

North Korea Nuclear Chronology

Last update: February 2011

This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

2010

1 January 2010

North Korea used outlets throughout the state media to call for ending the hostilities with the U.S. and to make the Korean Peninsula "nuclear-free through dialogue and negotiations." Coordinated efforts through KCNA, KCBC, *Rodong Sinmun*, *Joseoninmingun* and *Chongnyonjonwi*, expressed a desire for peace, however also lauded, "the successful launch of man-made satellite Kwangmyongsong-2 and the successful second underground nuclear test." There is no mention of a potential start date for the resumption of talks.

—"Full text of North Korea's 2010 New Year joint editorial," BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2 January 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korean new year editorial notes successful nuclear test", BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 1 January 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korean calls for end to hostility with US - state agency", BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 1 January 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korean editorial plays up dialogue in seeking denuclearization — Yonhap," BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 1 January 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

11 January 2010

North Korea's Foreign Ministry called for bilateral talks with the United States, focusing on an eventual peace treaty, according to state media KCNA. The following day, North Korean Ambassador to China Choe Jin Su reiterated, "To bring about trust between the DPRK and the United States, it is necessary to sign a peace accord first so as to remove the root cause of hostile relations and the state of war." Japanese media took the offer as "just North Korea's way of scheming to "delay" progress on the nuclear issue by first pushing for a peace treaty." The U.S. largely dismissed the statements.

—"North Korean Foreign Ministry Proposes Early Start of Talks on Peace Treaty", KCNA, 11 January 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korean Envoy to China Expresses Hope for Peace Accord with US", Xinhua, 12 January 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korea Aiming To Change Nature of Six-Party

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Talks - DPRK Proposal To Make Discussion on Peace Treaty an Agenda Item Intended to Delay Denuclearization", *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 12 January 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

18 January 2010

North Korea stated that it will not return to the Six Party Talks until UN-imposed sanctions are removed. South Korea dismissed the demand responding, "neither the forum nor its participants have the authority to lift the punishment."

—"South Korea rejects North's demand for removal of sanctions", *Yonhap*, 18 January 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korea demands removal of sanctions before six-party talks," *Yonhap*, 18 January 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

6-9 February 2010

Wang Jiarui, head of the International Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, led a delegation to North Korea in an attempt to restart the Six-Party Talks. Wang met with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, where he delivered a letter from President Hu Jintao. According to Chinese state media, Kim assured Wang that Pyongyang is committed to a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. In a further sign of thawing relations, North Korean senior envoy to the Six-Party Talks, Kim Kye-gwan, returned to Beijing with Wang on the 9th for additional meetings.

—Kwang-tae Kim "Chinese envoy arrives in North Korea," *The Associated Press*, 6 February 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "Senior Envoy Leads Delegation To DPRK", *China Daily*, 8 February 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; Hyung-Jin Kim, "Report: NKorea's Kim reiterates disarmament pledge", *Associated Press*, 9 February 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

10 February 2010

Former Vice Minister Wu Dawei was appointed Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs, including representing China in the Six Party Talks. Wu had been expected to retire from his Vice Ministry position. He has represented China at the Six-Party Talks since 2005.

—"China Appoints Wu Dawei as Envoy on Korean Peninsula Affairs", *Xinhua*, 10 February 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

9-13 February 2010

North Korean envoy Kim Kye-gwan met with China's newly re-appointed chief nuclear negotiator Wu Dawei on the subject of resuming the Six-Party Talks.

—"N.K. Nuclear Negotiator Heads for Home from Beijing", *Yonhap*, 14 February 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea's Nuke Envoy Kim Leaves Beijing for Pyongyang", *Japan Economic Newswire*, 13 February 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

9-12 February 2010

U.N. political chief B. Lynn Pascoe met with North Korean officials including North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Ui-chun. It was the first high-level visit of a UN official since 2004. Pascoe delivered a gift and message from UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon; the content was not revealed. Pascoe said the North Koreans were, "certainly not

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eager, not ruling out, but not eager to return to six-party talks," upon his arrival in Beijing.

—Hyung-jin Kim, "UN Envoy in North Korea to Spur Nuke Talks", Associated Press, 10 February 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; Donald Kirk, "North Korea Edges Toward New Nuclear Talks", *The Christian Science Monitor*, 12 February 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "UN Envoy Says N.Korea 'Not Eager' to Restart Nuclear Talks", Agence France Presse, 12 February 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

23-27 February 2010

On the 23rd, North Korean Communist Party official Kim Yong-il met with his Chinese counterpart Wang Jiarui and President Hu Jintao in Beijing, delivering a message from North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. The same day, Wi Sung-lac, South Korea's delegate to the Six-Party Talks, also arrived in Beijing to meet with his Chinese counterpart Wu Dawei to discuss China's plan for returning to the Six-Party Talks. American envoys Stephen Bosworth and Sung Kim arrived in the city and met with Wu Dawei the following day. Stephen Bosworth continued to Seoul where he met with Wi Sung-lac, as well as South Korea's National Security Advisor and the Minister of Unification. Special Envoy Bosworth then traveled to Tokyo where he met Japan's Foreign Minister and the Japanese delegate to the Six-Party Talks. Meanwhile also on the 26th, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Sung Kim met with South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan in Washington. This group of meetings were held to discuss ways to restart the Six-Party Talks.

—"Seoul's Top Nuclear Negotiator Heads to China", Yonhap, 23 February 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "Envoys in China for North Korea nuclear talks", Agence France Presse, 24 February 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "Remarks to Press upon Departure from Seoul", States News Service, 26 February 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "Okada, U.S. envoy agree to closely cooperate to resume 6-party talks", Japan Economic Newswire, 26 February 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. sees signs of progress for reopening of 6-way talks: Clinton" Yonhap, 27 February 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

9 March 2010

In response to annual U.S.-ROK Key Resolve/Foal Eagle military exercises, North Korean state media quoted a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry as saying "the DPRK is fully ready for dialogue and war. It will continue bolstering up its nuclear deterrent as long as the U.S. military threats and provocations go on."

—"Foreign Ministry Says DPRK Ready for Dialogue and War", KCNA, 9 March 2010, www.kcna.co.jp; "DPRK says fully ready for dialogue or war regarding U.S.-S Korea military drill: FM", Chinese Ministry of Defense, 9 March 2010, <http://eng.mod.gov.cn>; "N.Korea says ready for dialogue and war with US", Yahoo News, 9 March 2010, <http://news.yahoo.com>, 18 March 2010.

9 March 2010

South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met in Beijing; they discussed the North Korean nuclear issue, the Six-Party Talks, and agreed to step up efforts to restart the stalled Six-Party Talks.

—"China, South Korea Urge Early Resumption of North Nuclear Talks", Yonhap, 18 March 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "Yang Jiechi Holds Talks with Yu Myung-hwan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China; 18 March 2010, www.fmprc.gov.cn.

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21-22 March 2010

In February 2010, when China's Special Representative for Korean Affairs Wu Dawei met with U.S. and ROK, China detailed a three-step proposal on the resumption of the Six-party Talks. The three-step plan included a resumption of bilateral talks between North Korea and the U.S., followed by a preparatory meeting of six parties, and ending with the formal resumption of the Six-Party Talks. On the March 21, the U.S. accepted the plan to hold a preparatory meeting of the delegations, opening the way for bilateral talks between the U.S. and North Korea. Washington also indicated that it was possible to discuss rolling back sanctions and requirements for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. By March 22 all parties except North Korea had agreed to hold a preparatory meeting.

—"China Makes 3-Step Proposal on the Resumption of N. Korea Nuke Talks", Kyodo, 1 March 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "US Accepts Beijing Plan on Meeting of Six-party Talks Participants", ITAR-TASS, 21 March 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "Six-party Countries Except DPRK Agree to Holding Preliminary Talks: Media", Xinhua, 22 March 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

26 March 2010

North Korea announced that, "Those who seek to bring down the system in the DPRK, will fall victim to the unprecedented nuclear strikes of the invincible army." The statement referred to a 19 March news report in South Korea's Dong-a Ilbo that the U.S. Pacific Command and think-tanks in South Korea and China will meet in April to discuss possible contingency plans for weapons of mass destruction in case of regime collapse in North Korea.

—"US-S. Korean Moves to Bring down System in DPRK Warned", KCNA, 26 March 2010, www.kcna.co.jp; Kwang-Tae Kim, "NKorea Threatens 'Nuclear Strikes' on SKorea, US", Associated Press, 26 March 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korea vows nuclear attacks to defend its regime", Agence France Presse, 26 March 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

29 March 2010

State-run North Korean news agency KCNA announced that "the DPRK will witness the appearance of a light water reactor power plant relying on its own nuclear fuel in the near future in the 2010s." The remark was made in a lengthily article renouncing reports that the North Korean economy is weak or that the regime is in danger.

—"KCNA on Despicable Inside Story about Megaphone War", KCNA, 29 March 2010, www.kcna.co.jp; "N.Korea to Build Light Water Reactor Soon: State Media", Agence France Presse, 29 March 2010, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

9 April 2010

North Korea's Foreign Ministry called the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, "nothing different from the hostile policy pursued by the Bush administration." In the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, the United States renounced the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, but left its options open in the case of North Korea. North Korea claims it needs a nuclear deterrent against the United States and promised to "increase and update" its nuclear weapons.

—"Foreign Ministry Dismisses US Nuclear Plan", KCNA, 9 April 2010, www.kcna.co.jp.

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14 April 2010

Pyongyang renewed its calls for a peace treaty before returning to the Six-Party Talks. State-run *Rodong Sinmun* stated that the government called for an end to "the vicious cycle of distrust between the DPRK and the U.S." before the "denuclearization process to be pushed forward through confidence-building" could begin. Washington argued that a peace treaty should be put on hold until after North Korea has begun disarming.

—"North Korea Renews Call for Peace Treaty with the U.S. before Denuclearizing", Yonhap, 14 April, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexisnexis.com.

21 April 2010

North Korea released a memorandum stating that it would limit the number of nuclear weapons it produced rejoin the denuclearization efforts in exchange for being recognized as a nuclear arms state. The U.S. refused its demands.

—"Foreign Ministry Issues Memorandum on N-Issue", KCNA, 21 April 2010, www.kcna.co.jp; "N. Korea Vows to Limit Nuke Production in Return for Recognition as Nuclear State", Yonhap, 22 April 2010, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexisnexis.com.

5-6 May 2010

Kim Jong-Il met with President Hu Jintao of China, in part, to discuss the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Kim said that the DPRK was willing "to provide favorable conditions for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks," according to state-run KCNA. No timetable or demands for the return to the Talks were made public. There was also no public discussion of the sinking of *Cheonan*, an ROK navy vessel, which has been an impediment to the resumption of the Talks.

—"Kim Vows to Work on Return to N. Korea Nuclear Talks: Xinhua", Agence France Presse, 7 May 2010, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexisnexis.com; "Kim Jong Il Makes Unofficial Visit to China", KCNA, 8 May 2010, www.kcna.co.jp.

14 May 2010

Unusually high levels of xenon gas were detected along the North-South Korean border. The gas could be due to a nuclear test, leakage from a nuclear plant, or rare industrial processes. According to an anonymous science and education ministry official, "the amount of xenon detected in the air at the Geojin monitoring site in Goseong county on May 14 was eight times more than normal." There was no sign of a tremor, which normally accompanies a nuclear test. There is no public evidence of the origin of the gas. Wind patterns were blowing north to south, indicating it could have come from Russia, northern China or North Korea. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization did not detect any unusual readings. On 12 May 2010, North Korea announced that it had achieved nuclear fusion, which has been dismissed by scientists around the world.

—"Abnormal Radiation Detected near Korean Border", AP, 21 June 2010, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexisnexis.com; "Radioactive Gas Detected after N. Korea Nuclear Claim", Agence France Presse, 21 June 2010, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexisnexis.com.

24 May 2010

The DPRK Foreign Ministry gave a statement to state-run KCNA regarding the ongoing 2010 Review Conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The statement defended North Korea's withdrawal

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from the NPT in 2003 and said that North Korea had never violated the agreement while a member. Further, it claimed that the DPRK does not feel a need to be recognized a nuclear weapons state, and that "it is capable of reliably defending the sovereignty of the country and the security of the nation with its own nuclear weapons."

— "FM Spokesman on Right to Bolster Nuclear Deterrent", KCNA, 24 May 2010, www.kcna.co.jp.

30 May 2010

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 2010 Review Conference unanimously adopted a 28 page declaration that, "strongly urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fulfill commitments under the six-party talks, including the complete and verifiable abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in accordance with the September 2005 Joint Statement." The declaration also called for North Korea to return to NPT membership and adhere to IAEA safeguards.

— "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Adopts Outcome Document at Last Moment", United Nations Department of Public Information, 30 May 2010, www0.un.org; "NPT Conference calls on N. Korea to change ways, denuclearize", Yonhap, 30 May 2010, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexisnexus.com.

28 June 2010

Citing the United States' recent disclosure of previously classified documents indicating it considered using nuclear weapons on North Korea in 1954 and 1969, state-run KCNA reports that the North's foreign ministry wants "the DPRK to bolster its nuclear deterrent in a newly developed way to cope with the U.S. persistent hostile policy toward the DPRK and military threat toward it." The report does not provide details on how the DPRK plans to accomplish this goal.

—"Foreign Ministry Vows to Bolster Nuclear Deterrent in New Way," KCNA, 28 June 2010, www.kcna.co.jp; "N. Korea to strengthen nuclear arsenal," UPI, 28 June 2010, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexisnexus.com.

26-30 August 2010

Kim Jong-il makes his second trip to China in 2010, and meets with President Hu Jintao in Changchun on 27 August. According to Chinese state-run media, Kim tells Hu that "the DPRK's stance on adhering to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula had remained unchanged, and the country 'is not willing to see tensions on the peninsula.'"

—"Kim Jong Il Pays Unofficial Visit to China," KCNA, 30 August 2010, www.kcna.co.jp; "DPRK Top Leader Kim Jong-Il Hopes for Early Resumption of Six-Party Talks," Xinhua, 30 August 2010, news.xinhuanet.com.

23 September 2010

The Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK promotes three officials who were involved in negotiating breakthroughs on nuclear issues with the United States. Kang Sok-ju is promoted to Vice-premier of the Cabinet of the DPRK. Previously, he represented North Korea in the 1994 Agreed Framework negotiations. Kim Kye-gwan, who oversaw the 2005 Six-party Talks, which led to a joint statement on denuclearization, is now First Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs. Ri Yong-ho is now his Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs. Ri was also Kim's deputy during the 2005 negotiations.

—Chico Harlan, "N. Korean Leadership Changes Point to Shift in Nuclear Dealings," *Washington Post*, 23 September 2010, www.washingtonpost.com; "Kang Sok Ju Appointed as Vice PM," KCNA, 23 September 2010, www.kcna.co.jp; "New First Vice FM and Vice FM Appointed," KCNA, 23 September 2010, www.kcna.co.jp.

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30 September 2010

The Institute for Science and International Security releases a DigitalGlobe image from 29 September showing that North Korea recently constructed two buildings near the location of the demolished cooling tower at Yongbyon. Construction and excavation equipment remain at the site, and activity is ongoing. [Note: In November 2010, the construction is revealed to be related to a new light-water reactor.]

—David Albright and Paul Brannan, "What is North Korea Building in the Area of the Destroyed Cooling Tower? It Bears Watching," Institute for Science and International Security, 30 September 2010, www.isis-online.org.

8 October 2010

The Institute for Science and International Security releases a report stating the likelihood that North Korea "has moved beyond laboratory-scale work and has the capability to build, at the very least, a pilot-scale gas centrifuge plant." The report is based on procurement data, and does not show a clear indication that North Korea is ready to produce a significant amount HEU for weapons.

—David Albright and Paul Brannan, "Taking Stock: North Korea's Uranium Enrichment Program," Institute for Science and International Security, 8 October 2010, www.isis-online.org.

21 October 2010

Conservative South Korean newspaper *Chosun Ilbo* cites an unidentified ROK government source as saying that a U.S. satellite detected personnel and vehicle movements at Punggye-ri, the site of North Korea's 2006 and 2009 nuclear tests. Washington warns North Korea against conducting a third test, and North Korea responds by saying its nuclear arsenal "serves as a treasured sword" against the United States.

—"Is N. Korea Preparing for Another Nuke Test?" *Chosun Ilbo*, 21 October 2010, <http://english.chosun.com>; Lim Chang-Won, "N. Korea Justifies Nuclear 'Treasured Sword'," Agence France-Presse, 23 October 2010.

9-13 November 2010

Siegfried Hecker, John Lewis, and Robert Carlin of Stanford University visit the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex during their 9-13 November trip to North Korea. There, they view an experimental 25-30 MW(e) light-water reactor (LWR) under construction, and a completed industrial-scale uranium enrichment facility. The scientists are told that the enrichment facility has 2,000 centrifuges and is already producing low-enriched uranium for the LWR, ostensibly for civilian power generation. Hecker estimates that the 2012 completion date of the LWR is "much too optimistic."

—Siegfried Hecker, "A Return Trip to North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Complex," Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 20 November 2010, <http://iis-db.stanford.edu>; Kwang-Tae Kim, "Satellite Appears to Show N. Korea Nuke Building," *The Washington Post*, 19 November 2010, www.washingtonpost.com.

8-9 December 2010

Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo travels to Pyongyang, where he meets Kim Jong-il and holds "frank and in-depth talks" reaching a "consensus" according to Chinese media. Further details are not revealed until later, when an unidentified government source states that Kim Jong-il will accept IAEA nuclear inspections, should certain preconditions be met. The preconditions are not released publicly.

—"Dai Bingguo Holds 'Frank and In-depth' Talks with Kim Jong-il," Xinhua, 9 December 2010; Jack Kim and Ben

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Blanchard, "China, North Korea Reach Consensus over Crisis - Xinhua," Reuters, 9 December 2010; "NK Leader Kim Jong Reveals Intention to Allow IAEA Nuke Inspection," *Korea Herald*, 15 December 2010.

16-20 December 2010

Governor of New Mexico Bill Richardson visits North Korea as a private citizen at the DPRK's invitation. Upon his return, Richardson confirms the rumored willingness of North Korea to allow IAEA inspectors into its new uranium enrichment facility, and also says that Pyongyang will agree to set up a new military-to-military hotline, and discuss the creation of a joint military commission on the Yellow Sea with South Korea and the U.S. State Department. U.S. officials remain skeptical.

—"U.S. Cautious About N. Korean Commitments to Richardson," *Chosun Ilbo*, 21 December 2010; "Richardson in N. Korea, Hopes to Make a Difference," Agence France-Presse, 16 December 2010.

[Back to Top](#)

2009

18 January 2009

According to Selig Harrison who visited Pyongyang and met North Korean officials including a senior Foreign Ministry official and a general of the military, North Korea claimed that they had "weaponized" their stockpiles of plutonium of 67.8 pounds, which is sufficient to build four or five nuclear warheads. He also said that "the North Koreans are saying in effect that 'we are a nuclear weapons state' and you have to deal with us on that basis."

—Choe Sang-Hun and Edward Wong, "North Korea Claims Nuclear Gains, U.S. Scholar Says," *The New York Times*, 18 January 2009, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Barbara Demick, "The World; N. Korea makes plutonium claim; Officials say they have 'weaponized' their stockpile, and a U.S. envoy reports a harder stand in negotiations," *Los Angeles Times*, 18 January 2009, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N.K. says plutonium 'weaponized' and off-limits," *The Korea Herald*, 19 January 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

21 January 2009

South Korea's deputy nuclear envoy Hwang Joon-kook visited North Korea to discuss South Korea's possible purchase of unused fuel rods stored at Yongbyun nuclear facilities. North Korea is reportedly said to have about 14,800 fresh fuel rod, which are equivalent to 100 tons of uranium and worthy over \$10 million. South Korea is considering purchasing these unused fuel rods, but Hwang declined to say the result of his visit.

—Jin Dae-woong, "Nuke envoy returns from N. Korea trip," *The Korea Herald*, 21 January 2009, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "South Korean deputy nuclear envoy, North hold 'technical discussion on fuel rods,'" *Yonhap News Agency*, in BBC Monitoring, 21 January 2009, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korea has about 14,800 unused nuclear fuel rods," *Kyodo News Agency*, in BBC Monitoring, January 2009, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

6 February 2009

Some U.S. high-ranking officials said that North Korea detonated nuclear "weapon" in 2006, conversing their original remarks of "nuclear device" test. Those remarks reignited controversy over North Korean nuclear status

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that was erupted by a report of the U.S. Joint Forces Command in November 2008 that named North Korea in the list of five nuclear weapons states in Asia. In line with Leon Panetta, director-designate of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who recognized North Korea's nuclear weapon test, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said in his article that he believed North Korea had built several nuclear bombs.

—Jung Sung-ki, "Debate Re-ignited Over N. Korea's Nuclear Status," *Korea Times*, 6 February 2009, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Is North Korea a nuclear weapon state?," *The Korea Herald*, 7 February 2009, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

24 February 2009

North Korea announces plans to launch its Kwangmyongsong-2 communications satellite via an Unha-2 delivery rocket from the Musudan-ni launch site in the near future, ostensibly as a development of North Korea's space program. The announcement raised concerns among critics, who believe that the move may be a front for continued missile testing following a failed test of the long-range Taepodong-2 in 2006. Officials from South Korea and the United States have stated that the launch would constitute a violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718.

—Choe Sang-Hun, "Worry of a North Korean Missile Test," *The New York Times*, 24 February 2009.

24 March 2009

The Foreign Ministry of North Korea issued a statement warning that the Six-Party Talk will collapse if the United Nations imposes sanctions against its planned rocket launch.

—"North Korea says UN sanctions to break up six-way talks," Yonhap News Agency, in BBC Monitoring, 24 March 2009, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com. "North Korea foreign ministry spokesman's press statement," Korean Central News Agency, in BBC Monitoring, 24 March 2009, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

20 April 2009

North Korea announces that it will rebuild the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, which Pyongyang previously began dismantling as part of an agreement with its Six-Party Talks partners. Pyongyang also kicks out IAEA and U.S. inspectors. This will allow the facility to be reconstructed and commence the development of plutonium for nuclear weapons. North Korea's action follows the UN condemnation of the April 5 missile test, which Pyongyang views as an infringement on their sovereignty.

—"North Korea to Rebuild Reactor, Produce More Plutonium; U.N. Nuke Inspectors Ousted At Yongbyon," *Space & Missile Defense Report*, Vol. 32 No.16, April 20, 2009, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

26 April 2009

North Korea begins reprocessing thousands of spent nuclear fuel rods at the Yongbyon site, extracting plutonium from the rods to develop fissile material for nuclear weapons. However, reconstructing the Yongbyon site to full capacity will require several months. Specialists in Seoul argue that North Korea reopened the reprocessing plant to produce plutonium from thousands of spent fuel rods. These rods could yield enough plutonium for one or two bombs.

—Choe Sang-Hun, "N. Korea Reprocessing Spent Fuel Rods; Says Material Will Be Used to Make Nuclear Weapons," *The Boston Globe*, April 26, 2009, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

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25 May 2009

North Korean Central News agency announced the DPRK had conducted a nuclear test. The DPRK described the test as contributing to safeguarding their sovereignty, and guaranteeing peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. The USGS estimated a seismic activity of 4.7 on the Richter scale at coordinates of 41.331°N, 129.011°E. The activity was shallow and located in the same vicinity as the October 2006 nuclear test. That test had a seismic activity of 4.3 on the Richter scale. Martin Kalinowski of the Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Center for Science and Peace Research at the University of Hamburg the explosive yield of the test ranged from 3-8 kilotons of TNT with a likely yield of 4kt. In 2006 the yield was 0.5-0.8kt of TNT.

—Dr. Patricia Lewis, "North Korea Conducts Nuclear Test," James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, May 25, 2009, in CNS, <http://cns.miis.edu>.

12 June 2009

The UN Security Council passed resolution reprimanding North Korea for the 25 May nuclear and 26 May missile tests. The resolution imposes new sanctions, expands arms embargos, and authorizes ship searches on the high seas. The resolution aims to deprive North Korea of the means for financing its nuclear and missile programs, and bans DPRK arms exports, especially missiles. The resolution calls on countries to refrain from providing financial support to industries that could contribute to North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

—Edith M. Lederer, "UN Imposes Tough New Sanctions on North Korea," Associated Press, 12 June 2009, in Lexis Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

13 June 2009

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Korea issued a statement in response to UNSC Resolution 1874. Pyongyang states the second nuclear test was an exercise of self defensive to counter U.S. hostility. The DPRK rejects the UNSC resolution 1874 and will adopt countermeasures to protect their sovereignty and national dignity. Ministry of Foreign Affairs also states they will weaponize all of their newly extracted plutonium, commence the processing of uranium enrichment, and regards any attempt by the United States or its allies to blockade North Korea as an act of war which will be met with decisive military response.

—"DPRK Foreign Ministry Declares Strong Counter-Measures Against UNSC's Resolution 1874," USFK Korea Open Source Digest, 13-15 June 2009, in OSC Document KPP20090615041001.

15 June 2009

The North Korean Foreign Ministry stated, "The processing of uranium enrichment will be commenced." This draws considerable criticism of North Korea since it has stated achieved considerable success in developing and experimenting with uranium enrichment technology. Uranium enrichment will provide North Korea with another method to build nuclear weapons other than reprocessing plutonium.

—"North Korea To Push Ahead With Uranium Enrichment," Asia Pulse, June 15, 2009, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

16 July 2009

Kim Yong-nam, the president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, declares that the Six Party Talks are over. Kim states that dialogue cannot proceed "where the principles of respect for sovereign rights

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and equality are denied." Kim emphasized the need to strengthen the DPRK's nuclear deterrence. The statement was made at a Non-Alignment Movement meeting at the Egyptian resort Sharm el-Sheikh.

—"N.Korea No.2 Leader Says Nuclear Talks Are Over," Area Surrounding Japan OSINT Report, US Army Asian Studies Detachment 441st Military Intelligence Battalion, 16 July 2009 in OSC Document JPP20090716027006.

17 July 2009

In keeping with UNSCR 1718, which was adopted in 2006 after North Korea's first nuclear test, the UN Security Council imposes new sanctions on high ranking North Korean nuclear officials. The Council's sanctions committee imposes an asset freeze and a travel ban on officials from the General Bureau of Atomic Energy — the Bureau's directory Ri Je Son, Hwang Sok Hwa, head of the Bureau's Scientific Guidance Department — along with Ri Hong Sop, former director of Yongbyon nuclear research center. The sanctions also targeted Yun Ho Jin and Han Yu Ro, the heads of North Korean trading companies — Namchonggang, Korea Hykosin, and Korea Tangun — that are suspected of acquiring and transporting nuclear and missile parts for North Korea. The General Bureau of Atomic Energy, Namchonggang Trading Corp, Korea Hykosin Trading Corp, and Hong Kong Electronics (an Iranian based entity) were also placed on the UN blacklist.

— James Bone, Richard Lloyd, "UN Blacklists Leader's Henchmen as Tensions Rise in Pariah State; North Korea," 17 July 2009, in Lexis Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com, "Actions Taken by the United Nations Security Council 1718 Sanctions Committee To Implement Resolution 1874," U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 16 July 2009, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/126148.htm. "UN Approval of Sanctions on North Korean Entities and Personnel," Korean Open Source Digest Weekly Highlights 11-17 July, 17 July 2009, in OSC Document KPP20090717107001.

27 July 2009

North Korea issued a statement calling for direct talks with the United States. The Obama administration responded that the Washington will engage in direct negotiations with North Korea in the Six-Party framework.

— Jae-Soon Chang "NKorea Says It Is Open To New Dialogue On Nukes," Associated Press Worldstream, 27 July 2009, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

31 July 2009

U.S. Treasury Department places the Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation, a North Korean entity, under sanctions pursuant to Executive Order 13382. The North Korean firm owned by Korea Ryonbong General Corporation was blacklisted for their involvement in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The order effectively freezes the assets of WMD proliferators and prohibits U.S. persons from financial transactions with the entity.

— "US Blacklists Firm for Involvement in WMD Proliferation," Yonhap News, 31 July 2009, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

12 August 2009

The U.S. blacklisted a North Korean bank under Executive Order 13382 for its affiliation with firms sanctioned under the UNSCR 1874. The Department of Treasury identified the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation for providing financial services to Tanchon Commercial Bank and Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation.

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—"U.S Sanctions Another North Korean Bank for WMD Involvement," Asia Pulse, 12 August 2009, in LexisNexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

25 August 2009

North Korea invites U.S. envoys to Pyongyang for bilateral discussions on the DPRK's nuclear activities. North Korea reportedly extended the invitation during former U.S. President Bill Clinton's 4 August visit to Pyongyang to secure the release of two detained American journalists.

—"Reports: North Korea Invites US Envoys for Talks in September," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 25 August 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com.

3 September 2009

North Korea informs the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that: "Experimental uranium enrichment has successfully been conducted and entered into the completion phase," and "Reprocessing of spent fuel rods is at its final phase and extracted plutonium is being weaponized." Included in a letter issued to the UNSC sanctions committee, the DPRK announcement is also broadcast on the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). The DPRK letter was in response to the committee's inquiry into a North Korean arms shipment seized by the United Arab Emirates in mid-July 2009.

—"North Korea: Nearing Final Phase of Uranium Enrichment," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 4 September 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com; Patrick Walters, "Legal Check on ANL Arms Ship," *The Australian*, 31 August 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korea Claims Uranium Enrichment Is Progressing," *Jane's Intelligence Weekly*, 4 September 2009.

8 September 2009

The U.S. State Department imposes restrictions targeting two North Korean entities—the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE) and Korea Tanguan Trading Corporation. Designated under Executive Order 13382. The restrictions freeze any assets owned by the entities within U.S. jurisdiction and prohibit U.S. persons "from conducting any transactions with these entities." The announcement of the designation also emphasizes that the action is in uniformity with UNSCR1718 and UNSCR1874.

—"U.S. Department of State Designation of North Korean Nuclear and Missile Entities," U.S. Department of State, 8 September 2009, in www.state.gov.

18-24 September 2009

ROK defense officials indicate that locations of North Korean nuclear weapons are known to the South Korean military. Additionally, these locations are included among "major targets" in DPRK territory identified for early attack in the event of a military conflict. The statements made by chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, Kim Tae-young, and General Lee Sang-eui during their confirmation hearings before the ROK National Assembly for defense minister and chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman respectively.

—"SKorea Could Swiftly Hit NKorea Nuke Bases: General," Agence France Presse, 24 September 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com; "S. Korea Confirms Location of North's Nuclear Weapons: Defense Minister," Yonhap News Agency, 18 September 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com.

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21 September 2009

ROK President Lee Myung-bak proposes a "grand bargain" as a means to "fundamentally resolve the North Korean nuclear issue." According to the South Korean proposal, the DPRK would dismantle key elements of its nuclear program. In turn, the countries participating in the Six-Party Talks would "simultaneously provide security guarantees and international assistance to North Korea."

—"S. Korean President Proposes 'Grand Bargain' on Resolving N. Korean Nuke Issue," Yonhap News Agency, 22 September 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com; "SKorea President Proposes 'Grand Bargain'," Associated Press Worldstream, 22 September 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com; "Lee Calls for Strong Stand Against N. Korea, One-step Disarmament Deal," Yonhap News Agency, 27 September 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com.

24 September 2009

At a rare summit-level meeting chaired by U.S. President Barack Obama, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously passes resolution 1887 (UNSCR 1887) in an effort to reinforce the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Based on a draft resolution introduced by the United States, UNSCR1887 "reaffirms" prior DPRK-related resolutions UNSCR1718 and UNSCR1874 and discourages any withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Additionally, various speakers at the meeting - most notably French President Nicholas Sarkozy - criticize North Korea's record on efforts to denuclearize the Korean peninsula.

—Neil MacFarquhar and Helene Cooper, "Security Council, with Obama Presiding, Passes Antinuclear Measure; U.S.-Drafted Resolution follows Concessions by Russia on Iran," *The International Herald Tribune*, 25 September 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com; Christi Parsons, "U.N. Backs Abolishing Nuclear Arms; The Security Council Supports a Series of Goals Proposed by Obama for Eliminating the Weapons," *Los Angeles Times*, 25 September 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com; "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1887 (2009) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6191st meeting on September 24, 2009", United Nations Security Council, www.un.org.

5 October 2009

In a meeting with visiting Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il signals a possible DPRK return to the Six-Party Talks, but conditioned it on the result of "bilateral talks" with the United States. Kim's remarks at the meeting were carried by the state-run Korean Central News Agency. The Kim-Wen meeting was held in the context of a North Korean celebration of the 60th anniversary of official PRC-DPRK relations, and Kim's statements are later reconfirmed in official comments from China's Foreign Ministry. Kim also made reference at the meeting to an "unchanged" North Korean "commitment to realizing the denuclearization of the peninsula."

—Simon Martin, "NKorea's Kim Willing to Return to Nuclear Talks: State Media," Agence France Presse, 6 October 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com; Choe Sang-hun, "North Korea May Be Open to Talks," 6 October 2009, *The New York Times*, www.lexis-nexis.com; "Kim Jong Il Wants U.S. Meeting Before Nuclear Talks," Deutsche Press-Agentur, 6 October 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com.

6 October 2009

The South Korean news agency Yonhap reports that North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facility is in the "final stage" of restoration. Yonhap's report is based on a South Korean defense source who referenced intelligence data from a parliamentary audit. The intelligence data was apparently drawn from "South Korean and U.S. intelligence authorities" following an analysis of approximately 10 nuclear facilities.

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—"N. Korea in 'Final Stage' of Restoring Main Nuclear Facility - Source," Yonhap News Agency in BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, 6 October 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com; Jae-soon Chang, "Report: NKorea Nearly Restores Nuclear Facilities," Associated Press Online, 6 October 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com.

6 October 2009

Defense Minister Kim Tae-young advises the ROK National Assembly the North Korean military may not yet be able to attach their nuclear warheads to their delivery systems. Kim notes that while "it is not clear whether North Korea has nuclear arms," South Korean forces "have sufficient information on the locations where items related to the nuclear program are stored and where the delivery means are placed."

—Richard Lloyd Parry, "Risk of Germ Warfare Added to Menace of Nuclear Bomb," *The Times* (London), 6 October 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com.

2 November 2009

North Korea demands direct talks with the United States on its nuclear program, warning in a Foreign Ministry statement carried by the state-run Korean Central News Agency, that if the U.S. is not ready to "sit down at a negotiating table", then the DPRK "will go its own way." However, the DPRK's demand also indicates a willingness to return to the Six-Party Talks.

—Jae-soon Chang, "North Korea Demands Direct Talks with US," Associated Press Online, 2 November 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Pushes for Meeting with U.S.," CBC News, 2 November 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com.

3 November 2009

North Korea announces that reprocessing of 8,000 spent fuel rods was completed in August. According to the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the reprocessing was "part of the measure taken to restore the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon to their original state." The KCNA report also asserts "noticeable successes have been made in turning the extracted plutonium into weapons-grade for the purposes of bolstering up the nuclear deterrent of the DPRK." A senior South Korean defense official confirms that, based on satellite imagery analysis, the reprocessing facility at Yongbyon "appears to have been restored to its earlier condition." Commenting on the North Korean announcement, the U.S. State Department states that the DPRK's action "violates UN Security Council resolutions."

—"South Korea Regrets North Reprocessing Announcement," Yonhap News Agency via BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 3 November 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com; So-hyun Kim, "North Korean Nuclear Facility Back to Work," *Korea Herald*, 3 November 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korean Plutonium Production Violates UN Resolutions: U.S.," Agence France Press, 3 November 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com.

8-10 December 2009

U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth visits North Korea and meets with DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju, to explore restarting the six-party talks. North Korea's Korean Central News Agency later describes the meeting as "businesslike and candid", saying that the two sides "deepened the mutual understanding, narrowed their differences and found not a few common points." Bosworth later told the press that he urged the North not to conduct a third test, and promised "a vision of the future which would be a lot different than the present or the

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past", should the North abandon its nuclear programs. The DPRK lobbied for a loosening of sanctions, which Bosworth said was not possible until they returned to nuclear negotiations and dismantling of their atomic programs. No clear conclusion emerges from the meeting regarding the Six-Party Talks or next steps.

—"Obama Calls On N. Korea to Abandon Nuclear Ambitions," Yonhap News Agency, 11 December 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S.: Time for 'Strategic Patience' with N. Korea," Associated Press Worldstream, 12 December 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Says It Understands Need for Nuclear Talks," Associated Press Online, 11 December 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com; Kwang-Tae Kim, "China Calls for Efforts to Resume Nuclear Talks," Associated Press Worldstream, 17 December 2009, www.lexis-nexis.com.

[Back to Top](#)

2008

4 January 2008

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement in which it claims that Pyongyang had submitted a nuclear declaration in November 2007 and had "sufficient consultation with the U.S. side" on the contents. It further states that North Korea has allowed the United States to inspect military facilities that used imported aluminum tubes to address U.S. suspicions regarding their use in a uranium enrichment program. In addition, while the disablement process has entered its last phase of unloading the spent fuel, Pyongyang is slowing down disablement work in response to the delay in the delivery of heavy fuel oil and other rewards promised by the members of the Six-Party Talks.

In response to North Korea's statement, U.S. officials disputed North Korea's claim that it had submitted a declaration. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill states that the United States does not regard North Korea's account a final declaration and furthermore urges North Korea to submit a "complete and correct" declaration on all its nuclear programs as required by the October 3, 2007 agreement. However, Hill acknowledged that U.S. officials were granted access to the sites that used the imported aluminum tubes.

—"DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Issue of Implementation of October 3 Agreement," *Korean Central News Agency*, 4 January 2008, www.kcna.co.jp; Kyodo News Service, "North Korea Says US Shown List of All Nuclear Programmes," in BBC Monitoring, 4 January 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kyodo News Service, "US Does Not See North Korea Nuclear Account as Final Declaration - Envoy," in BBC Monitoring, 4 January 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Choe Sang Hun and Steven Lee Myers, "North Korea Says It Met Nuclear Disclosure Deadline in Previous Declaration," *New York Times*, 5 January 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Blaine Harden, "All Nuclear Efforts Disclosed, N. Korea Says; U.S. Calls Pyongyang's Declaration Incomplete but Says Negotiations Will Continue," *Washington Post*, 5 January 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Paul Richter, "N. Korea Says It Has Met Nuclear Criteria; U.S. Officials Say a Full List of Activities Has Not Been Produced," *Los Angeles Times*, 5 January 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

7 January 2008

South Korean President-elect, Lee Myung Bak's transition committee asks the Ministry of Unification to link inter-

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Korea economic cooperation projects to progress on North Korea's nuclear disarmament. During the Ministry's policy briefing, a key member of the committee stated that while humanitarian projects can continue, "economic cooperation projects should be carried out in parallel with the pace of North Korea nuclear talks." As a result, large-scale cross-border projects to reconnect the cross-border railways and expand the Kaesong industrial complex may be placed under review.

—Yonhap News Agency, "South President-Elect's Team Wants Inter-Korean Projects Tied to Nuclear Talks," in BBC Monitoring, 7 January 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Jung Sung-ki, "Big Ticket Inter-Korea Projects Put On Backburner," *Korea Times*, 7 January 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

30 January 2008

In a meeting with Wang Jiarui, head of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party, in Pyongyang, Kim Jong Il says that North Korea remains fully committed to implementing the agreements reached during the Six-Party Talks. He adds that the other parties should fulfill their commitments under the principle of "action for action."

—"Kim Jong Il Meets Senior CPC Official," *Xinhua News*, 30 January 2008, news.xinhuanet.com; Yonhap News Agency, "North Korea's Leader Vows to Honour Nuclear Accords: Report," in BBC Monitoring, 31 January 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

31 January - 2 February 2008

Sung Kim, director of the U.S. State Department's Office of Korea Affairs visited Pyongyang to discuss ways to move the Six-Party Talks process forward. During his visit, he met with North Korean Foreign Ministry officials and told them that the nuclear declaration must be complete and accurate.

—Kyodo News Agency, "Japanese Agency Details US Diplomat's Arrival in North Korea," in BBC Monitoring, 31 January 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency, "No Nuclear Declaration From North Korea - US Diplomat," in BBC Monitoring, 2 February 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

12 February - 16 February 2008

A U.S. team of experts make a trip to North Korea to assess progress in disablement of the key facilities in Yongbyon and discuss the possibility of implementing a U.S. program in the dismantling of North Korean nuclear weapons, a program resembling that of the 1991 Nunn-Lugar program. The team, which traveled in an unofficial capacity, consisted of Sigfried Hecker, the former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Joel Wit, a former State Department official and Keith Luse, an aide to U.S. Senator Richard Lugar. Upon return from the trip, Sigfried Hecker says that they enjoyed broad access to North Korea's nuclear facilities and that North Korea is serious about the denuclearization process as well as willing to consider a Nunn-Lugar type program in North Korea. However, Hecker says that North Korea is unwilling to move further unless the United States and other parties meet their end of the bargain. He also added that North Korea has slowed down the removal of the spent fuel rods at the Yongbyon reactor site.

—Kyodo News Agency, "US Experts On North Korea Arrives in Pyongyang," in BBC Monitoring, 12 February 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Barbara Demick, "U.S. Visitors Optimistic About North Korea," *Los Angeles Times*, 17 February 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Edward Cody, "N. Korea Slowing Disarmament, U.S. Nuclear

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Delegation Reports; North Cites Delays on Energy Aid, Delisting as Terrorism Sponsor, 17 February 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

19 February 2008

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and North Korean Vice Minister Kim Kye Kwan hold unannounced bilateral talks in Beijing. In his brief to reporters Hill says that Kim Kye Kwan was careful not to characterize the current situation as a stalemate and indicated North Korea is prepared to work towards moving the denuclearization process forward. According to Hill, Kim Kye Kwan "wanted to make it very clear that they are not at present having any nuclear cooperation with any other country and they will not in future."

—"Hill-Kim Meeting Seen to Bode Well For Nuke Talks," *Korea Times*, 19 February 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Nuke Envoys of N. Korea, U.S. Meet in Beijing," *Korea Times*, 19 February 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency, "US Envoy Says North Korea Seeks Progress in Nuclear Talks," in BBC Monitoring, 20 February 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

26 February 2008

The New York Philharmonic orchestra makes a historic performance in Pyongyang. It is reported that former Defense Secretary William Perry and former U.S. Ambassador to Korea Donald Gregg met North Korean Vice Minister Kim Kye Kwan and director-general of the North American division at the Foreign Ministry, Ri Gun, the day of the concert. In their meeting, the two former U.S. officials reportedly conveyed the message from U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill urging for a quick resolution.

—Yoon Won-sup, "Can NY Phil Concert in NK Resolve Denuclearization?" *Korea Times*, 27 February 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yoshikazu Shirakawa, "No Cause for Joy at N.Y. Phil Concert in DPRK," *Daily Yomiuri*, 27 February 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com;

"U.S., N. Korea Piggyback on Music Diplomacy," *Korea Herald*, 28 February 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com

13 March 2008

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and his North Korean counterpart Kim Kye Gwan meet in Geneva. Despite what is described by Hill as "substantive" discussions, they fail to reach a deal to move past the disagreement over the submission of a full nuclear accounting of North Korea's entire nuclear program. Hill says that they made considerable progress on discussing the format of the nuclear declaration, however, that the "really problematic element is that, we don't have a commitment from the DPRK to provide a complete and correct declaration."

—Yonhap News Agency, "US Envoy Says Nuclear Talks With North Korea 'Substantive'," in BBC Monitoring, 14 March 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "'Very Good' North Korea Talks Moving Ahead," *International Herald Tribune*, 15 March 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Donald Kirk, "High-Level Talks Keep North Korea Nuclear Deal Alive," *Christian Science Monitor*, 17 March 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency, "US Envoy Seeks 'Commitment' From North Korea on Nuclear Declaration," in BBC Monitoring, 20 March 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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26 March 2008

The new, conservative South Korean administration signals a tougher stance with North Korea by warning that it will speak out against human rights abuses in North Korea and that improving economic ties will be contingent on North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons program. In his policy briefing to President Lee Myung Bak, Minister of Unification, Kim Ha Joong links inter-Korean engagement to progress in dismantling North Korea's nuclear program. He states that "the speed and scope of as well as ways to push for any development in inter-Korea relations will be decided according to progress in the North Korean nuclear issue."

—Choe Sang-Hun, "Lee Signals He'll Take Harder Line on North; South Set to Condemn Rights Abuses and Tie Aid to Disarmament," *International Herald Tribune*, 27 March 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency, "South Unification Minister Vows to Raise Nuclear Issue in Inter-Korean Talks," in BBC Monitoring, 26 March 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

1 April 2008

Breaking a long silence, North Korea's state-run Rodong Shinmun vehemently criticizes the new, conservative South Korean President Lee Myung Bak and his North Korea policies. The commentary criticizes President Lee's North Korea policy for attaching "complete nuclear abandonment" of Pyongyang as a precondition to improving North-South relations and accuses Lee of "making a complete mess of the process to denuclearize the peninsula."

—"Lee Myung Bak Regime's Sycophancy Towards U.S. and Anti-DPRK Confrontation Hysteria Blasted," *Korean Central News Agency*, 1 April 2008, www.kcna.co.jp; Choe Sang-Hun, "North Korea Lashes Out at South Korea's President," *New York Times*, 2 April 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

8 April 2008

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and North Korean Vice Minister Kim Kye Gwan hold bilateral talks in Singapore where they report "important progress" in working towards breaking the current impasse in the Six-Party Talks. Furthermore, it is reported that the two parties reached a tentative agreement in which they would side-step the dispute over how much information North Korea is required to provide about any past uranium enrichment related activities and its suspected nuclear cooperation with Syria. This allows for the parties to focus on addressing North Korea's plutonium production capability, past and present. The agreement reportedly requires North Korea to finish the disablement process at Yongbyon and also to provide a full accounting of its stockpile of plutonium while "acknowledging" U.S. allegations regarding the uranium enrichment program and nuclear cooperation with Syria. In return, the United States will move toward lifting sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act and removing North Korea from U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism.

—"Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on DPRK-U.S. Talks," *Korean Central News Agency*, 9 April 2008, www.kcna.co.jp; Choe Sang-Hun, "U.S. and North Korea Report Progress On Restarting Nuclear Talks," *International Herald Tribune*, 9 April 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency, "US Envoy Says Nuclear Talks With North Korea Make Progress, Need More Time," in BBC Monitoring, 9 April 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Glenn Kessler, "U.S. Ready to Ease Sanctions on N. Korea; Pyongyang Would Have to Acknowledge Evidence About Nuclear Activities," *Washington Post*, 11 April 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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22 April - 24 April 2008

A U.S. interagency delegation, led by Sung Kim, director of the U.S. State Department's Korean Affairs office, visited North Korea to follow up on a provisional agreement reached between Kim Kye Gwan and Christopher Hill in Singapore earlier in the month. A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson told the Korean Central News Agency that "technical matters for winding up the implementation of the October 3 agreement, including the contents of the nuclear declaration" were discussed with the U.S. delegation.

—Blaine Harden, "U.S. Team Headed to Pyongyang in Search of 'Significant Progress'," *Washington Post*, 22 April 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency, "US Delegation Meets North Korean Nuclear Envoy in Pyongyang," in BBC Monitoring, 23 April 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Pyongyang Visit by U.S. Nuclear Experts Delegation," *Korean Central News Agency*, 24 April 2008, www.kcna.co.jp.

24 April 2008

In its first public statement since the Israeli bombing of a Syrian site on 6 September 2007, the White House confirms that Syria has been clandestinely engaged in building a nuclear reactor capable of plutonium production with the assistance of North Korea. The White House says that North Korea's covert nuclear cooperation with Syria is a "dangerous manifestation" of Pyongyang's proliferation activities which poses a serious concern. The Bush administration also released photographs taken inside the reactor before it was destroyed to support its assertion. However, Washington reaffirms its commitment to the Six-Party Talks framework "to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." The White House issued its statement shortly after Central Intelligence Agency Director Michael Hayden, White House national security advisor Stephen Hadley, and Director of National Intelligence J. Michael McConnell briefed congressional committees about the North Korea-Syria connection.

—Yonhap News Agency, "US Says North Korea Nuclear Talks to Continue Despite Syria Link," in BBC Monitoring, 25 April 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Greg Miller and Paul Richter, "The World; U.S. Opens Dossier on Syrian Facility; It Tells Congress that North Korea Helped Build a Nuclear Reactor and that an Israeli Airstrike Destroyed it," *Los Angeles Times*, 25 April 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Ewen MacAskill, "US Claims North Korea Helped Build Syria Reactor Plant: Damascus Dismisses Video of Unit Bombed by Israel: Congress Told Site was Set Up to Produce Plutonium," *The Guardian*, 25 April 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Robin Wright, "U.S. Details Reactor in Syria; Americans Push Damascus, N. Korea To Admit Collusion," *Washington Post*, 25 April 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; David E. Sanger, "Bush Administration Releases Images to Bolster Its Claims About Syrian Reactor," *New York Times*, 25 April 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

8 May 2008

North Korean officials turn over 18,000 pages of documents related to its plutonium program to Sung Kim, director of the U.S. State Department's Korean Affairs office on his follow-up visit to Pyongyang. An unnamed senior U.S. official says that the documents contain information about North Korea's three major campaigns to reprocess plutonium in 1990, 2003 and 2005. However, the document does not include information about its alleged uranium enrichment program or its nuclear proliferation to other countries.

—Helene Cooper, "North Korea Gives U.S. Files on Plutonium Efforts," *New York Times*, 9 May 2008, in Lexis-Nexis,

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web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency, "North Korea Gives US Officials Plutonium Documents - Yonhap," in BBC Monitoring, 9 May 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

27 May - 29 May 2008

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and North Korean Vice Minister Kim Kye Gwan meet in Beijing to discuss filling the remaining gaps in North Korea's nuclear declaration as well as the timeframe for its submission. —Kyodo News Agency, "US, North Korea Envoys Report 'Good' Talks in Beijing," in BBC Monitoring, 28 May 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S., N.K. Envoys Meet in Beijing," *Korea Herald*, 29 May 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

10 June - 11 June 2008

Sung Kim, director of the U.S. State Department's Korean Affairs, meets with North Korean officials in Pyongyang to discuss the remaining tasks for disablement, including how to deal with the used fuel rods. South Korea had previously offered to purchase the fresh fuel rods to use in its power reactors. North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson says that the discussions focused on "technical and practical ways of rounding off the disablement of the DPRK nuclear facilities and the issue of winding up the political and economic compensation for it."

—"U.S., N.K. to Discuss Disablement," *Korea Herald*, 10 June 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "DPRK Foreign Ministry's Spokesman on DPRK-U.S. Experts Negotiations," *Korean Central News Agency*, 12 June 2008, www.kcna.co.jp.

26 June 2008

North Korea submits its long-awaited nuclear declaration to China almost seven months past the deadline. The United States welcomes this development and vowed to "respond to North Korea's actions by lifting the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act, as well as announcing our intent to rescind North Korea's designation as a States Sponsor of Terror in 45 days."

—Yonhap News Agency, "USA Hails North Korea Nuclear List - Yonhap," in BBC Monitoring, 26 June 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Norimitsu Onishi and Edward Wong, "U.S. to Remove North Koreans From Terror List; Nuclear Declaration is Rewarded as Disarmament Efforts Advances," *International Herald Tribune*, 27 June 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Jonathan Watts, "Bush Hails Korean Breakthrough as Pyongyang Delivers Inventory of its Nuclear Activities: State to be Taken Off Terror List and Given Financial Aid: Atomic Plan's Most Visible Symbol to be Demolished," *The Guardian*, 27 June 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

27 June 2008

North Korea demolishes the cooling tower at its Yongbyon nuclear reactor site. The event was broadcasted by international media at Pyongyang's invitation.

—"N. Korea Destroys Reactor Cooling Tower," *Korea Times*, 27 June 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Barbara Demick, "The World; Demolition of Nuclear Tower Symbolic for N. Korea, U.S.; The Televised Event is Meant to Demonstrate That Pyongyang is Cooperating With the Bush Administration," *Los Angeles Times*, 28 June 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Blaine Harden and Stella Kim, "N. Korea Razes Cooling Tower In Show of Nuclear Accord," *Washington Post*, 28 June 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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1 July 2008

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill said, at the Center for International and Strategic Studies in Washington on July 1, that the North Korea deal is "a partially finished product." He also stated that "We have to keep working on issues that have not been fully disclosed, although not denied by the North Koreans." However, he emphasized that even though there are the unanswered questions about a uranium-enrichment program, the administration has succeeded in shutting down North Korea's nuclear reactor.

—Glenn Kessler, "Message to U.S. Preceded Nuclear Declaration by North Korea," *Washington Post* 2 July 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

2 July 2008

According to a source close to the Six-Party Talks, North Korea said it extracted a total of about 30 kilograms of plutonium in three different years in 1990, 2003, and 2005 and used 2 kilograms in the experiment conducted in October 2006. The U.S. government believed North Korea may be able to extract approximately 8 kilograms of plutonium from unprocessed spent nuclear fuel rods stored at nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, the source said. There are about 4 kilograms of residual plutonium inside components of the nuclear facilities and another 2 kilograms in nuclear waste stored at the facilities. The United States believes the plutonium extracted by North Korea plus an additional 8 kilograms of the substance yet to be removed, totals about 44 kilograms.

—Yoshiharu Asano, "DPRK Plutonium: 30 Kilograms Extracted, 2 Kilograms Used in Nuclear Test" *Yomiuri Shimbun*, in BBC Monitoring, 2 July 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

4 July 2008

According to sources from the participants of the Six Party Talks, North Korea revealed in the declaration submitted to China that it used 25.5-26 kilograms of plutonium for manufacturing nuclear weapons. The sources said that the above amount does not include the 2 kilogram which North Korea acknowledged in the report as the amount used for its first nuclear test in October 2006.

—Michael Ha, "Pyongyang Used 26 Kgs of Plutonium for Nuke Bombs," *Korea Times*, 4 July 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kyodo News agency, "Japan: North Korea used 25.5 kg plutonium for nuclear weapons, sources say," in BBC Monitoring, 4 Jul 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

10-12 July 2008

After a nine-month hiatus, the six countries convened the Heads of Delegation Meeting of the Six Party Talks in Beijing from 10 to 12 July in 2008. The two main issues of the talks were the verification and monitoring system of North Korea's nuclear program and energy assistance to North Korea. Six countries reached an agreement to set a verification mechanism consisting of experts of the six parties to verify the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. They agreed that the verification measures would include visits to facilities, review of documents, interviews with technical personnel and other measures. As for the Yongbyun nuclear facilities, North Korea agreed to work to complete the disablement of the facilities by the end of October 2008. Despite the agreement the principle of verification mechanism, six countries failed to agree on a number of details including scope and subjects of verification which were deferred to working-level discussions. No agreement was reached on a timetable for a verification protocol and Washington remained critical of the North Korea's 26 June declaration, arguing that it did not cover its alleged uranium-enrichment program and foreign weapons deals.

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—Kyodo News Agency, "Six nations agree on principles for verifying North Korea nuclear declaration," in BBC Monitoring 11 July 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Vigorous Verification," *Korea Herald*, 12 July, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Jim Yardley and Jake Hooker, "Nuclear Negotiators Reach Accord on Verifying North Korean Disarmament," *New York Times*, 13 July 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Edward Cody, "Accord in North Korea Talks; Nations Approve Nuclear Inspections but Still Lack Timetable," *Washington Post*, 13 July, 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Press Communique of the Heads of Delegation Meeting of-The Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, 12 July 2008, www.mofat.go.kr/press/hotissue/nuclear/index.jsp; Lee Joo-hee, "Critical negotiation to continue until Aug. 11," *Korea Herald*, 14 July 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

17 July 2008

According to sources close to the Six Party Talks, North Korea has pulled 4,000 nuclear fuel rods from the reactor in Yongbyun and put them into a water pond. Reportedly this discharge was a result of the most recent round of the Six Party Talks, where North Korea committed to try to complete the disablement of Yongbyun nuclear complex by end of October 2008.

—Naoko Aoki, "N. Korea removes half of fuel rods from Yongbyon reactor," *Kyodo News agency*, 17 July 2008 in BBC Monitoring, 17 July 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

22 July 2008

After meeting with his US counterparts Christopher Hill in Singapore on 22 July, Kim Sook, the South Korean delegation to the Six Party Talks said reporters that North Korea has already received the draft of a verification protocol. He added that "The ball is actually in North Korea's court because they already received the draft of a verification protocol." According to Christopher Hill, the U.S. top negotiator on the North Korean nuclear issue, the draft includes ways to verify North Korea's claims about nuclear past but does not contain a timeline.

—Yonhap news agency, "North Korea said to receive draft plutonium verification protocol," 22 July 2008, in BBC Monitoring, 22 July 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Nicholas Kralev, "U.S. gives Pyongyang no deadline to verify nuke deal; Rice to hold first meeting with foreign minister," *Washington Times*, 23 July 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Lee Joo-hee "Informal six-party talks to open today," *Korea Herald*, 23 July 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

23 July 2008

Foreign Ministers of the Six Party Talks countries had an informal meeting in Singapore on 23 July on the sidelines of the annual ASEAN Security Forum. After a 90-minute discussion, the ministers released a six-point agreement declaring their commitments. The ministers agreed that there had been achievements made so far in the six-way talks and reaffirmed their determination to ensure each country's obligations were met. In addition, they emphasized that a complete and balanced conclusion was crucial for the second denuclearization phase and that a verification mechanism must be promptly prepared. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated the meeting was "very good," adding that "it wasn't a standoff with people just stating their positions." According to the North Korean delegation's spokesman, Ri Dong Il, North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Ui Chun said North Korea was willing "to implement its own obligations," including verification, "closely following the implementation by other parties on the principle of action-for-action." Mr. Ri also said that "what's important is for the U.S. to fundamentally and

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entirely withdraw its hostile policy."

—Jung Sung-ki, "Foreign Ministers Seek to Advance Nuclear Talks," *Korea Times*, 23 July 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Helene Cooper, "In First Meeting, Rice Presses North Korean on Nuclear Effort," *New York Times*, 24 July 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. and North Korea take another step to improved ties; Pyongyang official meets with Rice," *International Herald Tribune*, 24 July 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "6-party talks look to add momentum," *Korea Herald*, 24 July 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Rare meeting in Singapore advances Pyongyang talks" *International Herald Tribune*, 24 July 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

30 July 2008

A senior official in the U.S. government said that Washington might suspend its removal of North Korea from the list of terror-sponsoring nations if the verification regime for verifying North Korea's nuclear program is not established. On 25 July, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned North Korea of a possible postponement of the removal unless the verifying mechanism is set up.

—Kyodo News Agency, "US warns N Korea of possible postponement of terror list removal," in BBC Monitoring, 25 July 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kyodo News Agency, "US said to keep North Korea on terror list if no deal on nuclear verification," in BBC Monitoring, 30 July 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

31 July-1 August 2008

Sung Kim, the US State Department's special envoy for the six-party talks and Li Gun, head of the North Korean Foreign Ministry's American affairs bureau met two times in Beijing from 31 July to 1 August to talk about the verification protocol. Even though there was no elaboration from them, it is reportedly said that there was no progress in the verification issue. According to a senior South Korean official in background briefing, "North Korea is still refusing to agree some basic stuff."

—Kyodo News Agency, "US nuclear envoy says no reaction yet from North Korea on draft plan," in BBC Monitoring, 1 August 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kyodo News Agency, "US, North Korea diplomats hold second day of nuclear talks," in BBC Monitoring, 1 August 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kyodo News Agency, "US, North Korea diplomats head home after nuclear talks in Beijing," in BBC Monitoring, 2 August 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap news agency, "South Korea says North "reluctant" to accept nuclear verification requirement," in BBC Monitoring, 5 August 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

12 August 2008

The Bush administration continues to delay the removal of North Korea from its terrorism list although the deadline for removal had passed. North Korea knows "what they need to do on a verification package, and we're continuing to work with them," US State Department spokesman Kelley Osterthaler said. State deputy spokesman Robert Wood also said "The 45 days are a minimum period, and what we need from North Korea is a strong verification regime."

—Dan Eggen, "Doubts About Nuclear Verification Keep N. Korea on List of Terrorist States," *Washington Post*, 12 August 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "US Yet to Delist N. Korea From Terrorism List," *Korea Times*, 12 August 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Takeo Miyazaki, "N. Korea playing waiting game; "Delaying

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tactics aimed at wresting concessions on verification regime," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 13 August 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

26 August 2008

North Korea released a statement saying that it halted disablement process at the Yongbyon site, its main nuclear facility, and was considering restoring and restarting operations at the facility. North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) quoted the North Korean Foreign spokesman as saying: "we have decided to immediately suspend disabling our nuclear facilities. This measure has been effective on Aug. 14, and related parties have been notified of it." The State Department described the announcement as a "step backward."

—Choe Sang-Hun, "North Korea Says It Stopped Disabling Nuclear Complex," *The New York Times*, 27 August 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Blaine Harden, "N. Korea, Angry Over Terror List, Threatens to Rebuild Nuclear Program," *The Washington Post*, 27 August 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Jung Sung-ki, "North Korea Halts Disabling Nuclear Plant," *Korea Times*, 26 August 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; David Blair, "North Korea threatens to rebuild its main nuclear plant," *The Daily Telegraph (London)*, 27 August 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "US Calls on N. Korea To Agree to Verification Regime Before Delisting," *Yonhap news agency*, in BBC Monitoring, 27 August 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "US Urges NK to Agree to Nuke Verification Regime Before Being Delisted," *Korea Times*, 27 August 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korean bluff," *The Korea Herald*, 20 August 2008, in Lexis Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

4 September 2008

The Foreign Ministry of South Korea confirmed that North Korea took measures to restore its nuclear facilities at Yongbyun, officially expressing regret over North Korea's activities. Meanwhile, Christopher Hill, the top U.S. negotiator, said that it was not still clear that North Korea was attempting to restart operation at the Yongbyun facilities, adding North Korea's real intention was still unclear. After meeting with his counterparts of South Korean, Japan and China in Beijing, he urged North Korea to agree on the verification regime.

—"South Korea says North restoring nuclear reactor," *Yonhap news agency*, in BBC Monitoring, 04 September 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Choe Sang-Hun, Helene Cooper "U.S. Doubts Reports of Work On North Korea Nuclear Site," *The New York Times*, 04 September 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "US envoy repeats call for verification regime for North Korea," *Kyodo News Agency*, in BBC Monitoring, 05 September 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Unclear, whether North Korea reactivating nuclear plant, US envoy says," *Kyodo News Agency*, in BBC Monitoring, 06 September 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

22-24 September 2008

North Korea asked the IAEA to remove seals and surveillance equipment at a nuclear reprocessing facility at Yongbyun to conduct tests. North Korea then ordered inspectors of the IAEA to leave the country and notified the agency that it would reintroduce nuclear material into the nuclear complex. According to a spokesperson for the agency, all the agency seals and surveillance equipment were removed from the Yongbyun facilities on 24 September.

—Elaine Sciolino, "North Korea Moves Closer to Restarting Its Nuclear Program, Atomic Agency Says," *The New York Times*, 23 September 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Karen DeYoung, "Unease Grows as N. Korea Asks to Remove IAEA Seals From Reactor," *Washington Post*, 23 September 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-

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nexis.com; "N.K. asks IAEA to remove seals," *The Korea Herald*, September 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Steven Lee Myers, Elaine Sciolino, "North Koreans Bar Inspectors at Nuclear Site," *The New York Times*, 25 September 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

1-3 October 2008

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill visited Pyongyang and had talks about the disputed verification regime for the North Korea's nuclear program with his counterpart Kim Kye-gwan. Hill reportedly proposed a new approach to North Korea, under which North Korea would submit its list of nuclear site to China and still have to permit inspections from the U.S. as well as Chinese officials. According to U.S. government sources, the proposal would be limited to North Korean nuclear activities and facilities that are reported to China in June, and in turn, the United States would provisionally remove North Korea from its terrorism-sponsoring states list. As for weapon program and undeclared other activities, North Korea would declare its intention to cooperate with the comprehensive verification by the IAEA.

—Helene Cooper, "Envoy Pushes To Save Deal On Disarming North Korea," *The New York Times*, 2 October 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Choe Sang-Hun, "U.S. in Nuclear Talks With N. Korea," *The New York Times*, 2 October 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "US may de-list N Korea after submits nuke verification plan," *Kyodo News Agency*, in BBC monitoring, 2 October 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Choe Sang-Hun and Helene Cooper, "U.S. Official Prolongs N. Korea Talks," *The New York Times*, 3 October 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Helene Cooper, "Envoy Leaves North Korea With Issues Unresolved," *The New York Times*, 3 October 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Satoshi Ogawa, "U.S. compromise could delist DPRK," *The Daily Yomiuri*, 4 October 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 October 2008

The United States removed North Korea in its list of states sponsoring terrorism after North Korea agreed to resume disabling its nuclear plant and allow inspectors access to the declared nuclear sites. The State Department issued a statement saying that "North Korea has agreed to a series of verification measures," and "North Korea has also stated it will assume disablement of its nuclear facilities." As for the verification protocol, the department said it would be "finalized and adopted by the six parties in the near future." In response to the U.S. decision, North Korea announced it was resuming the disablement of its nuclear program and would allow international monitors back to the site.

—"North Korea removed from US terror list," *Kyodo News Agency*, in BBC Monitoring, 11 October 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Glenn Kessler, "U.S. Drops North Korea From Terrorism List," *The Washington Post*, 12 October 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Helene Cooper, "U.S. Declares North Korea Off Terror List," *The New York Times*, 12 October 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Nicholas Kralev, "U.S. removes Pyongyang from terrorism blacklist," *The Washington Times*, 12 October 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Choe Sang-Hun and Helene Cooper, "North Koreans Confirm Pledge to Disable Plant," *The New York Times*, 13 October 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

12 November 2008

North Korea refused to allow inspectors to take soil and nuclear waste samples from a nuclear site, claiming that it had never agreed to allow sampling in its territory. The U.S. State of Department said that such a step would

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violate the agreement between them, adding that "it was basically agreed that experts could take samples and remove them from the country for testing."

—Kim Sue-young, "N. Korea, US Differ Over Nuclear Sampling," *Korea Times*, 13 November 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Choe Sang-Hun and Steven Lee Myers, "North Korea Limits Tests of Nuclear Site," *The New York Times*, 13 November 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Jung Sung-ki, "No Document on N. Korean Pledge to Nuclear Sampling," *Korea Times*, 25 November 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

8-11 December 2008

Six-Party Talks are held in Beijing and the parties negotiate a draft of a document on ways to verify North Korea's nuclear information. The negotiation ended without a document.

—Jin Dae-Woong, "Talks resume on N.K. nuke verification: U.S. mulls undisclosed nuclear sampling deal," *The Korea Herald*, 9 December 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Six-party North Korea talks in Beijing said deadlocked," *Yonhap News Agency*, in BBC Monitoring, 10 December 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com ; Jin Dae-Woong, "Nuke envoys fail to narrow gaps over verification pact," *The Korea Herald*, 9 December 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Jon Ward, "N. Korea nuke talks end without deal; Bush legacy of disarmament slips away," *The Washington Times*, 12 December 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Chairman's Statement of the Six-Party Talks 11 December 2008," www.mofat.go.kr.

[Back to Top](#)

2007

16-18 January 2007

In an unusual bilateral meeting, top U.S. envoy to the Six-Party Talks Christopher Hill and his North Korean counterpart Kim Kye-gwan discuss ways to revive the Six-Party Talks. Without disclosing any further detail, North Korea's KCNA website issues a Foreign Ministry statement noting that a "certain agreement" was reached during the meeting. Meanwhile Hill declares that North Korea is willing to return to the Six-Party Talks.

—"U.S., N. Korean Envoys End Three Days of Talks in Berlin," *Yonhap News Agency*, 19 January 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Results of DPRK-U.S. Talks," KCNA website, 19 January 2007, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; "Hill Says N. Korea 'Absolutely' Ready for More Nuclear Talks," *Japan Economic Newswire*, 19 January 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8-13 February 2007

The third session of the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks is held in Beijing, where the participant countries reach an agreement. The adopted "Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement" commits North Korea to shutting down and sealing nuclear facilities at Yongbyon within 60 days and allowing IAEA monitoring and verification in exchange for 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil.

—Audra Ang, "North Korea Agrees to Nuclear Disarmament," *Associated Press*, 13 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kozo Mizoguchi, "Japan Nixes Energy Aid to North Korea Under New Agreement, Cites

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Abduction Issue," *Associated Press*, 13 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Statement by President on Six-Party Talks," *Fed News*, 13 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 March 2007

U.S. Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary Daniel Glaser announces that Washington would authorize the transfer of US\$25 million in frozen North Korean funds that had been held in an account with the Macao-based Banco Delta Asia. Glaser says the money will be transferred to a North Korean bank account in Beijing. Pyongyang had cited the frozen funds as the reason for the DPRK not beginning to shut down its Yongbyon nuclear facility in accordance with the 13 February agreement. At the same time as the financial dispute between the United States and North Korea is being resolved, another round of the Six-Party Talks begins.

