclear issue facing the Korean peninsula through dialogue and to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while addressing all the concerns of the parties and working together to maintain peace and stability on the peninsula." The statement marks the first time that China, Japan, and South Korea have joined together to make a declaration of policy.


7 October 2003
A North Korean Foreign Ministry statement says that Japan should not take part "in any form of negotiations" for resolving the nuclear weapons issue. According to the statement, Japan is only an obstacle to the peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue due to their "black-hearted" intentions. Subsequently, US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher rejects North Korea's demand stating, "Japan clearly must and will continue to be a participant in the six-party talks in order to achieve a diplomatic solution to North Korea's nuclear arms program."

7 October 2003
An unidentified senior Bush administration official criticizes North Korea for attempting to drive a wedge between the five other members of the six-party talks and adds, "We can talk about this in the [United Nations] Security Council if North Korea doesn't want to cooperate."

9 October 2003
US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher states during a press briefing that the US will continue to pursue the six-party talks. Referring to a comment about raising the issue with the UN Security Council, Boucher says, "We're not headed off in another direction at this point."

9 October 2003
Chinese President Hu Jintao and Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue say the six-party talks should continue.

9 October 2003
In an apparent rejection of North Korean demands, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Yuriy Fedotov says the sixparty talks should continue to include Japan because it is "a successful format which may provide a solution."

10 October 2003
Wang Guangya, China’s ambassador to the UN, reiterates the need to continue the six-party talks and speculates that December may be ideal for the next round of talks.

10 October 2003
Konstantin Pulikovsky, presidential envoy in the Far Eastern Federal District of Russia, while visiting Beijing says that efforts are being made to continue the six-party talks.

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10 October 2003
Yun T'aeyong, spokesman for South Korea's presidential Blue House, tells reporters that South Korea will urge North Korea to continue the six-party talks when the two Koreas hold an inter-ministerial meeting in Pyongyang 14-17 October.

16 October 2003
A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman blames the Bush administration's "hostile policies" for the current nuclear issue and, in order to dispel doubts concerning its nuclear force, he says that North Korea will display "its nuclear deterrent to the public" at the "appropriate time." Subsequently, US Secretary of State Colin Powell and State Department spokesman Adam Ereli dismiss the North Korean statement as unclear and nothing new. South Korea's National Security Advisor Na Chong Il [Ra Jong Il] also discounts the threat as "another bargaining chip for negotiations to get the upper hand at the next round of six-party talks."

16 October 2003
Gen. Leon LaPorte, Commander of US Forces Korea, says North Korea is "a very, very credible threat" with its 800 mid-range missiles. He also indicates support for the six-party talks by saying, "We need to have all the nations with vested interests involved."

19 October 2003
US President George W. Bush says he is willing to commit to a multilateral written security guarantee not to attack North Korea in exchange for steps by Pyongyang toward abandoning its nuclear weapons program. However, he has ruled out a formal bilateral treaty of nonaggression that North Korea has demanded.

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20 October 2003

Members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum summit, which is being held in Thailand, welcome the United States' policy shift on the North Korea nuclear issue. Although President George W. Bush has rejected North Korea's demand for a formal nonaggression treaty, he wants to offer a multilateral written security assurance.


21 October 2003

North Korea dismisses a US offer of a multilateral written security guarantee in exchange for an end to its nuclear weapons program, and renews its demand for a bilateral nonaggression pact.


26 October 2003

US House member Curt Weldon (Republican from Pennsylvania) says opposition from the White House caused him to abandon plans to lead a group of US lawmakers to the nuclear reactor in Yongbyon-kun, the site of North Korea's main nuclear complex.


29 October 2003

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the international consortium financing the

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construction of light-water reactors in North Korea, discusses suspending the project due to the deepening of the nuclear standoff. Members of KEDO, which includes South Korea, Japan, the United States, and the European Union, add that the decision would be tentative and can be retracted if North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons program.


4 November 2003

The North Korean delegation votes against the non-binding UN resolution backing the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). North Korea's Deputy Ambassador Kim Chang Guk refers to the IAEA as "a tool of the United States" and walks out of the General Assembly chambers immediately following the vote of 129-1 that approved the resolution.


6 November 2003

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman comments on the impending decision by the United States and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to halt the construction of light water reactors in North Korea. He states that if construction is suspended, the U.S. and KEDO would be obliged to pay compensation and the DPRK will "never allow them to take out" the equipment and documents from the construction areas.


6 November 2003

President Pervez Musharraf tells a news conference that Pakistan had not transferred nuclear technology to North Korea although it had bought short-range missiles and related technology from North Korea. He says the visits to North Korea by Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan were related to purchases of missiles only, and Pakistan now produces missiles on its own and no longer conducts defense-related business with North Korea.


11 November 2003

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The Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, argues that American efforts to develop nuclear weapons may be reasons for other nations and North Korea to develop similar weapons, and that US moves "may spark a new arms race."


14 November 2003
A Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) editorial condemns the announcement by South Korea to purchase and deploy US-made surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 300 kilometers. KCNA warns the move as being "a very dangerous development" and threatens that "both the north and the south will fall victim to a nuclear war if it breaks out on the peninsula."


16 November 2003
A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says North Korea may consider accepting a multilateral written security guarantee in place of the nonaggression treaty with the United States at the next round of talks if Washington ceases to maintain a hostile policy toward and threaten North Korea.


17 November 2003
US Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld visits and meets with South Korean Minister of Defense Cho Yong-kil [Cho Yong Kil] as part of the annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM). They issue a joint statement following SCM that, among other things, expresses concerns over the nuclear issue with North Korea and urges Pyongyang to "completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle it nuclear weapons programs."


17 November 2003
Visiting US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly discusses the North Korean nuclear issue with Mitoji Yabunaka

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of the Foreign Ministry's Asian and Oceanic Affairs Bureau and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda. Kelly says he expects the next round of six-party talks to occur in mid-December.


18 November 2003
China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao says Beijing welcomes the 'positive message' from the DPRK referring to a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement made on 16 November that the DPRK continues to seek a negotiated peaceful solution to the ongoing nuclear issue.


19 November 2003
An editorial in the Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, states that the redeployment of US forces in South Korea farther south and away from the Demilitarized Zone is intended for the launching of a preemptive nuclear attack against North Korea.


19 November 2003
Chinese Vice Foreign Ministers Wang Yi and Dai Bingguo meet with visiting US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly to prepare for the second round of the Six-party Talks. A Foreign Ministry spokesman says both sides want the next round of discussions to take place as soon as possible.


21 November 2003
The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) decides to suspend the construction of two lightwater reactors in North Korea. The United States, South Korea, Japan, and European Union make up the KEDO consortium, which has committed $4.6 billion for the project. The one-year suspension, which is to begin on 1 December, is a reaction to North Korea's alleged violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework.

25 November 2003
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao says that North Korea's Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Yong Il met with Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, Vice Foreign Ministers Dai Bingguo and Wang Yi in Beijing to discuss and prepare for the second round of Six-party Talks. The DPRK representative to the six-way negotiations reassured Chinese officials of North Korea's final goal of a denuclearized peninsula and willingness to scrap its nuclear weapons program under the right conditions.

29 November 2003
The Korean Central News Agency states that "Japan should not be allowed to participate in the [six-party] talks as it is persistently trying to bring up" abduction grievances during the negotiations.

29 November 2003
The Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, demands financial compensation from the United States and KEDO for the losses to be incurred by the suspension of the light water reactor projects.

1 December 2003
The Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, urges the United States to accept Pyongyang's proposal based on "the principle of simultaneous actions" to resolve the nuclear issue. The actions would be "the US switchover in its hostile policy toward the DPRK, the DPRK's renunciation of its nuclear program followed by the opening of diplomatic relations between the two countries."
3 December 2003
Officials from the United States, South Korea and Japan reject a draft of a Chinese proposal for a joint statement on the Six-party Talks. The officials sense the China-sponsored draft is too favorable to North Korea because it calls for security guarantees in exchange for Pyongyang's declaration of its intention to dismantle its nuclear programs. However, the draft does not contain details of the implementation of the dismantlement.

3 December 2003
South Korea's Unification Minister Chong Se Hyon says the dispatch of ROK troops to Iraq is linked to "U.S. cooperation for peace on the Korea peninsula." The statement reveals the view of many in South Korea that the United States is too firm regarding the North Korea nuclear issue.

7 December 2003
Officials from the United States, South Korea and Japan draft a joint statement of principles for resolving the North Korea nuclear crisis. The proposal, which does not call for North Korea's return to the NPT, proposes coordinated steps where the other five nations of the Six-party Talks offer incentives to North Korea as it verifiably dismantles its nuclear facilities. South Korea's Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Su Hyok says, "For the parts on which the countries have some disagreements, we used indirect and implicative words." The joint statement is to be sent to Beijing to be passed on to Pyongyang.

9 December 2003
A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says the DPRK would freeze its nuclear activities in exchange for political and economic concessions. The statement also declares that "the resumption of the Six-party Talks in the future entirely depends on whether an agreement will be reached on the DPRK-proposed first-phase step or not."

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9 December 2003
US President George W. Bush rejects North Korea’s offer to freeze its nuclear program, insisting, "The goal of the United States is not for a freeze of the nuclear program; the goal is to dismantle a nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible way." White House spokesman Scott McClellan responds to the preconditions for continued talks by stating, "We, along with the rest of the members of the six-party talks, are ready for a new round of talks at an early date, and without any preconditions whatsoever."

11 December 2003
South Korea’s Unification Minister Chong Se Hyon says he has confirmed the delivery of the joint statement draft to resolve the nuclear issue from Beijing to Pyongyang. Representatives from the United States, South Korea and Japan drafted the proposal earlier in the week, and Chinese officials, the host of the Six-party Talks, were to relay the draft to North Korean officials.

11 December 2003
A statement released by the North Korean embassy in Moscow says that Pyongyang desires a nuclear-free Korean peninsula but will not abandon its nuclear programs without concessions. The statement directly refers to a perceived US nuclear threat by declaring "the United States legitimized and appropriated large amounts of money for the development of miniature nuclear weapons in order to keep us under constant threat."

12 December 2003
A nine-member European Union delegation led by Guido Martini of Italy meets with North Korea’s Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun and Vice Foreign Minister Kung Sok Ung and other North Korean officials to urge the DPRK to return to the Six-party Talks.

15 December 2003

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The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers Party, rejects the US-backed blueprint proposal for ending the nuclear issue for its failure to mention North Korea's proposed "simultaneous package solution." The newspaper also demands "complete, verifiable and irreversible security assurances" in exchange for complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID).


15 December 2003

US President George W. Bush tells reporters that he wants to settle the North Korean nuclear issue diplomatically. Bush offers his comments following the capture of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.


18 December 2003

The *Rodong Sinmun*, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, vows that North Korea will "keep and steadily increase its nuclear deterrent force" to deter a preemptive attack by the United States.


24 December 2003

US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher announces the United States will donate 60,000 metric tons of food to North Korea through the UN World Food Program despite North Korea's persistence in developing nuclear weapons. The decision brings US food aid donations for North Korea to a total of 100,000 metric tons for the year 2003.


25-27 December 2003

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits Pyongyang for three days to prepare for a tentative second round of Six-party Talks. Wang meets with North Korea's Vice Foreign Ministers Kim Kye Kwan, Kang Sok Chu, and Kim Yong Il.


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27 December 2003
North Korean First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok Chu expresses willingness to hold the next round of Six-party Talks early next year to Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

27 December 2003
A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman tells Korean Central News Agency that the United States' continued efforts to increase its military presence in South Korea is "casting a darker shadow on the prospect of solving the nuclear issue." The spokesman cites the recent decision by Washington to spend $11 billion to reinforce military hardware in South Korea.

29 December 2003
Fu Ying, head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Asian Affairs Bureau, states that Beijing does not believe North Korea has a clandestine uranium enrichment program. Fu makes the statement during his meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan *Yun Yŏng Kwan+ and Japanese director general of the Foreign Ministry's Asian and Oceanic Affairs Bureau Motojo Yabunaka while in Seoul to discuss North Korea's nuclear program.

2002

Early 2002
The US and South Korea have working-level discussions to develop a "roadmap" for a "package deal" to resolve North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD programs. The roadmap is said to be a "step-by-step package deal

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involving strict reciprocity."
Park Tu Shik, "Taebuk Kibonjongch'aek 'Road Map' Han'gug'e Chŏndal/Mi'e 'Ŏmgyŏkhan Sanghoju'ūi Chŏg'yong," Chosun Ilbo, 7 February 2002, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

**Early January 2002**

The South Korean government learns from Chinese sources that Kim Jong Il might visit China during mid February 2002. Speculation is that Kim is concerned the United States will expand the war on terrorism to North Korea. Other analysts believe Kim might visit China to address North Korea's severe foreign exchange shortage, which according to the Chosun Ilbo, is due in part to North Korea's declining missile exports.

6 January 2002

A South Korean government source says that IAEA officials will enter North Korea on 12 January 2002 to visit Isotope Production Laboratory in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.

7 January 2002

The IAEA announces that three inspectors will visit the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex in North Korea 15-19 January 2002. The inspectors will visit the Isotope Production Laboratory, but the IAEA emphasizes the visit will not constitute an "inspection." This will be the first IAEA visit to the lab, which is used to produce nuclear materials for medical and industrial uses.

7 January 2002

The Sankei Shimbun reports that Russia plans to build a nuclear power plant near its border with China and North Korea, and that energy would be provided to North Korea and China. The report says that Russia plans to complete the construction of the plant by 2010.

13 January 2002

US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage says on Radio Free Asia that North Korea must decide soon whether to accept IAEA inspections. Unless North Korea accepts inspections, Armitage says the Agreed Framework will collapse.

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24 January 2002

US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton says, "The fact that governments which sponsor terrorist groups are also pursuing chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs is alarming and cannot be ignored. Countries such as North Korea and Iraq must cease those violations of NPT and allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to do its work. Further, I caution those who think that they can pursue nuclear weapons without detection: the United States and its allies will prove you wrong." Bolton makes his comments during the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In response, North Korea's delegate says that North Korea was permitting international inspections of its nuclear facilities.


25 January 2002

The Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) conclude a one-day meeting in Seoul. The TCOG consists of government officials from the United States, South Korea, and Japan that meet to coordinate policy towards North Korea. The participants say North Korea will be an important topic during George W. Bush's trip to Asia in February, and that Bush's visits would "positively contribute to peace and stability on and around the Korean peninsula." A South Korean government official later reveals that the US delegation informs the Japanese and South Korean participants that the Bush administration will now require "step-by-step reciprocity from North Korea, and will spell out how North Korea will be punished or rewarded for future conduct."


28 January 2002

Cho Myǒng Rok, First Vice Chairman of the National Defense Committee, meets with China's new ambassador to North Korea. [Note: Cho has reportedly been suffering from kidney disease.]


29 January 2002

During his State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush says North Korea is part of an "axis of evil."


29 January 2002

The Joongang Ilbo reports that North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sŏk Chu is rumored to be seriously ill. Kang, 63 and last seen in public on 6 December 2001, has been in charge of relations with the United States and

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other Western countries. Kang was the senior North Korean delegate during the negotiations in 1994 for the
Agreed Framework.
Ilbo, 28 January 2002, in "DRPK's Vice ForMin Kang Sok-chu Reportedly Sick," FBIS Document ID:
KPP20020128000119; Ch'oe Wŏn Ki, "Tae'miogyot'ong Kang Sŏk Chu Wabyŏngsol," Joongang Ilbo, 29 January

30 January 2002
A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry denounces the remarks of US Under Secretary of State for
Arms Control John Bolton made on 24 January in Geneva. The spokesman says Bolton's suggestion that North
Korea's nuclear program poses a threat to international security is "nothing but a provocative remark by a person
totally ignorant of the contents of the Agreed Framework, to say nothing of the core of the nuclear issue." The
spokesman also says the United States "has not properly discharged its obligations under the Agreed Framework.
"Mi'gungmusŏng Ch'agwan'ŭi Sach'a'alsuyong Ch'okkubal'ŏnl Kyutan' an / Chosŏn'oemusŏngdaebyŏn' in," Korean
Allegations that the DPRK Nuclear Issue Is Threatening the International Community," Xinhua News Agency, 30
ID: CCp20020130000177.

30 January 2002
Bush administration officials say that although George W. Bush labeled North Korea as part of an "axis of evil" in
his 29 January State of the Union Address, the United States is not planning imminent military action against North
Korea, Iran, nor Iraq.

31 January 2002
A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement in response to George W. Bush's State of
the Union Address on 29 January. The spokesman blames the US economic recession, terrorist attacks, and other
US problems on the "unilateral and self opinionated foreign policy, political immaturity and moral leprosy of the
Bush administration." He says, "There has been no precedent in the modern history of DPRK-US relations that in
his policy speech the US President made undisguised threatening remarks on aggression and threat against the
DPRK, an independent and sovereign state. This is, in fact, little short of declaring war against the DPRK." He also
says, "The option to 'strike' imprudently advocated by the United States is not a monopoly."

31 January 2002
US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice tells the Conservative Political Action Conference that North Korea
is "the world's number one merchant for ballistic missiles. Rice says the United States has offered a "road map to

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for reciprocal steps that would enable North Korea to take a better course." However, she adds, "We've had no serious response from Pyongyang."


4 February 2002
North Korean print and broadcast media criticize the US policy towards North Korea, saying the "US is using the nuclear issue as a pretext to escalate its hard line policy and ignite a second Korean war." A North Korean television broadcast says that George W. Bush's "axis of evil" remark in the State of the Union Address is an "unbearable insult to a sovereign nation."


4 February 2002
The Chosun Ilbo reports that intelligence officials believe about 50-60 percent of North Korea's ballistic missile warheads are armed with chemical weapons. [Note: The report is ambiguous about the "intelligence officials," but they are almost certainly South Korea.]


5 February 2002
Former South Korean Minister if Foreign Affairs and Trade, Han Sŏng Su, who was dismissed yesterday, says that the United States has informed South Korea that North Korea has continued to develop and export missiles. Han says that before 11 September 2001, North Korea's WMD were not such a problem, but now the US basic strategy is that North Korea's WMD programs must be stopped. Han also says that the United States is not likely to extend the next stage of the "war on terrorism" to North Korea.


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5 February 2002
Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US Secretary of State Colin Powell says that George W. Bush’s reference to Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an "axis of evil" was "not a rhetorical flourish—he meant it." Powell also says, "it does not mean that we are ready to invade anyone or that we are not willing to engage in dialogue. Quite the contrary." Committee Chairman Joseph Biden says, "I agree with the president that each nation poses a security threat to the United States and to the civilized world, but they are hardly identical or allied with each other, and our policies toward them have up to now involved very different strategies."

5 February 2002
Yang Sŏng Ch'ŏl, South Korean ambassador to the United States, says that recent harsh comments from US officials towards North Korea indicates that must have significant evidence that North Korea is selling weapons of mass destruction. Yang says relations between the United States and North Korea could turn around if North Korea clarifies its position on WMD and allays fears that it possesses nuclear weapons.

5 February 2002
The Rodong Sinmun criticizes George W. Bush's State of the Union Address as being "little short of declaring war." The official daily of the Korean Workers' Party says the "options to 'strike' on the lips of the US is not its monopoly."

5 February 2002
Three US House members, Benjamin Gilman, Christopher Cox, and Edward Markey, send a letter to President Bush asking him to reconsider the implementation of the Agreed Framework.

6 February 2002
In testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, CIA Director George Tenet says North Korea is exporting ballistic missiles and missile components to countries like Iran, Libya, Syria, and Egypt. Tenet says North Korea could have a ballistic missile that could reach the United States by 2015, and that North Korea has enough plutonium for one or two nuclear bombs. According to Tenet, North Korea is using the profits from its missile exports to further develop its missiles, and probably to covertly develop WMD.

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6 February 2002
South Korean President Kim Dae Jung says that nuclear and missile problems must be resolved peacefully. Kim says that recently North Korea has been harshly criticizing the United States because of the US attitude towards North Korea. Kim also says that there can be policy differences among allies, but that anti-Americanism is not in Korea's interest.

6 February 2002
Im Dong Wŏn, national security and unification advisor to the South Korean president, says that North Korea poses a threat to security on the Korean peninsula, but the threat must be reduced through peaceful dialogue. Im says that the use of military force will only result in the danger of igniting another Korean war.

7 February 2002
North Korean UN Ambassador Pak Kil Yŏn says that North Korea is prepared to renew dialogue with the United States even though President George W. Bush labeled North Korea as a member of the "axis of evil." Park says that Bush’s speech amounts to a declaration of war, which surprised North Korea and caused confusion in governments around the world. Park says that if the United States has a hostile or confrontational approach to North Korea, then North Korea will respond in similar ways. On the other hand, Park says, "Nice words will be answered by nice words."

7 February 2002
South Korean Unification Minister Chŏn Se Hyŏn tells the National Assembly that the South Korean government will seek the opening of a direct air route between North Korea and South Korea to facilitate the construction of the LWRs in North Korea under the Agreed Framework.

8 February 2002
The Korean Central News Agency criticizes President Bush's defense budget, saying "Though it has the largest number of weapons of mass destruction in the world, the US is sharply increasing military expenditure. This clearly proves that the US, 'empire of devil,' is posing a grave threat to the world peace and stability."

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8 February 2002
North Korea cancels the proposed visits of four former US ambassadors to South Korea. The US delegation was to include William Gleysteen, Richard Walker, Donald Gregg, Stephen Bosworth, and University of California Professor Emeritus Robert Scalapino. North Korea proposed the visit in recent months as a way to maintain a channel of communication with the United States. Park Kil Yŏn, North Korean Ambassador to the UN, says he received instruction from Pyongyang to cancel the trip, but he does not link the move to George W. Bush's State of the Union Address. However, Gleysteen and Scalapino say Bush's speech is clearly the reason for the cancellation.


8 February 2002
South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ch’oe Sŏng Hong tells the National Assembly that South Korea will take issue with North Korea’s WMD programs when inter-ministerial talks resume. Ch’oe says that South Korea has told North Korea to address the suspicions surrounding its missile and WMD programs during the June 2000 summit and other occasions.


11 February 2002
In response to CIA Director George Tenet’s testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Korean Central News Agency says North Korea’s development of weapons of mass destruction is "non-existent." KCNA says the information provided by the CIA has "always been nothing but sophism designed to slander and do harm to other countries."


11 February 2002
According to a South Korean government source, snowfall this winter has been below normal, which will have a negative effect on North Korea’s hydroelectric power generation later this year.


11 February 2002
The Mainichi Shimbum reports that the LWRs under construction in North Korea will be delayed beyond the target date of 2003, and will only be completed by 2008 if the project progresses well from now on. According to the report, the delay in construction might increase costs.


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12 February 2002
In testimony before the Senate Budget Committee, Secretary of State Colin Powell says the United States has no plans to start a war with North Korea. Powell says, "We want to see a dialogue. We want to contain North Korea's activities with respect to proliferation, and we are going to keep the pressure on them." Powell adds that George W. Bush will offer to restart dialogue with North Korea without conditions.

13 February 2002
During a hearing held by a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, Secretary of State Colin Powell says the Agreed Framework will come to a halt unless North Korea allows safeguards inspections. Representatives Christopher Cox, Benjamin Gilman, and Edward Markey say they have introduced legislation to deny funding for KEDO.

15 February 2002
North Korean radio reports "there is no reason for our nuclear and missile policies to attract suspicion." The broadcast says these programs are "transparent, clear and are intended for self-defense." The report also calls George W. Bush the "most ferocious war fanatic among previous US presidents and an ignorant political hooligan."

16 February 2002
AFI Research reports that North Korea and Iraq have cooperated in the "area of nuclear weapons technology." [Note: This report is unsubstantiated.]

20 February 2002
During his visit to South Korea, George W. Bush says the United States has no intention of invading North Korea. Bush also says that he supports Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine policy" of engagement with North Korea, and that Washington is prepared to renew dialogue with Pyongyang.

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21 February 2002

_Nucleonics Week_ reports that North Korea "will now concede there are apparent discrepancies requiring explanation between its 1992 declared nuclear inventory and other evidence from the US and the IAEA." The report says that according to North Korea, the discrepancies "could at least be partially reconciled by the past operation history of the Isotope Production Laboratory in Yŏngbyŏn-kun." North Korea admits it separated a few hundred grams of plutonium at the lab in 1975, but denies any was separated after that.


21 February 2002

During a press conference in Beijing, President George W. Bush says that he has asked Chinese President Jiang Zemin to help the United States renew bilateral talks with North Korea.


22 February 2002

North Korea's Foreign Ministry releases a statement that rejects George W. Bush's call for dialogue with the United States. The English version reads, "We are not willing to have contact with his clan which is trying to change by force of arms the system chosen by the Korean people." However, the Korean version of the statement is slightly different, "While the US has no intention of recognizing our system, we do not need any proposals for a dialogue that is looking for a pretext to invade [North Korea]."


27 February 2002

The US and South Korea complete the first of a joint study on confidence-building measures (CBMs) with North Korea to address Pyongyang's ballistic missiles, WMD programs and conventional forces. The initial part of the study is said to have 32 items to be proposed for CBMs with North Korea. The joint study team reportedly began the study in June 2001.


5 March 2002

General Thomas Schwartz, Commander in Chief US Forces, Korea, tells the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Agreed Framework is "the roadmap to the future in my opinion. It is serving us well at this time. It stopped
their nuke development, there is no doubt about it." However, Schwartz also says that North Korea "still refuses to comply with nuclear nonproliferation protocols."


3 April 2002
North Korea and Russia sign an agreement for scientific exchanges during 2002-2004.

3 April 2002
A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says that North Korea has decided to resume suspended negotiations with KEDO. According to the spokesman, US and North Korean officials met in New York on 13 and 20 March to discuss bilateral relations and the resumption of dialogue.

26 April 2002
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Lt. General Leon J. LaPorte says that the Agreed Framework has proven successful in freezing North Korea's nuclear program. In absence of the Agreed Framework, North Korea could have produced weapons-grade plutonium for dozens of nuclear weapons."

2 June 2002
National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il, Kim Il Ch'ŏl, Minister of the People's Armed Forces, and Vice Marshal Kim Yong Ch'un, chief of the general staff of the Korean People's Army, and other high-ranking officials meet with a Russian military delegation from the Far Eastern Military District. The Russian delegation is led by Colonel General Yuri Yakubov, the commander of the district. Andrei Karlov, the Russian ambassador to North Korea, and Vladislav Prokopenko, the Russian military attaché from the embassy also attend the meetings. The delegation arrived in Pyongyang on 31 May, and was preceded by a "Red-Flag Ensemble" that arrived on 27 May.

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14 June 2002

Ambassador Jack Pritchard, Special Envoy for Negotiations with the DPRK, meets with Ambassador Pak Kil Yŏn at North Korea's Permanent Mission to the UN in New York. Pritchard asks the Mission if there are any convenient dates for a US delegation to visit North Korea. On 25 June, the United States informs the Mission that a delegation could be prepared to visit Pyongyang on 10 July. On 27 June, the US side asks for a confirmation of the date, and for a timely response in consideration of time needed for travel arrangements. Following the naval clash between North and South Korea on 29 June, and the lack of a response from Pyongyang, the United States cancels the proposed visit on 1 July 2002.


17 June 2002

Government delegations from the United States, Japan, and South Korea hold a Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting in San Francisco. The three sides agree about the importance of holding "comprehensive and flexible talks with North Korea." The US and Japanese delegations reaffirmed support for Kim Dae Jung's policy of engagement with Pyongyang, and for the implementation of the Agreed Framework.


18 June 2002

An anonymous South Korean government official says that an IAEA delegation will visit Pyongyang 26-29 June for working-level talks. The discussions are to cover the implementation of nuclear safety regulations and safeguards inspections among other issues.