—Christopher Bodeen, "U.S., North Korea Resolve Macau Bank Dispute as Six-Party Talks Begin," *Associated Press*, 19 March 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Six-Way Talks Resume Under Shadow of Linger Financial Sanctions Dispute," *Yonhap News Agency*, 19 March 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 March 2007

North Korean envoy to the Six-Party Talks Kim Kye-gwan leaves Beijing as the DPRK refuses to discuss implementing the 13 February agreement to shut down its Yongbyon nuclear facility until after it receives the US\$25 million dollars from its Banco Delta Asia account.

—"Nuclear Negotiators Extend Talks Amid Stalemate Over Frozen N. Korean Funds," *Yonhap News Agency*, 22 March 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Top North Korean Nuclear Envoy Appears to Have Left for Home Amid Stalled Nuclear Talks," *Yonhap News Agency*, 22 March 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 June 2007

A spokesman for the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs says that it has finally received the funds from its Banco Delta Asia account and it will begin implementing the 13 February agreement. The announcement comes over two months past the 14 April deadline to enact the agreement made in February.

—"Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Solution to Issue of Frozen Funds," *Korean Central News Agency*, 25 June 2007, www.kcna.co.jp; "North Korea Says its Banking Row with Washington Resolved," *Associated Press*, 25 June 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 July 2007

IAEA inspectors arrive in North Korea in order to confirm that the DPRK has shut down its Yongbyon nuclear facility. In the meantime the first shipment of heavy fuel oil aid to North Korea arrives from South Korea.

—Bo-mi Lim, "North Korea Receives Oil Shipment Promised for Nuclear Reactor Shutdown," *Associated Press*, 14 July 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea to Shut Down Nuclear Reactor After Months of Delay," *Yonhap News Agency*, 14 July 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 July 2007

IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei confirms that North Korea has shut down all of its five main nuclear facilities which include the 5 MW experimental reactor, the reprocessing plant and the nuclear fuel rod fabrication plant at

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Yongbyon. Meanwhile, as a new round of Six-Party Talks begins, South Korea's nuclear envoy Chun Yung-woo indicated that North Korea expressed its intention to declare and disable all of its nuclear facilities by the end of the year.

—Jae-Soon Chang, "U.N. Inspectors Verify All N. Korea Nuclear Facilities Closed Beyond Reactor," *Associated Press*, 18 July 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jae-Soon Chang, "S. Korea: N. Korea Agrees to Declare and Disable Nuclear Facilities by Year's End," *Associated Press*, 18 July 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 July 2007

The Six-Party Talks end without North Korea giving a hard deadline for when they will completely dismantle all of their nuclear weapons programs. However, U.S. envoy to the Six-Party Talks Christopher Hill says that even without setting a deadline the goal of North Korea disarming its nuclear weapons by the end of the year is "doable."

—Burt Herman, "N. Korea Nuclear Talks End without Setting Deadline for Next Disarmament Moves," *Associated Press*, 20 July 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "S. Korean Envoy Says Parties Unable to Set Dates for N. Korean Disarmament," *Yonhap News Agency*, 20 July 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 September 2007

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill says that North Korea has for the first time offered a timeline to declare and disable all of its nuclear weapons programs by the end of the year. Hill's announcement comes after meeting with North Korea nuclear envoy Kim Kye-gwan in Geneva.

—"U.S., N. Korea Start Diplomatic Normalization Talks," *Yonhap News Agency*, 2 September 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S.: N. Korea to Disable Nuclear Programs," *Associated Press*, 2 September 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 September 2007

Israeli warplanes destroy suspected nuclear facility in Syria while concerns are raised about a potential nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Syria.

—Mark Mazzetti and Helen Cooper, "U.S. Confirms Israeli Strikes Hit Syrian Target Last Week," *New York Times*, 12 September 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Glenn Kessler, "N. Korea, Syria May Be at Work on Nuclear Facility," *Washington Post*, 13 September 2007, www.washingtonpost.com; See also Richard Weitz, "Israeli Air Strike in Syria: International Reactions," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1 November 2007, <http://cns.miis.edu>.

11 September 2007

A team of nine experts from the United States, Russia and China, headed by Sung Kim, director of the U.S. State Department's Office of Korea Affairs, arrive in North Korea to examine and discuss the disabling of nuclear facilities at Yongbyon with North Korean officials. The team is expected to report its findings to the next session of the Six-Party Talks.

—Kyodo News Service, "US Nuclear Envoy, Experts Arrives in North Korea," in *BBC Monitoring*, 11 September 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; *Yonhap News Agency*, "Nuclear Experts Gain Full Access to North Korea's Nuclear Sites," in *BBC Monitoring*, 13 September 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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27 September 2007 - 3 October 2007

The second session of the sixth round of Six-Party Talks is held in Beijing. At the close of the session, the parties adopt the "Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement," which calls on North Korea to declare by 31 December 2007 its entire nuclear program and to disable its main nuclear facilities that had been shut down and sealed under the 13 February accord. The United States pledges to start the process of removing the designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism while all parties reaffirm their commitment to deliver the remaining 900,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea in return for nuclear disablement.

—"Deadline For Disabling N.K. Nukes Set At Year-End," *Korea Herald*, 4 October 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 October 2007

At the close of the inter-Korean summit, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il sign the "Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Relations, Peace and Prosperity," in which the two leaders reaffirm their commitment to the denuclearization process.

—Choe Sang-Hun, "2 Koreas Reach Accord But Skirt Nuclear Program; Summit Ends With Call For Peace Treaty; South Rues Absence of Resolve on Arms," *International Herald Tribune*, 5 October 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Daniel Dombey and Anna Fifield, "Pledge on Permanent Deal to End Korean War," *Financial Times*, 5 October 2007, www.ft.com.

11-18 October 2007

A working group of U.S. experts led by Sung Kim, director of the U.S. State Department's Office of Korea Affairs, visit North Korea to map out a plan for disabling North Korea's nuclear facilities.

—Kyodo News Service, "North Korean, US Experts Hold Talks on Nuclear Disablement Steps," in BBC Monitoring, 12 October 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Xinhua News Agency, "US Team Leaves N Korea After 'Useful' Nuclear Talks," in BBC Monitoring, 18 October 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27-29 November 2007

A fact-finding team composed of ten officials from China, South Korea, Russia and the United States visit North Korea to follow up on the progress in the disablement of the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. The KCNA reports that the officials witnessed the "processes of disabling the 5 MW test reactor, the reprocessing plant and fuel rod plant including the cooling tower and confirmed that the disabling operation is making proper progress."

—Xinhua News Agency, "Six-Party Talks Representatives Arrive in North Korea," in *BBC Monitoring*, 27 November 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KCNA Report on Visit to Area of Nyongbyon by Those Concerned and Nuclear Experts," *Korean Central News Agency*, 30 November 2007, www.kcna.co.jp.

3-5 December 2007

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill makes a trip to North Korea to discuss with his North Korean counterpart Kim Kye-gwan the disablement progress and declaration of all nuclear programs. Hill states that the disablement process is going smoothly and that North Korea has "done a lot of work in preparation of discharging the fuel in the reactor." He also said that North Korea is "pretty close to providing a declaration." During his visit,

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Hill also delivered a letter from U.S. President Bush addressed to Kim Jong-il. In his first direct communication to the North Korean leader, President Bush urges Kim Jong-il to fully disclose all nuclear programs before the end of the year.

—Yonhap News Agency, "Top US Envoy Arrives in North Korea for Nuclear Disclosure Talks," in *BBC Monitoring*, 3 December 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; *Xinhua News Agency*, "US Top Envoy Says North Korea's Nuclear Disarmament 'Going Well,'" in *BBC Monitoring*, 5 December 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Personal Letter to Kim Jong Il From U.S. President," *Korean Central News Agency*, 6 December 2007, www.kcna.co.jp; Brian Knowlton and Choe Sang Hun, "Bush Sends Personal Appeal to Kim Jong Il, North Korean Leader is Urged to Disclose All Nuclear Programs," *International Herald Tribune*, 7 December 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Helen Cooper, "Bush Writes to North Korean Leader," *International Herald Tribune*, 7 December 2007, www.ihf.com.

[Back to Top](#)

2006

10-18 January 2006

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il travels to China and meets with President Hu Jintao. At the unofficial summit meeting, Kim Jong-il reaffirmed North Korea's commitment to the Six-Party Talks. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that the two countries "agreed to continue to the peaceful resolution of the Korean Peninsula's nuclear issue by continually pursuing the six-way talks process."

—"Kim Jong Il Pays Unofficial Visit to China," KCNA website, 18 January 2006, www.kcna.co.jp; Choe Sang-Hun, "Kim's Trip to Beijing Lifts Hopes For Talks; Hu Pushes Korean to Resume Dialogue on Nuclear Issue," *International Herald Tribune*, 19 January 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Anna Field, "N Korea Raises Hopes On Nuclear Impasse," *Financial Times*, 19 January 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 January 2006

Chief nuclear envoys to the Six-Party Talks from North Korea, China and the United States meet in Beijing to discuss ways to revive the Talks. The trilateral meeting is held between U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan and China's Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei.

—Yonhap News Agency, "North Korea, Chinese, US Nuclear Envoys Meet in Beijing," in *BBC Monitoring*, 18 January 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 March 2006

U.S. and North Korean officials hold a meeting in New York where U.S. officials provided a briefing on the punitive financial actions the United States had taken against Banco Delta Asia (BDA). Ri Gun, director of American affairs in the North Korean Foreign Ministry, pressed Washington to cease such efforts threatening that "under such pressure, we cannot return to the six-way talks."

—Glenn Kessler, "N. Korea Sets Terms For Return to Nuclear Talks," *Washington Post*, 9 March 2006,

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www.washingtonpost.com; "N.K. Refuses to Return to Nuclear Talks," *Korea Herald*, 9 March 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 July 2006

North Korea test fires multiple ballistic missiles over the Sea of Japan including a long-range Taepodong-2 that apparently failed or was aborted 42 seconds after it was launched according to U.S. White House and Pentagon officials. The other missiles launched are a mix of short-range Scud-C missiles and intermediate-range Rodong missiles. In reaction to the test, the Bush administration strongly condemns North Korea's activities as "provocations"; however North Korea's Foreign Ministry states that the missile tests were "irrelevant to the six-party talks."

—Norimitsu Onishi and David E. Sanger, "Missiles Fired by North Korea; Tests Protested," *New York Times*, 5 July 2006, www.nytimes.com; Andrew Buncombe, "North Korea Defies US With Missile Tests," *The Independent*, 5 July 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; KCNA, "North Korea Defends Missile Launches," in BBC Monitoring, 6 July 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, "South Korean Analysts Say North Statement Could Show Intent to Rejoin Talks," in BBC Monitoring, 6 July 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 July 2006

The United Nations Security Council adopts a resolution condemning North Korea's missile launches and imposing limited sanctions. Resolution 1695 demands that North Korea suspend its ballistic missile program, and calls on all countries to prevent North Korea from receiving or transferring missile-related items. Furthermore, the resolution "strongly urges" North Korea to abandon its nuclear program and to return to the Six-Party Talks.

—Warren Hoge, "U.N. Council, in Weakened Resolution, Demands End to North Korean Missile Program," *New York Times*, 16 July 2006, www.nytimes.com.

19 August 2006

The director of South Korea's National Intelligence Service, Kim Seung-kyu, stated that North Korea was capable of conducting an underground nuclear test. Speaking at a closed-door briefing to the National Assembly, Director Kim said that "North Korea is believed to have facilities for a nuclear test" and that "the possibility of [a] nuclear test is always open as soon as Kim Jong-il makes a decision."

—Choe Sang-hun, "North Korea Seen as Capable of Test; Nuclear Facilities in Place, Seoul Says," *International Herald Tribune*, 29 August 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 September 2006

After meeting with North Korea officials in Pyongyang, U.S. scholar Selig S. Harrison states that North Korea intends to unload fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor and extract plutonium earlier than had been expected. Harrison quotes North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan as saying that the fuel rods would be unloaded this fall.

—Joseph Kahn, "North Korea to Challenge U.S. on Nuclear Fuel," *New York Times*, 25 September 2006, www.nytimes.com.

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3 October 2006

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement declaring that it plans to conduct a nuclear test. The statement cites "the extreme threat of a nuclear war and U.S. sanctions and pressure" as the reason for North Korea having to bolster its nuclear deterrent. The statement did not specify when the test would take place.

—"DPRK Foreign Ministry Clarifies Stand on New Measures to Bolster War Deterrent," KCNA website, 3 October 2006, www.kcna.co.jp; Anthony Fiola and Dafna Linzer, "N. Korea Pledges Nuclear Test; Need Cited to Deter Threat From U.S., But Not Date is Set," *Washington Times*, 4 October 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jonathan Watts, "North Korea Raises Stakes With Threat to Carry Out Nuclear Weapons Test: Move Aimed At Stalling Financial Sanctions: U.S. and Japan Lead Protest Against 'Reckless Action,'" *The Guardian*, 4 October 2006, in Lexis-Nexis <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 October 2006

The United Nations Security Council issues a statement urging North Korea not to carry out a planned nuclear weapon test saying that such action would "jeopardize peace, stability and security in the region and beyond."

—Warren Hoge, "U.N. Council Presses North Korea to Drop Plans for Nuclear Test," *New York Times*, 7 October 2006, www.nytimes.com.

9 October 2006

North Korea conducts an underground nuclear test. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) releases a report confirming the nuclear test and states that the test was "conducted with [100 percent] indigenous wisdom and technology." The U.N. Security Council holds an emergency meeting, strongly condemning North Korea's test, and vows to enact a "strong and swift" response.

—"DPRK Successfully Conducts Underground Nuclear Test," KCNA website, 9 October 2006, www.kcna.co.jp; Yonhap News Agency, "UN Security Council 'Strongly Condemns' North Korea Nuclear Test," in BBC Monitoring, 9 October 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 October 2006

In a meeting with Kyodo News delegation at Pyongyang's Mansudae Assembly Hall, Kim Yong-nam, president of the DPRK Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, stated that "the issue of future nuclear tests is linked to U.S. policy towards our country." He also stated that North Korea's return to the Six-Party Talks will also depend on U.S. policy towards North Korea.

—Kyodo, "North Korea Says Further Nuclear Tests Dependent on US Policy," in BBC Monitoring, 11 October 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 October 2006

The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopts a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter condemning North Korea's nuclear test of October 9, 2006. Resolution 1718 bans the transfer of nuclear or ballistic missile materials and imposes an embargo on luxury goods to North Korea. It further demands that no further tests or ballistic missile launches take place and calls on North Korea to immediately return to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

—Warren Hoge, "Security Council Supports Sanctions on North Korea," *New York Times*, 15 October 2006,

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www.nytimes.com; Philip Sherwell, "UN Vote Slaps Sanctions on North Korea," *Sunday Telegraph*, 15 October 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 October 2006

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and his North Korean counterpart Kim Kye-gwan hold secret talks in Beijing under the auspices of the Chinese government, where North Korea agrees to return to the Six-Party Talks. After the meeting, U.S. officials downplay the suggestion that North Korea's recent nuclear test would now make negotiations more difficult. According to a statement by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice: "Nobody accepts that [North Korea is] a nuclear power."

—Joseph Kahn and Helene Cooper, "North Korea Will Resume Nuclear Talks," *New York Times*, 1 November 2006, www.nytimes.com; Robert Marquand, "Now Nuclear, North Korea Will Talk," *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 November 2006, www.csmonitor.com.

18-22 December 2006

The second phase of the fifth round of Six-Party Talks resume in Beijing after a 13-month break. After holding five days of negotiations, the talks recess without achieving any tangible progress. North Korea insists that the issue of the frozen funds at Banco Delta Asia (BDA) needs to be resolved. The Chairman's Statement at the close of the session states that the six parties "agreed to recess to report to capitals and to reconvene at the earliest opportunity."

—Lee Joo-hee, "Process of Beijing Talks Under Scrutiny," *Korea Herald*, 23 December 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Tetsuya Suetsugu and Hiroshi Oyama, "6-Party Talks End in Stalemate," *Daily Yomiuri*, 23 December 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Joseph Kahn, "Talks End on North Korea's Nuclear Weapons," *New York Times*, 23 December 2006, www.nytimes.com; Edward Cody, "Nuclear Talks With N. Korea End in Failure; Six-Party Process Thrown Into Doubt," *Washington Post*, 23 December 2006, www.washingtonpost.com.

[Back to Top](#)

2005

5 January 2005

Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, says the United States should not even "dream" of North Korean disarmament while the two nations have hostile relations.

—"Do Not Dream of Unilateral 'Disarmament': Rodong Sinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 5 January 2004, www.kcna.co.jp "N. Korea Says U.S. Demand for Disarmament 'Nonsense'," Yonhap News Agency, 5 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

5 January 2005

International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei tells Reuters that the North Korean nuclear program poses the greatest proliferation threat to the world and is worsening.

—"N.K. Nuke Crisis Deepening: IAEA Chief," *Korea Times*, 7 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "IAEA

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Chief Says N. Korea's Nuclear Crisis Getting Worse," *Chosun Ilbo*, 7 January 2005, in OSC Document ID KPP20050106000195.

6 January 2005

White House spokesman Scott McClellan says at a press briefing that "it is in North Korea's interest" to resume the Six-Party Talks as soon as possible.

—"Press Briefing by Scott McClellan," Office of the Press Secretary, U.S. White House, 6 January 2004, www.state.gov; "U.S. Urges DPRK to Return to Six-Party Talks," Xinhua General News Service, 6 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

8 January 2005

U.S. Congressman Tom Lantos (D-CA), the ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Committee, visits Pyongyang to discuss the DPRK's nuclear program and human rights issues. Lantos sponsored the North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004.

—"U.S. Congressman Arrives in N. Korea for Four-day Trip," Yonhap News Agency, 8 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. Rights Act Sponsor Heads to North Korea," *Korea Times*, 8 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Issue of Six-Party Talks," Korean Central News Agency website, 8 January 2005, www.kcna.co.jp; *North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-333)*, 18 October 2004, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States House of Representatives, www.internationalrelations.house.gov.

8 January 2005

A DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman says the United States, which has a "hostile policy" towards the DPRK, is wholly responsible for the nuclear issue deadlock.

—"Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Issue of Six-Party Talks," Korean Central News Agency, 8 January 2005, www.kcna.co.jp; Yonhap News Agency, 9 January 2005, in "U.S. Policy Shift, Key to Resolve Nuclear Issue, Says North Korea," OSC Document ID KPP20050109000013; "North Calls on U.S. to Change Its Nuclear Stance," Asia Pulse, 10 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 January 2005

U.S. Congressman Tom Lantos returns from his visit to Pyongyang and says he told North Korean officials that it is in their country's interest to return to the Six-Party Talks. Included among the officials Lantos met with were Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan.

—"U.S. Congressman Urges N. Korea to Return to 6-Way Talks," Japan Economic Newswire, 11 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. Congressman Says He Discussed North Korea's Nuclear Program with Pyongyang Officials," Associated Press, 10 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Jim Yardley, "World Briefing Asia: North Korea: Congressman 'Optimistic'," *New York Times*, 12 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

13 January 2005

Japanese Defense Agency Director General Yoshinori Ono meets with South Korean Minister of Defense Yun

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Kwang-ung and both reaffirm their commitments to continue to work towards resuming the Six-Party Talks at an early date.

—"Kim Hyung, "Japanese Defense Chief Visits S. Korea," Yonhap News Agency, 12 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Japan's Defense Chief Arrives in S. Korea for Two-day Visit," Japan Economic News, 12 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Japan, S. Korea Confirm Efforts to Resume 6-Way Talks," Jiji Press Ticker, 13 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11-14 January 2005

A congressional delegation led by U.S. Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA), vice chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, visits Pyongyang to discuss North Korea's nuclear weapons program with the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly Kim Yŏng-nam, Foreign Minister Paek Nam-Sun, and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan. Weldon states that he and his delegation emphasized to the North Koreans the United States' commitment to a peaceful resolution of the nuclear crisis.

—"U.S. Lawmakers Arrive in Pyongyang: Report," Yonhap News Agency, 11 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Paek Nam Sun Meets U.S. Congress Delegation," Korean Central News Agency, 12 January 2005, www.kcna.co.jp; "Kim Yong Nam Meets U.S. Congress Delegation," Korean Central News Agency, 13 January 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; Sang-hun Choe, "U.S. Congressional Delegation Tries to Get North Korea to Rejoin Talks on Nuclear Weapons Programs," Associated Press, 13 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Pyongyang Ready to Return to Nuclear Talks: Weldon," *Korea Times*, 15 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Will Return to Nuclear Discussions; Six-Party Talks May Resume Within Weeks, U.S. says," *International Herald Tribune*, 15 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

14 January 2005

The DPRK's official Korean Central News Agency says North Korea will return to the Six-Party Talks if U.S. President George W. Bush pursues a more friendly policy towards the DPRK.

—"N.K to Treat U.S. as 'Friend' If It Ceases to Intervene: KCNA," Yonhap News Agency, 14 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Anthony Faiolo, "N. Korea Says It's Ready to Resume Nuclear Talks; In Meetings with U.S. Congressmen, Government Says U.S. Must Drop Its 'Belligerent Manner'," *Washington Post*, 14 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

14 January 2005

U.S. Department of State spokesman Richard Boucher says the United States hopes that North Korea's recent statements about returning to the Six-Party Talks "do, indeed, presage a return to the talks."

—"Daily Press Briefing," U.S. Department of State, 14 January 2005, www.state.gov; "U.S. Reacts Cautiously to Reported North Korean Overture," Agence France Presse, 14 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

18 January 2005

U.S. Congressman Curt Weldon reportedly says to Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda and Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi that North Korea will return to the Six-Party Talks in early February, provided that U.S. government leaders refrain from "inflammatory rhetoric."

—"N. Korea Could Return to Nuke Talks in Feb.: U.S. Lawmaker," Japan Economic Newswire, 18 January 2005, in

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Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Has No Intent to Keep Nukes Forever: Weldon," Japan Economic Newswire, 18 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

18 January 2005

Newly appointed U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says the DPRK can receive multinational security assurances in exchange for abandoning its nuclear weapons.

—"N. Korea Can Get Multinational Security Guarantee for Nukes: Rice," Yonhap News Agency, 19 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Rice Urges N. Korea to Resume Talks, Promises No Attack," Japan Economic Newswire, 18 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

24 January 2005

According to Japan's *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, China is encouraging the DPRK to admit the existence of its uranium enrichment activities for nuclear weapons development.

—Hiroshi Minegishi, "China Urges North Korea to Announce the Existence of Its HEU Plan, In An Effort to Promote Six-Party Talks," *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 24 January 2005, in "PRC Urges DPRK to Admit Existence of Highly-Enriched Uranium Plan," OSC ID JPP20050124000012.

26 January 2005

Libyan President Moammar Gadhafi (Mu'ammar al Qadhafi) urges North Korea and Iran to follow Libya's example and give up nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction programs.

—"N. Korea Should Give Up Nuclear Program: Gadhafi," Yonhap News Agency, 26 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Libyan Leader Urges N. Korea to Give up Nuclear Ambitions," Japan Economic Newswire, 25 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

27 January 2005

Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda says Japan "will make a strong appeal" to address the issue of abductions of Japanese nationals at the next round of the Six-Party Talks.

—"Japan Hits Back at N. Korea for 'Unacceptable' Attitude," Japan Economic Newswire, 27 January 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

27 January 2005

Japan's TV Asahi airs part of an interview with Hwang Chang-yŏp, the highest ranking North Korean defector in South Korea. Hwang reportedly says that before leaving North Korea he heard from a senior official in the military industry department of the Korean Workers' Party Central Committee that North Korea had reached an agreement with another country to build nuclear weapons by producing enriched uranium.

—Tokyo TV Asahi, 27 January 2005 in "DPRK Defector Hwang Discusses Flow of Uranium Ore from DPRK to China on Japan TV," OSC Document ID JPP20050128000003.

28 January 2005

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko denies media reports that North Korea may have purchased nuclear weapons from states of the former Soviet Union.

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—Interfax, 28 January 2005, in "Russia Denies North Korea Bought Nuclear Weapons from Former Soviet States," OSC Document ID CEP20050128000113.

2 February 2005

U.S. President George W. Bush says the United States is working "to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions" during the State of the Union Address. The statement, which marks the beginning of his second term as president, is perceived to be less confrontational than previous statements.

—"State of the Union Address," Office of the Press Secretary, 2 February 2005, U.S. White House, www.whitehouse.gov; "Bush Makes Terse Reference to North Korea in Key Address," Agence France Presse, 3 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Bush's Restraint Sends Silent Message to Pyongyang," Yonhap News Agency, 4 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

2 February 2005

According to articles in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*, scientific tests conducted at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory have led U.S. officials to conclude that nearly two tons of uranium hexafluoride sold to Libya, which can be enriched and used in a nuclear device, most likely originated from North Korea.

—David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "Tests Said to Tie Deal on Uranium to North Korea," *New York Times*, 2 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Glenn Kessler, "North Korea May Have Sent Libya Nuclear Material, U.S. Tells Allies," *Washington Post*, 2 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

2-3 February 2005

Michael Green, U.S. Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, visits Seoul to meet with Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon, Deputy Foreign Minister Song Min-soon, and Deputy Secretary-General of the National Security Council Lee Jong-seok to discuss resuming the Six-Party Talks and the two tons of uranium hexafluoride believed to have been transferred from North Korea to Libya.

—"U.S. Official Arrives for Consultations on N.K. Nukes," *Korea Times*, 2 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. National Security Official Arrives in Seoul," Yonhap News Agency, 2 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Joo Sang-Min, "Seoul, U.S. Officials Discuss Alleged N.K. Uranium Export," *Korea Herald*, 4 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

3 February 2005

The Washington Post reports that unnamed U.S. and IAEA officials say evidence linking North Korea to uranium sold to Libya is inconclusive and Pakistan instead may have been the real source of proliferation.

—Glenn Kessler and Dafna Linzer, "Nuclear Evidence Could Point to Pakistan," *Washington Post*, 3 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Pakistan May be the Source of Libya's Uranium Hexafluoride," *Press Trust of India*, 3 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

9 February 2005

Michael Green, U.S. Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, travels to Beijing and delivers a letter from U.S. President George W. Bush to Chinese President Hu Jintao that urges China to apply greater diplomatic pressure on North Korea to disarm its nuclear weapons program.

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—David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "U.S. Asking China to Increase Pressure on North Korea to End Its Nuclear Program," *New York Times*, 9 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "US Asks China to Press North Korea on Nuclear Issue: Report," Agence France Presse, 9 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

10 February 2005

A North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman announces that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons for "self-defense" and will be suspending its participation in the Six-Party Talks indefinitely due to the U.S. administration's hostile policy towards the DPRK. The spokesman specifically mentions U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's reference to the DPRK as an "outpost of tyranny" and President George W. Bush's State of the Union Address that includes the ultimate objective of "ending tyranny in our world."

—"DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-Party Talks for Indefinite Period," Korean Central News Agency, 10 February 2005, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; James Brooke and David E. Sanger, "North Koreans Say They Hold Nuclear Arms," *New York Times*, 11 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N.Korea Suspends Nuke Talks, Says it Produced Nukes," Japan Economic Newswire, 10 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

10 February 2005

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan urges North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks to resolve the nuclear issue.

—Kyodo News Service, "UN Chief Urges North Korea to Resume Six-Party Talks," in BBC Monitoring, 10 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Kofi Annan Urges North Korea to Return to Talks," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 10 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

10 February 2005

U.S. Whitehouse Spokesman Scott McClellan says the United States will continue to pursue "a peaceful, diplomatic solution" to the nuclear crisis, and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice urged North Korea to return to negotiations rather than risk "further international isolation."

—"U.S. Committed to Diplomatic Solution to N. Korea Nuke Row," Japan Economic Newswire, 10 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Anned Gearan, "Rice Warns that North Korea Should Avoid Confrontation with World over Nuclear Issue," Associated Press, 10 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Rice Says Pullout From Six Party Talks to Only Deepen DPRK's Isolation," Xinhua News Service, 10 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

10 February 2005

South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon says he is disappointed with North Korea's announcement that it is suspending its participation in the Six-Part Party talks. Ban says he expects China to play a more "positive" role in persuading the DPRK back to the negotiating table.

—"S. Korea Minister Expects China to Take 'More Positive' Role," Japan Economic Newswire, 10 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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10 February 2005

Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Alexander Yakovenko says Russia "regrets" the DPRK's decision to suspend the Six-Party Talks but still feels that the nuclear issue should be resolved through the six-way forum.

—Ksenia Kaminskaya, "RF Hopes for Soonest Resumption of 6-Sided Talks on Korea," ITAR-TASS News Agency, 10 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Russia Stands for Resolving Security Problem of DPRK through Negotiations," Xinhua News Service, 10 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 February 2005

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi says bringing North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks will still be first priority for Japan to deal with the nuclear crisis.

—"Japan Watching N. Korea's Intentions in Suspending Nuke Talks," Japan Economic Newswire, 10 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 February 2005

North Korea's Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Han Söng-ryöl says a U.S. decision to conduct direct bilateral negotiations with the DPRK would be perceived as "a signal that the United States is changing its hostile policy," giving North Korea the necessary impetus to rejoin the Six-Party Talks.

—Pak Ch'an-su, "North Korea 'The United States Should Directly Come to the Dialogue,'" *Hankyoreh* website, 12 February 2005, in "DPRK's UN. Envoy: "'Direct Dialogue' Signals Change in U.S. Hostile Policy' Toward DPRK," OSC Document ID KPP20050211000110; Sang-hun Choe, "Report: North Korea Demands Direct Dialogue with U.S. to Defuse Tension," Associated Press, 11 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 February 2005

U.S. White House Spokesman Scott McClellan states Washington will not negotiate bilaterally with North Korea but adds that "there's plenty of opportunity for North Korea to speak directly with us in the context of the Six-Party Talks."

—"Press Briefing," Office of the Press Secretary, 11 February 2005, U.S. White House, www.whitehouse.gov; "U.S. Rejects Bilateral Talks with N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 11 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; George Gedda, "U.S. Rejects North Korea Appeal for One-on-one Nuclear Talks," Associated Press, 11 February 2005 in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

12 February 2005

Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing tells U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice via telephone that Beijing will work with all relevant parties to resume the Six-Party Talks as soon as possible.

—Soo-Jeong Lee, "China Tells U.S. It Will Push to Revive Talks on North Korean Nuclear Standoff," Associated Press, 13 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Keith Bradsher and James Brooke, "China Calls on North Korea to Return to Regional Talks," *New York Times*, 13 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "China Tells U.S. It Will Push for Resumption of N. Korean Nuclear Talks," Agence France Presse, 13 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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14 February 2005

South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reaffirm their commitment to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis within the Six-Party Talks and to increase diplomatic efforts to bring North Korea back to the negotiations as soon as possible "without any preconditions."

—"S. Korea, U.S. Agree to Continue to Pursue Diplomatic (sic)," Yonhap News Agency, 14 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "S. Korea, U.S. Foreign Ministers Meet for Talks on N. Korea," Yonhap News Agency, 14 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S., S. Korea Agree to Step Up Diplomatic Efforts on N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

14 February 2005

South Korean Unification Minister Chŏng Dong-yŏng says to the National Assembly that North Korea's 10 February statement of possession of nuclear weapons "does not make North Korea a nuclear armed state."

—"South Korea Says Engagement with North Korea Unshaken," Agence France Press, 14 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "S. Korea, U.S. Foreign Ministers Meet for Talks on N. Korea," Yonhap News Agency, 14 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

16 February 2005

A bipartisan six-member delegation of the U.S. Congress, which was led by Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) to the January 2005 visit to Pyongyang, sends a letter to the DPRK Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly Kim Yŏng-nam urging North Korea to reconsider its decision to suspend its participation in the Six-Party Talks.

—Yonhap News Agency, "Weltŏn Ŭiwŏn, Kimyŏngnam'e 'Hoedam Ch'amga' Ch'okku Sŏhan," in *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 17 February 2005, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "U.S. Congressmen Urge Pyongyang to Abandon Its Nuclear Gambling," Yonhap News Agency, 16 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

17 February 2005

Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing and Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura consult and agree that both countries should work together to convince North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks. Machimura says he expects "a significant role by China" to help bring North Korea back to the negotiations.

—"Japan Calls on China to Persuade N. Korea Into Talks," Jiji Press, 16 February 2005, in "Machimura Speaks to Li Zhaoxing, Asks PRC to Persuade DPRK to Rejoin Talks," OSC Document ID JPP20050216000110; "China, Japan Agree to Jointly Press N. Korea to Return to Talks," Agence France Presse, 16 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

17 February 2005

South Korean Ambassador to China Kim Ha-chung says that China has much greater leverage over North Korea than is currently employed or realized.

—Lee Yŏng-sŏp, "Kimhajung Chujungdaesa: 'Chung Taebuk Appakk'adŭ Hyŏndankyesŏn Anssŭl Kŏt'," *Hankook Ilbo*, 18 February 2005, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Ambassador Says China's Role Bigger Than Expected," *Korea Times*, 19 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "China Could Twist North Korea's Arm: Envoy," *Chosun Ilbo*, 18 February 2005, in OSC Document ID KPP20050217000180.

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18 February 2005

At a Korea University breakfast, U.S. envoy to the Six-Party Talks Christopher Hill says China and the United States are in absolute agreement in the goal of bringing North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks.

—"U.S., China in Absolute Agreement on N. Korea: Envoy," Yonhap News Agency, 18 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 February 2005

North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Han Söng-ryöi says the DPRK will return to the Six-Party Talks if Washington promises peaceful coexistence and noninterference in Pyongyang's internal affairs.

—"NKorean Diplomat Says Nuclear Talks Possible if US Drops Hostility: Report," Agence France Presse, 19 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Pyongyang's Top Envoy Urges Washington to Promise Coexistence," Yonhap News Agency, 19 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

19 February 2005

Following a meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura and Japanese Defense Agency Chief Yoshinori Ono (also known as the "two plus two" talks), Rice says the group urges North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks to end its nuclear programs. Rice says North Korea should return to the talks "so that people don't have to contemplate other measures."

—"Japan, U.S Want N. Korea Back to Nuke Talks, Expect China Role," Japan Economic Newswire, 19 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Barry Schweid, "U.S., Japan Urge North Korea to Return to Six-Party Talks," Associated Press, 19 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S., Japan Express 'Deep Concern' Over N. Korea," Xinhua News Service, 21 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

19-22 February 2005

China's special envoy to North Korea Ning Fukui and other officials travel to Pyongyang to discuss resuming the Six-Party Talks with the DPRK Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly Kim Yöng-nam and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il. North Korean officials say they will return to the Six-Party Talks if the United States shows "trustworthy sincerity."

—"Chinese Official Meets N.K. Leaders," *Korea Times*, 21 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Stephanie Hoo, "Chinese Envoy in Pyongyang Amid Flurry of Diplomatic Efforts on North Korean Nuclear Standoff," Associated Press, 21 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Agrees to Conditional Return to Dialogue Table," Yonhap News Agency, 22 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Charles Whelan, "Roadblock Still Stands After Kim Jong-Il Climb Down: Analysts," Agence France Presse, 22 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

24 February 2005

South Korea's National Intelligence Service says in a report to the National Assembly's Intelligence Committee that they believe North Korea does not possess any nuclear bombs made with highly enriched uranium (HEU), and that North Korea has not reached the stage of building a large-scale uranium enrichment plant.

—Chöng Chae-kwön, "Puk, Uranyumnongch'uk Sönggong Mothantüt/P'üllut'onyum Hwakporo Haek 1~2 Kae,"

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Hankyoreh Shinmun, 25 February 2005, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "N. Korea Has Yet to Build HEU-Based Nuke Bombs: NIS Report," Yonhap News Agency, 24 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

26 February 2005

Top negotiators to the Six-Party Talks Christopher Hill of the United States, Kenichiro Sasae of Japan and Song Min-sun of South Korea meet in Seoul to discuss the resumption of negotiations and ways to urge North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks.

—"S. Korea, U.S., Japan Urge N. Korea to Return to Six-Way Talks," Yonhap News Agency, 26 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Representatives of Japan, the United States and South Korea Agreed Saturday on the Need for North Korea to Return Promptly to the Stalled Six-Way Talks on its Nuclear Weapons Programs," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 26 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "S. Korea, U.S., Japan Struggle to Deal With N. Korea," Yonhap News Agency, 27 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

28 February 2005

The Kyodo News Service reports that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il gave four conditions for North Korea's return to the Six-Party Talks to the head of the Chinese Communist Party's International Department Wang Jiarui during the 19-22 February meeting in Pyongyang. The four conditions for the United States are a security guarantee, reasons for labeling North Korea an "outpost of tyranny," willingness to negotiate on an equal basis, and the ability to demonstrate trustworthiness through its actions.

—"N. Korea Sets 4 Conditions for Return to Six-Way Talks," Japan Economic Newswire, 28 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Lays Out Nuke Talk Conditions," United Press International, 28 February 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

1 March 2005

According to the Kyodo World Service North Korean leader Kim Jong-il tells Chinese Communist Party International Department head Wang Jiarui that the DPRK has produced nuclear weapons and that North Korea possessing them is "not something new that happened yesterday or today." The Chinese Foreign Ministry declines to comment on the matter.

—Kyodo World Service, 1 March 2005, in " 'Source' Says Kim Jong Il Told PRC Envoy Nuclear Weapons Not 'New'," OSC Document ID JPP20050301000009; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China website, 1 March 2005, in "Transcript of PRC FM Spokesman News Conference" on 1 March 2005, OSC Document ID CPP20050301000161.

2 March 2005

South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon says during his weekly press briefing that if North Korea returns to the Six-Party Talks, the DPRK will be able to negotiate one-on-one with the United States within the framework of the multilateral discussions.

—"N. Korea Will Be Granted Direct Talks with U.S.: FM," Yonhap News Agency, 2 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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2 March 2005

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a rare memorandum outlining the DPRK's position on the Six-Party Talks. The memorandum explains why North Korea feels that currently there are "no grounds whatsoever to sit face to face with the United States, whether it is at the Six-Party Talks or DPRK-U.S. bilateral talks." The memorandum outlines what the United States must do in order to resume the multilateral negotiations over North Korea's nuclear issue. A spokesperson for the DPRK says that North Korea "will go to the talks any time if the U.S. takes a trustworthy sincere attitude and moves to provide conditions and justification for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks."

—The United States Will Pay a Due Price for Rupturing the Resolution of the Nuclear Issue Between the DPRK and the United States," Foreign Ministry Memorandum, 2 March 2005, in "DPRK Issues Rare Foreign Ministry 'Memorandum' on 6-Party Talks," OSC Feature 4 March 2005, ID FEA20050303001661 ; "DPRK's Stand on Six-Party Talks Reclarified (sic)," Korean Central News Agency, 2 March 2005, www.kcna.co.jp; "Pyongyang Reaffirms Its Willingness to Return to Talks," Yonhap News Agency, 2 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Clarifies Stance on Rejoining 6-Way Talks: Xinhua," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

2 March 2005

Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf says that former nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan "may have given some centrifuges or know-how [to North Korea] but they developed their nuclear programs from Western technology."

—Musharraf Acknowledges Nuclear Know-How Transfer to N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

6 March 2005

Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing says that while China remains committed to the peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula it also believes that "the legitimate concerns of the DPRK should be addressed." Li also says that the North Korean leadership has stated that they are "ready and willing to continue to participate in the Six-Party Talks." Li remains noncommittal on China's stance towards the existence of a secret North Korean uranium enrichment program, only saying to reporters "I don't know anything more than you do."

— Xinhua Domestic Service, 6 March 2005, in "Comparison--Text of FM Li Zhaoxing's News Conference 6 March During NPC Session," OSC Document ID CPP20050306000157; "China Calls for Attention to N. Korean Concerns in Nuclear Talks," Xinhua Financial Network News, 7 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Joe McDonald, "China Says North Korea Willing to Return to Nuclear Talks," The Associated Press, 6 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Hong Kong AFP, 6 March 2005, in "PRC FM Li Zhaoxing Comments on DPRK Uranium Program Situation," OSC Document ID CPP20050306000092; Joseph Kahn, "China Doubts U.S. Data on North Korean Nuclear Work," New York Times, 7 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

7 March 2005

An article in the *Asahi Shimbun* cites unnamed Japanese government officials who say that the United States handed over to the Japanese government significant test result evidence that allegedly proves North Korea exported uranium hexafluoride to Libya. The article also says that during his meeting with Japanese Chief Cabinet

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Secretary Hosoda Hiroyuki and other officials that the U.S. National Security Council's Asia director Michael Green revealed that North Korea had exported the uranium to Libya through Pakistan's A.Q. Khan nuclear black market.

—Proof Libya Got North's Uranium," *Asahi Shimbun*, 7 March 2005, in "Japan: High-Level Sources Say U.S. Has 'Solid Evidence' of Nuclear Black Market," OSC Document ID JPP20050307000048.

8 March 2005

White House Spokesman Scott McClellan reiterates the U.S. position that Washington will not have bilateral negotiations with North Korea outside of the Six-Party Talks framework.

—U.S. Rejects Calls for Direct Talks with N. Korea," *Chosun Ilbo* website, 9 March 2005, in OSC Document ID KPP20050308000905.

9 March 2005

According to newly appointed South Korean ambassador to the United States, Hong Seok-hyon, U.S. President George W. Bush said in a meeting with Hong that Washington would like to see China take on a larger role in resolving the Korean Peninsula nuclear crisis because the PRC has "lots of leverage" with which to persuade North Korea. Hong says that Bush also indicated a willingness on the part of the United States to reach a "give and take" deal with North Korea.

—U.S. Ready for Serious Negotiations with N. Korea: Envoy," Yonhap News Agency, 9 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

9 March 2005

Newly appointed U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and lead U.S. envoy to the Six-Party Talks Christopher Hill says during a policy discussion at the National Strategy Institute in Seoul that North Korea will have to make a fundamental decision between giving up its nuclear weapons or facing international isolation. Hill states that the United States will not negotiate bilaterally with North Korea outside the Six-Party Talks framework, but should the DPRK return to the discussions that Washington will engage Pyongyang's concerns with "passion and creativity." Hill also says that the Six-Party Talks could serve as the basis for a multilateral relationship between the Northeast Asian countries once the nuclear issue has been resolved.

— "No Halfway House for North Korea: Hill," *Chosun Ilbo* website, 10 March 2005, in OSC Document ID KPP20050309000114; "Hill Negative on N.K. Demand Outside Nuke Talks," *Korea Times*, 10 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Lee Joo-hee, "Hill Says 6-Party Talks Should Grow into Multilateral Asia, U.S. Meetings," *Korea Herald*, 10 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

10 March 2005

The European Union (EU) Parliament passes a resolution calling on the EU to be included as a seventh member in the Six-Party Talks.

—Kyodo World Service, 10 March 2005, in "EU Parliament Calls for EU's Entry to 6-Way Talks on N. Korea," in OSC Document ID JPP20050310000115, "EU Lawmakers Seek European Role in North Korea Talks," Paris AFP, 10 March 2005, in "European Parliament Wants EU Participation in North Korean Proliferation Talks, OSC Document ID EUP20050310000175.

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11 March 2005

In response to the European Union's 10 March resolution to join the Six-Party Framework, an unnamed government source tells the Yonhap News Agency that both the South Korean and U.S. governments have reservations about EU participation in the talks.

—S. Korea Reserved About Greater EU Role in N. Korean Nuke Issue," Yonhap News Agency, 11 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 March 2005

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says in an interview with Reuters news service that North Korea is "throwing up smoke screens" in reference to North Korea's decision to stall returning to the Six-Party Talks until Washington gives up its "hostile policy" towards Pyongyang. Rice says in an interview with the *Washington Times* that the United States has to be careful about "front-loading incentives" with North Korea since Pyongyang "took the carrots... and started breaking their obligations," under the 1994 Agreed Framework.

—Nicholas Kravetz, "Rice Vows No Apology to North Korea," *Washington Times*, 12 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Rice Says U.S. Not to Give Incentives to DPRK," Xinhua General News Service, 12 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 March 2005

A spokesperson for the Russian Embassy in Seoul says that Russian Atomic Energy deputy head Sergei Antipov's 10 March statements about North Korea not possessing nuclear weapons is Antipov's personal opinion and does not reflect Russia's official position. However the spokesperson did not go so far as to say that Russia believes that the DPRK possesses nuclear weapons.

—Russian Embassy Rebuffs Remark on North Korea's Nuclear Capability," Korea Times, 12 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency, 10 March 2005, in "North Korea Has No Nuclear Weapons: Russian Official," in OSC Document ID KPP20050310000121.

15 March 2005

A spokesperson for the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs says that North Korea will bolster its nuclear arsenal in response to the "hostile" joint U.S.-ROK military exercises planned for the weekend.

— "DPRK FM Spokesman Denounces U.S.-S. Korea Joint War Exercises," Korean Central News Agency, 15 March 2005, www.kcna.co.jp; "N. Korea Blasts S. Korea-U.S. Joint Military Exercise," Yonhap News Agency, 15 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "DPRK Blasts U.S.- S. Korean Plan for War Games," Xinhua General News Service, 15 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Soo-Jeong Lee, "North Korea Denounces U.S.-South Korean Military Exercises, Says It Will Bolster Nuclear Arsenal," Associated Press, 15 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Threatens to Build More A-Bombs to Deter War Drills," Agence France Presse, 15 March 2005, in web.lexis-nexis.com.

17 March 2005

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director, Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, tells a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that the DIA has assessed that the DPRK is not likely to surrender all of his nuclear weapon capabilities.

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—N. Korea Unlikely to Give Up All Nuclear Capabilities: Pentagon," Japan Economic Newswire, 17 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

18-21 March 2005

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice goes on a tour of Northeast Asia to coordinate efforts to resume the Six-Party Talks with Japan, South Korea and China. While in Tokyo, Rice meets with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura where the two top diplomats agree on the need for China to play a greater role in persuading North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons. While in Seoul Rice meets with ROK Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon and Unification Minister Chung Dong-young. Ban praises Rice's description of North Korea as a "sovereign state" and her assurance that the United States has no intention to attack the DPRK, saying that he believes those statements are "good in creating an atmosphere for resuming the Six-Party Talks." In a joint news conference with Ban, Rice reiterates the U.S. position that North Korea can talk directly with the United States within the framework of the multilateral negotiations. In Beijing, Rice meets with Chinese President Hu Jintao. Hu emphasizes China's firm commitment to solving the nuclear issue. Rice expresses to Hu the importance of China's role for making progress on the negotiations. At a press conference in Beijing at the end of her Asia tour, Rice says that the U.S. will use "other means" for pressing North Korea to disarm its nuclear weapons should the Six-Party Talks fail.

—U.S. Wants N. Korea Back at Talks, China to Embrace Democracy," Japan Economic Newswire, 19 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Ann Gearan, "Rice Insists Coalition Unifies to Stop North Korean Nukes," The Associated Press, 19 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com "Rice Presses N. Korea to Return to Talks, China to Embrace Democracy," Agence France Presse, 19 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Wang Mian, "Roundup: Rice's S. Korean Trip Focuses on Nuclear Issue," Xinhua General News Service, 20 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis.com; "Direct Talks with DPRK in Six-Party Talks Possible: Rice," Xinhua General News Service, 20 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com : "U.S. Has No Intention to Attack DPRK: Rice," Xinhua News Service, 20 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S., S. Korea Urge N. Korea to Return to 6-Party Talks," Japan Economic Newswire, 20 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; U.S. Secretary of State's Talks in China Dominated by N. Korea, Taiwan," Xinhua Financial Network News, 21 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. to Find 'Other Means' if N. Korea. Nuke Talks Fail: Rice," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Ann Gearan, "Rice Raises Stakes Over North Korean Arms Talks," The Associated Press, 21 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

20 March 2005

An article in the *Washington Post* rebuts the 2 February news story that cited U.S. intelligence officials claiming that North Korea had sold uranium hexafluoride to Libya. The news article says that it was Pakistan not North Korea who directly sold the uranium to Libya. The article further alleges that U.S. officials misled South Korea, Japan and China about North Korea's role in the transaction in an effort to get those countries to step up their pressure on the DPRK.

—Dafna Linzer, "U.S. Misled Allies About Nuclear Export; North Korea Sent Material to Pakistan, Not to Libya," *Washington Post*, 20 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Sridhar Krishnaswami, "U.S. Hid Pakistan Role in Nuclear Deals," *The Hindu*, 21 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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23 March 2005

Despite increasing domestic political pressure to impose sanctions on North Korea due to the DPRK's lack of cooperation on the abductee issue, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi says he will hold off on imposing sanctions on Pyongyang because he believes North Korea will come back to the Six-Party Talks.

—Kyodo World Service, 23 March 2005, in "Further on Koizumi's Comments on DPRK, Other Issues," OSC Document ID JPP20050323000086; Shingo Ito, "Japan's Koizumi Says No Sanctions Now on DPRK, Sees Six-Party Talks Resuming," Hong Kong AFP, 23 March 2005, in OSC Document ID JPP20050323000083.

22-27 March 2005

North Korean Premier Pak Pong-ju travels to China for six days where he meets with top Chinese officials including President Hu Jintao, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and Jia Qinglin, Politburo member and chairman of the People's Political Consultative Conference. On the first day of his visit Pak tells Wen that the DPRK has never opposed nor abandoned the Six-Party Talks and that North Korea will return when the conditions are right. Wen encourages North Korea to rejoin the talks, calling it "the realistic choice" for resolving the current standoff.

—North Korean Premier in Beijing Amid Renewed Nuclear Threats," Agence France Presse, 22 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N.K. Premier Delivers Kim Jong-Il's Letter to China's President," Yonhap News Agency, 23 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Hu Commits to China's Role for Resuming Six-Party Talks," Yonhap News Agency, 23 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korea Tells China It Has Not Given Up on Nuclear Talks," Xinhua Financial Network News, 23 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Chinese President Hu Meets N. Korean Premier Pak," Japan Economic Newswire, 23 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Joe McDonald, "Chinese Leader Steps Up Pressure on North Korea to Resume Nuclear Talks, Calling Them 'Only Correct Choice'," The Associated Press, 23 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Joe McDonald, "China President Said to Offer Help Restarting Nuclear Talks with North Korea," The Associated Press, 23 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "Chinese President Urges N. Korea to Play Constructive Role in the Crisis Talks," Agence France Presse, 23 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

31 March 2005

An unnamed spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry tells the Korean Central News Agency says that the DPRK believes the Six-Party Talks should be converted to a forum for arms reduction.

—DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Denuclearization of Korea," Korean Central News Agency, 31 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, www.kcna.co.jp; "Pyongyang Calls for Arms Reduction Talks," Yonhap News Agency, 31 March 2005, in "DPRK Urges 6-Way Talks Transformed to 'Arms Reduction Talks'," OSC Document ID KPP20050331000160; "Removal of U.S. Nuclear Threat Needed to Denuclearize Korean Peninsula: DPRK," Xinhua General News Service, 31 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Wants 6-Way Talks to Evolve into Disarmament Talks," Japan Economic Newswire, 31 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Bo-Mi Lim, "North Korea Demands Nuclear Talks on Equal Basis, Calls on U.S. to Dismantle Threats in Region," The Associated Press, 31 March 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

1 April 2005

Top U.S. envoy to the Six-Party Talks Christopher Hill calls North Korea's recent statement about making the multilateral negotiations into arms reduction talks "not serious."

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—Yonhap News Agency, 1 April 2005, in "Top U.S. Envoy Dismisses Pyongyang's Disarmament Proposal," OSC Document ID KPP20050401000186; Burt Herman, "U.S. Envoy Dismisses North's Latest Demand; Delayed North Korean Parliament Session to Meet," Associated Press, 1 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

2 April 2005

An editorial in the North Korean government's official paper, the *Minju Joson* restates the DPRK's opposition to Japanese participation in the Six-Party Talks.

—N. Korea Reiterates Opposition to Japan's Participation in Talks," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

2-5 April 2005

According to anonymous sources North Korean Vice Minister Kang Sok-ju arrives in Beijing with four other DPRK officials on a secretive visit to discuss resuming the Six-Party Talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, vice foreign ministers Ning Fukui and Dai Bingguo, and senior Communist Party official Wang Jiarui. During the visit Kang reportedly asked for a face-saving gesture from the other five parties in order to return to the negotiations.

—Yonhap News Agency, 4 April 2005, in "DPRK First FM Kang Allegedly in PRC for 6-Party Talks Since 2 Apr," OSC Document ID KPP20050404000015; "N. Korean Vice Foreign Minister Returns Home After Visit to China," Yonhap News Agency 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Top DPRK Diplomat Visits China," 5 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Asks for 'Face-Saving Exit' for Nuke Talks," *Korea Times*, 5 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Hong Kong AFP, 5 April 2005, in "PRC FM Spokesman Says DPRK Vice FM Held Talks with PRC Vice FM Dai Bingguo," OSC Document ID CPP20050405000114; "N.K. Says It Can Return to Nuke Talks If Its Position is Honored," Yonhap News Agency, 6 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Choe Sang-hun, "North Korean Official in China," *International Herald Tribune*, 5 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korea Said to Reject China's Bid on Nuclear Talks," *New York Times*, 8 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Joel Brinkley, "China Fails to Lure N. Korea Back to Talks; More Aggressive New Tactics Considered," *New York Times*, 9 April 2005, *New York Times*, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

4 April 2005

An editorial in the *Rodong Sinmun*, the official publication of the Korean Workers Party, says that "the state of confrontation between the [DPRK] and the United States is becoming extremely volatile," and that North Korea also has "the right to choose a preemptive attack option."

—Ri Ch'o'l-chun, "Manifestation of the Adventurous Bid to Provoke a Nuclear War of Northward Aggression," *Rodong Sinmun* (via *Uriminjokkkiri* website), 4 April 2005, in "DPRK Asserts Equal Right to Choose 'Preemptive Attack Option,'" OSC Document ID KPP20050404000055.

5 April 2005

At the start of a seven day visit within the United States, South Korean Vice Minister for Unification Yi Pong-cho says that U.S. is at fault for creating Pyongyang's anxiety that Washington is planning to overthrow the North Korean regime. Yi also says that American distrust of North Korea is not supported with specific evidence.

—U.S Fuels N.K. Suspicion of Regime Change: Seoul Official," Yonhap News Agency, 6 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Vice Minister Criticizes Washington's N.K. Policy," *Korea Times*, 7 April 2005.

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6 April 2005

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian affairs and top U.S. envoy to the Six-Party Talks, Christopher Hill, says that the United States has evidence that uranium that ended up in Libya originated in North Korea. Hill explains that the uranium made its way to Libya through the A.Q. Khan nuclear black market.

—U.S. Has Evidence of N. Korea-Origin Nuke Spilled into Libya: Hill," Yonhap News Agency, 6 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Choi Soung-ah "U.S. Has Evidence of N.K. Nuke Exports to Libya," *Korea Herald*, 7 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Choe Sang-hun, "Envoy Cites 'Evidence' of a Nuclear Network," *International Herald Tribune*, 7 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com Burt Herman, "A.P. Interview: U.S. Interview: U.S. Envoy Insists Evidence Proves North Korean Nuclear Materials Went to Libya," Associated Press, 7 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

9 April 2005

Selig Harrison, Director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy, tells a group of reporters in Beijing that during a recent visit to Pyongyang North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan told him that the DPRK cannot guarantee it will not transfer fissile material to terrorists if "the United States drives us into a corner."

—N. Korea Warns of Nuke Proliferation Possibility: U.S. Scholar," Japan Economic Newswire, 9 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

14 April 2005

An editorial in the *Rodong Sinmun*, the official newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, says that comments made a few days earlier by the commander of the U.S. forces in South Korea, General Leon LaPorte, about expanding the role of the U.N. command reveal the U.S. intention to lead an international invasion of the DPRK. Pyongyang warns that it will use its nuclear weapons in such a contingency.

—"U.S. Scheme to Inveigle Multinational Troops into Korean War Blasted," Korean Central News Agency website, 14 April 2005, www.kcna.co.jp; "N. Korea Claims Hostile U.S. Intention, Warns of Nuclear Use," Yonhap News Agency, 14 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

15 April 2005

Selig Harrison of the Center for International Policy says in an interview with the Yonhap News Agency that top-level North Korean officials, such as Chairman of the Presidium Kim Yong-nam and First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Seok-ju, told him during his visit to Pyongyang between April 5-9, 2005, that the DPRK will begin to remove an additional 8000 spent fuel rods from a nuclear reactor this month, potentially giving North Korea enough fissile material to double its nuclear arsenal.

—N.K. Plans to Unload Fuel Rods from Reactor This Month," Yonhap News Agency, 16 April 2005, in "DPRK Reportedly to Remove Spent Fuel Rods From Nuclear Reactor, Able to 'Double' Nuclear Arsenal," OSC Document ID KPP20050416000001; "N. Korea Moves to Bolster Nuclear Arsenal," *Korea Times*, 18 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

17 April 2005

A commentary on the DPRK's Korean Central News Agency website responds to a recent *Washington Post* article which alleged that U.S. government officials deliberately misled its Asian allies about North Korea selling uranium

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to Libya. The commentary says that such a "sheer lie" reveals U.S. intention to overthrow the DPRK government.
 — "U.S. Fabrication of Sheer Lie Related to DPRK's Nuclear Program Uncovered," Korean Central News Agency, 17 April 2005, www.kcna.co.jp; "DPRK Condemns U.S. Fabrication on Exporting Nuclear Substances," Xinhua General News Service, 17 April 2005, in "Nodong Sinmun Comments on 'U.S. Fabrication' on Exporting Nuclear Substances," OSC Document ID CPP20050417000070.

18 April 2005

The South Korean government officially announces that North Korea has stopped operations at one of its nuclear power reactors, which raises suspicions that the DPRK will begin reprocessing the spent fuel. Further, the Japanese newspaper *Asahi Shimbun* cites unnamed sources who claim that U.S. satellite images of the North Korean nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and other intelligence have lead U.S. officials to believe the facility has been shut down.
 —Gov't Working on Measures on N.K. Plans to Reprocess Spent Nuclear Fuel," Yonhap News Agency, 18 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "More Reprocessing Feared as N. Korea Shuts Nuclear Plant," Xinhua Financial Network News, 18 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Seoul Believes North Korea Suspended Reactor 'Temporarily'," Yonhap News Agency, 18 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Shuts Down Reactor to Make Nuke Bombs: Report," Japan Economic Newswire, 19 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Seoul Confirms Suspension of N. Korean Reactor," *Korea Times*, 19 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Soo-Jeong Lee, "South Korea Says North Shuts Down a Nuclear Reactor, Raising Plutonium Concerns," Associated Press, 18 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Anna Field, "Reactor Shutdown Fuels Bomb Fears North Korean Nuclear Programme," *Financial Times*, 19 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Nobuyoshi Sakajiri, "N. Korea Shuts Down Nuke Reactor," *Asahi Shimbun*, 18 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Could Boost Nuclear Capability: U.S. Expert," *Chosun Ilbo* website, 18 April 2005, in OSC Document ID KPP20050417000074.

18 April 2005

In light of speculation that North Korea may begin reprocessing spent fuel, Whitehouse spokesperson Scott McClellan says at a press briefing that the United States would talk with its regional allies and that referring North Korea to the U.N. Security Council is "certainly one possibility."
 — "North Korea," Press Briefing with Scott McClellan, 18 April 2005, www.whitehouse.gov; "U.S. May Take N. Korea to Security Council for Possible Sanctions," Japan Economic Newswire, 18 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. Warns of Taking N. Korea to U.N. Security Council," Yonhap News Agency, 19 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. May Take N. Korea to U.N. Security Council for Sanctions," Xinhua Financial Network News, 18 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

19 April 2005

South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon responds to recent remarks from the Whitehouse about referring North Korea to the U.N. Security Council by saying that he felt that the comments were intended "to remind that there is such a procedure" not to imply "there is such a possibility."
 —Seoul Voices Opposition to Referring N.K. to Security Council," Yonhap News Agency, 20 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Choe Sang-hun, "Seoul Frowns on Inviting Security Council (sic) to Talks; Move Would

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Alienate North, Minister Says," *International Herald Tribune*, 21 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com;
"Seoul Opposes Sanction on N. Korea," *Korea Times*, 21 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

21 April 2005

Responding to a growing perception that the U.S. is moving towards more coercive options to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, Whitehouse spokesperson Scott McClellan reaffirms the U.S. "focus on getting North Korea back to the talks."

—U.S. Views of Possibly Referring North Korea to the U.N. Security Council," Daily Press Briefing, 20 April 2005, www.state.gov.

21 April 2005

Pyongyang's AP Television News quotes a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying that if Washington refers North Korea to the U.N. Security Council and sanctions were imposed, the DPRK would regard this as a "declaration of war."

—N. Korea Says U.N. Sanctions Would Amount to a Declaration of War," Yonhap News Agency, 21 April 2005, in "DPRK to Regard Sanctions 'Declaration of War' if U.S. Refers Nuclear Issue to UNSC," OSC Document ID KPP20050421000167.

23 April 2005

At the Asia-Africa summit held in Jakarta, Indonesia, South Korean Prime Minister Lee Kang-jin meets with chairman of North Korea's Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly Kim Yong-nam. During the meeting Kim is quoted as saying that North Korea will return to the multilateral negotiations over its nuclear weapons program "if the environment of the six-nation talks is fully mature."

—Leaders of Two Koreas Agree on Resuming Talks," Yonhap News Agency, 23 April 2005, in "ROK Officials' Talks; ROK PM Calls Meeting 'Very Very Good'," OSC Document ID KPP20050423000062; "North, South Korean Leaders Discuss Nuclear Crisis in Rare Meeting," Agence France Presse, 23 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "North and South Korea Hold Breakthrough Talks on Pyongyang's Nuclear (sic)," Xinhua Financial Network News, 25 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com;

26-29 April 2005

Amid speculation that North Korea may soon perform a nuclear test, the United States senior negotiator to the Six-Party Talks Christopher Hill meets with South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and top nuclear envoy Song Min-soon, in order to discuss resuming the negotiations. After his visit to Seoul, Hill travels to Beijing and then to Tokyo. In China Hill meets with Chinese Vice foreign ministers Dai Bingguo, Yang Jiechi and Wu Daiwei and reiterates the U.S. commitment to the Six-Party Talks. In Japan Hill meets with Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi and both officials agreed on the need to get North Korea back to the talks and invigorate the process. Hill also meets with Tokyo's top envoy to the Six-Party Talks, Kenichiro Sasae and Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda. After traveling to Japan and China, Hill returns to South Korea where he meets with Unification Minister Chung Dong-young and later at a news conference warns that North Korea may be preparing for a nuclear test.

—Roh Meets Hill Over Ways to Resolve Stalled Six-Party Talks," Yonhap News Agency, 26 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Chief U.S. Negotiator Leaves For Beijing," Yonhap News Agency, 26 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis,

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web.lexis-nexis.com; "Hill Meets Beijing Officials on North Korea Nuclear Dispute," Yonhap News Agency, 26 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Roh, Hill Discuss Stalled Six-Party Talks," Xinhua General News Service, 26 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. Official Arrives in China to Discuss N. Korea," Kyodo World Service, 2005 April 26, in "OSC Document ID JPP20050426000079; "U.S. Envoy on N. Korea Holds Talks in Beijing," Xinhua Financial Network News, 26 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. Envoy Leaves Beijing Concerned Over Possible North Korean Nuclear Test," Xinhua Financial Network News, 27 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "6-Party Nuclear Process Facing Difficulty: Japan, U.S.," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 28 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Japan, U.S. May Refer 6-Way Talks Issue to Security Council," Japan Economic Newswire, 28 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Choe Sang-hun, "Allies Doubt Future of North Korea Talks," *International Herald Tribune*, 28 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Bo-Lim, "Top Washington Envoy on Nuclear Talks Warns Pyongyang Against Conducting Nuclear Test," Associated Press, 29 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; James Brooke, "U.S. Weapons Envoy Pessimistic About Talks with North Korea," *New York Times*, 30 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

29-30 April 2005

At a press conference U.S. President George W. Bush labels North Korean leader Kim Jong-il "a dangerous person." Bush goes on to say that while the Six-Party Talks is the ideal venue for resolving the nuclear crisis he would not rule out pursuing U.N. sanctions or other options. In response, the North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement which labels Bush a "hooligan bereft of personality" and declares that "the DPRK does not expect any solution to the nuclear issue...during his term."

—Bush Calls N. Korean Leader 'Tyrant'," Yonhap News Agency, 29 April 2005 in "More on U.S. Leader Calls DPRK Leader 'Tyrant'; Asst. Sec. Hill Holds News Conference," OSC Document ID KPP20050429000118; Lee Joo-hee, "Bush Stresses Diplomacy, Allied Consensus on N.K.: U.S., South Korea Discuss Nuclear Stalemate," Korea Herald, 30 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Bush Lambastes Kim Jong-il as 'Dangerous'," JoongAng Ilbo website, 30 April 2005, in OSC Document ID KPP20050429000167; Yonhap News Agency "Bush Calls for Diplomacy on North Korea," in OSC Document ID KPP20050429000072; "FM Spokesman Slams Bush's Vituperation Against DPRK's Supreme Headquarters," Korean Central News Agency, 30 April 2005, www.kcna.co.jp; "North Korea Says It Expects No Solution to Nuclear Standoff While 'Hooligan' Bush in Office," Associated Press, 30 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "'Bush a Hooligan Bereft of Personality': N.K. Foreign Ministry," Yonhap News Agency, 30 April 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

4 May 2005

South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon says at a weekly press briefing that the situation surrounding the currently stalled Six-Party Talks has "reached a level that is worthy of considerable concern" and that North Korea needs to resume the negotiations "without sticking to unreasonable arguments."

—Ban Says Likelihood of Resumed Six-Party Talks 'Not Bright'," Yonhap News Agency, 4 May 2005, in ROK FM Expresses Concern Over 6-Way Talks, Urges DPRK Against 'Unreasonable Arguments'," OSC Document ID KPP20050504000069; "S. Korea Minister Says Prospect of 6-Nation Talks 'Not Bright'," Japan Economic Newswire, 4 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "South Korean Foreign Minister Says Chances of Resuming Nuke

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Talks Not Good," Associated Press, 4 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "South Korea Voices Concern Over North Korean Nuclear Standoff," Agence France Presse, 4 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com

4 May 2005

Kyodo World Service reports that unnamed sources say that U.S. envoy to the Six-Party Talks Christopher Hill was told during his April trip to China, Japan and South Korea that North Korea would return to the talks if the United States referred to North Korea as a sovereign state and treat the DPRK as an equal negotiating partner.

—Kyodo World Service, 4 May 2005, in "North Korea May Be Softening Stance on Resumption of Six-Party Talks," OSC Document ID JPP20050504000059.

4 May 2005

At a speech at the 2005 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference South Korean deputy foreign minister for policy planning Chun Young-woo states that North Korea must make a "strategic decision to dismantle once and for all its entire nuclear weapons program" in order for there to be a "breakthrough in the Six-Party Talks."

—S. Korea Urges North to Return to NPT and Give Up Nuclear Programs," Yonhap News Agency, 4 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

6 May 2005

After meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing during a ministerial session of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon says of resuming the Six-Party Talks that "it's important that China continues to exert efforts. China is aware of its role." The two foreign ministers said that they would work to quickly resume the currently stalled Six-Party Talks.

—Nuke Crisis Dominates Talks Between S. Korea and China," Yonhap News Agency, 6 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "China Defends Diplomacy on .N.Korea; S. Korea Says Beijing Can Do More," Xinhua Financial Network News, 6 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "China, S. Korea Agree to Work on Resuming 6-Way Talks," Japan Economic Newswire, 6 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "China Urged to Take Tougher Line on N. Korea Nuclear Talks," *Financial Times*, 7 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

8 May 2005

International Atomic Energy Agency head Mohamed ElBaradei says that he estimates North Korea has developed as many as six nuclear weapons.

—U.N. Nuclear Chief Says North Korea Has Close to Six Nukes," AFP (North American Service), 8 May 2005, in "IAEA Head: DPRK May Have 'Close to' Six Nuclear Bombs," OSC Document ID LAP20050508000019; "N. Korea Has Close to Six Nuclear Weapons: IAEA Chief," Yonhap News Agency, 9 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

9 May 2005

During a trip to Moscow U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice repeats her earlier statement that the United States recognizes North Korea as a sovereign state.

—Yonhap News Agency 10 May 2005, in "Rice Again Calls North Korea 'Sovereign' Country," OSC Document ID KPP20050510000036; "Rice Says U.S. Sees N. Korea as 'Sovereign State', Assures No Attack," Japan Economic Newswire, 9 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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10 May 2005

Osaka University Professor of Economics and Law Yasuhiko Yoshida tells ROK newspaper *JoongAng Ilbo* that during a recent trip to North Korea that he was told by the DPRK deputy head of the Institute for Disarmament and Peace Pak Hyo'n-chae that a "plutonium-based nuclear test is unavoidable."

—Yae Yo'ng-chun and Brian Lee, "Pyongyang Aide Reportedly Calls Test Inevitable," 10 May 2005, in "DPRK Official Reportedly Says 'Plutonium-Based Nuclear Test is Unavoidable,'" *JoongAng Ilbo* website, OSC Document ID KPP20050509000186; "N. Korea Hinted It May Conduct Nuclear Test Soon, Says Japanese Scholar- Report," Xinhua Financial Network News, 10 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Anthony Faiola and Sachiko Sakamaki, "N. Korea Suggests It Will Hold Atomic Test; Country Also Hints at Return To 6-Party Talks," *Washington Post*, 10 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com;

10 May 2005

The DPRK's *Rodong Sinmun*, the official publication of the Korean Worker's Party, issues a statement calling U.S. reports of a possible North Korean nuclear test "one-sided."

— "N. Korea Media Blast U.S. Comments Warning of Nuke Test," Japan Economic Newswire, 10 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; In-Young Bang, "North Korea Says U.S. Making 'Fuss' By Notifying Allies of Possible Nuclear Test," *Associated Press*, 10 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korean Official Hints At Imminence of Underground Nuclear Test: Report," Agence France Presse, 10 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com

10 May 2005

U.S. envoy to the Six-Party Talks Christopher Hill says in an interview that the United States does not "question North Korea's status as a sovereign state" and has "no intention of attacking North Korea."

—U.S. Has 'Good Intentions' Toward N. Korea: Hill," Yonhap News Agency, 10 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com;

11 May 2005

A spokesman for the North Korean Ministry of Foreign affairs announces that the DPRK has finished removing 8000 fuel rods from its 5 megawatt nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lee Kyu-hyung responds by saying that the DPRK announcement aggravates the current Korean Peninsula crisis.

Whitehouse spokesperson Scott McClellan calls the DPRK claim "provocative statements" which "only further isolates North Korea." Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi calls North Korea's remarks "gamesmanship" and says the most important thing is to convince North Korea it is in its own best interest to dismantle its nuclear weapons program.

—DPRK FM Spokesman: DPRK Unloaded 8000 Spent Fuel Rods; DPRK to DPRK 'Bolster' 'Nuclear Arsenal'," Korean Central News Agency website, 11 May 2005, www.kcna.co.jp; Kyodo World Service, 11 May 2005 in "More on Kyodo Cites KCNA in Beijing: DPRK Completes Removing Spent Fuel Rods," OSC Document ID JPP20050511000074; Korean Central Broadcasting Station, 11 May 2005 in "DPRK Radio Carries FM Spokesman Remarks on 'Unloading' 8000 Spent Fuel Rods," OSC Document ID KPP20050511000137; "N.K. Completes Retrieval of Fuel Rods from Yongbyon Plant," 11 May 2005, in "ROK FM Spokesman: DPRK Notice on 'Unloading' of Fuel Rods 'Aggravates'

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'Situation'," OSC Document ID KPP20050511000142; "Koizumi Downplays N. Korea's Claim It Removed Nuke Fuel Rods," Japan Economic Newswire, 11 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 May 2005

In an interview, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice refers to North Korea as a "terrible regime" and says the U.S. administration is going to "shine a light" on the starvation of its people and the prison labor camps in the DPRK.

—Rice Calls N. Korea 'Terrible Regime,' Repeats U.S. Has Deterrent," Japan Economic Newswire, 11 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com;

12 May 2005

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Kong Quan responds to U.S. calls to exert greater pressure on North Korea to get Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party Talks by saying that Beijing "in principle...is not in favor of exerting pressure" or "resorting to sanctions to resolve international conflicts."

—China Rebuffs U.S. Call for Pressure on N. Korea, Calls for Positive Signals," Xinhua Financial Network News, 12 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com;

12 May 2005

South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon says in a telephone interview with ROK cable news channel YTN that "the government has grave concerns about the worsening situation," with respect to North Korea's recent announcement that it has removed 8000 fuel rods from its Yongbyon nuclear reactor.

—Seoul Says N. Korea's Move Is a Negotiating Tactic," Yonhap News Agency, 12 May 2005, in OSC Document ID KPP20050512000077.

13 May 2005

A U.S. government official (believed to be U.S. special envoy to the Six-Party Talks Joseph DeTrani) meets with a DPRK government official at North Korea's permanent mission to the United Nations in New York. According to White House National Security Council spokesperson Frederick Jones the purpose of the meeting was to tell Pyongyang "that it is time for [the North Koreans] to return to the Six-Party Talks."

—U.S., N. Korea Hold Talks in New York, 1st in 5 Months," Japan Economic Newswire, 19 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Joseph Coleman, "U.S. Officials Met with North Korea Officials in New York Last Week," Associated Press, 19 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korea Confirms May 13 Contact with U.S., Japan Economic Newswire, 22 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

16 May 2005

During talks between the ROK and the DPRK, chief South Korean delegate Yi Pong-cho says that Seoul told Pyongyang that South Korea will "make important proposals for practical gains in talks aimed at resolving the nuclear issue," if North Korea returns to the Six-Party Talks.

—Two Koreas Resume High-level Talks Amid Nuclear Row," Yonhap News Agency, 16 May 2005, in "ROK Officials Explain to U.S. Envoy Details of ROK's 'Important' Proposal to DPRK," OSC Document ID KPP20050516000182; "S. Korea Urges N. Korea to Resume 6-Nation Talks," Japan Economic Newswire, 16 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis,

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web.lexis-nexis.com; Paul Alexander, "Two Koreas Resume Talks After 10-Month Hiatus with Nuclear Dispute in Spotlight," Associated Press, 16 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Soo-Jeong Lee, "South Korea Promises 'Substantial Proposal' If North Returns to Nuclear Disarmament Talks," Associated Press, 16 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. Not Consulted Yet on S. Korea's New Plan to Break Nuclear Deadlock," Agence France Presse, 16 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Choe Sang-hun, South Korea Offers Incentive to North," *International Herald Tribune*, 17 May 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

18 May 2005

An editorial on North Korea's *Uriminjokkkiri* website states that because the DPRK has withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) "it is nobody's concern but ours to decide on what to do with the spent fuel rods extracted from the experimental nuclear reactor."

—Ch'oe Ch'ang-il, "Dog's Tail Cannot Turn into a Weasel's Tail Even in Three Years," *Uriminjokkkiri* website, 18 May 2005, in OSC Document ID KPP20050518000047.

21 May 2005

According to Radio Free Asia, U.S. Republican congressman Curt Weldon says that North Korea "will come to the nuclear talks if the U.S. lowers its level of denunciation" against Kim Jong-il and "conveys a message ... that Washington will recognize the North's system and is willing to hold talks with the North." Weldon led a congressional delegation that visited North Korea in January 2005.

—Lawmaker Urges N.K., U.S. to Stop Accusations Against Each Other," Yonhap News Agency, 21 May 2005, in "U.S. Lawmaker Says DPRK Will Return to 6-Way Talks if U.S. 'Lowers' 'Denunciations'," OSC Document ID KPP20050521000045

23 May 2005

South Korean Grand National Party (GNP) spokesperson Chun Yu-ok says that Wang Jiarui from the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee told GNP chairperson Pak Ku'n-hye the content of his January meetings with North Korean officials in Pyongyang over the DPRK's nuclear weapons program. Wang told Pak that he attempted to persuade the North Koreans to return to the Six-Party Talks and told Pyongyang there would be rewards if it dismantled its nuclear weapons.

—"Chinese Official Warns N.K. Not to Pursue Nuclear Ambitions," Yonhap News Agency, 23 May 2005, in "PRC Official Said to Warn DPRK Not to Pursue Nuclear Ambitions," OSC Document ID KPP20050523000184;

24 May 2005

An editorial in *Minju Joson*, North Korea's cabinet newspaper, argues that the DPRK's "possession of nuclear weapons is the best option to safeguard our dignity from the escalating U.S. nuclear maneuver to crush the Republic (North Korea) and realize a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula."

—Yonhap News Agency, 24 May 2005, in "N.K. Says Its Nuclear Power Guarantees Peace In Asia," OSC Document ID KPP20050524000025.

24 May 2005

According to South Korea's Yonhap News Agency, a high level ROK Foreign Ministry official was told that China will

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veto taking North Korea to the United Nations Security Council if the Six-Party Talks are unsuccessful. Meanwhile Japan's Kyodo World Service reported that Chinese officials warned Pyongyang of "grave consequences" if the DPRK performs a nuclear test.

—China Will Not Tolerate N.K. Possessing Nuclear Weapons: Official," Yonhap News Agency, 24 May 2005, in "ROK FM Official Claims PRC 'Will Not Oppose' Referring DPRK to UNSC if Talks Fail," OSC Document ID KPP20050524000123; Kyodo World Service, 24 May 2005, in "China Strongly Warns DPRK Against Nuke Test; Date of Warning Not Specified," OSC Document ID JPP20050525000012.

25 May 2005

South Korean Grand National Party Representative Pak Chin says that China has told the United States that South Korea's appeasement policy is undermining attempts to bring North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks.

—Yonhap News Agency, 25 May 2005 in "China Tells U.S. Seoul's N.K. Policy Is Delaying Talks: Lawmaker," OSC Document ID KPP20050525000081.

26 May 2005

During testimony to a House International Committee top U.S. envoy to the Six-Party Talks, Christopher Hill, says in reference to China's role in bringing North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks that Beijing "should be able to convince their very close friend to come to the table. And they haven't done it."

—Yonhap News Agency, 27 May 2005 in "U.S. Urges China's Efforts to Persuade N. Korea Back to Talks," OSC Document ID KPP20050527000079.

30 May 2005

In an interview on U.S. television, U.S. Vice-President Richard Cheney calls on China to exert greater leverage in bringing North Korea back to the negotiating table, saying that "the Chinese need to understand that it's incumbent upon them to be major players here."

—Yonhap News Agency, 27 May 2005 in "U.S. Urges China's Efforts to Persuade N. Korea Back to Talks," OSC Document ID KPP20050527000079.

30 May 2005

Sources tell Japan's *Jiji Press* that during his visit to Beijing in April 2005, North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju told Chinese officials that the DPRK had made a major decision with regards to its nuclear program.

—North Korean Vice Minister Kang Sok Ju Conveys 'Major Decision' on Nuclear Issue to China," *Jijiweb* website, 30 May 2005, in "DPRK's Kang Sok Ju Informs PRC Leaders of 'Major Decision' on Nuclear Issue," OSC Document ID JPP20050531000011.

1 June 2005

Kenichiro Sasae and Christopher Hill, top envoys to the Six-Party Talks for Japan and the United States, meet and agree to deal with North Korea flexibly if the DPRK returns to the multilateral negotiations.

—Jiji Press, 2 June 2005, in "Japan, U.S. to Deal 'Flexibly' With DPRK at Six-Way Talks: Senior Official," OSC Document ID JPP20050602000003.

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2 June 2005

Amidst much speculation that North Korea may perform a nuclear test, sources reveal to the Japan Economic Newswire that China has warned the DPRK it will consider stopping food aid if it goes through with the test.

— "China Eyes Stopping Food Aid if N. Korea Test Nuke," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

2 June 2005

A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry responds to U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney's labeling of DPRK Leader Kim Jong-il "an irresponsible leader" in a television interview by saying that Cheney's remarks are "little short of telling (North Korea) not to come out for the talks." White House spokesperson Scott McClellan stands by Cheney's initial comments, stating "We are going to call it the way it is."

—U.S. VP's Vituperation Against DPRK's Supreme Headquarters Rebuked," Korean Central News Agency, 2 June 2005, www.kcna.co.jp; Burt Herman, "North Korea Says Cheney Remarks Compel It to Stay Away from Nuclear Talks," 2 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Cheney A Blood-thirsty Beast, Says North Korea," 2 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "White House Defends Cheney After 'Bloodthirsty Beast' Attack by N. Korea," Agence France Presse, 2 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "War of Words Between Washington and Pyongyang Escalates," Agence France Presse, 2 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; James Brooke, "North Korea Denounces the U.S. and Calls Cheney 'Bloodthirsty'," *New York Times*, 3 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

2 June 2005

A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry tells the Korean Central News Agency that the DPRK takes note that U.S. President George W. Bush's referred to Kim Jong-il as "Mr. Kim"—a more respectful term than used previously—and will "closely follow" to see if this is an indicator of the United States softening its stance towards Pyongyang. According to reports, President Bush made the remarks during a news conference at the White House on 31 May.

—Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Bush's Remarks," Korean Central News Agency, 3 June 2005, www.kcna.co.jp; "N. Korea Elated by Bush's Use of 'Mr.' for Kim Jong-Il," Yonhap News Agency, 3 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Strikes Rare Positive Note on Bush's Comments," Japan Economic Newswire, 3 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korea Notes U.S. President's Use of Honorific for Leader Kim Jong-Il," BBC Monitoring, 3 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

4 June 2005

Top DPRK Envoy to the U.N. Pak Gil-yon says at a closed-door seminar at the University of Toronto that Pyongyang "can never give up [its] nuclear weapons program unless the U.S. does."

— "N.K. Leader's Visit to Seoul Needs Proper Timing, Modality: Envoy," Yonhap News Agency, 4 June 2005, in "DPRK Envoy to U.N.: We Can Never Give Up Our Nuclear Weapons Program Unless U.S. Does," OSC Document ID KPP20050604000051.

5 June 2005

According to the Japanese newspaper *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* diplomatic sources stated that China has warned

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North Korea that a DPRK nuclear test would cross a "red line in diplomacy."

—China Strongly Warns N. K. Not to Hold Nuclear Test: Tokyo Paper," Yonhap News Agency, 5 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

5 June 2005

According to Japan's *Asahi Shimbun*, U.S. intelligences sources disclosed that North Korea purchased 150 tons of high-strength aluminum from Russian dealer, which is enough to make 2,600 uranium enrichment centrifuges. The sources further revealed that U.S. intelligence officials were aware of the acquisition by North Korea as early as June 2002.

— Nobuyoshi Sakajiri, Yoshihiro Makino, "North Korea Procures High-Strength Aluminum; Sparked by 2002 Nuclear Crisis, Vital Information to the U.S.," *Asahi Shimbun*, 5 June 2005, in "Japan Daily Says DPRK Imported Aluminum for Nuclear Program, Cites U.S. Sources," OSC Document ID JPP20050605000005; "N. Korea Imports Key Nuclear Materials From Russia: Japanese Paper," Yonhap News Agency, 5 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. Knew of North Nukes Plan in 2002," *Asahi Shimbun* 6 June 2005, in "Japan: U.S. Sources Reveal Washington Knew of DPRK Nuclear Plan in 2002," OSC Document ID JPP20050606000024.

6 June 2005

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi says to reporters in Aichi prefecture that he believes that North Korea wants to resolve the nuclear issue through the Six-Party framework "by all means."

—Koizumi Believes N. Korea Is Eager to Return 6-Way Talks," Kyodo World Service, 6 June 2005, in "Koizumi Says He Believes DPRK 'Eager' to Return to 6-Party Talks," OSC Document ID JPP20050606000098.

7 June 2005

An editorial in the *Rodong Sinmun*, the official publication of the Korean Workers' Party, says that now that North Korea has become a nuclear power the purpose of the Six-Party Talks should be changed to nuclear disarmament by all parties.

—N. Korea Demands Nuke Disarmament Talks with U.S.," Yonhap News Agency, 7 June 2005, in "ROK Yonhap Cites DPRK Daily: DPRK Demands 6-Way Talks Changed to 'Disarmament Talks,' OSC Document ID KPP20050607000027; "Nuclear Threat to DPRK Must Be Removed First: Rodong Sinmun," KCNA 7 June 2005, www.kcna.co.jp.

6-8 June 2005

On 6 June North Korean ambassador to the United Nations Pak Gil Yon and U.S. special envoy to the Six-Party Talks Joseph DeTrani meet in New York to discuss resuming the multilateral negotiations. U.S State Department spokesperson Sean McCormack says that Pak informed the DeTrani that the DPRK would come back to the Six-Party Talks but did not specify a particular date. The Japanese newspaper *Asahi Shimbun* cites anonymous U.S. and DPRK sources who disclosed that Pak told DeTrani that North Korea deserves "treatment as a nuclear nation" during their meeting. Meanwhile, on 8 June, top Chinese envoy to the Six-Party Talks Wang Guangya says that the negotiations could begin again within weeks.

—N.K. Informs U.S. of Intention to Return to Nuke Talks: State Department," Yonhap News Agency, 8 June 2005, in "ROK Report Cites PRC Envoy to U.N.: 6-Way Nuclear Talks 'Could' Resume Within Weeks," OSC Document ID KPP20050607000193; "U.S. State Dept. Says 'N.K. Would Return to Nuclear Talks,'" *Chosun Ilbo* website, 9 June

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2005, in OSC Document ID KPP20050608000219; Kyodo World Service, 8 June 2005 in "N. Korea Seeks U.S. Recognition, Treatment as Nuclear State: Asahi Shimbun," OSC Document ID JPP20050608000074; Lee Joo-hee, "U.S. N.K. Seen Moving Closer to Six-Way Talks," Korea Herald website, 8 June 2005, in OSC Document ID KPP20050608000002; Hong Kong AFP 8 June 2005, in "North Korea Demands U.S. Recognize It as Nuclear Power: Report," OSC Document ID JPP20050608000064; Yonhap News Agency, 8 June 2005, in "N.K. Says Nuke Talks Hinges on U.S. Response to N.K.'s Requests," OSC Document ID KPP20050608000116.

8 June 2005

North Korea's top envoy to the Six-Party Talks, Kim Kye-kwan, says in an interview with a U.S. television network that the DPRK has enough nuclear bombs to defend against a U.S. attack. Kim answered "yes" when he was asked if North Korea was building additional nuclear weapons.

—Yonhap News Agency, 8 June 2005, in "U.S. ABC News Interviews DPRK FM Official: DPRK 'Building More' Nuclear Weapons," OSC Document ID KPP20050608000219; "N. Korea 'Building More Nukes'," *Chosun Ilbo* website, 10 June 2005, in "North Korea 'Building More Nukes'," OSC Document ID KPP20050609000153.

9 June 2005

Speaking in regards to the North Korean nuclear weapons program, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Jianchao states that Beijing "is not aware of the situation." Liu also goes on to say China hopes that "all relevant parties will make constructive efforts at once to promote the resumption of the Six-Party Talks as soon as possible."

—Kyodo World Service, 9 June 2005, in "PRC FM Spokesman Says PRC 'Not Aware' of DPRK Nuclear Weapons," OSC Document ID JPP20050609000072; "Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Liu Jianchao Answers Journalists' Questions at Routine News Conference on 9 June 2005," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China website, 9 June 2005, in "Transcript of PRC FM Spokesman News Conference on 9 Jun 05," OSC Document ID CPP20050609000122; Xu Song and Ren Ke, "Foreign Ministry Spokesman: China Hopes the Process of the Six-Party Talks Will Continue to Move Toward the Goal of Realizing a Nuclear-Free Peninsula," Xinhua Asia-Pacific Service, 9 June 2005, in OSC Document ID CPP20050609000112 "Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu Jianchao's Press Conference on 9 June 2005," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China website, 9 June 2005, in "English Transcript of PRC FM Spokesman News Conference 9 Jun 05," OSC Document ID CPP20050610000123.

10 June 2005

U.S. President George W. Bush meets with South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun at the White House. After their meeting Bush tells reporters that "South Korea and the United States share the same goal, and that is a Korean Peninsula with no nuclear weapons." Roh notes that "there are one or two minor issues, but I'm certain we will be able to work them out with dialogue." However, he goes on to say that the two presidents had "reconfirmed that we have no basic differences on the issue, and we completely agreed to the basic principles, and are continuously discussing various problems that occur in the process of negotiations."

— "U.S., S. Korea United on Six-Party Talks: Bush," Xinhua News Agency, 10 June 2005, in "Xinhua Reports President Bush Says U.S., South Korea 'United' on Six-Party Talks," OSC Document ID CPP20050610000218; Yonhap News Agency, 10 June 2005, in "U.S. ROK Leaders Reconfirm 'One Voice' on DPRK Nuclear Issue, 'Strong' U.S.-ROK Alliance," OSC Document ID KPP20050610000185; Jennifer Loven, "Bush, South Korean Leader Differ on How to

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Bring North Back to Nuclear Talks, but Talks of Unity Dominates," Associated Press, 10 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Tom Raum, "Bush, South Korean Leader Differ on How to Bring North Back to Nuclear Talks," Associated Press, 10 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com David E. Sanger, "U.S. and Seoul Try to Ease Rift on Talks with the North," *New York Times*, 11 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Reuben Staines, "Roh, Bush Lay Out Carrots for N.K.," *Korea Times*, 13 June 2005, in OSC Document ID KPP20050612000048.

14 June 2005

South Korean National Security Council senior official Yi Chong-so'k clarifies a statement that South Korean President made to reporters on 10 June 2005 after his summit meeting with U.S. President George W. Bush. At the time Roh said that there were minor issues between the U.S and the ROK. Yi explains to a parliamentary defense committee that the differences Roh was referring to were on U.S. plans for its troops stationed in South Korea, not differences over how to resolve the Korean peninsula nuclear crisis.

—OSC Feature 15 June 2005, in "Roh's Reference to 'Minor Issues' with U.S. Not on DPRK Nuclear Issue," OSC Document ID FEA20050615004182

15 June 2005

The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee holds a hearing entitled "North Korea: An Update on the Six-Party Talks and Matters Related to the Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis." U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Christopher Hill and Special Envoy to the Six-Party Talks Joseph DeTrani both provide testimony. Hill testifies that diplomacy is the best way to resolve the current nuclear crisis but acknowledged that the United States is also considering other options. Hill and DeTrani say that Washington has received support from the other participant countries in bringing North Korea back to the negotiations. Hill, however, also says that China is not exerting all the leverage that it could on Pyongyang.

—Brian Goodman, "Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on the Prospects of Six-Party Talks with N.K.," The Daily NK website, 16 June 2005, in "U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Assesses DPRK 6-Way Talks," OSC Document ID KPP20050616000063; *Chosun Ilbo* website, 16 June 2005, in "N. Korea Will Give Up Nukes One Way or Another: Hill," OSC Document ID KPP20050615000099; "China Avoiding Pressure on North Korea: Hill," *Chosun Ilbo* website, 16 June 2005, in OSC Document ID KPP20050615000160.

17 June 2005

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il meets with South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong-young and says that the DPRK will return to the Six-Party Talks if the United States recognizes and respects the North Korean government. According to Chung, Kim says that North Korea does need to possess nuclear weapons and that Kim "has a friendly feeling towards the United States." U.S State Department spokesperson Adam Ereli responds to Kim's announcement that the DPRK could return to the Six-Party Talks in July by saying that the United States is looking for is "actually getting back to the talks and engaging substantively."

—N. Korean Leader Says His Country Willing to Return to Nuke Talks in July," Yonhap News Agency, 17 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Kim Jong-Il Says N. Korea Willing to Return to Nuke Talks in July," Japan Economic Newswire, 17 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korea: Six Party Talks," Daily Press Briefing, 17 June 2005, U.S. State Department website, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2005/48287.htm; "U.S Looks for Action, Not Words from N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 17 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-

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nexis.com; Burt Herman "Reclusive Leader Offers Rare Flattery to the West," Associated Press, 17 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Burt Herman, "North Korea's Kim Jong Il Discusses Nuclear Standoff with South Korean Minister," 17 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

18 June 2005

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is skeptical of Kim Jong-il's statements about returning to the Six-Party Talks in July noting that it could be a diplomatic strategy.

—Koizumi Dismisses Kim Jong-Il's Remarks as 'Diplomatic Strategy'," 18 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

20 June 2005

In an interview on U.S. television, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice states that "the North Koreans love to make excuses for why they can't come back to the Six-Party Talks. The reason they don't want to come to the Six-Party Talks is they don't like facing China and Russia and Japan and South Korea and the United States telling them in a concerted fashion that it's time to get rid of their ... nuclear weapons."

—Rice, 'N.K. Loves to Make Excuses to Avoid 6-Way Talks'," *Chosun Ilbo* website, 21 June 2005, in OSC Document ID KPP20050620000059.

21 June 2005

U.S. Under Secretary of State Paula Dobriansky calls North Korea "an outpost of tyranny" during a forum speech arranged by the Hudson Institute. Meanwhile at an international conference in Brussels U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice makes a similar comment about the DPRK. South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon responds to the Rice and Dobriansky's comments noting that they would not "help create an atmosphere of dialogue."

— "Seoul Regrets Washington's Anti-Pyongyang Rhetoric," Yonhap News Agency, 21 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. Official Keeps 'Tyranny Outpost' Catchphrase Alive," *Chosun Ilbo*, 22 June 2005, in OSC Document ID KPP20050621000132; "South Korea Upset about U.S. Criticism of North Korea," Agence France Presse, 21 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "South Korea Upset about U.S. Criticism of North Korea," Xinhua Financial Network News, 22 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Seoul's Protest Over 'Tyranny' Catchphrase Falls on Deaf Ears," *Chosun Ilbo*, 23 June 2005, in OSC Document ID JPP20050622000031.

22 June 2005

According to a report by South Korea's Yonhap News Agency, on 3 November 2002 former *Washington Post* reporter Don Oberdorfer and former U.S. ambassador to Seoul Donald Gregg received a letter to give to U.S. President George W. Bush on behalf of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. An excerpt of the letter reads: "If the United States recognizes our sovereignty and assures non-aggression, it is our view that we should be able to find a way to resolve the nuclear issue in compliance with the demand of a new century." Oberdorfer and Gregg reportedly passed the letter onto National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley on 7 November who then replied that the Bush administration would not "reward bad behavior." On 13 November 2005 the Bush administration declared that it would suspend all of its shipments of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK.

—Bush Rebuffed Kim Jong-Il's Gesture on Nukes in 2002: Oberdorfer," Yonhap News Agency, 22 June 2005, in "U.S.

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Rebuffed Message from North Korean Leader in November 2002- Journalist," BBC Monitoring, 23 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

29 June 2005

U.S. President George W. Bush issues an executive order that freezes assets of North Korean entities that have been implicated in developing or spreading weapons of mass destruction. DPRK firms Tanchon Bank, Korea Mining Development Trading Corp. and Korea Ryonbong are designated under the executive order.

—U.S. Slaps Sanctions Linked to N. Korea on WMD, Urges Others to Join," Japan Economic Newswire, 29 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

30 June 2005

The Japanese newspaper *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* reports that North Korea has resumed construction on a 50-megawatt and a 200-megawatt reactor located in Taechon. Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda says to reporters that Tokyo has not confirmed the newspaper's report.

—N. Korea Resumes Construction of 2 Nuclear Reactors: Nihon Keizai," Japan Economic Newswire, 30 June 2005, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

9-10 July 2005

North Korea agrees to return to the Six Party Talks to after, according to DPRK media, the United States agreed to recognize North Korea as a sovereign nation and not threaten North Korea. Washington also agreed to hold bilateral talks within the Six-Party framework. The fourth round of talks is set to begin on 26 July.

—"US, China say North Korea's Return to Nuclear Talks 'Only First Step,' Agence France Presse, 10 July 2005, in Lexis Nexis, www.lexisnexis.com.

26-27 July 2005

North Korean delegate to the Six Party Talks rejected a U.S.-sponsored nuclear dismantlement proposal. North Korean delegate Kim Kye Gwan argued dismantling their nuclear weapons without assurances of regime security is unreasonable. North Korea calls on the other participants in the talks to lift economic sanctions and provide multilateral security assurances; after that DPRK would dismantle their nuclear program. The U.S. delegation persisted that North Korea must verifiably and irreversibly dismantle their nuclear program—both the plutonium and the uranium based programs. North Korea appears to be concerned about the sequencing of dismantlement—not wanting to lower their "deterrent" capability until they are assured that Washington does not plan to attack the North Korean regime. North Korea also wants normalization of relations between itself and the United States and Japan, and withdrawal of the nuclear umbrella over South Korea.

—"N.Korea Rejects US Proposal For Resolving Nuclear Row: Sources," Japan Economic Newswire, 27 July 2005, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com, "US Sticks With Stand North Korea Should End All Nuclear Programs," Agence France Presse, 27 July 2005, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com, "2nd Roundup: Seoul Brokers Solution to North Korea Nuclear Impasse," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 27 July 2005, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com.

7 August 2005

The Six Party Talks will take a three week recess for the participating delegations to return to their capitals, assess

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positions, and formulate resolutions. The main challenge to a resolution is whether North Korea should be allowed to keep nuclear programs for peaceful civilian energy; namely, to develop light water reactors, which the United States and other talks participants opposed. Washington wants North Korea to cease all nuclear programs, and fears that a civilian nuclear energy program will be used to restart nuclear weapons. Other members were willing to accept their peaceful nuclear program on the condition that the DPRK rejoins the Nonproliferation Treaty.
 —"Stalled North Korean Talks Break Off For Three Weeks," Agence France Presse, 7 August 2005, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com.

14 August 2005

North Korea's Chief Nuclear Negotiator Kim Gye Kwan reiterated that North Korea was not willing to give up their pursuit of non-military nuclear energy. However, they would accept international supervision of their nuclear energy program and were willing to return to the NPT.

—"North Korea Adopts Softer Tone in Nuclear Dispute," Agence France Presse, 14 August 2005, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com.

21 August 2005

North Korea restarted their nuclear reactor in Yongbyon in July before they re-entered the Six Party Talks. U.S. spy satellites detected steam rising from the boiler connected to the nuclear reactor building.

—"Report: North Korea Restarted Nuclear Reactor Before International Nuclear Talks," Associated Press Worldstream, 21 August 2005, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com.

13 September 2005

The Six Party Talks resume but remain in stalemate, with the North Koreans continuing to uphold the right to peaceful nuclear energy. The DPRK delegation also requested the construction of light water reactors previously promised under the 1994 Agreed Framework. The U.S. delegation refuses to agree to this. The North Korean side states that they would dismantle their graphite moderated reactors in return for the construction of light water reactors and oil shipments.

—"6 Way Talks Resume As N Korea Pushes for Civilian Nuke," Japan Economic Newswire, 13 September 2005, in Lexis Nexis, www.lexisnexis.com.

15 September 2005

US Treasury Department designates Banco Delta SARL a money laundering pawn for North Korea. The bank has supported North Korea multimillion dollar cash deposits and withdrawals. The bank facilitated criminal activities of the DPRK government and front companies including circulating counterfeit currency and handling bank transactions for drug trafficking. The U.S. Treasury prohibited U.S. financial institutions from business transactions in the U.S. or for the Banco Delta bank.

—Lee Dong, "Macau-Based Chinese Bank Named Money Launderer For North Korea," Yonhap, 15 September 2005, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com.

19 September 2005

The six delegations agree to the Statement of Principles. In this agreement, North Korea will abandon nuclear

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weapons and their existing nuclear programs. According to the agreement, "The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy." The DPRK also agrees to return to the Non Proliferation Treaty, abide by IAEA safeguards and inspections. In return North Korea will receive concessions including steps to normalize relations with Japan and the United States, and assurance that the United States will not attack North Korea conventionally or with nuclear weapons. North Korea will also receive economic aid and large amounts of energy assistance from South Korea. The six nations will meet again in November to discuss how they will reach the aims of the agreement. The terms of the agreement are to be carried out in a commitment for commitment, where all parties provide their concessions on a step by step basis.

—"North Korea Agrees To Abandon Nuclear Weapons Program," US Fed News, 19 September 2005, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com.

20 September 2005

After North Korea agreed to the Six Party Talk's agreement, North Korea demands the construction of a civil nuclear power reactor before they begin dismantling their civil and military nuclear facilities.

—"Chronology of US-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy," Arms Control Association, 20 September 2005, in Arms Control Association, armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron.

4 October 2005

Chief negotiator at the Six Party Talks, Christopher Hill, met with North Korean officials at the UN Mission in New York. This is the first time since North Korea agreed to dismantle their nuclear arsenal that the two nations representatives have spoken. North Korea states it will dismantle its nuclear weapons program after it receives Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) for their civilian energy programs. The U.S. Delegation maintains that a peaceful nuclear energy program will receive assistance only after North Korea dismantles their nuclear weapons arsenal. The issue of sequencing of various obligations was set on the agenda of issues to discuss at the upcoming fifth round of negotiations.

—"US, North Korea Hold Direct Talks on Nuclear Weapons," Agence France Presse, 4 October 2005, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com

20 October 2005

Governor Bill Richardson visits North Korea and tours the Yongbyon nuclear facility. Richardson speaks with the plant director and learns that the reactor was refueled in April and had reprocessed 8000 spent fuel rods. The North Koreans tell Richardson that they were willing to rejoin the NPT. The governor states that the North Korean appeared to be promoting transparency and was hopeful for the next round of the Six Party Talks.

—Joseph Coleman, "New Mexico's Richardson See's Increasing Flexibility of North Koreans on Nukes, Other Issues," Associated Press, 20 October 2005, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com.

9 November 2005

The fifth round of the Six Party Talks begins. The fifth round of negotiations are held in two stages. The first stage held from Wednesday to Friday where the actors will outline their recommendations. Bilateral meeting will follow. Challenges that emerge during the first stage of the talks will be discussed at the informal APEC summit in Pusan, South Korea. DPRK emphasized simultaneous action and renunciation of nuclear weapons programs in exchange

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for light water nuclear reactor. The US would not supply light water reactors until the Korean Peninsula is denuclearized, DPRK rejoins the NPT and accepts IAEA inspections.

— "Fifth Round of Nuclear Talks Opens In Beijing," News Bulletin, 9 November 2005, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com; "Three-Point Plan Put Forward to Resolve North Korea Nuclear Dispute," Agence France Presse, 9 November 2005, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com.

11 November 2005

The fifth round of Six Party Talks will recess for diplomats to attend the APEC summit in South Korea. No progress has been made in negotiating on the denuclearization of North Korea. U.S. and North Korean negotiators agreed to meet again but do not set another date to resume talks. Structural challenges emerged over U.S. sanctions on North Korean firms accused of proliferating weapons of mass destruction, and counterfeiting U.S. dollars. North Korea requested a removal of sanctions placed on these firms, while U.S. was pushing for North Korea to halt plutonium production.

—"North Korea Nuclear Talks in Beijing With No Word of Progress Toward Settlement," Associated Press, 11 November 2005, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com.

14 November 2005

North Korea proposed a five stage plan for dismantling their nuclear weapons. North Korea would suspend nuclear testing, transfer of nuclear technology, and shut down the production of nuclear weapons. They would allow outside inspections and dismantle nuclear weapons before returning to the NPT and accept IAEA safeguards. North Korea agreed to end their nuclear program in exchange for energy assistance and other benefits. However, North Korea has refused to dismantle their nuclear program until the US supplies a Light Water Reactor.

—"North Korea Offered Plan For Nuclear Dismantlement: Official," Agence France Presse, 14 November, 2005, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com.

29 November 2005

U.S. government decides to finally terminate the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) project to build two light water reactors as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework. After the U.S. government and KEDO officially cancelled the project, North Korea demands compensation for the political and economic losses. North Korea claims the United States is violating the Agreed Framework which promised to build the light water reactors; the U.S. government countered that the North Koreans were covertly developing a uranium enrichment program which was contrary to the Agreed Framework.

—"N. Korea Asks US to Compensate it For Cancelled Reactors," Yonhap News, 29 November 2005, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com.

11 December 2005

North Korea suspends its participation in the Six Party Talks for an indefinite period of time due to U.S. financial sanctions. The US blacklisted eight North Korean firms suspected of WMD proliferation.

"Nuclear Talks Suspended Indefinitely: Korea," Agence France Presse, 11 December 2005, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com.

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12 December 2005

The North Korean government orders the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to withdraw all employees from the nuclear power reactor construction site by January 2006. KEDO is also told they are not allowed to repatriate the equipment and materials on the construction site.

—"North Korea Orders Withdrawal of International Staff at Reactor Site," BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 12 December 2005, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com.

21 December 2005

North Korea announces the intended construction of light water reactors. They were also increasing the production of two graphite moderated reactors meant to extract weapons grade plutonium.

—Choe Sang Hun, "N.Korea Vows to Build Own Light Water Reactors," The international Herald Tribune, 21 December 2005, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com.

[Back to Top](#)

2004

1 January 2004

North Korea's three major newspapers, Rodong Sinmun, Chosŏn Inmin'gun and Ch'ŏngnyŏn Chŏnwi, release a joint editorial that says North Korea is willing to hold six-nation talks early this new year. But the editorial also warns that "we will always react with the toughest policy to the US hard-line policy."

—"Tang'ŭi ryŏngdo'mit'e kangsŏngdaegukkŏnsŏr'ŭi modŭn chŏnsŏn'esŏ hyŏngmyŏngjŏkkongserŭl pŏllyŏ olhaerŭl charangch'an sŭngni'ŭi haero pitnae'ija," Korean Central News Agency, 1 January 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "Joint New Year Editorial Published," Korean Central News Agency, 1 January 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "N. Korea to Seek Peace in Nuke Crisis, But to Resist U.S.," Kyodo News Service, 31 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Urges Peaceful Nuke Resolution," Associated Press, 31 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Shim Sun, "N. Korea Pledges Peaceful Resolution of Its Nuke Crisis," Yonhap News Agency, 1 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 January 2004

South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun says in his New Year's message to the nation, "I will do my best to lay a new foundation for peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula by peacefully resolving the North Korean nuclear problem."

—"President Roh Moo-hyun's New Year Message to the Nation," Korea Update, 1 January 2004, Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Washington, D.C., www.koreaemb.org; Shim Sun, "N. Korea Pledges Peaceful Resolution of Its Nuke Crisis," Yonhap News Agency, 1 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 January 2004

US Secretary of State Colin Powell says in a New York Times op-ed that the Bush administration will continue to pursue diplomacy within the six-nation framework to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue. He also writes, "We seek peace and reconciliation in the Korean peninsula, but we will not reward threats from Pyongyang or provide

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incentive for blackmail."

—Colin L. Powell, "What We Will Do in 2004," *New York Times*, 1 January 2004, in Proquest, www.il.proquest.com;
 "Powell Urges N. Korea to Abandon 'Dangerous' Nuke Arms," Kyodo News Service, 1 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 January 2004

The Korean Central News Agency says the US should "de-list the DPRK as a sponsor of terrorism, lift political, economic and military sanctions," as well as "supply heavy oil, power and other energy resources to the DPRK" based on the principle of simultaneous actions. In return the DPRK "is set to refrain from testing and production of nuclear weapons and even stop operating the nuclear power industry used for peaceful purposes as first-phase measures in the package solution."

—"6 Chahoedam'i kweto'e tül'ösönün'ganün migug'üi t'aedo yöha'e tallyö itta," Korean Central News Agency, 6 January 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "KCNA Urges U.S. Not to Shun Core Issue at Six-Way Talks," Korean Central News Agency, 6 January 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; Seo Hyun-jin, "N.K. Offers to Halt Nuke Facilities; Pyongyang Demands U.S. Lift Sanctions, Provide Energy," *Korea Herald*, 7 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 January 2004

US Secretary of State Colin Powell calls North Korea's offer to freeze its nuclear program a positive step for implying "that they would give up all aspects of their nuclear program, not just the weapons program."

—"Remarks with Tunisian Foreign Minister Habib Ben Yahia, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell," 6 January 2004, Speeches and Remarks, U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov; "Powell Welcomes N. Korea's Offer to Freeze Nuke Program," Yonhap News Agency, 7 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Seoul, Washington Welcome NK's Offer to Freeze Nukes," *Korea Times*, 8 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 January 2004

South Korea's Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Yoon Young-kwan [Yun Yöng Gwan] says, "We positively evaluate the North Korean statement [released today to freeze nuclear activities] because it stated specifically what measure it would take, and confirmed once again its willingness to tackle the issue through dialogue."

—Chang Jae, "Minister Yoon Welcomes North Korea's Offer to Freeze Nuke Program," Yonhap News Agency, 7 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "S. Korean FM Welcomes DPRK's Offer to Freeze Nuke Facilities," Xinhua News Agency, 7 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Seoul, Washington Welcome NK's Offer to Freeze Nukes," *Korea Times*, 8 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6-10 January 2004

An unofficial delegation of five Americans visits North Korea. During the five-day trip, the group, which includes former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Siegfried S. Hecker and John W. Lewis of Stanford University, visits the nuclear complex in Yöngbyön-kun, but they stress that their objective is not to inspect or negotiate on behalf of the US government. The North Koreans show Hecker a piece of metal that Hecker describes as having all the visible properties of plutonium, but Hecker does not have diagnostic equipment to completely verify that it is. The group also checks a few containers in the temporary storage pond containing 8,000 canned

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spent fuel rods, but the rods are empty.

—"Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on 'Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea, Siegfried S. Hecker," Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, 108th Congress, United States Congress, 21 January 2004, www.lanl.gov; Barbara Slavin, "N. Korea OKs U.S. Visit to Complex," *USA Today*, 2 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Joe McDonald, "American Delegation Visits Disputed North Korean Nuclear Facility but Won't Say What It Saw," Associated Press, 10 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jim Yardley, "Group of Private U.S. Experts Visits North Korea Nuclear Plant," *New York Times*, 10 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Private U.S. Mission Visits N. Korea to See Key Nuke Plant," Kyodo News Service, 6 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Allows U.S. Delegation to Visit Nuke Site," Korea Herald, 3 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Service, 12 January 2004, in "'Unofficial US Delegation' to DPRK Said to Hold 10-Hr Session With DPRK Vice FM," FBIS Document ID KPP20040112000104.

7 January 2004

US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher responds to a Washington Post report that Fu Ying, head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Asian Affairs Bureau, stated on 29 December 2003 that China did not believe North Korea has a clandestine uranium enrichment program by reiterating, "We certainly know North Korea has a highly enriched uranium program, and when confronted with that fact, North Korea admitted it."

—Glenn Kessler, "Chinese Not Convinced of North Korean Uranium Effort," *Washington Post*, 7 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "China Unconvinced North Korea Has Enriched Uranium Program: Report," Agence France Presse, 7 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, 8 January 2004, in "China Doubts US Views on DPRK Uranium Enrichment Program," FBIS Document ID JPP20040108000044; "U.S. Says North Korea Has HEU Program," Yonhap News Service, 8 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 January 2004

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman dismisses Libya's decision to abandon nuclear program as having nothing to do with the DPRK, stating that "to expect any 'change' from the DPRK [would be] foolish." He adds the decisions to allow intrusive inspections in Libya and Iran "only reinforce the DPRK's firm belief in the validity and vitality of its Sŏngun [military first] policy."

—"Spokesman for DPRK FM Dismisses Any Change from DPRK as Ridiculous," Korean Central News Agency, 9 January 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "North Korea Rejects Libyan Lead on Scrapping Nuclear Drive," Agence France Presse, 9 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Calls U.S. Hope It will Follow Libya's Path 'Ridiculous,'" Japan Economic Newswire, 9 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Joe McDonald, "American Delegation Visits Disputed North Korean Nuclear Facility but Won't Say What It Saw," Associated Press, 10 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 January 2004

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says the DPRK showed the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex to Professor John W. Lewis and the American delegation to "ensure transparency as speculative reports and ambiguous information about [North Korea's] nuclear activities are throwing hurdles in the way of settling the pending nuclear

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issue."

—"Woemusöng taeyöñ'in migukkyosuilhaeng'üi nyöngbyöñhaekshisölbangmun'e öngup," Korean Central News Agency, 10 January 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "Spokesman for DPRK FM on U.S. Professor's Visit to Nyongbyon Nuclear Facility," Korean Central News Agency, 10 January 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; Jung-A Song, "US Visit Boosts Chance of Talks with N Korea," *Financial Times*, 12 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "Visitors See North Korea Nuclear Capacity," *New York Times*, 11 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Barbara Slavin, "N. Korea Boasts of Nuke-Fuel Factory," *USA Today*, 12 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 January 2004

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan tells reporters that Chairman of the National People's Congress Wu Bangguo offered economic aid to North Korea during a visit to Pyongyang in October 2003. While Kong declines to give details of the economic package, Japan's Asahi Shimbun reports, "Beijing dangled the equivalent of \$50 million in grant aid for North Korea to attend multilateral talks on its nuclear standoff [that took place in December 2003]."

—"China Says Aid Offered to North Korea Last October," Deutsche Presse Agentur, 13 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "China Promises North Korea 50 mln dlrs in Exchange for Nuclear Talks: Report," Agence France Presse, 10 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Nobuyoshi Sakajiri, "China Offers \$50 Million for North Korea to Keep Talking," Asahi News Service, 12 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "China Confirms New Aid Package to North Korea," Agence France Presse, 13 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 January 2004

An unidentified US source says a senior North Korean Foreign Ministry official expressed the DPRK's intentions to address its nuclear weapons development and the issue of abductions of Japanese nationals separately. The intentions were reportedly expressed to the two Senate foreign policy aides of Sen. Richard Lugar and Sen. Joseph Biden, two of the five members of the unofficial US delegation that visited North Korea during 6-10 January.

—"N. Korea Seeks to Resolve Nuke, Abduction Issues Separately," Kyodo News Service, 12 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, 10 January 2004, in "U.S. Mission to N. Korea Takes Up Abduction Issue," FBIS Document ID JPP20040110000055; Kyodo News Service, 11 January 2004, in "Japan Ready to Negotiate N. Korean Offer on Abductees' Families," FBIS Document ID JPP20040111000011.

20-21 January 2004

South Korea's National Security Advisor Ra Jong Il meets with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi during a two-day visit to discuss the Six-Party Talks and bilateral issues. The two agree to continue seeking a peaceful solution under the six-way framework to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue.

—"Rajong'il—Kawaguchi, pukhaek kongjo chaehwag'in," Yonhap News Agency, 21 January 2004, www.yonhapnews.net; "Kawaguchi, S. Korea's Ra Call for Early 6-Party Talks," Jiji Press, 21 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan, S. Korea Confirm Need for Peaceful Solution on Nuke Issue," Kyodo News Service, 21 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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21 January 2004

Siegfried Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, testifies before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and says that he spoke with several scientific, military and economic officials but did not see an actual weapon during his five-day visit to North Korea. He says he did observe a restarted 5MW(e) reactor [capable of yielding approximately 5.5 kg of plutonium per year], empty spent fuel canisters in pond for perhaps 8,000 fuel rods, and what appeared to be a plutonium metal sample.

—Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on "Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea," Siegfried S. Hecker, Senior Fellow, Los Alamos National Laboratory, January 21, 2004, Committee Hearings 108th Congress Second Session – 2004, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, <http://foreign.senate.gov>; Barbara Slavin, "Scientist Describes N. Korea Nuclear Evidence," *USA Today*, 22 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 January 2004

Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, attacks the US National Nuclear Security Administration's decision to resume research into smaller nuclear weapons, saying, "The world is now on the verge of being embroiled in the second global arms race [due to the NNSA's decision]."

—"Pushihaengjǒngbu sohyǒnghaengmugiyǒn'gu chaegaejishi haekpǒminǔro sǒŭi chǒngch'e," Korean Central News Agency, 26 January 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "U.S. to Blame for Developing Nukes," Korean Central News Agency, 26 January 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "North Korea Criticizes US for Resuming Mini-Nuke Research," BBC, 26 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21-22 January 2004

Mitoji Yabunaka, director general of the Asian and Oceanic Affairs Bureau in the Japanese Foreign Ministry, South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Su Hyŏk, and US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly meet in Washington to discuss the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, North Korea's proposal to freeze its nuclear weapons program in exchange for the resumption of heavy fuel oil supplies, and Japan's desire to include the abductions issue in the multilateral talks.

—"Japan, S. Korea, U.S. Begin Talks on N. Korea Nuke Issue," Kyodo News Service, 21 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Seo Hyun-Jin, "Allies to Open Talks on N.K. Nuke Tension," *Korea Herald*, 21 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan, U.S., S. Korea Seek Early 6-Way Talks on North's Nukes," Jiji Press, 23 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kwŏn Sun-Ch'ŏl, "3 cha pukhaek chǒngch'aek hyŏp'ŭihoe," *Han'guk Kyŏngje*, 21 January 2004, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

29 January 2004

Pakistan's Interior Minister Faisal Saleh Hayat denies that Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan is suspected of transferring nuclear technology or know-how to North Korea, Iran, or Libya, saying, "Dr. Khan is neither a suspect, nor in custody." The statement comes following the interrogation of nuclear scientists and officials that have linked Khan to nuclear proliferation.

—"Khan Is Not Among Nuclear Suspects, Says Pakistani Minister," Deutsche Presse Agentur, 29 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Paul Watson, "Pakistan Sheds No Light on Detained Scientists," *Los*

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Angeles Times, 28 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; James Astill, "Nuclear Inquiry Targets Father of Pakistani Bomb," *The Guardian* (London), 27 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 January 2004

Australia sends a delegation of government officials to Pyongyang to urge the DPRK to restart the Six-Party Talks. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer says Australia is in a good position to persuade North Korean officials because it is one of the few countries that maintains diplomatic relations with North Korea even though Canberra is a close ally of Washington. Downer also says he believes the Six-Party Talks are "the most viable mechanism for finding a peaceful and a lasting solution to the nuclear issue."

—"Australian Delegation to North Korea to Talk Nukes," Deutsche Presse Agentur, 30 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Australia Sends Delegation to DPRK for Nuclear Talks," Xinhua News Agency, 30 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 January 2004

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, referred to as "the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb," is removed from his position as advisor to the Pakistani government on nuclear affairs to "facilitate the ongoing investigations" into alleged nuclear proliferation to Iran, Libya and North Korea. The decision followed a meeting of Pakistan's Nuclear Command and Control Authority, headed by President Pervez Musharraf. Khan held his position as advisor since 2001.

—"Father of Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb' Removed," Deutsche Presse Agentur, 31 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Founder of Pakistan's Nuke Program Sacked as Advisor," Kyodo News Service, 31 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, "Pakistanis Say Nuclear Scientists Aided Iran," Washington Post, 24 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 February 2004

A Pakistani official says Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan admitted to having transferred nuclear technology to North Korea, as well as to Iran, Libya, and Malaysia. Between 1986 and 1997, Khan allegedly provided centrifuge machines and technical drawings to North Korea and allowed North Koreans to visit the Kahuta Research Laboratory where a uranium enrichment program exists.

—"Khan Admits Nuke Know-How Transfers to 4 Countries," Kyodo News Service, 1 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Pakistani Nuclear Scientist Admits Transferring Nuke Technology," Xinhua News Agency, 2 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David Rohde and David E. Sanger, "Key Pakistani Is Said to Admit Atom Transfers," *New York Times*, 2 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; James Astill, "Nuclear Expert Admits Selling Secrets," *The Guardian* (London), 3 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Munir Ahmad, "Pakistan Official Says Nuclear Equipment Shipped to Iran, North Korea, Libya and Malaysia," Associated Press, 3 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 February 2004

South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman Sin Bong-kil says Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon and US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly agree to achieve complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Kelly states that he is "mildly optimistic" for a future round of Six-Party Talks.

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—"S. Korea, U.S. Reaffirm Stance on N. Korea Nuke Program," Kyodo News Service, 2 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Soo-Jeong Lee, "U.S., South Korean Officials Continue Efforts to Reopen Nuke Talks," Associated Press, 1 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Seo Hyun-jin, "Seoul, Washington Consult on N.K. Nukes," *Korea Herald*, 3 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Charles Whelan, "US Envoy in Talks Amid New Reports on N Korea's Nuclear, Chemical Weapons," Agence France Presse, 2 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 February 2004

The Korean Central News Agency reports that the second round of the Six-Party Talks will begin on 25 February 2004.

—"Taũmbõn 6 chahoedamgaech'oe 2 wõl 25 Ilput'õ," Korean Central News Agency, 3 February 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "KCNA Report on Resumption of Six-way Talks," Korean Central News Agency, 3 February 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; Nicholas Kralev, "U.S., North Schedule 6-way Nuke Talks in Beijing; Second Round to Begin Feb. 25 on Willingness to 'Dismantle'," *Washington Times*, 4 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 February 2004

After a meeting with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, US Secretary of State Colin Powell confirms that the next round of Six-Party Talks will resume on 25 February 2004 in Beijing.

—"Powell Confirms 2nd Round of 6-Way Talks on N. Korea Nuke," Kyodo News Service, 3 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Nicholas Kralev, "U.S., North Schedule 6-way Nuke Talks in Beijing; Second Round to Begin Feb. 25 on Willingness to 'Dismantle'," *Washington Times*, 4 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Christopher Marquis and Norimitsu Onishi, "North Korea Agrees to Resume Talks with U.S. Over Arms," *New York Times*, 4 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 February 2004

An unidentified Japanese Foreign Ministry official says Japan will raise the issue of Japanese nationals abducted to North Korea at the next round of Six-Party Talks. However, Japan may not raise the issue if North Korea agrees to hold separate bilateral talks to address the issue before the Six-Party Talks.

—Kanako Takahara, "Japan to Bring Up Abductions Issue," *Japan Times*, 4 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan Welcomes 2nd Round, Wants Progress on Abductions," Kyodo News Service, 3 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea, Japan Discuss Abduction Issue in Bilateral Talks," Yonhap News Agency, 25 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 February 2004

South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon states that ROK officials "fully understand the Japanese government's position and concern regarding the abduction issue and support Japan's position." However, he adds Japan should exclude the issue from the next round of Six-Party Talks and address the issue in bilateral discussions between North Korea and Japan.

—"Abduction Issue Better Not Included in Six-Party Nuke Talks: S. Korean FM," Xinhua News Agency, 4 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea, Japan Discuss Abduction Issue in Bilateral Talks," Yonhap News Agency, 25 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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4 February 2004

Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong tells Tomiichi Murayama, former Japanese Prime Minister and current honorary adviser to the Japan-China Friendship Association, that Japan should not address the issue of Japanese abductions by North Korean spies at the second round of Six-Party Talks.

—"China's Zeng Asks Japan Not to Raise Abductions at 6-Way Talks," Jiji Press, 4 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Abduction Issue Better Not Included in Six-Party Nuke Talks: S. Korean FM," Xinhua News Agency, 4 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 February 2004

Hwang Chang-yŏp, a former Korean Workers Party secretary who defected to South Korea, says that North Korea has been working covertly to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons since 1996. Hwang says he learned of this directly from Chŏn Pyŏng-ho, a party secretary overseeing munitions industries and a member of the National Defense Committee. Hwang states Chŏn went on a month-long trip to Pakistan in 1996 and learned that North Korea no longer needed plutonium because uranium-235 can be enriched and used in nuclear weapons.

—"North Korean Defector Says North Has Uranium Weapons Program Dating to 1996," Associated Press, 8 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Pursued Uranium-Based Nukes Since 1996, Defector Says," Yonhap News Agency, 8 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Launched Nuke Program Under Deal with Pakistan: Report," Agence France Presse, 8 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea, Khan Began Contacts in 1995-1996: U.S. Official," Kyodo News Service, 11 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 February 2004

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says the DPRK did not receive nuclear technology from Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. The statement is in response to Pakistan's announcement that Khan had admitted to proliferation of nuclear technology to North Korea, Iran, Libya and Malaysia. The spokesman instead accuses the US of attempting to derail the second round of Six-Party Talks scheduled for 25 February. He also says the announcement was made to give credibility to claims that North Korea had a covert weapons development program through "groundless propaganda."

—"Woemusŏngdaebyŏn'in migug'ŭi 'haekkisul'ijŏn' sŏlŭl paegyŏk," Korean Central News Agency, 10 February 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "DPRK FM Spokesman Refutes U.S. Story about 'Transfer of N-Technology' to DPRK," Korean Central News Agency, 10 February 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "N. Korea Denies Receiving Nuclear Technology from Pakistan," Yonhap News Agency, 10 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Andrew Ward, "N Korea Denies Nuclear Deal with Khan Pakistani Scientist," *Financial Times*, 11 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 February 2004

A DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman states that a Japanese Foreign Ministry delegation, while visiting North Korea's Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sŏk-chu during 11-14 February, was told that "if the Japanese side raises again the 'abduction issue' at the next round of the Six-Party Talks, the DPRK side will resolutely shut out Japan's participation in the talks."

—"Chosŏnwoemusŏngdaebyŏn'in ilbonwoemusŏng taep'yodan'ŭi chosŏnbangmun'e ŏn'gŭp," Korean Central

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News Agency, 14 February 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "Foreign Ministry Spokesman on DPRK Visit of Japanese FM Delegation," Korean Central News Agency, 14 February 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "North Korea Warns Japan Not to Raise Abductee Issue at Six-Way Talks," BBC, 14 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan Must Not Raise Abduction Issue at 6-Way Talks: KCNA," Kyodo News Service, 14 February, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 February 2004

A US State Department official voices low expectations for the next round of Six-Party Talks and says the Bush administration does not expect a breakthrough but that "if the talks are less than completely successful, we'll continue to try to work along that line."

—Glenn Kessler, "Hopes Lowered for U.S.—N. Korea Talks; Diplomacy Appears to Be a Priority," *Washington Post*, 20 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Guy Dinmore, "Gloom at New US Talks with N Korea," *Financial Times*, 20 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 February 2004

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers Party, carries an editorial calling for South Korea to join North Korea's fight against "US attempts to strangle and wage war against the North." The Six-Party Talks are scheduled to begin tomorrow.

—"Minjokkongjo'nŭn chogukt'ong'ilgwa minjokpŏn'yŏng'ŭi kil," Korean Central News Agency, 24 February 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "N.K. Calls for Inter-Korean Alliance Ahead of Nuclear Talks," Yonhap News Agency, 24 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 February 2004

CIA Director George Tenet testifies during a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing that he believes the DPRK "is pursuing a production-scale uranium enrichment program based on technology provided by [Pakistan's] A. Q. Khan." Tenet adds, "[North Korea] is trying to leverage its nuclear programs into international legitimacy and bargaining power, announcing its withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty and openly proclaiming that it has a nuclear deterrent."

—"The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context," Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 24 February 2004, www.cia.gov; "U.S. Assured N. Korea Possesses Uranium-Based Program, CIA Says," Yonhap News Agency, 24 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea, Khan Began Contacts in 1995-1996: U.S. Official," Kyodo News Service, 11 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 February 2004

A Japanese delegate to the Six-Party Talks says Japan will raise the issue of abductions at the negotiations and all parties would be informed of Tokyo's position. However, North Korea's chief delegate Kim Kye-gwan has stated he has no intention of discussing the issue in Beijing.

—Taro Karasaki, "Japan to Push Abduction Issue on Reluctant N. Korea at Talks," Asahi News Service, 25 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan, South Korea, US Hold Preparatory Meeting on Six-Party Talks," BBC, 23 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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25 February 2004

The second round of Six-Party Talks begin in Beijing six months after the conclusion of the first round in August 2003. The delegations are headed by James Kelly of the United States; Kim Kye-gwan of the DPRK; Lee Su-hyŏk of South Korea; Wang Li of China; Mitoji Yabunaka of Japan; and Alexander Losyukov of Russia.

—Audra Ang, "New Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program Convene in Chinese Capital," Associated Press, 25 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Six Nations to Start Talks over NK Nukes," *Korea Times*, 25 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "6 Nations Resume Talks to Discuss 1st Steps to End Nuke Crisis," Japan Economic Newswire, 25 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Seo Hyun-jin, "Six-Party Talks Open Today in Beijing," *Korea Herald*, 25 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Six Nations Open Talks on North Korea Nuclear Programme," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 25 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 February 2004

Delegates from the United States and North Korea meet in a bilateral "informal chat" on the sidelines during the first day of Six-Party Talks in Beijing.

—Jae-Suk Yoo, "North Korea, United States Meet Again on Sidelines of Six-Country Talks," Associated Press, 25 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Martin Parry, "US, N Korea Meet in Quest to Solve Nuclear Crisis," Agence France Presse, 25 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Audra Ang, "U.S., North Korean Envoys Hold Rare Meeting on Sidelines of 6-Nation Talks," Associated Press, 25 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 February 2004

On the first day of Six-Party Talks, South Korea's lead negotiator Lee Su-hyŏk proposes the creation of a working-group and calls for the six delegations to meet regularly every two months to address the North Korea nuclear issue.

—"S. Korea Proposes Holding 6-Nation Talks Every 2 Months," Japan Economic Newswire, 25 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Alexei Morozov and Vera Pavlova, "S Korea Proposes to Hold Regular Talks on N Korean Nukes," ITAR-TASS News Agency, 25 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "S. Korea Suggests Bi-Monthly Nuke Talks," United Press International, 25 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Seoul to Seek Working Groups at Six-Nation Talks on N.K. Nukes," Yonhap News Agency, 24 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "S. Korea Seeks Creation of 3 Working Groups on Nuke Issue," Kyodo News Service, 24 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 February 2004

North Korean and Japanese delegates hold bilateral consultations on the sidelines of the Six-Party Talks to discuss the issue of Japanese abductions by North Korea. The two sides fail to achieve progress but agree to continue discussions. North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan has repeatedly insisted that the kidnapping issue should not be a part of the six-way negotiations.

—"Japan, N. Korea Fail to Make Headway in Abduction Talks," Kyodo News Service, 25 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japanese Official Confirms Discussion of Abduction Issue with DPRK," Xinhua News Agency, 25 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N Korea and Japan to Hold Bilateral

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Meeting on Sidelines of Six-Party Talks," Agence France Presse, 25 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Further Details on Japan-North Korea Bilateral Meeting at Six-Party Talks," BBC, 25 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 February 2004

The United States delegation to the Six-Party Talks reportedly rejects North Korea's offer to freeze its nuclear arms programs as part of a "package deal" presented at the previous round of talks in August 2003. The US side says the offer falls short of "complete dismantlement" and fails to mention Pyongyang's covert uranium enrichment program. North Korea's proposal, which is offered again during this round of talks, contains three stages, but the Bush administration the proposed deal could enable North Korea to resume nuclear activities in the future. The DPRK is still denying the existence of uranium enrichment facilities.

—"U.S. Rejects N. Korea Nuke Arms Freeze Offer," Kyodo News Service, 26 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; *Sankei Shimbun*, 26 February 2004, in "DPRK Reportedly Presented 'Package Deal' on Nuclear Issue Mid-Jan, Rejected by US," FBIS Document ID JPP20040226000018; Beijing China Daily, 26 February 2004, in "PRC FM Spokesman: Six-Parties Find 'Some Consensus, Though Differences Remained,'" FBIS Document ID CPP20040226000021; "North Korea Repeats Call for 'Simultaneous' Solution to Nuclear Dispute," *Financial Times*, 24 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 February 2004

Lee Su-hyök, South Korea's lead delegate to the Six-Party Talks, offers to provide energy aid to North Korea in exchange for freezing its nuclear weapons development. Russia and China offer to join South Korea in providing energy aid while US and Japanese delegations respond coolly and DPRK delegates offer no immediate official reaction.

—"N. Korea Offers to Abandon Weapons; China, Russia Back Energy Plan," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 26 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 26 February 2004, in "ROK Envoy to 6-Way Talks: No 'Official' DPRK Reaction on ROK Energy Offer," FBIS Document ID KPP20040226000084; Kyodo News Service, 26 February 2004, in "PRC, Russia Ready to Join ROK in Giving Aid to DPRK: Deputy FM Yi Su-hyok," FBIS Document ID JPP20040226000081.

26 February 2004

United States and Japanese officials say they will not accept the draft joint statement that China presented because it failed to mention "complete, verifiable and irreversible" dismantlement of all North Korean nuclear programs and not just "weapons programs." Russia's head delegate Alexander Lusyukov says North Korea is showing "readiness" to dismantle its nuclear weapons programs while "retaining a nuclear program for peaceful purposes." Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao, however, tells reporters that the Six-Party Talks did not discuss civilian and military uses of North Korea's nuclear programs.

—"N. Korea Offers to Abandon Weapons; China, Russia Back Energy Plan," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 26 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan, U.S. to Seek Complete Nuke Dismantlement in Statement," Kyodo News Service, 26 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Rejects N. Korea Nuke Arms Freeze Offer," Kyodo News Service, 26 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Taro Karasaki, "N. Korea Offers to Freeze Nukes," Asahi News Service, 27 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis,

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<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Nuke Talks Struggle Over Summary," United Press International, 27 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 February 2004

Pakistan's Foreign Ministry spokesman Masood Khan strongly rejects a report in the *New York Times* that Pakistan may have conducted joint nuclear tests with North Korea as being "wild, mischievous and irresponsible speculation."

—"Pakistan Rejects Report of Joint Nuclear Tests with North Korea," Agence France Presse, 27 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "Pakistan May Have Aided North Korea A-Test," *New York Times*, 27 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Pakistan Denies Nuclear Cooperation with North Korea," BBC, 27 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 February 2004

The second round of Six-Party Talks in Beijing ends with agreement to hold more talks by July 2004 and to form a working-group, but without achieving a significant breakthrough. North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan insists, "We don't plan to include our civilian nuclear program for peaceful purposes in the freeze and dismantlement." Washington has demanded that North Korea admit and include uranium enrichment, which Pyongyang denies exists, in the nuclear negotiations.

—"Text of Statement Issued at N Korea Nuclear Talks," AFX News, 29 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jae-Suk Yoo, "U.S., N. Korea Divided After Nuke Talks," Associated Press, 28 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Washington Welcomes Results of Six-Way N.K. Nuke Talks," Yonhap News Agency, 29 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "6 States Fail to Agree on Nuke 'Principle, Scope': China," Japan Economic Newswire, 28 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Elaine Kurtenbach, "Nuke Negotiators Try to Avoid '94 Repeat," Associated Press, 28 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Robert Marquand, "Korea Talks: No Deal, But New Will," *Christian Science Monitor*, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 February 2004

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman blames the United States for failing to reach significant progress at the Six-Party Talks in Beijing saying, "The settlement of the nuclear issue will entirely depend on the change in the U.S. attitude." Concerning future talks, he says, "It is difficult to expect that any further talks would help find a solution to the issue."

—"Woemusöngdaebö'n'in che 2 ch'a 6 chahoedam'e ö'n'gö'p haengmunjehaegyölyöbu'nün migukch'ög'üi t'aedo'pyönhwa'e tallyö'itta," Korean Central News Agency, 29 February 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-Way Talks," Korean Central News Agency, 29 February 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; Soo-Jeong Lee, "N. Korea Urges U.S. to Change Its Policy," Associated Press, 29 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Robert J. Saiget, "North Korea Blames US for Lack of Progress at Nuclear Crisis Talks," Agence France Presse, 29 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 February 2004

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers Party, accuses US plans for redeployment of troops in

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South Korea as being "intended to finally complete the military operational preparations for the second Korean war against the DPRK, pursuant to its 'strategy for preemptive attack' and 'new operation plan 5026'."

—"US Redeployment of Its Armed Forces under Fire," Korean Central News Agency, 29 February 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "DPRK Denounces U.S. New War Plan on Korean Peninsula," *Chosŏn Shinbo*, 28 February 2004, www.korea-np.co.jp.

1 March 2004

South Korea President Roh Moo-hyun says in a holiday speech that he is confident the North Korean nuclear issue will be resolved peacefully through the Six-party Talks. Roh also reiterates his call for reducing dependence on the United States in foreign affairs and military support.

—"S Korea Presid (sic) Optimistic about DPRK Nuke Problem Settlement," ITAR-TASS News Agency, 1 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Samuel Len, "South Korean Leader Urges Less Dependence on U.S.," *International Herald Tribune*, 2 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 March 2004

U.S. President George W. Bush tells visiting South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon that the second round of Six-party Talks was fruitful because the six nations have clearly demonstrated that North Korea should dismantle its nuclear program.

—"Bush Upbeat on Nuke Talks with N. Korea," Yonhap News Agency, 3 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; South Korea Foreign Minister, US President Discuss North Korea, Iraq Issues, BBC Monitoring, 3 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Seo Hyun-jin, "Bush Confident of N.K. Nuclear Settlement," *Korea Herald*, 4 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Bush Says Dismantling NK Nuclear Programs is a 'Paramount Concern,'" *Korea Times*, 4 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 March 2004

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell says that the Six-party Talks last week produced "a good deal of progress" and that the United States will be patient in pursuing the current negotiations with diplomacy. Powell adds "whatever they [North Korea] are doing or not doing they will not force us or pressure us into any kind of a deal that is anything short of CVID [complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement]."