24 June 2002

The Korean Central news Agency reports that North Korea will host the "2002 Pyongyang International Technology
and Infrastructure Exhibition" 17-20 September 2002. The event will be co-sponsored by the DPRK International Exhibition Company and the Munich International Exhibition Corporation. The exhibition will display "equipment for developing the latest technology and machines and equipment to be used in building, building materials, metal, mining, transport, communications and chemical industry." [Note: Transfers of mining machines and technologies could be applied to uranium mining in North Korea. Furthermore, metallurgy technologies could possibly be applied to other aspects of nuclear bomb development.]


29 June 2002

North and South Korean naval forces clash in coastal waters off the west coast. One South Korean vessel is sunk and four sailors are killed. North Korean casualties are estimated to be about 30. During the skirmish, South Korean elint indicates that North Korean radars have been turned on for ship-borne anti-ship Styx missiles and for Silkworm missiles based onshore. The South Korean vessels disperse chaff as a countermeasure and reportedly break off their aggressive pursuit of the North Korean vessels in fear that a North Korea could respond with a missile attack, which would potentially result in a serious escalation of the conflict.


July 2002

A Pakistani C-130 transport plane lands in North Korea and is loaded with missile parts for export back to Pakistan. According to Outlook India.com, the shipment includes 47 tons of special aluminum that Kahn Laboratory acquired from a British firm in Blackburn, U.K. The shipment is reportedly delivered on a Shaheen Airlines flight. [Note: The shipment is part of a suspected nuclear-for-missile barter deal between Islamabad and Pyongyang. It is not clear if Pakistan delivered nuclear materials or technologies on this flight. If the Outlook India.com report is correct, the aluminum could have come from the TTI Group, Ltd., which is the U.K. subsidiary of the Materials Technology Division of Aalberts Industries NV, which is headquartered in the Netherlands.]


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1 July 2002
The United States cancels a proposed visit by a US delegation to Pyongyang. On 14 June, Ambassador Jack Pritchard, Special Envoy for Negotiations with the DPRK, met with Ambassador Pak Kil Yŏn at North Korea's Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, and proposed the visit. The US State Department says the trip, which was proposed for 10 July, is no longer possible because of the Pyongyang's "failure to respond in a timely manner," and because the clash between North and South Korean naval vessels on 29 June "had created an unacceptable atmosphere in which to conduct the talks.

1 July 2002
A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman accuses the United States of being responsible for the 29 June naval clash between North and South Korea because the "Northern Limit Line" was set unilaterally by the United States and was not part of the July 1953 armistice. According to the spokesman, "the incident occurred as the South Korean naval vessels intruded into the territorial waters of the north side and fired first hundreds of rounds of bullets and shells at the patrol boats of the navy of the Korean People's Army on routine coastal guard duty."

2 July 2002
A 25-member North Korean delegation arrives in South Korea to participate in a training program as part of the LWR construction project under the Agreed Framework. The delegation is led by Kim Yong Il, a director in North Korea's Nuclear Safety Regulatory Committee (核安全監督委員會), and the group will receive training at the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (韓國原子力安全技術院) in Taejŏn. The group is scheduled to stay in South Korea until 27 July.

7 July 2002
US Ambassador Thomas Hubbard says that the naval clash on 29 June appears to be a deliberate attack from North Korea, but that he expects no significant changes in bilateral relations between Washington and Pyongyang, and between Seoul and Pyongyang. Hubbard says the United States continues to support Kim Dae Jung's policy of engagement with North Korea, and he believes it is impossible to know whether Kim Jong Il was involved in the command decisions related to the sea battle.

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20 July 2002
The North Korean airline Air Koryo conducts the first direct inter-Korean flight to transport South Koreans working on the KEDO light water reactor project from Yangyang, Kangwŏn Province, South Korea to Sŏndŏk-ri, Ch'ongp'yŏng-kun, South Hamgyŏng Province, North Korea.

23 July 2002
In a statement before the Senate Foreign relations Committee, Frank Gaffney, president of the Center for Security Policy, says, "It is no coincidence the regimes that are currently working hardest to attain and proliferate weapons of mass destruction are the same regimes that are the most tyrannical." Gaffney includes North Korea with Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba, Sudan, Algeria, and China. [Note: The statement elicits a response from the North Korean media on 14 August.]

29 July 2002
During a visit to Pyongyang, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov says that North Korea "is ready for a constructive dialogue with the United States and Japan, without any preconditions." Ivanov held several hours of talks with Kim Jong Il during his two-day visit.

31 July 2002
US Secretary of State Colin Powell and North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun have a 15-minute talk over coffee at the ARF meeting in Brunei. Paek later says that North Korea has agreed to resume dialogue with the United States. Paek also holds a meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, and both parties agree to work towards the normalization of ties between Tokyo and Pyongyang.

August 2002
According to the Segye Ilbo, a South Korean daily, US satellite imagery reveals a secret underground nuclear reactor in Pyongyang. According to the report, North Korea has been operating the reactor for about 20 years, and it was built with Soviet technology. The reactor is said to be cooled with water from the Imwŏn Reservoir (林源貯水地). [Note: This report has not been substantiated, and the credibility of this report is dubious.]
August 2002
According to evidence acquired by the Bush administration, Pakistan has been assisting North Korea with its nuclear weapons program as late as August 2002. The administration believes Pakistan has been providing "nuclear technical knowledge, designs and possibly materials in exchange for missile parts up until this summer."

7 August 2002
KEDO holds a ceremony in Kŭmho-chigu, Shinp'o to mark the pouring of concrete for the construction of the first light water reactor under the Agreed Framework. Charles Pritchard, US Representative to KEDO, attends the ceremony and says, "The United States will continue to abide by the terms of this accord [the Agreed Framework] so long as North Korea does the same." Pritchard says that under the construction schedule, KEDO will deliver key components to the first reactor in mid 2005, and therefore, North Korea and the IAEA need to begin the safeguards inspection process now.

8 August 2002
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement regarding the visit of a special US envoy to Pyongyang. The spokesman says North Korea is willing to receive the envoy, but that results from the restart of bilateral dialogue would depend upon the "US dropping it hostile policy towards North Korea."

13 August 2002
A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry says that North Korea has abided by the Agreed Framework "100 percent," including the freezing of its nuclear facilities and the storage of spent fuel rods. However, the spokesman claims that the United States has not upheld its commitment to provide light water reactors by 2003, and that it is uncertain whether the reactors will be delivered by 2008. The spokesman says the most urgent issue in implementing the agreement is not safeguards inspections in North Korea, but compensation for the "loss of

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electricity" due to the delay in the reactor construction. An official from South Korea's Foreign Ministry downplays Pyongyang's threat to withdraw from the Agreed Framework, saying, "It is nothing but a tactic ahead of the forthcoming negotiations with the United States and will have no influence on future talks."


13 August 2002
Philip Reeker, Deputy Spokesman for the US State Department, says, "We have stated many times that the United States will continue to abide by the terms of the accord [Agreed Framework] as long as North Korea does the same. We have emphasized that it's critical for North Korea to begin cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and to meet all of its other obligations, as stipulated in the Agreed Framework."


14 August 2002
In response to the Senate testimony on 23 July by Frank Gaffney, president of the Center for Security Policy, the Rodong Sinmun says that North Korean missiles are "not for threatening anyone."


19 August 2002
The Korean Central News Agency in Pyongyang says in an editorial that the United States should compensate North Korea for construction delays under the Agreed Framework. Under the agreement, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) is to supply two light water reactors by a target date of 2003. Since the target date will be missed, North Korea believes it should be compensated for the "lost electricity due to the unilateral noncompliance with the Agreed Framework." The commentary cites "international law and the moral point of view" as reasons the United States should provide compensation, and says that US requests for North Korea to accept IAEA inspections now are unreasonable.


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24 August 2002
A KEDO delegation arrives in Pyongyang to discuss the ongoing storage of the spent fuel rods that were canned as part of the Agreed Framework. The delegation includes officials from the US State Department and Department of Energy. The spent fuel rods were discharged from the nuclear reactor core in Yongbyon-kun in 1994.

26 August 2002
In an interview with a South Korean Internet news provider, US Ambassador Thomas Hubbard says that the United States is not ruling out the possibility of seizing North Korean missile exports on the high seas. However, Hubbard says that the United States wants to resolve its dispute with North Korea over its missile and WMD programs through dialogue.

26 August 2002
While in Tokyo, John Bolton, US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, says the United States has evidence that North Korea is producing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and longrange ballistic missiles. Bolton also says that North Korea is exporting missiles and missile components.

29 August 2002
In Seoul, John Bolton, US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, says that "in addition to its disturbing weapons of mass destruction activities, North Korea also is the world's foremost peddler of ballistic missile-related equipment, components, materials and technical expertise." Bolton also says that George W. Bush's reference to North Korea as being part of an "axis of evil" was "more than a rhetorical flourish— it was factually correct." Bolton says the Agreed Framework is "in serious doubt" unless safeguards inspections begin soon, and there is "little doubt that North Korea has a chemical weapons program and "one of the most robust offensive bioweapons programs on earth."

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7 September 2002
The Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting is held in Seoul. The delegations from the United States, Japan and South Korea were led by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly, Director General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Hitoshi Tanaka, and Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Tae Shik. The three sides reaffirm their goal of resolving the issue of North Korea's WMD and missile programs through dialogue, and 'highlight the importance of improved implementation of the Agreed Framework.' [Note: Later reports indicate that while in Seoul, James Kelly briefs the South Korean government on US intelligence regarding North Korea's uranium enrichment program.]


10 September 2002
The Rodong Sinmun carries a commentary criticizing US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton’s recent remarks in Seoul regarding North Korea’s suspected WMD activities. The daily says Bolton’s charges are "sheer lies" with the "sinister intention to justify the US hostile policy towards North Korea." The commentary claims Bolton’s remarks are designed to "mislead public opinion through false propaganda to brand North Korea as a 'criminal' and to impose 'nuclear inspections'."


12 September 2002
US President Bush presents visiting Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi with intelligence indicating that North Korea has been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program based on uranium enrichment. The two leaders are meeting in New York to coordinate policies on North Korea prior to Koizumi’s historic meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il scheduled for 17 September. [NOTE: Koizumi reportedly does not press the issue of the secret uranium enrichment program during his talks with Kim, instead focusing on the issue on North Korea’s abduction of Japanese nationals.]

—Sonni Efron, Henry Chu and Mark Magnier, "U.S. Begins Diplomatic Offensive on North Korea; The White House

13 September 2002
In New York, US Secretary of State Colin Powell briefs Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi about North Korea's program to develop nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium.

16 September 2002
US Ambassador to Japan Howard Baker meets with a close aid to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to provide documents and information regarding North Korea's program to produce highly enriched uranium.

17 September 2002
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi pays a one-day visit to Pyongyang for a summit with North Korea's National Defense Chairman and Korean Workers' Party general Secretary Kim Jong Il. The two sides discuss a number of issues including North Korea's WMD and missile development programs. During the talks, Kim Jong Il admits that North Korea had abducted Japanese citizens in the past, but he apologizes and pledges to investigate past cases and prevent it from happening again. Kim also promises to extend Pyongyang's missile flight-test moratorium indefinitely, and to resolve the concerns over North Korea's nuclear program through international agreements. Later reports speculate that Kim indirectly admitted to Koizumi that North Korea has nuclear weapons when he said, "no one knows what will happen if we fight a nuclear war against the United States."

18 September 2002
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld tells the House Armed Services Committee that he is “almost certain” North Korea has nuclear weapons and is developing long-range missiles that can strike the US mainland.

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19 September 2002
According to a high-level official in the Japanese Foreign Ministry, IAEA officials say they are confirming North Korean plans to resume nuclear inspections.

27 September 2002
"A senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official" says that North Korea and the IAEA have begun detailed talks regarding the resumption of nuclear inspections.

29 September 2002
An IAEA spokesperson says that North Korea and the agency had begun negotiations on the return of IAEA inspectors to North Korea.

29 September 2002
The Independent on Sunday (London) reports that the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq has been accused "of having bargained with North Korea over stocks of plutonium." [Note: The article does not mention the origin or credibility of the accusation.]

Early October 2002
According to Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, Saudi Arabia is now actively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. "Highly-reliable sources" say that the kingdom is trying to acquire weapons, but is not seeking a production capability. According to the report, Saudi officials have approached one or two countries, possibly North Korea and/or China to purchase nuclear weapons.

3-5 October 2002
US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly leads a delegation to Pyongyang to discuss various bilateral issues. While in Pyongyang Kelly meets with First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sŏk Chu and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan. On the first day of the talks, Kelly offers no specific evidence, but says the United States has evidence that North Korea has been pursuing a program to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. The North Korean delegation initially denies the allegations, but on the second day of the talks, the North Korean delegation admits to having such a program. North Korean media describe Kelly's attitude as "arrogant" during the talks. Later, a "high-ranking South Korean government official" says that Kang proposed to link US nuclear suspicions and a reduction in conventional forces with the United States lifting economic sanctions and changing its hostile policy towards North Korea. [Note: US press reports suggest that the evidence regarding

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North Korea's uranium enrichment program is based on the discovery that North Korea has been attempting to acquire large amounts of high-strength aluminum for gas-centrifuges.


4 October 2002

The Asahi Shimbun reports that about three months ago North Korea disbanded the "727 Liaison Office for Japan (對日727連絡所)" under the Operations Department (作戰部) of the Korean Workers' Party Central Committee (朝鮮勞動黨中央委員會). The office, based in Ch'ŏngjin, North Hamgyŏng Province, was staffed with about 1,500 personnel and was responsible for spy ship operations in Japanese territorial waters. Kim Jong Il reportedly issued the order to disband the office in order to reduce the possibility of conflicts with Japan. The name of the office comes from the date of 27 July when Kim Il Sung is said to have issued instructions to encourage a revolution in South Korea.


7 October 2002

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement saying that during his 3-5 October trip to Pyongyang, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly took a "high-handed and arrogant attitude" in raising "issues of concern." According to the ministry, Kelly said that North Korea's relations with the United States, Japan and South Korea would be normalized only when North Korea meets the unilateral US demands regarding North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. The message conveyed by Kelly, according to the statement, indicates that the Bush administration is not pursuing a policy of dialogue, but rather "a hardline policy of hostility to bring North Korea to its knees by force." The ministry concludes that "such unchanged policy of the US compels North Korea to take all necessary countermeasures, pursuant to the army-based policy whose validity has been proven."


14 October 2002

The Tokyo Shimbun reports that North Korea has proposed a "technical consultation" with the IAEA to resolve suspicions over Pyongyang's nuclear program. The paper quotes a senior official in the Japanese Foreign Ministry as having said that North Korea made the proposal by fax several days after Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang on 17 September 2002.

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16 October 2002

Richard Boucher, spokesman for the US State Department, announces that during high-level talks in Pyongyang held from 3-5 October, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly presented his North Korean hosts with recently acquired US evidence that indicates North Korea has been pursuing a nuclear weapons program based on uranium enrichment. According to Boucher, North Korean officials acknowledged the existence of a uranium enrichment program when meeting with Kelly. This program, Boucher claims, is a serious violation of North Korea's commitments under the Agreed Framework, the NPT, its IAEA safeguards agreement and the Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. "Over the summer," Boucher says, "President Bush—in consultations with our allies and friends—had developed a bold approach to improve relations with North Korea." Boucher continues, "In light of our concern about the North's nuclear weapons program, however, we are unable to pursue this approach." [Note: US press reports suggest that the evidence regarding North Korea's uranium enrichment program is based on the discovery that North Korea has been attempting to acquire large amounts of high-strength aluminum for gas-centrifuges.]


17 October 2002

IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei expresses "deep regret" over North Korea's admission that it has been clandestinely pursuing a nuclear weapons program based on uranium enrichment. ElBaradei says that the IAEA is "urgently seeking information from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in response to this report, as well as information form the United States that will allow us to follow up on this very serious allegation."


17 October 2002

South Korea, Japan, and China stress the importance of continued engagement with North Korean following the revelation that North Korea has been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program based on uranium enrichment technology. Tokyo pledges to continue normalization talks with North Korea scheduled to resume 29 October, but Japanese officials claim that they will suspend the talks if North Korea fails to comply with the Agreed Framework. Im Sŏng Jun, South Korean national security adviser, says that Seoul regards the admission "as a sign North Korea is willing to resolve this problem through dialogue." In addition, according to a Blue House statement, Seoul will continue with its plan to send an aid package consisting of 400,000 tons of rice and 100,000 tons of fertilizer. However, "if public sentiment worsens here," a Seoul official says, "it will be difficult to give any additional aid." Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue says that China continues to oppose the introduction of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula but believes the issue "should be settled through dialogue and negotiations."


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**17 October 2002**

US intelligence officials claim that North Korea obtained the technology for its recently revealed uranium enrichment program from Pakistan. According to the officials, North Korea obtained gas centrifuges from Pakistan in the late 1990’s in exchange for missile technology. One intelligence official describes the relationship as "a perfect meeting of interests—the North has what the Pakistanis needed, and the Pakistanis had a way for Kim Jong Il to restart a nuclear program we had stopped." The cooperation between North Korea and Pakistan reportedly began around 1997, but the officials are uncertain as to when, or if, the relationship ended. The White House has refused to comment on Pakistan's role in helping North Korea acquire uranium enrichment technology, but Asad Hayauddin, a spokesman for Pakistan's Embassy in Washington, calls the allegations "absolutely incorrect." Hayauddin says, "We have never had an accident or leak or any export of fissile material or nuclear technology or knowledge."


**17 October 2002**

US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says he believes North Korea already has a small number of nuclear weapons and a program to produce more. He also says Pyongyang is now in violation of four separate agreements.


**17 October 2002**

The Blue House (Ch'ŏng'wadae), the South Korean presidential residence, issues a statement regarding North Korea's admission to having a uranium enrichment program to US envoy James Kelly. Im Sŏng Jun, Senior Secretary to the President for Foreign Affairs and National Security, says President Kim Dae Jung considers the issue very serious and that Pyongyang's development of nuclear weapons is unacceptable. However, the government considers the candid admission a sign that North Korea is prepared to resolve the issue through dialogue. The South Korean government's position is that the issue should be resolved peacefully through dialogue. The spokesman calls on North Korea fulfill its commitments under the NPT, Agreed Framework, and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.


**17 October 2002**

The IAEA sends a letter to Pyongyang asking for North Korea's cooperation "in seeking clarification of reported information about a program to enrich uranium."


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18 October 2002
In testimony before the National Assembly's National Defense Committee, South Korea's Minister of National Defense Lee Jun says it is still uncertain whether North Korea has completed or is operating an HEU production facility. He also says that North Korea should be able to use a uranium bomb without testing it.

18 October 2002
In testimony before the National Assembly's Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee, Minister of Unification Ch'oe Sŏng Hong says that the South Korean government had some information regarding North Korea's uranium enrichment program before James Kelly's visit to Pyongyang the first week of October. However, Ch'oe says the government was only able to grasp the details of the intelligence in August 2002.

18 October 2002
South Korea's National Assembly adopts a resolution calling for North Korea to immediately abandon all programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. However, rival political parties differ on the details for addressing North Korea's nuclear program.

18 October 2002
During a press conference in Moscow, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman denies press reports that Russia and China have assisted North Korea with its nuclear weapons program.

18 October 2002
The IAEA sends another letter to Pyongyang asking for North Korea's cooperation "in seeking clarification of reported information about a program to enrich uranium."

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19-22 October 2002

North and South Korea hold their Eight Inter-Ministerial Talks in Pyongyang. The two sides discuss a number of economic issues, and issue a joint statement that includes, "The North and the South agreed to make common efforts to guarantee peace and security on the Korean peninsula, consistent with the spirit of the June 15 Joint Declaration, and to actively cooperate to resolve all problems through dialogue, including the nuclear issue." North Korean officials tell South Korean Minister of Unification Chŏng Se Hyŏn that Pyongyang is willing to resolve the nuclear issue if the United States changes its hostile policy towards North Korea.


25 October 2002

North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says that James Kelly produced no evidence of a North Korean uranium program when he visited Pyongyang earlier this month. The statement says Pyongyang is willing to resolve the current impasse if the United States does three things: recognize the sovereignty of North Korea, assures North Korea of non-aggression, and not hinder North Korea's economic development. The spokesman says North Korea will address all US security concerns if Washington will stop its nuclear threats and sign a non-aggression pact with Pyongyang.


29-30 October 2002

Delegations from North Korea and Japan meet in Kuala Lumpur to discuss the normalization of diplomatic relations. Talks end in dispute when North Korea refuses to accept Japanese demands that immediate relatives of kidnap victims be allowed to visit Japan. North Korean delegates become dissatisfied when Japan refuses to discuss or provide economic assistance without resolving the issues of past kidnappings, and North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs. In response, the North Korean delegates say that the nuclear and missile issues must be resolved in negotiations with the United States. The two sides agree to establish working groups to discuss security issues the following month.

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31 October 2002

The *Nihon Keizai*, a Japanese business daily, reports the United States has concluded that North Korea might be preparing to conduct an underground nuclear test in the near future. However, Yasuo Fukuda, Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary, says that the Japanese government has received no such information.


1 November 2002

According to a "diplomatic source," the United States will soon consult with South Korea and Japan before deciding whether to impose economic sanctions against North Korea in response to Pyongyang’s admission that it has a program to enrich uranium. According to the source, this issue will be discussed at the next Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting that will being in Tokyo on 8 November. Furthermore, US Secretary of State Colin Powell will visit Seoul on 11 November.


2-5 November 2002

Donald Gregg, former US ambassador to South Korea, visits Pyongyang. Gregg holds 10 hours of talks with three senior North Korean officials, and Gregg says they have adopted a "neither confirm nor deny" position on the issue of North Korea’s HEU program. The Korean hosts tell Gregg that Pyongyang wants a non-aggression pact with the United States, and that it does not have to be a formal peace treaty. The former ambassador says that North Korea seems willing to take simultaneous steps with the United States to resolve the issue over Pyongyang’s HEU program, and that the officials consider the Agreed Framework to still be in force, but "hanging by a thread." Gregg is accompanied by journalist Don Oberdorfer. [Note: Since North Korea admitted to having an HEU program in early October 2002, both Washington and Pyongyang sides have been saying that the other side must make the first move to resolve the current impasse.]


3 November 2002

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Three National Assembly members from the Grand National Party (한나라당) say the United States is considering ways to pressure North Korea into abandoning its nuclear weapons program. The lawmakers are part of a sixmember Grand National Party team investigating North Korea’s nuclear program, and the team returned from a six-day trip to the United States on 1 November. The lawmakers say the Bush administration is unlikely to obtain funding for heavy fuel oil (HFO) shipments to North Korea next year. The HFO deliveries are part of US obligations under the Agreed Framework.


4 November 2002
The Korean Central News Agency says that the United States has failed to implement the four articles of the Agreed Framework over the last eight years, and that US actions have been intended to kill the agreement. The news agency accuses the United States using nuclear threats, so therefore Pyongyang feels rightfully entitled to possessing nuclear weapons and other weapons "even more powerful." The editorial also says the hostile policy of the United States is an impediment to positive developments in Northeast Asia, and that a frank discussion to implement the Agreed Framework and to conclude a non-aggression pact is the most appropriate way to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Furthermore, Pyongyang believes that US refusal to negotiate indicates an intention to invade North Korea.


4 November 2002
During a series of summit meetings in Phnom Penh organized by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Chinese Premier Zhu Rong Ji, and South Korean Prime Minister Kim Sŏk Su agree that North Korean should abandon its nuclear weapons program. The three sides say they will press Pyongyang into resolving the issue in a peaceful manner.


5 November 2002
A "South Korean government source" says the United States has informed the South Korean government that US analysts believe North Korean officials meant "biochemical weapons" when recently claiming Pyongyang has something "more powerful than nuclear weapons."


7 November 2002
The European Union Parliament adopts a non-binding resolution to review the KEDO project to build two light

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water nuclear reactors in North Korea. The resolution is adopted following North Korea’s admission that it has a program to produce highly enriched uranium.


8 November 2002
The Segye Ilbo, a South Korean daily, reports that North Korea has been acquiring plutonium, uranium, other metals and equipment from Kazakhstan and other central Asian countries since 1994. According to the report, North Korea has procured uranium-235, plutonium-239, as well as osmium-187, cesium-137 and strontium, which the report claims are used for reducing the size of nuclear warheads. The Segye Ilbo claims the information came in the form of a four-page Russian document acquired by the South Korean Embassy in Uzbekistan. The report also claims that North Korea acquired 70-80 documents that contain information regarding nuclear technologies, and that North Korea smuggled 32kg of HEU from Kazakhstan in August 2001. [Note: CNS sources indicate the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade received no such document, and there is no apparent use for osmium-187, cesium-137, and strontium in reducing the size of nuclear weapons; therefore, this report does not seem credible.]


11 November 2002
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov says Russia has no concrete evidence that North Korea possesses or is developing nuclear weapons. Ivanov makes the remarks at a press conference following a meeting with South Korean Defense Minister Lee Chun. The two sides conclude an agreement to cooperate on security issues, including nonproliferation, terrorism, and the maintenance of peace and security on the Korean peninsula.


13 November 2002
The US National Security Council decides in favor of ending heavy fuel oil (HFO) shipments to North Korea under the Agreed Framework. The decision is in response to Pyongyang’s admission in early October 2002 to having a program for highly enriched uranium. A "senior US government official" tells Reuters that a current shipment of HFO in route to North Korea will continue, but that shipments contracted for in December and January will be cancelled. The official also says that the United States expects South Korea, Japan and the European Union to concur with the US decision.


13 November 2002
South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency publishes the results of a telephone interview with a "high level North

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Korean." According to the official, Pyongyang will definitely consider the Agreed Framework null and void if heavy fuel oil shipments are terminated. The official said the United States has already violated three of its obligations under the agreement by failing to normalize relations, failing to cease its threats against North Korea, and failing to complete the LWR construction project by 2003. [Note: The official is probably assigned to North Korea's Permanent Mission since the article was written by a Yonhap News correspondent in New York, and officials at the mission have been granting interviews to the press.]


14 November 2002
KEDO’s executive board meets in New York and decides to suspend shipments of heavy fuel oil to North Korea beginning with the shipment of December 2002. [Note: The oil shipment now in route from Singapore will be allowed to continue.]


17 November 2002
A Rodong Sinmun commentary says that the United States has violated the Agreed Framework, and that US actions have destroyed the joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula signed by Pyongyang and Seoul. The official daily of the Korean Workers' Party claims that "US warmongers are calling for preemptive strikes against North Korea," and that this amounts to a declaration of nuclear war. The commentary concludes that the United States, as a nuclear weapons state, has a legal and moral obligation to conclude a non-aggression treaty with North Korea.


21 November 2002
A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement in response to the decision by KEDO on 14 November to suspend the delivery of heavy fuel oil (HFO) to North Korea. The spokesman describes the action as a "wanton violation of Article One of the Agreed Framework, which had a guarantee message from the US president." The statement says "the provision of HFO was the only one of four articles in the agreement that the US observed." Pyongyang also blames Washington for the delay in LWR construction, and for "working out a plan for a preemptive nuclear attack against North Korea, and for listing it as part of an ‘axis of evil’."


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25 November 2002
US Secretary of State Colin Powell says he has told Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf that Pakistan will face "consequences" if the US feels there is any "inappropriate contact" between Pakistan and North Korea.

25 November 2002
A Rodong Sinmun commentary says that North Korea has faithfully implemented the Agreed Framework while the United States has "wantonly violated the agreement and persistently neglected to fulfill its commitments." The daily says the key to resolving the current situation in Korea is to conclude a non-aggression pact between Washington and Pyongyang.