—"Powell Says US in No Hurry over North Korea Nuclear Crisis," Agence France Presse, 4 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Powell Says US 'Patient' on N. Korea Nuke Dismantlement," Kyodo News Service, 4 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Salamander Davoudi, "Powell Upbeat on N-Weapons Talks," *Financial Times*, 3 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Ban, Powell Agree on Peaceful Solution to NK Nuke Issue," *Korea Times*, 6 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 March 2004

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan praises the outcome of the latest Six-party Talks, citing "progress" and a "noticeable step forward" toward a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. Annan also promises to support the six nations "on ways to mobilize the support of the international community to [the denuclearization] end."

—"Annan Sees Progress at 6-Way Talks on N. Korea Nukes," Kyodo News Service, 3 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis,

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<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "UN's Annan Calls North Korea Six-Way Talks 'Noticeable Step Forward'," *Financial Times*, 3 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Powell, Annan Cites Good Deal of Progress at Korea Talks," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 3 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 March 2004

South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun says his government will continue dialogue and exchanges with North Korea despite a request from U.S. officials to sever ties and press North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions.

—Hwang Doo, "S. Korea to Engage N. Korea Despite U.S. Call for Severing Ties: Roh," Yonhap News Agency, 3 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "President Says South Korea to Pursue Dialogue with North Despite US Position," BBC Monitoring, 3 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "S. Korea to Continue to Engage the DPRK: S. Korean President," Xinhua News Agency, 3 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 March 2004

Russian Ambassador to Seoul Teymuraz O. Ramishvili says the six nations participating in the Six-party Talks need to utilize flexibility with the North Korea nuclear issue because the international community may not have the legal authority to stop North Korea's peaceful nuclear activities. He argues, "According to international law, it is impossible to stop such programs. But it could be considered in a diplomatic and political context."

—Seo Hyun-jin, "Russia Urges 'Flexibility' on N.K. Nukes," *Korea Herald*, 5 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "NK Has Right to Nuclear Development," *Korea Times*, 5 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 March 2004

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell tells reporters that the United States is in no hurry to find a solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis, saying, "We will be patient in pursuing this policy. The president strongly believes that a diplomatic solution is possible and we are not in any urgency to achieve that solution. We want a good solution."

—"Powell Says U.S. in No Hurry over North Korea Nuclear Crisis," Channel NewsAsia, 5 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 March 2004

South Korea's National Security Council (NSC) proposes new security policy initiatives to enhance security on the Korean Peninsula and allow Seoul to play a leading role in resolving the North Korea nuclear issue. Kwŏn Chin-ho, National Security Adviser to President Roh Moo-hyun, says at a press briefing that some of the proposed measures are replacing the Korean War armistice with a "peace regime," regaining wartime command and control of ROK troops from USFK, pursuing the "peace and prosperity policy" with North Korea, and restructuring the ROK army. The NSC publication, titled *Peace, Prosperity and National Security*, marks the first time Seoul has officially released a publication concerning the nation's overall national security.

—Kim So-young, "Seoul Lays Out Security Goals," *Korea Herald*, 5 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "South Korean Government Issues Publication on Security Policy," Yonhap News Agency, 3 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Seoul Softens 'Balanced Diplomacy' in Security Initiatives," *Korea*

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Times, 5 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "South Korea Hopes to Play Leading Role in Resolving North Nuclear Issue," BBC Monitoring, 4 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4-5 March 2004

According to the *New York Times*, a new CIA classified intelligence report is presented to White House officials detailing for the first time how Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) was able to provide North Korea with equipment and technology necessary to develop uranium-based nuclear weapons, including nuclear fuel, centrifuges and warhead designs. The assessment, partly based on interrogations of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan and his associates from KRL by the Pakistani officials, purportedly provides a history of KRL's dealings with North Korea that started in the early 1990s. According to the *New York Times*, intelligence officials also claim North Korea obtained some parts through the same suppliers and middlemen as Libya.

—David E. Sanger, "U.S. Widens View of Pakistan Link to Korean Arms," *New York Times*, 14 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KRL Provided N Korea with All Equipment to Produce Nuke Weapons," Press Trust of India, 14 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Khan Network May Have Supplied North Korea with Nuke Material: Report," Channel NewsAsia, 14 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 March 2004

South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ban Ki-moon meets with Japan's Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi in Tokyo, and the two parties agree "to communicate closely and cooperate" to settle North Korea's nuclear issue through the six-party framework.

—Seo Hyun-jin, "Seoul, Tokyo to Boost Efforts on N.K. Nukes," *Korea Herald*, 8 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Koizumi, Ban Agree to Cooperate to Settle N. Korea Nukes," Kyodo News Service, 8 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 March 2004

A commentary by North Korea's *Rodong Sinmun* criticizes South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ban Ki-moon for his recent remarks made in Washington regarding inter-Korea economic exchanges. Ban said it would be difficult to conduct economic exchanges between the two Koreas unless the current nuclear issue is settled. The commentary argues that the North's desire to have a nuclear deterrent force to "defend its right to existence and sovereignty" is natural and the statement by Ban corresponds to "anti-national and anti-reunification criminal acts."

—"S. Korean Foreign Minister's Unreasonable Remarks Flailed," Korean Central News Agency, 8 March 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "Rodong Shinmun: Woegyot'ongsangbu changgwan'ui sarie matchi annun kwebyon," Korean Central News Agency, 8 March 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "DPRK Condemns S. Korea for Linking Economic Cooperation with Nuclear Issue," Xinhua News Agency, 8 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 March 2004

A *Rodong Sinmun* commentary calls for a "verifiable and complete withdrawal" of U.S. forces stationed in South Korea as well as a "complete, verifiable and irreversible security assurance" guaranteed by the conclusion of a peace agreement and normalization of relations." It also demands that the United States stop its demand for "nuclear renouncement."

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—"Key to Resolving the (Nuclear) Issue Lies in the United States' Change of Attitude," *Rodong Sinmun*, 8 March 2004, in "N. Korea Urges Verifiable, Complete Withdrawal" of U.S. Forces in South Korea," BBC Monitoring, 9 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Rodong Sinmun on Key to Settlement of Nuclear Issue," Korean Central News Agency, 8 March 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "Rodongsimnum 'munjehaegyöläi yölsöenün migugüi t'aedobyönhwa'e itta," Korean Central News Agency, 8 March 2004, www.kcna.co.jp.

9 March 2004

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, warns that any U.S. economic sanctions as part of an effort to settle the North Korea nuclear crisis would amount to a "military operation aimed at staging a large-scale war" against North Korea.

—"Must Stop Military Commotion against the Republic," *Rodong Sinmun*, 9 March 2004, "North Korean Radio Urges U.S. to Stop War," BBC Monitoring, 9 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Rodongsinmun pan'gonghwagukkunsajöksodong'ül ködöch'iwöya handa," Korean Central News Agency, 9 March 2004, www.kcna.co.jp.

10 March 2004

Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson visits South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, and the two leaders issue a joint statement that "a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue through dialogue is essential for the maintenance of peace and stability not only in Northeast Asia but globally." Persson announced yesterday that he may visit Pyongyang to address North Korea's nuclear ambitions and issues concerning past abductions of Japanese citizens.

—"Sweden Backs Seoul's Effort for Peaceful Resolution of Nuke Crisis," Yonhap News Agency, 10 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Swedish Premier Eyes Visit to N. Korea on Nukes, Abductions," Japan Economic Newswire, 9 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Swedish PM May Still Visit North Korea This Week," Agence France Presse, 9 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Swedish Premier Urges North Korea to Abide by International Obligations," BBC Monitoring, 11 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 March 2004

A DPRK foreign ministry spokesperson says that the country's reluctance to abandon its nuclear program is a response to U.S. hostile policies against North Korea. The spokesperson adds, "If [the U.S.] persists in demanding a 'verifiable, irreversible and complete abandoning' of [North Korea's] nuclear program it should first promise a verifiable, irreversible and complete abandoning of its hostile policies against it."

—"Spokesman for DPRK FM Denounces U.S. Reckless Stand at Six-way Talks," Korean Central News Agency, 10 March 2004, www.kcna.co.jp.

12 March 2004

Mitchell Reiss, director of Policy Planning at the U.S. State Department, says that the U.S. is willing to pursue a "normal relationship" with North Korea as long as the latter "accepts international demands for complete elimination of its nuclear weapons program."

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— "U.S. Will Respond to N. Korean 'Actions, Not Mere Promises'," BBC Monitoring, 13 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 March 2004

South Korea's National Assembly passes an unprecedented impeachment bill that strips President Roh Moo-hyun of all executive powers until the Constitutional Court rules on the impeachment case. According to the ROK Constitution, Prime Minister Goh Kun assumes power as acting president.

—Chang Jae, "Parliament Impeaches Roh," Yonhap News Agency, 12 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Shim Sun, "Impeachment Unlikely to Stall Inter-Korean Relations, Officials Say," Yonhap News Agency, 12 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Samuel Len, "South Korea Parliament Votes to Strip President of Powers," *New York Times*, 12 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Anthony Faiola and Joohee Cho, "Jubilant, Rage in S. Korea; Impeachment of President Exposes Deep Ideological Rift," *Washington Post*, 13 March 2004, in ProQuest, <http://proquest.umi.com>; "South Korean Premier Pledges to Maintain Existing Policies," *BBC*, 12 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Lower-Level Talks on N. Korea Nuke Crisis to Get into Full Swing," Yonhap News Agency, 14 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kim So-young, "Roh Likely to Survive Impeachment Bill," *Korea Herald*, 11 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "S. Korea Urges North to Tackle Nuke Dispute Despite Impeachment," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 March 2004

White House spokesman Scott McClellan tells reporters that impeachment of South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun will not adversely impact the Six-party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program. U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says that Secretary Colin Powell spoke with South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ban Ki-moon, and the two officials confirmed to continue "to work together on issues of mutual concern, including things like the Six-party Talks and the Korean forces that are going to Iraq."

— "U.S. Unworried about Roh Impeachment Impact on 6-Way Talks," Japan Economic Newswire, 12 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Impeachment Not to Have 'Special Influence' on Six-Way Talks - S Korean Minister," *Financial Times*, 18 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "South Korean Premier Pledges to Maintain Existing Policies," BBC Monitoring, 12 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Seo Hyun-jin, "Goh Stresses Business as Usual; Interim Leader Stands by Troop Dispatch, North Korea Talks," *Korea Herald*, 17 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Associated Press, in "Seoul Warns N. Korea on Nuclear Talks," *Los Angeles Times*, 25 March 2004, in ProQuest, <http://proquest.umi.com>.

14 March 2004

A spokesman for North Korea's Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland says the impeachment of South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun has "pushed the political situation in south [sic] Korea to an unpredictable phase and brought an unbearable insult and disgrace to the south Korean people." The spokesman holds the United States responsible saying, "The U.S. had hatched such plot for 'impeachment' in south [sic] Korea since October last year."

—"Spokesman for CPRF on 'Motion on Impeachment against S. Korean President,'" Korean Central News Agency,

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14 March 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "Cho'p'yŏngt'ongtaebyŏn'in namjosŏn'esŏ'ŭi t'anhaek sat'ae'nŭn chŏngch'iballan, ŭihoe'k'udet'a," Korean Central News Agency, 14 March 2004, www.kcna.co.jp.

Mid March 2004

According to the *Tokyo Shinbun*, US special envoy Joseph DeTrani and North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Pak Kil-yŏn secretly met in New York to discuss ways to resolve the nuclear crisis.

—Yonhap News Agency, 5 April 2004, in "Japan Daily: DPRK, US Held 'Behind-the-Scenes Meeting' in Mar," OSC Document KPP20040405000072.

16 March 2004

North Korea's Korean Central News Agency states that Pyongyang was forced to cancel the 15 March meeting of the North-South Committee for the Promotion of Economic Cooperation because the impeachment of South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun has created a "state of anarchy and is making it impossible for both sides to have safe contacts."

—"Telephone Message to Chairman of South Side," Korean Central News Agency, 16 March 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; Hans Greimel, "North Korea Stokes Dispute over Scuttled Talks, Cites South Korean 'Anarchy'," Associated Press, 16 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Sang-Hun Choe, "North Korea Claims South in 'Anarchy'," Associated Press, March 16 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 March 2004

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao says, "The Chinese side has completed a concept paper [on the creation of working groups for the Six-party Talks]. We have submitted the paper to the other five parties concerned for opinion." Concurrently, South Korea's Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Su-hyŏk arrives in Beijing to discuss the setup of working groups and the Six-party Talks.

—"China Produces Concept Paper in Drive to Resolve N Korea Nuclear Standoff," Agence France Presse, 16 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "China Drafts Principles for Working Group on North Korea," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 16 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Ted Anthony, "South Korean Envoy Arrives in China for Talks on North Korean Nuclear Program," Associated Press, 16 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "China Foreign Minister Heads to N Korea on Rare Visit, Likely with Sweetener," AFX News, 23 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 March 2004

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei says he wants IAEA inspectors to return to North Korea "as early as possible" with "comprehensive" rights to examine nuclear facilities. Speaking after a meeting with U.S. President George W. Bush and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, he refers to the previous limits on IAEA inspectors prior to being expelled by Pyongyang at the end of 2002.

—Michael Adler, "UN Inspectors Would Need 'Comprehensive' Mandate in North Korea; IAEA," Agence France Presse, 18 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Michael Adler, "UN Agency to Work with US on Monitoring North Korean Nuclear Program," Agence France Presse, 19 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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19 March 2004

Referring to combined U.S.-South Korean military exercises, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson says that North Korea is forced to boost its nuclear arsenal in "quality and quantity" because the U.S. continues its "increased military threat."

—"U.S. Urged to Ponder over Unpredictable Consequences to Be Entailed by Its Provocations," Korean Central News Agency, 19 March 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; Sang-Hun Choe, "North Korea Threatens to Increase Nuclear Deterrent in 'Quality and Quantity'," Associated Press, 19 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 March 2004

In a report to Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party, the Japanese Foreign Ministry calls on North Korea to abandon its nuclear program "in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner." The report also expresses concerns about North Korea's ballistic missile program.

—"Japan Renews Call on N. Korea to Completely Abandon Nuke Programs," Japan Economic Newswire, 19 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 March 2004

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il meets with visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing to coordinate and discuss the prospects of a third round of Six-party Talks.

—"Chinese FM Meets with North Korea's Kim Jong-Il," Agence France Presse, 24 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Associated Press, in "N. Korean Leader, Chinese Aide Discuss Arms," *Washington Post*, 25 March 2004, in ProQuest, <http://proquest.umi.com>; "N. Korea's Kim Meets Chinese FM," United Press International, 24 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 March 2004

Radio Pyongyang reiterates that the DPRK will never accept the demand for "complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling" of its nuclear weapons programs first. The broadcast insists the United States must provide economic aid and written security guarantees first and that North Korea has the right to keep civilian nuclear programs.

—"North Korea Rejects Complete Disarmament," *Korea Herald*, 29 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korean Radio Criticizes US Demand for Nuclear Dismantlement," BBC Monitoring, 27 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Joseph Kahn, "North Korea Rejects U.S. Demand to Scrap Its Nuclear Programs," *New York Times*, 28 March 2004, in ProQuest, <http://proquest.umi.com>.

29 March 2004

South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon visits Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing and Assistant Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo in Beijing to discuss the creation of a working group for the Six-party Talks framework. Ban also asks Li, who visited Pyongyang to discuss the Six-party Talks 23-25 March, to work to grant asylum to North Korean defectors detained in China for humanitarian reasons.

—Choi Soung-ah, "Foreign Ministers Meet on N.K. Nukes," *Korea Herald*, 30 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "China, South Korea Agree on Early Start for North Nuclear Issue Working Group," BBC Monitoring, 30 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "China, South Korea Push Six-Party Working

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Group," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 29 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Seoul, Beijing Discuss NK Nuke Issue," *Korea Times*, 30 March 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 April 2004

Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, argues in an editorial for North Korea's nuclear development as "a legitimate self-defense measure" against a possible "US preemptive nuclear attack." It cites the preemptive strike on Iraq and military exercises with South Korea as evidence of US intentions to "provoke a war against the North."

—"U.S. Should Not Act Rashly," Korean Central News Agency, 5 April 2004, www.kcna.co.jp.

6 April 2004

A commentary by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency condemns the "1-4-2-1 defense strategy worked out" by the US Department of Defense. The 1-4-2-1 strategy refers to the US force-sizing construct that can "defend the homeland, deter forward in and from four regions, and conduct two, overlapping 'swift defeat' campaigns."

—"KCNA Assails U.S. 'Defense Strategy,'" Korean Central News Agency, 7 April 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2004, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in American Forces Information Service, www.defenselink.mil.

6 April 2004

South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon confers by telephone with his Japanese counterpart Yoriko Kawaguchi to discuss the standoff over North Korea's nuclear program and other issues. They agree to discuss ways to convene a working group session of Six-Party Talks at their upcoming meeting in San Francisco.

—"S. Korean, Japan FM's exchange views on DPRK Nuclear issue," Xinhua News Agency, 6 April 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "Japan, S.Korea Confirm N.Korea Policy Coordination," Jiji Press Service, 6 April 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

7-8 April 2004

US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Yi Su-hyök and Japanese Foreign Ministry Director General Mitoji Yabunaka hold "information trilateral consultations" in San Francisco. They conclude that the six-party working group should be convened as soon as possible, ideally by the end of the month.

—"US Wants to Hold DPRK Nuclear Working Group Talks this Month," Xinhua News Agency, 9 April 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "Japan, South Korea, US Begin Talks on North Korea Working Group," Kyodo News Service, 8 April 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

8 April 2004

Kim Il-ch'öl, North Korean Minister of the People's Armed Forces, argues that the US military threat will force North Korea to increase its "nuclear deterrent force." Kim spoke at a celebration to mark the 11th anniversary of Kim Jong Il's election as chairman of the National Defense Commission.

—"Kim Il-ch'öl, "Inminmuryökpung migugi wihyöphalsurok chosönüi haekökcheryökto kanghwa," Korean Central

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News Agency, 9 April 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "11th Anniversary of Kim Jong Il's Election as Chairman of NDC of DPRK," 9 April 2004, www.kcna.co.jp.

10 April 2004

South Korea's Deputy Foreign Minister Yi Su-hyök reiterates that North Korea's nuclear program should be dismantled in accordance with CVID [complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement].

—"South Korean Minister Reiterates Call for North Nuclear Disarmament," Yonhap News Agency, 10 April 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "S. Korea, US, Japan Hope for Working Group Meeting on Nuclear Issue by April," Xinhua News Service, 10 April 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 April 2004

The New York Times reports that Abdul Qadeer Khan told interrogators he made a trip to North Korea five years ago and was shown three nuclear devices in a secret underground nuclear facility.

—David E. Sanger, "Pakistani Says He Saw North Korean Nuclear Devices," *New York Times*, 13 April 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Pakistani Scientist Says He Saw Three North Korean Nuclear Bombs: Report," Agence France Presse, 13 April 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kim Jaeho, "'Pukhansŏ haekchangch'i 3gae bwatta,' p'ak'isŭt'an 'haengmugi abŏji' k'anbaksa chujang," *Chosun Ilbo*, 14 April 2006, www.kinds.or.kr.

15 April 2004

While visiting Fudan University in Shanghai, US Vice President Dick Cheney says he hopes the negotiations at the Six-Party Talks will result in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. Cheney insists on complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea's nuclear development programs.

—"Cheney Hopes Six-Party Talks to Result in Nuclear-Free Peninsula," Xinhua News Agency, 16 April 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lim Chang-won, "Cheney Winds Up Asian Tour with Call for support on Iraq, North Korea," Agence France Presse, 16 April 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 April 2004

US Vice President Dick Cheney tells South Korean officials that the Six-Party Talks need to reconvene at an early date and end the nuclear standoff. During his discussions with South Korea's Prime Minister Ko Kŏn, Cheney also voices concerns that North Korea could proliferate nuclear weapons technology to terrorist groups.

—"Cheney Reiterates Concern about N.K.'s Nuclear Proliferation," Yonhap News Agency, 17 April 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "Dick Cheney Says Need to Resolve N Korean Standoff Soon," Yonhap News Agency, BBC Monitoring, 17 April 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

18 April 2004

A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry assails US Vice President Dick Cheney's remarks demanding that North Korea dismantle its nuclear programs completely. The spokesman adds that North Korea will not consider complete dismantlement (CVID) and will not tolerate economic sanctions.

—"Chosŏnwoemusŏngdaebyŏn'in konghwaguk'ŭl mohamhanŭn migukpudaet'ongnyŏng ch'einiŭi mangbal'ŭl

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kyut'an," Korean Central News Agency, 19 April 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts Cheney's Anti-DPRK Remarks," Korean Central News Agency, 19 April 2004, www.kcna.co.jp.

19-21 April 2004

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il visits Beijing for three days and tells Chinese President Hu Jintao and other Chinese leaders that North Korea seeks to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully. Kim is accompanied by members of his cabinet and the National Defense Commission.

—"Kim Jong Il ch'ongbisŏ chunghwa'inmin'konghwaguk'ül pigongsik pangmun," Korean Central News Agency, 23 April 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; Kim Yŏng-sik, "Kim Jong Il-Hu Jintao chŏngsanghoedam, samdaeüijaero bon hoedam chŏnmang," *Donga Ilbo*, 20 April 2004, www.kinds.or.kr; Jim Yardly, "Kim Jong Il's Invisible Summit in China," *International Herald Tribune*, 21 April 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Taro Karasaki, "Secret Summit," *Asahi News Service*, 23 April 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "China, DPRA Agreed to Continue Pushing Forward Six-Party Talks Process," Xinhua News Agency, 21 April 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 April 2004

The Washington Post reports that the United States is preparing to raise its estimate of the number of nuclear weapons held by North Korea from "possibly two" to at least eight.

—Glenn Kessler, "N. Korea Nuclear Estimate To Rise; U.S. Report to Say Country Has At Least 8 Bombs," *Washington Post*, 28 April 2004, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea May Have Eight Nuclear Bombs: US report," *Agence France Presse*, 28 April 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 April 2004

Chinese special envoy Ning Fukui arrives in Seoul and says that countries should be more flexible and take a realistic approach so progress can be made. He also urged for in-depth talks at the working group talks to be held in May.

—Seo Hyun-jin, "N. Korean Nuclear Negotiations Regain Momentum," *Korea Herald*, 30 April 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N Korea Agrees to Fresh Nuclear Talks, but Warns of 'Hurdle' Ahead," *Agence France Presse*, 29 April 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 April 2004

A DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman demands that the US abandon its "hostile policy" in exchange for dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapon program under the principle of "reward for freeze."

—"Chosŏnwoemusŏngdaebyŏn'in 6chahoedamsilmu gŭrubbaheŏi'esŏ 'tonggyŏl tae posang' an'ül t'ŏi'halgŏtsŭl chujang," Korean Central News Agency, 30 April 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "Spokesman of DPRK Demands Discussion over Reward for Freeze in Working Group Meeting," Korean Central News Agency, 30 April 2004, www.kcna.co.jp.

29 April 2004

Adam Ereli, deputy spokesman of the US Department of State, denies knowledge of a new US government estimate that raises North Korea's nuclear devices to eight or more. Ereli confirms that six party working group meetings will begin in Beijing on May 12, 2004.

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—"South Korea Downplays US Report on Estimate of North's Nuclear Weapons," Yonhap News Agency, BBC Monitoring, 29 April 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Adam Ereli, Daily Press Briefing, www.state.gov; Daily Press Briefing, 29 April 2004, U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov.

30 April 2004

US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says the United States will not "pay [North Korea] not to do things [nuclear development] it shouldn't have been doing in the first place."

—Daily Press Briefing, 29 April 2004, U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov; "U.S. Dismisses Rewards for N.K. to Resolve Nuclear Impasse," Yonhap News Agency, 1 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 May 2004

A North Korean radio broadcast accuses the United States of preparing for a preemptive nuclear attack, citing combined military exercises with South Korea as well as the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

—"North Korea Says US Preparing for 'Pre-emptive Nuclear Attack'," BBC Monitoring, 2 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 May 2004

U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says China's special envoy to North Korea Ning Fukui met with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to discuss how to proceed with the first working group meeting for the Six-Party Talks. Ning also met with U.S. special envoy to the Six-Party Talks Joseph DeTrani and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly.

—Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, 3 May 2004, www.state.gov; "U.S., China Mull N. Korea Nukes before 6-Party Working Group Meeting," BBC Monitoring, 3 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "China's Special Envoy Discusses North Korea Talks with US Officials," BBC Monitoring, 4 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 May 2004

The *Financial Times* publishes Selig Harrison's feature story based on his April 2004 two-hour discussion with North Korean leaders. North Korea's Kim Yŏng-nam, president of the Supreme People's Assembly, reportedly stated that Pyongyang "would never allow such transfers [of nuclear material] to al-Qaeda or anyone else."

—Selig Harrison, "Inside North Korea: Leaders Open to Ending Nuclear Crisis," *Financial Times*, 4 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Victor Mallet, "North Korea Offers US Pledge on Weapons," *Financial Times*, 4 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 May 2004

Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, cites Israel's nuclear weapons program and attacks the United States for what it views as an "unfair and unjustifiable double standard."

—"Rodongsinmun haekchŏnp'aüi kongbŏmja, pulgongjŏngha 2 chunggijun," Korean Central News Agency, 4 May 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "U.S. Slammed for Shutting Its Eyes to Israel's Nuclear Program," Korean Central News Agency, 4 May 2004, www.kcna.co.jp.

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4-7 May 2004

A South Korean delegation led by Minister of Unification Chŏng Se-hyŏn visits Pyongyang to discuss the upcoming Six-Party Talks working group meeting and inter-Korean exchanges. The DPRK abruptly ends the meeting without reaching an agreement, demanding instead a cessation of U.S.-ROK combined military exercises.

—Kong Yŏng-ung, "6 chahoedam 12 il kaech'oe tangsaguktŭlŭi umjigim," *Munhwa Ilbo*, 4 May 2004, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Kim Kwang, "Two Koreas to Open Cabinet-Level Talks Tuesday," Yonhap News Agency, 4 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "South Korean Minister to Push North on Six-way Talks at Pyongyang Meeting," BBC Monitoring, 3 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Soo-jeong Lee, "South Korea Hopes to Use Inter-Korean Talks This Week to Discuss Nuclear Issue," Associated Press, 4 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12-14 May 2004

The six-party talks working group meets in Beijing to discuss the North Korea nuclear issue. The stalemated meeting ends with the North Korean delegation vowing to never accept US' demands for complete dismantlement.

—O Kwang-jin, "Pukhaek 6 cha hoedam taŭmtal'e katkiro," *Han'guk Kyŏngje*, 15 May 2004, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "US, North Korea May Meet Bilaterally on Sidelines of Beijing Talks," BBC Monitoring, 12 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Cindy Sui, "Working Level Talks End as N Korea Vows Never to Accept US Demands," Agence France Presse, 14 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18-22 May 2004

United Nations Special Envoy Maurice F. Strong visits Pyongyang to discuss ways to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue, as well as other issues. Strong says North Korea will continue to develop its nuclear program.

—"UN Envoy Arrives in N. Korea for Talks on Nukes," Japan Economic Newswire, 18 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Special Envoy of UN Secretary General Arrives," Korean Central News Agency, 18 May 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "UN Envoy in DPR of Korea for Talks on Nuclear Program," *UN News Center*, 18 May 2004, www.un.org; Joe McDonald, "U.N. Envoy: North Korea Vows to Push Ahead with Nuclear Development," Associated Press, 22 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 May 2004

Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, accuses the United States of preparing for a preemptive nuclear attack on North Korea and creating "a dangerous situation on the Korean peninsula in which a nuclear war may break out." The paper cites U.S. combined military exercises with South Korea and Japan as evidence that an attack is imminent.

—"U.S. Plan for Preemptive Nuclear Attack Denounced," Korean Central News Agency, 19 May 2004, www.kcna.co.jp.

19 May 2004

U.S. State Department deputy spokesman Adam Ereli tells reporters that the United States will not provide light-water reactors to North Korea in exchange for nuclear dismantlement.

—Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, 19 May 2004, www.state.gov; "US Rejects North Korean Request for Nuclear Reactor," Agence France Presse, 19 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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22 May 2004

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visits Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang to discuss the nuclear issue, as well as other security and bilateral issues. The summit ends without significant breakthroughs in resolving the nuclear stalemate.

—James Brooke, "North Korea and Japan Sign a Deal on Abductions," *New York Times*, 23 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Eric Talmadge, "Koizumi Faces Criticism after Returning from North Korea with Abductees' Children," Associated Press, 23 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Koizumi, Kim Fail to Reach Breakthrough on Nuke Issue," Kyodo News Service, 22 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 May 2004

According to a *New York Times* report, the International Atomic Energy Agency found strong evidence that two tons of enriched uranium secretly delivered in 2001 to Libya for its covert nuclear program came from North Korea. The evidence is attributed to interviews with members of the secret supplier network set up by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.

—David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "Evidence Is Cited Linking Koreans to Libya Uranium," *New York Times*, 22 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; George Jahn, "Suspected North Korean Sale of Uranium to Libya Raises Concerns of North's Role in Nuclear Black Market," Associated Press, 23 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Stephen Fidler, "North Korea 'Gave Libya Material for Nuclear Arms'," *Financial Times*, 26 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 May 2004

An unidentified South Korean official says the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade is searching for other terminology to replace "complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement." The official believes the phrase commonly referred to as CVID, which North Korea has objected to in the past, is perceived as threatening by North Korea.

—"Han'guk, 'CVID' taech'e yong'ŏ kusangjung," *Maeil Kyŏngjae TV*, 24 May 2004, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "S Korea Seeking 'Alternative Wording' of US Demand in Pyongyang Nuclear Standoff," *Financial Times*, 24 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 May 2004

The Korean Central News Agency in Pyongyang accuses the United States of attempting to pressure North Korea on nuclear issues by launching a "human rights offensive" with false reports on North Korean human rights violations.

—"KCNA Refutes U.S. Talk about Human Rights and Democracy," Korean Central News Agency, 24 May 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "N. Korea Denounces U.S. Human Rights Report as 'Hypocrisy'," Yonhap News Agency, 24 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 May 2004

Stephen Rademaker, acting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, refuses to confirm that North Korea supplied Libya with uranium in 2001 and whether it was enriched.

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—Stephen Fidler, "North Korea 'Gave Libya Material for Nuclear Arms'," *Financial Times*, 26 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 May 2004

A commentary by the DPRK's Korean Central News Agency claims that the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and related U.S. efforts aimed at North Korea "compels the DPRK to maintain and increase its nuclear means."

—"KCNA Brand U.S. as Ringleader of Nuclear Proliferation," Korean Central News Agency, 25 May 2004, "N.K. Claims U.S. Interdiction Plan Forced It to Develop Nukes," Yonhap News Agency, 25 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 May 2004

North Korea's Central News Agency denies the alleged illegal sale of uranium to Libya as a "false story" and "sheer fabrication."

—"KCNA Refutes Misinformation about 'Illegal Sale of Uranium Hexafluoride'," Korean Central News Agency, 29 May 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "North Korea Denies Enriched Uranium Sale to Libya," BBC Monitoring, 29 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 May 2004

U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says the United States sees "absolutely no future" in the KEDO light-water reactor project. The project, part of the 1994 Agreed Framework, was suspended in November 2003.

—Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, 28 May 2004, www.state.gov; "Spokesman Says US Sees 'No Future' in North Korea KEDO Reactor Project," BBC Monitoring, 29 May 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 June 2004

Wŏlgan Chosŏn, a South Korean monthly newsmagazine, quotes an unidentified U.S. intelligence source as saying that A. Q. Khan provided North Korea with key equipments related to uranium enrichment. The magazine also reports that A. Q. Khan allegedly offered a nuclear bomb design to North Korea.

—Kim Yon-kwang, "Haeksilhŏm'ül Pakistan'esŏ hamkkae haetta," *Wŏlgan Chosun*, June 2004, <http://monthly.chosun.com>; David E. Sanger, "Pakistani Says He Saw North Korean Nuclear Devices," *New York Times*, 12 April 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

1 June 2004

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Japan's Senior Vice Foreign Minister Ichiro Aisawa meet to coordinate their approaches to the Six-party Talks.

—"Moscow, Tokyo Reiterate Intention to Strengthen Interaction," ITAR-TASS News Agency, 1 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 June 2004

South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon says he expects a new round of Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program to take place by the end of this month.

—"South Korean Minister Says Six Party Talks Expected by End of June," Yonhap News Agency, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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3 June 2004

William Perry, Former U.S. Defense Secretary, criticizes the Bush administration saying that they have taken no action to stop the North Korean nuclear program. He also warns South Korea of the misconception that a North Korean nuclear program does not threaten the South.

—Choi Soung-ah, "Perry Urges Joint Stance on N. Korea," *Korea Herald*, 3 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Pu Hyönggwön, "Perry chön kukpangjanggwan 'han'guk kwallidül pukhaengmunje esö ch'uksso," *Donga Ilbo*, 4 June 2004, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

3 June 2004

A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry blames the Bush administration for the halt of light water reactor (LWR) construction in North Korea. The spokesman says the U.S. administration "threw away the Agreed Framework, whose core issue is the provision of LWRs, like a pair of old shoes."

—"Chosön woemusöng taebjön'in kyöngsuro 'unmyöng' munje'e taehan migukkwa k'edo'üi kwebyön'ül kyut'an," Korean Central News Agency, 4 June 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "North Korea Says USA 'Unilaterally' Scrapped 1994 Agreement," 3 June 2004, BBC Monitoring, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 June 2004

Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, publishes a commentary that says North Korea's self-defense capabilities are justified and the right choice. The article also accuses the U.S. Defense Department of increasing its budget for research and development of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator [RNEP] to stifle North Korea.

—"Uri konghwagukül haeküro absalharyönnün mumohan ch'aekdong," Korean Central News Agency, 7 June 2004, www.kcna.co.jp.

5 June 2004

U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld warns in his speech in Singapore that protracted diplomatic negotiation is giving North Korea time to develop their nuclear weapons, which raises the risk of the weapons falling into terrorist hands.

—Jim Mannion, "Rumsfeld Warns of Growing Risk of North Korean Proliferation," Agence France Presse, 6 June 2004, in Lexis-nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 June 2004

Lee Soo-hyuck, South Korean Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, urges China to play a more substantive role in the next round of the Six-Party Talks to solve the long-running standoff over North Korea's nuclear program.

—"South Korea Appeals for 'More Substantive' Chinese Ideas at Nuclear Talks," Agence France Presse, 6 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 June 2004

Rodong Shinmun, the official daily of the Korean Worker's Party, criticizes a sub-critical nuclear experiment conducted in Nevada on May 25th as U.S. defiance and a threat to world peace. The commentary argues that the DPRK has the right to consolidate its nuclear deterrent in response to the U.S. nuclear preemptive strike against

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the DPRK.

—"Rodong Sinmun miguk'ŭi rimgyejŏnhaeksihŏm kyut'an, haek'ŏkcheryŏk'ŭi kanghwa chujang," Korean Central News Agency, 7 June 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "U.S. conducts subcritical nuclear test," Japan Economic Newswire, 25 May, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 June 2004

Junichiro Koizumi, Japanese Prime Minister says in a press conference that North Korea's leader Kim Jong Il is sincere about verifiably dismantling his country's nuclear program. Introducing his summit meeting with Kim on May 22, he adds that "I told him face to face that, if you compare what you gain from nuclear weapons with what you gain from dismantling them, it is like that difference between heaven and earth."

—David Pilling, "N Korea 'Ready to Abandon Nuclear Arms'-Koizumi," *Financial Times*, 8 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; James Brooke, "Japan Leader Calls on North Korea to Dismantle Nuclear Program," *New York Times*, 8 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan's Koizumi Says North Korea Sincere About Dismantling," Agence France Presse, 8 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 June 2004

Zhou Wenzhong, China's Deputy Foreign Minister, says in an interview with the *New York Times* that he has doubts about the Bush administration's claim that North Korea has a secret uranium enrichment program.

—Joseph Kahn and Susan Chira, "Chinese Official Challenges U.S. Stance on North Korea," *New York Times*, 9 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Joseph Kahn and Susan Chira, "Beijing Doubts U.S. Claims on North Korean Nuclear Effort," *International Herald Tribune*, 10 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kim Yŏngsik, "Chung woegyobu 'puk haekkaebal chŭnggŏ ŏpta' miwa ŏpbakcha," *Donga Ilbo*, 11 June 2004, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

10-11 June 2004

At the G8 summit on Sea Island, Georgia reconfirms that member countries of the G8 support a comprehensive solution by diplomatic means to the DPRK nuclear issue. While G8 leaders conclude that North Korea's weapons activities are a "serious concern," Japanese Prime Minister says that North Korea doesn't want nuclear weapons.

—"Full text of G-8 Chairman's Summary," 11 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Roy Eccleston, "N Korea's Nuclear Ambitions Waning, Says Koizumi-G8 Summit," 10 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 June 2004

The Japanese Trade Ministry announces it will ban a trading company in Nigata Prefecture from exporting goods for four months because the firm illegally exported to North Korea an inverter that could be used in nuclear weapons development.

—"Japanese Firm Sanctioned for Sending Potential Nuclear Part to North Korea," Kyodo News Service, 11 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 June 2004

A South Korean official says that South Korea is considering the provision of extraordinary energy aid to North

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Korea if it commits to the "complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement [CVID]" of its nuclear program.

—"South Korea Considers Energy Aid to North in Return for Nuclear Dismantling," Yonhap News Agency, 11 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 June 2004

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell meets with Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing to discuss the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

—"US, China Foreign Ministers Set to Discuss Korean Nuclear Crisis," Agence France Presse, 11 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Powell Meets Chinese FM Li on N. Korea, Taiwan, Trade," Japan Economic Newswire, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13-14 June 2004

Senior officials from the United States, South Korea, and Japan hold preparatory talks ahead of a multilateral meeting over ending North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

—"S Korean Delegate Calls 'Strategy' Talks with US, Japan 'Useful'," Yonhap News Agency, 15 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kim Chŏngkon, "Wŏsingtŏn hanmi'il samja hyŏpŭihoe," *Hankook Ilbo*, 14 June 2004, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Officials from US, South Korea and Japan discuss nuclear crisis," *Channel NewsAsia*, 15 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 June 2004

In a speech marking the anniversary of the North-South summit meeting in 2000, South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun offers to extend "comprehensive and concrete" economic aid to North Korea if it scraps its nuclear program.

—Kim Kwang, "S. Korea Offers N. Korea Massive Economic Aid on Resolution of Nuclear Program," Yonhap News Agency, 15 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "President Roh Pledges 'Comprehensive' Economic Aid to North Korea," Agence France Presse, 15 June 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 June 2004

U.S. Department of States spokesman Richard Boucher renews the call for the "complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement" (CVID) of North Korea's nuclear programs at a press briefing.

—"US Spokesman Reaffirms Stance on North Korea's Nuclear Programme," BBC Monitoring, 16 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 June 2004

A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry rejects the call for "complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement." The [North] Korean Central News Agency repeats a similar argument in its commentary.

—"Chosŏn woemusŏng taeyŏnin chesamch'a yukjaeodam munje'e ŏn'gŭp mikuk'i CVID kojiphamyŏn hoedam kyŏlgwarul kidae ŏpke toelgŏt," Korea Central News Agency, 16 June 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "Spokesman for DPRK FM Ministry on Third Round of Six-Party Talks," Korean Central News Agency, 16 June 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "KCNA Refutes U.S. Call for DPRK's CVID," Korean Central News Agency, 16 June 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "North

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Korea attacks US stance on complete nuclear dismantling," BBC Monitoring, 15 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 June 2004

Kyodo News Service cites an unidentified Japanese source and reports that North Korea will be able to produce enough highly-enriched uranium in three years to make two to four nuclear devices.

—"Japanese Study Analyses North Korea's Weapons Production Capability," Kyodo News Service, 15 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N Korea Can Enrich Uranium for 2-4 Nuke Bombs in 3 Years: Expert," Japan Economic Newswire, 15 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 June 2004

Governor of New Mexico Bill Richardson calls for a shift of strategy against North Korea's nuclear program.

— Anthony Faiola, "Richardson Urges Shift in U.S. Tack on N. Korea," *Washington Post*, 17 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 June 2004

South Korea's Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon downplays the principle of "complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement" of North Korea's nuclear program, saying that the terminology is not important.

—"Seoul Aims for Progress in Nuke Talks," *Korea Herald*, June 17, 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 June 2004

Senior South Korean officials review a plan to provide North Korea with energy and other economic assistance if it agrees to dismantle its nuclear program.

—"South Korea Holds Security Ministers' Meeting on Nuclear Talks," Yonhap News Agency, 17 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "South Korean Security officials discuss nuclear issue of six party talks," BBC Monitoring, 17 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 June 2004

Six-party Talks officials hold a second working-group meeting to prepare the third round of six-party talks.

—"Six Countries Begin Working-level Nuclear Talks," Yonhap News Agency, 21 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Working Group Meeting Begins to Prepare for Third Round of Six Party Talks," Xinhua News Agency, 21 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 June 2004

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasizes that North Korea's nuclear issue must be solved peacefully through dialogue.

—"Chinese Vice FM Elaborates China's Stance on Nuclear Talks," Xinhua News Agency, 22 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 June 2004

Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the [North] Korean Workers' Party, denounces the United States' demand for North Korea to "scrap" its nuclear program first and without assurances and benefits.

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—"Rodong sinmun bakerüi punsuöpnün molsangsikhan ch'ösa," Korean Central News Agency, 24 June 2004, <http://kcna.co.jp>; "North Korea warns US against raising 'brigandish demands' at six-party talks," Yonhap News Agency, 24 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23-26 June 2004

At the third round of six-party talks, the U.S. delegation presents comprehensive proposals including energy provision and security guarantee in exchange for dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program. North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan warns his U.S. counterpart Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly that North Korea will test a nuclear weapon unless the United States accepts its proposal of reward for nuclear freeze.

—Kuk kiyon, Lee Sangmin, "Puk 'mi energy chiwönddaen haekdonggyöl' kyöngjaebongswae haejae düng yoku'aen sinch'uk yipchang pyomyöng," *Segye Ilbo*, 26 June 2004, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Text of Chairman's Statement Issued at End of N Korea Nuclear Talks," Agence France Presse, 26 June 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US says atmosphere of six-party talks 'constructive'," Xinhua News Service, 25 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Threatens to Test Nuclear Weapon," Yonhap News Agency, 25 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 June 2004

A spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry welcomes Washington's willingness to consider rewarding North Korea in exchange for freezing its nuclear program. However, he dismisses the proposed U.S. timetable of three months to shut down and seal its nuclear facilities, labeling the proposal as "unrealistic."

—"Chosön woemusöngdaebyön'in chesamch'a yukchahoedam chinhaengjöngghöngö ö'n'güp," Korean Central News Agency, 29 June 2004, <http://kcna.co.jp>; "North Korean spokesman notes 'positive progress' at six-way talks," BBC monitoring, 28 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N Korea rejects 'unrealistic' US offer but calls nuclear talks positive," Agence France Presse, 28 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea rejects US timetable for disarmament Nuclear arms talks," *Financial Times*, 29 June 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 July 2004

North Korea's ambassador to China Ch'oe Chin Su says that Pyongyang's recent Six-Party Talks proposal to freeze plutonium reprocessing only applies to those reprocessed after 10 January 2003. Plutonium excluded from this freeze proposal would leave enough fissile material for one or two nuclear warheads.

—DPRK Envoy to PRC Says Nuclear Freeze Plan Only Covers Post-2003 Plutonium," Kyodo World News Service, 1 July 2004, in OSC Document JPP20040701000090; "North Korean Nuclear Freeze Plan Only Covers Post 2003 Material - Envoy," BBC Monitoring, 1 July 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 July 2004

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell briefly talks with North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun in Jakarta, Indonesia. Paek says that the only way to resolve the current standoff is through simultaneous actions by both the United States and North Korea. Powell tells Paek that North Korea must declare all of its nuclear activities and that if Pyongyang commits to disarming its nuclear weapons, the U.S. would make very quick progress on a comprehensive deal.

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—Powell Meets North Korea's Foreign Minister Over Nuclear Issue," Yonhap News Agency, 2 July 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "Powell Discusses Nuclear Impasse with North Korean Foreign Minister," Associated Press, 1 July 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> Christopher Marquis, "Powell Meets Foreign Minister of North Korea to Discuss Arms," *New York Times*, 2 July 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "Powell Meets DPRK FM on ASEAN Sidelines," Xinhua General News Service, 2 July 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 July 2004

James A. Kelley, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the chief U.S. negotiator to the Six-Party Talks, reconfirms the CVID principle in a U.S. Senate hearing, emphasizing that "the threat can be dealt with through multilateral diplomacy.

—James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, "Dealing With North Korea's Nuclear Programs," Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 15 July 2004, U.S. Department of State.

6 July 2004

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, argues that the U.S. proposal for "a three-month preparation period for nuclear disarmament" is "unrealistic" because it requires that Pyongyang freeze and dismantle its nuclear program first before it can get any rewards.

—U.S. Urged to Make Political Decision on Talks," Korean Central News Agency, 6 July 2004, www.kcna.co.jp, "DPRK Rejects US Proposal at 6-Way Talks as Similar to US 'Mideast' Method, Korean Central News Agency, 7 July 2004, in OSC Document KPP20040707000034; "Rodong Sinmun 'uriegenün tarün naraüi pangsiiki t'onghalsu öpta'," Korean Central News Agency, 7 July 2004, www.kcna.co.jp.

6 July 2004

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell says North Korea should not receive a reward for dismantling a nuclear weapons program that it should not have started in the first place.

—North Korea Dismisses U.S. Proposal on its Nuclear Arms Program," Yonhap News Agency, 6 July 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US Secretary of State Rules Out Reward for North Korea," Yonhap News Agency, 7 July 2004, in OSC Document KPP20040707000012.

9 July 2004

U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice tells South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon in Seoul that North Korea will be surprised at how much is possible if it gives up all of its nuclear weapons programs.

—NKorea to get 'Surprised (sic)' Rewards for Nuclear Dismantlement: Rice," Agence France Presse, 9 July 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "Rice Insists N.Korea Reveal Highly Enriched Uranium Program, Kyodo World Service, 7 July 2004, in OSC Document JPP20040709000120; Hwang Doo, "So Much Is Possible If P'Yang Gives Up Nuclear Ambitions: Rice," Yonhap News Agency, 9 July 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 July 2004

A broadcast on North Korea's state radio accuses the United States of developing a new type of nuclear weapon and only pretending to be interested in resolving the nuclear issue. The reference to the new type of nuclear

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weapon is the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), commonly referred to as "bunker busters."

—"DPRK Accuses US of Developing 'New Type' of Nuclear Weapons," Yonhap News Agency, 11 July 2004, in OSC Document, KPP20040711000032; "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Budget Request and Plan, FY2005-FY2009," CRS Report for Congress, 8 March 2004, www.nti.org.

12 July 2004

Japan's *Asahi Shimbun* quotes an unnamed U.S. official as stating that the United States would insist on North Korea giving up its ballistic missiles as well as its nuclear weapons for the United States to provide the DPRK with security assurances under a deal to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

—Chong Kwon-hyon, "Japanese Daily Cites US Official: US To Ask DPRK to Give Up 'Ballistic Missiles,'" *Chosun Ilbo*, 12 July 2004, in OSC Document, KPP20040711000054; Park Wŏn-jae, "Mi: 'puk t'andomisailto p'ogihayea' anjŏnbojang taega yogugyehoek," *Donga Ilbo*, 12 July 2004, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

13 July 2004

The DPRK Deputy Ambassador to the UN Han Sŏng-yŏl replies to U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice's offer of a surprising reward in exchange for DPRK renunciation of its nuclear weapons programs by saying that North Korea is not interested in any deal that calls on the DPRK to give up its nuclear weapons now for the promise of an American reward later.

—DPRK Envoy Shows 'Cool' Response to US Offer of 'Surprising Reward,'" Yonhap News Agency, 13 July 2004, in OSC Document, KPP20040713000034; Hong Kwŏn-hui, "'Haek p'ogi nollalmanhan posang' pukhan 'kwanshimŏpta' ilch'uk," *Donga Ilbo*, 14 July 2004, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

14 July 2004

A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry says Pyongyang will verifiably give up its nuclear weapons programs and return to the NPT after the United States drops its "hostile policy" towards the DPRK. The spokesman also says that while the DPRK's ultimate goal is denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea will continue to retain the right to nuclear activities for peaceful purposes.

—FM Spokesman on DPRK's Stand on Nuclear Freeze and Way of Verification," Korean Central News Agency, 14 July 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency, in "DPRK FM Spokesman on 'Peaceful Purpose' Nuclear Activities, Verification Issue," 14 July 2004, OSC Document KPP20040714000105; "Chosŏnwoemusŏng taeyŏnin tonggyŏltaesang mit kŏmjŏngbangbŏp'e taehan ripchang'ŭl ch'ŏnmyŏng," Korean Central News Agency, 14 July 2007, www.kcna.co.jp.

15 July 2004

An editorial on a North Korean website says that recent statements by a U.S. official saying that the DPRK will also have to give up its ballistic missiles as well as its nuclear weapons in order to receive security guarantees from the U.S. creates an artificial obstacle to progress within the Six-party Talks.

—DPRK Website Asserts US Obstructs 'Smooth Progress' of Six-Party Talks," (Original title: "The United States Should Not Make a Miscalculation," by Kim Sun-ho) Uriminjokkiri website, 14 July 2004 in OSC Document, KPP20040714000050.

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20 July 2004

Park Kil-yŏn, North Korea's ambassador to the United Nations, says that Pyongyang is prepared to freeze its nuclear weapons programs in exchange for Washington's lifting of economic sanctions and providing two million kilowatts of electric power. Park also denies the existence of a uranium enrichment program and the admission of such a program to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly.

—DPRK Ambassador to UN: DPRK 'Prepared to 'Give Up' Nuclear Weapons Program," Yonhap News Agency, 21 July 2004, OSC Document KPP20040721000016; "DPRK Envoy to UN Says No Plans to Conduct Nuclear Tests," Kyodo World Service, 21 July 2004, OSC Document JPP20040721000012; "DPRK's UN Official Denies HEU Program, Admits to Possession of 'Nuclear Deterrent,'" Yonhap News Agency website, 21 July 2004, OSC Document KPP20040721000041.

21 July 2004

South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun says the time will not be right for an inter-Korean summit with North Korea until sufficient progress is made in the Six-Party Talks to resolve the nuclear crisis.

—ROK Leader Rules Out Inter-Korean Summit Citing 'Burden' for DPRK Leader," Yonhap News Agency, 21 July 2004, OSC Document KPP20040721000155; Yonhap News Agency, in "South Korean Minister Denies Reports of Inter-Korean Summit," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 20 July 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 July 2004

U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton states that if Pyongyang makes the same "strategic decision" to give up its nuclear weapons that Libya did, then the North Korean regime will be able to stay in power.

—Yonhap News Agency, in "US Official Bolton on DPRK Says Regime Can Stay 'In Power' with WMD Abandonment," 21 July 2004, OSC Document KPP20040721000127; "US Arms Control Chief Urges N. Korea to Dismantle Nuke Program," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 July 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "US Won't Be Fooled Again by North Korea Nuclear Freeze: Bolton," *Channel NewsAsia*, 21 July 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 July 2004

After meeting in South Korea, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun promise that they both will work to bring a quick end to the current North Korea nuclear standoff.

—Koizumi, Roh Agree to Speed Up Work on N.Korea Nuke Issue," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 July 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "Roh, Koizumi Offer N.K Massive Aid, Diplomatic Ties for Nuke Resolution," Yonhap News Agency, 21 July 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> Wang Mian, "Roundup: Seoul-Tokyo Summit Ends in Resort Island without Necktie," Xinhua News Service, 21 July 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 July 2004

Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hatsuhsa Takashima says Russia and Japan share the same goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and that Russia is in a good position to provide energy aid to North Korea following North Korea's nuclear disarmament.

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—Sergei Karmalito and Alexander Potyomkin, "Tokyo, Moscow Equally Seek N Korea Denuclearization - Japan FM," ITAR-TASS, 27 July 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "Japan Says Tokyo, Moscow Both Seek North Korea Denuclearization," ITAR-TASS, 27 July 2004, in OSC Document, CEP20040727000101.

1-2 August 2004

The heads of the Chinese and South Korean delegations to the Six-Party Talks meet to discuss a working-level meeting for the next round of negotiations in September. Both Ning Fukui and Cho T'ae-yŏng say the dispute over North Korea's uranium enrichment program is the key to resolving the nuclear crisis.

—"Chinese Ambassador Flies to Seoul 1 Aug to Discuss Six Party Talks," Yonhap News Agency, 1 August 2004, OSC Document, KPP20040801000003; "Chinese Envoy in South Korea to Prepare for North Korea Nuclear Talks," Agence France Presse, 1 August 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "Seoul, Beijing Agree Uranium Issue Key to Solving Nuke Row," Yonhap News Agency, 2 August 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 August 2004

An editorial in North Korea's *Minju Chosŏn*, a publication of the DPRK cabinet, argues that recent U.S. threats to refer North Korea to the United Nations Security Council for economic sanctions are designed to suffocate the DPRK.

—Yu Yong-su, "The Right to Choose Belongs to Us, Too," *Minju Choson*, in "DPRKG Paper Criticizes US CVID Demand as 'Regime Overthrow' Bid" OSC Document, KPP20040721000090.

3 August 2004

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly and South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Su-hyŏk meet to prepare for the next round of the Six-Party Talks.

—*Daily Press Briefing*, U.S. Department of State, 3 August 2004, www.state.gov; "S.Korea, US Hold Consultations on N.Korea Nuclear Issue," Yonhap News Agency, 4 August 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "ROK, US Discuss Reward for NK," *Korea Times*, 5 August 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 August 2004

The Korean Central News Agency denies claims that top nuclear scientist Kim Kwang-bin has defected from North Korea and subsequently testified that Pyongyang has developed nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium.

—"KCNA Dismisses Misinformation Spread by S. Korea 'Ministry of Unification'," Korean Central News Agency, 4 August 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "ROK's Yonhap: N. Korea Denies Defection of Top Nuclear Scientist," Yonhap News Agency, 4 August 2004, OSC Document KPP20040804000077.

9 August 2004

Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, says that U.S. statements about leaving "all options on the table" undermine efforts to resolve the nuclear crisis diplomatically. Meanwhile South Korean officials argue the U.S. statements do not represent a change by the United States.

—"Remarks of Spokesman for U.S. State Department Under Fire," Korean Central News Agency, 9 August 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; Yu Chin, "Seoul Downplays US Rhetoric on NK Nukes," *Korea Times*, 10 August 2004, in "ROK Officials Downplay US Remark on 'All Options' Open on DPRK Nuclear Issue," OSC Document KPP20040809000065.

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10 August 2004

According to an unidentified South Korean Uri Party member, President Roh Moo-hyun told U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice that South Korea should work closely with the United States, not China in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis.

—*JoongAng Ilbo*, in "ROK Lawmaker: ROK President 'Stressed' to US NSA Need to 'Work Closely' with US, not China," 10 August 2004, OSC Document KPP20040809000093; Chŏng Yŏng-gŭn, "No Taet'ongnyŏn 'Tongbuka Chirettaenŭn Hanmidongmaeng'," *Naeil Sinmun*, 10 August 2004, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

15 August 2004

Yang Xiyu, China's Korean Peninsula Affairs Director within the Foreign Ministry, says the resolution of the Korean nuclear crisis depends on the United States and North Korea as China can only play a mediating role.

—*Hsiang Kang Shang Pao*, "PRC FM Official for DPRK Affairs Says US Holds Key to Solution of DPRK Issue," 15 August 2004, OSC Document CPP20040816000036.

16 August 2004

An unidentified South Korean Foreign Ministry official accuses North Korea of "foot-dragging" on working group meetings. A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says the DPRK will not be able to continue Six-Party Talks if the U.S. continues its "hostile policy" towards North Korea, citing the North Korean Human Rights Act being passed by the U.S. House and Senate and U.S.-ROK joint military efforts as two examples.

—Yonhap News Agency, "N. Korea Accuses U.S. of Destroying Foundation of Six Party Talks," 16 August 2004, OSC Document, KPP20040816000117; "N.Korea Pulls Out of Early N-Talks," *Financial Times*, 17 August 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "'Footdragging' Said 'Dimming' Prospects for Sep 6-Way Talks in Beijing," Yonhap News Agency, 17 August 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> *North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-333)*, 18 October 2004, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States House of Representatives, www.internationalrelations.house.gov.

17 August 2004

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell says North Korea is a more "troublesome country to deal with" than Iran.

—"Powell Explains U.S. Force Restructuring, Defends Iraq Policy," *Current Issues*, 17 August 2004, International Information Programs, U.S. State Department, <http://usinfo.state.gov>; Yonhap News Agency, "Powell Likens North Korea 'Tough Nuts'," 19 August 2004, OSC Document KPP20040819000028.

17 August 2004

The Korean Central News Agency, citing a report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service, argues that U.S. accusations of illegal drug trafficking by the DPRK reveal a lack of U.S. interest in resolving the nuclear crisis.

—"KCNA Refutes Report on Drug Smuggling," Korean Central News Agency, 17 August 2004, www.kcna.co.jp.

18 August 2004

North Korea's *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, criticizes the U.S. position against providing aid in exchange for simply freezing North Korea's nuclear weapons program. It also adds that the United States is fabricating or distorting the issues of human rights, defectors, and drug trafficking in order to undermine

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the DPRK regime.

—"U.S. Attitude Towards Six-party Talks Assailed," Korean Central News Agency, 18 August 2004, www.kcna.co.jp
"North Korean Daily Says Nuclear Issue Pretext for US Aggression," BBC Monitoring, 19 August 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 August 2004

South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Su-hyŏk meets with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei in Beijing to discuss how to break the current deadlock surrounding North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

—"South Korean Deputy FM visits Beijing for North Korean Nuclear Talks," Agence France Presse, 24 August 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 August 2004

A DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman criticizes U.S. President George W. Bush's call for South Korea, Japan, Russia and China to work together to unite and resolve the North Korea nuclear issue. He adds that the "U.S. hostile policy towards North Korea" makes it "quite impossible" for North Korea to negotiate with the United States.

—"DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts Bush's Reckless Remarks," Korean Central News Agency, 23 August 2004, www.kcna.co.jp.

26 August 2004

South Korean Prime Minister Lee Hae-ch'an argues a summit between North and South Korea could help ease the tensions surrounding the nuclear crisis.

—"Nam Kungmuch'ongni 'Haengmunje Haegyŏl Wihae Nambukchŏngsanghoedam Ch'ujin'," Chayu Asia Pangsong, 27 August 2004, www.rfa.org; "ROK PM Hopes to Break Impasse on DPRK Nuclear Issue with Summit," Nikkei Telecom 21 website, 26 August 2004, in OSC Document JPP20040827000011.

2 September 2004

U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Christopher Hill says North Korea must make the decision to give up its nuclear weapons even before receiving compensation.

—O Nam-sŏk and Park Su-kyun, "Sin'imjuhan mi taesa yŏyauwon 30myŏnggwa taehwa 'hanmi FTA chogi ch'egyŏlhaeya'," *Munhwa Ilbo*, 2 September 2004, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Time for N. Korea to Give up Nuke Unconditionally: U.S. Ambassador," Yonhap News Agency, 2 September 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 September 2004

Han Sŏng-ryŏl, North Korea's deputy chief of mission to the United Nations, says South Korea's secret nuclear experiment in 2000 is a threat that could trigger an arms race in Northeast Asia. Han also accuses the U.S. of applying a double standard by not expressing concerns while pressing the DPRK on a nonexistent HEU program.

—Yonhap News Agency, "N. Korea to Take Issue with S. Korea's Uranium Enrichment Program," 8 September 2004, in "DPRK Envoy to UN Decries US for 'Double Standards' Regarding ROK's Uranium Tests," OSC Document KPP20040908000128; "N. Korea Slams S. Korea's Uranium Enrichment Experiment," Japan Economic Newswire, 8

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September 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; James Brooke, "North Korea Says Seoul's Nuclear Experiments Stoke Arms Race," *New York Times*, 9 September 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 September 2004

A "mushroom cloud" is observed in North Korea's Yanggang province by the monitoring network of the UN Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and regional governments. [Note: The cloud later is determined to have come from the use of conventional explosives on a large construction project].

—Kim Kwang-duk and Kim Chŏng-ho, "Puk Yanggangdo taegyumo p'okpal/chŏngbu mmchigim," *Hankook Ilbo*, 13 September 2004, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Yonhap News Agency, 11 September 2004, in "Nature of Blast in North Korea Unclear," OSC Document KPP20040912000014; Yonhap News Agency, 11 September 2004, in "N.K.'s Nuke Test Will be Referred to UNSC if True: Sources," OSC Document KPP20040912000018.

11 September 2004

The 9 September explosion in North Korea is believed to be the result of a major accident or demolition project and not a nuclear device test by the ROK presidential office. U.S. State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher says the United States does not believe the explosion was created by a nuclear test. A CTBTO spokeswoman affirms the non-nuclear nature of the explosion to *New Scientist* magazine.

—Kim Kwang-duk and Kim Chŏng-ho, "Puk Yanggangdo Taegyumo p'okpal/chŏngbu umchigim," *Hankook Ilbo*, 13 September 2004, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr "No Signs of Nuclear Test in N. Korea: South Korea Official," Yonhap News Agency, 13 September 2004, in "ROK: Official: No Evidence Linking DPRK Blast to Nuclear Weapons Test," OSC Document, KPP20040913000052; Yonhap News Agency, 11 September 2004, in "Nature of Blast in North Korea Unclear," OSC Document KPP20040912000014; Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, 14 September 2004, www.state.gov; Rob Edwards, "North Korean Blast Not a Nuclear Test," *New Scientist*, 13 September 2004, www.newscientist.com.

11 September 2004

A DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman says North Korea suspects the ROK's nuclear experiments in 2000 were for military purposes and it will be impossible for North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons as long as the United States continues to apply double standards in its treatment of nuclear issues.

—"Spokesman for DPRK FM on Issue of Uranium Enrichment in South Korea," Korean Central News Agency, 11 September 2004, www.kcna.co.jp "North Korea May Boycott Nuke Talks over S. Korea's Nuclear Experiments," Yonhap News Agency, 11 September 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11-14 September 2004

During British Foreign Office Minister Bill Rammell's visit to Pyongyang, North Korea tells the British delegation it will not negotiate its nuclear issues until South Korea's past nuclear experiments are "fully probed" and the United States drops its "hostile policy" towards the DPRK.

—"Chosŏnwoemusŏng Taebyŏnin Yŏnggukwoemusŏngdaep'yodanŭi Chosŏnbangmun'gyŏlgwa'e Ŏn'gŭp Namjosŏnhaeksilhŏm Haemyŏngdoegijŏn'enŭn 6 Chahoedam'e Nagalsu Ŏpta," Korean Central News Agency, 16 September 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on British Foreign Office Delegation's DPRK Visit," Korean Central News Agency, 16 September 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; Sang-hun Choe, "North Korea Says It

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Won't Join Six Party Talks Until Truth Revealed Over South Korean Nuclear Experiments," Associated Press, 16 September 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 September 2004

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell says on NBC's "Meet the Press" television program that he does not believe the explosion on 9 September in North Korea was a nuclear test.

—Christopher Torchia, "Huge Explosion in North Korea; Powell Says It was not a 'Nuclear Event,'" Associated Press, 12 September 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "Powell Says Nuclear Test by nuclear test by N. Korea Unlikely," Japan Economic Newswire, 12 September 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 September 2004

South Korean Foreign Ministry Spokesman Lee Kyu-hyŏng denies North Korea's accusation of Seoul's laboratory nuclear experiments having a military objective as "absolutely untrue." Lee also says that he hopes the experiments issue should not have any bearing on the upcoming round of the Six-Party Talks.

—Yonhap News Agency, "Chŏngbu 'han'guk haekkwallyŏn shirhŏm kunsajŏksŏnggyŏk anida," *Donga Ilbo*, 12 September 2004, www.donga.com; Ha T'ae-wŏn, "Puk 'mi, tongmaengguk haek mugin'... nam silhŏm—6 chahoedam yŏn'gye sisa," *Donga Ilbo*, 12 September 2004, www.donga.com.

14 September 2004

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell says he doubts North Korea will return to the Six-Party Talks before the U.S. presidential election race concludes.

—James Brooke, "North Korea to Wait Out Election in U.S., Then Talk, Diplomat Says," *New York Times*, 15 September 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Barry Schweid, "Top Official Says Resumption of North Korea Talks Before U.S. Election Unlikely," Associated Press, 14 September 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 September 2004

Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Kong Quan says South Korea's nuclear experiments will be discussed at the upcoming round of the Six-Party Talks since the purpose of the negotiations is to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

—"Six Way Talks to Address Seoul's Nuke Experiments: China," Yonhap News Agency, 21 September 2004 in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "China Says S. Korea's Nuke Tests Complicating Talks," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 September 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 September 2004

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi tells the United Nations General Assembly that Japan will continue to work to "comprehensively" resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula in line with the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration.

—Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, "A New United Nations for the New Era," 21 September 2004, in "Text of Prime Minister Koizumi's Address to UNGA," OSC Document, JPP20040922000030.

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23 September 2004

Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, says Japan would be turned into a "nuclear sea of fire" if the United States strikes North Korea.

—"N. Korea Threatens to Turn Japan into 'Nuclear Sea of Fire'," Yonhap News Agency, 23 September 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, "Kyodo: N. Korea Threatens to Turn Japan Into 'Nuclear Sea of Fire'," 23 September 2004, OSC Document JPP20040923000067; David Ibison and Andrew Ward, "N. Korea Warns of 'Nuclear Sea of Fire' War of Words," *Financial Times*, 24 September 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 September 2004

Chŏng U-sŏng, the foreign policy advisor to South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, says the ROK's recently revealed secret nuclear experiments will not be on the agenda for the upcoming Six-Party Talks.

—Yu Kang-mun, "Han'guk haeksirhŏm 6 chahoedam pyŏnsu toena," *Hankyoreh*, 23 September 2004, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Seoul Says Nuclear Tests Won't be Discussed at 6-Way Talks," *Korea Times*, 23 September 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 September 2004

North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su-hŏn tells the United Nations General Assembly that North Korea has "weaponized" 8,000 spent fuel rods and already possesses a nuclear deterrent against the United States.

—Press Release, United Nations website, 27 September 2004, in "Full Text of DPRK Vice Foreign Minister's Speech to UNGA on 27 Sep 2004," OSC Document KPP20040928000024; "Pyongyang Already 'Weaponized' Spent Nuclear Fuel: N. Korean Envoy," Yonhap News Agency, 28 September 2004, in "Yonhap Cites DPRK Official: Pyongyang 'Already' 'Weaponized' Spent Fuel Rods," OSC Document KPP20040928000006; Edith M. Lederer, "North Korea Official Says Plutonium Has Been Turned Into Nuclear Weapons as Deterrent Against Possible U.S. Strike," Associated Press, 27 September 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 September 2004

North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su-hŏn says the U.S. double standard on North and South Korean nuclear issues, as well as the U.S. hostile stance towards the DPRK, are holding up the resumption of the Six-Party Talks.

—"U.S. is to Blame for Failure to Open Six Party Talks," Korean Central News Agency, 27 September 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "N. Korea Says U.S. Destroyed Groundwork for 6-Way Talks," Japan Economic Newswire, 27 September 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 September 2004

China's Assistant Foreign Minister Shen Guofang says the Six-Party Talks mechanism should be maintained even if the talks are not held in September.

—"China Says N Korean Nuclear Talks Should Continue Despite Missing Deadline," Hong Kong AFP, 30 September 2004, in "PRC Assistant FM Shen Guofang Urges Maintaining Six Party Talks Mechanism," OSC Document CPP20040930000078.

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3 October 2004

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei visits South Korea and says the North Korean nuclear crisis needs to be resolved quickly and peacefully.

—"IAEA Chief Stresses Need for Early, Peaceful Resolution of N.K. Nuke," Yonhap News Agency, 3 October 2004, in "IAEA Chief Stresses Need for Early, Peaceful Resolution of N.K. Nuke," OSC Document KPP20041003000018.

3 October 2004

The Chinese Six-Party Talks delegation reportedly confirms to other participants that North Korea "at least attempted to enrich" uranium, one of the key contentions of the ongoing negotiations.

—Kyodo News Service, 3 October 2004, in "China Tells Six-Party Forum Members N Korea Tried to Enrich Uranium," OSC Document JPP20041004000026; Choi Soung-ah, "China Says N.K. Tried to Enrich Uranium: Report," *Korea Herald*, 5 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 October 2004

North Korea's Central Broadcasting Station reports that the DPRK will increase its nuclear arsenal "a thousand times" if the United States does not drop its hostile policy towards the DPRK.