26 November 2002
A South Korean Ministry of Unification official says that contacts between the LWR reactor project office in Seoul and its counterpart in Pyongyang have been cut off, and that training for North Korean engineers originally scheduled for this month are now in doubt. The training on the safe operation of reactors was to be held in South Korea.

27 November 2002
US Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow says that North Korea could produce nuclear warheads in one or two years, and that the United States now believes Pyongyang’s HEU program is progressing from “the development to the manufacturing stage.” According to Vershbow, the United States has information about cooperation between Pakistani and North Korean technical personnel, but no evidence about Pakistani government involvement in the North Korean HEU program.

29 November 2002
The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution reiterating it previous calls for North Korea to cooperate with the IAEA in order to fulfill all its safeguards commitments. The resolution also requests that Pyongyang clarify recent reports of a uranium enrichment program in North Korea.

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Early December 2002
According to intelligence sources cited by the Washington Times, North Korea receives 20 tons of tributyl phosphate (TBP) from a Chinese company in Dalian. TBP has commercial uses, such as making paint, ink and plastics, but the compound can also be used in reprocessing plutonium and enriching uranium. [Note: On 9 December, the Washington Times reported that US intelligence has discovered that North Korean government agents had approached several Chinese companies to acquire TBP, but subsequent reports on 17 and 20 December started that North Korea had actually received 20 tons of TBP.]

2 December 2002
In Beijing, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin sign a joint declaration which states, "The two sides maintain that it is crucial to peace and security in Northeast Asia to maintain a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and the system for nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction." The declaration also calls on North Korea and the United States to abide by the Agreed Framework and to normalize relations.

2 December 2002
North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun sends a letter to the IAEA in response to the IAEA Board of Governors resolution adopted on 29 November. Paek says that Pyongyang cannot accept the terms of the resolution because North Korea is under a nuclear threat from the United States. Paek accuses the agency "of acting under the manipulation of the United States," and says, "Our principal stance over the nuclear issue remains unchanged."

2 December 2002

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
A Korean Central News Agency editorial criticizes the United States for "being keen on developing nuclear weapons capable of destroying underground plants and facilities." The commentary also says the United States "is practically increasing the nuclear threat to the DPRK after listing it as part of an 'axis of evil' and a target of its preemptive nuclear attack in wanton violation of the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework and the basic spirit of the DPRK-U.S. joint statement. It is, therefore, a legitimate sovereign right for the DPRK to keep itself fully ready to cope with the enemy's threat."


3 December 2002
USA Today reports that the Verification and Compliance Bureau of the US State Department is preparing verification measures in case an agreement is reached with North Korea to curb its HEU program.

3 December 2002
During a televised debate in South Korea, Grand National Party presidential candidate Lee Hoe Ch'ang says that North Korea has nuclear weapons. The statement is controversial as the rival Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) calls for Lee to provide proof of the accusation or retract it because the MDP says it creates anxiety for the South Korean people and increases tensions between the two Koreas.

3 December 2002
At a Department of Defense press briefing, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says, "North Korea has weapons of mass destruction and is denying freedom and food and every kind of opportunity that is available to the South Korean people to the people of North Korea. It's a tragedy that it happens." Rumsfeld also says that the ruling regime in North Korea is "vicious," and that "what it is doing to the people of North Korea is criminal."

9 December 2002
After a meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage tells the press that the United States has "patience for diplomacy to work" in dealing with North Korea. Armitage also says that US policy towards North Korea is in line with allies in the region.

10 December 2002
Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
Yukio Takasu, Japan’s ambassador to the IAEA, says that an IAEA expert is now in Pyongyang meeting with North Korean government officials. The IAEA official was reportedly sent to Pyongyang last week.


10 December 2002
In response to the IAEA resolution of 29 November, the Korean Central News Agency accuses the IAEA of being biased and speaking on behalf of the United States. KCNA calls the resolution unreasonable and says the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula is a result of the Washington’s hostile policy towards Pyongyang, and the United States having deployed nuclear weapons to South Korea.


12 December 2002
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement that says Pyongyang will “immediately resume the operation and construction of its nuclear facilities to generate electricity.”


14 December 2002
Lee Che Sŏn (Ri Je Son), director general of North Korea’s General Department of Atomic Energy, sends another letter to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reiterating Pyongyang’s request that the IAEA remove all seals and monitoring cameras at the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex.


19 December 2002
Roh Moo Hyun (No Mu Hyŏn; 盧武鉉), a former human rights lawyer, and candidate of the Millennium Democratic Party (새千年民主黨), wins South Korea’s presidential election. [Note: Roh has said he would like continue engagement with North Korea, but cannot accept North Korea developing nuclear weapons.]

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19 December 2002
The Chinese Foreign Ministry dismisses as "groundless," reports by the Washington Times that Chinese firms have sold 20 tons of tributyl phosphate to North Korea. Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao states that the Washington Times "often publishes ill-intentioned and irresponsible reports and these reports are also groundless. We think this report is not worth comment." [Note: Tributyl phosphate has commercial uses, but it can also be used to make weapons-grade plutonium and weapons-grade uranium.]

20 December 2002
A Rodong Sinmun commentary says that if the United States "has a right to use nuclear weapons, then North Korea is entitled to counter it." The daily says, "The Bush administration has not implemented the DPRK-US Agreed Framework deliberately but breached it systematically. The Bush bellicose forces have led nuclear pressure upon the DPRK to a high pitch." The commentary also adds that Pyongyang has proposed a non-aggression be signed by the two sides, and that Washington should accept the proposal.

21 December 2002
North Korean technicians begin removing seals and disabling monitoring cameras at the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.

22 December 2002
North Korean technicians begin removing seals and disabling monitoring cameras at the temporary storage facility for about 8,000 spent fuel rods in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
23-24 December 2002
North Korean technicians remove most of the seals and disables monitoring cameras at the Radiochemistry Laboratory, which is a plutonium reprocessing plant, and the fuel fabrication plant in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.

24 December 2002
On the 11th anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s appointment as supreme commander of North Korea's armed forces, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces Kim Il Ch’ŏl says, "The US hawks who are pushing the situation on the Korean Peninsula to the brink of a nuclear war. If they, ignorant of their rival, dare provoke a nuclear war, the army and people of the DPRK led by Kim Jong Il, the invincible commander, will rise up to mete out determined and merciless punishment to the US imperialist aggressors with the might of single-hearted unity more powerful than A-bomb."

27 December 2002
In Crawford, Texas, White House Spokeswoman Claire Buchan says, "The United States will not negotiate in response to threats or broken commitments," and that the United States wants Pyongyang.

27 December 2002
The IAEA receives a letter from North Korea requesting "the immediate removal of IAEA inspectors from North Korea in light their decision to lift the ‘freeze’ on their nuclear facilities." IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei says, "Together with the loss of cameras and seals, the departure of inspectors would practically bring to an end our ability to monitor [the] DPRK’s nuclear program or assess its nature."

31 December 2002
Pak Ui Chun, North Korea’s ambassador to Russia, suggests that North Korea will pull out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Speaking at a news conference in Moscow, Pak says, "North Korea is not currently able to meet its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—this is the fault of the United States." Pak claims that North Korea can no longer fulfill its treaty obligations because the United States has stopped heavy fuel oil deliveries and continues to threaten North Korea with a preventive nuclear strike.

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2001

KEDO delivers 559,613 metric tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea.

2001-2005
The EU pledges to contribute €150 million ($130 million) for the construction of the two light water reactors in North Korea under the Agreed Framework. The EU will provide 30 million euro per year for five years.

5 January 2001
The Chosun Ilbo reports that at the two Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meetings held on 30 March and 26 June 2000 respectively, the US delegation reportedly proposed to build six standard power plants instead of one of two light water nuclear reactors, under the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework. According to the documents produced from the TCOG meeting, the US delegation suggested that the said proposal will help ease North Korean power shortage in a shorter time frame and at a much less cost. However, according to the Chosun Ilbo, the South Korean government disagreed with the proposal saying that even though electricity supply to North Korea is a key issue of ongoing North-South dialogue, it cannot be mixed with the conditions of the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework. The United States stated its dissatisfaction with South Korea's attempt to support North Korea's electricity generating capacity on its own, disregarding the 1994 Agreed Framework. The US contention is that such a move will aggravate the US position at the negotiation table with North Korea.

10 January 2001
A South Korean official announces that construction of two nuclear power plants under the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework is likely to be further delayed due to contractual and funding problems. The first reactor is to be built by 2003 and the second by 2004. The US company General Electric Co. backed out of a deal to supply turbine generators for the project because the supply contract did not contain financial liabilities and compensation guarantees in case of plant accidents. KEDO has now decided to award the contract to a Japan's Hitachi-Toshiba consortium for supply of power turbines. According to the official, the contract worth $100 million will be signed within six months. The official also says that work on site preparation has almost been completed and reactor construction work is expected to begin in the later half of the year 2001. The contract with Japanese consortium would increase the pace of planning and constructing the nuclear power plants. However, according to the official, some South Korean lawmakers have opposed the Japanese firms' participation, saying it will only benefit Japan's economy, while turning the North Korean power stations into a Japanese model instead of Korean. Other South Korean lawmakers refute the contention, stressing that Japanese earnings from the contract will only be $250 million as compared to $1 billion contribution to the project by Japan.

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13 January 2001
KEDO officials say that North Koreans have been demanding an almost six-fold pay rise since February 2000, with some 100 workers taking leave everyday to pressure KEDO. According to the officials, bargaining talks have been continuing off and on without any early conclusion in sight. The officials also say that the consortium is considering employing construction workers from Uzbekistan for the light water nuclear reactor project in North Korea.

13 January 2001
Song Min Sun, director general of North American Affairs Bureau in South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, says the idea of replacing a nuclear power plant, currently under construction in North Korea, with a thermal plant is unworkable "politically, economically and technologically." Song says, "Once, we reviewed the idea, but reached the conclusion that it is unworkable because of underlying problems regarding the replacement." Noting that Seoul is set to provide 70 percent of the total construction cost reaching $4.6 billion, Song said that it should have the key voice in any possible change in the agreement.

17 January 2001
US Secretary of State-designate Colin Powell tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Bush administration will adhere to the Agreed Framework, "provided North Korea does the same."

1 February 2001
KEDO issues an Authorization to Proceed, allowing KEPCO to commence negotiations with Doosan to begin preliminary work on the turbine generators for the KEDO light water reactor project. [Note: General Electric (GE) was to be the supplier of the turbine generators, but after failing to receive liability guarantees from the US Congress, GE pulled out of the KEDO project.]

3 February 2001
Desaix Anderson, Director General of KEDO, says that construction of the two light water nuclear reactors in North Korea would be continued even though the Bush administration has pursued the replacement of the light water reactors with conventional power plants. He dismisses media reports of replacing one LWR with a thermal plant.

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15 February 2001
According to the *Wolgan Chosun*, Kim Jong Il is shot in the side by one of his bodyguards. According to the report, Pak Song Pong, first vice director of the Munitions Industry Department under the Korean Workers' Party, was also shot and died on 20 February. [Note: Pak's sudden death on 20 February has been confirmed, but he shooting has not.]

15 February 2001
KEPCO and the government of Uzbekistan sign a contract by which 250 Uzbeks will be employed to work on the KEDO light water reactor project beginning in March 2001.

19-21 February 2001
Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, meets with South Korean officials in Seoul to discuss various issues. While in Seoul, Kartman meets with Chan Sun Sup, head of South Korea's Office of Planning for the Light Water Reactor Project. The two reportedly discuss recent developments in the KEDO project, including the employment of 250 Uzbeks to work on the project beginning in March.

21 February 2001
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement criticizing the hard-line policies of the Bush administration. The spokesman says that the United States and North Korea agreed to improve bilateral relations and remove distrust in the Agreed Framework, but that US calls for "conditional reciprocity" mean the United States wants North Korea to "disarm itself." The spokesman says that the United States has not sincerely implemented its commitments under the Agreed Framework, which has "caused huge losses to North Korea." Furthermore, the spokesman says the KEDO light water reactors (LWR) are unlikely to be completed by 2003, and that the United States "is obliged to compensate for North Korea's loss of electricity caused by the delayed LWR project."

21 February 2001
US government sources state that the Bush administration plans to emphasize a reduction in North Korean conventional forces, including a withdrawal of forward-deployed North Korean troops. Other US officials state that reaching an agreement with North Korea on conventional forces will be relatively easy compared to nuclear and missile issues. The Bush administration is also considering the replacement of one or both light water reactors under the Agreed Framework with conventional power plants as part of its ongoing policy review.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
2 March 2001
Senior lawmakers, including Henry Hyde (R-Illinois) chairman of the House International Relations Committee; Christopher Cox (R-California), chairman of the Republican Policy Committee, and Edward Markey, (D-Massachusetts), deliver a letter to the Bush administration urging the United States to reconsider its commitments under the Agreed Framework to provide North Korea with light water reactors.

2 March 2001
State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says that the Bush administration plans to fulfill its Agreed Framework commitments "completely and fully."

7 March 2001
President George Bush states that he is not certain North Korea can be trusted to adhere to its commitments under the Agreed Framework. Speaking in Washington at a joint press conference with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, Bush says, "I do have some skepticism about the leader of North Korea. We're not certain as to whether or not they're keeping all terms of all agreements."

8 March 2001
US Secretary of State Colin Powell announces that the United States may modify the Agreed Framework. Speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Powell says, "For the moment we are in accord with the 1994 agreement, but that doesn't prevent us from looking at aspects of it that we might wish to revisit or change."
Powell says the 1994 Agreed Framework had many promising elements, but "what was not there was a monitoring and verification regime of the kind that we would need to have in order to move forward in negotiations with such a regime."

9 March 2001
Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sends a letter to George W. Bush urging him to renegotiate the Agreed Framework with North Korea and substitute conventional power plants for the two light water reactors. Helms accuses North Korea of not upholding its commitments under the agreement.

9 March 2001
KEPCO, the main contractor for the KEDO light water reactor project, announce that Donga Construction will no longer participate in the project, thus leaving its 20 percent share of the construction project to be divided amongst the other three companies subcontracted for the project.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
10-13 March 2001

A KEDO delegation travels to Pyongyang "to participate in high-level negotiations" with North Korea officials regarding the light water reactor project.


11 March 2001

North Korean radio says, "The people of the earth all know that there are approximately 1,000 nuclear weapons still in existence in South Korea." The report quotes a publication of the "National Democratic Front," which North Korea claims is an underground resistance organization operating in South Korea.


13 March 2001

The head of the North Korean delegation for inter-ministerial talks, which are scheduled to begin today in Seoul, calls his counterpart in Seoul to inform him that North Korea will have to postpone the talks. Chŏn Kŭm Chin, the North Korean representative gives no reason for the sudden postponement, but some speculate the reason may be health problems for Chŏn, the recent summit between Kim Dae Jung and George W. Bush, or the perceived US hard-line policy towards North Korea.


23 March 2001

The Education Center of Unification, a South Korean think tank, issues a report stating that over 3,000 nuclear scientists are currently working in North Korea.


25 March 2001

The Washington Post reports that the North Korean nuclear project under the Agreed Framework is unlikely to be completed until 2010. According to the report, the Bush administration is looking skeptically at the project, and some key Republican senators are demanding changes. North Korea has been threatening war if the project is not carried forward. Yet, the report quotes officials involved with the project as saying that they are confident that the project will not be abandoned. Chang Sŏn Sŏp, head of South Korea's Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project, has said that there is no alternative to the project.


28 March 2001
Chang Sŏn Sŏp, head of South Korea's Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project, says that replacing the light-water nuclear reactors with thermoelectric power plants would be impractical. He says, "There would be difficulties in revising the Agreed Framework and the replacement would not be of help in reducing the construction period or curtailing of costs."

9 April 2001
The US State Department announces that the United States has earmarked $95 million for fiscal year 2002 to be used on the KEDO light water reactor project. This amount marks a 73 percent increase in US contributions to KEDO from fiscal year 2001.

Mid-April 2001
The US National Security Council decides to permit a renewed authorization of certain nuclear technology transfers to North Korea under the Agreed Framework. [Note: Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham signed the authorization on 3 May 2001.]

17 April 2001
The Nihon Keizai Shimbun reports that the United States is planning to urge North Korea to accept a nuclear inspection team to "confirm the existence of a storage place for plutonium." The report also says the new US administration is seeking to replace one of the light water reactors under the Agreed Framework with a conventional power plant. [Note: The reference to "the storage place" is likely referring to the two suspect waste sites in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.]

17 April 2001
Speaking in Washington, D.C., John McLaughlin, deputy director of the CIA, says that North Korea "probably has one or two nuclear bombs—and it may also have biological ones alongside its chemical ones."

26 April 2001
Charles Kartman, a former US State Department official, is appointed new director of KEDO. Kartman will replace Desaix Anderson on 1 May 2001.

May 2001

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
The United States renews for five years an authorization for the transfer of certain nuclear technology to North Korea. The authorization is issued under the Department of Energy's regulations in 10 CFR Part 810, and it allows limited technology transfers only to what is "necessary for the licensing and safe operation of the reactors and not technology enabling the design or manufacture of nuclear reactor components or fuel." [Note: According to Department of Energy documents released in March 2003, Westinghouse Co. transfers approximately 300 nuclear related documents to North Korea from May 2001 to March 2003. The 300 documents, including safety analysis reports, training documents, quality assurance documents, and construction documents, are among 3,100 nuclear related documents from Westinghouse Co. that have been approved by the Department of Energy. 100 Westinghouse documents have been blocked by the Department's export control office.]


1 May 2001

KEDO's Executive Board names Charles Kartman as the new executive director of KEDO.


1-5 May 2001

A KEDO delegation visits Pyongyang to participate in "high-level expert negotiation" with North Korea. The talks are in regard to the provision of two LWRs under the Agreed Framework. It is later revealed that quality guarantee protocols are covered in the talks, and that North Korea agrees it will be the responsible party for operating the reactors, and that it will accept responsibility for any accidents at the site.


Early May 2001

In a US Senate conformation hearing, James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, says he does not expect the Bush administration to scrap the Agreed Framework after the policy review on North Korea is completed.


2 May 2001

Moscow TV 6 says there have been reports in the Moscow press that 20 Russian have gone to North Korea and assumed aliases. The scientists are said to be working on the North Korean nuclear program.


3 May 2001

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham signs a new authorization for Westinghouse to transfer certain nuclear technology to North Korea. The new five-year authorization replaces one that was issued in 1996 and was due to expire on 6 May 2001. The earlier authorization was for Combustion Engineering, which has now merged with Westinghouse. Only technology that is necessary for the implementation of the Agreed Framework can be transferred to North Korea under this authorization. Technology for “the design or manufacture of nuclear reactor components or fuel” is still banned.


7 May 2001

South Korean media report that the United States has decided to replace the two light-water nuclear reactors being constructed in North Korea by KEDO with thermal power stations. According to reports, President Bush has instructed Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to inform South Korea and Japan of the decision during his upcoming diplomatic trip to South Korea and Japan. However, a spokesman for the South Korean government says that the United States does not have the final decision over the replacement of the light-water reactors with conventional power plants.


8 May 2001

The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers’ Party, condemns CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin for suggesting that North Korea might have one or two nuclear weapons. According to the report, Pyongyang is shocked that the "CIA dared find fault with us groundlessly on an official occasion." The report continues, "It is a known fact that we do not have nuclear problems. The transparency of our peaceful nuclear energy program has already been confirmed."


15 May 2001

The Rodong Sinmun criticizes IAEA Director ElBaradei for trying "to shift responsibility for the delayed construction of the light water reactors under the Agreed Framework onto North Korea." The commentary says that the United States is "chiefly responsible for the noncompliance with the Agreed Framework," and that North Korea has an urgent need to be compensated for the loss of electricity "due to the intentional delaying tactics of the US." However, the Rodong Sinmun also says, "There is no change in North Korea’s stand to sincerely implement the Agreed Framework."


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16 May 2001
The Korean Central News Agency releases a report on the Agreed Framework that says the light water reactors (LWR) may not be completed until 2010. The report says North Korea should be compensated for the shortfall in electricity, and that the 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) delivered per year under the Agreed Framework will not be sufficient. The HFO is supposed to compensate for the closure of North Korea's two graphite-moderated nuclear plants of 50MW(e) and 200MW(e), while each of the LWRs is to generate 1,000MW(e). North Korea says other countries may contribute to this shortfall besides the United States, but that North Korea may pull out of the Agreed Framework and reopen the graphite-moderated reactors if it does not receive compensation.

21 May 2001
The Korean Central News Agency publishes another report stating that the United States is responsible for the delay in the KEDO light water reactor project, and must compensate North Korea for the electricity loss. The report also complains about "cock-and-bull stories about the 'revision' of the AF [Agreed Framework] and the 'provision of thermal power plants' [that] are heard from among officials of the Bush administration."

22-29 May 2001
An IAEA delegation travels to North Korea. The delegation meets with North Korean officials in Pyongyang on 23 to 25 May for the 16th round of negotiations on the implementation of the Agreed Framework. Olli Heinonen, director of safeguards for the IAEA in Asia, asks North Korea for a detailed program guaranteeing scrutiny of the two suspect waste sites in Yŏngbyŏn-kun and other facilities. The negotiations end with no agreement to resume inspections, but another meeting is scheduled for October.

23 May 2001

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
Yonhap News Agency reports that the United States will try to accelerate safeguards inspections in North Korea so that they may begin no later than next year. The Joongang Ilbo quotes a diplomatic source in Seoul as saying, "It seems like the US Bush administration has made up its mind to resolve the North's nuclear suspicion first among all the other matters and launch early verification process (sic)." The administration is likely taking this stand because of the delay in the LWR construction that was originally targeted for completion by 2003.


25 May 2001
James Kelly, US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, tells South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Im Sŏng Jun that talks between the United States and North Korea are likely to resume in June. Kelly makes the remarks in Honolulu during the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting. Kelly says the North Korean missile program will likely be the first item on the agenda.


26 May 2001
James Kelly, US representative to the Trilateral Consultation and Oversight Group (TCOG), briefs his South Korean and Japanese counterparts on the US policy review of North Korea. He says, "We are in the final stage in the comprehensive review of US policy toward North Korea." All three delegations agree that consultation and coordinated policy is needed towards several issues regarding North Korea, including missiles, WMD, and humanitarian issues. The delegations reaffirm their commitment to the Agreed Framework, and express strong support for South Korea's engagement policy towards North Korea.


29 May 2001
After the Trilateral consultation and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting in Honolulu, senior officials from South Korea, the United States and Japan hold an unofficial meeting to discuss North Korea policy. During the meeting, South Korean Unification Minister Im Tong Wŏn, former US Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry William Perry, and Ryozo Kato, who is later named the new Deputy Vice Foreign Minister of Japan, review the Bush administration's policy toward North Korea.


Late May 2001

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun tells Selig Harrison, an American scholar, that Pyongyang is reconsidering its missile flight-test moratorium. Harrison quotes Foreign Minister Paek as saying, "As to whether we will maintain the moratorium until 2003, that is yet to be decided. It depends entirely on the policy of the new administration." During his five-day visit to Pyongyang, Harrison also meets with Colonel General Lee Ch'ang Pok, the North Korean representative at Panmunjom. Harrison quotes Colonel General Lee as saying, "Right now our government has not decided that we need nuclear weapons, but everybody is thinking in that direction in view of the hostile attitude of the Bush administration." Harrison concludes that the Bush administration's stance is playing into the hands of hard-liners in Pyongyang.

31 May 2001
Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer says that Australia will invite North Korean officials to a nuclear safeguards training course to be held in Australia later this year. Downer says the invitation is being extended so that North Korean officials can "join regional counterparts in developing their expertise in the management and accounting of nuclear materials, to assist North Korea to meet its NPT and IAEA obligations." Downer also says that Australia "supports efforts to achieve comprehensive and verifiable cuts in the DPRK missile program."

June 2001
The United States and South Korea begin a joint study on confidence-building measures (CBMs) with North Korea to address Pyongyang's ballistic missiles, WMD programs and conventional forces. The joint study team reportedly completes the first part of the study in late February 2002, with 32 items to be proposed for CBMs with North Korea.

1 June 2001
The Financial Times reports that US officials are concerned about contacts between North Korean officials and senior figures in the Pakistani nuclear program. There is also evidence that North Koreans have visited a nuclear weapons site in Pakistan. Some speculate that North Korea might obtain nuclear weapons technology in exchange for ballistic missile technology.

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4 June 2001
Charles Kartman, executive director of KEDO, says the United States will not provide any compensation for delays in the construction of two light water reactors in North Korea. However, Kartman denies reports that the reactors will be replaced with conventional power plants.

5 June 2001
Pakistani Foreign Minster Abdul Satter categorically denies that Pakistan has ever exported nuclear technology to North Korea. Speaking at a press conference, Satter stresses that Pakistan has never and will never export nuclear technology or material to any country.

6 June 2001
The Bush administration announces that its North Korea policy review is complete. The administration says it wants to restart talks with Pyongyang to seek "improved implementation of the Agreed Framework, verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile program, a ban on missile exports, and a less threatening North Korean conventional military posture." The administration offers incentives, such as "greater humanitarian aid, easing of economic sanctions, and unspecified political steps."

6 June 2001
North Korea criticizes the United States for suggesting in the TCOG meeting on 27 May that North Korea should submit to early IAEA safeguards inspections. Instead, North Korea feels it should be compensated for the loss in electricity due to the delay in the light water reactor (LWR) construction under the Agreed Framework. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in Pyongyang says, "The inspection is unthinkable before a great deal of the LWR project has been carried out." Furthermore, KCNA says, "It is the deserved right and option for the DPRK to restart the construction of graphite-moderated reactors for its right to existence unless compensation is made for the electricity loss resulting from the heavy delay in the LWR project..."

7 June 2001
US Secretary of State Colin Powell states that the United States is placing no preconditions on the proposed talks with North Korea. However, Powell adds that the Bush administration wants to expand the dialogue with North Korea by "putting conventional forces on the agenda and by making it clear to the North Koreans that we want to talk about missiles and missile technology and missile sales and nuclear weapons programs, but we also want to talk about humanitarian issues."

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9 June 2001
South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Han Sŭng Su says he is confident that the Bush administration will abide by the Agreed Framework. Han met with White House and State Department officials last week in Washington. Han quotes officials as saying that the new target date for transferring the two light water reactors is 2008.

11 June 2001
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei urges North Korea to comply with IAEA requests for safeguards inspections. ElBaradei makes the request during the opening statement of the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna.

13 June 2001
Jack Pritchard, US special envoy for Korean peace talks, meets with Lee Hyŏng Ch’ŏl, North Korean ambassador to the UN, in New York. Pritchard explains the outline of the Bush administration’s policy towards North Korea, and requests a meeting with Kim Kye Kwan, North Korean vice foreign minister. Lee responds that he will reply in one or two weeks after delivering the message to Pyongyang.

14 June 2001
South Korean Unification Minister Im Dong Wŏn says that South Korea has no intention of linking the supply of electricity to North Korea with the issues of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile proliferation.

18 June 2001
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement in response to the Bush administration’s announcement on 6 June 2001 of its intention to resume dialogue with North Korea. A ministry spokesman says that the United States is attempting to "disarm North Korea through negotiations" because the administration has proposed the topics of discussion to include North Korea's nuclear weapons program, missile program and conventional military forces. North Korea claims there should be no preconditions for resuming the dialogue that has been suspended for four months. Furthermore, the spokesman says North Korea will never discuss its conventional forces as long as US military forces remain in South Korea, and that the first item on the agenda should be "compensation for the loss in electricity due to the delay in construction of the light water reactors under the Agreed Framework."
—"Spokesman of DPRK Foreign Ministry on Bush's Statement on Resuming Negotiations with DPRK," Korean

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18 June 2001
The IAEA issues a statement that says North Korea remains in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement.

19 June 2001
NBC News, quoting anonymous US intelligence sources, reports that the United States believes North Korea has built one or two nuclear bombs, but "there is no evidence it has built missile warheads."

19 June 2001
Glyn Ford, a member of the European Parliament, says that the EU will contribute $87.5 million to the KEDO light water reactor project. Thus far the EU has contributed $75 million to the KEDO project.

20 June 2001
North Korean television and radio criticize the United States for unilaterally setting the agenda for bilateral talks. The Bush administration announced on 6 June 2001 bilateral talks should resume, but the administration proposed that conventional weapons should be included on the agenda. The broadcast accuses the United States of not implementing the Agreed Framework, and reiterates the North Korean demand for compensation due to the delay in the construction of the two light water reactors.

20 June 2001
At a luncheon hosted by the Korea Society in New York, Charles Kartman, executive director of KEDO, says that there will be no more delays in the construction of the two light water reactors in North Korea.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
20 June 2001
The Korean Central News Agency carries a commentary that criticizes the IAEA for joining the "hostile forces in the US attempting to suffocate North Korea to death" by calling for special inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities. The commentary emphasizes that the completeness and correctness of North Korea's initial declaration must wait until a considerable portion of the light water reactors (LWRs) is completed, and before any critical nuclear components are delivered, as stipulated under the Agreed Framework. KCNA says that IAEA Director now admits the LWR project will be delayed until 2008, and that inspections will take 3-4 years. The commentary also says that North Korea has faithfully guaranteed the IAEA's ability to "observe" (maintain the continuity of safeguards) the nuclear freeze, and that North Korea will faithfully carry out its obligations under the Agreed Framework.


21 June 2001
South Korean Defense Minister Kim Dong Shin meets with US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in Washington, D.C. The two agree on a number of issues, including: the United States should maintain a long-term military presence in Korea to ensure regional stability; the United States and South Korea should strengthen military readiness against North Korea and develop an allied defense posture for the 21st century; and North Korea poses a threat with its nuclear and missile programs, and must submit to IAEA inspections. Secretary Rumsfeld also expresses US support for Kim Dae Jung's engagement policy towards North Korea. The two sides also agree that South Korea should take the lead in negotiating conventional arms control issues with North Korea, which seems contradictory to the results of the Bush review of policy towards North Korea announced on 6 June 2001.


21 June 2001
Korean Central Television in Pyongyang repeats North Korean news reports from yesterday saying compensation for the delay in the construction of the two light water reactors under the Agreed Framework should top the

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agenda of bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea.

23 June 2001
North Korea’s Minju Joson carries a commentary criticizing the Bush administration’s agenda for renewing dialogue
with North Korea, saying that North Korea can never accept the US demands. The piece claims that the “top
priority in the bilateral relations for the present is for the United States to deal with the issue of the delayed
delivery of the light water reactors in a responsible manner.”
—"Minju Joson on DPRK's Stand on Negotiations with U.S.,” Korean Central News Agency, 23 June 2001,
www.kcna.co.jp; "Migug'ui Hyōpsangūijenūn PiHyōnsihilchōgida/Minjuchosŏn,” Korean Central News Agency, 23

25 June 2001
NuclearFuel says that reports in early June 2001 about possible cooperation in the nuclear field between North
Korea and Pakistan are erroneous. US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was cited as the source of the
earlier reports, but a "US nonproliferation official” said a week earlier that the evidence points to cooperation in
the area of solid-fuel missiles. Apparently, there is no indication of Pakistan assisting North Korea with uranium
enrichment.

25 June 2001
KEDO officials say that 21 North Korean policymakers will be invited to a briefing on 28 June at the light water
reactor construction site in *Kŭmho-chigu*, Shinp’o, North Korea. North Korean officials requested the briefing so
that they could inform their superiors on the progress of the project. Cho Kyu Hyŏng, deputy executive director of
KEDO, will give the briefing.
—Yonhap News Agency, 26 June 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: KEDO to Brief N.K. Officials at Reactor Construction Site,
FBIS Document ID KPP20010626000003.

26 June 2001
A US State Department official states that substituting conventional power plants for the light water reactors
under the Agreed Framework is "not something that we are looking at right now."
—Alex Wagner, “Bush Outlines Resuming Talks with North Korea,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2001, pp. 23,
25.

28 June 2001
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld tells the US House Armed Services Committee that North Korea is very close to
developing an ICBM, and has nuclear material needed to develop nuclear weapons.
Document ID: KPP20010629000105; Chu Yong Chung, "Alaska’e MD Ch’ot Paech‘i’ Mi Kukpang ‘Puk ICBM Kaebal

30 June 2001
In a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, President Bush says that Kim Jong Il is not

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trustworthy because "he makes his own people go hungry."

July 2001
In an issue of Han'guksa, a South Korean Defense Ministry magazine published by the Han'gukkunsamunje'yôn'guso twice a year, General Thomas Schwartz, commander of the United Nations Command in South Korea, calls North Korea "the major security threat in Northeast Asia." Schwartz also says "their dogged adherence to a 'military first' policy when viewed against the backdrop of a nation on the brink of complete economic and social collapse is problematic." Schwartz says, "North Korea also possesses weapons of mass destruction and continues to develop asymmetric threats."

Second Half of 2001
According to the CIA, North Korea "continues its attempts to procure technology worldwide that could have applications in its nuclear program."

4-6 July 2001
North and South Korea hold the first direct meetings on export control issues regarding the supply of the light water reactors under the Agreed Framework. The meeting is held in Hyangsan, North Korea, and it addresses the export controls of the United States, South Korea and Japan.

5 July 2001
President Bush authorizes the release of $20 million for heavy fuel oil deliveries to North Korea under the Agreed Framework.

6 July 2001
During a State Department briefing session, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage says that North Korea is abiding by the Agreed Framework. Armitage also urges North Korea to resume bilateral talks with the United States.

9 July 2001
The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, states, "The DPRK has never allowed 'verification' and 'inspection' as its national defense industry and military forces are vital to it [sic]. It will neither permit 'verification' and 'inspection' nor accept the demand for the reduction of armed forces in the future, too, but further strengthen them."

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10 July 2001
Joe Bermudez, in an interview with USA Today, claims that North Korea may have mastered a new "electromagnetic isotope separation" technique to enrich uranium, and may already have enough fissile material for 12 nuclear bombs. The report also says North Korea intends to acquire enough fissile material for 30 bombs by 2015. The speculation is from a new book edited by Henry Sokoloski, Planning for a Peaceful Korea. However, Bermudez admits, "It's not that I firmly believe what I wrote. I was just trying to think outside the box."

11 July 2001
Korean Central Television in Pyongyang denounces the Bush administration's proposal for renewing bilateral dialogue. The broadcast says that if the United States truly intends to reopen dialogue, "the agenda items should be practical issues about implementing the articles in the DPRK-US Framework Agreement [sic] and the DPRK-US Joint Communiqué as agreed upon."

15 July 2001
The Chosun Ilbo reports that between 1 January 2001 and 20 June 2001, the South Korean government borrowed W172.5 billion with an interest of W17.1 billion in order to finance its share of the LWR project in North Korea. The National Assembly has delayed legislation to levy a 3.0 percent tax on South Korean utility costs to finance the South Korean share of the project.

16 July 2001
In response to a June 2001 report from the IAEA board of governors report, the Korean Central News Agency says the report is "once again a partial behavior and criminal attempt of the IAEA to shift the responsibility for the noncompliance with the DPRK-US Agreed Framework onto the DPRK at any cost as their remarks were timed to coincide with Bush's announcement of the US unilateral and conditional 'policy toward the DPRK.'" The IAEA report suggested North Korea's refusal to allow full safeguards inspections would adversely affect the provision of light water reactors under the Agreed Framework.

16 July 2001
Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
South Korean President Kim Dae Jung issues an amended presidential decree to implement and enforce the South Korean Atomic Energy Act. The changes will include the establishment of a review committee for export controls, which could affect the delivery of nuclear components and technology for the light water reactors under the Agreed Framework.


17 July 2001
Vice Marshall Cho Myŏng Rok, First Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission, enters Hospital 301 in Beijing with kidney disease, and receives a kidney transplant. Cho is later reported to be in critical condition.


20 July 2001
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement in response to the 14 July 2001 missile interceptor test by the United States stating that North Korea must take counter-measures for self-defense, and that North Korea "will have nothing to lose even if all the points agreed upon between the DPRK and the US are scrapped."


24 July 2001
According to an official at South Korea's Unification Ministry, North Korea and KEDO initial a quality assurance and warranties protocol in New York following a fifth round of negotiations held 16-24 July. The protocol is the eighth between KEDO and North Korea, and the document took four years to negotiate. The official says the formal signing of the protocol will take place in about one month.


26 July 2001
Charles Pritchard, US special envoy for Korean peace talks, says that lack of cooperation from Pyongyang is responsible for the delays in the KEDO light water reactor project. Speaking at a hearing of the Asia and Pacific subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, Pritchard says that North Korea "must begin active cooperation soon to avoid serious delays in the KEDO project."

—"U.S. Envoy Raps N. Korea for Delay in KEDO Project," Japan Economic Newswire, 26 July 2001, in Lexis-Nexis,

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Late July 2001
Diplomatic sources tell *NuclearFuel* that Russia has offered to provide enriched uranium and fabricated fuel assemblies for the light water reactors being constructed by KEDO in North Korea. However, KEDO and US officials say they have not been informed of any Russian plans to renew nuclear cooperation with North Korea.

August 2001
According to the *Segye Ilbo*, a South Korean daily, North Korea smuggles 32kg of HEU from Kazakhstan. According to the 8 November 2002 report, North Korea has been acquiring plutonium, uranium, other metals and equipment from Kazakhstan and other central Asian countries since 1994. North Korea has reportedly been procuring uranium-235, plutonium-239, as well as osmium-187, cesium-137, and strontium, which the report claims are used for reducing the size of nuclear warheads. The *Segye Ilbo* claims the information comes from a four-page Russian document later acquired by the South Korean Embassy in Uzbekistan. [Note: CNS sources indicate the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade received no such document, and there is no apparent use for osmium-187, cesium-137, and strontium in reducing the size of nuclear weapons; therefore, this report does not seem credible.]

1 August 2001
A broadcast in Pyongyang says that North Korea will not resume dialogue with the United States unless the United States drops its stance that "the verification of North Korea's missile and nuclear programs" be included on the agenda. Furthermore, the broadcast says that the US proposal to include conventional weapons in bilateral talks is part of a US effort to "completely disarm" North Korea.

Early August 2001
According to an interview with the *Joongang Ilbo*, Senator Joseph Biden, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, meets with President George Bush, and Bush recognizes the problems he created with his remarks during President Kim Dae Jung's visit to Washington in March 2001. Biden says Bush’s remarks are unintentional, and that Bush "displayed enthusiasm for reopening talks with Pyongyang." [Note: On 7 March, President Bush, speaking in Washington at a joint press conference with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, says, "I do have some skepticism about the leader of North Korea. We're not certain as to whether or not they're keeping all terms of all agreements."]

2 August 2001
A senior Russian official confirms the *NuclearFuel* report of late July that Russia is prepared to supply enriched

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uranium and fuel for the KEDO light water reactor project.

2 August 2001
According to ITAR-TASS, an official from Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry says that Russia is interested in building nuclear reactor for North Korea, and that the issue will be discussed in summit talks between President Putin and National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il on 4 August 2001. The official says Russia will suggest that the reactor be financed with funds from KEDO.

3 August 2001
Interfax reports that Yevgeniy Reshetnikov, deputy atomic energy minister, has said Russia is not planning to increase cooperation with North Korea in the area of power generation. According to Reshetnikov, the United States pressured Russia to abandon its plan to join KEDO. The deputy minister says that North Korea had a debt of $5 million with the ministry, but that it had been reduced to $1.5 million, and that he expects North Korea to pay off the debt by the end of this year.

4 August 2001
Kim Jong II holds a summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, where they discuss the planned construction of two light water reactors (LWRs) under the Agreed Framework. The details of the discussion are unknown, but there is speculation that Russia possibly proposes the sale of Russian-made LWRs to North Korea. North Korea is believed to have expressed its dissatisfaction with the project's delay, as well as its desire for compensation from the loss in electricity.

8 August 2001
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement saying that North Korea "can never accept the agenda items of the talks raised unilaterally by the United States out of its intention to disarm the DPRK and stifle it and will not respond to the talks with the United States before it withdraws the items." The statement is similar to several responses that have followed the 6 June 2001 proposal to resume talks with North Korea.

13 August 2001
At a press conference in Moscow, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says, "By the year 2003, North Korea will have completed the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and currently possesses enough plutonium to develop five nuclear warheads." Rumsfeld also says, "I have already presented the view in
1998 that North Korea would establish its ICBM capability within five years. Considering the fact that North Korea has already tested a three-stage long-range missile, the completion of its ICBM development by 2003 is certain."

13-24 August 2001
Six North Korean nuclear specialists participate in a 12-day "Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material" in Canberra and Sydney, Australia. The program also includes participants from Australia, China, South Korea, and New Zealand.

16 August 2001
First Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission Marshall Cho Myŏng Rok returns from China after having received a kidney transplant at the 301 Hospital in Beijing.

21-25 August 2001
A high-level KEDO delegation meets with North Korean officials in Pyongyang to discuss the supply of the two light water reactors under the Agreed Framework.

28 August 2001
KEDO Executive Director Charles Kartman reveals that excavation work will begin in September 2001 to prepare the foundations for the light water reactors to be constructed in North Korea under the Agreed Framework.

29-30 August 2001
Government officials from the United States, South Korea and Japan meet in New York for a KEDO meeting to discuss nuclear exports. The meeting is held to coordinate policy on the transfer of nuclear facilities, equipment material and technology to North Korea under the Agreed Framework.

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31 August 2001
Site preparation work for the KEDO light water reactor project is completed in *Kŭmho-chigu*, Shinp'o, North Korea.

1 September 2001
North Korea’s State Nuclear Safety Regulatory Commission issues the construction permit for the light water reactors to be built under the Agreed Framework. The permit is issued after the review of a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report and an Environmental Report submitted by the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) earlier this year.

3 September 2001
First Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission Marshall Cho Myŏng Rok greets Chinese President Jiang Zemin during his arrival at Sunan Airport for an official state visit to North Korea. Cho was hospitalized in mid July 2001 at the 301 Hospital in Beijing to receive a kidney transplant.

4 September 2001
During talks with visiting Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Kim Jong Il reaffirms that North Korea will maintain its flight-test moratorium for its ballistic missiles until at least 2003. The newly appointed Chinese ambassador to South Korea later reveals that Kim Jong Il says "both sides (North and South Korea) must strive to create the conditions for his trip to Seoul by the end of the year."

10 September 2001
In hearings before the South Korean National Assembly’s Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee, the Ministry of Unification says that $638 million was spent on the KEDO light water reactor project between February 2000 and 31 August 2001. South Korea provided $447 million (70 percent) and Japan provided $191 million (30 percent) of the total. South Korea’s expenditures on the project have resulted in a national debt of W150 billion in 1999, W255 billion in 2000, and W262.5 billion for the period between January 2001 and 31 August 2001. The total deficit from the project over this period is W667.5 billion. The operating expenses for KEDO during 2001 are $18.36 million, with the United States, South Korea and Japan each contributing $4.56 million. US expenses for heavy fuel oil for the year are $70.32 million, and the United States has supplied North Korea with 308,000 tons of heavy fuel oil from January 2001 to 31 August 2001. The Ministry of Unification also reveals that KEDO plans to begin training North Korean technicians to operate the light water reactors under construction in North Korea. According to the Ministry, the training is to begin in February 2002, and will be divided into two steps for 529 personnel in all.

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10 September 2001

Jack Pritchard, US special envoy for Korean peace talks, says that bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea should resume soon. While visiting Seoul for meetings with South Korean officials, Pritchard says that we should expect talks to begin soon now that Kim Jong Il has had recent summit meetings with Vladimir Putin and Jiang Zemin. Pritchard is in Seoul after participating in the TCOG meeting in Tokyo on 6 September.


11 September 2001

KEDO Executive Director Charles Kartman postpones his trip to North Korea because of a typhoon. Kartman plans to depart for North Korea on the 13th to attend a groundbreaking ceremony for the two light water reactors in *Kŭmho-chigul*, Shimp'o on 14 September, but cancels his travel plans after terrorists hijack four aircraft and crash two into New York’s World Trade Center and another into the Pentagon.


11 September 2001

Korean Central Broadcasting in Pyongyang says that the Bush administration must learn from the Clinton administration’s North Korea policy, and abandon its policy of "crushing North Korea to death."


12 September 2001

A South Korean Foreign Ministry official says that the groundbreaking work for the KEDO light water reactor project will begin as scheduled on 13 September 2001, but there will be no ceremonies. [Note: This report is erroneous; the groundbreaking ceremony is held on 14 September.]


12 September- 21 December 2001

Throughout the 56th UN General Assembly, the North Korean delegation repeatedly demands that the United States carry out its commitments under the Agreed Framework.


14 September 2001

A 61-member delegation from KEDO and South Korea attends the groundbreaking ceremony for the light water reactor project in Shimp'o, North Korea.

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reactors in North Korea.

15-18 September 2001
North and South Korea hold the fifth round of ministerial talks in Seoul. The delegations are headed by North Korean Senior Cabinet Councilor Kim Ryŏng Sŏng and South Korean Unification Minister Hong Sun Yŏng. The two sides agree to resume construction of a railway connecting Seoul to Kaesŏng, North Korea, where the South pledged to finance the development of an industrial zone.

17 September 2001
The IAEA opens its annual conference in Vienna, and IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei delivers a speech that includes a request for North Korea to cooperate with onsite safeguards inspections at its nuclear facilities. ElBaradei says the IAEA is monitoring the nuclear freeze under the Agreed Framework, and the conference is expected to adopt a resolution encouraging North Korea to accept inspections. ElBaradei also raises concerns about nuclear safety in North Korea.

17-21 September 2001
During its 45th General Conference in Vienna, the IAEA adopts a resolution requesting North Korea to abide by its NPT commitments and submit to safeguards inspections.

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18 September 2001
Forbes.com, citing a North Korean researcher who has fled to China, reports that North Korea has moved its entire nuclear development program to "new underground bunkers before U.S. inspections of its old facilities begin." According to the report, the underground facilities now look like a rural village through satellite imagery.

25 September 2001
The IAEA reveals that it plans a three step approach to address suspicions about North Korea's nuclear past. The first step will include an inspection of the 5MW(e) research reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun and its approximate 8,000 spent fuel rods that have been canned under the Agreed Framework. The IAEA has requested that the inspections begin no later than next year. In May 2001, IAEA officials asked for North Korean compliance during a visit to Pyongyang, but North Korea has yet to respond affirmatively.

25-29 September 2001
A KEDO delegation meets with North Korean officials in Pyongyang to conduct "high-level negotiations" regarding the construction of the light water reactors in North Korea under the Agreed Framework. [Note: These negotiations have been conducted about two or three times over the last few years.]

26 September-6 October 2001

29 September 2001
The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) criticizes IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei for his stating on 19 September 2001 that "the agency is unable to verify the accuracy of North Korea's nuclear program." KCNA reports

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that, "this can not be construed otherwise than reckless acts of the riffraff to shift the responsibility for the noncompliance with the Agreed Framework on to the DPRK, defying international justice and impartiality." The report continues, "If the US had remained sincere in implementing the Agreed Framework, it would have been implemented to such a level as to enable the DPRK and the IAEA to start negotiations on verifying the accuracy and perfectness [sic] of the initial report on nuclear substance [sic]."


3 October 2001
An unnamed "South Korean government official" or "diplomatic source" reports that KEDO will be able to begin negotiations with North Korea by the end of the year on the delivery of the core reactor parts for the light water reactors under construction as part of the Agreed Framework. The agreement will have to comply with the export controls of the United States, South Korea and Japan. South Korea and Japan have already presented their draft agreements, and the United States is to present its draft agreement soon. The United States has reportedly been reluctant to establishing a protocol for the transfers of critical technology and materials since North Korea has yet to submit to full safeguards inspections.


5 October 2001
Korean Central Broadcasting in Pyongyang criticizes the IAEA for "emphasizing the need for North Korea to cooperate with the IAEA to verify and guarantee transparency of North Korea's nuclear past through on-site inspections." The commentary also criticized the Agency for ignoring the 14th sub-critical nuclear test carried out by the United States at the Nevada test site.


6 October 2001
North Korea's Minju Joson says that the IAEA has "thrown away its impartiality by following US demands to inspect and verify North Korea's nuclear past, while ignoring the need to inspect and verify the United States for continuing to carry out sub-critical nuclear tests in Nevada."


7 October 2001
A Rodong Sinmun commentary criticizes Japan for violating the "three noes" on nuclear policy established in 1967 by allowing the United States to bring nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. The commentary also accuses

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Japan of having a plan to become a nuclear power and to stockpile 100 tons of plutonium by 2010.

8 October 2001
A Rodong Sinmun commentary says that the IAEA, at the request of the United States, is trying to uncover North Korea's military bases and defense industries under the pretext of carrying out nuclear safeguards inspections. Furthermore, the commentary says that the United States has helped Israel acquire nuclear weapons, and that "nothing is being done to inspect and verify Japan's plutonium stockpile, which is beyond Japan's needs." The Korean Central Broadcasting Station in Pyongyang carries similar criticism during a broadcast, but adds the accusation that the United States is "violently violating the NPT spirit and demands" with a sub-critical nuclear test in Nevada on 26 September 2001.

11 October 2001
Korean Central Television in Pyongyang criticizes the IAEA for "fanning (encouraging) the US hard-line policy towards North Korea." The broadcast says the IAEA has a double standard because while it is requesting inspections and verification of North Korea's nuclear program, it is not recognizing the fact that the United States conducted its 14th sub-critical nuclear test last month in at the Nevada test site.

16 October 2001
In an interview at the White House with Asian journalists before departing to attend the APEC summit in Shanghai, President Bush warns North Korea "not to think that because we happen to be engaged in Afghanistan we will not be prepared and ready to fulfill our end of our agreement with the South Korean government." Bush also says that he would like to renew dialogue with North Korea but that, "I must tell you that I've been disappointed in Kim Jong Il not rising to the occasion, being so suspicious, so secretive."

19 October 2001
During a news conference in Shanghai, President Bush says his administration would like to begin a dialogue with

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the government of North Korea, and that he supports South Korea's sunshine policy.


21 October 2001

The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, criticizes the United States for deploying aircraft from the USS Kitty Hawk to South Korean airbases. The aircraft carrier is usually based in Yokosuka, Japan, but it was deployed to the Indian Ocean in support of military operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda network. The commentary says the deployment "complicates the situation" and "compels the DPRK to increase its military power with heightened vigilance."


23 October 2001

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement criticizing President George Bush for comments "unbecoming for the president of a superpower." The criticism is in response to Bush's remarks on 16 October about his suspicion of Kim Jong Il. A ministry spokesman praises the thaw in US-North Korea relations at the end of the Clinton presidency, and says North Korea was prepared to abandon its missile program but that the Bush administration "attaches priority to the establishment of a missile defense system intended for world supremacy, and it felt a more urgent need to make an enemy called 'rogue state.'" The spokesman says that the Bush administration's policy toward North Korea has "cooled" relations between North and South Korea, and that it has made it impossible to implement agreements between the two Koreas. Furthermore, he says that the only "normal and rational" way to reopen dialogue between the United States and North Korea is to begin with a discussion of the "practical problems related to the implementation of the Agreed Framework and the Joint Communiqué between the US and North Korea."


30 October-3 November 2001

A KEDO delegation meets with North Korean officials in Pyongyang to hold "high-level expert" negotiations on the implementation of the Agreed Framework.


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**Early November 2001**

According to a South Korean government official, North Korea has agreed to allow IAEA inspections of its Isotope Production Laboratory in Yŏngbyŏn-kun at the 17th working-level meeting with the IAEA in Vienna. The facility is not subject to safeguards inspections, but IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei says, "This is a step in the right direction towards the normalization of the DPRK’s relations with the IAEA." However, North Korea has still not responded to an IAEA request made in May 2001 during meetings in Pyongyang to begin the process of accounting for North Korea’s past nuclear activities.


**13 November 2001**

In a speech at the UN General Assembly, North Korean Ambassador to the UN Lee Hyŏng Ch’ŏl says that the United States must return to the position of the former Clinton administration before North Korea will resume bilateral dialogue. Lee also says, "It is totally irrational to say the United States deploys huge armed forces around the Korean Peninsula and conducts large-scale military exercises against us to advance peace, whereas it is a 'threat to peace' that we take self-defense measures to cope with the US military threat." Furthermore, Lee says that any accusations of North Korea posing a "missile threat" are groundless.


**26 November 2001**

During an appearance at the White House rose garden, George W. Bush says, "I made it very clear to North Korea that in order for us to have relations with them, that we want to know: Are they developing weapons of mass destruction? And they ought to stop proliferating."


**27 November 2001**

Following a meeting in San Francisco, the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) issues a statement reiterating the commitment of the three member countries: Japan, South Korea, and the United States—to implement the Agreed Framework.


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28 November 2001
A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry says US demands for inspections are unreasonable and that the Agreed Framework is being indefinitely delayed. He also says that North Korea has no option but to "take necessary counter-measures."

29 November 2001
Korean Central Television in Pyongyang says that the North Korean missile program and its conventional forces are matters of national sovereignty and the right to self-defense. The broadcast also says that North Korea will not reduce its conventional forces until US forces are withdrawn from South Korea.

30 November 2001
US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says that safeguards inspections will have to begin now to prevent further delays in the construction of the LWRs in *Kŭmho-chigu*, Shinp'o.

December 2001
According to a South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade source, the United States offers to hold deputy minister-level talks with North Korea, but North Korea declines. The United States suggests that Jack Pritchard, special envoy for the four-party talks, and Kim Kye Kwan, North Korean vice foreign minister, participate in the talks.

1-4 December 2001
KEDO Executive Director Charles Kartman leads a delegation to Pyongyang. Kartman meets with Kim Sŏng Su, North Korea's director of the light water reactor project. North Korea and KEDO sign the Quality Assurance and Warranties Protocol. The protocol lays the groundwork for the participation of North Korean safety personnel in the light water reactor project. The protocol also covers the electricity supply, core parts, and the initial supply of nuclear fuel. During Kartman's stay in Pyongyang, he and North Korean officials also discuss labor issues and the need to establish a separate communication network to increase construction efficiency.

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3 December 2001
In an interview with the BBC, South Korean Unification Minister Hong Sun Yŏng says, "Several North Korean hardliners are trying to enfeeble or reverse the reconciliation process [with South Korea]." He also says that North Korean hard-liners are using South Korean enhanced security measures in the wake of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 as a pretext to exert their influence. Hong says there is "friction or tension between militarists and economists."


4 December 2001
The US Department of Defense (DOD) labels North Korea the third greatest threat among countries that proliferate weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In a report submitted to Congress, the DOD ranks the proliferation threat posed by 19 states. The DOD names Russia and China as posing the highest WMD proliferation threat. North Korea ties with Iraq and Iran as posing the third greatest threat.


5 December 2001
Charles Kartman, executive director of KEDO, says that the United States and North Korea may resume dialogue soon. Kartman says Kim Kye Kwan, North Korean vice foreign minister, and Jack Pritchard, special envoy to the Korean peace talks, will likely be the participants if dialogue is to resume. He adds that North Korea’s requests for compensation due to the delay in the construction of the light water reactors is not a matter for KEDO. In regard to North Korea permitting IAEA inspections of its Isotope Production Laboratory in Yŏngbyŏn-kun, Kartman says it is not a breakthrough in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem, but it is just a hopeful sign. Kartman makes his comments in Seoul following his visit to Pyongyang.