—Yonhap News Agency, 4 October 2004, in "N.K. Vows to Increase Nuclear Deterrent Force," OSC Document KPP20041004000219.

5 October 2004

South Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choe Yŏng-jin tells the ROK National Assembly that North Korea probably has enough plutonium to make two or three nuclear weapons.

—Kim Sŏk-gi, "Kukchŏnggamsa Obŏhanŭn Ŭiwŏndŭl ... Orakkarak Chang.Ch'agwan," *Munhwa Ilbo*, 6 October 2004, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "N.K. Capable of Producing Two to Three Nuclear Weapons: Ministry," Yonhap News Agency, 5 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 October 2004

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei urges the United Nations Security Council to take action against North Korea saying the Council's lack of response concerning North Korean NPT violations "may be setting the worst precedent of all."

—"IAEA Head Urges Security Council to Act on N. Korean NPT Breaches," Yonhap News Agency, 6 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; James Brooke, "Director of U.N. Nuclear Agency, in Seoul, Cautions Both Koreas," *New York Times*, 6 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 October 2004

According to White House spokesman Scott McClellan, U.S. President George W. Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao discuss the North Korea nuclear crisis over the telephone and renew their commitment to resolve the issue through the Six-Party Talks.

—"Bush, Hu Confirm Continuation of 6-Way Talks on N. Korea Nuke," Japan Economic Newswire, 7 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Bush, Hu Discuss North Korea, Taiwan," Agence France Presse, 7 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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13 October 2004

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says Pyongyang is committed to resolving the nuclear issue through the Six-Party Talks but blames the U.S.'s hostile policy towards the DPRK for holding up negotiations.

—Korean Central Broadcasting Station, 13 October 2004, in "DPRK FM Spokesman: DPRK 'Can Immediately Resume' Talks if U.S. Drops Hostile Policy," OSC Document KPP20041008000103; "N. Korea Says It Still Seeks Peaceful Settlement of the Nuke Issue," Yonhap News Agency, 11 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 October 2004

China special envoy for Korean affairs Ning Fukui visits Seoul to discuss the deadlock in the Six-Party Talks. Ambassador Fukui says it seems unlikely that the negotiations will be held before November.

—"S. Korea, China Agree to Work for Resumption of Nuclear Talks," Yonhap News Agency, 13 October 2004, in "More on PRC Envoy Visit; PRC, ROK, Agree 6-Way Talks 'Before Early' Nov 'Difficult'," OSC Document KPP20041013000130.

14 October 2004

According to unidentified diplomatic sources, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) Executive Board decides to extend the suspension of the two light water reactor construction project in North Korea for another year. South Korea's Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon says KEDO should resume constructing the light water reactors if the Six-Party Talks "yield tangible results."

—"KEDO Agrees to Put Reactor Project on Hold for Another Year: Source," Yonhap News Agency, 15 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KEDO to be Kept Afloat for One More Year," *Korea Times*, 16 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Seoul, Washington Haggles Over NK Reactor Project," *Korea Times*, 15 October 2004, in "DPRK Project 'Should Be Resumed' If 6-Way Talks 'Go Well'," OSC Document KPP20041014000113.

15 October 2004

Ning Fukui, head of the Chinese delegation to the Six-party Talks, meets with Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly, and special envoy for negotiations with North Korea Joseph DeTrani in Washington to discuss how to move the Six-Party Talks forward.

—"U.S, China Discuss How to Resume 6-Way N. Korea Talks," Japan Economic Newswire, 15 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "6-Party Talks Targeted in Late November," *Korea Times*, 15 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 October 2004

Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda says North Korea has developed a plutonium-based nuclear weapon and is "close to developing" a uranium-based weapon. Hosoda also says Japan is considering referring the nuclear issue to the United Nations Security Council in the absence of progress through the Six-Party Talks.

—"N. Korea Has Already Developed Plutonium Bomb, Japan Says," Yonhap News Agency, 17 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan May Take N. Korea Nuke Issue to U.N. If No Breakthrough Made," Kyodo News Service, 17 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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18 October 2004

Kim Yŏng-nam, the DPRK's president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, travels to Beijing to meet with Chinese President Hu Jintao, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, and Chairman of the National People's Congress Wu Bangguo to discuss the current deadlock in the Six-Party Talks.

—"High-level North Korean Official Begins Trip to Beijing," Yonhap News Agency, 18 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N Korea's Number Two Leader Visits China Amid Pessimism Over Nuclear Talks," Agence France Presse, 18 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Chu Sang-min, "N.K. Group May Discuss 6-Party Talks," *Korea Herald*, 18 October 2004, in "ROK English Daily Says DPRK Delegation to Discuss Nuclear Talks, Invite PRC Leader," OSC Document KPP20041018000018.

18 October 2004

The DPRK's Korean Central News Agency criticizes IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei for his "biased attitude" towards the North Korea nuclear issue and "downplaying" South Korea's secret nuclear experiments.

—"Chosŏnchungangt'ongsin Ronp'yŏng Migukŭi Hasuin Paradei," Korean Central News Agency, 18 October 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "KCNA Brands El Baradei as Servant for U.S.," Korean Central News Agency, 18 October 2004, www.kcna.co.jp.

22 October 2004

A DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman says North Korea will return to the Six-Party Talks if the United States drops its "hostile policy" towards the DPRK, and that Pyongyang is ready to "freeze for a reward." The spokesman also says the talks should discuss "South Korea's nuclear issue before anything else."

—"Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Issue of Resuming Six-Party Talks," Korean Central News Agency website, 22 October 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; James Brooke, "North Korea Sets 3 Conditions For Returning to Nuclear Talks," *New York Times*, 22 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 October 2004

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell says North Korea's preconditions demanded on 22 October for resuming the Six-Party Talks should be raised at the negotiations and not before.

—Glenn Kessler, "N. Korea's Condition For Talks Rejected; Powell Rules Out Advance Compensation," *Washington Post*, 24 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Powell Opens Talks in Japan After Rejecting N. Korean Nuclear Demands," Agence France Presse, 24 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Issue of Resuming Six-Party Talks," Korean Central News Agency website, 22 October 2004, www.kcna.co.jp.

23-26 October 2004

To discuss and gather support for the resumption of Six-Party Talks, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell travels to East Asia and meets with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura, Chinese President Hu Jintao and Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon.

—"Powell Begins Asian Tour To Discuss N. Korea, Base Realignment," Japan Economic Newswire, 22 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; George Gedda, "Powell On Way To Assure North Korea Is Not Being

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Threatened," Associated Press, 21 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Powell Leaves On Asian Tour For Talks On North Korea, U.S. Troops, Taiwan," Agence France Presse, 22 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 October 2004

Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing reportedly tells U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell that China shares the U.S. objective of bringing North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks but feels the United States is not doing its utmost to adopt "a flexible and practical attitude on the issue."

—George Gedda, "Powell Discusses Human Rights, Taiwan, Other Issues During China Visit," Associated Press, 26 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Powell Wins Backing for New NKorea Pressure, but Hears Call for Flexibility," Agence France Presse, 26 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 October 2004

Following a talk with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon calls for members of the Six-Party Talks to make "more creative and realistic proposals" to bring North Korea back to the talks.

—"U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Holds New Conference in Seoul," Yonhap News Agency, 26 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Sang-Hun Choe, "Powell Urges North Korea to Resume Nuclear Talks; South Korea Calls for Greater Flexibility Among Participants," Associated Press, 26 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 October 2004

North Korea's *Uriminjokkkiri* website says U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell's visits to Japan, China and South Korea were part of attempts by the United States to blame North Korea for holding up the Six-Party Talks while ignoring South Korea's secret nuclear experiments.

—Choe Chang-il, "Criminal Junket Aimed at Isolating and Crushing the North," *Uriminjokkkiri*, 30 October 2004, in "North Korea Says Powell's Visit to South 'Dims' Prospects for Six-Way Talks," BBC Monitoring, 31 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 November 2004

Japanese Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Shinichi Kitaoka tells the UN General Assembly that North Korea's nuclear weapons development threatens regional peace and stability, while North Korea's Deputy Ambassador to the UN Kim Ch'ang-guk accuses the United States of having deployed nuclear weapons in Japan. Kim asserts that U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan and South Korea's secret nuclear experiments pose greater threats to the DPRK.

—"DPRK Engages in Heated Verbal Battle with Japan, ROK Over Nuclear Issues at UNGA Session," Kyodo News Service, 2 November 2004, in "Japan, ROK in Battle with DPRK Over Nuclear Issues at UNGA Session," OSC Document JPP20041102000044.

3 November 2004

North Korea's Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Han Sŏng-ryŏl says the U.S. must repeal the recently

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passed North Korean Human Rights Act and cease its "hostile policy" towards North Korea to resume Six-Party Talks.

—"North Korea Outlines Criteria for New Talks," *Chosun Ilbo*, 3 November 2004, in OSC Document KPP20041104000033; "N Korea Lays Out Terms for Rejoining Six-Way Nuclear Talks: Report," Agence France Presse, 3 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; *North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-333)*, 18 October 2004, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States House of Representatives, www.internationalrelations.house.gov.

5 November 2004

South Korea's presidential office spokesman Kim Chŏng-min says President Roh Moo-hyun has spoken with re-elected U.S. President George W. Bush via telephone and agreed to resume the Six-Party Talks as soon as possible.

—"Roh, Bush Seek Resumption of 6-Party Talks on N. Korea's Nukes," Japan Economic Newswire, 5 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> Sang-Hun Choe, "Bush, Roh Want Early Resumption of Talks Over North Korea's Nuclear Threat," Associated Press, 5 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "Roh, Bush Agree to Early Six-Party Talks," *Korea Herald*, 6 November 2004, in OSC Document KPP20041105000236.

6 November 2004

Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura visits Seoul to meet with South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon to discuss the North Korean nuclear issue. Both parties agree to resume the Six-Party Talks as early as possible and to work to extend the suspension of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development project rather than abandoning the project entirely.

—"(2nd LD) Seoul, Tokyo Reiterate Importance of 6-Nation Nuke Talks," Yonhap News Agency, 6 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "Japan, ROK Agree to Keep Alive N-Reactor Project in N. Korea," Jiji Press Ticker, 6 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 November 2004

Yomiuri Shimbun reports an unidentified high-level U.S. official as having stated that the United States would take immediate action if North Korea were to transfer any nuclear material to another country and that a military strike could not be ruled out.

—Yonhap News Agency, "ROK's Yonhap: U.S. Sets 'Red Line' in North Korean Nuke Issue: Yomiuri," 9 November 2004, OSC Document KPP20041109000010; "U.S. Sets 'Red Line' Over N.K. Nukes," *Korea Times*, 10 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 November 2004

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, says South Korea has no right to discuss North Korea's nuclear issue because Seoul conducted secret nuclear experiments in the past.

—Cho'n Chong-ho, "The Nuclear Criminal Has No Right to Talk About the Nuclear Issue," *Rodong Sinmun* via Uriminjokkkiri website, 9 November 2004, in "DPRK Daily Decries ROK Authorities as 'Nuclear Criminals', Have 'No Right' To Discuss Nuclear Issues," OSC Document KPP20041109000027.

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12 November 2004

Responding to the 9 November report that the United States would not rule out military options in the case of North Korea passing nuclear material to another state, North Korea's Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland and the Uriminjokkkiri website criticize the "U.S. hostile policy" against North Korea and argue that the DPRK is justified in developing and strengthening its "nuclear deterrent."

—Kim Sun-ho, "Rash Act by the Nuclear Fanatics," *Uriminjokkkiri*, 12 November 2004, in "DPRK Denounces U.S. for Setting 'Red Line' Regarding DPRK's Nuclear Activities," OSC Document KPP20041112000046; Korean Central Broadcasting Station, 12 November 2004, in "DPRK's CPRF Spokesman: DPRK to Continue to 'Strengthen' 'Nuclear Deterrent'," OSC Document KPP20041112000127.

12 November 2004

South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun says during a speech in Los Angeles that a hard-line policy to resolve the nuclear crisis would endanger the lives of South Koreans and risk another war. Roh also argues that North Korea would give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees.

—"The U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance and the Situation on the Korean Peninsula, His Excellency Roh Moo-hyun," 12 November 2004, *Speeches 2004-05*, in Los Angeles World Affairs Council, www.lawac.org; Yonhap News Agency, 13 November 2004, in "ROK President Roh Urges U.S. Not to Put Embargo on DPRK," OSC Document KPP20041113000001; Mark Lavine, Hong Kong AFP, in "ROK President Warns U.S Hardline Policy to DPRK Will Have 'Grave Repercussions'," OSC Document JPP20041113000065.

17 November 2004

United Nations General Assembly President Jean Ping visits DPRK Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun and President of the Supreme People's Assembly Presidium Kim Yŏng-nam in Pyongyang to discuss ways to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis.

—Yonhap News Agency, 17 November 2004, in "U.N. General Assembly President Arrives in North Korea," OSC Document KPP20041117000135; "President of the 59th Session of the United Nations General Assembly to Visit Korea," *Press & Public Affairs*, 18 November 2004, in ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, www.mofat.go.kr.

18 November 2004

At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Chile, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura urge North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions and return to the Six-Party Talks "unconditionally and promptly."

—Kyodo News Service, "Japan Urges North Korea To 'Unconditionally' Resume Six-Way Talks," BBC Monitoring, 18 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "Japan Urges North Korea to Drop Nuclear Plans," Agence France Presse, 19 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 November 2004

General Leon J. LaPorte, Commander of Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea, says the DPRK's need for hard currency could lead it to attempt to sell weapons grade plutonium to international terrorists.

—Kim Chŏng-gon, "Rap'otŭ: 'Puk, P'ŭllut'onnyum P'anmae Kanŭngsŏng," *Hankook Ilbo*, 20 November 2004, in

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KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "U.S. Commander Fears N.K. May Sell Weapons-grade Plutonium," Yonhap News Agency, 19 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 November 2004

South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun tells U.S. President George W. Bush that South Korea will make proposals in a "bolder and more leading" manner at the Six-Party Talks.

—"Roh, Bush to Coordinate on NK Nukes," *Korea Times*, 20 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Roh, Bush Agree to Resolve Nuke Crisis Peacefully Via 6-Way Talks," Yonhap News Agency, 20 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20-21 November 2004

U.S. President George W. Bush, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Chinese President Hu Jintao and Russian President Vladimir Putin meet on the sidelines of the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Chile and reaffirm their commitment to resolve the North Korea nuclear crisis as soon as possible through the Six-Party Talks.

—"Roh, Bush Agree To Nuke To Resolve Nuke Crisis Peacefully Via 6-Way Talks," Yonhap News Agency, 20 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "Bush, Hu Agree To Seek Peaceful Solution To N. Korea's Nuke Issue," Japan Economic Newswire, 20 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "Chinese, Russian Leaders in Chile Vow To Work Closely On North Korea," Xinhua News General News Service (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific), 21 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "Koizumi To Keep Pressing N. Korea To Drop Nuke Ambitions," Japan Economic Newswire, 20 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 November 2004

Following his visit to Pyongyang, United Nations General Assembly President Jean Ping tells South Korean officials that North Korea "urgently" wants to return to the Six-Party Talks if certain countries drop what Pyongyang perceives as a hostile stance towards the DPRK regime.

—"N.K. Gives 'Very Positive Message' on Nuclear Talks: U.N. Official," Yonhap News Agency, 24 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "N. Korea Wants To Resume Nuke Talks 'Urgently' But Has Conditions," Japan Economic Newswire, 24 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "N.K. Wants Better Conditions For Resumption Of Nuclear Talks: U.N. Official," Yonhap News Agency, 25 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 November 2004

During a sideline meeting at the annual ASEAN Plus Three summit, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun all agree to increase cooperation in order to end the North Korean nuclear crisis peacefully.

—"Northeast Asian Leaders Agree to Resolve N.K. Nuke Issue Peacefully," Yonhap News Agency, 29 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "(Update) Japan, China, ROK Agree To Kick-Start 6-Party Talks," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 29 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "China Warns Japan, S. Korea

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'Difficulties' Remain On N. Korea Nuclear Issue," Agence France Presse, 29 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 November 2004

Following a visit to Pyongyang by China's special envoy for Korean affairs Ning Fukui, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue says the DPRK is trying to gauge the reelection of U.S. President George W. Bush for any U.S. policy changes before agreeing to another round of Six-Party Talks in Beijing.

—"North Korea Waiting for Signs from US before Agreeing to Nuclear Talks," Agence France Presse, 30 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "N. Korea Wants to See U.S. Attitude before Deciding Date of Talks," Kyodo News Service, 30 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 November 2004

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, reports that the reelection of President George W. Bush casts "dark clouds" on a peaceful resolution to the nuclear issue.

—"Pyongyang Skeptical of Repairing Rift with Washington," Yonhap News Agency, 30 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> Yonhap News Agency, "North Korean Daily Says US Hostility Hampers Solution of Nuclear Crisis," BBC Monitoring, 30 November 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 December 2004

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says the IAEA's November investigation into South Korea's secret nuclear experiments is not sufficient to assuage the DPRK's concerns, and the issue must be discussed during the Six-Party Talks before discussing North Korea's nuclear issue.

—"Foreign Ministry Spokesman Blasts U.S. and IAEA's Double Standards," Korean Central News Agency, 1 December 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central Broadcasting Station, 1 December 2004, in "DPRK FM Spokesman Decries Outcome of IAEA Meeting on ROK 'Secret' Nuclear Experiments," OSC Document ID KPP20041201000175.

2 December 2004

According to the Japanese *Sankei Shimbun*, the DPRK insists on security guarantees, energy aid, partial lifting of U.S. sanctions and the complete resumption of the "New York channel" (bilateral communications via permanent missions to the United Nations) as preconditions before returning to the Six-Party Talks.

—Yukio Kajiyama, "DPRK Steadfast on Preconditions to Six-Party Talks, Indicating to Reject Resumption of Talks if Conditions Not Met," *Sankei Shimbun*, 4 December 2004, in "Japan: DPRK Insists on Having Preconditions Met before Agreeing to Six-Party Talks," OSC Document ID JPP20041204000028; Yonhap News Agency, 4 December 2004, in "Japan's Sankei Shimbun: DPRK Wants Fuel Oil as Condition to Resume 6-Way Talks," OSC Document ID KPP20041204000012.

3 December 2004

South Korea's Unification Minister Chŏng Dong-yŏng says the ROK is willing to address and explain its controversial 1982 and 2000 nuclear research experiments at the next round of the Six-Party Talks.

—Lee Chi-un and Ku Hye-yŏng, "Chŏng Dong-yŏng 'Han'guk Haengmulchilsilhŏm Munje 6 Chahoedamsŏ Non'ŭi Kanŭng'," *Seoul Shinmun*, 3 December 2004, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Reuben Staines, "Seoul Willing to Explain

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Lab Tests to Pyongyang," *Korea Times*, 3 December 2004, in "ROK Unif Min: 'We Can Explain All' about ROK's Nuclear Tests to DPRK at 6-Way Talks," OSC Document ID KPP20041202000178.

3 December 2004

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei tells the *New York Times* he believes North Korea has reprocessed all of the nuclear material once monitored by the IAEA during the 1990s. The stockpile of spent nuclear fuel is believed to be enough to yield four to six nuclear devices.

—David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "North Korea Said to Expand Arms Program," *New York Times*, 6 December 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Chief Says North Has Up to Six Nukes," *Chosun Ilbo* website, 8 December 2004, in OSC Document ID KPP20041207000109.

3 December 2004

Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, says the United States' discussion of North Korea's "redline," or limit on North Korea's nuclear activities, is an attempt by Washington to escalate tensions on the Korean peninsula.

—"Rodong Sinmun: 'Pukhaekhan'gyesŏn' ūn Haeksŏnjegonggyŏkŭl Wihaen Kushil," Korean Central News Agency, 3 December 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "U.S. Talk about North's Nuclear Red Line Flailed," Korean Central News Agency, 3 December 2004, www.kcna.co.jp.

6 December 2004

South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun says the "hard-line" postures of the United States and other countries arguing for the collapse of the DPRK regime make it difficult to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully. Roh also says Seoul should have the "strongest say" at the Six-Party Talks because of the direct implications for South Korea.

—"Countries Hoping for N.K. Collapse, Make Deal Difficult: Roh," Yonhap News Agency, 6 December 2004, in "ROK: President: DPRK 'Feels Uneasy' as Countries 'Think' DPRK 'Regime Should Collapse'," OSC Document ID KPP20041206000016; Choi Hoon, Min Seong-jae, "Roh, in Paris, Is Even More Outspoken on North Korea," *JoongAng Ilbo*, 7 December 2004, in "ROK President Says 'Strongest Remarks Yet' on DPRK Nuclear Issue," OSC Document ID KPP20041206000122; Yonhap News Agency, 6 September 2004, in "ROK's Yonhap: President Roh Says S. Korea Can Play 'Leading Role' in N-E Asia," OSC Document ID KPP20041206000136.

7 December 2004

U.S. State Department deputy spokesman Adam Ereli says special envoy Joseph DeTrani met in New York with a North Korean representative on 30 November and 3 December to urge the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks without preconditions and at an early date to resolve the nuclear issue diplomatically.

—*Daily Press Briefing*, U.S. Department of State, 6 December 2004, www.state.gov; "U.S., N. Korean Officials Meet Twice in New York," Yonhap News Agency, 7 December 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Holds Talks with N. Korea in New York," *Korea Times*, 8 December 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 December 2004

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei tells the Spanish newspaper *El Pais* that North Korea is "the most serious" challenge facing the IAEA.

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—"IAEA Chief Says N. Korea 'Most Serious' Challenge, Pakistan 'Disconcerting,' *El Pais*, 12 December 2004, in OSC Document ID EUP20041212000122.

10 December 2004

U.S. State Department deputy spokesman Adam Ereli says the United States had known about North Korea's secret uranium enrichment program before James Kelly's October 2002 visit to Pyongyang.

—*Daily Press Briefing*, U.S. Department of State, 10 December 2004, www.state.gov; *Chosun Ilbo*, "N.K. Uranium Program Known for Years: U.S. State Department," 13 December 2004, in OSC Document ID KPP20041212000059.

10 December 2004

According to the Japan Economic Newswire, "sources with U.S.-North Korean matters" say that the United States has offered to settle the standoff over the DPRK's uranium enrichment program if Pyongyang admits to the existence of a "peaceful-use" enrichment program and also agrees to abandon it.

—"U.S. Offers Compromise Deal on N. Korea Uranium Issue: Sources," Japan Economic Newswire, 10 December 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14-15 December 2004

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan, and South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon caution Japanese officials about imposing sanctions against North Korea out of fear that they could undermine diplomatic efforts to resolve the nuclear crisis.

—"U.S. Cautions Japan Against Economic Sanctions on Unpredictable North Korea," Agence France Presse, 14 December 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "China Calls for Japan's Careful Approach on Sanctions," Jiji Press Ticker, 15 December 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "S. Korea Opposes Economic Sanctions on N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 15 December 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 December 2004

A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry says that Pyongyang would consider Japanese economic sanctions a "declaration of war."

—"DPRK Stand on Japanese Ultra Right Forces-Proposed Sanctions Against DPRK Clarified," Korean Central News Agency, 14 December 2004, www.kcna.co.jp; "North Korea Says Japanese Sanctions Would be 'Declaration of War'," Agence France Presse, 15 December 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 December 2004

Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura says there needs to be a timeframe for the Six-Party Talks so that negotiations do not "go on for years without reaching any conclusion."

—"Japan Calls for Clear Timeframe for 6-Party Talks," Jiji Press Ticker, 16 December 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 December 2004

North Korea's Councilor to the International Atomic Energy Agency Son Mun-san tells the Japanese daily *Sekai Nippo* that the five megawatt reactor in Yöngbyön is in "full operation."

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—Hwang Hui-kyong: "Japan's Sekai Nippo: North Korean 5MW Nuclear Reactor in Yongbyon in Full Operation," Yonhap News Agency, 19 December 2004, in "DPRK Envoy Says Yongbyon Nuclear Reactor in 'Full Operation'," OSC Document ID KPP20041219000066.

21 December 2004

The U.S. State Department's *Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2004* states that "continuing stalemate could call into question the utility of negotiations as a means to resolve the North Korea nuclear crisis."

—FY 2004 *Performance and Accountability Report*, U.S. State Department Bureau of Resource Management, November 2004, www.state.gov; "U.S. State Department Doubts 6-Way Talks," *Korea Times*, 23 December 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "State Dept. Raises Doubts about Dialogue with N. Korea in Report," Japan Economic Newswire, 22 December 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 December 2004

U.S. ambassador to South Korea Christopher Hill says the United States' patience concerning the stalled Six-Party Talks is "not limitless."

—Yonhap News Agency 21 December 2004, in "Regime Transformation Means Change in N.K.'s Behavior: U.S. Envoy," OSC Document ID KPP20041221000083.

24 December 2004

A North Korean television broadcast reports that the DPRK will not attend the Six-Party Talks unless Japan is prohibited from participating. The announcement comes in response to a dispute over the returned remains of Japanese kidnapping victims.

—Yonhap News Agency, 24 December 2004, in "N. Korea Threatens to Exclude Japan from Nuclear Talks," OSC Document ID KPP20041224000026; "Angry North Korea Threatens to End Dialogue with Japan in Abduction Row," Agence France Presse, 31 December 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 December 2004

Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Hitoshi Tanaka says a breakthrough at the Six-Party Talks cannot occur unless North Korea makes a major policy shift.

—"Persistence Needed in N. Korean Diplomacy: Foreign Ministry Official," *Nikkei Telecom 21*, 28 December 2004, in "Hitoshi Tanaka Says DPRK Issue Needs 'Major Policy Shift' From DPRK," OSC Document ID JPP20041229000001.

[Back to Top](#)

2003

January 2003

US satellite imagery analysts observe covered trucks repeatedly transporting material away from the facility temporarily storing 8,000 spent fuel rods in Yongbyon-kun. US intelligence analysts suspect that the trucks are transporting the fuel rods to a reprocessing facility where they could be converted into weapons-grade plutonium.

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—David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, "Satellite Said to See Activity at North Korean Nuclear Site," *New York Times*, 31 January 2003, www.nytimes.com.

January 2003

According to US and Japanese government sources, North Korea begins preparing to reactivate the nuclear reprocessing facility located in the Yongbyon nuclear complex. US and Japanese intelligence reportedly detect shipments of coal arriving at the heat supply boiler facility that is adjacent to the reprocessing facility. The boiler, which is used to maintain the temperature of a nitric acid solution used in reprocessing, becomes active by early February as reconnaissance satellites detect smoke billowing from the facility.

—Kyodo News Service, 28 February 2003, in "N. Korea Set to Restart Nuclear Reprocessing Facility: Sources," FBIS Document ID JPP20030228000203.

1 January 2003

The last two members of the three-member IAEA inspection team leave North Korea.

—P.S. Suryanarayana, "IAEA Inspectors Leave N. Korea," *The Hindu*, 1 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 January 2003

US President George W. Bush reaffirms his intention to address North Korea's decision to restart its previously frozen nuclear facilities diplomatically. Speaking to reporters on his ranch in Crawford, Texas, Bush says that the situation with North Korea is not a military problem but rather a diplomatic problem.

—Ivan Lebedev, "North Korean Nuclear Programme Should Be Settled Peacefully-Bush," ITAR-TASS, 3 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 January 2003

US Secretary of State Colin Powell and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi agree to continue using diplomatic means to pressure North Korea into reversing its decision to abandon the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

—Kyodo News Service, 5 January 2003, in "Kawaguchi, Powell in Talks on North Korea Nuclear Crisis," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 January 2003

The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution that "deplores in the strongest terms the DPRK's unilateral acts to remove and impede the functioning of containment and surveillance equipment at its nuclear facilities and the nuclear material contained therein, including the expulsion of IAEA inspectors, which renders the Agency unable to verify, pursuant to its safeguards agreement with the DPRK, that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the DPRK." Addressing the Board of Governors, IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei states that the Agency is "regrettably at present unable...to verify that the DPRK is not diverting nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and it is also at present unable to verify that the DPRK has declared to the Agency all the nuclear material that is subject to the safeguards."

—Report by the Director General on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement Between the Agency

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and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2003/3, 6 January 2003; Introductory Statement by IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei to the Board of Governors, 6 January 2003, International Atomic Energy Agency, www.iaea.org.

6 January 2003

In an interview with Interfax News Agency, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov states that North Korea must readmit IAEA inspectors. However, Ivanov adds, "it is necessary to provide North Korea with security guarantees, otherwise the situation could become unpredictable."

—"N. Korea Must Get Security Guarantees to Avoid Crisis Worsening: Moscow," Agence France Presse, 6 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 January 2003

US President George Bush states that the United States has no intention of invading North Korea. Speaking at a cabinet meeting, Bush says, "We have no intention of invading North Korea. I believe this will be resolved peacefully and I believe it can be resolved diplomatically."

—"US Has No Intention To Invade DPRK: Bush," Xinhua News Agency, 7 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6-7 January 2003

Representatives from the United States, Japan and South Korea hold a meeting of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) in Washington to discuss North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program. On 7 January, representatives from the three nations issue a joint statement urging North Korea to eliminate its nuclear program while reiterating their intention to "pursue a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the issue."

—"US Willing to Talk to North Korea But No Quid Pro Quo," Agence France Presse, 7 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Anwar Iqbal, "Allies Urge N. Korea to Quit Nuclear Plans," United Press International, 7 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 January 2003

The Korean Central News Agency states that US claims of a missile threat from North Korea are merely attempts to justify the establishment of a missile defense system. According to a KCNA report, the United States' desire to deploy a missile defense system further illustrates its attempts at global supremacy. The report also claims that North Korea "has increased its self-defensive military capability to cope with the US intensified policy to invade and stifle it with nukes." The report concludes, "If the US unleashes a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula, it will not escape its destruction."

—"KCNA on US Moves for MD Establishment," Korean Central News Agency, 7 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

7 January 2003

The Korean Central News Agency reports that any attempt US to impose economic sanctions on North Korea would mean war. The report states, that "the US should opt for dialogue with the DPRK, not for war, clearly aware that it will have to pay a very high price for such reckless acts." The report also includes a demand for an apology from the US for what it refers to as the "piracy" against the North Korean ship *Sosan* in December 2002.

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—"US Urged to Apologize and Compensate for Its Piracy against DPRK Ship," Korean Central News Agency, 7 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

8 January 2003

KCNA accuses the United States of increasing the threat of nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula. According to the news agency, the US has created the rumor of North Korea's clandestine nuclear weapons program in order to prevent reconciliation of North and South Korea and keep tensions on the peninsula high.

—"KCNA Accuses US of Increasing Danger of Nuclear War in Korea," Korean Central News Agency, 8 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

9-11 January 2003

Han Song Ryol and Mun Jong Chol, two representatives of North Korea's permanent mission to the UN, travel to Santa Fe, New Mexico and meet with New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, a former US ambassador to the UN. The two sides discuss ways in which to resolve the conflict between the US and North Korea over North Korea's nuclear program. According to Bush administration officials, the meetings are unofficial, and Richardson is only authorized to reiterate the message that the administration has already stated publicly. Speaking to reporters after the talks, Richardson announces that Han informed him that "North Korea has no intention of building nuclear weapons." Richardson adds that he believes the talks were successful in conveying to the North Korean representatives "the depth of international concern over this issue." Commenting on the high level of inflammatory rhetoric coming from North Korea, Richardson says that North Koreans "don't negotiate like we do. They don't have our same mentality. They believe in order to get something they have to lay out additional cards, step up the rhetoric, be more belligerent."

—Barry Schweid, "Richardson Says North Korean Diplomat Says His Country Does Not Intend to Build Nuclear Weapons," Associated Press, 11 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Seth Mydans, "Threats and Responses: Nuclear Standoff; North Korea Says It Is Withdrawing from Arms Treaty," *New York Times*, 10 January 2003, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Barry Schweid, "United States Condemns North Korea's Decision to Quit Nuclear Arms Treaty," Associated Press, 10 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Leigh Strope, "North Korea Ready to Negotiate Despite Increasing Rhetoric," Associated Press, 12 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 January 2003

Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan says that the best way to resolve the dispute between the US and North Korea is through direct dialogue. Speaking at a meeting with his French counterpart Dominique de Villepin, Jiaxuan also says, "The framework agreement reached by the two sides in 1994 should be maintained and continue to be carried out."

—Xinhua News Agency, in "Chinese Foreign Minister, Visiting French Counterpart Urge US-North Korea Talks," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 9 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 January 2003

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei meets with US Secretary of State Colin Powell in Washington to discuss North Korea's decision to resume its nuclear program. While in Washington, ElBaradei also meets with National

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Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Senator Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee.
—"UN Nuclear Monitoring Chief to Meet Powell in Washington," Agence France Presse, 9 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David Gollust, "Powell: US Committed to Seeking Diplomatic Solution with N. Korea," Voice of America News, 10 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Powell Says North Korea Disrespect for NPT Must Be Dealt With; ElBaradei Says Inspectors Seek More Proactive Iraqi Cooperation," Federal Information and News Dispatch, Inc. State Department, 10 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 January 2003

The North Korean government announces that the country no longer considers itself bound by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). North Korea reportedly decided to withdraw from the NPT because the United States persistently tries to suppress North Korea through force and the IAEA is nothing more than a tool of the United States to accomplish this goal. According to the government statement, while North Korea is no longer party to the NPT and is no longer bound by its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, "we have no intention to produce nuclear weapons and our nuclear activities at this stage will be confined only to peaceful purposes such as the production of electricity." [NOTE: North Korea's announcement elicits multiple condemnations from the international community, including China, North Korea's closest ally.]

—"Statement of DPRK Government on Its Withdrawal from NPT," Korean Central News Agency, 10 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "Chosonjongbusongmyomg Haengmugijonp'abangjijoyageso T'alt'oe," Korean Central News Agency, 11 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; Christopher Torchia, "North Korea Withdraws from Nuclear Arms Control Treaty, Warns of 'Third World War,'" Associated Press, 10 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 January 2003

Responding to Pyongyang's announced decision to withdraw from the NPT, US Secretary of State Colin Powell states that in withdrawing from the treaty, "North Korea has thumbed its nose at the international community. It is a very serious situation," says Powell, adding, "We are not going to be intimidated."

—Barry Schweid, "Richardson Says North Korean Diplomat Says His Country Does Not Intend to Build Nuclear Weapons," Associated Press, 11 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 January 2003

Yun Kuk Hui, deputy general director of North Korea's General Department of Atomic Energy states that the atomic energy industrial sector fully supports Pyongyang's decision to withdraw from the NPT and establish a "*chuch'e*-oriented nuclear power industry." Yun adds that North Korea's atomic energy sector will "thoroughly implement the policies of our party and the republic government" and continue "using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the future as we did in the past."

—Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 10 January 2003, in "North Korean Atomic Energy Bureau Chief Expresses 'Full Support' for Policy," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 10 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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11 January 2003

Lee Che Son, director general of North Korea's General Department of Atomic Energy, sends a letter to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei stating that North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT is now in effect. In the letter, Lee states, "Under the prevailing situation where the United States seeks to destroy the DPRK by force, and the IAEA is incapable of observing the principle of impartiality, the DPRK government issued a statement on January 10, 2003 declaring an automatic, immediate and effectual withdrawal from the NPT on which it declared a moratorium."

—"DPRK's Withdrawal from NPT Now Effectual: Official," Xinhua News Agency, 11 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lee Chong Hun, "NPT T'alt'oe Songmyonghu Pukhanp'yojong/Min'gan'gun Ch'ongdongwon 'Taemi Kyoljonuiji' Kwashi," *Donga Ilbo*, 13 January 2003, p. 10, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

11 January 2003

Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Yukio Takeuchi and Im Song Chun, South Korean presidential envoy, meet in Japan and agree that Japan, South Korea and the United States should work together to end the North Korean nuclear crisis. The two officials reportedly agree to use their respective diplomatic channels to urge Pyongyang to engage in dialogue. They also agree that tough economic sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council could do more harm than good.

—Kyodo News Service, 11 January 2003, in "Japan, South Korea Agree on Trilateral Work with US on North Korea," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 11 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 January 2003

Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, prints a commentary accusing the United States of responding to North Korea's "sincere proposal for concluding a nonaggression treaty" by threatening a blockade and military action. The commentary continues, "If the US evades its responsibility and recklessly challenges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the army and people of the DPRK will never miss the chance but certainly make them pay for the blood and turn the stronghold of the enemy into a sea of fire." The commentary continues, "It is the unshakeable revolutionary principle and stand of the DPRK to respond to a hard-line with a super hard-line. It has nothing to be afraid of even under the worst situation." The commentary also asserts that North Korea pulled out of the NPT because the US threatened it with nuclear war, thus openly violating the treaty. However, North Korea's decision to restart its indigenous nuclear program, according to the *Rodong Sinmun* commentary, was based on the country's energy needs, not security concerns.

—Korean Central News Agency, 12 January 2003, in "North Korean Media Warn of 'Sea of Fire,'" BBC Monitoring International Reports, 12 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 12 January 2003, in "North Korea Says Nuclear Admission Was US 'Fabrication,'" 12 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 January 2003

South Korean President-elect Roh Moo Hyun meets with US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly and informs him that South Korea will play a "leading role" in resolving the North Korean nuclear standoff. Roh also reiterates his belief that the nuclear issue should be resolved through peaceful dialogue. Speaking to reporters after the meeting, Kelly states that the US is willing to talk to North Korea. Kelly says, "Once we get beyond nuclear

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weapons, there may be opportunities with the US, with private investors, with other countries to help North Korea in the energy area."

—"DPRK Issue Should Be Settled Peacefully: S. Korean President-Elect," Xinhua News Agency, 13 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Howard W. French, "Aides Declare US 'Willing to Talk' in Korea Dispute," *New York Times*, 14 January 2003, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "DPRK Insists on US Talks to End Nuclear Row, Mediation Continues," Xinhua News Agency, 15 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 January 2003

Pak Ui Ch'un, North Korean ambassador to Russia, dismisses as "hypothetical" the allegations made by US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly that North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons. Pak claims that Kelly is responsible for raising tension on the peninsula by making such an allegation. In addition, Pak calls any efforts by the US to adopt UN sanctions against North Korea a "declaration of war." Speaking to an ITAR-TASS reporter, Pak states that if the United States agrees to a nonaggression treaty, North Korea will consider allowing IAEA inspectors to return. However, Pak stresses, the IAEA "must stop working as a protйгй of America and the United States must stop trying to use the IAEA as an instrument for pressuring North Korea." According to Pak, North Korea is willing and ready to prove that it has not developed nuclear weapons if the US drops its hostile policy.

—"N. Korean Ambassador Denies Pyongyang Has Nuclear Program," Agence France Presse, 13 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap, 13 January 2003, in "DPRK Envoy in Russia on Possession of Weapons 'More Powerful' Than Nuclear Weapons," FBIS Document ID: KPP20030114000011.

13 January 2003

Andrew Natsios, head of the US Agency for International Development, says that the United States is withholding food aid until monitors can verify that it is not being diverted to the North Korean military. Natsios denies that the US is withholding food aid in order to pressure North Korea into giving up its nuclear weapons program, claiming that the demand to monitor aid distributions dates from 7 June 2002, before the most recent nuclear crisis.

—Steven Edwards, "Washington Denies It Is Wielding Food Weapons: US Insists It Monitor Distribution in North Korea," *National Post*, 14 January 2003, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 January 2003

During US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly's visit to Beijing, China offers to host talks between the United States and North Korea to resolve the growing tension over North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

—"North Korea Threatens New 'Options' as China Offers to Mediate in Crisis," *Guelph Mercury*, 15 January 2003, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Hong In P'yo and Kim Kwang Ho, "Pukhaek Chungwoegyo 'Shihommudae' Puk, Mihoedam Changsojegong Koron'dung Chungje Umjigim," *Kyunghyang Shimmun*, 16 January 2003, p. 11, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

14 January 2003

US President George W. Bush announces that the US would consider giving energy and food aid to North Korea if Pyongyang gives up its nuclear weapons program. But on 15 January, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman

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dismisses Bush's offer, calling it "a deceptive drama" that is meant "to mislead world public opinion." The spokesman says that Washington's "loudmouthed supply of energy and food aid is like a painted pie in the sky as they are possible only after the DPRK is totally disarmed."

—Knight Ridder, "Bush Offers Energy, Food Aid for North Korean Nuke Talks," *Vancouver Province*, 15 January 2003, p. A19, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "Bush Says Shift by North Korea Could Bring Aid," *New York Times*, 15 January 2003, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Chosonwoemusong Taebyonin Migugui <Taehwa> Solun Kimanguk," Korea Central News Agency, 15 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "DPRK FM Spokesman on US Rumor about Dialogue," Korean Central News Agency, 15 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

14 January 2003

US Secretary of State Colin Powell says that the 1994 Agreed Framework cannot sufficiently prevent North Korea from pursuing a nuclear weapons program. In an interview with the *Wall Street Journal*, Powell says that the United States needs "a new arrangement" by which the United States may meet North Korea's energy needs by means other than building light-water nuclear reactors. [Note: Many critics of the 1994 Agreed Framework, including those in the Bush Administration, have suggested providing North Korea with coal burning power plants instead of light-water reactors.]

—Steven R. Weisman, "Solving the North Korean Puzzle: Once Again, the US Will Try Persuasion." *New York Times*, 15 January 2003, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Carla Anne Robbins and David S. Cloud, "Leading the News: Powell Urges Tougher North Korea Nuclear Pact-Citing Flaws in 1994 Deal, He Says US Seeks to Curb Capacity to Make Weapons," *Wall Street Journal*, 14 January 2003, p. A3, in Proquest, www.il.proquest.com.

14 January 2003

The Korean Central News Agency reports that the nuclear crisis will only be resolved through bilateral talks between North Korea and the United States. Another KCNA report claims the United States is responsible for the current nuclear crisis by placing North Korea on a list of potential targets for a preemptive nuclear strike in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review.

—"KCNA Accuses U.S. of Mocking at UN and International Community," Korean Central News Agency, 14 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "KCNA Refutes U.S. Sophism about DPRK's Decision," Korean Central News Agency, 14 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

14 January 2003

A commentary in published in *Rodong Sinmun*, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, warns the United States not to pursue a policy of stifling North Korea. The commentary warns that North Korea "has so far shown the utmost self-control and patience," but if US provocations continue, North Korea will exercise its secret "options."

—"DPRK, Too, Has Options," Korean Central News Agency, 14 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

14 January 2003

The *Rodong Sinmun* warns Japan not to support the US in provoking North Korea over the ensuing nuclear crisis. A

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Rodong Sinmun commentary broadcasted on Pyongyang Radio states that North Korea has made clear its position on Japan: "For Japan to seek to crush us by following in the footsteps of the United States would lead to its own self-destruction."

—Pyongyang Broadcasting Station, 15 January 2003, in "North Korea Warns Japan against 'Following in the Footsteps' of USA," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 15 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14-18 January 2003

A delegation of Australian diplomats travels to Pyongyang to convey the international community's concerns over steps taken by North Korea to reactivate its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. The delegation led by Murray McLean, chief of the North Asia division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, reportedly delivers a letter from Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer to his North Korean counterpart Paek Nam Sun. During the meetings, North Korean officials reportedly deny that Pyongyang is pursuing a uranium enrichment program. North Korean officials also reportedly tell the Australian delegation that they are concerned that the United States will push for regime change in North Korea after it has disarmed Iraq. Upon returning to Australia, members of the delegation inform the press that Pyongyang's concern of becoming a US target of counter-proliferation efforts has overshadowed concerns about economic aid and trade. Members of the delegation subsequently inform officials in Washington, Seoul and Tokyo about the results of the diplomatic trip.

—"DPRK Insists on US Talks to End Nuclear Row, Mediation Continues," Xinhua News Agency, 15 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Don Kirk, "Pressure Mounts on North Korea: Calls to Halt Nuclear Program Increase as US Seems to Ease Stand Against Talks," *International Herald Tribune*, 15 January 2003, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Australia Informs S. Korea of Pyongyang Trip Results," Xinhua News Agency, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Axis of Evil' Slam Blocks N. Korea Nuclear Resolution: Paper," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Denies Enriching Uranium, Open to Multilateral Talks," Malaysia General News, 26 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 January 2003

A commentary printed in the North Korean newspaper *Minju Joson* claims that North Korea withdrew from the NPT because of the hostile policies of the US. The commentary says that North Korea will not compromise on issues related to its "sovereignty and dignity." The commentary adds that in order to protect its sovereignty and dignity North Korea is prepared to take "self-defensive measures" stronger than withdrawing from the NPT.

—"Minjujoson Hyon Sat'aeui Ch'aegimun Chonjoguro Mi'gug'e Itta," Korean Central News Agency, 15 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency, 15 January 2003, in "North Korean Paper Blames USA for Current Crisis," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 15 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Serious Challenge to Korea's Reunification," Korean Central News Agency, 16 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

15 January 2003

White House spokesman Ari Fleisher says that the United States will not agree to a nonaggression pact with North Korea until Pyongyang complies with earlier agreements and gives up its nuclear weapons program. "The issue is not: what is the United States going to do? The issue is: what is North Korea going to do?" Fleisher says. "North

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Korea needs to begin by dismantling its nuclear programs in a verifiable and irreversible way. That comes first."

— Richard Tompkins and Eli J. Lake, "North Korea Dismisses US Deal Offer," United Press International, 15 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 January 2003

Pyongyang Radio broadcasts a bellicose commentary warning the United States not to underestimate North Korea's resolve and capability to fight and win a war. The commentary warns that "the US imperialists should not by any means listen absentmindedly to the warning of our army and people that there is no limit to our target range and that we would make the entire United States into a sea of fire." Claiming that these threats are not merely "empty words," the commentary states that if the United States forces a war on the Korean Peninsula, "we will blast the entirety of your land off the face of the earth with powerful attack capabilities beyond anything the world can imagine – a frightful attack beyond anything ever seen or heard."

—Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 16 January 2003, in "Pyongyang Radio Commentary Accuses USA of Underestimating North Korea," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 16 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 January 2003

South Korean President-elect Roh Moo Hyun meets with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi and says that while he will not tolerate North Korea's attempts to develop a nuclear weapons program, "the issue should be resolved through dialogue." Roh says that "cooperation between South Korea and Japan is very important in solving the North Korean nuclear issue." Later in the day, Roh tells reporters that he believes once North Korea escapes its status as a rogue state, it should abandon its nuclear weapons program. Roh also says that he would not consider a military strike against North Korea even if it was found to be reprocessing nuclear fuel for use in a bomb.

—Yonhap News Agency, 16 January 2003, in "South Korea's Roh Stresses Dialogue, Cooperation to Resolve North Issue," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 16 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Howard W. French, "South Korea's President-Elect Rejects Use of Force Against North Korea," *New York Times*, 17 January 2003, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 January 2003

Speaking before the National Assembly's National Defense Committee, South Korea's Defense Minister Lee Jun says that a war between North and South Korea would be "unavoidable" if the United States carried out a preemptive attack on the North's suspected nuclear weapons facilities. Lee says that while South Korea is not certain that the North is developing uranium-based nuclear weapons, the probability is high. Lee also claims that US and South Korean forces are prepared for a "worst-case scenario." [Note: On 18 January, a spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense says that Lee's statements did not indicate that the security situation on the peninsula was becoming increasingly precarious, but rather the statements were meant to reiterate the readiness of South Korea's armed forces to handle any contingencies that might arise.]

—Yonhap News Agency, 16 January 2003, in "South Korean Minister Says Peninsula War 'Unavoidable' if USA Strikes North," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 16 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Howard W. French, "South Korea's President-Elect Rejects Use of Force against North Korea," *New York Times*, 17

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January 2003, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 18 January 2003, in "South Korean Defence Ministry Downplays 'Inevitable' War Statement by Its Chief," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 18 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 January 2003

A Korean Central News Agency commentary once again blames the United States and the IAEA for North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The commentary claims that "the DPRK can no longer be bound by the NPT and the IAEA now that they are being used for the US moves to stifle the DPRK." —"KCNA on Unjust Behavior of IAEA," Korean Central News Agency, 16 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency, 16 January 2003, in "North Korean Agency Blames Treaty Withdrawal on 'Menacing' Atomic Agency," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 16 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Chosonjungang T'ongshin Ronp'yong Kukchewonjaryokkiguui Pudanghan Ch'osa," Korean Central News Agency, 16 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

16 January 2003

A commentary appearing in *Rodong Sinmun*, the official newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, blames the United States for the current nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. According to the commentary, "the DPRK was compelled to withdraw from the NPT as a self-defense step taken after careful consideration to cope with the grave situation where its supreme interests are most seriously threatened by the US." The commentary continues, "The nuclear issue surfaced on the Korean Peninsula as the US has posed a nuclear threat to the DPRK for scores of years by massively deploying and stockpiling nukes in and around South Korea, pursuant to its hostile policy towards Pyongyang in line with its strategy to dominate the world." —"The US is Chiefly to Blame for the Worst Situation on the Korean Peninsula," *Rodong Sinmun*, 16 January 2003, in KCNA, 17 January 2003, in "Pyongyang Blames US for Situation on Korean Peninsula," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 17 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 January 2003

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei criticizes North Korea for practicing "nuclear blackmail". Speaking to reporters in Moscow, ElBaradei says, "The international community is ready to look favorably at North Korea's security concerns and economic needs, but not under nuclear blackmail." —"IAEA Chief Denounces North Korea's 'Nuclear Blackmail,'" Agence France Presse, 16 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 January 2003

Son Chun Yong, South Korea's ambassador to the UN, says that the North Korean nuclear crisis will eventually be resolved through dialogue, but he speculates that a peaceful resolution will take at least two years. Son claims that while both the US and North Korea are using strong rhetoric, both sides have stressed a desire to resolve the issue through dialogue. However, Son points out that the 1993 nuclear crisis required over a year and half before it was resolved, and since the current crisis involves nuclear, missile and biochemical weapons, "it will take at least two years for the issue to be resolved."

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—Yonhap News Agency, 17 January 2003, in "S. Korean UN Envoy Says 'At Least Two Years Needed' to Resolve Nuclear Issue," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 17 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 January 2003

US Ambassador to Japan Howard Baker meets with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, and the two agree that the United States, Japan and South Korea should cooperate in finding a peaceful solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis. According to Baker, the two discuss the nature of Pyongyang's intentions and try to anticipate what Pyongyang might do next.

—Kyodo News Service, 17 January 2003, in "Japan, USA Reaffirm Cooperation over North Korea," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 17 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 January 2003

US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage tells reporters that President George Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell "have spoken out that we have no hostile intentions to North Korea." However, Armitage states that the United States has no intention of concluding a nonaggression pact with North Korea since Congress would certainly fail to pass such an agreement. Armitage also says that the United States has no intention of changing Kim Jong Il's regime in North Korea.

—"U.S. Ready to Assure N. Korea of Nonaggression: Armitage," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 18 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Natalie Obiko Pearson, "Senior U.S. Official Says United States Willing to Grant North Korea Security Guarantee," Associated Press, 18 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 January 2003

North Korean Ambassador to China Ch'oi Chin Su tells reporters that the current nuclear standoff can be resolved through dialogue if the United States first pledges not to invade the North, recognizes North Korea's sovereignty, and does not impede the North's economic development.

—"N. Korea Sets Conditions for Ending Nuclear Standoff," Japan Economic Newswire, 18 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Pak Yong Ch'ae, "Puk, Haekp'ogi '3 Tae Chogon' Cheshi-Pulgach'im, Chaju'gwon Injong, Kyongjesang'e Paejedung," *Kyungyang Shinmun*, 20 January 2003, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

18 January 2003

A commentary appearing in the North Korean publication *Minju Joson* warns Japan not to support the United States' hostile policy toward North Korea.

—Korean Central News Agency, 18 January 2003, in "North Korea Urges Japan 'To Mind Its Own Business' in Pyongyang Nuclear Issue," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 18 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 January 2003

Choson Sinbo, a newspaper published by the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, reports that North Korea's Ministry of Power and Coal Industries is taking actions to resume nuclear activities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and to build additional nuclear facilities.

—Yonhap News Agency, 20 January 2003, in "North Korea Could Build More Nuclear Plants after Initial Success at

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Yongbyon," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Mun Song-hui, *Choson Sinbo*, 26 February 2003, in "Pro-DPRK Paper Says DPRK's 'Peaceful' Nuclear Developments Began in 1961," FBIS Document ID KPP20030227000123.

19 January 2003

US Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard says that if North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable way, the United States would consider economic cooperation with North Korea that goes beyond food aid.

—Yonhap News Agency, 19 January 2003, in "US Ambassador Says Economic Cooperation with N Korea Possible," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 19 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19-20 January 2003

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov meets with North Korean officials in Pyongyang and presents a "package plan" for resolving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Losyukov also reportedly meets with Kim Jong Il for six hours to deliver a message from Russian President Vladimir Putin and discuss the proposed "package plan." The "package plan" reportedly calls for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, security guarantees for North Korea and the resumption of economic aid in exchange for North Korea's abandoning its nuclear weapons program. [Note: Before and after the trip to Pyongyang, Losyukov stops in Beijing to discuss the trip with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Yang Wenchang.]

—Hans Greimel, "Russian Reportedly Submits Nuclear Settlement Plan to North Korea," Associated Press, 19 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Russian Special Envoy Says Talks with Kim Jong Il 'Substantive,'" Xinhua News Agency, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "DPRK Officials Continue Talks with Russian Envoy," Xinhua News Agency, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Russian Envoy to Pyongyang back in Beijing," Xinhua News Agency, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 January 2003

US Secretary of State Colin Powell meets in New York with Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, and the three agree that North Korea's nuclear program is an international problem and should be resolved accordingly. Later in the day, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Chu issues a statement condemning the United States for attempting to "internationalize" the issue and trying to get the UN involved. Kang says, "The DPRK and the US should sit face-to-face to solve the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula."

—William C. Mann, "Administration Tries to Widen Perspective on North Korea to an International Problem," Associated Press, 19 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Karl Malakunas, "North Korea Rejects International Efforts to End Nuclear Crisis," Agence France Presse, 19 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Konghwagukchongbu Russia Taet'ongryong T'uksarul Wihayo Yonhoe," Korean Central News Agency, 19 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "Special Envoy of Russian President Feted," Korean Central News Agency, 19 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

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19 January 2003

US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says that while the Bush administration is committed to resolving the nuclear standoff with North Korea peacefully, it has not ruled out the use of force if the crisis escalates.

—Charles Hoskinson, "Diplomacy for Now with NKorea, But Force Not Ruled Out: US," Agence France Presse, 19 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 January 2003

White House National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice says that the Bush administration has not ruled out any options in dealing with North Korea's nuclear program but remains committed to resolving the issue diplomatically. Rice also says that the nuclear crisis is an international issue, not a bilateral issue between the US and North Korea.

—Charles Hoskinson, "Diplomacy for Now with NKorea, But Force Not Ruled Out: US," Agence France Presse, 19 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 January 2003

US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly meets with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi in Tokyo to discuss issues related to North Korea. During the meeting, Kelly describes US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's proposal to offer a written non-aggression statement in exchange for a pledge from North Korea that it will end its nuclear weapons program. Kawaguchi expresses support for this new proposal and the two officials agree that Japan and the US will cooperate with South Korea, China and Russia to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis.

—"US Stance on North Korea Pleases Gov't," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Tokyo Wants in on Any US Deal with N. Korea," Asahi News Service, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Govt Backs US, Pyongyang Plan," *Daily Yomiuri*, 20 January 2003, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 January 2003

US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton meets with Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Wang Guangya in Beijing to discuss various issues related to strategic security, multilateral arms control and nonproliferation. The two reportedly discuss in depth how best to address North Korea's decision to withdraw from the NPT and its decision to reactivate nuclear facilities in Yongbyon-kun. After the meeting, Bolton tells reporters that the two did not discuss the possibility of imposing economic sanctions against North Korea. However, Bolton adds that he did not detect any opposition to bringing the issue of North Korea's nuclear program before the UN Security Council.

—"China, US Hold First Round of Vice-Foreign Ministerial Level Consultations," Xinhua News Agency, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US Pushes Hard for UN Involvement in N. Korea Nuclear Standoff," Channel NewsAsia, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Ted Anthony, "US Envoy: China Wouldn't Oppose Security Council Involvement in North Korea Issue," Associated Press, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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20 January 2003

Speaking before the UN Security Council, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan says that China is committed to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and a peaceful resolution of the current crisis. He states that China does not rule out any option for resolving the issue diplomatically, but he adds that China has learned from past experiences that direct dialogue between North Korea and the United States is key to resolving any crisis on the peninsula.

—"Chinese FM on Iraq, Korean Peninsula Nuclear Issues," Xinhua News Agency, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 January 2003

Pakistani Foreign Minister Khursheed Mehmood Kasuri denies that Pakistan has ever assisted North Korea in developing a nuclear program. Kasuri states that there has been no cooperation in the field of nuclear energy with North Korea either under current Pakistani President Musharraf or his predecessors.

—"Pakistani Minister Denies Nuclear Contacts Btw Pakistan, N Korea," ITAR-TASS, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 January 2003

The Korean Central News Agency calls the Bush administration's claim that it has no intention to invade North Korea "no more than a hypocritical farce to mislead the world public. The report warns that "the Bush administration is well advised to act with discretion, mindful that the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula can be settled only when the US provides security to the DPRK by law through the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty."

—"KCNA on Deceptive and Hypocritical Balderdash on Dialogue," Korean Central News Agency, 20 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

20 January 2003

A commentary read over Pyongyang Radio claims that withdrawing from the NPT was in the best interest of North Korea. The commentary also states that the United States is fully responsible for bringing the Korean Peninsula to the brink of war by designating North Korea as possible target for a preemptive nuclear strike.

—Central Broadcasting Station, (Pyongyang), 20 January 2003, in "North Korean Radio Commentary Calls on US Not to Criticize NPT Withdrawal," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 January 2003

Lee To Sop, North Korean consul-general in Hong Kong, tells the *Ming Pao Daily News* that North Korea will view economic sanctions as a declaration of war by the United States, and North Korea will react accordingly. Lee also claims that the current standoff over North Korea's nuclear program can only be resolved through bilateral US-North Korean negotiations, stating that "the role of mediators...is basically not important." He also adds that North Korea will not attack South Korea in order to fight against the United States.

—Yonhap News Agency, 20 January 2003, in "N. Korean Diplomat Downplays Role of Intermediaries in Resolving Nuclear Issue," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lee Kwang Hoe, "'Miwa Ssaugi Wihae Puk, Hangukkonggyok Anhae' Hong Kong Chujae Pukch'ongyongsa Palkyo," *Chosun Ilbo*, 21 January 2003, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

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20-22 January 2003

Carl Ford, US Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, travels unannounced to Seoul. Ford reportedly meets with President-elect Roh Moo Hyun, opposition leaders and members of the National Intelligence Service to discuss ways in which to resolve the crisis over North Korea's nuclear program.

—Yonhap News Agency, 23 January 2003, in "US State Department Intelligence Official Visits South Korea Unannounced," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 23 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Top US Official Paid Secret Visit to Seoul," Agence France Presse, 24 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 January 2003

Georgiy Mamedov, Russian deputy foreign minister, meets with Alexander Vershbow, US ambassador to Moscow, to discuss various issues, including the situation on the Korean Peninsula. After the meeting, the Russian Foreign Ministry issues a statement confirming that "despite considerable nuances in the approaches, the mutual efforts towards solving these issues in the spirit of the new Russian-American partnership prevail."

—Interfax News Agency, (Moscow), 20 January 2003, in "Russia, US Agree to Work Together on North Korean Nuclear Dispute," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21-23 January 2003

US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton meets with high ranking South Korean officials to discuss ways of resolving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Bolton meets with Foreign Minister Ch'oi Song Ho, Deputy Foreign Ministers Lee T'ae Shik and Defense Ministry officials in an attempt to coordinate US and South Korean policies concerning North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship diplomacy. On 21 January, Bolton tells members of the press that even though the United States is aiming to bring the issue of North Korea's nuclear program to the UN Security Council, "the issue of imposing sanctions against North Korea is a very different question." Following talks on 22 January, Bolton tells members of the press that the Agreed Framework had run its course and the United States was unlikely to attempt to re-implement it during the course of negotiations with North Korea.

—"South Korean Defense Minister Meets with US Official," Xinhua News Agency, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Bolton Arrives in Seoul Today to Discuss NK Nuke Issue," Korea Times, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US to Bring North Korea Crisis to Security Council," Deutsche Presse Agentur, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 21 January 2003, in "South Korean Defense Chief, US Official Discuss North's Nuclear Standoff," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Divided over Taking N. Korea Crisis To Security Council," Agence France Presse, 22 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Cho Sung Jin, "Panghan Bolton Migungmuch'a'gwan 'Mi, Taebuk Pulgach'im Pojang Kanung'," *Taehan Maeil*, 22 January 2003, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

21 January 2003

North Korea's *Rodong Sinmun*, the official newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, runs a commentary accusing the United States of giving rise to the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. According to the commentary, the

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United States has infringed on North Korea's sovereignty by listing it as a possible target for a preemptive nuclear strike. The commentary also claims that Washington's stated intention to resolve the issue through dialogue is merely a "deceptive act" since Washington first requires North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program, an "unfair" precondition, according to the commentary, to which Pyongyang is not willing to agree. The commentary concludes that the only way of resolving the crisis is for the United States to first provide legally binding security assurances.

—"Assuring Legal Security Assurances Is the Key to Resolving Nuclear Issue," *Nodong Sinmun*, 21 January 2003, in Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 21 January 2003, in "North Korea Radio Claims Non-Agression Treaty with US 'Key' to Nuclear Issue," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 January 2003

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan "strongly urges" North Korea to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the NPT. Speaking before the Conference on Disarmament, Annan says, "Recent challenges to the existing nonproliferation regimes, in particular the announcement by the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its withdrawal from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, raise serious concerns."

—"Kofi Annan Urges N. Korea to Reconsider NPT Withdrawal," Channel NewsAsia, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 January 2003

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue says that China remains open to any suggestions for maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, but "at the present stage...dialogue is the only effective way."

—"FM Spokeswoman: Dialogue Remains Effective Way to DPRK Nuclear Issue," Xinhua News Agency, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22-24 January 2003

North and South Korea hold the ninth round of inter-Korean ministerial talks in Seoul. The five-member North Korean delegation is headed by senior cabinet member Kim Yong Song, and the South Korean delegation is headed by Unification Minister Chong Se Hyon. In his keynote speech at the opening of the talks, Kim states that North Korea's nuclear program is only for generating electricity, and accuses the United States of politicizing the nuclear issue in an attempt to gain control over both North and South Korea. The South Korean delegation demands that North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons program and retract its decision to withdraw from the NPT, but according to delegation spokesman Lee Bong Jo, the South Korean delegation is disappointed that North Korea refuses to make any concrete commitments during the meeting. The two sides agree to continue cooperating in order to resolve peacefully the conflict over North Korea's nuclear program, and at the conclusion of the talks, they agree to meet again in April. [Note: The tenth round of talks is scheduled to take place from 7 to 10 April in Pyongyang, but since North Korea fails to confirm that it will participate in the talks and does not invite the South Korean delegation to Pyongyang, the talks are postponed until 27 April.]

—"DPRK's Ministerial Delegation Arrives in S. Korea," Xinhua News Agency, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Cho Kyung, "S. Korea Demands N. Korea End Nuclear Programs," Japan Economic

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Newswire, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Christopher Toricha, "North Korean Delegation Arrives in Seoul for High-Level Talks," Associated Press, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North and South Korea Agree on Peaceful Solution to Atomic Strife," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 23 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "South Korea Says Cabinet-Level Talks Stalled, Want Action from North," Agence France Presse, 23 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Cho Kyung, "Koreas Vow to Resolve Nuclear Standoff Peacefully," Japan Economic Newswire, 24 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; James Brooke, "Korean Talks Make Little Progress on Arms Issue," *New York Times*, 24 January 2003, p. A16, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "S. Korea Regrets N. Korea's Cancellation of Ministerial Talks," Japan Economic Newswire, 6 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 January 2003

US Secretary of State Colin Powell tells reporters that while "negotiating with North Korea is a very difficult, arduous process," there has been some progress in talks aimed at bringing North Korea into compliance with multilateral and bilateral nonproliferation agreements.

—"US Sees 'Progress' in North Korea Standoff," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 22 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Powell Says Progress Made on DPRK Nuclear Issue," Xinhua News Agency, 23 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 January 2003

In an interview published in *Choson Sinbo*, North Korean Minister of Power and Coal Industries Shin Yong Son claims that North Korea is just a few weeks away from reactivating its graphite moderated nuclear reactors. However, Sin reiterates that the reactors will only be used to generate electricity.

—"North Korea 'a Few Weeks' Away from Reactivating Nuclear Plant," Agence France Presse, 22 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "DPRK Will Re-Operate Nuclear Facilities within a Few Weeks to Produce Electricity," Interview with Sin Yong Song, Vice Minister of Power and Coal, *The People's Korea*, 30 January 2003, www.korea-np.co.jp; Choi Hup, "Puk, Idalmal Wonjaro Chaegadong/Choch'ongryon Kigwanji 'Yongbyonso Sujunae Chollyoksaengsan'," *Chosun Ilbo*, 23 January 2003, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

22 January 2003

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, denounces the IAEA, claiming that it "has been totally reduced to a shock brigade and a henchman executing the U.S. policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK."

—"IAEA Urged Not to Follow U.S. Anti-DPRK Policy," Korean Central News Agency, 22 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

23 January 2003

US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says that North Korea's nuclear program is a matter "of concern to the entire international community," and thus should be referred to the UN Security Council. Boucher says, "We do think the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors needs to report the issue to the Security Council. That's one of their responsibilities under their charter, and certainly the issue, as it affects international peace and security, is something the Security Council needs to have on its plate."

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—US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing by Spokesman Richard A. Boucher, 23 January 2003, www.state.gov.

23 January 2003

Russian President Vladimir Putin calls US President George W. Bush to brief him on Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Losyulov's recent diplomatic trip to Pyongyang. Putin tells Bush that based on Losyulov's visit he believes there is a good chance to resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula peacefully.

—Interfax News Agency, 23 January 2003, in "Putin, Bush Discuss Iraq, North Korea by Phone," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 23 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Putin Consults with Bush on DPRK, Iraq," Xinhua News Agency, 23 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 January 2003

Former US Secretary of Defense William Perry claims that North Korea has begun reprocessing 8,000 nuclear fuel rods that had been sealed and monitored under the 1994 Agreed Framework. Perry, speaking at the Brookings Institute, states that by reprocessing the fuel rods and pursuing a uranium enrichment program, North Korea poses an imminent threat to the United States. [Note: Other sources state that North Korea has made preparations for reprocessing the fuel rods but has not actually begun reprocessing.]

—"Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: Implications for US Policy in Northeast Asia," Speech by William Perry, Brookings Institute, 24 January 2003.

25 January 2003

A North Korean Foreign Ministry official says that North Korea will not address its nuclear program in any multilateral forum, insisting that the issue can only be resolved through bilateral talks with the United States.

—"DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on 'Multi-Party Talks,'" Korean Central News Agency, 25 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

25 January 2003

US Secretary of State Colin Powell announces that talks with North Korea will come "eventually," but he adds, "We will work out what the proper manner and form is." Speaking in Zurich, on his way to the World Economic Forum, Powell says, "There is a strong desire on the part of the North Koreans to talk directly to us." However, Powell adds, "We believe that the problem that exists in North Korea is not a US-DPRK problem. Other nations are involved."

—James Brooke, "North Koreans Still Demand Direct Talks with the US," *New York Times*, 26 January 2003, www.nytimes.com.

26 January 2003

US Secretary of State Colin Powell criticizes North Korea for violating the Agreed Framework pursuing a clandestine uranium enrichment program. However, speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Powell says that the United States has "no intention of attacking North Korea."

—"No US Intention to Attack North Korea, Powell Says," Deutsch Presse-Agentur, 26 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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27-29 January 2003

Im Tong Won [Lim Dong Won], special envoy of South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, travels to Pyongyang in an attempt to diffuse mounting tensions on the Korean Peninsula. North Korean officials reportedly tell Im that North Korea does not possess a uranium-enrichment program. [Note: North and South Korea had reportedly agreed that Im would meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, but after waiting for three days, North Korean officials inform Im that Kim will not be able to meet with him.]