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6-7 December 2001
KEDO holds an executive board meeting in Seoul to discuss the light water reactor project under way in North Korea. The meeting covers the KEDO budget for 2002, and the extension of the EU’s executive membership in KEDO for another five years. The EU is expected to increase its financial contribution to 20 million ECU's per year from 15 million ECU's. KEDO expenditures for 2001 are $90.56 million.


7 December 2001
Japanese officials participating in the KEDO executive board meeting in Seoul says that Hitachi Limited and Toshiba Corporation are expected to provide the turbines for the light water reactors under construction in North Korea. The firms are expected to replace General Electric of the United States, which pulled out of the deal after failing to receive indemnification for any possible future accidents at the site.


9 December 2001
North Korean radio and print media criticize the United States for delaying the construction of the light water reactors under the Agreed Framework. The broadcast says the United States is "pressuring North Korea to accept inspections, but under such circumstances, North Korea can no longer expect to settle issues with the US through dialogue."


10 December 2001
The South Korean Ministry of National Defense issues a report on weapons of mass destruction, estimating that North Korea extracted 10-12kg of weapon-grade plutonium from its graphite-moderated reactors before shutting them down in 1994. The report also claims that North Korea conducted about 70 high-yield explosive tests between 1983 and 1998. However, the report states that despite the extensive testing, North Korea still lacks necessary components to construct a functional high-explosive triggering device. Furthermore, North Korea does not have the sophisticated machinery required to proceed with nuclear-related tests. Therefore, the report concludes, North Korea would need several years to weaponize a nuclear bomb.


Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
16-29 December 2001
Kim Hŭi Mun, director general of North Korea's Light-Water Reactor Bureau, leads a 20-member delegation to South Korea to tour nuclear power facilities. The visit is a result of the training protocol signed by North Korea and KEDO on 20 October 2000. While in South Korea the delegation travels to Ulchin, North Kyŏngsang Province to visit South Korea's No. 3 and No. 4 nuclear reactors.


21 December 2001
Korean Central Television in Pyongyang reports that on 12 August 1945, Japan tested an atomic bomb off the coast of Hŭngnam, South Hamgyŏng Province, in present-day North Korea. [Note: The North Korean media often cite a nuclear threat from Japan, which could be used as a pretext for North Korea's development of nuclear weapons.]


26 December 2001
The Jammu Daily Excelsior of India reports that Pakistan's AQ Khan Research Laboratories, which handle Pakistan's nuclear program, have used North Korean technology to develop a missile with a "capacity far beyond the Ghauri." [Note: There is the possibility that Pakistan could have exchanged nuclear technology for North Korean missile technology.]


28 December 2001
According to the Tokyo Shimbun, a Japanese government source connected with KEDO reveals that KEDO has officially notified North Korea that the light water reactors would not be completed until 2009.

The South Korean government issues more than W254.7 billion in treasury bonds to help finance the light water reactor project in North Korea under the Agreed Framework. Interest on the debt for the year totals W19 billion.

6 January 2000
The Rodong Sinmun, official daily the Korean Workers Party, warns that 'the continuation of national division is bringing the holocaust of a nuclear war upon our fellow countrymen." The paper claims that North and South Korea 'will get nothing but national ruin from confrontation.'

11 January 2000
Japan and the EU reconfirm continued cooperation on their policies toward North Korea. At ministerial-level talks held in Brussels, Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono tells the EU delegation that the stability of North Korea is vital to nuclear nonproliferation efforts.

16 January 2000
The Sunday Telegraph reports that North Korea is trying to obtain uranium from the Democratic Republic of the Congo's Shinkolobwe uranium mine, leading to increased suspicion that North Korea is still trying to develop nuclear weapons. According to the report, the director of a British mining company claims that several of his workers have observed North Koreans in Shinkolobwe. The report also quotes Richard Cornwall, a researcher at the South African Institute for Security Studies, as saying, 'We know that there have been North Koreans in that area and they are definitely training government forces, but whether they are soldiers or miners we do not know, and we can only speculate what they are getting in exchange.'

20 January 2000
Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian tells South Korean Defense Minister Cho Song T'ae that Beijing fully supports efforts to make the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons, and that China is actively working towards that end. Chi, meeting with his South Korean counterpart in Seoul, is the first Chinese Defense Minister to visit South Korea since its founding in 1948. Chi is in Seoul from the 19 to the 23 January.

20 January 2000
The Swiss firm Asea Brown Boveri AG (ABB) announces that it recently signed contracts with Korea Heavy Industries and Construction Co., Ltd. and Korea Power Engineering Corporation to deliver $200 million worth of
equipment and services for the KEDO light water reactor project.


22 January 2000
North Korea says that the Washington's claim that North Korea poses a nuclear and missile threat to the United States is merely an attempt to justify a missile defense program. A commentary appearing in the Rodong Sinmun says that the real nuclear and missile threat is from the United States. The paper says that US 'nuclear weapons and missiles, wherever they are deployed, will be targeted at (North Korea)."

22-28 January 2000
The United States and North Korea meet in Berlin to discuss a proposed visit by a high-ranking North Korean official to Washington. The delegations are headed by US special envoy for Korean affairs, Charles Kartman, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan. According to sources close to the talks, the two sides reach an agreement on the proposed visit of a high-ranking North Korean official to Washington and a further easing of economic sanctions against North Korea. The two sides agree to meet at a later date to finalize preparations for the proposed high-level meeting in Washington. [Note: The visit of a high-ranking North Korean official to Washington is one of the recommendations laid out by William Perry in his report assessing the US policy on North Korea. Perry's report was presented to Congress on 14 September 1999.]

30 January 2000
The Rodong Sinmun cites 'an official US document" to report that Japan is 'allowing the US to use its entire territory as the latter's nuclear base." The article says the Japanese government approved the deployment of US nuclear weapons on Japanese territory in 1960. The paper also says that Tokyo's intention of pursuing this policy is to take participate in any US aggression in Northeast Asia so that it might regain its former colonial empire, with North Korea being the first target of combined US-Japanese aggression. The paper concludes that should Japan attack North Korea, it would be 'wholly responsible for the ensuing consequences."—'Japan Urged to Think Twice over Consequences," Korean Central News Agency, 30 January 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'Vietnam Chonjaengshigi Ilbon'ui Haengmugibanipsung'insashil'u Ronp'yong/Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 30 January 2000, www.kcna.co.jp.

31 January 2000
The Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) signs a loan agreement with KEDO extending up to ¥116.5 billion in loans for the light water reactors to be constructed in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp’o, North Korea. [Note: The loans were originally to be provided by the Export-Import Bank of Japan, but on 1 October 1999 the Export-Import Bank of Japan merged with the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund to form the JBIC.]

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February 2000
KEDO dispatches a 20-member 'peace maintenance corps" to protect the light water reactor construction site in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o and South Koreans working on the project. [Note: In July 1996, KEDO and North Korea signed the 'protocol governing privileges, immunities and consular protection" granting KEDO the responsibility of preserving public order at the light water reactor site and related facilities.]

1 February 2000
The US, South Korea and Japan hold a meeting of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) in Seoul. The three countries discuss the results of the US-North Korea talks held in Berlin 22-28 January 2000 and agree to provide additional aid to North Korea if it takes further steps to allay international concerns over its suspected nuclear weapons program.

1 February 2000
Japanese State Foreign Secretary Ichita Yamamoto meets with KEDO Executive-Director Desaix Anderson in Tokyo to discuss current issues facing KEDO. Yamamoto tells Anderson, "It is important that North Korea comply with safeguard inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as delivery of key nuclear components begins." Desaix agrees to press Pyongyang to accept full inspections of its nuclear facilities. The two also reaffirm the need to implement the KEDO project without delay, calling it 'the most realistic and effective framework" to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons.

1 February 2000
Desaix Anderson, executive-director of KEDO, says that the timeframe for construction of the two light water reactors has been extended by at least four years.

2 February 2000
The EU’s Executive Commission recommends renewing EU support for KEDO after the current agreement expires at the end of 2000. The EU’s External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten, calling KEDO a vital to international nuclear nonproliferation efforts, says, "It is only right that the EU should stand alongside the United States, Japan and Korea in a project as important to regional stability as KEDO." [Note: EURATOM, the EU's nuclear agency, originally signed a contract with KEDO to supply €75 million over a five-year period.]

3 February 2000
The turnkey contract between KEDO and KEPCO becomes effective, and KEPCO begins construction on the two

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light water reactors in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o, North Korea. [Note: On 15 December 1999, KEPCO signed the turnkey contract with KEDO authorizing the commencement of construction on the actual reactors. Site preparation work began in August 1997.]


3 February 2000
In an interview published by the Korean Central News Agency, North Korean Vice Premier Cho Ch'ang Dok accuses the United States of blatantly violating the Agreed Framework, and hints that North Korea might reopen its frozen nuclear reactors if it does not receive compensation for the delays in the KEDO light water reactor (LWR) project. Cho blames North Korea's recent electricity shortage on the US failure to honor its commitments under the Agreed Framework. Cho says, 'Due to the unreasonable US delaying tactics the LWR construction is not likely to be completed even in 2010, to say nothing of 2003, the (original) deadline." Cho claims that the US failure to honor its commitments has already caused a loss of 'tens of billions of KWH of electricity, bringing immeasurable adverse effect on the national economy and the people's living." Cho concludes that 'if the US does not fulfill its commitments but persistently pursues the policy of stifling the DPRK, the DPRK will be left with no option but to go its own way.'


7 February 2000
KEDO's Executive Board meets in New York. The board members discuss ways to speed up construction on the two light water reactors following the 3 February threat by North Korean Vice Premier Cho Ch'ang Dok that North Korea might resume its frozen graphite moderated nuclear program if delays continue.


7 February 2000
The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers Party, says that North Korea's 'energy situation is strained since the nuclear freeze.' The commentary criticizes the United States for blaming rising oil prices for its difficulty in delivery the heavy fuel oil under the Agreed Framework, and says that the light water reactors will probably not be completed by 2010. The article says that North Korea 'has a choice and cannot just sit around.'


7 February 2000
North Korea criticizes Western press reports that North Korea has been acquiring uranium for nuclear weapons from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in return for military aid. The Korean Central News Agency dismisses the reports as 'sheer fabrication' and 'a charade intended to slander and hurt the DPRK." [Note: Beginning in August 1999, various press agencies have reported on the presence of North Korean military personnel near the Shinkolobwe uranium mine, leading to speculation that North Korea is providing military training for Congolese

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troops in exchange for uranium.]
—‘KCNA on Fiction of DPRK's 'Purchase of Uranium',' Korean Central News Agency, 7 February 2000,
www.kcna.co.jp; ‘<Uranium Kuip>Solun Wanjonhan Howi/Chosonjoongangt'ongshin,’ Korean Central News

15 February 2000
US President Bill Clinton sends a presidential determination to Congress stating that he could not confirm that
North Korea has abandoned its pursuit of a nuclear weapons program. Under the North Korea Threat Reduction
Act of 1999, President Clinton must confirm that North Korea is not pursuing uranium enrichment or reprocessing
spent nuclear fuel before any funds in fiscal year 2000 may be used for supplying North Korea with heavy fuel oil.
Clinton does, however, certify that North Korea is complying with all its commitments under the Agreed
Framework. In the presidential determination, Clinton informs Congress that while evidence of North Korea’s
nuclear intentions is inconclusive, he is exercising his authority to waive the confirmation requirement and
proceeding with the annual deliveries of heavy fuel oil.
—George Gedda, 'US Worried about North Korean Nuclear Intentions,” Associated Press, 3 March 2000, in Lexis-
Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Henry Sokolski, 'Implementing the Korean Nuclear Deal: What U.S. Law Requires," The
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, www.npec-web.org/essay/6-4-00-DPRK-Sokolski.htm.

22-25 February 2000
KEDO and North Korea hold a high-level meeting in Hyangsan, North Korea to discuss various problems that might
arise during the construction of the two light water reactors being constructed in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp’o. The two
sides agree to open a direct passenger boat service from Sokch’o, South Korea to Yanghwa-ri, Shinp’o, North Korea
for South Koreans working on the light water reactor project. [Note: The meeting is the first between KEDO and
North Korea since construction of the reactors began.]
—Yonhap News Agency, 29 February 2000, in 'North Korea Agrees to Direct Route for South Reactor Workers,”
Meeting on Reactor Construction," Korea Herald, 23 February 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; ‘KEDO
Kowi’gupchonmun’gahyopsangdaep’yodan Toch’ak,” Korean Central News Agency, 23 February 2000,
www.kcna.co.jp;

23 February 2000
Pyongyang accuses the United States of being responsible for North Korean power shortage. The Korean Central
News Agency claims that the freeze of North Korea’s nuclear program had resulted in billions of dollars in lost
production, and the United States has not sufficiently compensated North Korea with heavy fuel oil promised
under the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework.
Kinjanghan Chollyoksajong/Chosonjung’angt’ongshin," Korean Central News Agency, 23 February 2000,
www.kcna.co.jp; Korea Central News Agency, 23 February 2000, in 'Serious Shortage of Electricity," FBIS Document
ID KPP20000223000102.

24 February 2000
US President Bill Clinton announces that the United States will soon release $15 million earmarked for heavy fuel
oil shipments to North Korea.
—‘U.S. to Spend $15 Mil. for Shipment of Heavy Fuel Oil to N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 25 February

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7 March 2000
Japan names Kojiro Takano as ambassador to KEDO and Tokyo’s representative to normalization talks with North Korea.

8-15 March 2000
The United States and North Korea hold high-level talks in New York to discuss various bilateral issues. The delegations, headed by Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean Affairs, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan, address a wide range of sensitive issues such as North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, delays in implementing the Agreed Framework, North Korea’s designation by the State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism, and the proposed visit to the United States by a top-level North Korean official. The talks end on 15 March without any agreement between the two sides. Although the talks fail to produce an agreement, the two sides agree to resume the dialogue in the future. [Note: On 18 March, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry announces that at the talks the United States acknowledged the legitimacy of North Korea’s demand for compensation for electricity shortages caused by delays in the light water reactor construction. According to a ministry spokesman, discussions on the issue progressed to ways the United States could compensate North Korea for the lost electricity.]

9 March 2000
South Korean President Kim Dae Jung delivers his 'Berlin Declaration,” which proposes governmental talks between the two Koreas, and aims to increase inter-Korean exchanges.

16 March 2000
At a hearing of the House International Relations Committee, Ambassador Wendy Sherman of the State Department, states that the Agreed Framework 'continues to be our best means of capping and eventually eliminating the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons." She also announces that on 15 March, Pyongyang confirmed its agreement to allow a second inspection of the suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch’angri in May.

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18 March 2000
US Secretary of Defense William Cohen meets with South Korean officials in Seoul to discuss various issues including the continuing military threat from North Korea. Cohen and his South Korean counterpart Cho Song T'ae vow to respond "immediately and sternly" if North Korea attempts a military provocation ahead of the South Korean presidential elections scheduled for April.

21 March 2000
The Rodong Sinmun accuses the United States of raising suspicions about its nuclear program merely as a 'mean maneuver to try to evade its responsibility for having delayed the construction of the light water reactors in accordance with the DPRK-US Agreed Framework...and for even having failed to observe the schedule for the supply of heavy oil.'

21 March 2000
In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Wendy Sherman, a State Department counselor, announces that North Korea has agreed to 'recommence talks related to our concern about its missile program and to begin a new negotiation on implementation of the Agreed Framework." Sherman does not mention whether or not the two sides have decided on a date and venue for the talks.

29 March 2000
The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers Party, condemns the United States for intentionally delaying the implementation of the Agreed Framework and causing widespread electricity outages in North Korea. The paper warns that if the United States does not resolve the issue of compensation for the lost electricity, the DPRK will have no option but to revive its graphite moderated nuclear program.

30-31 March 2000
The US, Japan and South Korea hold a meeting of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) in Tokyo to coordinate their policies on North Korea. According to reports, the US side suggests that one of the LWRs being supplied to North Korea under the Agreed Framework should be replaced with six conventional power plants. However, the South Korean delegation disagrees with the proposal.

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April 2000
US and IAEA technicians complete the process of canning over 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods in North Korea. A US State Department official announces on 13 June that the canning of the spent fuel rods was completed in April and that the IAEA has confirmed that the remaining rod fragments 'do not represent a proliferation concern.' [Note: North Korea removed the spent fuel rods from its 5MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon-kun.]

1-4 April 2000
KEDO and North Korean officials meet in Hyangsan, North Korea to discuss a protocol on the training of North Korean engineers who will operate the two light water reactors once they are completed. KEDO reportedly wants the engineers trained in South Korea, but North Korea insists the training take place in any country other than South Korea. According to a KEDO official, North Korea agrees to comply with KEDO's decision to conduct the training at a South Korean nuclear plant.

3 April 2000
North Korea denounces what it refers to as an attempt by 'US conservative hardliners' to amend the Agreed Framework to include a 'verification devices' in order to monitor North Korea's compliance with the agreement. A report by the Korean Central News Agency states that 'if the US tries to 'amend' the agreed framework, skeptical over the DPRK measure of nuclear freezing and the Agreed Framework itself, instead of sincerely implementing it, the Agreed Framework will be bound to be abrogated.'

4-7 April 2000
North Korea and Japan hold high-level rapprochement talks for the first time in eight years. At the talks, held in Pyongyang, the Japanese delegation expresses concern over North Korea's missile program and suspected nuclear weapons program.

9 April 2000

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Diplomatic sources in Seoul announce that ongoing negotiations with North Korea on implementation of the Agreed Framework are failing to make significant progress due to Pyongyang's continuing refusal to disclose the amount of plutonium it reprocessed prior to the 1994 agreement.


11 April 2000

Benjamin Gilman, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, and Edward Markey, ranking member of the House Commerce Committee, send a letter to President Bill Clinton expressing their concern over his 15 February decision to authorize the release of funds to be used for the delivery of heavy fuel oil to North Korea despite his stated inability to certify that North Korea is not pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program, as required by the North Korean Threat Reduction Act of 1999. In the letter, Gilman and Markey tell Clinton, 'You did not hesitate to certify the third requirement, that 'North Korea is complying with all provisions of the Agreed Framework,' If, as you explain, the 'the evidence is inconclusive whether North Korea is seeking to develop or acquire the ability to enrich uranium,' then how can you certify that North Korea is complying with all aspects of the Agreed Framework?" [Note: The White House reportedly sends a reply to the House International Relations Committee stating that in order to release the funds for the second 2000 delivery of oil, Clinton will not waive the requirement that he certify that North Korea is not pursuing a nuclear weapons program.]


11 April 2000

Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer announces that Australia will donate an additional A$1 million to KEDO, bringing Australia's total donations since 1995 to A$15.8 million.


17 April 2000

The Joongang Ilbo, quoting nuclear experts, reports that North Korea possesses a superior plutonium extraction technology that South Korea never possessed. North Korea is believed to possess a know how in the area of radioactive chemicals and other sectors of the nuclear technology.


18 April 2000

The Korea Non-Life Insurance Association announces that LG Insurance will be the main insurance provider for the KEDO light water reactor project. The insurance association also announces that LG Insurance will soon conclude negotiations with KEPCO over the scope of the coverage.


20 April 2000

Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono claims that North Korea will be fully responsible if an accident occurs at one of the two light water reactors being constructed by KEDO. Speaking before the House of Councilors Committee on

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Foreign Affairs and Defense, Kono says, 'North Korea cannot avoid taking responsibility because it is an internationally established principle that the operator of a nuclear reactor assumes full responsibility (in the event of an accident)."

20 April 2000
North Korea's Foreign Ministry calls on the United States to remove all weapons of mass destruction from South Korea. A ministry spokesman claims that despite Washington's 1992 pledge that it had removed all nuclear weapons that were deployed outside its territory, it continues to 'massively deploy nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction...in and around South Korea.' Calling the continued deployment of nuclear weapons clear evidence of the aggressive US ambitions toward North Korea, the spokesman warns that 'the Korean people and the people's army are fully prepared fro any confrontation.'

24 April 2000
Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, says that the IAEA has been unable to verify the state of North Korea's nuclear program because of its refusal to comply with the safeguards agreement it signed with the agency. Speaking at the opening session of the NPT Review Conference, ElBaradei say, "the agency remains unable to verify the correctness and completeness of North Korea's initial declaration of its nuclear material subject to safeguard and cannot, therefore, provide any assurance about non-diversion from non-military to military uses."

26 April 2000
KEDO's Executive Board meets in New York to assess the implementation of the light water reactor project. At the meeting, Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, announces that he will soon travel to Beijing to request that the Chinese government assist in supplying heavy-fuel oil to North Korea.

10-12 May 2000
A four member IAEA delegation led by Olly Heinonen, director general of IAEA safeguards, travels to Pyongyang to attend the 14th nuclear technology meeting between the IAEA and North Korea. The IAEA delegation reportedly calls on North Korea to submit details on its past nuclear facilities according to the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea.
12 May 2000
Officials from the United States, Japan, and South Korea meet in Tokyo for a meeting of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG). The delegations are headed by Wendy Sherman, counselor of the US State Department, Chang Chae Ryong, South Korean deputy foreign minister, and Yukio Takeuchi, Japanese deputy vice foreign minister for foreign policy. In a joint statement the participants of the TCOG meeting praised Pyongyang’s decision to hold separate talks with each of the three nations. The delegations also ’reiterated their continuing commitment to consult closely and the coordinate their respective policies toward North Korea."

15 May 2000
An official from KEPCO, the primary contractor for the KEDO light water reactor project, announces that the current consortium of South Korean subcontractors for the project will be disbanded unless an agreement on how to divide the project is reached by the end of June. The statement is in response to complaint filed by Daewoo Construction on the same day to the Fair Trade Commission claiming that Hyundai Engineering and Construction is attempting to monopolize the third stage of construction. [Note: In 1996, Hyundai, Donga, Daewoo, and Korea Heavy Industries agreed to divide the light water reactor project 35%, 25%, 20%, and 20% respectively.]

16 May 2000
The US House of Representatives passes an amendment to the North Korean Threat Reduction Act of 1999, entitled the 'Congressional Oversight of Nuclear Transfers to North Korea Act of 2000," requiring House and Senate approval of the president's certification that North Korea is not pursuing a nuclear weapons program before funds will be released for heavy fuel oil deliveries for North Korea. [Note: Under the North Korean Threat Reduction Act of 1999, the president is required to certify to Congress that North Korea is not pursuing a nuclear weapons program. However, the president has the option to waive the requirement, as President Clinton did on 15 February.]

18 May 2000
The US House of Representatives passes an amendment to the Defense Authorization Act prohibiting the US government from indemnifying from liability any US company participating in the KEDO light water reactor project. The amendment is in response to General Electric’s request that the White House indemnify it from any future liability before it exports $30 million in steam turbines for the KEDO reactors. Following the House legislation, General Electric announces that it will not provide the turbines for the reactors, thus propagating further delays in the KEDO project since the reactor designs are based on using General Electric’s turbines.
—Amendment No. 3, Section 1205, Prohibition on Assumption by United States Government of Liability for Nuclear Accidents in North Korea, offered by Mr. Cox, Mr. Markey, Mr. Spenser, Mr. Gilman, Mr. Knollenberg, Mr. Bereuter, reprinted along with the floor debate in U.S. Congressional Record, 19 May 2000, pp. H3358-H3362.

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24-30 May 2000
The US and North Korea resume talks in Rome to discuss various bilateral issues as well as finalizing arrangements for a high-level visit to Washington by a North Korean official. The delegations are once again headed by Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan. At the talks, Kim claims that delays in heavy fuel oil deliveries have caused severe economic harm to North Korea, and Kartman reportedly says that Washington will consider compensating North Korea for the economic losses.

25-27 May 2000
A 12-member team of US nuclear experts conducts a second inspection of the suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch’ang-ri. [Note: The first inspection, conducted 20-24 May 1999 revealed 'an unfinished site, the underground portion of which was an extensive, empty tunnel complex." While the inspectors did not find any evidence of nuclear activity at the Kumch’ang-ri facility, US officials, speaking after the first inspection, said that the facility could still be used to store nuclear equipment in the future, and that North Korea had plenty of time during the course of negotiations to remove any incriminating evidence.]

26 May 2000
The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers Party, accuses conservatives in the US Congress of purposefully delaying the implementation of the Agreed Framework. The paper says that recent legislation demanding 'compulsory House and Senate approval" of any transfer of nuclear technology to North Korea is proof that Washington is only paying lip service to the agreement. [Note: The legislation to which the article refers is an amendment to the North Korean Threat Reduction Act of 1999, entitled the 'Congressional Oversight of Nuclear Transfers to North Korea Act of 2000." The amendment passed the House of Representatives on 16 May.]

27 May 2000
South Korean Minister of Unification Im Dong Won pays a secret visit to Pyongyang to hold talks with Kim Jong II. The talks last for four hours, and Im notes that Kim has a sense of humor and is respectful towards his elders. He also believes that Kim Jong II is a much stronger leader than his father, and that he is a very good listener. According to Im, Kim directly took notes during the meeting, as if he were a student in class. [Note: Im’s observations are part of a report submitted to President Kim Dae Jung upon Im’s return to Seoul, which are cited in Don Oberdorfer’s revised edition of The Two Koreas. The revised edition is scheduled for release in December 2001.]

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31 May 2000
State Department spokesman Philip Reeker says, 'The team [that inspected Kumch'ang-ri] found conditions unchanged since the first visit a year ago...It remains an unfinished site, the underground portion of which is an extensive empty tunnel complex.' Reeker also reports that North Korea informed the inspection team that the complex was originally intended as an unspecified 'national security-related facility,' but they would consider other uses for the site.

June 2000
During a meeting of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), the US delegation repeats the suggestion made in March 2000 about replacing one LWR under the Agreed Framework with six conventional power plants. The South Korean government disagrees with this proposal.

4 June 2000
Tsugio Uchinishi, a scrap yard owner from Tokyo's Nakano Ward, mails envelopes containing small amounts of monazite powder to 9 Japanese government offices and Prime Minister Mori's personal residence. Uchinishi explains in memos accompanying the radioactive material that 'seventy tons of a radioactive substance is being smuggled from Niigata Port into North Korea to produce nuclear missiles.' Uchinishi claims that an associate of Hiroshi Ikeda, director of Nihon Bosei Bunka Kyokai, sold monazite to a broker who in turn transferred the radioactive material to North Korea. However, the unnamed associate told police that he refused to sell the substance after learning that the prospective buyer had ties to North Korea. [Note: Ikeda later admits in interviews with police that he had imported the monazite from Thailand over twenty years ago because 'it can be used in hot spas."

7 June 2000
Robert Einhorn, US Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, says that North Korea's nuclear weapons program continues to threaten the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region. However, according to Einhorn, Pyongyang's recent efforts to normalize relations with various countries shows that a diplomatic approach to dealing with North Korea's nuclear weapon' program, embodied in the Agreed Framework, is beginning to pay off.

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9 June 2000
A Korean Central News Agency commentary says that due to the delays in heavy fuel oil deliveries and the resulting negative economic impact on North Korea, several officials within the North Korean leadership are calling for the nullification of the Agreed Framework and restarting North Korea's indigenous nuclear program.

10 June 2000
An editorial in North Korea's Pyongyang Times says the US attempt to establish a nuclear verification system over all North Korean territory is not part of the Agreed Framework. Citing the remarks of James Lilly, a former US ambassador to South Korea, the editorial says the Agreed Framework is likely to collapse due to the US failure to honor its commitments, including its failure to deliver heavy fuel oil and the indefinite delay in the completion of the LWR project.
—'Option is Not US Monopoly,' Pyongyang Times, 10 June 2000 in FBIS Document ID KPP20000712000096.