—"NK Denies Running Uranium-Based Nuclear Weapons Program: Lim," *Chosun Ilbo*, 31 January 2003, www.nkchosun.com; "S. Korean Envoy Meets DPRK Official on Nuclear Crisis," Xinhua News Agency, 27 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Charles Whelan, "North Korea's Envoy Snub an 'Unacceptable Insult': S. Korean Press," *Agence France Presse*, 30 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Don Kirk, "Kim Jong Il Refuses to See Envoy from Seoul," *International Herald Tribune*, 30 January 2003, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 30 January 2003, in "Incoming South Korean Leader Has Asked North Korean Leader to Visit Seoul," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 30 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 January 2003

The *New Yorker* publishes a story by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh detailing the nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and North Korea. Citing a former high level Pakistani official, Hersh reports that by 1997 Pakistan had "no more money" to pay for North Korean missile imports. The former Pakistani official tells Hersh that in 1997 Pakistan began paying for North Korean missiles by providing "some of the know-how and the specifics" of a nuclear weapons program based on uranium enrichment. In addition to actual uranium enrichment technology, Pakistan reportedly helped North Korea conduct several "cold tests," simulated nuclear tests using natural uranium used to test the effectiveness of warhead designs. According to the former Pakistani official, Pakistan also provided North Korea with information on how to hide a uranium enrichment facility from international inspectors and foreign intelligence services. Hersh also quotes a US intelligence official who, referring to the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate's assessment of the source of North Korea's uranium enrichment program, says, "It points a clear finger at the Pakistanis. The technical stuff is crystal clear – not hedged and not ambivalent."

—Seymour M. Hersh, "The Cold Test: What the Administration Knew about Pakistan and the North Korean Nuclear Program," *New Yorker*, 27 January 2003, pp. 42-47.

27 January 2003

Delegates of the North and South Korean militaries meet in Panmunjom for working level talks. The two sides agree to provide military assurances to each other while making preparations for the construction of a temporary road which would traverse the demilitarized zone and connect North and South Korea.

—"S. Korean Envoy in Pyongyang; Inter-Korean Talks Agree on Passage of MDL," Xinhua News Service, 27 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 27 January 2003, in "Koreas Agree to Security Terms on Military Demarcation Line," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 27 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 January 2003

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement saying, "We oppose all attempts to internationalize the

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nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula and are authorized to state that we shall not take part in any 'multilateral talks,' whatever the format." The Foreign Ministry adds, "The only way to reach a peaceful and fair settlement of the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula is direct and equitable talks between North Korea and the US. No other options are possible."

—Interfax News Agency, 28 January 2003, in "North Korea Rejects Multilateral Talks," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 28 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; ITAR-TASS News Agency, 28 January 2003, in "North Korea's Moscow Embassy Rejects Multilateral Talks to Defuse Crisis," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 28 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 January 2003

US President George W. Bush delivers the annual State of the Union address, in which he claims that the United States will not be blackmailed by North Korea into giving concessions based upon the threat of developing nuclear weapons. President Bush says, "America is working with the countries of the region—South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia—to find a peaceful solution, and to show the North Korean government that nuclear weapons will bring only isolation, economic stagnation, and continued hardship." President Bush also labels the ruling regime in North Korea an "oppressive regime" that "rules a people living in fear and starvation." "The gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world," President Bush continues, "is outlaw regimes that seek to possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons."

—"President Delivers 'State of the Union,'" Office of Press Secretary, The White House, 28 January 2003, www.whitehouse.gov.

28 January 2003

The Korean Central News Agency reports that contrary to the wishes of the North Korean government, the situation on the Korean Peninsula has reached a level at which war may be inevitable. The KCNA report claims that the United States has begun making preparations for a preemptive attack.

—"Report of Korean Central News Agency," Korean Central News Agency, 28 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 January 2003

A commentary broadcasted on Pyongyang Radio condemns the Bush administration's recent calls for a peaceful resolution to the nuclear crisis as "a mere deceptive trick aimed at covering up its sinister war plot to invade our Republic and mislead the world's public opinion."

—Pyongyang Central Broadcasting Station, 29 January 2003, in "DPRK Commentary Says US U-2 Crash 'Due Mishap' for Raising DPRK Nuclear Issue," FBIS Document ID KPP20030129000102.

29 January 2003

A Korean Central News Agency commentary denounces the United States for adopting a policy of "tailored containment" toward North Korea, by which the United States hopes to "escalate the economic and political pressure to the extremes and push North Korea to collapse."

—"KCNA Blasts US 'Tailored Containment' Strategy," Korea Central News Agency, 29 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

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29 January 2003

Pakistani Minister of Information and Media Development Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed claims that Pakistan has never assisted North Korea in developing its nuclear program. Speaking to reporters in Qatar, Ahmed says, "We have our own scientists and technology and there are no relations whatsoever with North Korea in this regard." —"No Pak N-Deal with N Korea: Minister," *Gulf Times*, 30-31 January 2003, www.gulf-times.com.

30 January 2003

Chang Jun Shik, North Korea's ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament, says that North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) because of the United States' "hostile policy," and the 6 January "impartial and unilateral resolution adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which encroached upon our sovereignty and dignity." Jang also reiterates that North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT became effective on 11 January, one day after it was announced.

—Final Record of the Nine Hundred and Eighteenth Plenary Meeting of the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, CD/PV.918, 30 January 2003.

30 January 2003

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement condemning US President George W. Bush's State of the Union address as "an undisguised declaration of aggression to topple the DPRK system."

—"Bush Hit for Slandering DPRK," Korean Central News Agency, 30 January 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "DPRK Condemns Bush's State of Union Address," Xinhua News Agency, 31 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 January 2003

The EU Parliament adopts a resolution condemning North Korea for withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The resolution also condemns Pakistan for helping North Korea with uranium enrichment technology.

—Report from the Daily Notebook issued by the European Parliament on 30 January, in "EU Parliament Condemns North Korea's Withdrawal from Nonproliferation Treaty," FBIS Document ID EUP20030130000286.

31 January 2003

The *New York Times*, citing US intelligence officials, reports that US spy satellites have observed trucks transporting material from a nuclear storage facility, part of the Yongbyon nuclear complex. Intelligence officials suspect that the trucks, which have been observed for the past month, are transporting 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods to a reprocessing facility where they will be converted into weapons-grade plutonium. In this case, according to intelligence officials, North Korea could begin producing weapons-grade plutonium by March. In addition to the increased truck traffic around the storage facility, one defense official, without elaborating, says that the United States has detected other activities "you'd associate with an active weapons facility." Some US officials remain skeptical about the interpretation of the satellite imagery. "There's still a debate about exactly what we are seeing and how provocative it is," one senior official is quoted as saying. "The North Koreans made no real effort to hide this from us."

—David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, "Satellites Said to See Activity at North Korean Nuclear Site," *New York Times*,

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31 January 2003, www.nytimes.com; Timothy L. O'Brien and Erik Eckholm, "US Warns North Korea Not to Advance Nuclear Arms Program," *New York Times*, 31 January 2003, www.nytimes.com; Pauline Jelinek, "US Says Spy Satellites See Increased Activity at North Korea Nuclear Plant," Associated Press, 1 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 January 2003

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei says that North Korea could have a "significant" amount of weapons-grade nuclear material within six months. He also calls the recent discovery of increased activity around a storage facility in Yongbyon-kun "a matter of grave concern."

—Timothy L. O'Brien and Erik Eckholm, "US Warns North Korea Not to Advance Nuclear Arms Program," *New York Times*, 31 January 2003, www.nytimes.com.

31 January 2003

Ch'oi Chin Su, North Korea's ambassador to China, announces that the only way to resolve the growing nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula is through bilateral negotiations between the US and North Korea. Ch'oi says, "If the United States will sign a nonaggression treaty that will have binding force after being ratified by Congress, North Korea has a willingness to prove that it is not producing nuclear weapons." Ch'oi disregards the assertion by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly that during his October 2002 visit to Pyongyang North Korean officials admitted to pursuing a nuclear weapons program based on enriched uranium. According to Ch'oi, the assertion is merely "a sinister plot invented by the extreme warmongers in the United States." The ambassador adds that Kelly had taken "an arrogant attitude during his visit to our country, groundlessly urging us to admit" to the clandestine program. Thus, according to Ch'oi, "we took the attitude of neither denying it nor confirming it."

—Timothy L. O'Brien and Erik Eckholm, "US Warns North Korea Not to Advance Nuclear Arms Program," *New York Times*, 31 January 2003, www.nytimes.com.

February 2003

A former North Korean spy, Kinki Aoyama (pseudonym), tells the Japanese government that North Korea has nuclear weapons and has an "information sharing alliance" with Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. Aoyama claims that he learned of the nuclear weapons program and the cooperation with Pakistan, Iran and Iraq while he was an industrial spy in China during the 1990's.

—"Japanese-Born Former Spy Says Pyongyang Has Nuclear Weapons," Channel NewsAsia, 5 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Early February 2003

According to South Korean and Japanese government officials, KEDO executive board members unofficially agree to slow down the project to construct two light-water reactors in North Korea by postponing the purchase of equipment necessary in order to proceed with the construction. The executive board, consisting of the United States, Japan, South Korea and the European Union, also reportedly agreed to halt air services between South Korea and the construction site in North Korea, and freeze a training program for North Korean engineers in South Korea.

—Kyodo News Service, 28 February 2003, in "KEDO to Delay Nuclear Reactor Project in N. Korea," FBIS Document

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ID JPP20030228000194; Yonhap News Agency, 1 March 2003, in "KEDO Members Said to Agree on 'Provisional Measure' to Delay Reactor," FBIS Document ID KPP20030301000009; So Hyon-chin, "KEDO Project Hits Snag," *Korea Herald*, 3 March 2003, in "ROKG Official Denies Delayed KEDO Project 'Deliberate Measure' to Slow Pace," FBIS Document ID KPP20030302000045.

1 February 2003

The *Washington Post* reports that in November 2001 intelligence analysts at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory sent a classified report to President George W. Bush in which they determined that North Korea had begun constructing a uranium enrichment facility. The *Washington Post* also quotes a "senior US official" as saying that Pakistan provided some of the new intelligence on North Korea after the United States dropped economic sanctions against Pakistan.

—Walter Pincus, "N. Korea's Nuclear Plans Were No Secret: US Stayed Quiet as It Built Support on Iraq," *Washington Post*, 1 February 2003, p. A1.

2-9 February 2003

Chung Tae Chol, South Korean President-elect Roh Moo Hyun's special envoy, travels to the United States and Japan to meet with top government officials and convey President-Elect Roh's intention to resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula peacefully, as well as strengthen the US-South Korean alliance and South Korean-Japanese relationship. During 3-5 February, Chung is in Washington D.C. and meets with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell. While meeting with Rumsfeld, Chung reportedly conveys President-elect Roh's desire to make the South Korean-US alliance a "true partnership." While meeting with Vice President Dick Cheney, Chung and Cheney agreed to establish a bilateral forum in which the United States and South Korea could discuss important issues of mutual concern such as North Korean nuclear program. While in Tokyo, Chung meets with Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and the two agree to remain committed to resolving issues related to North Korea's nuclear program peacefully.

—Yonhap News Agency, 2 February 2003, in "South Korean President-Elect's Envoy to Deliver Letter to Bush on North's Issue," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 2 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Ken Guggenheim, "Envoy of South Korean President-Elect Meets with Top U.S. Officials," Associated Press, 4 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, 7 February 2003, in "Japan, South Korean Envoy to Urge North to Scrap Nuclear Programme," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "S. Korea, US to Set Up New Body to Discuss N. Korea Policies," Japan Economic Newswire, 10 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 February 2003

US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld orders twelve B-52 and twelve B-1 bombers on alert for possible deployment from bases in the United States to Guam. [Note: A few days earlier, Admiral Thomas Fargo, commander of US forces in the Pacific, reportedly requested additional air and naval forces as a deterrent against North Korea as the crisis over North Korea's nuclear program escalates. The bombers are deployed in early March and arrive in Guam on 6 March.]

—Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger, "US Bombers on Alert to Deploy as Warning to the North Koreans," *New York Times*, 4 February 2003, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David A. Sanger and Eric Schmitt,

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"Admiral Seeks Deterrent Force in Korea Crisis," *New York Times*, 1 February 2003, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, "US Sending 2 Dozen Bombers in Easy Range of North Koreans," *New York Times*, 5 March 2003, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Sang Hun Choe, "US Heavy Bombers Arrive in Guam to Deter Hostility in West Pacific," Associated Press, 6 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 February 2003

The Korean Central News Agency claims that the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula cannot be settled unless the United States accepts North Korea's demands for "direct and equal negotiations and the conclusion of a nonaggression treaty."

—"US Hit for False Information," Korean Central News Agency, 3 February 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

3 February 2003

The US State Department releases its proposed budget for fiscal year 2004 and does not earmark any funds for the administrative costs of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) or heavy-fuel oil shipments to North Korea. [Note: The State Department earmarked \$3.5 million for KEDO administrative costs in fiscal year 2003.]

— US Department of State, Special Briefing on 2004 Request for International Affairs Budget, Christopher B. Burnham, Assistant Secretary of State for Resource Management; Joseph W. Bowab, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Assistance Programs and Budget; and Sharon A. Nell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for State Programs, Operations and Budget, 3 February 2003, www.state.gov; "US Not to Fund KEDO Administration Costs," Japan Economic Newswire, 3 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 February 2003

US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Bush administration is committed to resolving the nuclear standoff with North Korea peacefully. Armitage also says that even though the administration will consider all options in dealing with matters of national security, the situation with North Korea dictates that diplomacy is the best option "at this time." When committee chairman Richard Lugar urges the administration to begin direct talks with North Korea, Armitage replies, "Of course we are going to have direct talks with the North Koreans—there is no question about that."

—Prepared Statement of Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage, WMD Developments on the Korean Peninsula, Hearing of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 108th Congress, 1st session, 4 February 2003; "US Will Talk Directly to DPRK: Senior US Official," Xinhua News Agency, 4 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Ken Guggenheim, "Envoy of South Korean President-Elect Meets with Top US Officials," Associated Press, 4 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 February 2003

Following a hearing of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld tells reporters that the United States has assessed that North Korea possesses one or two nuclear weapons, and, given the rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea might soon declare itself a nuclear power.

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—"N. Korea May Become Declared Nuke State, Rumsfeld Says," Japan Economic Newswire, 5 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 February 2003

The Korean Central News Agency quotes a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying, "The DPRK is now putting the operation of its nuclear facilities for the production of electricity on a normal footing after their restart." The spokesman adds that the nuclear program would be limited to peaceful uses "at the present stage." [Note: The North Korean Foreign Ministry later denies that North Korea has restarted its nuclear facilities, claiming that the Western media misinterpreted its 5 February statement.]

—"US Anti-DPRK International Pressure Campaign Assailed," Korean Central News Agency, 5 February 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "North Korea Has No Nuclear Arms But Can Make Some – Russian Scientists," ITAR-TASS, 6 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 February 2003

Lee Pyong Gap, a deputy director in the North Korean Foreign Ministry, tells the British daily *Guardian* that North Korea reserves the right to launch a preemptive attack on US forces stationed in South Korea. However, Lee also urges the British to encourage the US to hold direct talks with North Korea.

—Richard Tomkins, "US Has 'Robust Plans' if N. Korea Attacks," United Press International, 6 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jonathan Watts, "Pyongyang Asserts Right to Pre-emptive Attack Tensions Rise Over American Build-up," *The Guardian*, 6 February 2003, www.guardian.co.uk; US White House, Daily Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, 6 February 2003, www.whitehouse.gov.

6 February 2003

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, claims that a US preemptive attack on its nuclear facilities would trigger "all-out war." A commentary published in the paper and broadcasted on Pyongyang Radio states, "It is foolish for the US to think that we sit idle with folded arms to wait until it gives orders for a forestalling attack to be started. We will answer a forestalling attack with a powerful counterattack and all-out war with all-out war."

—"Prelude to Provocation of War of Aggression," *Rodong Sinmun*, in Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 6 February 2003, in "North Korean Daily Warns 'Secret' US Plan to Destroy Nuclear Facilities," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 6 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 February 2003

US Secretary of State Colin Powell, speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, says that while the United States is committed to resolving the issue of North Korea's nuclear program peacefully, the US is "still looking for the right formula" to provide North Korea with the security guarantees they are demanding. However, Powell says that the United States is "not going to just say you've got these guarantees and then hope they will satisfy our concerns and the world's concerns about what they have been doing with respect to plutonium activities and uranium enrichment." Powell reiterates that the best way to resolve the issue is through a multilateral framework that consists of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council as well as Australia, the European Union, Japan, South Korea and North Korea. Powell also tells the committee that the Bush

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administration has not taken any options off the table in dealing with North Korea.

—"US Mulling 'Right Formula' for N. Korea Nuke: Powell," Japan Economic Newswire, 6 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Powell Fields Questions from Senate Foreign Relations Committee," Channel NewsAsia, 7 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 February 2003

US President George W. Bush claims that the United States is committed to resolving the nuclear crisis with North Korea diplomatically, but adds that "all options are on the table," inferring that the United States has not ruled out military force or economic sanctions.

—"Bush: 'All Options' Available in Resolving N. Korea Standoff," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US President Says 'All Options' on Table to Deal with DPRK," Xinhua News Agency, 7 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jennifer Loven, "President Bush Says 'All Options on the Table' to Deal with North Korea," Associated Press, 7 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 February 2003

The Korean Central News Agency claims that the United States is attempting to avoid its responsibility of resolving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula by insisting on multilateral talks. KCNA also claims that the current nuclear crisis on the peninsula is a result of the United States' hostile policy toward North Korea.

—"KCNA Urges US to Respond to Direct Talks with DPRK," Korean Central News Agency, 7 February 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

7 February 2003

A commentary appearing in the *Rodong Sinmun*, official newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, claims that the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's decision to place 24 bombers on standby for redeployment to Guam proves that the United States is not interested in resolving the nuclear crisis peacefully. The commentary says, "This situation compels the DPRK to take due precaution and a counter-measure."

—Korean Central News Agency, 7 February 2003, in "North Korean Agency Says US 'Dangerous' Build-Up 'Blatant Challenge,'" BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 February 2003

The *Joongang Ilbo* reports that US reconnaissance satellites have detected steam billowing from North Korea's 5MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon-kun, indicating that the reactor has been reactivated on what US and South Korean officials believe to be a test basis. Another Seoul official, who said he was not familiar with the imagery, said the reactor could have been put into operation because the loading of the 8,000 fuel rods is probably complete. He added, however, that because the plant has been idle since 1994, it is probably not operating at full capacity.

—"N. Korea's Reactor May Reach Full Operation after Mid-Feb.," Japan Economic Newswire, 7 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Oh Young Hwan, "North May Have Started Its Reactor, Officials Say," *Joongang Ilbo*, 7 February 2003, <http://joongangdaily.joins.com>.

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8 February 2003

A *Rodong Sinmun* commentary states that North Korea will never participate in multilateral talks to resolve issues related to its nuclear program.

—Pyongyang Broadcasting Station, 8 February 2003, in "North Korean Party Paper Rejects US Call for Multilateral Talks," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 8 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8-11 February 2003

Indonesian presidential envoy Nana Sutresna travels to Pyongyang in order to convey to North Korean officials that Indonesia is opposed to North Korea's nuclear weapons program and wants to help resolve the issue peacefully. North Korean officials reportedly reply that its nuclear program is an issue to be discussed only between the United States and North Korea.

—Shin Yong Bae, "NK Insists on Direct US Talks," *Korea Herald*, 14 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 February 2003

South Korean Prime Minister Kim Sok Su says that he does not believe that North Korea has nuclear weapons.

— Lee Jong Heon, "S. Korea, US to Consult on N. Korea," United Press International, 10 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Christopher Torchia, "South Korea's Prime Minister Says He Doubts North Korea Has Nuclear Weapons," Associated Press, 10 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10-12 February 2003

Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, travels to Seoul and meets with high ranking South Korean government officials, including President Kim Dae Jung and President-elect Roh Moo Hyun, to discuss ways to resolve issues related to North Korea's nuclear program peacefully. Solana says that the EU remains committed to resolving the crisis through dialogue and plans to send a high level delegation to Pyongyang to help defuse the growing tension on the Korean Peninsula. Speaking at a press conference in Seoul following the meetings, Solana says that economic sanctions against North Korea would be counterproductive and serve only to inflame the already high tensions.

—"S. Korean President Meets Visiting EU Senior Official," Xinhua News Agency, 11 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Solana Reconfirms EU Plan to Send Delegation to N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 11 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jong Heon Lee, "EU Seeks to Resolve N. Korea Nuke Crisis," United Press International, 12 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 February 2003

In testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, CIA Director George Tenet says, "Kim Jong Il's attempts this past year to parlay the North's nuclear weapons program into political leverage suggest he is trying to negotiate a fundamentally different relationship with Washington—one that implicitly tolerates the North's nuclear weapons program." Tenet also states that profits from missile exports are necessary for North Korea to continue funding its missile, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs.

—"The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World," Prepared Statement by Director of

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Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States*, 108th Congress, 1st session, 11 February 2003.

11 February 2003

Chung Tae Chol, a South Korean politician and recently returned envoy to the United States of President Kim Dae Jung, says that intelligence authorities believe North Korea possesses three plutonium based nuclear weapons. —Yonhap News Agency, 11 February 2003, in "South Korean Lawmaker Says North Believed to Have up to Three Nuclear Bombs," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 11 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11-14 February 2003

Representatives from North and South Korea meet for the fourth round of inter-Korean economic talks. During the talks the South Korean delegation stresses that economic cooperation between the two countries is hindered mainly by suspicions of a North Korean nuclear weapons program. The North Korean delegation refuses to comment on its nuclear program, stating only that it is a matter to be resolved through direct talks with the United States.

—"Inter-Korea Talks End without Date for Cross-Border Rail," Japan Economic Newswire, 13 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Pyongyang Sidesteps Nuclear Issue at Inter-Korean Economic Talks," *Korea Times*, 13 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 February 2003

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CIA Director George Tenet states that North Korea "probably" has one or two plutonium-based nuclear warhead. When asked by Senator Evan Bayh (D-IN) if North Korea currently possesses the capability of striking the West Coast of the United States with a ballistic missile, Tenet replies, "I think the declassified answer is yes, they can do that." When asked to clarify whether or not North Korea currently has the capability to couple a nuclear warhead to an ICBM, Tenet says that he will address the issue in the closed session.

—US Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Threats to U.S. National Security: Hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services*, 108th Congress, 1st session, 12 February 2003.

12 February 2003

The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution finding North Korea "in further non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement." Noting North Korea's continuing non-compliance and the IAEA's inability to verify that North Korea has not diverted nuclear material to a nuclear weapons program, the Board of Governors decides to report the issue to the UN Security Council.

—"IAEA Board of Governors Adopts Resolution on Safeguards in North Korea," International Atomic Energy Agency, Media Advisory 203/48, 12 February 2003, www.iaea.org; Report by the Director General on the Resolution Adopted by the Board on 6 January 2003 and of the Agreement between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2003/3, 22 January 2003.

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13 February 2003

US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly tells the House International Relations Committee that North Korea's nuclear weapons program may prompt Japan to pursue a nuclear weapons program.

—"N. Korea Nuke to Affect Japan Nonnuclear Policy: US Official," Japan Economic Newswire, 13 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 February 2003

US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, says that North Korea poses a larger threat as a proliferator of nuclear weapons than as an aggressor in Northeast Asia. Rumsfeld also says that the United States is working with South Korea to redeploy US forces further south on the peninsula away from Seoul and the demilitarized zone. Rumsfeld says that he would like to see US forces "more oriented toward an air hub and a sea hub with the ability to reinforce so that there is still a strong deterrent, and possibly with our improved capabilities of moving people, some of those forces come back home."

—Barry Schweid, "Powell: North Korea Rejects US Proposal for Regional Talks on Nukes," Associated Press, 13 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Bradley Graham, "US May Shift Troops in Korea," *Washington Post*, 14 February 2003, p. A20, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 February 2003

US Secretary of State Colin Powell tells the House Budget Committee that US-North Korean bilateral talks are not an acceptable way to address issues related to North Korea's nuclear program, saying that North Korea poses such a threat to neighboring countries, such as China, Japan, Russia and South Korea, that a multilateral talks, incorporating all concerned states, is the only option.

—Barry Schweid, "Powell: North Korea Rejects US Proposal for Regional Talks on Nukes," Associated Press, 13 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 February 2003

South Korean Prime Minister Kim Sok Su tells the National Assembly that North Korea has extracted enough plutonium to make two nuclear weapons, but Kim adds that the South Korean National Intelligence Service cannot confirm whether or not North Korea has actually succeeded in construction nuclear weapons.

—Shin Yong Bae, "Seoul Claims No Knowledge of Nuclear Bombs in North," *Korea Herald*, 13 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 February 2003

North Korean ambassador to the UN Pak Kil Yon says the only way to resolve the current standoff over North Korea's nuclear program is for the United States to sign a nonaggression pact. Claiming that North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT was a self-defensive maneuver, Pak says, "It is a big mistake if the United States thinks North Korea will sit idle while the United States is recklessly moving to overthrow the North Korean regime."

—Yonhap News Agency, 14 February 2003, in "Pyongyang to Resist US 'Overthrow' Attempt – North Korean Envoy," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 14 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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13 February 2003

Delegates from the United States and North Korea hold unofficial talks in Berlin on ways to resolve the standoff over North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program. Official representatives from the United States and North Korea do not participate in the talks, but the experts on each side reportedly have close ties to their respective governments. At the 10 hour meeting, the North Korean delegation reportedly asked the US experts about the specifics of how the US government planned to verify the dismantlement of North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program.

—"N. Korea, US Held Private Talks in Berlin over Nuclear Issue," Japan Economic Newswire, 5 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 February 2003

The Korean Central News Agency condemns the IAEA for referring the issue of North Korea's nuclear program to the UN Security Council. KCNA states that since North Korea officially withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on 11 January, the IAEA, which it denounces as merely a tool of the United States, has no authority to discuss North Korea's nuclear program.

—"KCNA Blasts IAEA's Irresponsible Decision," Korean Central News Agency, 14 February 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

Mid February 2003

Kim Tae Ho, a North Korean defector who reportedly worked at North Korean nuclear facilities from 1985 to 1992, tells Japanese media that, in preparation for a special IAEA inspection in 1992, North Korea concealed the full amount of nuclear activities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex by using lead boards to eliminate radiation traces emanating from secret underground levels dedicated to a nuclear weapons program. Kim also reports second hand that missile base located in Musudan-ri was constructed at that location to launch nuclear missiles at US forces stationed in Japan in the event of a war with the United States. [Note: In early 2003, Kim, who reportedly worked at the April Enterprise in the Yongbyon nuclear complex and the Namch'on Chemical Complex in North Hwanghae Province, published a book in Japan entitled, *The Truth about the North Korea Nuclear Plants That I Saw*, in which he details his eight years working for North Korea's nuclear industry.]

—*Tokyo Seiron*, 3 April 2003, pp. 88-95, in "Ex-DPRK Nuclear Plant Worker on Facilities in Yongbyon, P'yongsan," FBIS Document ID JPP20030313000011; *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 16 February 2003, p. 7, in "Japan: DPRK Defector Says Yongbyon Facility Ready to Resume Operations Any Time," FBIS Document ID JPP20030218000028; *Tokyo Shimbun*, 19 February 2003, p. 5, in "Defector Interviewed on Poor Safety Management at DPRK Nuclear Facilities," FBIS Document ID JPP20030220000051; Kim Tae Ho, *Watashi ga Mita Kitachosen no Kakukojo no Shinjitsu*, (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 2003); Yoshijharu Fujiwara, "'Scoop Information' – Nuclear Triggering Device Completed in 1990," *Yomiuri Weekly*, 16 March 2003, in "Japanese Defense Official Says DPRK Completed Nuclear Triggering Device in 1990," FBIS Document ID JPP20030304000056.

16 February 2003

White House National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice says that the United States will not hold bilateral negotiations with North Korea over its suspected nuclear weapons program. Speaking on "Fox News Sunday," Rice says, "I know that the North Koreans would like nothing better than this to become a bilateral problem between the United States and North Korea." However, Rice says, "We cannot allow the North Koreans to step back into a

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bilateral discussion with the United States."

—"US Not to Hold Bilateral Talks with DPRK: Rice," Xinhua News Agency, 16 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Transcript: Condoleezza Rice on Fox News Sunday," 16 February 2003, www.foxnews.com.

16 February 2003

In an interview with the *Sunday Telegraph*, Kim Chae Rok, North Korean government official, says that North Korea is planning to construct four new nuclear power plants to meet the energy needs of the country. Kim says that the new nuclear power plants will be able to produce up to 200MW of power.

—Mike Thomas, "North Korea to Build Four More Nuclear Reactors," *Sunday Telegraph*, 16 February 2003, www.sundaytelegraph.com.

17 February 2003

The *New York Times*, citing senior US government officials, reports that the United States is developing a plan to impose sanctions on North Korea aimed at encouraging North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program and halt its export of weapons of mass destruction, including ballistic missiles.

—James Dao, "US Planning Sanctions against North Korea," *New York Times*, 17 February 2003, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 February 2003

A spokesman for the Korean People's Army (KPA) declares that North Korea will abandon the 1953 Armistice Agreement that ended the Korean War if the United States imposes economic sanctions or sets up a naval blockade, actions which North Korea would view as acts of war.[Note: On 26 March, the KPA sends a message to the United Nations Command (UNC) stating that North Korea would no longer send delegates to meet with US and UN officers for routine meetings at the liaisons office in the truce village of Panmunjom. In the official message delivered to UNC Deputy Chief of Staff Major General James Soligan, the KPA reiterates its claim that economic sanctions or a naval blockade would be viewed as an act of war and North Korea would react accordingly.]

—"Spokesman for Panmunjom Mission of KPA Issues Statement," Korean Central News Agency, 18 February 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

19 February 2003

The UN Security Council considers the issue of North Korea's nuclear program for ten minutes and then decides to refer the issue to a group of experts before discussing it further.

—"Security Council Sends N. Korea Nuke Issue to Experts," Japan Economic Newswire, 19 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 February 2003

Shin Kon, chief of South Korea's National Intelligence Service, tells the National Assembly's Intelligence Committee that although North Korea has prepared to reactivate its 5MW(e) reactor located in the Yongbyon nuclear complex, the reactor has not yet been reactivated.

—Yonhap News Agency, 19 February 2003, in "North Korea Shows 'No Sign' of Restarting Nuclear Plant – Seoul

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Intelligence," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Has Yet to Fire up Nuclear Reactor: South Korean Spy Agency," Agence France Presse, 20 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 February 2003

A *Rodong Sinmun* commentary claims that the United States' talk about resolving the dispute over North Korea's nuclear program peacefully is "nothing but a deceptive trick to mentally disarm us and guarantee a pre-emptive strike." The commentary warns the United States that if it continues on its current path of aggravating North Korea, it will lead to a "disastrous explosion."

—Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 19 February 2003, in "NKorea: Paper Warns USA of 'Disastrous Explosion' over Nuclear Issue," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 February 2003

A North Korean MiG-19 fighter jet crosses the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea and temporarily flies about 13km into South Korean airspace. The incursion lasted only two minutes, as the North Korean jet retreated to North Korean airspace after several South Korean jets were scrambled to intercept it. South Korean Defense Ministry spokesman Brigadier General Hwang Yong Su states that the incursion, the first North Korean penetration of South Korean airspace since 1983, could have resulted in "very serious consequences in the current situation on the Korean Peninsula. [Note: North Korea has repeatedly stated that it does not recognize the NLL, thus instigating several naval clashes in South Korean waters, including a confrontation in June 2002 that resulted in the deaths of six South Korean sailors and an unknown number of North Korean sailors.]

—Sang Hun Choe, "North Korean Fighter Jet Crosses Border with South Korea, Returns without Incident," Associated Press, 20 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 20 February 2003, in "N. Korean Jet 'Provocation' Possibly Related to Armistice Agreement Threat," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 20 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 21 February 2003, in "UN Command Probes Possible North Korean Armistice Breach with Jet Incursion" BBC Monitoring International Reports, 21 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Don Kirk, "North Korean MiG Swoops off Coast of South Korea," *International Herald Tribune*, 21 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 February 2003

The Korean Central News Agency warns that "the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia is so alarming that a nuclear war may break out any moment."

—"KCNA on US Hostile Policy toward DPRK," Korean Central News Agency, 20 February 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

20 February 2003

Ra Jong Il, Senior Advisor for National Security to South Korean President-Elect Roh Moo Hyun, meets with Chon Kum Ch'ol, vice chairman of North Korea's Korean Asia-Pacific Peace Committee. Ra reportedly initiated the contact in Beijing to propose an inter-Korean summit soon after Roh takes office.

—Oh Young Hwan and Lee Young Jong, "Roh Aide Met North Envoy in China," *JoongAng Daily*, 5 March 2005.

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22 to 25 February 2003

US Secretary of State Colin Powell travels to Japan, China and South Korea on a diplomatic mission to coordinate policies with the East Asian nations regarding Iraq and North Korea. After meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi on 22 February, Powell says that both agreed that talks to resolve North Korea's nuclear issue should be held in a "multilateral forum." On 23 February, Powell meets with Chinese President Jiang Zemin and his successor Hu Jintao in Beijing, and according to Powell, the two Chinese leaders insist that the North Korean issue should be resolved through bilateral talks between Washington and Pyongyang. Powell then travels to South Korea on 24 February to attend the inauguration of President Roh Moo Hyun, who reportedly tells Powell that Seoul supports resolving the issue of North Korea's nuclear program in a multilateral setting.

—US Secretary of State Colin Powell, Press Conference from Tokyo, 23 February 2003, US Department of State, www.state.gov; US Secretary of State Colin Powell, Press Conference from Seoul, 25 February 2003, US Department of State, www.state.gov; US Secretary of State Colin Powell, Press Conference from Beijing, 24 February 2003, US Department of State, www.state.gov; US Secretary of State Colin Powell, Press Briefing on Board Plane en Route Elmendorf Air Force Base, 25 February 2003, US Department of State, www.state.gov; "North Korea Said to Restart Key Nuclear Reactor: US's Powell Consults Asian Nations," *Facts on File World News Digest*, 26 February 2003, p. 119D1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 February 2003

US Secretary of State Colin Powell announces that the United States will send 100,000 metric tons of food aid to North Korea in 2003 beginning with an initial delivery of 40,000 metric tons. [Note: The United States did not send any food aid to North Korea for the first two months of 2003, but Secretary of State Colin Powell claims that the suspension was merely due to congressional delays, not in order to exert pressure on North Korea.]

—US Secretary of State Colin Powell, Press Conference from Seoul, 25 February 2003, US Department of State, www.state.gov; "North Korea Said to Restart Key Nuclear Reactor: US's Powell Consults Asian Nations," *Facts on File World News Digest*, 26 February 2003, p. 119D1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 February 2003

Addressing the 13th Conference of Heads of State of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Kim Yong Nam, president of the Presidium of North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly, says that North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was a self defensive measure and North Korea's "nuclear activities at this stage would be confined only to peaceful purposes such as the production of electricity."

—"DPRK Leader Defends Policy on Nuclear Issue," Xinhua News Agency, 25 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lawrence Bartlett, "North Korea Warns over Nuclear Missiles at NAM Summit," Agence France Presse, 25 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 25 February 2003, in "North Korean Envoy's Speech at Non-Aligned Summit in Malaysia," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 26 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 February 2003

US reconnaissance satellites detect suspicious plumes of smoke emitting from North Korea's 5MW(e) reactor located in the Yongbyon nuclear complex, prompting US intelligence officials on 26 February to announce that

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North Korea has reactivated the nuclear reactor. [Note: Pursuant to the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to freeze operations at several nuclear facilities, including the 5MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon-kun. Therefore, by reactivating the reactor, North Korea directly violated the agreement.]

—David A. Sanger, "Reactor Started in North Korea, US Concludes," *New York Times*, 27 February 2003, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; George Gedda, "US Says North Korea Has Reactivated Nuclear Reactor," Associated Press, 26 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Said to Restart Key Nuclear Reactor: US's Powell Consults Asian Nations," *Facts on File World News Digest*, 26 February 2003, p. 119D1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 27 February 2003, in "ROKG Allegedly Concedes Having 'Information' in DPRK's Reactor Reactivation," FBIS Document ID KPP20030227000079.

Late February 2003

The Chinese government closes an oil pipeline to North Korea for three days, reportedly as a warning to Pyongyang not to provoke the United States and escalate the crisis over North Korea's nuclear program.

—John Pomfret, "China Urges N. Korea Dialogue: Beijing Sees Risk of Losing Influence in Area Vital to Security," *Washington Post*, 4 April 2003, p. 16.

28 February 2003

A South Korean government official tells the Yonhap News Agency that the South Korean government, after studying intelligence provided by the United States, has confirmed that North Korea has reactivated the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor located in the Yongbyon nuclear complex. In 1994, North Korea agreed to freeze operations at the reactor as part of the Agreed Framework. Yet despite North Korea's latest violation of the agreement, the government officials says, South Korea will not halt construction of two light-water nuclear reactors being constructed in Kumho-chigu [Shinp'o], North Korea as part of the Agreed Framework.

—"South Korea Confirms Restart of North Reactor, Expresses 'Strong Regret,'" Yonhap News Agency, 28 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Seo Hyun Jin, "Seoul Regrets News of Reactivation," *Korea Herald*, 28 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 February 2003

South Korea's Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry issues a statement expressing "deep concern and regret" that North Korea decided to reactivate the reactor. In the statement, the ministry also "urge(s) North Korea to comply with our efforts, as well as those of the international community to find a peaceful resolution to the nuclear problem."

—"South Korea Confirms Restart of North Reactor, Expresses 'Strong Regret,'" Yonhap News Agency, 28 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Seo Hyun Jin, "Seoul Regrets News of Reactivation," *Korea Herald*, 28 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 February 2003

The *Los Angeles Times* quotes a US government source as saying that North Korea has been conducting activities at a plutonium reprocessing plant located in the Yongbyon nuclear complex. [Note: The "activities" referred to by the anonymous source could be a reference to the deliveries of coal and plumes of smoke emitting from the boiler detected by US and Japanese intelligence in January. The boiler, adjacent to the reprocessing facility, is used to

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maintain the temperature of the nitric acid solution used in plutonium reprocessing.]

—Sonni Efron, "Activity Seen at N. Korean Nuclear Plant: US Observers Are Unsure Whether Pyongyang Has Begun Reprocessing Plutonium that Could Be Used to Make Bombs," *Los Angeles Times*, 1 March 2003.

March to May 2003

According to an 11 June *Sankei Shimbun* report that cites "an informed source on Korean Peninsula issues," Iranian nuclear specialists visit North Korea three times from March to May. According to the "informed source," a delegation of Iranian officials from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran visit North Korea on 1 March for several days, and subsequently return to North Korea in April and May. The Iranian delegations reportedly seek advice from North Korean officials on how to manage IAEA inspections of a suspected nuclear weapons program.

—*Sankei Shimbun*, 11 June 2003, in "Sankei Reports Iranian Nuclear Experts Secretly Visited DPRK Thrice in 2003," FBIS Document ID JPP20030611000016.

Early March 2003

According to Japanese government sources, North Korean and Japanese government officials hold several informal telephone conversations during which the North Korean officials indicate that Pyongyang would be willing to participate in multilateral talks to resolve issues related to its nuclear program, backing off from its earlier demand that only bilateral talks with the United States would resolve the crisis.

—Kyodo News Service, 11 April 2003, in "N. Korea Easing Stance for Multilateral Talks," FBIS Document ID JPP20030411000162.

2 March 2003

North Korean radio broadcasts a commentary stating, "Should war break out on the Korean Peninsula due to the US imperialists, it will escalate into a nuclear war." The commentary continues, "Then, not only the Korean people in the North and South but the people in Asia and many countries around the world will suffer from a frightful nuclear catastrophe."

—Pyongyang Broadcasting Station, 2 March 2003, in "North Korea Says US Plan to Attack Nuclear Facilities 'Presupposes' Nuclear War," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 March 2003

Four North Korean MiG-29s intercept a US reconnaissance plane over international waters 150 miles from the North Korean coast. The MiGs, one of which flew within 50 feet of the RC-135S reconnaissance plane, reportedly attempt to force the US plane to land in North Korea. Following the incident, the United States suspends reconnaissance flights over the Sea of Japan, but flights resume ten days later. [Note: Due to heightening tension on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea's test-launch of anti-ship missiles into the Sea of Japan on 24 February, the United States had been conducting routine reconnaissance flights in anticipation of a ballistic missile launch by North Korea.]

—Kathleen T. Rhem, "North Korean Fighters Intercept US Jet Over Sea of Japan," American Forces Press Service, 3 March 2003; Matt Kelley, "US Considers Fighter Escorts for Surveillance Planes after Intercept by North Korea," Associated Press, 4 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Doug Struck, "N. Korean Jet Keep Their Distance During US Missions," *Washington Post*, 1 April 2003, p. 16.

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3 March 2003

In an interview with *Sankei Shimbun*, North Korean defector Kim Tae Ho says that North Korea's nuclear industry relies heavily on machinery and equipment imported from Japan via an unnamed Southeast Asian country. Kim says that materials and equipment used in the Yongbyon nuclear complex, from high acid resistant stainless steel liquid waste tanks and pipes, drainage pumps, hydraulic boring machines, to transportation trucks, were all of Japanese origin.

—*Sankei Shimbun*, 3 March 2003, in "Japan: DPRK Defector Says Nuclear Missile Aimed at Tokyo," FBIS Document ID JPP20030303000046.

4 March to 2 April 2003

US and South Korean forces conduct the annual Foal Eagle combined military exercises simulating a repelled invasion from North Korea. On 19 March, US and South Korean forces begin the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) combined military exercises integrating it with the second half of the Foal Eagle exercises. The United States deploys the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson and six F-117 stealth bombers to participate in the RSIO exercises. [Note: North Korea repeatedly condemns the military exercises as a rehearsal for a preemptive nuclear attack and subsequent invasion of North Korea.]

—"US and South Korea Troops Start Major War Games," Agence France Presse, 4 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Blasts Major US-S. Korea War Games," Agence France Presse, 4 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Test Nuclear War against DPRK Flayed," Korean Central News Agency, 5 March 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; Jong Heon Lee, "US, S. Korea Launch Another War Game," United Press International, 19 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 March 2003

The *Washington Post*, quoting a Senate source familiar with the Bush administration's evolving North Korea policy, reports that the United States is resigned to North Korea becoming a nuclear power and is now focusing on preventing North Korea from exporting nuclear material. However, Ari Fleisher, White House press secretary, denies the report, claiming, "It is important to make certain that there is a denuclearized peninsula. And that's why we're working so hard on this and why we have called directly and publicly for North Korea to dismantle its nuclear programs."

—Doug Struck and Glenn Kessler, "Foes Giving in to N. Korea's Nuclear Arms," *Washington Post*, 5 March 2003, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Press Briefing by Ari Fleisher, 5 March 2003, Office of the Press Secretary, United States White House, www.whitehouse.gov.

6 March 2003

In a televised news conference, US President George W. Bush says that the only way to resolve the nuclear issue with North Korea is through multilateral talks, and thus the United States must convince nations with vested interests that "they must stand up to their responsibility."

—President George Bush Discusses Iraq in National Press Conference, 6 March 2003, Office of the Press Secretary, United States White House, www.whitehouse.gov.

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6 March 2003

US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says that the United States is currently considering moving US forces stationed in South Korea away from the DMZ. Speaking at a Pentagon town hall meeting, Rumsfeld says, "We still have a lot of forces in Korea arranged very far forward, where it's intrusive in their lives, and where they really aren't very flexible or usable for other things." Rumsfeld adds that while the United States remains committed to maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea "has all the capability in the world of providing the kind of up-front deterrent that is needed."

—"Pentagon Town Hall Meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld," DoD News, 6 March 2003, www.dod.gov.

7 March 2003

South Korea's Prime Minister Ko Kun tells US ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard that "the role of the US troops as a tripwire must be maintained." Responding to US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's statements on 6 March that US forces should be redeployed away from the demilitarized zone, Ko tells Hubbard that it would be "inappropriate to talk about redeploying US troops at this time, given the tension surrounding the nuclear issue."

—James Brooke, "Musing on an Exodus of GI's, South Korea Hails US Pressure," *New York Times*, 8 March 2003, p. A11, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Realignment of USFK," *Korea Herald*, 11 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 March 2003

The Korean Central News Agency says that the nuclear standoff between the United States and North Korea "can surely be solved if the US has a will to settle it through dialogues and negotiations with the DPRK."

—"KCNA Refutes Bush's Bellicose Remarks," Korean Central News Agency, 7 March 2003, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 March 2003

Kim Myong Ch'ol, executive director of the Tokyo-based Center for Korean-American Peace, a group with ties to the North Korean government, says that North Korea will test-fire a missile capable of "splashing down off Los Angeles or New York" if the Bush administration refuses to participate in bilateral talks. Kim also warns that if the United States carries out a preemptive strike on the Yongbyon nuclear complex, North Korea will retaliate with missile attacks that will "leave Washington, New York and Chicago aflame."

—"US 'in Range of Korea's Missiles,'" *Sunday Mail* (Queensland), 9 March 2003, p. 44, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 March 2003

A *Minju Joson* commentary claims that the United States is currently planning a preemptive attack on North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear complex. The commentary says that the US Department of Defense has developed plans to use not only air raids and cruise missile attacks, but also tactical nuclear weapons. The piece concludes that North Korea's "army and people will take every possible self-defensive measure to cope with the US forces' new war moves."

—"DPRK Ready to Repel Any US Military Attack," Korean Central News Agency, 9 March 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

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10 March 2003

The *Rodong Sinmun*, the official newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, says that the combined military exercises currently being conducted by US and South Korean forces are merely preparations for a preemptive nuclear strike on North Korea in the summer. The commentary also claims that North Korea will not sit by idly while it is just a matter of time before a nuclear war erupts on the Korean Peninsula.

—Central Broadcasting Station, 10 March 2003, in "North Korean Commentary Notes US 'Secretly' Drawing up Attack Plan," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 10 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 March 2003

The *Rodong Sinmun* calls on the United States to participate in bilateral talks to resolve the standoff over North Korea's nuclear program, saying "negotiations are neither a sort of reward to be given by one party to the other party nor a business dealing in which one party makes a profit while the other party suffers a loss."

—"DPRK-US Direct Talks Called For," Korean Central News Agency, 11 March 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

11 March 2003

The US Department of Defense announces that the United States is deploying six F-117 stealth bombers to South Korea to participate in joint military exercises. [Note: The bombers arrive at Kunsan Air Base on 14 March.]

—"US Sending Stealth Fighters to S. Korea for Exercises," Japan Economic Newswire, 11 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 March 2003

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, says that North Korea's uranium enrichment program is becoming a serious threat to international security, claiming it is "only probably a matter of months and not years behind the plutonium [program]."

—James A. Kelly, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Regional Implications of the Changing Nuclear Equation on the Korean Peninsula," 108th Congress, Session 1, 12 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; James A. Kelly, Prepared Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Regional Implications of the Changing Nuclear Equation on the Korean Peninsula," 108th Congress, Session 1, 12 March 2003.

12 March 2003

Speaking before the US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, General Leon LaPorte, commander of US Forces Korea, says, "According to estimates by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea has an untested ballistic missile capable of delivering a payload the size of a nuclear weapon to parts of the continental United States." General LaPorte also states that according to US military assessments, "the Kim regime believes possession of nuclear weapons will guarantee survival."

—General Leon J. LaPorte, Statement before the 108th Congress House Armed Services Committee, 12 March 2003.

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12 March 2003

North Korean radio quotes Kim Jong Il as saying that the United States is solely to blame for the current nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula since it has continuously threatened North Korea with nuclear weapons located in South Korea.

—Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 12 March 2003, in "North Korean Radio Blames USA over Nuclear Issue," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 14 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 March 2003

The *Rodong Sinmun*, the newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, quotes Kim Jong Il as saying that the United States' recent deployment of two dozen bombers to Guam is "none other than a part of their military adventure maneuvers aimed at suddenly launching a preemptive strike against our republic with nuclear weapons." Kim is also quoted as saying, "The US imperialists are trying to provoke a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula by all means and expand it into a global thermonuclear war."

—"Why Did B-52s Fly into Guam?" *Rodong Sinmun*, 13 March 2003, broadcast by Pyongyang Broadcasting Station, 13 March 2003, in "North Korea Says US Planning Attack as Prelude to 'Global Thermonuclear War,'" BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 13 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 March 2003

US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton claims in an article published in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* that the United States was surprised that when it confronted North Korea with evidence of a clandestine uranium enrichment program in October 2002, North Korean officials broke with tradition and "brazenly admitted to developing a uranium-enrichment program (sic)."

—John Bolton, "Why North Korea Is Different," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 March 2003, www.feer.com.

14-15 March 2003

Representatives from over forty nations participate in track-two talks in Berkeley, California aimed at resolving the standoff over North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program. While the talks are unofficial, many of the delegates, including three North Koreans, have close ties to their respective governments. The three participating North Koreans are Han Song Ryol, North Korean ambassador to the UN, Cho Kil Hong and Kim Sam Ch'ong, respectively deputy director and senior researcher at North Korea's Institute for Disarmament and Peace. During the talks, Kim reportedly says that North Korea's nuclear program is not intended to threaten anyone but is only intended to defend North Korea from the United States.

—Matthew Yi, "North Korean to Join Berkeley Nuclear Meeting; Unofficial Talks Aim to Jump-Start Communications," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 14 March 2003, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Matthew Yi, "North Korean Official Explains Rationale for Nuclear Arms," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 15 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 March 2003

A commentary appearing in the *Rodong Sinmun*, official newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, claims that the current combined military exercises being conducted by the United States and South Korea—Foal Eagle and Reception, Staging Onward Movement and Integration—are aimed at preparing for an invasion of North Korea.

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using nuclear weapons. The commentary states that by integrating the two military exercises, the United States is "trying to once and for all complete preparations for a nuclear war for northward aggression and launch a nuclear preemptive strike against [North Korea] at any given moment."

—"Challenge to Peace and Reunification," *Rodong Sinmun*, broadcast by Pyongyang Broadcasting Station, 15 March 2003, in "North Korea Claims US 'Pre-Emptive Strike' a Matter of Times," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 15 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 March 2003

Japan's *Yomiuri Weekly*, citing an anonymous military authority, reports that North Korea successfully developed a nuclear warhead triggering device in 1990.

—Yoshijharu Fujiwara, "'Scoop Information' – Nuclear Triggering Device Completed in 1990," *Yomiuri Weekly*, 16 March 2003, in "Japanese Defense Official Says DPRK Completed Nuclear Triggering Device in 1990," FBIS Document ID JPP20030304000056.

17 March 2003

Ra Jong Il, Senior Advisor for National Security to South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun, says that North Korea has not made any apparent preparations to begin reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods.

—"N. Korea Shows No Sign of Reactivating Reprocessing Plant," Japan Economic Newswire, 17 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 March 2003

South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun calls for multilateral talks to resolve the current standoff over North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program. Speaking at the commencement ceremony of the Korea Air Force Academy, Roh says, "Not only dialogue with the North and cooperation with the United States and Japan, but also a cooperative framework involving China, Russia and the European Union should be activated. [Note: This is the first time that President Roh has explicitly called for multilateral talks to resolve issues related to North Korea's nuclear program.]

—"Roh Urges Multilateral End to NK Nuclear Standoff," *Korea Herald*, 19 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 March 2003

Robert Gallucci, special envoy to the Korean Peninsula during the Clinton administration, says that the Clinton administration knew of North Korea's uranium enrichment program. Speaking at Korea University, Gallucci says that the Clinton administration had planned to bring up the matter with North Korea but never had the opportunity.

—Yonhap News Agency, 19 March 2003, in "Former US Envoy Says Clinton Administration 'Knew' of N Korean Nuclear Programme," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 19 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Seo Hyun Jin, "After Iraq, U.S. Seen to Focus on N.K.," *Korea Herald*, 21 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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21 March 2003

In an interview with the *Mainichi Shimbun*, US Ambassador to Japan Howard Baker says that the United States would not consider a preemptive attack on North Korea until first consulting with Japan and South Korea. Baker reiterates Washington's position that it seeks a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. —Yonhap News Agency, 28 March 2003, in "ROK's Yonhap: US Would Never Consider Unilateral Preemptive Strike on NK," FBIS Document ID KPP20030328000004.

24 March 2003

The United States imposes economic sanctions on Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories and North Korea's Ch'anggwang Shinyong Corporation for "engaging in proliferation activities." The sanctions, imposed pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act and Executive Order 12938, prevent the US governmental or private sector from conducting business with either of the named entities for two years. Since the United States did not conduct business with either entity in Pakistan or North Korea, the sanctions are mainly a symbolic protest of missile technology transfers from North Korea to Pakistan. [Note: Khan Research Laboratories is primarily responsible for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and Ch'anggwang Shinyong Corporation is the financial institution that processes payments for North Korean missile-related exports. While Pakistan is suspected of transferring uranium enrichment technology to North Korea through the Khan Laboratories, a US State Department spokesman claims that the sanctions "were for a specific missile-related transfer." The US embassy in Islamabad issued a statement following the implementation of the sanctions, claiming that the Khan Laboratory is charged with "material contribution to the efforts of a foreign country, person or entity of proliferation concern, to use, acquire, design, develop and or secure weapons of mass destruction." However, in the purposefully vague statement the embassy does not mention whether the Khan Laboratory is being sanctioned because of transfers of nuclear technology or receipt of missile technology.]

—Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions Against a North Korean Entity, Public Notice 4326, Federal Register, vol. 68, no. 63, 2 April 2003, p. 16113; Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures on a Foreign Entity, Including a Ban on US Government Procurements, Public Notice 4327, Federal Register, vol. 68, no. 63, 2 April 2003, p. 16113-16114; Nicholas Krale, "Pakistan Purchases N. Korean Missiles," *Washington Times*, 31 March 2003, p. 1; Philip T. Reeker, Deputy Spokesman, "North Korea-Pakistan: Missile Related Sanctions and Executive Order 12938 Penalties," US Department of State Press Release, 1 April 2003; David E. Sanger, "US Rebukes Pakistanis for Lab's Aid to Pyongyang," *New York Times*, 1 April 2003.

Late March 2003

Cho Myong Rok, first vice chairman of North Korea's National Defense Commission, travels to China to receive treatment for chronic kidney problems. [Note: In 2002, Cho, the highest ranking military official after Kim Jong Il, reportedly received a kidney transplant at the same Beijing hospital.]

—"North Korea's Military Chief Hospitalized in China: Report," Agence France Presse, 28 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Late March 2003

According to South Korean Defense Ministry officials, Washington informs Seoul of its intention to relocate the Army's 2nd Infantry Division south of the Han River in the latter half of 2003. This move would put the 2nd Infantry

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Division out of range of North Korean long-range artillery.

—"Seoul Set to Block US Troop Reduction," *Korea Times*, 7 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 March 2003

The Korean People's Army sends a message to the United Nations Command (UNC) stating that North Korea would no longer send delegates to meet with US and UN officers for routine meetings at the liaisons office in the truce village of P'anmunjom. The message is reportedly delivered by Lee Chan Bok to UNC Deputy Chief of Staff Major General James Soligan by telephone. The Korean Central News Agency reports that Lee informed Soligan that any economic sanctions imposed on North Korea would be viewed as a breach of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, and if sanctions were imposed, North Korea would respond by abandoning all commitments made under the Armistice Agreement.

—Vincent Yu, "N. Korea Ends 50 Years of Key Meetings," Associated Press, 27 March 2003; "Telephone Message to Chief Delegate of US Forces Side," Korean Central News Agency, 26 March 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; Yonhap News Agency, 26 March 2003, in "DPRK Threatens Not to Join P'anmunjom Talks Citing Military Drills," FBIS Document ID KPP20030326000076.

26 March 2003

Speaking before the US House Appropriations Committee, Secretary of State Colin Powell says that the United States has no intention of launching a preemptive military strike against North Korea. Powell also claims that while the administration does not want to withdraw all US forces stationed in South Korea, officials from Washington and Seoul have been discussing the possible redeployment of US troops in South Korea.

—Yonhap News Agency, 27 March 2003, in "ROK's Yonhap: US Has No Intention of Complete Withdrawal of USFK: Powell," FBIS Document ID KPP 20030327000013.

27 March 2003

North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly allocates 15.4 percent of the annual budget for defense expenditures, an increase from 14.9 percent for 2002. The increase in defense expenditures is part of a 14.4 percent increase in the overall expenditures. In order to fund the budgetary increases, the Supreme People's Assembly announces that it will sell government bonds for the first time since the Korean War. The Supreme People's Assembly also adopts a new military service law by which government officials who have not previously served in the military must join the Korean People's Army for at least three years. [Note: North Korean military budget figures are opaque, but the announced figures can be interpreted as a trend.]

—"Finance Minister on State Budget for 2003," Korean Central News Agency, 26 March 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "State Budget Discussed at Session of DPRK Supreme People's Assembly," Korean Central News Agency, 26 March 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "6th Session of 10th SPA of DPRK Held," Korean Central News Agency, 26 March 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; Lim Chang Won, Hong Kong AFP, in "AFP: North Korea Boosts Military Spending as Nuclear Crisis Persists," FBIS Document ID JPP20030327000103.

28 March 2003

US Secretary of State Colin Powell informs South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Yong Kwan that China has proposed three-way talks between the United States, China and North Korea in order to discuss the ways of resolving to

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rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Yun, considering the "seriousness of the situation," accepts the three-party talks that exclude South Korea with the understanding that South Korea would participate in subsequent rounds of talks. [Note: The three-party talks are held in Beijing 23-24 April.]

—Yonhap News Agency, 16 April 2003, in "ROK's Yonhap: South Korea Confirms Three-Way Talks Over NK Nuclear Issue," FBIS Document ID KPP20030416000066.

29 March 2003

A commentary appearing in the *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers Party, states that North Korea "would have already met the same miserable fate as Iraq's had it compromised its revolutionary principle and accepted the demand raised by the imperialists and its followers for 'nuclear inspection' and disarmament."

—"DPRK Will Not Make Any Concessions or Compromise," Korean Central News Agency, 29 March 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

31 March 2003

During talks with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, Thomas Fargo, commander of the US Pacific Fleet, says that a strong deterrent is necessary in dealing with North Korea. Fargo adds that while North Korea should not be provoked, the international community must demonstrate that North Korea's nuclear weapons program is intolerable.

—Kyodo News Service, 31 March 2003, in "Kawaguchi, Fargo Agree N. Korea Nuke Program Intolerable," FBIS Document ID JPP20030331000109; "Strong Deterrence Needed for N. Korea: US Commander," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 31 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 April 2003

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov says that the US-led war against Iraq is pushing North Korea to improve its defenses. Losyukov claims that it "is absolutely clear" that North Korea will pursue nuclear weapons more vigorously as a result of perceived threat of a US-led war against Iraq.

—"North Korea May Seek Nuclear Weapons Because of Iraq War: Russia," Agence France Presse, 1 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 April 2003

Pakistani Information Minister Sheikh Rashid, responding to recent US sanctions on Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories, claims that Pakistan has never imported nor exported nuclear weapons technology. [Note: The United States imposed the sanctions on 24 March pursuant to Executive Order 12938. While Pakistan is suspected of transferring uranium enrichment technology to North Korea through the Khan Laboratories, a US State Department spokesman claims that the sanctions "were for a specific missile-related transfer."]

—Hong Kong AFP, 1 April 2003, in "AFP: Pakistan Wants Proof from Washington of Alleged Nuclear Trade with DPRK," FBIS Document ID JPP20030401000152.

6 April 2003

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement saying that US military actions against Iraq "suggest that even the signing of a nonaggression treaty with the US would not help avert a war." The Foreign Ministry says that

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the only way to avert war is for North Korea to develop a "tremendous military deterrent force."

—"Statement of FM Spokesman Blasts UNSC's Discussion of Korean Nuclear Issue," Korean Central News Agency, 6 April 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

Early to Mid April 2003

North Korea attempts to import three direct-current stabilizers from Japan. The stabilizers are seized before they are unloaded in Thailand, where they were reportedly to be diverted to North Korea. On 8 May, Tokyo police raid Meishin, the Japanese company that exported the stabilizers. [Note: Direct-current stabilizers, also called frequency converters, can be used for gas centrifuges.]

—Joby Warrick, "N. Korea Shops Stealthily for Nuclear Arms Gear; Front Companies Step Up Efforts in European Market," *Washington Post*, 15 August 2003, p. 19; "Firm Admits to Exporting Nuke-Related Devices to N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 8 July 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 April 2003

The UN Security Council meets to discuss ways to resolve the growing nuclear crisis in North Korea but is unable to reach agreement reportedly due to China's refusal to support even a non-binding statement by the Security Council president condemning North Korea's recent moves to reactivate its nuclear weapons program. [Note: The five permanent members of the UN Security Council had met many times leading up to the 9 April meeting, but on 8 April, the Chinese representative expressed strong opposition to any statement or resolution condemning North Korea. Speaking at an 8 April press conference in Beijing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said, "We think intervention by the UN Security Council now cannot help resolve the North Korean nuclear issue." Russia also did not support the resolution and reportedly informed the United States of its belief that if the Security Council adopted a resolution denouncing North Korea, Pyongyang would retaliate by officially declaring itself a nuclear power.]

—"Security Council Holds Talks on DPR of Korea Nuclear Issue," UN News Service, 9 April 2003, www.un.org; Colum Lynch and Doug Struck, "China Blocks U.N. Statement Condemning N. Korea: Move Hampers Security Council's Efforts to Pressure Pyongyang over Nuclear Weapons Program," *Washington Post*, 9 April 2003, p. 16; James Brooke, "North Korea's Neighbors Seek Crisis Role," *New York Times*, 9 April 2003, www.nytimes.com; Barbara Slavin, "North Korea Pulls Out of Non-Nuclear Treaty," *USA Today*, 10 April 2003, p. 10; Kyodo News Service, 12 April 2003, in "Kyodo: 'Diplomatic Source' Says UN Rebuke May Prompt DPRK to Declare Owning Nukes," FBIS Document ID JPP20030412000005.

10 April 2003

South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Yong Kwan meets with Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing in Beijing. The two agree to work together to persuade North Korea to participate in a multilateral dialogue in order to resolve issues related to its nuclear weapons program in a multilateral forum.

—Yonhap News Agency, 10 April 2003, in "ROK FM Official: ROK, China 'Might Have Agreed' on Multilateral Talks for DPRK Nuclear Issue," FBIS Document ID KPP20030410000115.

10 April 2003

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officially recognizes that North Korea has withdrawn from the

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Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). [Note: On 10 January, Pyongyang issued a statement announcing its withdrawal from the NPT, but the IAEA claimed that North Korea had to wait 90 days from the time of notification before the withdrawal would be official. North Korea is the first country to withdraw from the NPT since it came into force in 1970.]

—Barbara Slavin, "North Korea Pulls Out of Non-Nuclear Treaty," *USA Today*, 10 April 2003, p. 10.

12 April 2003

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement saying that since North Korea is no longer a signatory to the NPT, there is no reason to resolve issues related to its nuclear program in a multilateral forum. The spokesman adds that North Korea seeks direct bilateral talks with the United States in order to confirm whether or not Washington has the political willingness to abandon its hostile policy toward North Korea. However, the spokesman states that North Korea is prepared to resolve the crisis without sticking "to any particular dialogue format."

—"Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Peaceful Solution to Nuclear Issue," Korean Central News Agency, 12 April 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

12 April 2003

The Korean Central News Agency reports that at the 9 April UN Security Council meeting addressing North Korea's nuclear program, only the United States and one other country supported a resolution calling on North Korea to retract its withdrawal from the NPT.

—"Majority of UNSC Members Stand for Peaceful Solution to Korean Nuclear Issue," Korean Central News Agency, 12 April 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

12 April 2003

French and German authorities board the French ship *Ville de Virgo* and seize 214 aluminum tubes bound for North Korea. The aluminum tubes, made of a special alloy called 6061-T6, could have been used in the construction of up to 3,500 gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment.

—Joby Warrick, "N. Korea Shops Stealthily for Nuclear Arms Gear; Front Companies Step Up Efforts in European Market," *Washington Post*, 15 August 2003, p. 19.

15 April 2003

US President George W. Bush meets with Secretary of State Colin Powell and reportedly approves a negotiating strategy for the upcoming trilateral talks with China and North Korea by which the United States will not settle for a freeze on North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Instead, the United States will demand that North Korea completely dismantle its nuclear weapons program. Senior administration officials announce the negotiating position on 16 April, adding that they had low expectations for the first round of talks scheduled to begin on 23 April.

—David E. Sanger, "Bush Takes No-Budge Stand in Talks with North Korea," *New York Times*, 17 April 2003, www.nytimes.com.

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15 April 2003

Speaking at a meeting of Japanese and Iranian lawmakers, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohsen Aminzadeh says that Iran will not export nuclear or missile-related technology to North Korea.

—Jiji Press (Tokyo), 15 April 2003, in "Iran Not to Transfer Arms Tech to N. Korea: Deputy Foreign Min.," FBIS Document ID JPP2003415000074.

16 April 2003

Japanese government officials announce that Japan and South Korea will participate in the second round of multilateral talks aimed at reducing tension on the Korean Peninsula and resolving issues related to North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The first round of talks, scheduled to begin on 23 April, will only involve delegations from the United States, North Korea and China.

—Kyodo News Service, 16 April 2003, in "Japan, S. Korea to Join N. Korea Talks from 2nd Round," FBIS Document ID JPP20030416000158.

18 April 2003

The Korean Central News Agency quotes a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying, "as we have already declared, we are successfully reprocessing more than 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods at the final phase as we sent interim information to the US and other countries." [Note: Many observers believed the statement to be an admission by the North Korean Foreign Ministry that North Korea had not only begun reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods but had also informed other nations when it did so. However, officials from the United States, South Korea and Japan deny having been informed by North Korea that it had commenced reprocessing the fuel rods. On 19 April, the US government Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS) determined that the Foreign Ministry spokesman had not stated that North Korea had begun reprocessing spent fuel rods, but instead, KCNA had mistranslated an ambiguous statement. The FBIS translation is as follows: "We are successfully completing the final phase to the point of the reprocessing operation for some 8,000 spent fuel rods." On 21 April, KCNA posts a revised version of the English translation which states that North Korea has progressed "to the point of reprocessing fuel rods."]

—"Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Expected DPRK-U.S. Talks," Korean Central News Agency, 18 April 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; CNS, "Factsheet on North Korean Nuclear Reprocessing Statement," 23 April 2003, <http://cns.miis.edu>; "No Indication N. Korea Reprocessed Spent Fuel Rods: US State Department Official," Channel NewsAsia, 18 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 18 April 2003, in "South Korea Not 'Informed' on North Nuclear Reprocessing," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 18 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Paul Eckert and Arshad Mohammed, "Pyongyang Statement Puzzles Cites Banned Work on Spent Fuel Rods; Translation Disputed," *Boston Globe*, 19 April 2003, p. A5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Charles Whelan, "North Korea Revises Statement, Removes Obstacle to Nuclear Talks," Agence France Presse, 21 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 April 2003

The *Weekend Australian* reports that in late 2002, American and New Zealanders, working at arms length from their respective governments, helped Kyong Won Ha, a reported North Korean nuclear scientist, and other high ranking North Korean officials and scientists defect from North Korea. Operation Weasel, as it was called,

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incorporated the help of the Pacific Island nation of Nauru to help transport the defectors from China to the United States or US allies. The US State Department denies that the United States offered any incentives to Nauru to help high-ranking North Koreans defect. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher calls the *Weekend Australian* report "great reading but untrue." However, the State Department neither confirms nor denies that the defections reported in the article actually occurred. [Note: On 3 June 2003, the director of South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), tells that National Assembly that NIS has learned that Kyong is still in North Korea.] —Martin Chulov and Cameron Stewart, "N. Korean Scientists Defect," *Weekend Australian*, 19 April 2003, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Story on North Korean Defections False: US," Agence France Presse, 21 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 3 June 2003, in "S. Korean 'Source' Cast Doubts on Reported Defection by North Nuclear Scientist," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 3 June 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 April 2003

Kim Ryong Song, chief North Korean delegate to the inter-Korean ministerial talks, sends a message to South Korean Unification Minister Chong Sae Hyon proposing the that the next round of talks be held on 27-29 April in Pyongyang. On 21 April, South Korea agrees to participate in the delayed talks. [Note: The tenth round of ministerial talks were originally scheduled for 7-10 April, but North Korea failed to respond to South Korea's requests for preliminary talks and never invited the South Korean delegation to Pyongyang, the scheduled venue.] —Jong Heon Lee, "N. Korea Proposes Talks with South," United Press International, 19 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 21 April 2003, in "Further on Inter-Korean Agreement to Hold 10th Cabinet-Level Talks 27-29 April," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 21 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 April 2003

The *Australian Report*, citing "well-informed sources close to US thinking," reports that the US Department of Defense has developed a detailed plan to carry out precision strikes against North Korea's nuclear facilities and selected artillery units located near the demilitarized zone if North Korea begins reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods. —"US Draws up Plan to Bomb North Korea's Nuclear Plant: Australian Report," Agence France Presse, 22 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 April 2003

South Korean Defense Minister Cho Yong Kil tells the National Assembly that he believes that even though North Korea has completed preparations to reprocess 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods, it has not actually started reprocessing. —"N. Korea Has Not Yet Begun Reprocessing Nuclear Fuel Rods – S. Korea," AFX-Asia, 22 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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22 April 2003

Thomas Hubbard, US ambassador to South Korea, tells the South Korean press that the United States will not compensate North Korea for merely placing a freeze on its nuclear activities. However, Hubbard says the United States is prepared to implement a new "bold approach" in dealing with North Korea if it abandons its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible manner."

—"North Korea Must Abandon Nukes First," *Korea Herald*, 23 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23-24 April 2003

China, the United States and North Korea hold trilateral talks in Beijing aimed at resolving the standoff over North Korea's nuclear program. The Chinese, US and North Korean delegations are headed respectively by Fu Ying, director general of the Asian Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs, and Li Gun, deputy director general of the American Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry. During the first day of talks, Li reportedly claims that North Korea has almost completed reprocessing 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods. Li also reportedly tells Kelly on the sidelines of the talks that North Korea already possesses nuclear weapons and threatens to conduct a nuclear test or export nuclear material. According to the *Washington Times*, Li tells Kelly, "We can't dismantle them. It's up to you whether we do a physical demonstration or transfer them." However, according to other accounts of Li's statement, Li did not explicitly threaten that North Korea would conduct a nuclear test or sell nuclear material, stating vaguely that North Korea might take "physical actions." At the talks, the North Korean delegation also presents a proposal for resolving the nuclear standoff by which the United States would offer diplomatic recognition and provide security assurances and economic assistance in return for North Korea's pledge to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. The North Korean proposal also reportedly calls for US-North Korean bilateral talks to be followed shortly by multilateral talks including China, Japan and South Korea. The talks, originally scheduled for 23-25 April end a day early. [Note: The exact meaning of Li's claim that North Korea has almost completed reprocessing 8,000 nuclear fuel rods is not clear since sources present at the talks contend that Li used the same ambiguous language as the 18 April Foreign Ministry statement which sparked diplomatic tension due to an apparent mistranslation by KCNA.]

—Glenn Kessler, "N. Korea Says It Has Nuclear Arms; At Talks with U.S.; Pyongyang Threatens 'Demonstration' or Export of Weapons," *Washington Post*, 25 April 2003, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "North Korea Says It Now Possesses Nuclear Material," *New York Times*, 25 April 2003, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US and North Korea Break Off Dialogue on Nuclear Issue," ITAR-TASS, 25 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Wolf Blitzer and Andrea Koppel, "Administration Sources: North Korea Threatens Nuke Weapon Test," CNN, Transcript #042401CN.V00, 24 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Bill Gertz, "N. Korea Reiterates Plans for Fuel Rods; Starts Talks Vowing Reprocessing Work," *Washington Times*, p. A1, 24 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea, in Talks with US, Says It Possesses Nuclear Arms; Said to Offer 'Deal' for Concessions," *Facts on File World News Digest*, 23 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea's 'Bold Proposal' Features 4 Points," Japan Economic Newswire, 28 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US Urged Not to Raise Format of Talks as Precondition," Korean Central News Agency, 24 May 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

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24 April 2003

Kim Il Chol, minister of the North Korea People's Armed Forces, claims that the North Korean army is "equipped with powerful offensive and defensive means capable of defeating any formidable enemy at one swoop."

—"Revolutionary Armed Forces of DPRK Fully Ready to Wipe out Aggressors," Korean Central News Agency, 24 April 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

24 April 2003

US President George W. Bush, commenting on the recently concluded Beijing talks, tells NBC News that North Korea is "back to the old blackmail game." On the same day, Secretary of State Colin Powell says that North Korea should not walk away from the Beijing talks "with the slightest impression that the United States and its partners will be intimidated by bellicose statements or by threats."

—David E. Sanger, "North Korea Says It Now Possesses Nuclear Material," *New York Times*, 25 April 2003, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Secretary Colin L. Powell, "Changing Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific Region: Implications for U.S. Business and Policy," Speech at the United States Asia Pacific Council Symposium, 24 April 2003, US Department of State, www.state.gov; Tom Brokaw Interview of US President George W. Bush, Transcript, 25 April 2003, <http://usinfo.org>.

25 April 2003

The North Korean Foreign Ministry releases a statement saying that at the recently concluded Beijing talks the North Korean delegation offered a "new bold proposal" to settle the nuclear standoff. However, the Ministry claims the US delegation replied only by saying that it would not continue dialogue until North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable manner.

—"DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on U.S. Attitude toward DPRK-US Talks," Korean Central News Agency, 25 April 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

27-30 April 2003

North and South Korea hold the tenth round of ministerial-level talks in Pyongyang. The North and South Korean delegations are respectively headed by North Korean Senior Cabinet Councilor Kim Ryong Song and South Korean Unification Minister Ch'ong Sae Hyon. During the talks, the South Korean delegation demands that North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons program, but the North Korean delegation reportedly dismisses the demand, refusing to clarify the reported admission at talks with the United States and China in Beijing, and claiming that its nuclear program is an issue to be discussed only in bilateral US-North Korean talks. In a joint statement released at the conclusion of the talks, the two sides agree to "cooperate in resolving the nuclear standoff peacefully through dialogue."

—"North Korea, in Talks with US, Says It Possesses Nuclear Arms: Said to Offer 'Deal' for Concessions," *Facts on File World News Digest*, 7 May 2003, p. 324B3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Stalls During Weapons Talks," *Newsday* (New York), 28 April 2003, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Seo Hyun Jin, "North Deaf to South's Call for Disarmament," *Korea Herald*, 28 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 28 April 2003, in "N. Korea 'Reluctant' to Include South's 'Demand' on Nuclear Issue in Statement," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 28 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jong Heon Lee, "S. Korea Fails to Get North's Nuke Pledge," United Press International, 29 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis,

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<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 29 April 2003, in "North, South Korea Issue Joint Statement from Ministerial Talks," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 29 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 April 2003

In a daily press briefing, US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher confirms that at talks held in Beijing on 23-24 April the head of the North Korean delegation stated that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons.

—Richard Boucher, US Department of State Daily Press Briefing, 28 April 2003, www.state.gov.

29 April 2003

White House spokesman Ari Fleisher says that the United States "will not reward North Korea for bad behavior." Commenting on the proposal presented by North Korea to the United States at trilateral talks held in Beijing on 23-24 April, Fleisher says, "We will not provide them (North Korea) with inducements for doing what they always said they were going to do anyway."

—"US Rules Out Concessions to DPRK on Weapons Issues," Xinhua News Agency, 29 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Daily Press Briefing by Ari Fleisher, White House, 29 April 2003, www.whitehouse.gov.

30 April 2003

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman states that even though North Korea supported denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, "the reality requires the DPRK to deter the escalating US moves to strike the DPRK with a physical force, compels it to opt for possessing a necessary deterrent force and put it into practice."

—"DPRK FM Spokesman Accuses U.S. of Derailing Denuclearization Process in Korea," Korean Central News Agency, 30 April 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

Late April to Early May 2003

US reconnaissance satellites reportedly discover increased human activity at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and plumes of smoke coming from the Radiochemistry Laboratory, which indicates that North Korea has likely begun reprocessing its 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods. However, commenting on the reports, White House spokesman Ari Fleisher says that intelligence analysts have come to "no hard conclusions" on whether or not North Korea has begun reprocessing the fuel rods.

—Glenn Kessler, "Plan for N. Korea Will Mix Diplomacy and Pressure," Washington Post, 7 May 2003, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Stephen Collinson, "'No Hard Conclusion' on Reported North Korean Reprocessing: White House," Agence France Presse, 7 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Daniel Cooney, "South Korean Official: US Spy Photo Shows Signs North May Be Reprocessing Fuel Rods," Associated Press, 8 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "New Activity Spotted at North Korean Nuke Plant in Late April: South," Agence France Presse, 8 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 May 2003

According to the *New York Times*, US President George W. Bush informs visiting Australian Prime Minister John Howard that the United States may refocus its strategy from trying to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons to preventing North Korea from transferring nuclear material to other states or non-state actors. The *New York Times* quotes an anonymous official present at the talks as saying, "The president said that the central

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worry is not what they've got, but where it goes. He's very pragmatic about it, and the reality is that we probably won't know the extent of what they are producing. So the whole focus is to keep the plutonium from going further." However, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, speaking to reporters on 5 May following the *New York Times* report, denies that the US has shifted its North Korea policy, stating that the US is still committed to impressing upon North Korea that it should eliminate its nuclear weapons program.

—David E. Sanger, "Bush Shifts Focus to Nuclear Sales by North Korea," *New York Times*, 5 May 2003, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Remarks with NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson after Their Meeting, US Department of State, 5 May 2003, www.state.gov.

7 May 2003

South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Yun Yong Kwan says, "Only the verifiable and irreversible scrapping of North Korea's nuclear programs can lead to security guarantees and economic aid for the North." Yun adds, "The United States and the international community will not reward North Korea for its bad behavior."

—Jong Heon Lee, "N. Korea Must First Scrap Nukes: Seoul's FM," United Press International, 7 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Pyongyang Must Earn Aid: Minister," *Korea Herald*, 8 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 May 2003

Tokyo police raid Meishin, a Japanese company run by pro-Pyongyang Korean residents in Japan, for reportedly attempting to export to North Korea frequency converters that could be used in a uranium enrichment program. Hong Kong authorities reportedly seize the devices after being alerted by Japanese officials. [Note: In mid-1999, the US Department of Energy issued a report stating that North Korea's Taesong Yushin Trading Company had recently ordered two frequency converters from a Japanese company, but the transfer was not confirmed.]

—John Larkin and Donald Macintyre, "Arsenal of the Axis: North Korea Already Supplies Missiles to Rogue States. Now It Poses a New Threat: Nuclear Proliferation," *Time Asia*, 14 July 2003, vol. 162, no. 1, www.time.com; Bill Gertz, "Pyongyang Working to Make Fuel for Nukes," *Washington Times*, 11 March 1999, p.A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US Concerned about Nuke Moves by N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 11 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Shane Green, "Japan's Missile Parts Slipped into N. Korea," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 17 May 2003, p. 22, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 May 2003

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers Party, claims that the United States' hostile policy has forced North Korea to arm itself with "the necessary deterrent and translate it into action."

—Kang Chol-su, "Fate of Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula Depends on the United States' Policy," *Rodong Sinmun*, 11 May 2003, p. 6, in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 28 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 May 2002

The Korean Central News Agency reports that the 1992 North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has been reduced to a "dead document" because of the hostile US attitude against North Korea. The report also states that North Korea will arm itself with a "physical means of deterrence" in order to cope with hostile US intentions.

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—"US to Blame for Derailing Process of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," Korean Central News Agency, 12 May 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

13 May 2003

Germany's Interior Minister Otto Schily presents a report of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution stating that North Korean diplomats in Germany are involved in "intelligence service activities," and have been attempting to procure "sensitive goods" for North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

—"Schily Warning of Spies from North Korea," Bild, 13 May 2003, in "Germany Criticizes Behavior of Some North Korean Diplomats," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 13 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 May 2003

South Korean Unification Ministry spokesman Kim Chong No says that despite Pyongyang's admission that it possesses nuclear weapons and has begun reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods, construction of the two KEDO light-water nuclear reactors continues. According to Kim, 605 South Koreans, 353 Uzbeks and 99 North Koreans are currently working on the reactors. Kim also announces that as of April 2003, South Korea has spent \$850 million on the project.

—"Two Nuclear Reactors under Construction in N. Korea," ITAR-TASS, 14 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jae Suk Yoo, "Construction of Nuclear Reactors in North Korea Ongoing, Despite Tension," Associated Press, 14 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 May 2003

US President George W. Bush and South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun meet in Washington. After the meeting the two leaders issue a joint statement in which they state that they "will not tolerate" nuclear weapons in North Korea and will continue to work toward "the complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program through peaceful means based on international cooperation."

—"Bush, Roh 'Will Not Tolerate' Nuclear Weapons in N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Tom Raum, "South Korean President, Bush Agree They Can't Tolerate a Nuclear Armed North Korea," Associated Press, 14 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 15 May 2003, in "Full Text of South Korea-US Summit Joint Statement," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 15 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 May 2003

At inter-Korean economic cooperation talks held in Pyongyang, South Korean Vice Finance and Economy Minister Kim Kwang Lim tells the North Korean delegation that if North Korea continues to raise tension on the peninsula with its nuclear weapons program, South Korea will not be able to promote inter-Korean business projects. In response, Pak Ch'ang Ryon, head of the North Korean delegation, warns that South Korea will suffer an "unspeakable catastrophe" if it continues to support US efforts to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program.

—"S. Korea Conveys Concern to North about Nuclear Program," Japan Economic Newswire, 20 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Korean Economic Bilateral Suspended after North Korean Threat," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 21 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 21 May 2003, in

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"Inter-Korean Economic Talks Suspended after North's Warning," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 21 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 May 2003

Testifying before the US Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee, North Korean defector Lee Bok Koo (pseudonym) says that ninety percent of the equipment used in North Korea's nuclear weapons program has been imported from Japan. [Note: This figure is not credible or reliable.]

—Testimony of Bok Koo Lee (Alias) Before the Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, May 20, 2003, www.senate.gov; George Gedda, "Defectors, Their Faces Hidden, Testify on Weapons, Drug Exports," Associated Press, 20 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 May 2003

US President George W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi meet at the president's ranch in Crawford, Texas. Immediately following the meeting, Bush says at a joint press conference that the two leaders remain confident that the standoff over North Korea's nuclear weapons program can be resolved diplomatically, but "further escalation of the situation by North Korea will require tougher measures from the international community."

—Sarah Suk, "Koizumi, Bush to Get Tough with N. Korea if Needed," Japan Economic Newswire, 23 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Bush, Koizumi Vow to Not Be Intimidated by Pyongyang," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 23 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Scott Lindlaw, "Bush, Koizumi Present United Front against North Korean's Nuclear Program," Associated Press, 23 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 May to 1 June 2003

Curt Weldon, vice chairman of the US House Armed Services Committee, leads a group of six US congressmen to Pyongyang to meet with North Korean officials including Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun, and Ch'oi Tae Bok, chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly. After the trip, Weldon tells reporters in Seoul that senior North Korean officials confirmed that North Korea currently possesses nuclear weapons and is in the final stages of reprocessing 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods. Despite the admission, Weldon claims that the "extensive and lengthy meetings" with senior North Korean officials were amicable, leading him to believe that there is "a window of opportunity" to resolve the crisis peacefully before it erupts into military conflict.

—Don Kirk, "Disparate Views Emerge over North Korean Nuclear Strengths," *New York Times*, 2 June 2003, www.nytimes.com; "US Lawmakers Seeking to Ease Tensions Arrive in North Korea," Associated Press, 30 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "DPRK Officials Meet US Legislators," Xinhua News Agency, 31 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "SPA Chairman Meets Delegation of US Congressmen," Korean Central News Agency, 31 May 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

31 May 2003

US President George W. Bush announces a plan to interdict ships and planes suspected of transferring weapons of mass destruction. Bush announces the plan, called the Proliferation Security Initiative, at a speech in Krakow,

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Poland.

—US President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President to the People of Poland, Krakow, Poland, 31 May 2003, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov>>.

June 2003

In an interview with *Gendai*, a Japanese monthly, An Yong Chol (pseudonym), a former general in the Korean People's Army, claims that North Korea imported four intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads from the Soviet Union in 1983. According to An, the nuclear missiles, which have a range of 8,000km and are targeted at the US mainland, are located at an underground facility in P'odae-ri, Samjiyon-kun, Yanggang Province. In addition to the four Soviet origin nuclear missiles, An claims North Korea has indigenously developed dozens of nuclear missiles with a range of 4,000km. These missiles are reportedly targeted at US military bases in Okinawa. An also states that North Korea, under the guidance of the Soviet Union, built a secret nuclear base in Cuba in the 1970s. [Note: An's claims are highly suspect. Many North Korean defectors exaggerate claims and distort information in order to inflate their personal value to the countries to which they defect. Hideshi Takesada, a professor at Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies, tells Agence France Presse that An "may possibly be a defector who has been sent by the North or wants to whip up fear as a gift for the North.]"

—*Gendai*, June 2003, pp. 28-40, in "DPRK: 'Ex-General' Describes Underground Military Bases to Japan Journal," FBIS Document ID JPP20030507000011; "N. Korea Has Dozens of Nukes, Top Defector Tells Magazine," Agence France Presse, 14 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 June 2003

Time reports that in May the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recruited a foreign nuclear scientist who had worked on North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Citing two anonymous US officials and a "foreign government source," *Time* reports that the scientist has provided information on the "location, degree of development in capabilities, where they are, how far along they are in developing multiple-weapons capabilities." The scientist reportedly tells the CIA that North Korea's nuclear weapons program is much further along than it had thought. —Timothy J. Burger and Perry Bacon Jr., "A New Eye on North Korea," *Time*, 2 June 2003, vol. 161, no. 22, p. 19.

4 June 2003

Speaking before the House International Relations Committee, John Bolton, US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, says that because many rogue states seeking weapons of mass destruction "are nearly immune to conventional diplomatic dialogue," the United States is considering other "robust techniques" to combat WMD proliferation such as economic sanctions, interdiction and preemptive attacks. With regard to North Korea, Bolton says, "While all options remain on the table, the United States has made clear repeatedly and at the highest levels that we seek a peaceful, diplomatic end to North Korea's nuclear weapons program."

—John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, US Department of State, 4 June 2003, www.state.gov.

7 June 2003

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun meet in Tokyo to discuss various bilateral issues including how to deal with North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The two leaders agree

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that North Korea must dismantle its nuclear weapons program in a "verifiable and irreversible manner," and they also agree that the issue should be resolved in a "peaceful and diplomatic manner."

—Yonhap News Agency, 7 June 2003, in "'Unofficial Translation' of Japan-South Korea Joint Statement," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7 June 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 June 2003

The Korean Central News Agency reports that if the United States does eliminate its hostile policy toward North Korea, Pyongyang "will have no option but to build up a nuclear deterrent force." According to KCNA, North Korea's intention to build up a nuclear deterrent is based on a desire to reduce the size of conventional forces while maintaining the same level of military deterrence. The report also claims that since North Korea is no longer a party to the NPT, it is as entitled under international as the United States to possess nuclear weapons.

—"KCNA on DPRK's Nuclear Deterrent Force," Korean Central News Agency, 9 June 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

12 June 2003

Delegates from eleven countries meet in Madrid to discuss a program of interdicting vessels from "rogue states" suspected of shipping weapons of mass destruction technology or missile technology. The eleven countries that participated in the meeting are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Australia and the United States. [Note: The meeting is part of the Proliferation Security Initiative, which was first introduced by US President George W. Bush during a 31 May speech in Poland.]

—Steven R. Weisman, "Plan to Block North Korean Nuclear Shipments Gains Support," *New York Times*, 18 June 2003, www.nytimes.com; Sonni Efron and Barbara Demick, "11 Nations to Discuss Blocking Shipments of Weapons Material; US-led Talks in Madrid Seek Ways to Stop Such Trade by 'Rogue' Countries or Terrorists," *Los Angeles Times*, 12 June 2003, p. 13, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12-13 June 2003

Representatives from the United States, Japan and South Korea meet in Hawaii for a meeting of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group aimed at coordinating policies on North Korea. In a joint statement issued at the conclusion of the talks, the delegations state that while North Korea's nuclear weapons program will not be tolerated, the conflict should be resolved peacefully and diplomatically through five-party talks that include Japan, South Korea and China. At the talks, the US delegation reportedly suggests halting the project to build two light water nuclear reactors in August and beginning talks to dissolve KEDO, the consortium in charge of the light water reactor project.

—"Japan, US, S. Korea to Seek 5-Way Talks with N. Korea," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 12 June 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, 13 June 2003, in "Japan, US, South Korea Agree to Urge N. Korea to Abandon Nukes," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 13 June 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 14 June 2003, in "South Korea, Japan, US Issue Statement in Dealing with Pyongyang," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 14 June 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 14 June 2003, in "South Korean Official Says Seoul Keen to Continue North Energy Project," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 14 June 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Seoul Hints at Complying with US to Halt Nuclear Plant in NK," *Korea Times*, 26 June 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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13 June 2003

South Korean Unification Minister Chong Se Hyon says that if North Korea "worsens the nuclear situation, it will inevitably affect exchanges and cooperation between South and North Korea."

—Sang Hun Choe, "South Korea Threatens to Cut Economic Cooperation with North Korea," Associated Press, 13 June 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 June 2003

A commentary appearing in the *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers Party, claims that the United States' insistence that North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons program before commencing negotiations is merely "intended to contain (North Korea) with ease after forcing it to disarm itself."

—"DPRK's Determination to Strongly React to US Hard-Line Measure Reiterated," Korean Central News Agency, 18 June 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

18 June 2003

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement saying that North Korea "will put further spurs to increasing its nuclear deterrent force for self-defense as a just self-defense measure to cope with the US strategy to isolate and stifle (North Korea)."

—"DPRK to Put Spurs to Increasing Its Nuclear Deterrent Force for Self-Defence," Korean Central News Agency, 18 June 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

19 June 2003

At the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, US Secretary of State Colin Powell and North Korean Ambassador Ho Jong meet informally for three minutes. Powell reportedly reiterates the United States desire to resolve the standoff over North Korea's nuclear program through multilateral talks that include China, Japan and South Korea.

—Glenn Kessler, "N. Korea's Nuclear Ambition Are Urgent Issue, Powell Says," *Washington Post*, 19 January 2003, p. A23, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 June 2003

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf tells US President George W. Bush that Pakistan will have no military cooperation with North Korea in the future. Speaking to reporters the following day, Musharraf says, "It is an issue of the past, there is no linkage whatsoever between Pakistan and North Korea."

—"Pakistan Vows Not to Have Military Contact with N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 24 June 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Musharraf – Pakistan Will Not 'in Future' Proliferate Its Nuclear Technology," AFX – Asia, 25 June 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 June 2003

Minju Choson, a North Korean publication, reports that aggressive moves by the United States compel North Korea "to increase its nuclear deterrent."

—Korean Central News Agency, 24 June 2003, in "North Korea Stresses 'Nuclear Deterrent Force' to Counter US Moves," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 24 June 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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Late June 2003

Charles Kartman, executive director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), travels to Japan and South Korea to discuss the future of KEDO. On 27 June, Kartman meets with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi and Katsunari Suzuki, the Japanese official in charge of KEDO issues. Kawaguchi reportedly warns Kartman that suspension of the KEDO project at this time could seriously hinder the proposed upcoming multilateral talks. On 30 June, Kartman meets with South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Yong Kwan and warns that the future of KEDO depends on the amount of progress made in talks with North Korea regarding its nuclear weapons program. [Note: During a meeting of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group held in Hawaii from 12 to 13 June, the United States representative suggested abandoning the KEDO project in August if no progress had been made in urging North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program.]

—"Reactor Project Depends on Progress in N. Korea Nuke Crisis: KEDO Chief," *Agence France Presse*, 30 June 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Gary Schaefer, "Minister: Japan Doesn't Want to Pull Plug on North Korean Nuclear Project," *Associated Press*, 27 June 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan Cautious about Suspending KEDO Project," *Japan Economic Newswire*, 27 June 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 June 2003

US Ambassador to Japan Howard Baker warns North Korea that the international community could easily grow impatient "in the face of serial provocations" by North Korea, adding that the United States has not taken any option off the table.

—Natsumi Mizumoto, "US Unlikely to Stick to KEDO Program for N. Korea: Envoy," *Japan Economic Newswire*, 27 June 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Early July 2003

Park Kap Tong, a North Korean defector currently living in Japan, meets with the US National Security Council and advises high ranking Bush administration officials that Kim Jong Il has made the decision to develop nuclear weapons and will not stop even if the United States tries to implement a system of verifiable inspections. Warning that North Korea will use nuclear weapons against South Korea, Japan and the United States if given the time to develop a miniaturized nuclear warhead, Park advises the administration officials to carry out preemptive strikes against "selected targets" in North Korea in order to destroy Kim Jong Il's regime. [Note: Park is the head of the National Salvation Front, a group of high ranking military and civilian defectors from North Korea.]

—"Defector to Bush Officials: Strike N. Korea before It's Too Late," *World Tribune*, 11 July 2003, www.worldtribune.com.

1 July 2003

The *New York Times* reports that in recent weeks the US Central Intelligence Agency has discovered a new high-explosive test site in Yongdok-dong, Kusong, North P'yon'an Province, North Korea. According to US intelligence officials cited in the report, the test site is could be used to develop high-explosive triggering devices necessary for miniaturizing nuclear warheads. [Note: The site is not new.]

—David E. Sanger, "CIA Said to Find Nuclear Advances by North Koreans," *New York Times*, 1 July 2003, p. A1, www.nytimes.com.

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1 July 2003

The chief of the P'anmunjom mission of the Korean People's Army (KPA) warns the United States that any type of economic sanctions or blockades will be met with "merciless retaliatory measures" as the KPA will no longer be bound by the Armistice Agreement.

—"Statement of Chief of KPA Panmunjom Mission," Korean Central News Agency, 1 July 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

2-3 July 2003

Representatives from the United States, Japan and South Korea meet in Washington to discuss how to diplomatically resolve the standoff over North Korea's nuclear weapons program. All three delegations agree to call on North Korea to resolve the nuclear standoff through five-party talks that would include representatives from the United States and North Korea as well as China, Japan and South Korea. According to sources close to the talks, the three sides agree to discuss suspending the KEDO light water reactor project if negotiations with North Korea do not produce any results by the end of August. [Note: US officials reportedly want to make a decision on the suspension or cancellation of the KEDO project before Congress begins debate in early September on the budget for fiscal year 2004.]

—"US, Japanese, S. Korean Officials Meet on DPRK Nuclear Issue," Xinhua News Agency, 2 July 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan Proposes Suspension of KEDO Reactor Construction," Japan Economic Newswire, 3 July 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 3 July 2003, in "South Korea Presents USA, Japan with Blueprint to Resolve North Crisis," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 3 July 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "No Decision Made for KEDO Project for N. Korea," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 4 July 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US Eyes KEDO Decision by Aug. to Stop Reactor Construction," Japan Economic Newswire, 8 July 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 July 2003

South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Yun Yong Kwan says that there is no evidence that North Korea has begun reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods.

—Yonhap News Agency, 3 July 2003, in "South Korean Minister: 'No Clear Sign' North Reprocessing Spent Fuel Rods," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 3 July 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 July 2003

Hwang Chang Yop, the highest ranking North Korean ever to defect to the South, tells the South Korean National Assembly that in 1996 Kim Jong Il and Chon Pyong Ho, one of Kim's top aides on national security, told him personally that North Korea had developed nuclear weapons. Hwang also says that by the time he defected in 1997, North Korea had concluded a deal to obtain uranium enrichment technology from Pakistan. In addition, Hwang claims, North Korea had plans to conduct an underground nuclear explosion in 1991 or 1992.

—Yonhap News Agency, 4 July 2003, in "Top Defector Says North Korea, Pakistan Agreed Uranium Enrichment Deal," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 4 July 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jae Suk Yoo, "Defector Says North Korean Leader Claimed Nuclear Capability in 1996," Associated Press, 4 July 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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5 July 2003

A South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade official says that North Korea has not begun full-scale reprocessing of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel cells in its possession. Instead, the official claims, North Korea conducted limited tests of its reprocessing facilities between late April and Early May.

—"North Korea Has Not Yet Begun Reprocessing Spent Fuel: South Korean Official," Agence France Presse, 5 July 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 5 July 2003, in "South Korea Believes North Ran Reprocessing Facilities on Trial Basis," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 5 July 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 July 2003

Colonel Shin Chae Kon of South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) says that following the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea diverted all of its top scientists from working on its plutonium-based nuclear weapons program to a uranium-based nuclear weapons program. In an article published in the JCS magazine, Shin also claims that North Korea is most likely developing a "gun-type" uranium bomb instead of a more technologically complicated implosion device.

—Yonhap News Agency, 6 July 2003, in "North Korea Developing Uranium-Based Nuclear Bombs, Says South Military Official," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6 July 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 July 2003

During an unannounced meeting at the UN in New York, North Korean representatives to the UN reportedly tell Charles "Jack" Pritchard, a State Department official, that on 30 June North Korea completed reprocessing 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods and is currently using the plutonium to make additional nuclear weapons.

—David E. Sanger, "North Korea Says It Has made Fuel from Atom Bombs," *New York Times*, 15 July 2003, www.nytimes.com.

9 July 2003

South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) reports to the National Assembly Intelligence Committee that according to NIS estimates, "North Korea has recently reprocessed a small number of the 8,000 fuel rods it was keeping in Yongbyon-kun." The NIS also reports that North Korea has conducted over 70 tests of suspected nuclear triggering devices in Yongdok-dong, Kusong, North P'yŏn'an Province.

—"North Korea Reprocessed Nuclear Rods, Seoul Says," *New York Times*, 9 July 2003, www.nytimes.com.

9-10 July 2003

Representatives of eleven nations meet in Brisbane, Australia to support a US plan to intercept North Korean shipments of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The eleven nations involved in the plan, called the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), are Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Britain and the United States. In a statement adopted on 10 July, the participant nations of the PSI voice support for the initiative and also agree to increase the level of intelligence sharing regarding suspect shipments. [Note: North Korea has stated on numerous occasions that it would consider any interdiction an act of war.]

—Bob Burton, "11 Nations to Help US Intercept North Korean Transport," Inter Press Service, 10 July 2003.

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10-12 July 2003

Representatives of North and South Korea meet in Seoul for the eleventh Inter-Korean Ministerial Meeting. The North and South Korean delegations are headed by Kim Ryong Song and Chong Se Hyon respectively. In his opening speech, Kim blames the United States for the current nuclear standoff and says that North Korea is prepared for both dialogue and war. The South Korean delegation urges North Korea to accept a multilateral forum for discussing the issue with the United States, but the North Korean delegation remains recalcitrant, insisting that bilateral US-North Korean talks are the only way of resolving the standoff and thus must precede any multilateral talks.

—P.S. Suryanarayana, "N-Arms: Seoul to Harden Stance," *The Hindu*, 12 July 2003, www.thehindu.com; "High-Level Dialogue Put Off in Seoul: Wording of Joint Statement Causes Delay," *Bangkok Post*, 12 July 2003, www.bangkokpost.com.

11 July 2003

South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Yun Yong Kwan, referring to North Korea's refusal to participate in multilateral talks on resolving the current nuclear standoff, tells that National Assembly that "if the North continues to refuse to abandon its existing policy and does not agree to negotiations, it will affect the way the (South Korean) government pursues the 'peace and prosperity policy' or the contents of the policy itself."

—P.S. Suryanarayana, "N-Arms: Seoul to Harden Stance," *The Hindu*, 12 July 2003, www.thehindu.com.

Mid July 2003

US and South Korean intelligence sources discover evidence suggesting that North Korea might possess a second plutonium reprocessing plant. According to US officials, sensors set up on North Korean borders have detected elevated levels of krypton-85, a signature emission released when the cladding of spent fuel rods is cut. While the levels of krypton-85 do not indicate that North Korea has reprocessed all 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods as North Korean officials have claimed, computer analysis of wind direction and the path of the krypton-85 gas indicates that it did not originate from the known reprocessing facility in Yongbyon-kun. In addition, a South Korea intelligence agent reports the existence of a second reprocessing plant northeast of the Yongbyon nuclear complex. [Note: Several scholars and South Korean officials dispute the conclusion that elevated levels of krypton-85 indicates that North Korea has a second reprocessing plant or has even begun reprocessing plutonium at the Radiochemistry Laboratory in Yongbyon-kun. These skeptics contend that the krypton gas could have originated from Russia, China or Japan, or North Korea could have deliberately released krypton gas that had been stored from earlier reprocessing in an attempt to exaggerate its nuclear progress. However, it might not be possible to "store" krypton-85 emissions for later release.]

—David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, "North Korea Hides New Nuclear Site, Evidence Suggest," *New York Times*, 20 July 2003, www.nytimes.com; Rob Edwards, "Krypton Clue to North Korean Nuclear Progress," *New Scientist*, 21 July 2003, www.newscientist.com; Bill Gertz, "2nd N. Korean Nuclear Site Not Likely," *Washington Times*, 22 July 2003, p. 8; *Daily Yomiuri*, 20 July 2003, in "Source Says US Informs Japan, ROK of DPRK's Second Plutonium Plant," FBIS Document ID JPP20030720000043.

15 July 2003

In an interview with the *Washington Post*, former US Secretary of Defense William Perry says that the nuclear

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standoff on the Korean Peninsula is spiraling out of control. Perry says, "The nuclear program now underway in North Korea poses an imminent danger of nuclear weapons being detonated in American cities."

—Thomas E. Ricks and Glenn Kessler, "US, N. Korea Drifting Toward War, Perry Warns: Former Defense Secretary Says Standoff Increases Risk of Terrorists Obtaining Nuclear Device," *Washington Post*, 15 July 2003, p. 14.

18 July 2003

Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the IAEA, calls North Korea "the most serious threat to the nuclear nonproliferation regime."

—"UN Official Warns of North Korea's Nuclear Threat," *New York Times*, 18 July 2003, www.nytimes.com.

18 July 2003

China's Deputy Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo meets with high ranking US officials in Washington to discuss ways to resolve the nuclear standoff with North Korea diplomatically. Bush administration officials reportedly tell Dai that the United States will participate in another round of trilateral talks with North Korea and China if the talks are immediately followed by multilateral talks that incorporate South Korea, Japan and possibly Russia. The officials also reportedly claimed that at the latter of the two meetings, the United States will present a plan for resolving the nuclear standoff.

—David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, "North Korea Hides New Nuclear Site, Evidence Suggests," *New York Times*, 20 July 2003, www.nytimes.com; Glenn Kessler, "Proposal to N. Korea Weighed: US Might Offer No-Attack Pledge," *Washington Post*, 22 July 2003, p. 1.

21 July 2003

U.S. News and World Report, citing anonymous Bush administration officials, reports that senior officials in the Department of Defense are drafting a new war plan for a possible future military conflict with North Korea. The new plan, called Operation Plan 5030, reportedly calls for provocative pre-war maneuvers by US forces in Korea in order to deplete North Korean military resources before an actual confrontation. Such pre-war maneuvers would include flying RC-135 reconnaissance planes closer to the North Korean border in order to encourage North Korea to send fighter jets to intercept the plane and thus deplete limited supplies of jet fuel. Operation Plan 5030 has not been approved yet.

—Bruce B. Auster and Kevin Whitelaw, "Upping the Ante for Kim Jong Il: Pentagon Plan 5020, a New Blueprint for Facing Down North Korea," *U.S. News and World Report*, 21 July 2003, www.usnews.com.

23 July 2003

Reuters, citing a source with close ties to the North Korean government, reports that North Korea is prepared to declare itself a nuclear power on 9 September if the nuclear standoff is not resolved by then.

—So Su Min, "NK Threatens to Declare Itself Nuclear State by Sept. 9," *Korea Times*, 24 July 2003, in "ROK Cites Reuter Report on DPRK Plan to 'Declare Itself a Nuclear State' on 9 Sep," FBIS Document ID KPP20030723000084.

31 July 2003

North Korean ambassador to Russia reportedly tells Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Yuri Fedotov that North

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Korea supports resolving the nuclear standoff on the Korean Peninsula through multilateral talks that would involve delegates from North Korea and the United States as well as China, Japan, Russia and South Korea.

—David Stout, "State Dept. Sees North Korea as Ready for 6-Way Negotiations," *New York Times*, 31 July 2003, www.nytimes.com.

31 July 2003

Representatives from the United States and North Korea meet in New York to discuss the format of future high-level talks aimed at resolving North Korea's nuclear weapons crisis. According to the North Korean Foreign Ministry, the North Korean representative proposes a six-party format at which the United States and North Korea will hold bilateral meetings on the sidelines of talks that incorporate representatives from China, Japan, Russia and South Korea.

—"Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Recent DPRK-US Contact," Korean Central News Agency, 1 August 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

4 August 2003

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement that says six-party talks aimed at resolving the standoff over North Korea's nuclear program will soon be held in Beijing.

—"DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-Party Talks," Korean Central News Agency, 4 August 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "Choson'oemusong Taebyon'in 6 Chahoedam'i Beijing'eso Kot Yollige Toenda," Korean Central News Agency, 4 August 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

4 August 2003

The *Los Angeles Times* reports that North Korean "military scientists were recently monitored entering Iranian nuclear facilities." The report cites "people inside Iran and foreign intelligence officials" as having asserted that the North Koreans are assisting Iran develop a nuclear warhead. According to the report, so many North Koreans are residing in Iran working on its missile and nuclear weapons programs that a resort on the Caspian Sea has been set aside for their personal use.

—Douglas Frantz, "Iran Closes In on Ability to Build a Nuclear Bomb; Tehran's Reactor Program Masks Strides toward Weapons Capability," *Los Angeles Times*, 4 August 2003, p. 1, in Proquest.

11 August 2003

During a meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing announces that China will host six-party talks in Beijing aimed at resolving the standoff over North Korea's nuclear crisis. The talks will take place over three days in late August.

—Jiji Press, 11 August 2003, in "China to Host 6-Way Talks in Beijing Late August," FBIS Document JPP20030811000052.

13 August 2003

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement that says the upcoming six-party talks will amount to nothing if the United States insists upon North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons program before first signing a nonaggression treaty, normalizing diplomatic relations, and removing all economic sanctions. Until the United

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States takes these steps, the Foreign Ministry says, North Korea "will not abandon its nuclear deterrent force."
—"DPRK's Stand on Six-party Talks Clarified," Korean Central News Agency, 13 August 2003, www.kcna.co.jp;
Korean Central Broadcasting Station, 13 August 2003, in "DPRK Radio Carries FM Spokesman's Press Statement on 6-Way Talks," FBIS Document KPP20030813000062; "Choson'oemusong Taebyon'in 6 Chahoedam'e Rimha'nun Uriui Ch'wiji Palkhim," Korean Central News Agency, 13 August 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

13 August 2003

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov tells reporters that "it would be fair to provide some security guarantees for North Korea." He questions whether the United States is ready to provide them, adding that the main goal of the six-party talks is to overcome the differences between the US and North Korea.
—Moscow Interfax, 13 August 2003, in "Russian Foreign Ministry Considers Security Guarantee for North Korea Fair," FBIS Document CEP20030813000337; Xinhua News Agency, 13 August 2003, in "Russia Says DPRK's Demand for Security Guarantees 'Absolutely Logical,'" FBIS Document CPP20030813000131.

14 August 2003

China's Foreign Ministry announces that it will host six-party talks in Beijing 27-29 August in an effort to resolve the North Korean nuclear standoff. The participants will include representatives from the US, China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Russia.
—Reuters, "Beijing to Host North Korea Talks," *New York Times*, 14 August 2003, www.nytimes.com; "Beijing Confirms Six-way N Korea Talks Set for August 27-29," Agence France Presse, 14 August 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 August 2003

Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi states that her South Korean counterpart, Yun Yong Kwan, supports Japan's plans to raise the issue of North Korea's past abductions at the upcoming six-party talks. North Korea admitted in September 2002 that it abducted 13 Japanese nationals decades earlier.
—Kyodo World Service, 22 August 2003, in "S. Korea Supports Japan's Plan to Raise Abductions," FBIS Document JPP20030822000106; Jiji Press, 22 August 2003, in "Kawaguchi Says Japan to Raise Abduction Issue in Six-Way Talks," FBIS Document JPP20030822000094.

22 August 2003

Mitoji Yabunaka, head of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Asian and Oceanic Affairs Bureau, requests that the United States not withdraw its extended nuclear deterrence for Japan, regardless of the outcome of the six-party talks. Reflecting fears that Japan may lose the protection of the US nuclear umbrella after North Korea obtains security guarantees from the US, Yabunaka states that such guarantees should not ban the use of nuclear weapons in return for North Korea's nuclear disarmament.
—"Japan Asks US to Maintain Nuclear Deterrence," BBC Monitoring, 22 August 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 August 2003

North and South Korea agree on details to reconnect railways that have been severed since 1950. South Korea,

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which will provide all of the equipment, materials, and construction expertise, will be sending several teams of engineers to the North.

—Yonhap News Agency, 22 August 2003, in "Koreas Agree on Details of Relinking Railways," FBIS Document KPP20030822000091; Korean Central News Agency, 22 August 2003, in "Working-Level Contact for Reconnecting Inter-Korean Rail and Road Links," FBIS Document KPP20030822000065; "Working-level Contact for Reconnecting Inter-Korean Rail and Road Links," Korean Central News Agency, 22 August 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

23 August 2003

A senior official of the US State Department, speaking on condition of anonymity, says the US would consider establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea but would not concede to North Korea's demand for a nonaggression pact at the six-party talks.

—Yonhap News Agency, 23 August 2003, in "US to Consider Establishing Ties with North Korea; Official," FBIS Document KPP20030823000004.

24 August 2003

North Korea discloses details of a four-phase solution to the nuclear problem. The four phases are: 1) North Korea would announce its intention to abandon its nuclear program; 2) the United States would resume supplying fuel oil to North Korea; 3) the US and North Korea would sign a nonaggression treaty; and 4) North Korea would dismantle its nuclear facilities in exchange for the completion of a light-water power reactor. The proposal, which fails to address nuclear weapons, extracted plutonium, ballistic missiles, and Japanese abductions, is expected to be rejected by the US, Japan, and South Korea. [NOTE: The proposal was verbally presented during the US-DPRK-PRC trilateral talks in April 2003.]

—*Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 24 August 2003, in "DPRK Calls for Four-Phase Process to Scrap Nuclear Facilities," FBIS Document JPP20030824000042.

27 August 2003

The first round of six-party talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue begin in Beijing. Heads of the delegations to the talks are James Kelly, assistant US secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Wang Yi, Chinese vice-foreign minister, Kim Yong Il, DPRK deputy foreign minister, Alexander Losiukov, Russian deputy foreign minister, Lee Su Hyok, South Korean deputy minister of foreign affairs and trade, and Mitoji Yabunaka, director-general for the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

—"Six-party Talks Begin in Beijing," Xinhua News Agency, 27 August 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Andrei Kirillov and Vladimir Pavlov, "First Day at Six-sided Talks in Beijing Concluded," ITAR-TASS News Agency, 27 August 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "DPRK Delegation to Six-way Talks Leaves for Beijing," Korean Central News Agency, 26 August 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

27-29 August 2003

A North Korean delegate tells diplomats at the Six-Party Talks that the DPRK has "no choice but to declare its possession of nuclear weapons" and "conduct a nuclear weapons test." North Korean diplomats, however, reiterated that the DPRK would be willing to dismantle its nuclear programs if the United States "changed its hostile policies, stopped obstructing North Korea's economic growth, and aided the energy needs of North Korea."

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The US voiced optimism and called the Beijing meeting a "positive session." The six delegations maintained their respective positions and failed to make progress but agreed to continue talks and meet again in Beijing within two months.

—Peter Slevin and John Pomfret, "N. Korea Threatens Nuclear Arms Test: Delegate to Talks Cites US Hostility," *Washington Post*, 29 August 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo World Service, 28 August 2003, in "Russian Envoy Says 6 Nations Agree to Meet Again within 2 Months," FBIS Document JPP20030828000154; Kyodo World Service, 28 August 2003, in "6 Nations Set for Accord to Continue Dialogue," FBIS Document JPP20030828000155; "Keynote Speeches Made at Six-way Talks," Korean Central News Agency, 29 August 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

30 August 2003

A North Korea Foreign Ministry spokesman, commenting on the Six-Party Talks that concluded yesterday in Beijing, says that the North Korean delegation "made clear its consistent stand on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and set out reasonable and comprehensive ways to realize it." However, the spokesman also accuses the US delegation as having "raised undisguised brigandish demands." He says the US rejected "a package solution and the order of simultaneous actions," and that according to the US side, a wide range of issues could only be discussed after North Korea dismantles its nuclear program in a verifiable and irreversible manner. He concludes that "there is no other option for us but to further increase the nuclear deterrent force as a self-defensive measure to protect our sovereignty."

—"DPRK Foreign Ministry on Six-way Talks," Korean Central News Agency, 30 August 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "Chosonwoemusongdaepyon'in 6 Chahoedam'e To'nun Ku Oddon Hungmina Kidaedo Kajilsu Opta," Korean Central News Agency, 30 August 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "North Korea Rejects US Proposal – DPRK Embassy in Moscow," *Financial Times*, 1 September 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Joseph Khan, "Korea Arms Talks Close with Plans for a New Round," *New York Times*, 30 August 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 September 2003

North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly, during its first session of the 11th term, reelects Kim Jong Il as the chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC). This position is considered to be the highest post in North Korea. Kim is also the general secretary of the Korea Workers Party and commander of the Korea People's Army. Other elected members of the NDC are: Cho Myong Rok, First Vice-Chairman; Yon Hyong Muk and Ri Yong Mu, Chairmen; Kim Yong Ch'un, Kim Il Ch'ol, Chon Pyong Ho, Ch'oe Ryong Su, and Paek Se Bong, Members.

—"DPRK's New Premier Gives 'Oath' in First Session of 11th SPA," Korean Central News Agency, 3 September 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "Kim Jong Il Reelected Chairman of DPRK National Defense Commission," Korean Central News Agency, 3 September 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "Reelection of Kim Jong Il Congratulated," Korean Central News Agency, 4 September 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "DPRK National Defense Commission Elected," Korean Central News Agency, 3 September 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "Choson Minju Chu ui Inmin Konghwakuk Kukpang Wiwonhoe Son'go," Korean Central News Agency, 3 September 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central Broadcasting Station, 3 September 2003, in "DPRK's Kim Yong-nam, Ch'oe T'ae-pok Address Kim Chong-il's Nomination as NDC Chairman," FBIS Document ID KPP20030903000126; Jong-heon Lee, "Analysis: N. Korea Toughens Nuke Stance," United Press International, 3 September 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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3 September 2003

North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly passes a resolution supporting the Foreign Ministry's handling of the nuclear standoff with the US. The resolution blames Washington's "hostile policy" for the current nuclear crisis, and criticizes the Bush administration for having "termed the DPRK 'part of an axis of evil' and 'a target of preemptive nuclear attacks'." The resolution also supports the Foreign Ministry's view that North Korea "would have no other option but to keep and increase its nuclear deterrent force."

—"SPA Approves Measures Taken by Foreign Ministry as Regards Nuclear Issue," Korean Central News Agency, 3 September 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "Chomihaengnunjewa Kwallyonhayo Choson'oemusong'i Ch'wihan Taeojokchoch'idurul Sung'inham'e Taehan Kyolchong," Korean Central News Agency, 3 September 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; Sang-Hun Choe, "North Korean Parliament Supports Pyongyang's Decision to Build up Nuclear Capabilities," Associated Press, 3 September 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 September 2003

Chong Ha Ch'ol, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korea Workers Party, says the DPRK will continue to increase its military deterrent force because the US has not abandoned its "hostile policy" towards the DPRK. Chong made the remarks in a speech delivered to congratulate Kim Jong Il on his reelection as the chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC).

—"Pyongyangites Congratulate Kim Jong Il on His Reelection as Chairman as NDC," Korean Central News Agency, 4 September 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

8 September 2003

Mohamed ElBaradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) says North Korea's nuclear buildup poses a "serious and immediate challenge" to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In his introductory statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, ElBaradei says that "the Agency has been unable to implement fully its comprehensive NPT safeguards agreement with the DPRK."

—Mohamed ElBaradei, "Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors," 8 September 2003, www.iaea.org; "North Korea a Grave and 'Immediate' Threat to Nonproliferation: ElBaradei," Agence France Presse, 8 September 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 September 2003

Vice Marshal Kim Yong Ch'un, chief of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army (KPA), says the DPRK will continue to increase its nuclear deterrent force. Kim makes the remark in a speech to celebrate the 55th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK.

—"DPRK to Steadily Increase Its Nuclear Deterrent Force," Korean Central News Agency, 9 September 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "James Brooke, "North Korea Celebrates without Missile Test," *International Herald Tribune*, 10 September 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Charles Whelan, "North Korea Sets Bellicose Tone for 55th Birthday Bash," Agence France Presse, 9 September 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Soo-Jeong Lee, "North Korea Marks 55th Anniversary with Military Parade, But No Nuke Test," Associated Press, 9 September 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Holds Military Parade, No Missiles Displayed," Kyodo News Service, 9 September 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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10 September 2003

"A US official" says North Korea has halted activities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. According to the Los Angeles Times, the official says, "various sensors and imagery and other things we have don't show activity." The official also says that North Korea easily start and stop activities at the site and that it would be very hard to conceal activities there.

—Paul Richter and Greg Miller, "Halt in Work Seen at N. Korea Nuclear Site," *Los Angeles Times*, 11 September 2003, in Proquest.

12 September 2003

North Korea agrees in principle to hold a second round of the six-nation talks in early November. The first round was held on 27-29 August 2003 in Beijing.

—"North Korea Reportedly Agrees to Further Six-Way Talks in November," *Financial Times*, 12 September 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Agrees in Principle to Six-Party Talks in November: Report," Agence France Presse, 12 September 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N.K. Agrees to Second Round of Six-way Talks in November: Report," Yonhap News Agency, 12 September 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 September 2003

The Korean central News Agency dismisses the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution to rejoin the NPT, citing that the "hostile" US government is using the IAEA and that the DPRK is not bound to the NPT.

—"KCNA Dismisses Resolution of IAEA Meeting," Korean Central News Agency, 23 September 2003, www.kcna.co.jp.

30 September 2003

A spokesman for North Korea's Foreign Ministry says the DPRK is "taking practical measures to steadily beef up the nuclear deterrent force as a just self-defensive means to repel the US nuclear preemptive attack." The spokesman says the measures are necessary because of the US "hostile policy."

—"U.S. Much Publicized Efforts for 'Peaceful Solution' to Nuclear Issue Dismissed," Korean Central News Agency, 30 September 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "North Korea to 'Steadily Beef Up Nuclear Deterrent' – Spokesman," BBC, 30 September 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lim Chang-won, "N Korea Has No Interest in Crisis Talks, Wants More Nukes," Agence France Presse, 30 September 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 September 2003

North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Ch'oe Su Hon tells the UN General Assembly in New York that his government may not participate in the next six-party talks. Ch'oe says the DPRK is driven to lose "interest in or expectations on such talks" due to Washington's "hostile policies."

—"Pyongyang Says It will Make No Promises on Further Nuclear Talks," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 30 September 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lee Mi Suk, "Puk '2 ch'a 6 chahoedam kwanshimopta,'" *Munhwa Ilbo*, 1 October 2003, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

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1 October 2003

North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Ch'oe Su Hon tells reporters that while North Korea is committed to a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue, Washington's "hostile policy" and the lessons from the Iraq war force the DPRK to defend itself with a "nuclear deterrence force." Ch'oe also says that North Korea will only use its "nuclear force" for deterrence and will not proliferate.

—"DPRK Vice FM Praises Friendship with PRC, Denies Nuke Proliferation Intention," *Financial Times*, 2 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "DPRK Feels Safe with 'Strong Nuclear Deterrence': Top Diplomat," Xinhua News Agency, 1 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 October 2003

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman declares North Korea has successfully completed the reprocessing of 8,000 spent fuel rods that can be used to produce nuclear weapons, and more spent fuel rods may be reprocessed in the future. He also states that, contrary to rumors, the DPRK has not made any commitments to resume the six-party talks in Beijing.

—"DPRK to Continue Increasing Its Nuclear Deterrent Force," Korean Central News Agency, 2 October 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "Chosonwoemusong taebyonin 8,000 yotaui p'eyollyobongchaech'ori songgwajoguro kkut'naetta," Korean Central News Agency, 2 October 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "N Korea Completes Nuclear Fuel Rod Reprocessing – Foreign Ministry," Agence France Presse, 2 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jong-Heon Lee, "Analysis: N. Korea's Nuke Game Going Further," United Press International (UPI), 2 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 October 2003

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, and South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun release a joint statement while attending the summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Bali, Indonesia. Among several issues, the statement addresses the North Korean nuclear issue, stating, "The three countries [China, Japan, and South Korea] reaffirm their commitment to a peaceful solution of the nuclear issue facing the Korean peninsula through dialogue and to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while addressing all the concerns of the parties and working together to maintain peace and stability on the peninsula." The statement marks the first time that China, Japan, and South Korea have joined together to make a declaration of policy.

—"Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation among Japan, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, Bali, Indonesia," 7 October 2003, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, www.mofa.go.jp; "Japan, China, S. Korea Pledge to Deal with N. Korea Nukes," Kyodo News Service 7 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Roh Says N. Korea Nuke Standoff Will Ultimately Be Resolved," Yonhap News Agency, 8 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Hiroshi Ito, "Asia Giants: No Nukes in Korea," Asahi News Service, 8 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 October 2003

A North Korean Foreign Ministry statement says that Japan should not take part "in any form of negotiations" for resolving the nuclear weapons issue. According to the statement, Japan is only an obstacle to the peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue due to their "black-hearted" intentions. Subsequently, US State Department

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spokesman Richard Boucher rejects North Korea's demand stating, "Japan clearly must and will continue to be a participant in the six-party talks in order to achieve a diplomatic solution to North Korea's nuclear arms program." —"Chosonwoemusong taeyonin haekhyopsangmadang'e ilbon'i kkiyodunun'gossul yongnaphaji ant'a," Korean Central News Agency, 8 October 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "Japan Urged Not to Meddle in Any Negotiations to Solve Nuclear Issue," Korean Central News Agency, 7 October 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "North Korea says Japan Not Allowed in Nuclear Negotiations," BBC, 7 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korean Radio Carries Official Statement Barring Japan from Nuclear Talks," BBC, 8 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "DPRK Bars Japan from Future Talks on Nuke Issue on Korean Peninsula," Xinhua News Agency, 7 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Rejects N. Korean Call for Excluding Japan from Nuke Talks," Kyodo News Service, 7 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Insists on Japanese Role in Talks with North Korea," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 October 2003

An unidentified senior Bush administration official criticizes North Korea for attempting to drive a wedge between the five other members of the six-party talks and adds, "We can talk about this in the [United Nations] Security Council if North Korea doesn't want to cooperate."

—"U.S. May Seek U.N. Sanctions if N. Korea Rejects 6-way Talks," Kyodo News Service, 8 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 October 2003

US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher states during a press briefing that the US will continue to pursue the six-party talks. Referring to a comment about raising the issue with the UN Security Council, Boucher says, "We're not headed off in another direction at this point."

—"U.S. Not to Take N. Korea Nuke Issue to UN for Now," Kyodo News Service, 9 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Daily Press Briefing Transcript, 9 October 2003, U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov.

9 October 2003

Chinese President Hu Jintao and Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue say the six-party talks should continue.

—"China Urges Continuation of Six-Party North Korea Talks," Financial Times, 9 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Chinese Leader Urges More Multi-national Talks on North Korea," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 9 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 October 2003

In an apparent rejection of North Korean demands, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Yuriy Fedotov says the six-party talks should continue to include Japan because it is "a successful format which may provide a solution."

—"Russian Minister Insists Six-Sided Talks on North Korea Must Continue," BBC, 9 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Russia Favors Continuation of Six-Nation Talks on N. Korea," *Financial Times*, 10

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October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "China, Russia Support Japan Staying in N. Korean Talks," Jiji Press, 9 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 October 2003

Wang Guangya, China's ambassador to the UN, reiterates the need to continue the six-party talks and speculates that December may be ideal for the next round of talks.

—"China Wants Resumption of North Korea Talks," Agence France Presse, 10 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 October 2003

Konstantin Pulikovskiy, presidential envoy in the Far Eastern Federal District of Russia, while visiting Beijing says that efforts are being made to continue the six-party talks.

—Yasuo Naito, "Japan: Senior Russian Foreign Ministry Official Comments on Six-Nation Talks," *Financial Times*, 9 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Russia Works for Resumption of North Korea Nuclear Talks – Official," BBC, 10 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Vera Pavlova, "Russia Pressing for More Talks on N Korea's Nuc Problem," ITAR-TASS News Agency, 10 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 October 2003

Yun T'ae Yong, spokesman for South Korea's presidential Blue House, tells reporters that South Korea will urge North Korea to continue the six-party talks when the two Koreas hold an inter-ministerial meeting in Pyongyang 14-17 October.

—"Seoul to Urge Pyongyang to Participate in Multilateral Nuke Talks," Yonhap News Agency, 10 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "S. Korea to Urge Pyongyang to Accept Next Round of Nuclear Talks," Xinhua News Agency, 10 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "South Korea to Raise Six-Way Nuclear Negotiations at Cabinet Talks with North," *Financial Times*, 10 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 October 2003

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman blames the Bush administration's "hostile policies" for the current nuclear issue and, in order to dispel doubts concerning its nuclear force, he says that North Korea will display "its nuclear deterrent to the public" at the "appropriate time." Subsequently, US Secretary of State Colin Powell and State Department spokesman Adam Ereli dismiss the North Korean statement as unclear and nothing new. South Korea's National Security Advisor Na Chong Il [Ra Jong Il] also discounts the threat as "another bargaining chip for negotiations to get the upper hand at the next round of six-party talks."

—"Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on U.S. Rumor Over Nuclear Issue," Korean Central News Agency, 16 October 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "Chosonwaemusong taeyonin ddaega toemyon uriui haeg'okcheryog'ul mullijoguro konggae," Korean Central News Agency, 16 October 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "DPRK to Unveil Its Nuclear Deterrent at Appropriate Time," Xinhua News Agency, 17 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N Korea Says It will 'prove' It Has Nukes – Foreign Ministry," Agence France Presse, 18 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Dismisses N. Korea Statement on Possible Nuke Test," Kyodo News

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Service, 16 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Charles Whelan, "Nuke Test Threat a Bargaining Ploy – South Korea," *Agence France Presse*, 17 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 October 2003

Gen. Leon LaPorte, Commander of US Forces Korea, says North Korea is "a very, very credible threat" with its 800 mid-range missiles. He also indicates support for the six-party talks by saying, "We need to have all the nations with vested interests involved."

—"N.K. Has 800 Mid-Range Missiles," *Korea Herald*, 17 October 2003, www.koreaherald.com; "North Korea 'A Very Credible Threat' says Commander of US Forces in South," BBC, 16 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 October 2003

US President George W. Bush says he is willing to commit to a multilateral written security guarantee not to attack North Korea in exchange for steps by Pyongyang toward abandoning its nuclear weapons program. However, he has ruled out a formal bilateral treaty of nonaggression that North Korea has demanded.

—Mike Allen and Glenn Kessler, "Bush says Pact with N. Korea Possible," *Washington Post*, 20 October 2003, www.washingtonpost.com; "U.S. Tries to Coax N. Korea," *USA Today*, 20 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Roh, Bush Agree on Security Guarantee for N. Korea," *Japan Economic Newswire*, 20 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Sim Sung-tae, "Bush May Assure N.K. Security; Surprise Move Depends on Progress in Nuclear Talks," *Korea Herald*, 21 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Bush Back Security Guarantee for NK," 21 October 2003, *Korea Times*, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Joseph Curl, "Security Pledge Offered to N. Korea; Pyongyang Fires Missile after Talks," *Washington Times*, 21 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "South Korean Agency: North 'responded' to US 'overtures' with Missile Launch," *Financial Times*, 20 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 October 2003

Members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum summit, which is being held in Thailand, welcome the United States' policy shift on the North Korea nuclear issue. Although President George W. Bush has rejected North Korea's demand for a formal nonaggression treaty, he wants to offer a multilateral written security assurance.

—"APEC Welcomes US Call for Diplomatic solution to N. Korea Nuclear Crisis," *Channel NewsAsia*, 20 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan Welcomes Softer US Stand on North Korea Security Guarantee," *Kyodo News Service*, 20 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Russian Defence Minister Praises Bush Offer of Guarantee to North Korea," BBC, 20 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Sim Sung-tae, "Bush May Assure N.K. Security; Surprise Move Depends on Progress in Nuclear Talks," *Korea Herald*, 21 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Terence Hunt, "Bush Pushes for Compromise in Nuclear Standoff with North Korea," *Associated Press*, 20 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Mike Allen and Glenn Kessler, "Bush Says Pact with N. Korea Possible," *Washington Post*, 20 October 2003, www.washingtonpost.com; "Bush, Roh Discuss Possible North Korea Compromise," *Agence France Presse*, 20 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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21 October 2003

North Korea dismisses a US offer of a multilateral written security guarantee in exchange for an end to its nuclear weapons program, and renews its demand for a bilateral nonaggression pact.

—"DPRK's Stand on Talks with U.S. Clarified," Korean Central News Agency, 23 October 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "Migug'ui chongch'aekjonhwani opnun oddon hwoedamedo hungmiga opda," *Rodong Sinmun*, in Korea Central News Agency, 23 October 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "North Korea Reportedly Rejects US Security Guarantee Offer," BBC, 22 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N Korea Rejects as 'Laughable' US Offer of Multilateral Security Guarantee," Agence France Presse, 22 October 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 October 2003

US House member Curt Weldon (Republican from Pennsylvania) says opposition from the White House caused him to abandon plans to lead a group of US lawmakers to the nuclear reactor in Yongbyon-kun, the site of North Korea's main nuclear complex.

—Associated Press, "Congressional Trip to N. Korea Called Off: White House Objected to Visit to Nuclear Weapons Plant," *Washington Post*, 27 October 2003, p. 9; Associated Press, "Lawmaker: White House Nixed N. Korea Trip," *New York Times*, 27 October 2003, www.nytimes.com; "Congress Delays North Korea Trip," BBC, 27 October 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk>.

29 October 2003

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the international consortium financing the construction of light-water reactors in North Korea, discusses suspending the project due to the deepening of the nuclear standoff. Members of KEDO, which includes South Korea, Japan, the United States, and the European Union, add that the decision would be tentative and can be retracted if North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons program.

—Yonhap News Agency, 29 October 2003, in "KEDO Set to Suspend Reactor Construction in N. Korea," FBIS Document ID KPP20031029000138; Yonhap News Agency, 29 October 2003, in "KEDO Decides to Suspend Reactor Construction in N.K.," FBIS Document ID KPP20031029000011; Barbara Borst, "Suspension of N. Korea Reactors Discussed," Associated Press, 4 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KEDO to Suspend N. Korea Reactor Project for 1 Year," Kyodo News Service, 4 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 November 2003

The North Korean delegation votes against the non-binding UN resolution backing the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). North Korea's Deputy Ambassador Kim Chang Guk refers to the IAEA as "a tool of the United States" and walks out of the General Assembly chambers immediately following the vote of 129-1 that approved the resolution.

—Edith Lederer, "North Korea Opposes Resolution Supporting U.N. Nuclear Agency, Calling It a U.S. Tool," Associated Press, 4 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; United Nations Resolution A/58/PV.54, *Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency*, 4 November 2003, www.un.org.

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6 November 2003

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman comments on the impending decision by the United States and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to halt the construction of light water reactors in North Korea. He states that if construction is suspended, the U.S. and KEDO would be obliged to pay compensation and the DPRK will "never allow them to take out" the equipment and documents from the construction areas.

—"Chosonwoemusong taeyon'in migug'ui kyongsuro'gonsolchungjimunje'e ongub," Korean Central News Agency, 6 November 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "Spokesman for DPRK FM on U.S. Intention to Stop LWR Construction," Korean Central News Agency, 6 November 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; Glenn Kessler, "N. Korea Reactor Project May End," *Washington Post*, 4 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "International Consortium May End DPRK Nuclear Reactor Project," Xinhua News Agency, 4 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jun Kwanwoo, "N Korea Threatens to Seize US-led Consortium's Assets," *Agence France Presse*, 6 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Sang-hun Choe, "North Korea to Seize Key Data, Equipment from Nuclear Reactors after U.S., Allies Stop Building," *Associated Press*, 6 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 November 2003

President Pervez Musharraf tells a news conference that Pakistan had not transferred nuclear technology to North Korea although it had bought short-range missiles and related technology from North Korea. He says the visits to North Korea by Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan were related to purchases of missiles only, and Pakistan now produces missiles on its own and no longer conducts defense-related business with North Korea.

—"Musharraf Denies Role in NK Nuke Program," *Pakistan Press International*, 6 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Musharraf: No N. Korea Nuclear Swap," *Associated Press*, November 7, 2003, in *CNN.com*, www.cnn.com.

11 November 2003

The *Rodong Sinmun*, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, argues that American efforts to develop nuclear weapons may be reasons for other nations and North Korea to develop similar weapons, and that US moves "may spark a new arms race."

—"Migug'ui sohyonghaengmugi'gaebal chungjirul yogu," Korean Central News Agency, 11 November 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "U.S. Moves to Develop Smaller Nukes Under Fire," Korean Central News Agency, 11 November 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "North Korean Paper Says US Development of Small Nukes May Spark 'New Arms Race,'" *BBC*, 11 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 November 2003

A Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) editorial condemns the announcement by South Korea to purchase and deploy US-made surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 300 kilometers. KCNA warns the move as being "a very dangerous development" and threatens that "both the north and the south will fall victim to a nuclear war if it breaks out on the peninsula."

—"Chosonjungangt'ongshin ronp'yong namchosondanggug'ui sajong 300km missail olhaean silchonbaech'i," Korean Central News Agency, 14 November 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "KCNA Blasts New Type Missile Deployment in S. Korea," Korean Central News Agency, 14 November 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "N Korea Denounces S Korea's

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Missile Deployment as US Aggression," Agence France Presse, 14 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korean Agency Says South's Missile Deployment 'Intolerable,'" BBC, 14 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 November 2003

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says North Korea may consider accepting a multilateral written security guarantee in place of the nonaggression treaty with the United States at the next round of talks if Washington ceases to maintain a hostile policy toward and threaten North Korea.

—"Woemusongdaebyon'in migug'ui choktaeshijongch'aek ch'olhoedoe'myon haekkyehoekp'ogi," Korean Central News Agency, 16 November 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Next Round of Six-way Talks," Korean Central News Agency, 16 November 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "US Envoy in Japan to Discuss New Round of North Korean Talks," Agence France Presse, 17 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Offers to 'Modify' Phraseology of Simultaneous Action Principle," *Financial Times*, 17 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Voices Readiness to Halt Nuclear Program: KCNA," Kyodo News Service, 16 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 November 2003

US Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld visits and meets with South Korean Minister of Defense Cho Young-kil [Cho Yong Kil] as part of the annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM). They issue a joint statement following SCM that, among other things, expresses concerns over the nuclear issue with North Korea and urges Pyongyang to "completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear weapons programs."

—"S. Korea, US Hold Security Meeting with Joint Statement," Xinhua News Agency, 17 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Rumsfeld Pledges Continued Security in South Korea Amid Nuclear Dispute," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 17 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "S Korean, US Defence Chiefs Begin Talks 'Amid' Anti-war Protests," *Financial Times*, 17 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jae-Suk Yoo, "U.S. Envoy Discusses North Korean Nuclear Crisis in Seoul," Associated Press, 20 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 November 2003

Visiting US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly discusses the North Korean nuclear issue with Mitoji Yabunaka of the Foreign Ministry's Asian and Oceanic Affairs Bureau and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda. Kelly says he expects the next round of six-party talks to occur in mid-December.

—"Kelly Meets Japanese Officials for Talks over North Korean Row," Channel NewsAsia, 17 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US Official Expects 6-Party Talks to be Held in Mid-December," Xinhua News Agency, 17 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 November 2003

China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao says Beijing welcomes the 'positive message' from the DPRK referring to a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement made on 16 November that the DPRK continues to seek a negotiated peaceful solution to the ongoing nuclear issue.

—"Spokesman Says China Welcomes Recent 'Positive Message' from North Korea," *Financial Times*, 28 November 2003.

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2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Martin Parry, "US Envoy in China as Beijing Welcomes 'Sincere' N Korean Gesture," Agence France Presse, 18 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "China Welcomes DPRK's Latest Declaration to Maintain Peaceful Solution to the Nuclear Issue," Xinhua News Agency, 18 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 November 2003

An editorial in the *Rodong Sinmun*, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, states that the redeployment of US forces in South Korea farther south and away from the Demilitarized Zone is intended for the launching of a preemptive nuclear attack against North Korea.