13 June 2000
KEDO asks the US Nuclear Regulation Commission to allow North Korean nuclear inspectors to receive technical training in the United States. After the completion of the two KEDO light water reactors, North Korean inspectors will be tasked with conducting safety checks and regulatory audits of the reactors. However, the would-be inspectors have no experience with light water nuclear reactors.

13-15 June 2000
North Korea’s National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il and South Korean President Kim Dae Jung meet in Pyongyang to discuss various bilateral issues. On 14 June, the two leaders sign an agreement, the 'Joint North-South Declaration," by which they pledge to work for reconciliation and eventual reunification of the two countries. The agreement contains a clause by which the two Koreas agree not to engage in offensive military operations against each other. Upon returning to Seoul following the historic talks, Kim Dae Jung announces that he raised the issue of international concerns over North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. According to South Korean government spokesman Park Chun Yong, President Kim Dae Jung, in a 16 June telephone conversation with US President Bill Clinton says that he comprehensively discussed the North Korean weapons development program with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il during their summit in Pyongyang. Park says, "President Kim told President Clinton that he strongly urged the North Korean leader to successfully conclude negotiations with the United States on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, and that leaving these weapon issues unsettled could impede regional peace and cooperation."
19 June 2000
The US eases economic sanctions against North Korea. The measures are said to be 'the final phase of what President Clinton announced last September 17.' The end of sanctions will allow North Korea to export raw materials to the United States and allow US companies to invest in agriculture, mining, roads, ports travel and tourism in North Korea. However, since North Korea remains on the State Department’s list of states sponsoring terrorism, prohibitions on the sales of high technology and dual-use goods remain intact.

Late June 2000
The fifteen member nations of the EU agree to give the European Commission, the executive body of the EU, the authority to negotiate additional funding for KEDO with the other executive board member nations.

23 June 2000
US Secretary of State Madeline Albright meets with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung and Foreign Minister Lee Chong Bin in Seoul. Albright reaffirms the South Korean leaders that US troops will remain in South Korea indefinitely in order to maintain stability in East Asia.

26 June 2000
KEDO holds an executive board meeting in New York. At the meeting, Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, remarks that due to current high crude oil prices, it would be difficult to provide fuel oil to North Korea by 22 October 2000, as provided by the Agreed Framework. Kartman says the United States will call for financial contributions from the international community to cover the cost of fuel oil for North Korea. In addition, KEDO sources report that financial compensation demanded by North Korea for the delay of the LWRs was not discussed in the board meeting since it is unacceptable.

29 June 2000
US President Bill Clinton certifies to Congress that North Korea appears to be living up to its commitment under the Agreed Framework to freeze its nuclear weapons program. The presidential certification, required by Congress, authorized the release of $20 million to be used for heavy fuel oil deliveries to North Korea.
—'Chronicle of Major Events in South and North Korea (June-July 2000)," Korea and World Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 3,

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1 July 2000
The North Korean Foreign Ministry announces that if the United States does not compensate North Korea for the losses incurred due to delays constructing two light water reactors, North Korea will have no choice but to revert to producing electricity using its graphite moderated reactors.

3-4 July 2000
KEDO and North Korea hold talks but fail to make progress on quality assurances and warrant protocol for the construction of light water reactors. According to a KEDO source close to the talks, 'since the negotiations are related to technical matters, the breakdown is not due to KEDO's delay of construction of the light water reactors.'

11 July 2000
A Korean Central News Agency commentary says that if the United States fails to compensate North Korea for the loss of electricity incurred from delays in implementing the Agreed Framework, North Korea 'will be left with no option but to restart its independent nuclear power industry.'

19 July 2000
Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan meet in Berlin to discuss various bilateral issues. While the talks were originally scheduled to deal with North Korea's nuclear and missile issues, Kartman and Kim use the meeting to prepare for the upcoming meeting between US Secretary of State Madeline Albright and North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun.

18 July 2000
An anonymous EU source says that the EU plans to provide at least €75 million over the next five years to KEDO to help finance the light water reactor project. According to the source, the EU will soon meet with the other KEDO executive board member nations to discuss the issue of additional funding.

28 July 2000
US Secretary of State Madeline Albright meets with her North Korean counterpart Paek Nam Sun in a closed-door meeting on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Bangkok. Albright and Paek address a variety of

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bilateral issues including North Korea's suspected efforts to produce nuclear weapons. Albright says her meeting with Paek, 'constitutes a substantively modest but symbolically historic step away from the sterility and hostility of the past and toward a more direct and promising approach to resolving differences and establishing common ground.' The meeting between Albright and Paek represents the highest level talks between the United States and North Korea since the Korean War.


29 July 2000

Representatives from the EU and KEDO meet in Seoul prior to the KEDO executive board meeting to discuss additional contributions by the EU to the international consortium.


30-31 July 2000

North and South Korea hold ministerial-level talks in Seoul. At the talks, the two sides agree to reopen the South-North liaison office in the truce village of Panmunjom by 14 August 2000. They also agree to hold a new round of talks from 29-30 August.


31 July 2000

KEDO holds an executive board meeting in Seoul. At the meeting, the EU reportedly asks for one of the deputy executive director positions in exchange for a larger contribution to the consortium. [Note: The United States currently holds the executive director's seat, while Japan and South Korea, the other two founding members of KEDO, hold the deputy executive director seats.]


August 2000

According to the Joongang Ilbo, US intelligence later believes that North Korea completes the final high-explosives tests for a uranium bomb.


6 August 2000

Bulat Nigmatulin, Russian vice minister for atomic energy, announces that Russia is interested in joining KEDO. Nigmatulin adds that due to the inability of KEDO to gain sufficient funding for the timely construction of the two light water reactors, Russia is proposing that KEDO instead use two, less expensive Russian model reactors.

—'Russia Wants to Take Part in KEDO Project: Official," Japan Economic Newswire, 6 August 2000, in Lexis-Nexis,
9 August 2000
Chen Kuo Yuan, deputy chief head of Commission of National Cooperation in Taiwan's Economics Ministry, announces that Taiwan has given permission to the Taiwan Power Company to renew a 1997 contract with North Korea by which it would ship up to 200,000 barrels of low grade radioactive material to North Korea for storage. [Note: Taiwan backed out of the original agreement in 1998 citing North Korea's lack of proper facilities to dispose of the waste.]

14 August 2000
North and South Korea reopen the inter-Korean liaison office in truce village of Panmunjom. The liaison office, the only direct channel of communication between the two Koreas, had been closed since 1996.

29 August-2 September 2000
Desaix Anderson, executive director of KEDO, travels to North Korea accompanied by his two deputies, Cho Kyu Yong of South Korea and Masaaki Uno of Japan. While in North Korea, the KEDO delegation travels to Shinp'o to inspect the progress of the light water reactor construction.

September 2000
According to Yonhap News Agency, 80 percent of land-leveling work for the light water reactor project under the Agreed Framework has been completed in Kumho-chigu, Shinp'o. The news agency later says that the construction work might face snags due to management of a crisis facing the subcontractors, and also due to financing problems.

8 September 2000
Terasuke Terada, Japan's ambassador to KEDO, warns that the light water reactor project will continue to experience delays until North Korea allows the IAEA full access to its frozen graphite moderate nuclear facilities. Terada adds that Japan will not normalize relations with North Korea until it resolves suspicions about its nuclear program.

11 September 2000
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, addressing the IAEA Board of Governors, says, 'The Agency is still...
unable to verify that the DPRK has declared all nuclear material which should be subject to safeguards." "We want access to all sites," ElBaradei states, "and at the moment we are just being given documents." ElBaradei stresses that North Korea must come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement before any key nuclear components for the KEDO light water reactors will be delivered.


12 September 2000

The US Defense Department issues a report to Congress stating, "While North Korea denies possession of nuclear weapons and has frozen its nuclear program at Yongbyon, we remain concerned the North could revive a weapons production program."


13 September 2000

Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono meets with Chris Patten, EU external affairs commissioner, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session to convey Japan's disappointment that the EU decided not to increase financial contributions to KEDO.


22 September 2000

At the IAEA's 44th General Conference in Vienna, the IAEA passes a resolution calling on North Korea to 'come into full compliance with it safeguards agreement with the IAEA, to cooperate fully and promptly with the Agency in the implementation of the safeguards agreement and to take all steps the Agency may deem necessary to preserve all information relevant to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on the inventory of nuclear material subject to safeguards."


23 September 2000

Pyongyang Radio carries a report threatening that North Korea will restart its graphite moderated nuclear program unless the United States promptly fulfills its obligations under the Agreed Framework.


26 September 2000

KEDO holds its fifth annual meeting in New York. At the meeting, Charles Kartman, US representative to KEDO, asks the other member states to assist the United States in financing the annual heavy fuel oil deliveries to North Korea. At the executive board meeting held a day before the general meeting, Chang Son Sop, head of South Korea's Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project, is named the new director general.


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Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan meet in New York to discuss various bilateral issues including North Korea's missile and nuclear programs and North Korea's alleged support for terrorism. Following the talks, both Kartman and Kim report progress on a number of issues.


28 September 2000
The Korean Central News Agency criticizes the IAEA resolution on North Korea that was passed on 22 September. The news agency calls the resolution 'a grave challenge to the sovereignty of the DPRK and a very unreasonable action which endangers the Agreed Framework.'


October 2000
The US State Department begins 'seriously looking at what provisions might be necessary to include in a formal nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and North Korea.'


October 2000
South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials acknowledge that the US government has been proposing the provision of fossil fuel plants instead of one or both of the LWRs to be built under the Agreed Framework. The officials also say that the US government has considered alleviating North Korea's energy problems by supplying electricity from South Korea's Korea Electric Power Company, but thus far this option has been politically unacceptable to Pyongyang.


9-12 October 2000
Cho Myong Rok, first vice chairman of North Korea's National Defense Commission, travels to the United States to meet with various high ranking officials. Cho, considered third in North Korea's hierarchy of power, is the highest ranking North Korean ever to visit the United States. On 9 October, Cho meets with President Bill Clinton to discuss various global and bilateral issues including North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. During the meeting, Cho reportedly delivers a letter to Clinton from Kim Jong Il putting forth a series of proposals by which the two

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countries can further ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. While in Washington, Cho also meets with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Defense Secretary William Cohen. Following Cho’s historic trip, the United States and North Korea issue a joint statement noting the benefits of normalized relations and stating the intention to arrange a formal peace treaty to replace the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement.


20 October 2000
Desaix Anderson, executive director of KEDO, and Kim Hui Mun of North Korea, sign a protocol in Pyongyang on training 529 North Korean workers for the LWR project under the Agreed Framework. According to a South Korean government official, the training site is undecided and is likely to be finalized in April 2001.


23-24 October 2000
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright travels to North Korea and meets with North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Il. Albright is the highest ranking US official ever to visit North Korea and the first US official to meet with Kim Jong Il. Albright presents Kim with a letter from President Bill Clinton addressing various bilateral issues. Following her visit to North Korea, Albright informs the foreign ministers of Japan and South Korea that her talks with Kim focused on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.


Early November 2000
The South Korean National Assembly holds hearings on the KEDO light water reactor project amid concerns about the project’s obstacles. The main problems appear to be a strike by North Korean workers at the site, potential financial shortfalls, the North Korean power grid, and the refusal of General Electric to provide technology for the reactor turbines. Many South Koreans are also concerned that the South Korean government may have to assume loan guarantees for the project.


Early November 2000
Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the IAEA, says that North Korea’s compliance with the IAEA safeguards would help to further facilitate its rapprochement with South Korea. He makes these remarks at the 12th meeting of the Pacific Basin Nuclear Conference (PBNC), which is held in Seoul from 29 October to 2 November 2000. Welcoming the recent diplomatic normalization talks between North Korea and the United States, ElBaradei says

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he hopes that the US-North Korea discussions will amicably resolve the issues related to North Korea's nuclear and missile program. Later, while speaking to the UN General Assembly on 6 November 2000, ElBaradei says that nuclear inspectors would like to start work immediately to verify and assess North Korean claims made in September 2000 that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only. ElBaradei adds that since verification may take two to three years, work should begin immediately so that the light water nuclear (LWR) project under the Agreed Framework may proceed as scheduled.


8 November 2000

Glyn Ford, a member of the European Union Parliament and the British Labor Party, says the light water reactors to be built under the Agreed Framework are unlikely to be completed before 2010. Ford visited North Korea from 31 October to 4 November, and met with Kim Yong Nam, president of the Supreme People’s Assembly, and with Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun. Ford says, 'If you are going to have a seven-year delay, it would lead to a doubling of the cost.'


14-15 November 2000

Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer meets with North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun in Pyongyang. During the talks, Downer indicates that Australia would be willing to provide training and technical assistance on nuclear safeguards to North Korea.


19 November 2000

A South Korea government official announces that the EU has pledged €150 million ($130 million) over the coming five years for the KEDO light water reactor project. The official says that an EU delegation visiting Pyongyang from 25-28 November 2000 is likely to inform North Korean officials of the increase in the EU’s annual contribution to KEDO from €15 million to €30 million for the next five years.


26 November 2000

The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers Party, condemns the United States for delaying the KEDO light water reactor project. According to the paper, the United States is purposefully delaying the project in an attempt to 'weaken (North Korea’s) economic and military potentials and watch for a chance to stifle (North Korea)

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by force of arms." The paper adds that if the delays continue, North Korea will have to take a 'corresponding measure.'


30 November 2000

Nucleonics Week reports that General Electric (GE) might refuse to provide the turbines for the LWRs to be built in North Korea under the Agreed Framework. If GE pulls out of the project, the entire balance of plant (BOP) will have to be redesigned, and the extra work will cost several million dollars according to some analysts. The Agreed Framework requires North Korea to obtain liability insurance, but Pyongyang is not yet a member of the Vienna International Nuclear Liability Convention, and there is still no insurance for the LWR project. GE is concerned about liability in North Korea because of the weak power grid.


4 December 2000

Nine senior experts from KEDO meet with a three-man delegation from North Korea's Department of Nuclear Safety in the State Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the first time. The North Korean delegation is led by Kim Yong Il, director of the department. The meeting is held to introduce KEDO to North Korea's nuclear regulatory environment. KEDO will have to submit plans for the light water reactors to the regulatory agency to receive a construction permit. KEDO invites the North Koreans to another round of talks in April 2001.


6 December 2000

During an ambassador-level KEDO executive board meeting in Tokyo, the United States, Japan, and South Korea ask the EU to increase its contribution to the light water reactor project. The EU's current share is 75 million Euros ($68 million) over five years through 2000. At the meeting, the executive board members also discuss several pending issues, such as the increasing price of heavy fuel oil and contracting a firm to supply materials and equipment for the reactors. According to a Japanese Foreign Ministry statement released on 7 December, the executive board decided that Hitachi Ltd. and Toshiba Corp. will most likely receive contracts to provide the turbines for the reactors following General Electric Co.'s decision to back out of the KEDO project.


7 December 2000

Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the IAEA, announces at an IAEA board meeting that North Korea is not cooperating with the Agency on inspecting its nuclear facilities and material. However, ElBaradei adds, the Agency will soon reach an agreement with KEDO on safety inspections of the light water reactors currently under construction in North Korea.

11 December 2000
Uzbekistan becomes a member of KEDO.

18 December 2000
Nucleonics Week, quoting Republican Party sources, reports that the new US administration headed by the President-elect George W. Bush is expected to reconsider the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework. Republican Party sources state that several key administration figures question the efficacy of the Agreed Framework. Included in this group are Secretary of State-designate Colin Powell; National Security Advisor-designate Condoleezza Rice; former ambassador to China James Lilley, who is likely director-designate of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); and Paul Wolfowitz, who may be appointed head of CIA or the Department of Defense. The official sources said that Wolfowitz and Rice are highly critical of providing two nuclear energy power projects to North Korea under the 1994 agreement. They would prefer to 'get into a transition to provide nonnuclear energy sources," which would require renegotiation of the deal with North Korea. At the same time, the sources said that Powell, Wolfowitz and Rice would take action solely regarding US policy towards Agreed Framework and Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). They would not attempt to force South Korea to abandon its Sunshine Policy of developing a relationship with North Korea.

16 December 2000
Percy Westerlund, a senior official in charge of Korean affairs at the European Commission, reportedly meets with Desaix Anderson, KEDO executive director, in New York and informs him that the EU will increase its donations to KEDO to €100 million ($90 million) over the next five years.

22 December 2000
KEPCO signs a contract with Hyundai Engineering and Construction, Donga Construction, Daewoo Corp. and Korea Heavy Industries for the secondary stages of construction of the two KEDO light water reactors. The four firms are contracted to complete construction of the reactors, turbines, generators and other related facilities January 2009.

22 December 2000
Japan and China agree to work together to have North Korea sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Chinese arms control experts agree to a proposal from their Japanese counterparts for considering ways to persuade North Korea to sign the CTBT.

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1999

The South Korean government issues W150 billion ($125 million) in treasury bonds to help finance the LWR project under the Agreed Framework.

1 January 1999
An official from the South Korea Ministry of Unification announces that North Korea has replaced the director of its Light-Water Reactor Bureau. According to the official, Pyongyang has recently replaced Kim Pyong Ki with Kim Song Su.

South Korean President Kim Dae Jung urges a diplomatic solution to problems arising from North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. Presiding over a National Security Council meeting, Kim says, "We need to solve the pending problems, including the North's nuclear and missile issues, through dialogue and negotiation."

A US government official announces that Washington is considering easing economic sanctions against North Korea if Pyongyang allows unconditional access to a suspected nuclear weapons facility in Kumch'ang-ri. According to the official, Washington is considering such measures as unfreezing North Korean assets in the United States and allowing US companies to participate in mining operations in North Korea.

The US, China and the two Koreas hold working level consultations at the UN in New York to prepare for the upcoming fourth round of four-party talks to be held in Geneva on 18-22 January.

The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, condemns the United States, South Korea and Japan for postponing until June 1999 the commencement of construction on the two light water reactors in Kumho-chigu, Shin'po, and for delaying deliveries of heavy fuel oil. In a veiled threat that North Korea might restart its nuclear program, the Rodong Sinmun warns, "The United States must know that if it fails to do what it should do, while continuing to insult the dialogue partner and resort to pressure on the DPRK, the DPRK, too, will do what it should do."
6 January 1999
US government officials announce that the United States has recently allocated an additional $12 million necessary to fund the remaining 110,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil to be sent to North Korea for 1998. [Note: Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, the United States agreed to supply North Korea with 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil annually to meet North Korea’s energy needs until the completion of two light water reactors. However, in 1998, the US Congress failed to allocate the funds necessary to meet the US commitment.]

7 January 1999
South Korean Defense Minister Ch’on Yong T’aek and his Japanese counterpart Housei Norota meet in Seoul to expand military cooperation to prepare for possible aggression from North Korea. The two defense ministers agree that stability in Northeast Asia requires greater transparency in North Korea’s nuclear program. At the meeting, Norota also reiterates Tokyo’s threat to suspend all financial contributions to the KEDO light water reactor project if North Korea test launches another long-range missile. [Note: On 31 August 1998, Tokyo suspended all financial support to KEDO after North Korea test fired a rocket over Japanese territory. Tokyo did not lift the freeze on financial contributions until late-October 1998.]

7 January 1999
The North Korean Anti-Nuclear Peace Committee issues a statement saying that the United States owes North Korea “tens of billions of dollars” in damages incurred from delays in oil shipments and construction of two light water reactors. The statement adds, "If the US, approaching the Geneva agreement with insincerity, continues to delay implementing it although it promised before the world, the DPRK also has no intention of observing it, suffering only losses."

9 January 1999
North Korea’s Minju Joson says that "the DPRK-US Agreed Framework has been reduced to an empty paper" due to the US failure to live up to its commitments. The paper alleges that the true US intention behind delays in implementing the Agreed Framework and demands to inspect a suspected underground nuclear facility is to weaken North Korea prior to a declaration of war.

11 January 1999
North Korea's Foreign Ministry states that US suspicion of an "underground nuclear facility" is based in "groundless information," and thus, is an insult to North Korea. A ministry spokesman reiterates the demand that if the United States wants to inspect the site, it must pay $300 million in cash. However, if the United States cannot pay in cash, the spokesman says, "it may grant the DPRK economic benefits tantamount to the amount even in any appropriate form." The spokesman adds that if the United States continues to link the issue of the suspected nuclear facility with implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea "will no longer have any interest in the agreement."

11 January 1999
Gary Samore, Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls for the National Security Council, warns that the United States might end food aid to North Korea if it does not allow inspections of a suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumchang-ri. Speaking at a seminar on nonproliferation in Washington, Samore says, "We have made it clear to the North it cannot expect to continue to receive the direct and indirect benefits of the Agreed Framework and improve relations with the United States" while denying access to a suspected nuclear facility.

11-14 January 1999
US Secretary of Defense William Cohen meets with senior Japanese officials in Tokyo to coordinate policies on North Korea. Cohen tells the Japanese officials and press that the United States has significant evidence that a suspected facility in Kumchang-ri is related to a nuclear program and a one-time inspection would not be sufficient. However, according to Cohen, the United States is committed to resolving the issue diplomatically. On 13 January, Cohen meets with Defense Minister Housei Norota, and the two reaffirm their support for the 1994 Agreed Framework and the KEDO light water reactor project. While in Japan, Cohen comments on the 11 January statement by the North Korean Foreign Ministry that reiterated the demand for $300 million in exchange for access to the Kumchang-ri facility. Cohen rejects the demand, saying, "We are not in the business of giving compensation. What we need to have is some verification."

12 January 1999
A Rodong Sinmun commentary calls on the United States to clarify "its stand about whether it will implement or break the Agreed Framework." The commentary claims that because the United States "has not faithfully implemented any of its commitments...(and) has intentionally delayed or evaded its implementation," North Korea "expects nothing any longer from the Agreed Framework."

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12 January 1999
Chang Son Sop, director of South Korea's Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project, announces that it would be physically impossible to complete the light water reactors by the original target date of 2003. Chang says that due to several events, including the September 1996 incursion of a North Korean submarine into South Korea and North Korea's firing of a rocket over Japan in August 1998, the two light water reactors will not be completed for several years beyond the original target date.

13 January 1999
A US State Department official announces that the United States is seeking "multiple inspections" of the suspected nuclear weapons facility under construction in Kumch'ang-ri. The official says that the United States is offering North Korea the opportunity to prove that the facility is not related to a nuclear weapons program, but, the official adds, "we are not going to pay for it." [Note: North Korea has repeatedly offered to allow a one-time inspection of the facility in exchange for $300,000 in cash.]

14 January 1999
A KEDO official announces that due to difficulty in collecting funds, full-scale construction of the two light water reactors will not begin on 15 January as scheduled. Instead, construction is scheduled to begin five months later on 15 June.

14 January 1999
A source close to the US-North Korean bilateral negotiations on a suspected nuclear facility in Kumch’ang-ri, says that the 1994 Agreed Framework contains a secret supplementary memorandum by which North Korea agrees to forgo any future construction of additional graphite-moderated nuclear reactors. However, according to the source, the supplementary memorandum contains no language on inspections to resolve suspicions should they arise.

14 January 1999
The Korean Central News Agency reports that the Agreed Framework "has already reached such an extent as it may break up of its own accord due to the US hypocritical and double-dealing attitude." The report also condemns as "impudent utterances" Gary Samore's 11 January statement that the United States may suspend food aid to North Korea if it does not allow access to the suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch’ang-ri. Samore's statement, the report says, creates "serious threats to the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula in wanton violation of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework."
14-16 January 1999
US Secretary of Defense William Cohen meets with South Korean officials in Seoul to coordinate policies on North Korea. Cohen and Defense Minister Ch’on Yong T’aek issue a joint statement in which they state that "combined defense readiness should be steadfastly maintained against a wide range of possible threats" from North Korea. The two defense ministers also demanded full access to a suspected nuclear facility in Kumch’ang-ri. At a joint press conference with Chun, Cohen says that while there is no conclusive evidence that the site is related to a clandestine nuclear weapons program, "we believe there is sufficient evidence for us to be suspicious, and the suspicions must be addressed." Chun adds that Seoul and Washington will take joint action if conclusive evidence is found that the Kumch’ang-ri facility is nuclear related.


16-17 January 1999
The US and North Korea hold closed-door negotiations in Geneva on a suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch’ang-ri. The delegations are headed by Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minster Kim Kye Kwan. Following the first day of talks, Kim tells reporters that neither side had budged from its original position. After the second day of talks, neither delegation comments on details of the negotiations, but a spokesman for the North Korean mission to the UN announces that the two sides will meet again on 23 January. [Note: North Korea, insisting that the site is a civilian facility, has repeatedly offered to grant a one-time inspection in exchange for $300,000, but the United States has demanded unconditional multiple inspections of the facility. After the talks, reports surface saying that North Korea offered access to the site in exchange for 1 million tons of food aid.]


18 January 1999
Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura announces that Tokyo "will find it difficult to win public support for KEDO financing without Pyongyang allaying suspicions over the underground nuclear site" in Kumch’ang-ri.


19 January 1999
North Korea denounces the statements by US Secretary of Defense William Cohen, on a recent visit to Seoul, that the United States would provide a nuclear umbrella to South Korea in the case of war with the North. A commentary carried on the Korean Central News Agency, says that if Cohen's comments were meant as a threat, "the US hawks should know that if they think they can survive a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula kindled by them, it would be a serious mistake."

19-22 January 1999
Representatives from the United States, China and the two Koreas meet in Geneva for the fourth round of fourparty peace talks aimed at replacing the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement with a formal peace treaty. For the first time the four parties meet in two earlier established subcommittees, one to address facilitating a lasting peace between the two Koreas, and the other to address reducing tension on the peninsula. The talks make little progress as North Korea reportedly renews its demand for the withdrawal of all US forces from South Korea. The four parties agree to resume talks in mid-April.

19-23 January 1999
Representatives from North Korea and KEDO meet in Hyangsan, North Korea for talks on a protocol detailing the procedure for training North Korean technicians on light water reactor operations.

22 January 1999
A North Korean Foreign Ministry official says that "the second Korean war will be a nuclear war," and, the official adds, North Korea, "which has been living under a nuclear threat from the United States for decades, is completely ready for nuclear war." The ministry official stresses that "if there is no avoiding hostilities, and North Korea is forced to take reply measures against America's aggression, the North Korean republic is bound to win."

23 January 1999
The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, warns of "nuclear holocaust" if the United States attacks North Korea with nuclear weapons. The paper says, "The United States, which dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has not yet been hit by a single shell over the past five decades or so." "But the situation is different now," the commentary adds, "if the United States attempts to inflict a nuclear holocaust on the DPRK, its mainland will never be left unharmed, either."

23-24 January 1999
Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minster Kim Kye Kwan resume talks in Geneva on a suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. While both Kartman and Kim refuse to comment on the substance of the talks, sources close to the negotiations report that North Korea has withdrawn its earlier demand of $300 million in exchange for a one-time inspection, instead demanding that the United States provide one million tons in food aid. However, while the United States has reportedly expressed a willingness to

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provide additional food aid and ease economic sanctions if North Korea allows access to the suspected facility, it continues to insist that any agreement must guarantee multiple inspections. The two sides fail to reach an agreement on inspecting the site, but they agree to continue talks at a later date. [Note: Various unverified reports, commenting on details of the negotiations, surface in early February. According to a 4 February Asahi Shimbun report, North Korea offers to allow two "visits" to the site; however, the "visits" reportedly would not entail close inspections. Another 4 February report from Kyodo News Service quotes an anonymous source close to the negotiations as saying that the North Korean delegation suggests that the United States and North Korea establish a joint company at the disputed Kumch'ang-ri site. In such a case, the North Korean delegation reportedly says, the United States would be free to inspect the site whenever it wanted.]


25 January 1999
Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi calls on North Korea to allow international inspections of a suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri.

27 January 1999
Representatives from the United States, Japan, South Korea, and the EU hold a KEDO executive board meeting in New York.

28 January 1999
Commenting on a recent meeting between American and North Korean officials to discuss US access to Kumch'ang-ri, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says, "The US...hinted that it affirmatively (is) taking into account the DPRK's demand for compensation." [Note: Sources close to the 23-24 January negotiations reported that North Korea withdrew its earlier demand of $300 million in exchange for a one-time inspection, instead demanding that the United States provide one million tons in food aid. However, while the United States reportedly expressed a willingness to provide additional food aid and ease economic sanctions if North Korea allows access to the suspected facility, it continues to insist that any agreement must guarantee multiple inspections.]


28 January 1999

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The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, accuses the United States of having no intention to fulfill its obligation under the 1994 Agreed Framework. According to the paper, the United States "had no intention to implement the Agreed Framework when it adopted it with the DPRK. It foolishly thought that the DPRK might collapse before parts of the light water reactors are provided to the DPRK." The daily continues to say that "if the US wants to break the Agreed Framework, we will not be confined only to it but will freely develop the independent power industry."


1 February 1999
Washington reiterates its demand that North Korea allow multiple inspections of a suspected nuclear weapons facility in Kumch’ang-ri. Commenting on the stalled bilateral talks to address the issue, State Department spokesman James Rubin says, "We've made clear that we need multiple site access to the Kumch’ang-ri facility in order to resolve our concerns."


2 February 1999
US Central Intelligence Agency Director George Tenet tells the Senate Armed Services Committee that the North Korean military "has become more volatile and unpredictable." He adds that the current situation "will encourage the North to rely more heavily on risky brinkmanship in its dealings with the United States."


4 February 1999
Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka announces that Japan will halt all financial contributions to KEDO if North Korea test fires another long-rang missile. [Note: On 31 August 1998, Japan temporarily froze contributions to KEDO after North Korea fired a rocket over its territory. Tokyo did not resume contributions to KEDO until late October.]


6-10 February 1999
Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, meets with senior South Korean officials in Seoul to discuss progress in the four-party peace talks and US desire to gain access to North Korea's suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch’ang-ri. On 9 February, Kartman meets with Kwon Chong Rak, director general for the North American Affairs Bureau of the South Korean Foreign Ministry, and Terusuke Terada, Japanese special envoy for Korean affairs, to coordinate US, South Korean and Japanese policies on various North Korean issues including the suspect Kumch’ang-ri facility, implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework, and the possibility of another North Korean missile test. According to a government official in Seoul, Kartman informs Kwon and Terada that the United States will not ease economic sanctions against North Korea until Pyongyang allows inspection of the Kumch’ang-ri site. Terada also reportedly says that Japan will not send additional food aid to North Korea until suspicions about the site are erased.


Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
8 February 1999
US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott meets with Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Shunji Yanai in Washington and urges Japan to pay its pledged $1 billion to KEDO as soon as possible.

9 February 1999
The Czech Republic becomes a member of KEDO.

9 February 1999
The Korea Times, quoting a South Korean government official, reports that the United States is prepared to offer North Korea up to 500,000 tons in additional food aid in exchange for access to a suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. The report claims that Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, revealed the offer in a three-way meeting with senior South Korean and Japanese officials in Seoul earlier in the day. Later in the day, a US State Department spokesman James Rubin denies the report, saying, "Our policy is to provide food on a humanitarian basis and we do not link it to other issues...We are not prepared to pay for access to the site."

9-13 February 1999
Representatives from KEDO and North Korea meet in Hyangsan, North Korea to discuss various issues related to the implementation of the KEDO light water reactor project.

10-11 February 1999
Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura visits South Korea to discuss North Korea's suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. While in Seoul, Komura meets with President Kim Dae Jung and Foreign Minister Hong Sun Yong. Speaking to reporters after his two-day visit, Komura reiterates that Japan will not resume food aid to North Korea until Pyongyang resolves suspicions about the suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. Komura also states that Japan will once again freeze financial contributions to KEDO if North Korea tests another long-range missile. [Note: On 31 August 1998, Japan temporarily froze contributions to KEDO after North Korea fired a rocket over its territory. Tokyo resumed contributions to KEDO in late-October.]

10-11 February 1999
Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, consults with Chinese officials in Beijing on the progress of the four-party peace talks and North Korea's suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri.

13 February 1999
Kyodo News Service, quoting US government sources, reports that Japan's Finance Ministry has insisted on loan guarantees for the $1 billion Japan has pledged to KEDO. The ministry's insistence on loan guarantees has reportedly slowed down negotiations between KEDO executive board members on financing the light water reactor project.

21 February 1999
The Tokyo Shimbun, quoting a KEDO source, reports that the KEDO light water reactor project will not be completed until at least 2007. According to the source, delays are mainly due to stalled negotiations between KEDO executive board members on financing the project.

24-25 February 1999
US Secretary of State Madeline Albright tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 24 February and the House International Relations Committee on 25 February that US-North Korean relations will not improve until Pyongyang resolves suspicions over a suspected underground nuclear weapons facility in Kumch'ang-ri.

25 February 1999
The North Korean Foreign Ministry, responding to recent reports that the KEDO light water reactor project will not be completed until at least 2007, says that if such reports are true, "it means the US side's violation of the DPRKUSA Agreed Framework and...accordingly, it cannot but give rise to serious matters." In this regard the ministry calls on the US to clarify its stand on the light water reactor project, so that North Korea can "make relevant decisions according to it."

27 February 1999

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
According to a 28 February report in the Daily Yomiuri, US government sources say that the United States is prepared to extend direct food aid to North Korea in exchange for multiple inspections of a suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. The government source reportedly says that the 100,000 tons of grain would be sent in April and an additional 100,000 would be sent again in July. These proposed food shipments would be sent directly to Pyongyang without going through the usual channel of the UN World Food Program.


**27 February - 15 March 1999**

The United States and North Korea meet in New York for the fourth round of talks on a suspected North Korean nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. The US and North Korean delegations are once again respectively headed by Charles Kartman, special envoy for Korean affairs, and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan. According to sources close to the talks, the main point under negotiation is the amount of food aid to be provided by the United States in exchange for access to the suspected site. On 6 March, the two sides hit a stalemate, because, according to Kim, "the US side is making excessive demands which go far beyond the scope of clarifying suspicions (over the Kumch'ang-ri site)." The two sides resume negotiation on 8 March after consultations with their capitals. On 10 March, the two sides break again for consultations with their capitals. On 11 March the two delegations resume negotiations, and US State Department spokesman James Rubin announces that "there has been some progress, some headway." Despite the early setbacks, on 15 March the two sides reach an agreement, and on the following day issue a joint statement in which North Korea agrees to provide the United States with "satisfactory access to the site at Kumch'ang-ri," including multiple "visits to remove US concerns about the site's future use. The US agrees "to take a step to improve political and economic relations between the two countries." While the joint statement does not mention the specifics of the agreement, on 16 March US State Department spokesman James Rubin announces that the United States has agreed to take part in a bilateral agricultural project to improve North Korea's potato production. However, Rubin stresses that any agricultural assistance or increased food aid is for humanitarian reasons and should not be viewed as compensation for access to the Kumch'ang-ri site.


**1 March 1999**

US officials announce that Washington has agreed to Tokyo's demand that KEDO provide loan guarantees for the $1 billion it has pledged to the consortium. [Note: In mid-February, Japan's Finance Ministry, fearing that North Korea would default on the loan, insisted on guarantees for the $1 billion. The ministry's insistence on loan guarantees slowed down negotiations between KEDO executive board members on financing the light water reactor project.]


Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
Early March 1999
According to a 10 March report by the Yonhap News Agency, US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director Patrick Hughes meets with South Korean intelligence officials in Seoul. Yonhap quotes an intelligence source as saying, "(Hughes') trip this time was very meaningful." [Note: The DIA has reportedly conducted intensive reconnaissance work on North Korea's suspected nuclear and missile facilities.]

4 March 1999
US President Bill Clinton issues a presidential determination, which is subsequently submitted to Congress on 5 March, verifying that "North Korea is complying with all provisions of the Agreed Framework and with the confidential minute between North Korea and the United States." Clinton also states that "North Korea is cooperating fully in the canning and safe storage of all spent nuclear fuel from its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors." [Note: On 20 October 1998, Congress passed a budget for fiscal year 1999 allocating $35 million for heavy fuel oil deliveries to North Korea. However, the budget stipulated the funds would not be allocated until 1 March 1999, and no more than $15 million would be allocated before 1 June 1999. Thirty days prior to each date, President Clinton must certify that North Korea is taking steps to implement the 1994 Agreed Framework and is no longer exporting ballistic missiles. Congress also specifies that "30 days before the June deadline, the White House must certify that it has reached an agreement with North Korea on the means for satisfying US concerns regarding suspect underground construction."]

8 March 1999
William Perry, coordinator of US policy on North Korea, travels to Seoul and meets with President Kim Dae Jung, Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Hong Sun Yong and Im Dong Won, senior presidential secretary for foreign affairs and national security. Perry, who for the past few months has been writing a review of Washington's policy on North Korea, discusses the differences between Washington's and Seoul's approach to addressing concerns arising from North Korea. After meeting Perry, Hong announces that the two sides agreed to "solve North Korea's nuclear and missile issues within the framework of Seoul's engagement policy."

9-13 March 1999
An IAEA delegation meets with North Korean officials in Pyongyang to negotiate over access to information necessary to determine the completeness and correctness of North Korea's initial declaration of nuclear material. After the talks, IAEA delegation head Demetrius Perrikos says that "nothing serious has happened" at the talks.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
10 March 1999

William Perry, coordinator of US policy on North Korea, meets with senior Japanese officials in Tokyo to coordinate US and Japanese policies on North Korea. Speaking to reporters after meetings with Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura, Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka and Defense Agency Director General Hosei Norota, Perry says that "any successful policy toward North Korea must be a closely coordinated joint effort of the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea."


11 March 1999

The Washington Times, citing a Department of Energy (DOE) intelligence report, reports that North Korea is currently pursuing uranium enrichment technology to be used in a nuclear weapons program. According to the DOE report, North Korea's Taesong Yushin Trading Company recently ordered two frequency converters from a Japanese company. Frequency converters provide a special electric current for gas centrifuges used for uranium enrichment. The intelligence report adds, "On the basis of Pakistan's progress with a similar technology, we estimate that North Korea is at least six years from the production of highly enriched uranium, even if it has a viable centrifuge design." "On the other hand," the report notes, "with significant technical support from other countries, such as Pakistan, the time frame would be decreased by several years." Given North Korea's support of Pakistan's missile program, the report claims that Pakistan, which obtained uranium enrichment technology from China in 1996, could very well assist North Korea in its pursuit of uranium enrichment technology. US State Department spokesman James Rubin, speaking to reporters later in the day, says that while he cannot comment on specifics of the report, Washington remains concerned about North Korea's "intentions regarding nuclear weapons, including the possibility that North Korea may be seeking uranium enrichment technology." [Note: While the transfer of the frequency converters is not confirmed, on 8 May 2003, Tokyo police raid Meishin, a Japanese company run by pro-Pyongyang Korean residents in Japan, for reportedly exporting frequency converters to North Korea.]


11 March 1999

Former US Secretary of Defense William Perry, speaking to reporters at the Brookings Institute, says that North Korea's suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri does not pose an immediate threat since it would take three to five year to produce a nuclear weapon there. However, Perry adds, North Korea "seem(s) the have other programs under way which are part of the nuclear weapons program." [Note: Perry is currently undertaking a comprehensive review of the US policy toward North Korea.]


12 March 1999

Pakistan categorically denies that it has assisted North Korea in obtaining uranium enrichment technology. Tariq Altaf, acting spokesman for Pakistan's Foreign Office, denounces as "false and tendentious" a Washington Times

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Report on 11 March that suggests Pakistan might be assisting North Korea with uranium enrichment in return for North Korea's past support of Pakistan's missile program. The spokesman reiterates Pakistan's policy not to export sensitive nuclear technology to any other country.


12 March 1999
The Joongang Ilbo, quoting a South Korean government official, reports that North Korea is removing evidence from the suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri in anticipation of a US inspection. The Seoul official says, "The USA, which has been watching the Kumch'ang-ri site, confirmed that trucks carrying construction equipment are frequently coming in and going out of this facility. This is judged as the North carrying out engineering works to remove evidence from the suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri, which has been under construction for several years." The official adds, "The US government recently informed our government of such movements. These movements seem to be a measure to prepare for the possible opening of the Kumch'ang-ri facility on case an agreement is reached at the New York talks."


13 March 1999
An official in South Korea's Planning Office for the North Korean Light-Water Reactor Project says that the canning of the spent-fuel rods from the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yongbyon-kun will be complete sometime in May or June 1999.


18 March 1999
Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi tells the Diet that Japan should be allowed to inspect the suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri in North Korea since it has pledged $1 billion to the KEDO light water reactor project. "If Japan can check (the suspected site) for itself, it will find it easier to solicit cooperation from the Japanese people," Obuchi says, "Japan should check how plutonium development is under way (in North Korea) before it pays for the light water reactors."


18 March 1999
A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says that while North Korea will allow the United States access to a suspected site in Kumch'ang-ri for an "inspection fee," North Korea "will take a determined countermeasure if the US raises suspicion of any other [facility]."


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18 March 1999
The *Yomiuri Shimbun*, quoting a source familiar with US intelligence on North Korea's nuclear developments, reports that the Kumch'ang-ri facility is not the only underground facility under construction in North Korea with suspected ties to a clandestine nuclear weapons program. The source claims that US intelligence has confirmed the construction of two large underground facilities in Chagang Province. According to the source, US intelligence has monitored many scientific and technical experts traveling to and from one of the Chagang Province facilities, leading them to believe the facility is to be used for nuclear tests. The other facility has reportedly been repeatedly visited by many North Korean military experts. The other two suspected underground facilities are located in an area known as "Ha'gap" and a location between T'aech'on-kun and Kusong in North P'yong'an Province. [Note: The second location is probably located in Kump'ung-ri (???), Kusong (???), North P'yon'an Province.]

18 March 1999
South Korean Foreign Minister Hong Sun Yong calls on Japan and the United States to extend diplomatic recognition to North Korea. Hong says that the agreement is "just the beginning of the process of confirming whether or not North Korea has a nuclear program."

19 March 1999
The Korean Central News Agency denounces recent allegations that North Korea is seeking uranium enrichment technology from Japan and Pakistan. The news agency calls the reports "a whopping lie which was invented out of an ulterior intention to charge the DPRK with violating the DPRK-USA Agreed Framework of 1994 at any cost and put pressure upon it." [Note: According to a classified DOE report quoted in the 11 March issue of the *Washington Times*, North Korea's Taesong Yushin Trading Company recently ordered two frequency converters for a Japanese company. Frequency converters have applications in gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment.]

19-21 March 1999
Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi meets with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung in Seoul to coordinate policy on North Korea. Obuchi and Kim state that they intend to fully cooperate with the United States in their future dealings with North Korea.

22 March 1999
US State Department spokesman James Foley announces that the United States will send an additional 100,000 metric tons of corn and corn-soy blend to North Korea through the UN World Food Program. Foley denies any link

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to the increased food aid to North Korea's recent agreement to allow the United States to inspect a suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. [Note: In 1998, the United States sent 500,000 tons of food aid to North Korea, and the recent addition brings the 1999 total to 200,000 tons.]


24 March 1999
An IAEA official reports that critical parts of the North Korean 50MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yongbyon-kun have been missing since 1994 when IAEA inspectors first arrived at the site. The parts, vital for controlling nuclear reactions in the reactor's graphite core, could be used to construct another nuclear reactor. According to the official, the IAEA has repeatedly asked North Korea to clear up the issue in multiple bilateral meetings. Originally, North Korea denied it had ever built the critical reactor parts, but in subsequent meetings, according to the IAEA official, North Korea said, "it was checking into the missing parts."


25 March 1999
Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka says that the recent incursion of a North Korean spy vessel into Japanese territorial waters will not affect Japan's commitment to the KEDO light water reactor project. Nonaka says that Japan "must separate this matter, since the assistance to KEDO is the scheme that includes the IAEA's inspection of a suspected North Korean nuclear facility."


26 March 1999
US North Korean Policy Coordinator William Perry confirms that his upcoming report to the Clinton administration will not include "time limits" for when the United States should consider alternatives to diplomatic engagement with North Korea. He says, "I believe military confrontation is so serious, we should exhaust every diplomatic measure." [Note: Since December 1998, Perry has been writing a comprehensive review of the US policy on North Korea.]


30 March 1999
The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, rebukes Japan's request to inspect a suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. A commentary printed in the paper claims that the issue of the Kumch'ang-ri site is between only the United States and North Korea. The commentary adds that Japan's request to participate in the "inspections" illustrates an ignorance of the agreement since the United States will not conduct an "inspection." Rather, the commentary points out, North Korea has granted the United States permission to "visit" the facility. The commentary also claims that North Korea will not care if the agreement is abandoned, adding that implementation "wholly depends on the US side." [Note: On 18 March, Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi said that Japan should be allowed to inspect the Kumch'ang-ri site for itself since it is funding $1 billion of the KEDO light water reactor project.]

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
30 March-3 April 1999
A team of seven US officials and nuclear experts, headed by Joel Wit of the US State Department Korea Desk, travels to Pyongyang to negotiate the itinerary and scope of agreed upon access to a suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. The experts fail to resolve the scope of US access to the site and agree to meet again soon to conclude negotiations.


7-18 April 1999
Representatives from North Korea and KEDO meet in New York for the second round of talks on the training of North Korean engineers to operate the two light water reactors to be built in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o.


3 April 1999
A Rodong Sinmun commentary says that nuclear war with the United States is imminent. The editorial says that "belligerent relations between the DPRK and USA cannot be avoided because the USA is getting frantic in their moves to stifle the DPRK through a nuclear war." The commentary adds that if the United States chooses to use nuclear weapons, North Korea "will have no alternative but to take a countermeasure against it. In that case, the United States will be held wholly responsible for all consequences."


7 April 1999
Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka reiterates Japan's pledge to support the KEDO light water reactor project despite the incursion of two North Korea spy vessels into its territorial waters in March.


Early April 1999
The KEDO Executive Board meets in New York to discuss loan guarantees for the $4.6 billion project. The United States, EU, South Korea, and Japan reportedly agree that contracts with KEDO should include the consortium's guarantee to pay back the loans if North Korea defaults. However, the United States reportedly demands assurance that it would not assume responsibility for paying back the loans even though it is a KEDO board member.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 14 April 1999, in "South Korea, USA, Japan Fail to Agree on Recovering North's

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12 April 1999
Chang Yong Shik, president of KEPCO, the primary contractor of the KEDO light water reactor project, tells reporters in Japan that the reactors to be constructed in North Korea should never use mixed oxide fuel (MOX), a mixture of uranium and plutonium.

14 April 1999
Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura and IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei meet in Tokyo and reaffirm their support for the KEDO light water reactor project. Komura says that Japan intends to continue its support of KEDO because "the KEDO framework is the most realistic and effective way now to stop the North from developing nuclear weapons."

15 April 1999
Japan ruling Liberal Democratic Party agrees to support Tokyo's plan to provide $1 billion to KEDO.

23-28 April 1999
Representatives from the United States and North Korea meet in Geneva to finalize the terms of US access to a suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. The US and North Korean delegations, headed respectively by Charles Kartman, special envoy for Korean affairs, and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan, meet before the scheduled four-party peace talks, but after failing to reach an agreement, the two sides continue to meet on the sidelines for the duration of the talks. On 28 April, a source close to the talks reports that the two sides agree that a US delegation, comprising approximately 15 experts from the Departments of Defense, State and Energy, will visit the Kumch'ang-ri facility from 15 to 20 May. However, the source notes, "the period can be readjusted according to the circumstances, as the visit needs at least five to seven days."

24-25 April 1999
The US, South Korea, and Japan meet in Hawaii to coordinate their policies on North Korea. The three nations, taking note of the threat North Korea's nuclear and missile programs pose to regional security, agree to establish the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) to institutionalize the process of coordinating policies on North Korea.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
**24-28 April 1999**

Representatives from the United States, China, and the two Koreas meet in Geneva for the fifth round of peace talks aimed at replacing the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement with a formal peace treaty. The four parties fail to make any progress in the talks as North Korea reportedly continues to refuse to agree on any confidence-building measures as long as the issue of US troop withdrawal from South Korea is not on the agenda. Speaking to reporters after the talks, Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan, head of the North Korean delegation, says that North Korea will continue to insist on US troop withdrawal from South Korea, and if future talks do not address that issue, North Korea would have no interest in participating. Regardless, the four parties agree to meet again in August.


**Late April 1999**

South Korea's Defense Ministry submits a report to the National Assembly Defense Committee stating that "Team Spirit was never completely terminated," and the United States and South Korea could agree at any time to resume the joint military exercise. [Note: Team Spirit was suspended in 1994 as part of a deal to encourage North Korea to give up its graphite-moderated nuclear program and ease tension on the Korean Peninsula.]


**3 May 1999**

Japan signs a contract with KEDO to provide $1 billion to the light water reactor project. The loan, to be provided by the Export-Import Bank of Japan, must still be accepted by the Diet. [Note: The Diet approves the funding on 30 June.]


**4 May 1999**

South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, in a CNN interview, calls on the United States and North Korea to improve relations by reducing mutual threats and faithfully implementing the 1994 Agreed Framework.


**7 May 1999**

The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, warns the United States that any preemptive attack would trigger "a total war between the DPRK and the US." In such a case, the paper says, North Korea "will mercilessly strike and annihilate" the United States.


**13-14 May 1999**

Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, travels to Pyongyang to make final arrangements for the 15

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member team of US experts that is schedule to visit a suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri later in the month. Kartman’s visit is also reportedly to arrange a meeting between Kim Jong Il and William Perry, coordinator for US policy on North Korea, during his upcoming visit to North Korea. [Note: After his visit to North Korea, Kartman travels to Seoul to brief South Korean officials about his trip. During the briefing, Kartman reportedly says that he is satisfied with North Korea’s preparations for the upcoming visit of US inspectors to the Kumch’ang-ri facility.]


13-17 May 1999
South Korean Foreign Minister Hong Sun Yong meets with US officials in Washington to encourage the United States to support a comprehensive approach to North Korea based on South Korean President Kim Dae Jung’s “sunshine policy.” At a 17 March joint press conference with US Secretary of State Madeline Albright, Hong says that William Perry, in his upcoming trip to North Korea, will deliver a package of “attractions and incentives” to Pyongyang. Hong adds, “North Korea is well-advised to seize this opportunity.”


17 May 1999
US Secretary of State Madeline Albright announces that the United States will send an additional 400,000 tons of emergency food aid to North Korea, bringing the total food donations in 1999 to 600,000 tons. Albright, speaking at a joint press conference with South Korean Foreign Minister Hong Sun Yong, says the food aid is in response to an April request from the UN World Food Program and not related to nuclear talks with North Korea.


20-24 May 1999
A 14-member US team, comprising nuclear scientists and officials from the departments of state, defense, and energy, inspects a suspected nuclear facility in Kumch’ang-ri. The team, headed by Joel Wit, deputy director of the State Department’s office of Korean affairs, is allowed to measure the dimensions of all underground areas at the main complex, and videotape and photograph agreed above-ground facilities. They are also allowed to take soil and water samples to be analyzed for radioactive substances. Upon the completion of the inspection, State Department spokesman James Rubin announces that the team “received good cooperation from North Korean officials.” On 27 May, Rubin announces that “the team found an unfinished site, the underground portion of which was an extensive, empty tunnel complex...A careful technical analysis of the team’s work will now take place before further judgments can be made and reported." On 25 June, Rubin gives a more detailed account of the visit and concludes that the Kumch’ang-ri site does not violate the 1994 Agreed Framework. [Note: While the inspectors do not find any evidence of nuclear activity at the Kumch’ang-ri facility, US officials say that the facility could still be used to store nuclear equipment in the future, and that North Korea had plenty of time during the course of negotiations to remove any incriminating evidence.]

—"US Inspection Team Gets ‘Good Cooperation' from North Koreans," Agence France Presse, 24 May 1999, in

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
21 May 1999
The Korean Central News Agency says that, "The US decision to offer food to the DPRK is linked to the on-going discussions on outstanding issues between the two countries."

24 May 1999
William Perry, coordinator of US policy on North Korea, Im Dong Won, South Korea's Minister of Unification, and Ryozo Kato, Japanese director general for foreign policy, meet in Tokyo to fine-tune their respective policies on North Korea. The three also discuss Perry's upcoming trip to Pyongyang and the package deal he is to present to high-ranking North Korean officials. The three say in a joint statement that they hope Perry's meetings in Pyongyang "will produce useful insights as the review of a joint approach toward North Korea moves toward a conclusion."

25-28 May 1999
William Perry, coordinator of US policy on North Korea, meets with senior North Korean officials in Pyongyang to present a package deal aimed at halting North Korea's nuclear and missile programs as well as reducing tension on the Korean Peninsula. Perry reportedly urges Pyongyang to halt its nuclear and missile programs in exchange for an easing of economic sanctions, increased food aid, and normalization of diplomatic relations with Washington and Tokyo. On 26 May, Perry gives Kim Yong Nam, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly, a letter from President Bill Clinton to be passed on to North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. The letter reportedly contains a personal proposal to end the 50-year-old economic sanctions on North Korea in return for North Korea's halting its nuclear and missile programs. Perry also delivers messages to Kim Jong Il from Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and South Korean President Kim Dae Jung.

29 May 1999

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
William Perry, coordinator of US policy on North Korea, meets with South Korea’s Unification Minister Im Dong Won and Ryozo Kato, Japanese director general for foreign policy, in Seoul to discuss his recently concluded trip to North Korea during which he proposed a package deal to Pyongyang by which it would halt its nuclear and missile programs in exchange for an easing of economic sanctions, increases food aid, and diplomatic recognition from Washington and Tokyo. At a press conference later in the day, Perry says that he “clearly and firmly” expressed the combined concerns of the United States, South Korea and Japan over North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. However, Perry adds, “It will take some time for (North Korea) to further reflect upon the views I have expressed and for us to reflect on our visit.”


31 May 1999
North Korea threatens to pull out of the 1994 Agreed Framework. The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers’ Party, accuses the United States of trying to "backpedal on the Agreed Framework, crying for a new framework agreement." The newspaper adds that North Korea "can no longer pin hope on the Agreed Framework, even while sacrificing its self-reliant nuclear energy industry."


3 June 1999
Japan’s lower house of the Diet unanimously passes a bill allocating $1 billion for the KEDO light water reactor project. The bill is passed on to the upper house of the Diet.


7-8 June 1999
Senior US and South Korean officials meet in Hawaii to discuss recent developments in North Korea including the recent US inspection of a suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri.


7-11 June 1999
The IAEA Board of Governors meets in Vienna. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei tells the board that North Korea has made no progress in implementing its nuclear safeguards agreement since the last meeting in March. However, ElBaradei adds that two IAEA official remain in North Korea. On the final day of the meeting, the board of governors issues a report stating that while the safeguards agreement North Korea signed with the agency remains "binding and in force," the agency has been unable to "verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material" due to lack of cooperation from Pyongyang. The report adds that "there was still no progress in technical discussions with the DPRK regarding the preservation by the DPRK of information that the agency deems necessary for verification of the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration."

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
8-15 June 1999
North Korean vessels cross the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea on 8 Junr, apparently to fish in the crab-rich waters. South Korean Navy vessels respond by bumping the ships back across the line that separates the two countries. The tense standoff continues and comes to a head on 15 June, when the two nations, still technically at war, exchange heavy gun fire for ten minutes. The ten-minute naval clash, the largest since the 1953 Armistice Agreement, results in casualties on both sides and the sinking of a North Korean gunship. In response to the rising tension on the peninsula, the United States sends air and naval reinforcements to South Korea. [Note: North Korea does not recognize the Northern Limit Line because it was not part of the 1953 Armistice and was established unilaterally by the UN Command in Seoul following the war. On 29 June 2002, a South Korean naval vessel is sunk in a similar clash.]

9 June 1999
North Korea's Foreign Ministry announces that US inspectors found only empty tunnels at the Kumch'ang-ri site, thus proving that North Korea is faithfully implementing the 1994 Agreed Framework. However, in a veiled threat, the Foreign Ministry says that while the Kumch'ang-ri site is empty for the time being, what the tunnels will be used for in the future "depends entirely upon the attitude of the US side concerning the implementation of the DPRK-US agreement."

9 June 1999
William Perry, coordinator of US policy on North Korea, briefs Congress on his recent trip to Pyongyang during which he met with senior North Korean officials. Perry, who since December 1998 has been authoring a comprehensive review of the US policy toward North Korea, indicates that he will present his review to the president and Congress as early as July. [Note: Perry submits his report to Congress on 14 September.]

23-24 June 1999
Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, meets with North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan in Beijing to discuss the recent visit of US inspectors to a suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri, progress of the four-party peace talks, and other issues related to the 1994 Agreed Framework. The talks also address
recent reports that North Korea is preparing for another test-launch of a long-range ballistic missile.

25 June 1999
Japan and South Korea hold working-level talks in Sapporo to discuss implementation of the KEDO light water reactor project. The talks focus on the contract between KEDO and KEPCO, the primary contractor for the light water reactor project.

25-26 June 1999
The US, Japan, and South Korea hold a meeting of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) in Washington to coordinate their policies on North Korea amid rising tension on the Korean Peninsula following a naval clash on 15 June. The delegations are headed by Wendy Sherman, councilor for the US State Department, Ryozo Kato, director-general of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, and Chang Chae Ryong, deputy minister of foreign affairs and trade.

25 June 1999
US State Department spokesman James Rubin announces the US inspection team witnessed no effort by North Korea to conceal the site at Kumch'ang-ri during the May 1999 visit. He says that the site was incomplete and that there was no equipment present during the inspectors' visit. Furthermore, additional work remained to be completed, as almost all of the tunnels were still bare rock. Rubin dismisses allegations that nuclear equipment could have been removed prior to the inspectors' arrival. Rather, he says that Kumch'ang-ri was at a stage of construction at which no other equipment other than construction equipment would be expected to be present. Rubin concludes that the site does not contain a plutonium-production reactor or reprocessing plant, either completed or under construction. Given the size and configuration of Kumch'ang-ri and the type of graphitemoderated reactor North Korea previously built in Yongbyon-kun, the site is not suitable for a reprocessing plant.
"Nevertheless," Rubin adds, "Since the site is a large underground area, it could support a facility in the future with substantial modifications." At present, however, Kumch'ang-ri does not violate the Agreed Framework.

30 June 1999
Japan's upper house of the Diet approves $1 billion for the KEDO light water reactor project, thus clearing the way for Tokyo to send the much needed funds to KEDO. Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura says that Japan hopes "North Korea will take it [the Diet approval] positively." However, Komura warns that Japan would find it difficult to send the funds if North Korea test launches another long-range missile. [Note: On 3 June, the lower house of the Diet unanimously approved the funds.]

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1 July 1999
A senior US government official says that even if North Korea test-fires another long-range missile, the United States, Japan, and South Korea should adhere to their commitments under the 1994 Agreed Framework. In the case of such a missile launch, the official says, the United States, Japan, and South Korea should "coordinate a response that will seek to, as much as possible, preserve our national security interests and not lead to the rupture of the Agreed Framework."

2 July 1999
South Korea signs a contract with KEDO to provide $3.2 billion for the light water reactor project. The contract is signed by Chang Son Sop, South Korea’s representative to KEDO, and KEDO Executive Director Desaix Anderson. According to an official from South Korea’s Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project, South Korea will provide the funds in won, at a fixed rate of 1,100 won per dollar. [Note: The contract is unanimously approved by the National Assembly on 12 September.]

4 July 1999
Kyodo News Service, quoting a senior Japanese Foreign Ministry source, reports that Tokyo has not ruled out freezing financial contributions to the KEDO light water reactor project if North Korea test-fires another long-range missile.

6 July 1999
South Korean Ambassador to Japan Kim Sok Kyu urges Tokyo not to freeze contributions to the KEDO light water reactor project even if North Korea test-fires another long-range ballistic missile. Addressing the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s Research Committee on Foreign Affairs, Kim says that freezing KEDO funds "is not the best policy from a diplomatic point of view."

6 July 1999
Japanese Ambassador to the United States Kunihiko Saito announces that Washington understands Tokyo’s position that it would be difficult to continue funding the KEDO light water reactor project should Pyongyang conduct another long-range missile test.

6 July 1999
KEDO's Executive Board meets in New York to resolve issues related to signing loan agreements between member

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states and KEDO.

13 July 1999
Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka announces that "should North Korea fire another Taepodong missile, it would be extremely difficult [for Japan] to contribute to KEDO, as gaining public understanding on funding would be hard."

13-14 July 1999
Senior officials from the United States, Japan, and South Korea meet in Tokyo to coordinate policies on North Korea. During the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting, the three nations agree to work together to deter North Korea from testing another long-range ballistic missile. According to an official from the Japanese Foreign Ministry, the three nations will face similar domestic problems in funding KEDO if North Korea shows signs of preparing for a missile launch.

14 July 1999
Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi warns that "if North Korea fires [another Taepodong missile], it will be difficult to gain public understanding for our cooperation with KEDO." Addressing the lower house of the Diet, Obuchi adds, "In practical terms, that would make it very difficult for the government to contribute to KEDO."

Mid-July 1999
South Korea establishes sound detection stations in Kang‘won Province that are capable of detecting a nuclear test explosion in North Korea. The stations, located near the demilitarized zone and consisting of four ultra-low frequency reception facilities, are set one kilometer apart and are capable of detecting explosions up to 1,000km away.

20 July 1999
LG-Caltex Oil Corp delivers 32,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea. This is the sixth oil delivery to North Korea since Pyongyang agreed to freeze its graphite moderated nuclear program in exchange for two light water reactors and 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil per year to meet its interim energy needs.

21 July 1999
Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura meets with Desaix Anderson, executive director of KEDO, and reiterates Tokyo’s position that it would find it difficult to continue funding KEDO if North Korea tests another long-range missile.

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21 July 1999

The US House of Representatives passes an amendment to the Fiscal Year 2000 International Relations Authorization Act that predicates US nuclear cooperation with North Korea on the latter’s compliance with the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and the 1994 Agreed Framework. The amendment, named the North Korea Nuclear Threat Act of 1999, passes by a 305-120 vote in the House of Representatives. The bill is based on a similar amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999, but unlike the 1999 appropriations bill, the North Korea Threat Reduction Act requires congressional approval of the President’s certification that North Korea is complying with the requirements. In addition, it carries no provision for waiving the preconditions for nuclear cooperation should they not be met. [Note: Congressmen Benjamin Gilman originally proposed the North Korea Threat Reduction Act on 19 May.]


26 July 1999

US Secretary of State Madeline Albright, South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Hong Sun Yong, and Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura meet on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The three foreign ministers issue a joint statement warning Pyongyang that if it launches another long-range missile, "it would adversely affect peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and beyond, and would have serious negative consequences" for North Korea. While the three foreign ministers do not specify what consequences would follow a missile launch, Komura reiterated Tokyo's threat to freeze contributions to KEDO if Pyongyang tests another missile.


26 July 1999

A North Korea Foreign Ministry spokesman says that North Korea has "sincerely fulfilled" its obligations under the 1994 the US-North Korea Agreed Framework. "The US, however," the spokesman says, "has neglected the implementation the DPRK-US Agreed Framework." The spokesman warns that "if the United States wishes to abrogate the Agreed Framework on the pretext of the DPRK's satellite launch, which has nothing to do with the framework, we will be compelled to take a relevant measure."


2 August 1999

The US State Department says that the United States will abide by its commitments under the 1994 Agreed Framework even if North Korea conducts another long-range missile test. State Department spokesman James Rubin says, "The Agreed Framework is a very important instrument that benefits the security of the United States...and we would intend and want to see that program and agreement continued, even if we have problems

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and serious concerns about the missiles."

3 August 1999
New Zealand pledges an additional $795,000 to KEDO. Foreign Minister Don McKinnon announces the pledge, saying, "KEDO is a major plank in moves to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and can also play an important role in improving relations between North and South Korea."

5 August 1999
South Korean Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Hong Sun Yong tells the National Assembly's Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee that Seoul intends to continue supporting the KEDO light water reactor project even if North Korea tests another long-range missile.

5-9 August 1999
Representatives from the United States, China, and the two Koreas meet in Geneva for the sixth round of fourparty peace talks aimed at replacing the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement with a formal peace treaty. The talks once again fail to make significant progress reportedly due to North Korea's continuing insistence that the talks address US troop withdrawal from South Korea. Despite the lack of noticeable progress, the four nations, in a joint statement, describe the talks as "useful and productive."

6 August 1999
The Washington Times reports that North Korea is providing military assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in exchange for uranium ore from the Congo's Shinkolabwe uranium mine. According to the paper, Pentagon intelligence agents have witnessed hundreds of North Korean military advisors training the forces of Congolese President Laurent Kabila. [In September, the South Korean Ministry of Defense submits a report to the National Assembly stating that 147 North Korean military officers are in the Democratic Republic of Congo.]

12 August 1999
The South Korean National Assembly unanimously approves a loan of $3.2 billion [to be paid in won] to fund the KEDO light water reactor project. The loans, to be provided through the Inter-Korea Cooperative Fund, will cover 70 percent of the estimated $4.6 billion project.

16 August 1999

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The South Korean Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project announces that preliminary site preparation in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o will be extended until 15 December. An official from the office says that delays in negotiations among the nations responsible for financing the KEDO project have in turn delayed the conclusion of a contact between KEDO and KEPCO, the primary contractor for the project.


16-28 August 1999
The US and South Korea hold the joint military exercise "Ulchi Focus Lens." Pyongyang condemns the exercise as a rehearsal for an invasion of North Korea, and threatens to take "corresponding measures" if the United States and South Korea insist on creating tension on the peninsula.


18 August 1999
South Korean President Kim Dae Jung tells visiting Japanese official Taku Yamasaki that the 1994 Agreed Framework and KEDO are vital to ensuring that North Korea does not develop nuclear weapons. Kim also urges Japan not to follow through with its threat to freeze funding for the KEDO light water reactor project if North Korea tests another long-range missile.


23 August 1999
The Los Angeles Times quotes a US official as saying that "it is highly probable" that North Koran technicians are working in Pakistani nuclear labs in a continuing deal between the two countries in which nuclear technology is exchanged for missile technology and components.


24 August 1999
Pyongyang claims that the United States is purposefully delaying the construction of two light water reactors in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o, and threatens to restart its graphite-moderated nuclear program if the United States continues such delays. A Rodong Sinmun commentary states that "the light water reactor construction is not a matter that the United States has a choice of living up to or not. It is an inescapable duty of the United States that accompanies the DPRK-US Framework Agreement." The paper adds that "forcibly connecting our peaceful launch of an artificial satellite with the light water reactor construction is no different from refusing to continue the light water reactor construction." If the United States continues to delay the construction of the light water reactors as it does now and does not actively take steps to build the light water reactors as scheduled," the commentary warns, "we will have to take corresponding steps." Later the same day, US State Department spokesman James Foley refutes the claim, saying, "The United States is meeting all of its obligations under the Agreed Framework and remains committed to the light water reactor project." Foley adds, "The burden-sharing agreement reached last August among KEDO members does not contain any commitment by the United States to contribute to the

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conductive to improve bilateral relations and to peace and security in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region."

12 September 1999
US President Bill Clinton, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, and Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi issue a joint statement saying that the three nations are prepared "to undertake measures to improve their respective relations" with North Korea. The three leaders issue the statement before the opening of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Auckland, New Zealand.

14 September 1999
William Perry, coordinator of US policy on North Korea, presents his report on North Korea to the Congress in which he advises Washington to take steps to normalize relations with North Korea and ease economic sanctions, while urging Pyongyang to allay international concerns about its nuclear and missile programs. In the secret report, Perry states that it is necessary for the United States to obtain a reliable guarantee from North Korea that it will suspend its nuclear and missile programs. The report also says that should North Korea abandon the 1994 Agreed Framework, it would be able to produce a "significant number" of nuclear weapons each year. Perry also issues the threat that Pyongyang "needs to understand that there are certain forms of provocative behavior that represent a direct threat to the United States and its allies and that we will respond appropriately." Both South Korea and Japan voice their support of the Perry Report. [Note: Perry's report is the culmination of a 10-month effort beginning in December 1999 and including multiple consultations with Seoul, Tokyo, and Pyongyang. The quotes are taken from the unclassified version of the report released on 12 October.]

15 September 1999
North Korea accuses the United States of deploying more than 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons and a large number of depleted uranium bombs in South Korea. The accusation comes from a White Paper on US strategic weapons issued by North Korea's National Reunification Institute.

17 September 1999
US President Bill Clinton announces an easing of some US sanctions on North Korea, allowing most consumer goods to be available for exports and permitting the imports to the United States of North Korean commodities.

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Restrictions on the transfer of dual-use, civilian-military technology and military exports will remain in force. [Note: On 19 June 2000, the Bureau of Export Administration implements President Clinton’s statement and amends the Export Administration Regulations.]

19 September 1999
A South Korean official announces that "the cleaning of debris and remnants in the water tank of the spent fuel rods in the No. 2 reactor [the 5MW(e) reactor] in Yongbyon-kun, has been completed, which indicates that the work of sealing the spent-fuel rods has virtually been completed."

19 September 1999
A Rodong Sinmun commentary claims that the US talk about countering a nuclear attack by North Korea is merely intended as a pretext for a pre-emptive US nuclear strike.

20 September 1999
The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a summary statement of Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei reconfirming the validity of the nuclear safeguards agreement North Korea signed with the agency in 1992. ElBaradei reports no change since the last board of governors meeting in June of Pyongyang's progress in implementing the safeguards agreement. The board of governors urges North Korea to implement the safeguards agreement as soon as possible.

24 September 1999
Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi tells William Perry, coordinator of US policy on North Korea, that Japan "wholeheartedly supports the contents of the Perry Report." [Note: Perry’s report, submitted to the US Congress on 14 September, calls for normalizing ties with North Korea in exchange for a pledge from Pyongyang to halt its nuclear and missile programs.]

25 September 1999
Approximately 30 delegates from the United States, Japan, South Korea, and KEPCO meet with North Korean officials in Pyongyang to discuss pending issues concerning the KEDO light water reactor project.

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27 September 1999
At the opening session of the IAEA General Assembly, Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei says, "the agency remains unable to verify that all nuclear material subject to safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been declared to the agency." ElBaradei adds that 12 rounds of IAEA-North Korean talks have shown "no progress on important issues." Without necessary information, ElBaradei says, "it will be difficult, if not impossible, to verify in the future compliance by the DPRK with its safeguards agreement."

29 September-1 October 1999
Representatives from KEDO and KEPCO, the main contractor for the KEDO light water reactor project, meet with North Korean officials to discuss technical issues related to beginning construction of the reactors. During the meeting, KEDO and North Korea sign a memorandum of understanding on environmental protection and indemnification.

30 September 1999
Mexico's donation of $100,000 worth of heavy fuel oil to KEDO arrives in Japan en route to North Korea.

October 1999
The US Congress approves $35 million for heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea. However, President Clinton's proposed budget for fiscal year 2000 called for $55 million to be spent on the oil shipments.

1 October 1999
The IAEA adopts a resolution at its 43rd regular session of its General Assembly calling on North Korea to comply with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The IAEA urges North Korea to cooperate fully in the implementation of its safeguards commitments, and to enable the IAEA to verify North Korea's initial report on its nuclear materials subject to safeguards.

4 October 1999
CNN, citing unnamed Pentagon sources, reports that during 1994, the US planned a pre-emptive air strike against North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Complex. President Bill Clinton was reportedly briefed on the option on 15 June 1994, but before he could order the air strike, former President Jimmy Carter telephoned from Pyongyang with news that North Korea was prepared to accept a deal to curtail its graphite-moderated nuclear program.

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South African researcher quoted in the report, says that while the presence of the North Koreans in Congo has been known for a while, "it is not clear whether they are providing personal security for President Kabila, training his fighters, or working at the uranium mine."


12 October 1999
Washington releases an unclassified version of William Perry's policy recommendations for dealing with North Korea. In the report, the culmination of 10 months of research and consultations, Perry recommends that Washington take steps to normalize relations with North Korea in exchange for a reliable pledge from Pyongyang to halt its nuclear weapons and missile programs.


13 October 1999
The US General Accounting Office (GAO) issues a report claiming that heavy fuel oil sent to North Korea to meet its energy needs until the completion of two light water reactors has been diverted. The GAO report says, "State Department officials have acknowledged that there is some evidence that perhaps 5 percent of the heavy fuel oil has been used for unauthorized purposes." While the State Department and KEDO have monitoring equipment installed at seven approved heating and electrical generating plants in North Korea, frequent power outages severely limit the effectiveness of the monitoring equipment. [Note: GAO presented the report to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on 30 September.]


13 October 1999
Benjamin Gilman, chairman of the US House of Representatives International Relations Committee, says that North Korea may be pursuing a nuclear weapons program based on highly enriched uranium despite the 1994 Agreed Framework. Speaking at a committee hearing attended by US Policy Coordinator for North Korea William Perry, Gilman says, "My greatest fear is that this unpredictable regime in Pyongyang will combine its covert nuclear weapons program with an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking the United States-and our policy will have failed to prevent it."


14 October 1999
Chang Son Sop, director of South Korea's Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project, says that while KEDO-KEPCO negotiations are in the final stages, there is only a fifty percent chance that the contract will be completed in time to begin construction on the two light water reactors by the end of the year.

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18 October 1999
North Korea condemns the upcoming "Foal Eagle" US-South Korean joint military exercise to be held from 26 October to 5 November. North Korea says, "The projected US war maneuvers are a clear indication that it is unwilling to implement the DPRK-US Agreed Framework and ease tension on the Korean Peninsula." The North also warns that "the United States must be wholly responsible for the adverse impact the war maneuvers will have on the situation on the Korean Peninsula and DPRK-US relations."

20 October 1999
The North Korean Foreign Ministry calls on the United States to take steps to implement the 1994 Agreed Framework as soon as possible. A spokesman for the ministry criticizes Washington for having taken an "insincere" approach to the agreement and only paying "lip service" to its promises to construct two light water reactors and provide 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil per year until the completion of the reactors.

23 October 1999
South Korea's KBS Radio reports that Russian authorities are currently detaining several trains at Khasan Station because of detected amounts of radiations. The detained trains regularly traveled from Russia to Najin-Sonbong [Nason], North Korea.

1-2 November 1999
KEDO and South Korea's Export-Import Bank hold working level talks in Seoul to finalize the loan agreement for South Korea's $3.2 billion [to be paid in South Korean won] contribution to the light water reactor project.

2 November 1999
Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono announces that Japan will resume charter flights to North Korea as the first step in easing sanctions on North Korea in exchange for addressing international concerns about its nuclear and missile programs.

3 November 1999
A group of senior Congressional Republicans presents a report labeling the 1994 Agreed Framework a failure. The report, written by the nine-member North Korea Advisory Group, claims that "there is significant evidence that undetected nuclear weapons development activity continues, including efforts to acquire uranium enrichment technologies and recent nuclear-related high explosive tests." Representative Ben Gilman, speaking at a press conference to unveil the report, says, "The comprehensive threat that's been posed by North Korea to our national security has not been reduced".

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security has increased since 1994." Gilman adds, "North Korea has not terminated or frozen its nuclear weapons program [and its] intercontinental ballistic missile program now poses a direct threat to the United States and the American people." [Note: The report, written at the request of House Speaker Dennis Hastert, contrasts sharply with William Perry's report which calls for a normalization of relations with North Korea. Congressional Democrats criticized Hastert for appointing only Republicans already critical of President Clinton's North Korean policy to write the report.]


5 November 1999
An official from South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs questions the credibility of a report submitted by US Congressional Republicans on 3 November claiming that North Korea is actively pursuing nuclear weapons despite the 1994 Agreed Framework. The official claims that "the evidence Republicans presented is just a compilation of various suspicions which have already been raised by news media in the United States."


6 November 1999
The US completes its yearly commitment to provide 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea to meet its energy need until the completion of the first of two light water reactors being constructed KEDO.


8-9 November 1999
The Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), comprising the United States, South Korea, and Japan, meets in Washington. The three delegations discuss coordinating policies on North Korea and implementing the comprehensive approach to North Korea recommended in the Perry Report. On 9 November, the three nations issue a joint statement in which they reaffirm their commitment to the Agreed Framework.


15 November 1999
The UN General Assembly adopts a resolution expressing deep concern over North Korea's failure to fully implement its nuclear safeguards agreement it signed with the IAEA in 1992. The resolution, adopted by a vote of 122 to 1, calls on North Korea to take all measures the IAEA deems necessary to verify the completeness and correctness of its initial declaration of nuclear material.


15-19 November 1999
Representatives from North Korea and the United States meet in Berlin to discuss various bilateral issues.
According to South Korean officials, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan calls for the lifting of all US economic sanctions against North Korea and criticizes the delayed implementation of the partial lifting of US sanctions promised at the September meeting. The talks also addressed the itinerary, agenda, and various details of the proposed visit of a high-level North Korean official to the United States. The two sides adjourn the meeting on 19 November without making arrangements for a higher-level meeting or setting a date for further working-level consultations. [Note: According to a source close to the talks quoted by the Japanese Economic Newswire, the North Korean delegation criticizes the Perry Report, claiming that if North Korea gives up its missile and nuclear weapons program in exchange for only normalized relations, North Korea would be left in a "weak position." The source says that the North Korean delegation demanded that Washington show a willingness to negotiate US troop withdrawal from South Korea.]


16 November 1999
A South Korean government official says that North Korea is in the final stage of sealing over 8,000 spent-fuel rods from its 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yongbyon-kun.

16 November 1999
Japan's Jiji Press reports that Pak Ok Kyong, former deputy chief of North Korea's Atomic Research Institute, recently defected to the United States. According to Jiji Press, Pak disappeared from Beijing in April while serving as a representative of the international intelligence investigation department of the Korean Workers' Party office. He subsequently requested political asylum in the United States while hiding in Ulan Bator, Mongolia. Pak reportedly has top secret knowledge about North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program.

18 November 1999
Dr. Shin Song T'aek, a researcher with the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, claims that since 1994 North Korea has stockpiled 40kg of plutonium. While this amount of plutonium is enough for 10 small nuclear weapons, Shin claims that Pyongyang will not develop several nuclear weapons due to its "one nuclear warhead strategy." Shin presents his conclusions, which are based on data from the CIA and a South Korean-US nuclear inspection team, at the Korea-Russia Defense Forum held in Seoul.

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21-22 November 1999
KEDO’s Executive Board meets in New York to narrow differences between board members on a turn-key contract to be signed with KEPCO, the primary contractor of the light water reactor project. The board agrees to wrap up the turn-key contract before 15 December, the date site preparation work in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp’o is schedule to be completed.

22 November 1999
The Washington Times reports that U.S. intelligence agencies are concerned that the Democratic Republic of the Congo might be providing North Korea with uranium ore in exchange for training assistance provided to Congolese forces. North Korea could use the ore for a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

24 November 1999
The EU and North Korea hold working-level talks in Brussels to address various issues including nuclear

29 November 1999
The US Senate passes into law the North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999 requiring the President to certify that Pyongyang is adhering to its commitments under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and the Agreed Framework before any funds may be given to KEDO. However, the Senate removes the precondition in the House version of the bill requiring congressional approval following presidential certification that North Korea is complying with the necessary requirements.

December 1999
Condoleezza Rice, policy advisor to US presidential candidate George W. Bush, suggests that should Bush become president, the United States would take a more hard-line approach towards North Korea. In the January-February 2000 addition of Foreign Affairs, Rice says, "The United States must approach regimes like North Korea resolutely and decisively." Rice criticizes the Clinton administration for "sometimes threatening to use force and then backing down." What the United States must do, according to Rice, is clearly convey the message to Pyongyang that any attempt to use weapons of mass destruction would result in the destruction of North Korea.

10 December 1999

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North Korea denounces "conservative hard-liners of the United States" for issuing a report calling for a more confrontational approach to North Korea. The Korean Central News Agency claims that Pyongyang "will be compelled to change [its] stand if a policy, which is intended to disarm and lead the DPRK to change and 'collapse' is adopted in the US." North Korea adds, "If the US takes the road of military confrontation, we cannot but take all self-defensive measure corresponding to this." [Note: The report to which North Korea is referring, written by a group of senior Congressional Republicans, labels the 1994 Agreed Framework a failure. The report, written by the nine-member North Korea Advisory Group and presented to Congress on 3 November, claims that "there is significant evidence that undetected nuclear weapons development activity continues, including efforts to acquire uranium enrichment technologies and recent nuclear-related high explosive tests."]


11 December 1999
Kyodo News Service reports that three Japanese firms, Mitsubishi Industries Ltd, Toshiba Corp, and Hitachi Ltd, will participate in the KEDO light water reactor project as subcontractors. According to a Japanese official quoted by Kyodo, the three firms will sign working agreements with KEPCO by the end of the month.

13 December 1999
KEDO’s Executive Board meets in Tokyo and adopts a resolution allowing KEDO Executive Director Desaix Anderson to conclude a turnkey contract with KEPCO, the main contractor for the light water reactor project, on 15 December.

Mid-December 1999
Representatives from the IAEA and North Korea meet in Vienna for the 13th round of talks addressing North Korea’s failure to fully implement its nuclear safeguards agreement.

15 December 1999
KEDO and KEPCO sign a $4.6 billion dollar turnkey contract in Seoul, allowing KEPCO to begin construction on the two light water reactors in Shinp’o. The contract, signed by KEDO Executive Director Desaix Anderson and KEPCO President Ch’oe Su Pyong, supercedes the preliminary works contract signed by KEDO and KEPCO in August 1997. [Note: While the turnkey contract is signed on 15 December, it does not become effective until 3 February 2000 when KEDO signs a contract with Japan’s Bank of International Cooperation for $1 billion in funding for the project.]

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15 December 1999
Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono calls on North Korea "to fully cooperate with the IAEA and related nations to fulfill its obligations." Kono says that while Japan welcomes the signing of a turnkey contract between KEDO and KEPCO, North Korea must "clear up past suspicions over nuclear weapons developments" before KEDO will supply the reactors.

15 December 1999
An official from South Korea's Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project announces that KEDO will not provide financial assistance to North Korea for the construction of a new electricity transmission and distribution system, which is necessary for the successful operation of the two KEDO light water reactors.

23 December 1999
North Korea calls on KEDO to pay compensation for losses incurred due to delays in constructing two light water reactors. A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry says, "If the reactors are not built as promised, losses stemming from freezing our own nuclear programs and the significant impact the delay has on our economy must be carefully calculated and accounted for. Other measures must also be taken to compensate us for these losses."

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