—"Sinister Designs Behind Relocation of U.S. Military Bases Exposed," Korean central News Agency, 19 November 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mi'gun'giji chaebaech'i norumun pukch'imul wihan kunsajokchoch'i," Korean Central News Agency, 19 November 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "North Korean Paper Says Aim of US Forces Relocation in South Is Invasion," *Financial Times*, 19 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Radio Says US Military Relocation Aimed at 'Northward Aggression'," BBC, 19 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 November 2003

Chinese Vice Foreign Ministers Wang Yi and Dai Bingguo meet with visiting US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly to prepare for the second round of the Six-party Talks. A Foreign Ministry spokesman says both sides want the next round of discussions to take place as soon as possible.

—"China, US Agree on Need to Start Six-Party Talks as Soon as Possible," *Financial Times*, 20 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "China, U.S. Discuss North Korea Nuclear Stand-Off," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 19 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>;

21 November 2003

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) decides to suspend the construction of two light-water reactors in North Korea. The United States, South Korea, Japan, and European Union make up the KEDO consortium, which has committed \$4.6 billion for the project. The one-year suspension, which is to begin on 1 December, is a reaction to North Korea's alleged violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework.

—Peter James Spielmann, "Nuclear Consortium Suspends Work on Two Reactors for North Korea," Associated Press, 21 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KEDO Suspension of North Korea Reactor Project Set to Begin 1 December," *Financial Times*, 21 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Construction of North Korea Nuclear Projects Suspended," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 21 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KEDO Suspends North Korea Nuke Project for One Year," Agence France Presse, 21 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Shim Jae-yun, "Allies to Suspend NK Nuclear Plant Project," *Korea Times*, 5 November 2003, <http://times.hankooki.com>.

25 November 2003

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao says that North Korea's Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Yong Il met with Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, Vice Foreign Ministers Dai Bingguo and Wang Yi in Beijing to discuss and prepare for the second round of Six-party Talks. The DPRK representative to the

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six-way negotiations reassured Chinese officials of North Korea's final goal of a denuclearized peninsula and willingness to scrap its nuclear weapons program under the right conditions.

—"Spokesman Says China, North Korea Meeting on Six-way Talks 'Productive'," BBC, 25 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N Korea's Nuclear Talks Envoy Briefed by China," Agence France Presse, 25 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman's 25 November News Conference," *Financial Times*, 25 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "China Hopes Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons: Chinese Premier," Xinhua News Agency, 24 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 November 2003

The Korean Central News Agency states that "Japan should not be allowed to participate in the [six-party] talks as it is persistently trying to bring up" abduction grievances during the negotiations.

—"Ilbon'un 6 chahoedam'e kkiyodul chagyogi obda," Korean Central News Agency, 29 November 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "Japan Not Qualified to Participate in Six-way Talks," Korean Central News Agency, 1 December 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; Jae-suk Yoo, "North Korea Rejects Japan's Participation in Nuclear Talks," Associated Press, 29 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 November 2003

The *Rodong Sinmun*, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, demands financial compensation from the United States and KEDO for the losses to be incurred by the suspension of the light water reactor projects.

—"Migukkwa kedo'e taesanggonsolyaksok pullihaeng'ui wiyakkum yogu," Korean Central News Agency, 19 November 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "North Korea Demands US Compensation over Light Water Reactor Suspension," BBC, 29 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Demands Compensation from US for KEDO Nuke Project," Channel NewsAsia, 29 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Boris Cambreleng, "North Korea Demands Compensation from US for KEDO Nuke Project," Agence France Presse, 29 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Soo-Jeong Lee, "North Korea Says United States Must Pay for Delay to construction of Nuclear Reactor," Associated Press, 30 November 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 December 2003

The *Rodong Sinmun*, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, urges the United States to accept Pyongyang's proposal based on "the principle of simultaneous actions" to resolve the nuclear issue. The actions would be "the US switchover in its hostile policy toward the DPRK, the DPRK's renunciation of its nuclear program followed by the opening of diplomatic relations between the two countries."

—"Migug'e tongshihaeng'dong'wonch'ikkwa ilgwalt'agyoran suyongch'okku," Korean Central News Agency, 1 December 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "U.S. Urged to Accept Simultaneous Action and Package Solution," Korean Central News Agency, 1 December 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "DPRK Urges US to Accept Proposed Package Solution," Xinhua News Agency, 1 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Urges US to Accept Nuclear Package Deal," Agence France Presse, 1 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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3 December 2003

Officials from the United States, South Korea and Japan reject a draft of a Chinese proposal for a joint statement on the Six-party Talks. The officials sense the China-sponsored draft is too favorable to North Korea because it calls for security guarantees in exchange for Pyongyang's declaration of its intention to dismantle its nuclear programs. However, the draft does not contain details of the implementation of the dismantlement.

—"Japan, U.S., S. Korea Reject Proposed 6-way Statement," Japan Economic Newswire, 3 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan, US, South Korea Reject China Draft of Six-Way Talks Statement," BBC, 3 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "6-Way Meet on N. Korea May Be Delayed into Next Year," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 3 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 December 2003

South Korea's Unification Minister Chong Se Hyon says the dispatch of ROK troops to Iraq is linked to "U.S. cooperation for peace on the Korea peninsula." The statement reveals the view of many in South Korea that the United States is too firm regarding the North Korea nuclear issue.

—"Seoul Expects Troop Dispatch to Help Get U.S. Support on N.K. Nuke Issue," Yonhap News Agency, 4 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "South Korea Urges US to Soften Stance on North Korea," BBC, 4 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "South Korean Minister Says Troops Decision Linked to Nuclear Issue," BBC, 3 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 December 2003

Officials from the United States, South Korea and Japan draft a joint statement of principles for resolving the North Korea nuclear crisis. The proposal, which does not call for North Korea's return to the NPT, proposes coordinated steps where the other five nations of the Six-party Talks offer incentives to North Korea as it verifiably dismantles its nuclear facilities. South Korea's Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Su Hyok says, "For the parts on which the countries have some disagreements, we used indirect and implicative words." The joint statement is to be sent to Beijing to be passed on to Pyongyang.

—David E. Sanger, "U.S. and 2 Allies Agree On a Plan for North Korea," *New York Times*, 8 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Glenn Kessler, "U.S. Agrees to Statement on North Korea Talks; Text Urges 'Coordinated Steps' to End Pyongyang's Nuclear Program," *Washington Post*, 8 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Members of 6-Way Talks Discussing Draft Statement: White House," Kyodo News Service, 8 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US Confirms It Is Seeking Joint Statement for North Korea Talks," Agence France Presse, 8 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Seo Hyun-Jin, "China to Contact N.K. on Talks; Beijing to Convey Allies' Position on 6-Way Forum," *Korea Herald*, 8 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 December 2003

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says the DPRK would freeze its nuclear activities in exchange for political and economic concessions. The statement also declares that "the resumption of the Six-party Talks in the future entirely depends on whether an agreement will be reached on the DPRK-proposed first-phase step or not."

—"Spokesman of DPRK Foreign Ministry on Issue of Resumption of Six-Way Talks," Korean Central News Agency, 9 December 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; Soo-Jeong Lee, "North Korea Offers Proposal in Nuclear Standoff with

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Washington; Bush Says It Falls Short," Associated Press, 9 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Barry Schweid, "Bush Says North Korea's Nuclear Freeze Offer Isn't Good Enough," Associated Press, 9 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Bush Rejects N Korea's Nuclear Freeze Offer," Xinhua Financial News, 10 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 December 2003

US President George W. Bush rejects North Korea's offer to freeze its nuclear program, insisting, "The goal of the United States is not for a freeze of the nuclear program; the goal is to dismantle a nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible way." White House spokesman Scott McClellan responds to the preconditions for continued talks by stating, "We, along with the rest of the members of the six-party talks, are ready for a new round of talks at an early date, and without any preconditions whatsoever."

—"President Bush and Premier Wen Jiabao Remarks to the Press," White House Press Briefings, 9 December 2003, www.whitehouse.gov; Barry Schweid, "Bush Says North Korea's Nuclear Freeze Offer Isn't Good Enough," Associated Press, 9 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Bush Rejects North Korea's Nuclear 'Freeze' Offer," Agence France Presse, 9 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Soo-Jeong Lee, "North Korea Offers Proposal in Nuclear Standoff with Washington; Bush Says It Falls Short," Associated Press, 9 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Bush Rejects N Korea's Nuclear Freeze Offer," Xinhua Financial News, 10 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Anwar Iqbal, "U.S. Rejects N. Korea's Terms for Talks," UPI, 9 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 December 2003

South Korea's Unification Minister Chong Se Hyon says he has confirmed the delivery of the joint statement draft to resolve the nuclear issue from Beijing to Pyongyang. Representatives from the United States, South Korea and Japan drafted the proposal earlier in the week, and Chinese officials, the host of the Six-party Talks, were to relay the draft to North Korean officials.

—Jae-Suk Yoo, "South Korea: U.S.-Backed Proposal to End Nuclear Crisis Delivered to North Korea," Associated Press, 11 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Revised Statement Conveyed to N. Korea, Japan-U.S.-S. Korea," Kyodo News Service, 12 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 December 2003

A statement released by the North Korean embassy in Moscow says that Pyongyang desires a nuclear-free Korean peninsula but will not abandon its nuclear programs without concessions. The statement directly refers to a perceived US nuclear threat by declaring "the United States legitimized and appropriated large amounts of money for the development of miniature nuclear weapons in order to keep us under constant threat."

—"DPRK Rules Out Unconditional Freezing of Nuclear Programs," Xinhua News Agency, 11 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korean Embassy in Moscow Lists Conditions to USA to Resume Talks," BBC Monitoring, 11 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 December 2003

A nine-member European Union delegation led by Guido Martini of Italy meets with North Korea's Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun and Vice Foreign Minister Kung Sok Ung and other North Korean officials to urge the DPRK

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to return to the Six-party Talks.

—Yonhap News Agency, 12 December 2003, in "EU Delegation Urges N. Korea to Return to Nuclear Talks," FBIS Document ID KPP20031212000075; Jun Kwanwoo, "Top EU Delegate Says North Korea Trip 'Good for All,'" Agence France Presse, 12 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Hans Greimel, "European Diplomats Cross from North Korea to the South Amid Fading Hopes for New Talks," Associated Press, 12 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Seo Hyun-Jin, "EU Envoys Debrief Seoul on N.K. Visit," Korea Herald, 13 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 December 2003

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers Party, rejects the US-backed blueprint proposal for ending the nuclear issue for its failure to mention North Korea's proposed "simultaneous package solution." The newspaper also demands "complete, verifiable and irreversible security assurances" in exchange for complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID).

—"Uri'ui tongshi'ilgwalt'agyoranul padadulyoya handa," Korean Central News Agency, 15 December 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "U.S. Urged to Accept DPRK-Proposed Simultaneous Package Solution," Korean Central News Agency, 15 December 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; Sang-Hun Choe, "North Korea Rejects U.S. Proposal on Ending Nuke Crisis," Associated Press, 15 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 December 2003

US President George W. Bush tells reporters that he wants to settle the North Korean nuclear issue diplomatically. Bush offers his comments following the capture of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

—Press Conference of the President, White House Press Briefings, 15 December 2003, www.whitehouse.gov; "Bush Opts for Diplomacy over N. Korea's Nuke Standoff," Kyodo News Service, 15 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 December 2003

The *Rodong Sinmun*, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, vows that North Korea will "keep and steadily increase its nuclear deterrent force" to deter a preemptive attack by the United States.

—"Chonjaeng'bangjiui kyolchongjoksuda'nun haeg'okcheryokpakke opta," Korean Central News Agency, 18 December 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "DPRK Stand to Increase Nuclear Deterrent Force Remains Unchanged," Korean Central News Agency, 18 December 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; Sang-Hun Choe, "North Korea Says It will Never Give Up Nuke Program without U.S. Concessions," Associated Press, 18 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N Korea Sticks to Decision to Increase Nuclear Force – Paper," BBC, 18 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 December 2003

US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher announces the United States will donate 60,000 metric tons of food to North Korea through the UN World Food Program despite North Korea's persistence in developing nuclear weapons. The decision brings US food aid donations for North Korea to a total of 100,000 metric tons for the year 2003.

—Stephen Collinson, "US to Give 60,000 Tonnes of Food to North Korea," Agence France Presse, 24 December

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2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Decides to Offer Food to DPRK," Korean Central News Agency, 24 December 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; Reuters, "U.S. Will Give More Food Aid to North Korea," *New York Times*, 25 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25-27 December 2003

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits Pyongyang for three days to prepare for a tentative second round of Six-party Talks. Wang meets with North Korea's Vice Foreign Ministers Kim Kye Kwan, Kang Sok Chu, and Kim Yong Il.

—"Chosonwoemusongdaebyon'in chochungi che 2 ch'a 6 chahoedam naenyonjogigaech'oe'e noryok," Korean Central News Agency, 27 December 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-way Talks," Korean Central News Agency, 28 December 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "Chinese Official in DPRK for Preparation for Six-way Talks," Xinhua News Agency, 26 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Visits North Korea to Discuss Six-party Talks," BBC, 26 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 December 2003

North Korean First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok Chu expresses willingness to hold the next round of Six-party Talks early next year to Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

—"Chosonwoemusongdaebyon'in chojunggi che 2 ch'a 6 chahwoedam naenyonjogigaech'oe'e noryok," Korean Central News Agency, 27 December 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Six-way Talks," Korean Central News Agency, 28 December 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "DPRK Seeks Holding Next Round of Six-Party Talks Early Next Year," Xinhua News Agency, 28 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Signals Readiness to Attend Nuclear Talks Early Next Year," Agence France Presse, 28 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Has Agreed to a New Round of Nuclear Talks: Report," Agence France Presse, 27 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 December 2003

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman tells Korean Central News Agency that the United States' continued efforts to increase its military presence in South Korea is "casting a darker shadow on the prospect of solving the nuclear issue." The spokesman cites the recent decision by Washington to spend \$11 billion to reinforce military hardware in South Korea.

—"Chosonwoemusongdaebyon'in migunui mujangjangbi chunggangch'aektong'un hyon daehwa'gwajong'e chongmyonbaech'i," Korean Central News Agency, 27 December 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "U.S. Escalated Arms Buildup Assailed," Korean Central News Agency, 28 December 2003, www.kcna.co.jp; "DPRK Slams US for Upgrading Weapons in S. Korea," Xinhua News Agency, 27 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Transcript of North Korean Radio Broadcast, "North Korea Needs 'Physical Deterrent' to Cope with US Deployment – Spokesman," BBC, 27 December 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "USFK Unveils Massive Force Reinforcement Program," *Korea Times*, 2 June 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. to Add \$11 Billion to Spending on U.S. Forces in South Korea," Associated Press, 31 May 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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29 December 2003

Fu Ying, head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Asian Affairs Bureau, states that Beijing does not believe North Korea has a clandestine uranium enrichment program. Fu makes the statement during his meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan [Yun Yǒng Kwan] and Japanese director general of the Foreign Ministry's Asian and Oceanic Affairs Bureau Motoji Yabunaka while in Seoul to discuss North Korea's nuclear program.

—Glenn Kessler, "Chinese Not Convinced of North Korean Uranium Effort," *Washington Post*, 7 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "China Unconvinced North Korea Has Enriched Uranium Program: Report," Agence France Presse, 7 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, 8 January 2004, in "China Doubts US Views on DPRK Uranium Enrichment Program," FBIS Document ID JPP20040108000044; "U.S. Says North Korea Has HEU Program," Yonhap News Agency, 8 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 January 2004

Australia sends a delegation of government officials to Pyongyang to urge the DPRK to restart the Six-Party Talks. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer says Australia is in a good position to persuade North Korean officials because it is one of the few countries that maintains diplomatic relations with North Korea even though Canberra is a close ally of Washington. Downer also says he believes the Six-Party Talks are "the most viable mechanism for finding a peaceful and a lasting solution to the nuclear issue."

—"Australian Delegation to North Korea to Talk Nukes," Deutsche Presse Agentur, 30 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Australia Sends Delegation to DPRK for Nuclear Talks," Xinhua News Agency, 30 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 January 2004

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, referred to as "the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb," is removed from his position as advisor to the Pakistani government on nuclear affairs to "facilitate the ongoing investigations" into alleged nuclear proliferation to Iran, Libya and North Korea. The decision followed a meeting of Pakistan's Nuclear Command and Control Authority, headed by President Pervez Musharraf. Khan held his position as advisor since 2001.

—"Father of Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb' Removed," Deutsche Presse Agentur, 31 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Founder of Pakistan's Nuke Program Sacked as Advisor," Kyodo News Service, 31 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, "Pakistanis Say Nuclear Scientists Aided Iran," *Washington Post*, 24 January 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

[Back to Top](#)

2002

Early 2002

The US and South Korea have working-level discussions to develop a "roadmap" for a "package deal" to resolve

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North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD programs. The roadmap is said to be a "step-by-step package deal involving strict reciprocity."

—Park Doo-shik, "US Open to Talks with North Korea," *Chosun Ilbo*, 8 February 2002, <http://english.chosun.com>; Park Tu Shik, "Taebuk Kibonjŏngch'aek 'Road Map' Han'gug'e Chŏndal/Mi'e 'Ŏmgyŏkhan Sanghojuŭi' Chŏg'yong," *Chosun Ilbo*, 7 February 2002, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

Early January 2002

The South Korean government learns from Chinese sources that Kim Jong Il might visit China during mid February 2002. Speculation is that Kim is concerned the United States will expand the war on terrorism to North Korea. Other analysts believe Kim might visit China to address North Korea's severe foreign exchange shortage, which according to the *Chosun Ilbo*, is due in part to North Korea's declining missile exports.

—Yi Kyo-kwan, "Kim Chong-il To Possibly Visit Beijing Around February," *Chosun Ilbo*, 29 January 2002, in "'Source' Says DPRK Leader To 'Possibly' Visit China, Vietnam in Jan-Feb," FBIS Document ID: KPP20020129000114; Lee Kyo Kwan, "Kim Chŏng Il Ddo Chungguk Kana...2 Wŏl Kke Beijing Pangmun Chang Jjŏ Min Kwa Hoedam Kanŭngsŏng," *Chosun Ilbo*, 30 January 2002, p. 53, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

6 January 2002

A South Korean government source says that IAEA officials will enter North Korea on 12 January 2002 to visit Isotope Production Laboratory in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.

—"IAEA Delegation to Visit North, on 12th," *Joongang Ilbo*, 7 January 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; Cho Jŏng Jin, "IAEA Taepyodan 12 Il Pangbuk," *Segye Ilbo*, 7 January 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

7 January 2002

The IAEA announces that three inspectors will visit the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex in North Korea 15-19 January 2002. The inspectors will visit the Isotope Production Laboratory, but the IAEA emphasizes the visit will not constitute an "inspection." This will be the first IAEA visit to the lab, which is used to produce nuclear materials for medical and industrial uses.

—"IAEA Team to Visit North Korean Nuclear Facilities," WorldAtom Press Release, PR 2002/01, 10 January 2002, www.iaea.org; Vanessa Gera, "UN to Visit N. Korea Nuclear Site-AP," *Joongang Ilbo*, 8 January 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; "IAEA Taepyodan 15 Il Yŏngbyŏn Haekshisŏl Pangmun," *Joongang Ilbo*, 8 January 2002, www.joins.com; "IAEA Tae'p'yodan 15 Il Yŏngbyŏn Haekshisŏl Pangmun," Yonhap News Agency, 7 January 2002, www.yonhapnews.co.kr; Agence France Presse, 7 January 2002, in "IAEA Inspection Team Reportedly To Visit DPRK 12 Jan," FBIS Document ID KPP20020107000039.

7 January 2002

The *Sankei Shimbun* reports that Russia plans to build a nuclear power plant near its border with China and North Korea, and that energy would be provided to North Korea and China. The report says that Russia plans to complete the construction of the plant by 2010.

—Kim Hee-Sung, "Russia to Build Nuclear Plant at Borderline of N. Korea and China," *Joongang Ilbo*, 7 January 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; Kim Yong Su, "Rŏ, Pukhan-Chungguk Kukkyŏng'e Wŏnjŏn Kŏnsŏl Ch'ujin," *Joongang Ilbo*, 7 January 2002, www.joins.com.

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13 January 2002

US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage says on Radio Free Asia that North Korea must decide soon whether to accept IAEA inspections. Unless North Korea accepts inspections, Armitage says the Agreed Framework will collapse.

—"Haeksach'al Anbad'ŭ'myŏn Geneva Hab'ŭi Kkaejilsudo," *Chosun Ilbo*, 14 January 2002, www.chosun.com;

24 January 2002

US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton says, "The fact that governments which sponsor terrorist groups are also pursuing chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs is alarming and cannot be ignored. Countries such as North Korea and Iraq must cease their violations of NPT and allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to do its work. Further, I caution those who think that they can pursue nuclear weapons without detection: the United States and its allies will prove you wrong." Bolton makes his comments during the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In response, North Korea's delegate says that North Korea was permitting international inspections of its nuclear facilities.

—Elizabeth Olson, "U.S. Warns of Arms Threat, Citing North Korea and Iraq," *New York Times*, 26 January 2002, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com>; Tim Witcher, "North Korea to be Feature of Bush's Asia Visit," Agence France Presse, 25 January 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com>; "US, South Korea and Japan Discuss North Korea Moves," Agence France Presse, 25 January 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com>; Peter Slevin, "U.S. Backs Rules Against Arms Spread," *Washington Post*, 25 January 2002, p. A15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com>.

25 January 2002

The Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) conclude a one-day meeting in Seoul. The TCOG consists of government officials from the United States, South Korea, and Japan that meet to coordinate policy towards North Korea. The participants say North Korea will be an important topic during George W. Bush's trip to Asia in February, and that Bush's visits would "positively contribute to peace and stability on and around the Korean peninsula." A South Korean government official later reveals that the US delegation informs the Japanese and South Korean participants that the Bush administration will now require "step-by-step reciprocity from North Korea, and will spell out how North Korea will be punished or rewarded for future conduct."

—Tim Witcher, "North Korea to be Feature of Bush's Asia Visit," Agence France Presse, 25 January 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com>; "US, South Korea and Japan Discuss North Korea Moves," Agence France Presse, 25 January 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com>; "U.S. to Keep North on a Short Leash," *Joongang Ilbo*, 7 February 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; Jong-Heon Lee, "Bush Visit Seen as Peace Builder," United Press International, 25 January 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com>; "TCOG Meeting," *Korea Update*, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 2002, p. 3.

28 January 2002

Cho Myŏng Rok, First Vice Chairman of the National Defense Committee, meets with China's new ambassador to North Korea. [Note: Cho has reportedly been suffering from kidney disease.]

—"Cho Myŏng Rok Ch'ongjŏngch'i'gukchang'i Chunggukshin'imdaesarŭl Manatta," Korean Central News Agency, 28 January 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency, 28 January 2002, in "DPRK's KCNA: Director of KPA

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General Political Department Meets New Chinese Ambassador," FBIS Document ID KPP20020128000101; Kim Tu Hwan, "Puk Cho Myŏng Rok, U Dŭng Hŏ Chungguktaesa Manna," *Joongang Ilbo*, 29 January 2002, www.joins.com;

29 January 2002

During his State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush says North Korea is part of an "axis of evil."

—George W. Bush, "The President's State of the Union Address," 29 January 2002, www.whitehouse.gov.

29 January 2002

The *Joongang Ilbo* reports that North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sŏk Chu is rumored to be seriously ill. Kang, 63 and last seen in public on 6 December 2001, has been in charge of relations with the United States and other Western countries. Kang was the senior North Korean delegate during the negotiations in 1994 for the Agreed Framework.

—Ch'oi Won-ki, "Kang Sok-chu, Expert in Diplomacy Toward the United State (sic), Is Reportedly Sick," *Joongang Ilbo*, 28 January 2002, in "DPRK's Vice ForMin Kang Sok-chu Reportedly Sick," FBIS Document ID:

KPP20020128000119; Ch'oe Wŏn Ki, "Tae'mioegyot'ong Kang Sŏk Chu Wabyŏngsol," *Joongang Ilbo*, 29 January 2002, p. 13, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

30 January 2002

A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry denounces the remarks of US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton made on 24 January in Geneva. The spokesman says Bolton's suggestion that North Korea's nuclear program poses a threat to international security is "nothing but a provocative remark by a person totally ignorant of the contents of the Agreed Framework, to say nothing of the core of the nuclear issue." The spokesman also says the United States "has not properly discharged its obligations under the Agreed Framework."

—"U.S. State Under Secretary's Remarks Blasted," Korean Central News Agency, 30 January 2002, www.kcna.co.jp;

"Mi'gungmusŏng Ch'agwan'ŭi Sach'alsuyong Ch'okkubal'ŏn'ŭl Kyut'an / Chosŏn'oemusŏngdaebyŏn'in," Korean Central News Agency, 30 January 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Li Zhengyu, "DPRK Condemns United States for Making Allegations that the DPRK Nuclear Issue Is Threatening the International Community," Xinhua News Agency, 30 January 2002, in "DPRK FM Spokesman 30 Jan Condemns US Allegations on DPRK Nuclear Issue," FBIS Document ID: CCp20020130000177.

30 January 2002

Bush administration officials say that although George W. Bush labeled North Korea as part of an "axis of evil" in his 29 January State of the Union Address, the United States is not planning imminent military action against North Korea, Iran, nor Iraq.

—David E. Sanger, "Bush Aides Say Tough Tone Put Foes On Notice," *New York Times*, 31 January 2002, p. 1; Sally Buzbee, "Rumsfeld: U.S. Watching 'Axis of Evil'," Associated Press, in *Joongang Ilbo*, 1 February 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; Kim Chin and O Yŏng Hwan, "Mi'guk 'Bush Pal'ŏn Kunsahaengdong Imbak Ddŭs Anida'," *Joongang Ilbo*, 31 January 2002, www.joins.com;

31 January 2002

A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement in response to George W. Bush's State of

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the Union Address on 29 January. The spokesman blames the US economic recession, terrorist attacks, and other US problems on the "unilateral and self opinionated foreign policy, political immaturity and moral leprosy of the Bush administration." He says, "There has been no precedent in the modern history of DPRK-US relations that in his policy speech the US President made undisguised threatening remarks on aggression and threat against the DPRK, an independent and sovereign state. This is, in fact, little short of declaring war against the DPRK." He also says, "The option to 'strike' imprudently advocated by the United States is not a monopoly."

—"Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry Slams Bush's Accusations," Korean Central News Agency, 31 January 2002, www.kcan.co.jp; Bush'ŭi <Nyöndu'gyosö>nün Uri'e Taehan Sönjönp'ogo / Chosönoemusöngdaebyön'in Söngmyöng," 31 January 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Seo Soo-min, "NK Likens Bush's Remarks to Declaration of War," *Korea Times*, 1 February 2002, www.koreatimes.co.kr; David R. Sands, "North Korea Assails 'Axis' Label," *Washington Times*, 1 February 2002, p.1.

31 January 2002

US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice tells the Conservative Political Action Conference that North Korea is "the world's number one merchant for ballistic missiles. Rice says the United States has offered a "road map to for reciprocal steps that would enable North Korea to take a better course." However, she adds, "We've had no serious response from Pyongyang."

—Condoleezza Rice, "Remarks by the National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice to CPAC," 31 January 2002, www.cpac.org; "North Korea Leads World in Ballistic Missile Exports," *World Tribune.com*, 4 February 2002, www.worldtribune.com; Peter Slevin, "Powell Offers Reassurance to South Korea; U.S. Remains Willing to Hold Talks With North, Seoul Counterpart Is Told," *Washington Post*, 2 February 2002, p. A19, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com>; George Gedda, "Powell Plans Talks with Leaders from Europe, the Middle East and Asia on Terror-Fighting Policy," Associated Press, 1 February 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com>; Bob Deans, "Despite 'Axis of Evil' Status, U.S. Open to Talks with North Korea," Cox News Service, 1 February 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com>; Choi Won-ki, "North Korea Refused Talks with U.S." *Joongang Ilbo*, 4 February 2002, <http://english.joins.com>.

4 February 2002

North Korean print and broadcast media criticize the US policy towards North Korea, saying the "US is using the nuclear issue as a pretext to escalate its hard line policy and ignite a second Korean war." A North Korean television broadcast says that George W. Bush's "axis of evil" remark in the State of the Union Address is an "unbearable insult to a sovereign nation."

—"U.S. Accusation Against DPRK over 'Nuclear Issue' Refuted," Korean Central News Agency, 4 February 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mi'guk'ŭi <Haengmunjae> Rŭl Kölgo Tŭ'nüngös'ün Chönjaenggwa Korip'ül Wihan'göt / Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 4 February 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Kim Hee-sung, "'Axis of Evil' Called a U.S. Ploy to Gain Hegemony," *Joongang Ilbo*, 5 February 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; Ch'oe Sönn Yöng, "'Mi, Haengmunjaero Puk Korip Noryö' <Puk Shinmun>," Yonhap News Agency, 4 February 2002, www.yonhapnews.co.kr.

4 February 2002

The *Chosun Ilbo* reports that intelligence officials believe about 50-60 percent of North Korea's ballistic missile

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warheads are armed with chemical weapons. [Note: The report is ambiguous about the "intelligence officials," but they are almost certainly South Korea.]

—Yu Yong Wŏn, "Pukhanŭi Saenghwahangmugi Poyushilt'ae...Hwahangmugiryang 5000t 'Segye 3 Wi'," *Chosun Ilbo*, 4 February 2002, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Yu Yong-won, *Chosun Ilbo*, 3 February 2002, in "DPRK reportedly Ranks Third in Possessing Chemical Weapons," FBIS Document ID: KPP20020203000047.

5 February 2002

Former South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Han Sŭng Su, who was dismissed yesterday, says that the United States has informed South Korea that North Korea has continued to develop and export missiles. Han says that before 11 September 2001, North Korea's WMD were not such a problem, but now the US basic strategy is that North Korea's WMD programs must be stopped. Han also says that the United States is not likely to extend the next stage of the "war on terrorism" to North Korea.

—Oh Young-hwan, "North Persists in Arms Sales, U.S. Tells Seoul," *Joongang Ilbo*, 6 February 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; O Yŏng Hwan, "Pukhan Missile Such'ul Kyesok Chŭngga," *Joongang Ilbo*, 6 February 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Park Tu Shik, "Han Sŭng Su Chŏn Oegyo 'Mi, Ag'ŭi Ch'uk Palŏn Kŭ'gŏ'itta," *Chosun Ilbo*, 6 February 2002, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Yonhap News Agency, 5 February 2002, in "ROK's Yonhap: Outgoing Minister Says U.S. Unlikely To Take War on Terror to N.K." FBIS Document ID: KPP20020205000069; Hwang Chae Hun, "Mi 'Puk Missile Such'ulhwaktae' T'ongbo," Yonhap News Agency, 5 February 2002, www.yonhapnews.co.kr.

5 February 2002

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US Secretary of State Colin Powell says that George W. Bush's reference to Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an "axis of evil" was "not a rhetorical flourish—he meant it." Powell also says, "it does not mean that we are ready to invade anyone or that we are not willing to engage in dialogue. Quite the contrary." Committee Chairman Joseph Biden says, "I agree with the president that each nation poses a security threat to the United States and to the civilized world, but they are hardly identical or allied with each other, and our policies toward them have up to now involved very different strategies."

—Richard Wolffe, "Powell Acts to Defend Policy on Rogue States 'Axis of Evil' Bush Stance Challenged," *Financial Times* (London), 6 February 2002, p. 8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com>; Todd S. Purdum, "Powell Says U.S. Plans To Work Out Binding Arms Pact," *New York Times*, 6 February 2002, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com>; "Powell, Puk-MI Taehwa 'Kong'ŭn Ije Pukhan'e' (Chonghap)," Yonhap News Agency, 6 February 2002, www.yonhapnews.co.kr.

5 February 2002

Yang Sŏng Ch'ŏl, South Korean ambassador to the United States, says that recent harsh comments from US officials towards North Korea indicates that must have significant evidence that North Korea is selling weapons of mass destruction. Yang says relations between the United States and North Korea could turn around if North Korea clarifies its position on WMD and allays fears that it possesses nuclear weapons.

—Oh Young-hwan, "North Persists in Arms Sales, U.S. Tells Seoul," *Joongang Ilbo*, 6 February 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; Park Doo-shik, "US Steps Up NK Missile Monitoring," *Chosun Ilbo*, 5 February 2002,

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<http://english.chosun.com>; "Puk Missile Munjae Choyul Chaengjŏmhwa-2," Yonhap News Agency, 5 February 2002, www.yonhapnews.co.kr.

5 February 2002

The *Rodong Sinmun* criticizes George W. Bush's State of the Union Address as being "little short of declaring war." The official daily of the Korean Workers' Party says the "options to 'strike' on the lips of the US is not its monopoly."

—"Bush's Accusation against DPRK Under Fire," Korean Central News Agency, 5 February 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "<T'agyŏk>üi Sŏnt'aekkwŏn'ün Mi'guk'üi Tukjŏmmul'i Anida / Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 5 February 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

5 February 2002

Three US House members, Benjamin Gilman, Christopher Cox, and Edward Markey, send a letter to President Bush asking him to reconsider the implementation of the Agreed Framework.

—"Lawmakers Call on Bush to Cancel Transfer to NKorea (sic) of Light Water Reactors," Agence France Presse, 13 February 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Three Lawmakers Seek Reevaluation of Commitment to Pyongyang," Associated Press, 7 February 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 February 2002

In testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, CIA Director George Tenet says North Korea is exporting ballistic missiles and missile components to countries like Iran, Libya, Syria, and Egypt. Tenet says North Korea could have a ballistic missile that could reach the United States by 2015, and that North Korea has enough plutonium for one or two nuclear bombs. According to Tenet, North Korea is using the profits from its missile exports to further develop its missiles, and probably to covertly develop WMD.

—James Risen, "A Nation Challenged: The Threat; Al Qaeda Still Able to Strike U.S., Head of C.I.A. Says," *New York Times*, 7 February 2002, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Associated Press, "Countries, Groups and Others that Are Considered Risks to U.S. Security," *St. Petersburg Times*, 7 February 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Han Ki Hŭng, "Mi CIA Kukchang 'Puk 2015 Nyŏn Mibont'o Konggyŏk Kanŭng," *Donga Ilbo*, 7 February 2002, www.donga.com.

6 February 2002

South Korean President Kim Dae Jung says that nuclear and missile problems must be resolved peacefully. Kim says that recently North Korea has been harshly criticizing the United States because of the US attitude towards North Korea. Kim also says that there can be policy differences among allies, but that anti-Americanism is not in Korea's interest.

—Chŏng Jae Yong, "Kim Taet'ongnyŏng, 'Haek, Missile Munjae, Taehwaro Pulŏya'," *Joongang Ilbo*, 6 February 2002, www.joins.com; Yonhap News Agency, 6 February 2002, in "ROK Leader Says 'Anti-US' Voices 'No Help' To ROK-DPRK Relations," FBIS Document ID 200202060000121; Chŏng Chae Yong, "Kim Taet'ongnyŏng 'Taehwaro P'ulŏya'-1," Yonhap News Agency, 6 February 2002, www.yonhapnews.co.kr; "President Urges Dialogue with North Korea," *Chosun Ilbo*, 7 February 2002, <http://english.chosun.com>.

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6 February 2002

Im Dong Wŏn, national security and unification advisor to the South Korean president, says that North Korea poses a threat to security on the Korean peninsula, but the threat must be reduced through peaceful dialogue. Im says that the use of military force will only result in the danger of igniting another Korean war.

—Kwŏn Kyŏng Bok, "Im T'ŭkpo 'P'yŏnghwajŏgŭro Anbowihyŏp Haeso'," Yonhap News Agency, 6 February 2002, www.yonhapnews.net.

7 February 2002

North Korean UN Ambassador Pak Kil Yŏn says that North Korea is prepared to renew dialogue with the United States even though President George W. Bush labeled North Korea as a member of the "axis of evil." Park says that Bush's speech amounts to a declaration of war, which surprised North Korea and caused confusion in governments around the world. Park says that if the United States has a hostile or confrontational approach to North Korea, then North Korea will respond in similar ways. On the other hand, Park says, "Nice words will be answered by nice words."

—Edith M. Lederer, "North Korea Takes Wait-And-See Tone," Associated Press, in *Joongang Ilbo*, 11 February 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; "UN Chujae Puktaesa 'Ŏnjedŭn Puk-Mi Taehwa Yongŭi'," *Joongang Ilbo*, 8 February 2002, www.joins.com; Zeno Park, "North Korea Calls US 'Empire of Devil'," Agence France Presse, 8 February 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com>.

7 February 2002

South Korean Unification Minister Chŏn Se Hyŏn tells the National Assembly that the South Korean government will seek the opening of a direct air route between North Korea and South Korea to facilitate the construction of the LWRs in North Korea under the Agreed Framework.

—Yonhap News Agency, 7 February 2002, in "ROK's Yonhap: Gov't Looking to Open Direct Air Route to N.K. for KEDO Project," FBIS Document ID KPP20020207000049.

8 February 2002

The Korean Central News Agency criticizes President Bush's defense budget, saying "Though it has the largest number of weapons of mass destruction in the world, the US is sharply increasing military expenditure. This clearly proves that the US, 'empire of devil,' is posing a grave threat to the world peace and stability."

—"KCNA on U.S. National Defense Budget," Korean Central News Agency, 8 February 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Segye'rŭl Wihyŏpha'nŭn Mi'gug'ŭi Kukpang'yesan / Chosŏnjungangt'ongshin Ronp'yŏng," Korean Central News Agency, 8 February 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Zeno Park, "North Korea Calls US 'Empire of Devil'," Agence France Presse, 8 February 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com>.

8 February 2002

North Korea cancels the proposed visits of four former US ambassadors to South Korea. The US delegation was to include William Gleysteen, Richard Walker, Donald Gregg, Stephen Bosworth, and University of California Professor Emeritus Robert Scalapino. North Korea proposed the visit in recent months as a way to maintain a channel of communication with the United States. Park Kil Yŏn, North Korean Ambassador to the UN, says he received instruction from Pyongyang to cancel the trip, but he does not link the move to George W. Bush's State of

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the Union Address. However, Gleysteen and Scalapino say Bush's speech is clearly the reason for the cancellation.
—Micheal Gordon, "A Nation Challenged: Korea; North Korea Cancels Trip By 4 Experts From the U.S.," *New York Times*, 9 February 2002, p. A9, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Vanessa Palo, "N. Korea Tells US Envoys Not to Come," Associated Press, in *Joongang Ilbo*, 11 February 2002, <http://english.joins.com>.

8 February 2002

South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ch'oe Sŏng Hong tells the National Assembly that South Korea will take issue with North Korea's WMD programs when inter-ministerial talks resume. Ch'oe says that South Korea has told North Korea to address the suspicions surrounding its missile and WMD programs during the June 2000 summit and other occasions.

—Yonhap News Agency, 9 February 2002, in "ROK's Yonhap: Seoul to Issue Direct Appeal to Pyongyang over WMD," FBIS Document ID KPP20020209000014.

11 February 2002

In response to CIA Director George Tenet's testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Korean Central News Agency says North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction is "non-existent." KCNA says the information provided by the CIA has "always been nothing but sophism designed to slander and do harm to other countries."

—"KCNA on CIA Chief's Remarks," Korean Central News Agency, 11 February 2002, www.kcna.co.jp;
"Mijungangjŏngboguk Changgwan'ŭi Moryag'in <Taeryangsallyungmugigaebal> Mangbal / Chosŏnjungangt'ongshin Ronp'yŏng," Korean Central News Agency, 11 February 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

11 February 2002

According to a South Korean government source, snowfall this winter has been below normal, which will have a negative effect on North Korea's hydroelectric power generation later this year.

—Chu Yong Sŏng, "Puk Ol Kŏlch'ŏl Chŏllyŏk Shimhae," Yonhap News Agency, 11 February 2002, www.yonhapnews.co.kr.

11 February 2002

The *Mainichi Shimbun* reports that the LWRs under construction in North Korea will be delayed beyond the target date of 2003, and will only be completed by 2008 if the project progresses well from now on. According to the report, the delay in construction might increase costs.

—Kim Yong Su, "Taepuk Kyŏngsuro Kŏnsŏl Bballaya 2008 Nyŏn Ihu," *Joongang Ilbo*, 11 February 2002, www.joins.com; "Keisuiroteikyo, Ohhabaokure," *Mainichi Shimbun*, 11 February 2002, www.mainichi.co.jp.

12 February 2002

In testimony before the Senate Budget Committee, Secretary of State Colin Powell says the United States has no plans to start a war with North Korea. Powell says, "We want to see a dialogue. We want to contain North Korea's activities with respect to proliferation, and we are going to keep the pressure on them." Powell adds that George W. Bush will offer to restart dialogue with North Korea without conditions.

—Alan Sipress, "Powell: No Plans Now for War With 'Axis'; Diplomatic, Political Approaches Stressed," *Washington*

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Post, 13 February 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com>; Michael R. Gordon and David E. Sanger, "A Nations Challenged: Iraq; Powell Says U.S. Is Weighing Ways to Topple Hussein," *New York Times*, 13 February 2002, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com>; Barry Schweid, "Powell Says President Will Offer North Korea Unconditional Talks," Associated Press, 12 February 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com>; Xinhua News Agency, "U.S. to Offer Unconditional Talks to DPRK: Powell," Xinhua General News Service, 12 February 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com>; Kim Jin, "U.S. Hopes to Draw North from Isolation, Powell Says," *Joongang Ilbo*, 14 February 2002, <http://english.joins.com>.

13 February 2002

During a hearing held by a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, Secretary of State Colin Powell says the Agreed Framework will come to a halt unless North Korea allows safeguards inspections. Representatives Christopher Cox, Benjamin Gilman, and Edward Markey say they have introduced legislation to deny funding for KEDO.

—"Lawmakers Urge Scuttling of U.S. Pact with North Korea," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 13 February 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, "U.S. Threatens to Stop KEDO Plan if N. Korea Denies Inspections," Japan Economic Newswire, 13 February 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Ju Yong-joon, "US Reps Urge Reconsidering NK Reactor Project," *Chosun Ilbo*, 14 February 2002, <http://english.chosun.com>; Kim Chin, "Powell 'Pukhan Haeksach'al Köbu'ddaen Kyöngsuro Chiwön Chungdan," *Joongang Ilbo*, 14 February 2002, www.joins.com; "Mimaep'a, 'Pukkyöngsuro Indo Ch'wiso'," *Munhwa Ilbo*, 14 February 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

15 February 2002

North Korean radio reports "there is no reason for our nuclear and missile policies to attract suspicion." The broadcast says these programs are "transparent, clear and are intended for self-defense." The report also calls George W. Bush the "most ferocious war fanatic among previous US presidents and an ignorant political hooligan."

—Kim Ho-sam, 15 February 2002, in "DPRK Calls Bush 'Ignorant Political Hooligan,' Decries US 'Hypocrisy' Over Missile Threat," FBIS Document ID KPP20020215000205.

16 February 2002

AFI Research reports that North Korea and Iraq have cooperated in the "area of nuclear weapons technology." [Note: This report is unsubstantiated.]

—AFI Research, "The Axis of Evil—Why These Three Countries?" A MILNET Analysis, 16 February 2002, www.milnet.com.

20 February 2002

During his visit to South Korea, George W. Bush says the United States has no intention of invading North Korea. Bush also says that he supports Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine policy" of engagement with North Korea, and that Washington is prepared to renew dialogue with Pyongyang.

—O P'ung Yönn, Kim Su Chöng, and Hong Wönn Sang, "Bush, 'Pukch'imgong Ŭisa Öpta'," *Taehan Maeil*, 21 February 2002, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Kim Min Bae, "Bush 'Pukch'imgong Ŭisa Öptta'," *Chosun Ilbo*, 20 February 2002, www.chosun.com;

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21 February 2002

Nucleonics Week reports that North Korea "will now concede there are apparent discrepancies requiring explanation between its 1992 declared nuclear inventory and other evidence from the US and the IAEA." The report says that according to North Korea, the discrepancies "could at least be partially reconciled by the past operation history of the Isotope Production Laboratory in Yŏngbyŏn-kun." North Korea admits it separated a few hundred grams of plutonium at the lab in 1975, but denies any was separated after that.

—Mark Hibbs, "North Korea Points to Isotope Lab as Key to Inventory Discrepancies," *Nucleonics Week*, Vol. 43, No. 8, 21 February 2002, www.mhenergy.com.

21 February 2002

During a press conference in Beijing, President George W. Bush says that he has asked Chinese President Jiang Zemin to help the United States renew bilateral talks with North Korea.

—"Bush Seeks Jiang's Help in NKorea Dialogue," *Agence France Presse*, 21 February 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lee Sang Min, "Bush 'Puk-Midaehwa Chaegae'e Chung Chiwŏn Yoch'ŏng'," *Joongang Ilbo*, 21 February 2002, www.joins.com;

22 February 2002

North Korea's Foreign Ministry releases a statement that rejects George W. Bush's call for dialogue with the United States. The English version reads, "We are not willing to have contact with his clan which is trying to change by force of arms the system chosen by the Korean people." However, the Korean version of the statement is slightly different, "While the US has no intention of recognizing our system, we do not need any proposals for a dialogue that is looking for a pretext to invade [North Korea]."

—"DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Bush's Slanders," *Korean Central News Agency*, 22 February 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Uri Ch'eje'e Taehan Bush'ŭi Mangbal'ŭn Uriwŭi Taehwabujŏngsŏn'ŏn / Chosŏn'oemusŏngdaebyŏn'in Tamhwa," *Korean Central News Agency*, 22 February 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Kim Yŏng Shik, "Puk, Bush Taehwaje'ŭi Kŏbu," *Donga Ilbo*, 22 February 2002, www.donga.com.

27 February 2002

The US and South Korea complete the first of a joint study on confidence-building measures (CBMs) with North Korea to address Pyongyang's ballistic missiles, WMD programs and conventional forces. The initial part of the study is said to have 32 items to be proposed for CBMs with North Korea. The joint study team reportedly began the study in June 2001.

—Jong-Heon Lee, "U.S. Moves to Tackle Conventional Weapons," *United Press International*, 28 February 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; C.W. Lim, "US and South Korea Study Ways to Ease Tensions with North," *Agence France Presse*, 28 February 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kim Min-Seok, "U.S. to Join Effort to Limit North's Arms," *Joongang Ilbo*, 28 March 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; Yu Yong Wŏn, "[Han-Mi] Taebuk Kunsashilloejoch'i Maryŏn...Hotline Tŭng Hyŏpsang," *Chosun Ilbo*, 27 February 2002, www.chosun.com; Kim Kwi Kŭn, "[Han-Mi, CBM Kongdong'yŏn'gusŏnggwawa Chŏnmang]," *Chosun Ilbo*, 27 February 2002, www.chosun.com; Kim Kwi Kŭn, "Hanmi, Kunsashilloejoch'i Kongcongdaeŭng Hab'ŭi," *Chosun Ilbo*, 27 February 2002, www.chosun.com; "Military Confidence-Building," *Korea Now*, Vol. 31, No. 5, 9 March 2002, p. 9.

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5 March 2002

General Thomas Schwartz, Commander in Chief US Forces, Korea, tells the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Agreed Framework is "the roadmap to the future in my opinion. It is serving us well at this time. It stopped their nuke development, there is no doubt about it." However, Schwartz also says that North Korea "still refuses to comply with nuclear nonproliferation protocols."

—"Statement of General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command & Commander, United States Forces Korea, before the 107th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 5 March 2002, p. 9, www.senate.gov; "North Korea Expanding Missile Sales: US General," Agence France Presse, 5 March 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Chu Yong Chung, "[Schwartz Chŭng'ŏn] 'Puk Haeksach'al Köbuhamyŏn Wigisanghwang Olsudo'," *Chosun Ilbo*, 6 March 2002, www.chosun.com.

3 April 2002

North Korea and Russia sign an agreement for scientific exchanges during 2002-2004.

—Ch'oe Sŏn Yŏng, "Puk-Rŏ, Munhwa.Kwahakkyoryugyeheksŏ Ch'egyŏl," *Joongang Ilbo*, 6 April 2002, www.join.com;

3 April 2002

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says that North Korea has decided to resume suspended negotiations with KEDO. According to the spokesman, US and North Korean officials met in New York on 13 and 20 March to discuss bilateral relations and the resumption of dialogue.

—"Foreign Ministry Spokesman on DPRK-U.S. Contacts," Korean Central News Agency, 3 April 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Chomi New York Chŏpch'ok Chinhaeng, KEDO Waŭi Hyŏpsang'ül Chaegae/Chosŏn Oemusŏngdaebyŏn'in," Korean Central News Agency, 3 April 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

26 April 2002

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Lt. General Leon J. LaPorte says that the Agreed Framework has proven successful in freezing North Korea's nuclear program. In absence of the Agreed Framework, North Korea could have produced weapons-grade plutonium for dozens of nuclear weapons."

—"Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Leon J. LaPorte, USA Nominee for the Position of Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/Commander, United States Forces Korea," April 2002, www.senate.gov; Jim Garamone, "Korea, Pacific Command Nominees Testify," American Forces Press Service, 26 April 2002, www.defenselink.mil.

2 June 2002

National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il, Kim Il Ch'ŏl, Minister of the People's Armed Forces, and Vice Marshal Kim Yŏng Ch'un, chief of the general staff of the Korean People's Army, and other high-ranking officials meet with a Russian military delegation from the Far Eastern Military District. The Russian delegation is led by Colonel General Yuri Yakubov, the commander of the district. Andrei Karlov, the Russian ambassador to North Korea, and Vladislav Prokopenko, the Russian military attaché from the embassy also attend the meetings. The delegation arrived in Pyongyang on 31 May, and was preceded by a "Red-Flag Ensemble" that arrived on 27 May.

—"Kim Jong Il Meets with Russian Military Delegation," Korean Central News Agency, 2 June 2002,

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www.kcna.co.jp; "Kim Jong Il Ch'ongbisŏ Russia Ryŏnbgangmuryŏk Wŏndonggun'gwan'gudaep'yodan'ül Chŏpkyŏn," Korean Central News Agency, 2 June 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Chief of KPA general Staff Meets Russian Military Delegation," Korean Central News Agency, 2 June 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Kim Yŏng Ch'un Ch'ongch'ammojang'i Russia Ryŏnbgangmuryŏk Wŏndonggun'gwan'gudaep'yodan'ül Mannatda," Korean Central News Agency, 2 June 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Delegation of Far Eastern Military District of Russia Here," Korean Central News Agency, 31 May 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Russia Ryŏnbgangmuryŏk Wŏndonggun'gwan'gudaep'yodan Toch'ak," Korean Central News Agency, 31 May 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Russian Military Delegation Feted," Korean Central News Agency, 1 June 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Inminmuryŏkpu'esŏ Russia Ryŏnbgangmuryŏk Wŏndonggun'gwan'gudaep'yodan'ül Wihayŏ Yŏnhoe Maryŏn," Korean Central News Agency, 1 June 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Delegation and Ensemble of Far Eastern Military District of Russia Here," Korean Central News Agency, 27 May 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Russia Ryŏnbgangmuryŏk Pulg'ün'giwŏndonggun'guhyŏpchudan Toch'ak," Korean Central News Agency, 27 May 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "<Pukhandanshin> Russia Kunhyŏpchudan Pyongyang Toch'ak," Yonhap News Agency, 27 May 2002, www.yonhapnews.net; "N.K. Defense Minister Meets with Russian Military Delegation," *Joongang Ilbo*, 3 June 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; "Puk Kim Il Ch'ŏl, Rŏgun Taep'yodan Manna," *Chosun Ilbo*, 3 June 2002, <http://nk.chosun.com>.

14 June 2002

Ambassador Jack Pritchard, Special Envoy for Negotiations with the DPRK, meets with Ambassador Pak Kil Yŏn at North Korea's Permanent Mission to the UN in New York. Pritchard asks the Mission if there are any convenient dates for a US delegation to visit North Korea. On 25 June, the United States informs the Mission that a delegation could be prepared to visit Pyongyang on 10 July. On 27 June, the US side asks for a confirmation of the date, and for a timely response in consideration of time needed for travel arrangements. Following the naval clash between North and South Korea on 29 June, and the lack of a response from Pyongyang, the United States cancels the proposed visit on 1 July 2002.

—Press Statement, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, "Status of Political Dialogue with North Korea," US Department of State, 2 July 2002, www.state.gov; Office of the Spokesman, "Taken Questions From Daily Press Briefing of June 14, 2002: North Korea – Talks in New York," US Department of State, 14 June 2002, www.state.gov; Yonhap News Agency, 28 June 2002, in "ROK's Yonhap: Washington Suggests Sending Envoy to Pyongyang Second Week of July," FBIS Document ID: KPP20020629000007; "ROK"Mi T'ŭksabangbuk Ch'ŏlhoe Kongshik Palp'yo," *Joongang Ilbo*, 3 July 2002, www.joins.com;

17 June 2002

Government delegations from the United States, Japan, and South Korea hold a Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting in San Francisco. The three sides agree about the importance of holding "comprehensive and flexible talks with North Korea." The US and Japanese delegations reaffirmed support for Kim Dae Jung's policy of engagement with Pyongyang, and for the implementation of the Agreed Framework.

—Press Statement, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, "Joint Statement by the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group," US Department of State, 18 June 2002, www.state.gov; "U.S. Hopes to Ease N. Korea Tension – AP," *Joongang Ilbo*, 19 June 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; Shim Jae-yun, "ROK Urges US to Upgrade Level for Dialogue

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with NK," *Korea Times*, 21 June 2002, www.hk.co.kr; Kim Ji-ho, "North Korea Urged to Allow International Nuclear Inspection," *Korea Herald*, 20 June 2002, www.koreaherald.co.kr.

18 June 2002

An anonymous South Korean government official says that an IAEA delegation will visit Pyongyang 26-29 June for working-level talks. The discussions are to cover the implementation of nuclear safety regulations and safeguards inspections among other issues.

—Kim Hee-sung, "IAEA Plans 5-Day Negotiation in Pyeongyang (sic)," *Joongang Ilbo*, 18 June 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; "IAEA Officials to Visit N.K. Next Week," *Korea Herald*, 19 June 2002, www.koreaherald.co.kr; Ryu Cahe Hun, "IAEA Taep'yodan 25 Il Pangbuk / 'Haeg'anjön' Shilmu Hyöpsang," *Hankryoreh Shinmun*, 19 June 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Kim Yöng Shik, "IAEA Taep'yodan Pangbuk...Puk Haeg'anjönjoch'i Ihaeng Hab'üi," *Donga Ilbo*, 19 June 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

24 June 2002

The Korean Central news Agency reports that North Korea will host the "2002 Pyongyang International Technology and Infrastructure Exhibition" 17-20 September 2002. The event will be co-sponsored by the DPRK International Exhibition Company and the Munich International Exhibition Corporation. The exhibition will display "equipment for developing the latest technology and machines and equipment to be used in building, building materials, metal, mining, transport, communications and chemical industry." [Note: Transfers of mining machines and technologies could be applied to uranium mining in North Korea. Furthermore, metallurgy technologies could possibly be applied to other aspects of nuclear bomb development.]

—"Pyongyang International Technology and Infrastructure Exhibition to Be Held," Korean Central News Agency, 24 June 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "P'yöngyang Kukcheгыöngje Mit Habugujö Chöllumhoega Chinhaeng Toenda / 9 Wöl 17 Il ~ 20 Il," Korean Central News Agency, 24 June 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

29 June 2002

North and South Korean naval forces clash in coastal waters off the west coast. One South Korean vessel is sunk and four sailors are killed. North Korean casualties are estimated to be about 30. During the skirmish, South Korean elint indicates that North Korean radars have been turned on for ship-borne anti-ship Styx missiles and for Silkworm missiles based onshore. The South Korean vessels disperse chaff as a countermeasure and reportedly break off their aggressive pursuit of the North Korean vessels in fear that a North Korea could respond with a missile attack, which would potentially result in a serious escalation of the conflict.

—"The Naval Clash on the Yellow Sea on 29 June 2002 between South and North Korea: The Situation and ROK's Position," Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 1 July 2002, www.mnd.go.kr; "Pukhan'gun'üi NLL Ch'imbömm Mit Tobal'gwa Uri Kun'üi Taeüng," Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2 July 2002, www.mnd.go.kr; "Söhae'gyojön Chosa Kyöl'gwa [Söhae'gyojönsat'ae Kwallyön Podo Briefing ('02.7.7)]," Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 7 July 2002; Ministry of National Defense, 7 July 2002, in "ROK Defense Ministry Announces Investigation Results of West Sea Clash—Graphics," FBIS Document ID: KPP20020707000007; Hwang Jang-jin, "N.K Readied Anti-Ship Missiles During Naval Exchange of Fire," *Korea Herald*, 5 July 2002, www.koreaherald.co.kr; Yonhap News Agency, 4 July 2002, in "ROK DefMin (sic) Refutes Criticism, Says DPRK Was Preparing Missile Launch in Sea Clash," FBIS Document ID: KPP20020704000034; Hwang Jang-jin, "S. Korea, U.S.

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Analyze Communications During West Sea Skirmish with N. Korea," *Korea Herald*, 1 July 2002, www.koreaherald.co.kr; Hwang Jang-jin, "South, North Exchange Fire in West Sea," *Korea Herald*, 30 June 2002, www.koreaherald.co.kr; Doug Struck, "N. Korea Sends Contradictory Signals," *Washington Post*, 1 July 2002, p. 12; Yonhap News Agency, 7 July 2002, in "ROK's Yonhap: Misinformation Causes Navy's Meager Reaction to N. K. Provocation," FBIS Document ID: KPP20020707000010; "S. Korean Military to Blame for Armed Clash in West Sea," Korean Central News Agency, 30 June 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Sŏhaemujangch'ungdolsa'gŏn Taehan Namjosŏn Tanggug'ŭi Palp'yo'nŭn Nalcho / Chosŏn'inmin'gun Haegunsaryŏngbu Taebŏn'in," Korean Central News Agency, 30 June 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "U.S. Is to Blame for Armed Clash in West Sea of Korea," Korean Central News Agency, 1 July 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Migug'ŭn Sŏhaemujangch'ungdolsa'gŏn'ŭi Ch'aeg'im'esŏ Chŏltaero Pŏs'ŏ Nalsu Őpta / Chosŏn'oemusŏngdaebyŏn'in," Korean Central News Agency, 1 July 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

July 2002

A Pakistani C-130 transport plane lands in North Korea and is loaded with missile parts for export back to Pakistan. According to Outlook India.com, the shipment includes 47 tons of special aluminum that Kahn Laboratory acquired from a British firm in Blackburn, U.K. The shipment is reportedly delivered on a Shaheen Airlines flight. [Note: The shipment is part of a suspected nuclear-for-missile barter deal between Islamabad and Pyongyang. It is not clear if Pakistan delivered nuclear materials or technologies on this flight. If the Outlook India.com report is correct, the aluminum could have come from the TTI Group, Ltd., which is the U.K. subsidiary of the Materials Technology Division of Aalberts Industries NV, which is headquartered in the Netherlands.]

—David E. Sanger, "In North Korea and Pakistan, Deep Roots of Nuclear Barter," *New York Times*, 24 November 2002, www.nytimes.com; "Pak Despatched [sic] N-Material to N Korea This July," *Outlook India.com*, 6 December 2002, www.outlookindia.com.

1 July 2002

The United States cancels a proposed visit by a US delegation to Pyongyang. On 14 June, Ambassador Jack Pritchard, Special Envoy for Negotiations with the DPRK, met with Ambassador Pak Kil Yŏn at North Korea's Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, and proposed the visit. The US State Department says the trip, which was proposed for 10 July, is no longer possible because of the Pyongyang's "failure to respond in a timely manner," and because the clash between North and South Korean naval vessels on 29 June "had created an unacceptable atmosphere in which to conduct the talks.

—Press Statement, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, "Status of Political Dialogue with North Korea," US Department of State, 2 July 2002, www.state.gov; Office of the Spokesman, "Taken Questions From Daily Press Briefing of June 14, 2002: North Korea – Talks in New York," US Department of State, 14 June 2002, www.state.gov; Vernon Loeb, "U.S. Shelves N. Korea Talks" *Washington Post*, 3 July 2002, p. 20, www.washingtonpost.com; Yonhap News Agency, 3 July 2002, in "ROK's Yonhap: Hope for U.S.-N.K. Talks Disappears Due Mostly to Naval Clash," FBIS Document ID: KPP20020703000029; "Mi T'ŭksabangbuk Ch'ŏlhoe Kongshik Palp'yo," *Joongang Ilbo*, 3 July 2002, www.joins.com;

1 July 2002

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman accuses the United States of being responsible for the 29 June naval clash between North and South Korea because the "Northern Limit Line" was set unilaterally by the United States

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and was not part of the July 1953 armistice. According to the spokesman, "the incident occurred as the South Korean naval vessels intruded into the territorial waters of the north side and fired first hundreds of rounds of bullets and shells at the patrol boats of the navy of the Korean People's Army on routine coastal guard duty."

—"U.S. Is to Blame for Armed Clash in West Sea of Korea," Korean Central News Agency, 1 July 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Migug'ün Söhaemujangch'ungdolsagön'úi Chaeg'im'esö Chöldaero Pös'ö Nalsu Öpta/Chosön'oemusöngdaebýön'in," Korean Central News Agency, 1 July 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

2 July 2002

A 25-member North Korean delegation arrives in South Korea to participate in a training program as part of the LWR construction project under the Agreed Framework. The delegation is led by Kim Yöng Il, a director in North Korea's Nuclear Safety Regulatory Committee (核安全監督委員會), and the group will receive training at the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (韓國原子力安全技術院) in Taejön. The group is scheduled to stay in South Korea until 27 July.

—Seo Hyun-jin, "N.K. Officials Her for Nuclear Reactor Training," *Korea Herald*, 3 July 2002, www.koreaherald.co.kr; "N. Korean Nuclear Experts Visit South for Safety Training," Yonhap News Agency, 3 July 2002, www.yonhapnews.net; Lee Yöng Chong, "Pukhan Kyöngsuro Anjön'yowön 25 Myöng Ipuk," *Joongang Ilbo*, 2 July 2002, www.joins.com; Mun Kwan Hyön, "Pukkyöngsuro Anjön'yowön 25 Myöng Yejöngdaero Naehan," *Joongang Ilbo*, 2 July 2002, www.joins.com;

7 July 2002

US Ambassador Thomas Hubbard says that the naval clash on 29 June appears to be a deliberate attack from North Korea, but that he expects no significant changes in bilateral relations between Washington and Pyongyang, and between Seoul and Pyongyang. Hubbard says the United States continues to support Kim Dae Jung's policy of engagement with North Korea, and he believes it is impossible to know whether Kim Jong Il was involved in the command decisions related to the sea battle.

—Kim Kwang-tae, "Naval Clash NK's 'Deliberate' Provocation: Hubbard," *Korea Times*, 8 July 2002, www.hankooki.com.

20 July 2002

The North Korean airline Air Koryo conducts the first direct inter-Korean flight to transport South Koreans working on the KEDO light water reactor project from Yangyang, Kang'wön Province, South Korea to Söndök-ri, Chöngp'yöng-kun, South Hamgyöng Province, North Korea.

—"DPRK Plane Makes Second Inter-Korean Direct Air Route Fly," Xinhua News Agency, 15 October 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; Lee Dong Jun, "Nambuk Chikhangno Onül Kaet'ong," *Hankook Ilbo*, 20 July 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Hwang Chae Söng, "Nambuk Chikhangno 20 Il Shihömbihaeng," *Donga Ilbo*, 17 July 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

23 July 2002

In a statement before the Senate Foreign relations Committee, Frank Gaffney, president of the Center for Security Policy, says, "It is no coincidence the regimes that are currently working hardest to attain and proliferate weapons of mass destruction are the same regimes that are the most tyrannical." Gaffney includes North Korea with Iran,

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Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba, Sudan, Algeria, and China. [Note: The statement elicits a response from the North Korean media on 14 August.]

—Frank J. Gaffney, "Nuclear Treaty with Russia," Statement before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, 23 July 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 July 2002

During a visit to Pyongyang, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov says that North Korea "is ready for a constructive dialogue with the United States and Japan, without any preconditions." Ivanov held several hours of talks with Kim Jong Il during his two-day visit.

—Karen DeYoung, "N. Korea Eager for Talks, Russia Says," *Washington Post*, 30 July 2002, p. 11, <http://washingtonpost.com>.

31 July 2002

US Secretary of State Colin Powell and North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun have a 15-minute talk over coffee at the ARF meeting in Brunei. Paek later says that North Korea has agreed to resume dialogue with the United States. Paek also holds a meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, and both parties agree to work towards the normalization of ties between Tokyo and Pyongyang.

—Don Kirk, "Powell Meets With North Korean Counterpart in Brunei," *New York Times*, 31 July 2002; Karen DeYoung, "Powell Tentative on N. Korea," *Washington Post*, 1 August 2002, p. 22; "Coffee With North Korea," *Washington Post*, 1 August 2002, p. 26; Kyodo News Service, 31 July, in "Japan, N. Korea Agree to promote Normalization," FBIS Document ID: JPP20020731000116.

August 2002

According to the *Segye Ilbo*, a South Korean daily, US satellite imagery reveals a secret underground nuclear reactor in Pyongyang. According to the report, North Korea has been operating the reactor for about 20 years, and it was built with Soviet technology. The reactor is said to be cooled with water from the Imwŏn Reservoir (林源貯水地). [Note: This report has not been substantiated, and the credibility of this report is dubious.]

—Cho Chong-chin, "Secret Underground Nuclear Power Plant in P'yongyang," *Segye Ilbo*, 5 December 2002, in "DPRK Allegedly Operates Secret Underground Nuclear Power Plant Near P'yongyang," FBIS Document ID: KPP20021205000069; Cho Chŏng Chin, "P'yŏngyang'e Pimil Chihawŏnjŏn," *Segye Ilbo*, 5 December 2002, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Kim Ki-tong, "'Underground Atomic Energy Power Plant' Shock—DPRK Nuclear Controversy Increases," *Segye Ilbo*, 5 December 2002, in "Article Warns of Recurring 1994 'Crisis' With DPRK's 'Secret' Nuclear Power Plant" FBIS Document ID: KPP20021205000077; Kim Ki Tong, "'Chihawŏnjŏn Shock'...Pukhaekp'amun Chŭngp'ok," *Segye Ilbo*, 5 December 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

August 2002

According to evidence acquired by the Bush administration, Pakistan has been assisting North Korea with its nuclear weapons program as late as August 2002. The administration believes Pakistan has been providing "nuclear technical knowledge, designs and possibly materials in exchange for missile parts up until this summer."

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—Glenn Kessler, "Pakistan's N. Korea Deals Stir Scrutiny," *Washington Post*, 13 November 2002, p. A1, www.washingtonpost.com.

7 August 2002

KEDO holds a ceremony in Kŭmho-chigu, Shinp'o to mark the pouring of concrete for the construction of the first light water reactor under the Agreed Framework. Charles Pritchard, US Representative to KEDO, attends the ceremony and says, "The United States will continue to abide by the terms of this accord [the Agreed Framework] so long as North Korea does the same." Pritchard says that under the construction schedule, KEDO will deliver key components to the first reactor in mid 2005, and therefore, North Korea and the IAEA need to begin the safeguards inspection process now.

—Charles L. Pritchard, "North Korea's Nuclear Program: Light Water Reactor Project," Remarks at KEDO Concrete Pouring Ceremony, 7 August 2002, www.state.gov; Kwon Kyung-bok, "KEDO Celebrates Next Phase Construction," *Chosun Ilbo*, 7 August 2002, <http://english.chosun.com>; Lee Young-jong, "Ceremony for Nuclear Reactors Draws Criticism," *JoongAng Ilbo*, 6 August 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; Nicholas Kralev, "North Korea to Lay Base for Reactor," *Washington Times*, 6 August 2002, p. 1, www.washtimes.com; Kyodo News Service, 6 August 2002, in "KEDO Team Leaves for Ceremony on N. Korean Nuclear Reactor," FBIS Document ID: JPP20020806000098; Seo Hyun-jin, "KEDO Leaders Discuss Nuclear Project before launch of New Construction Stage," *Korea Herald*, 6 August 2002, www.koreaherald.co.kr; "KEDO Celebrates Next Phase of Nuclear Project in N. Korea," *Korea Herald*, 7 August 2002, www.koreaherald.co.kr.

8 August 2002

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement regarding the visit of a special US envoy to Pyongyang. The spokesman says North Korea is willing to receive the envoy, but that results from the restart of bilateral dialogue would depend upon the "US dropping its hostile policy towards North Korea."

—"Spokesman of DPRK FM on Issue of Pyongyang Visit of U.S. Special Envoy," Korean Central News Agency, 8 August 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Munjenŭn Migug'i Taejosŏnjŏktaeshijŏngch'aeg'ŭl Kŭ'mandu'nŭnde Itta / Chosŏn'oemusŏngdaebyŏn'in Migukt'ŭksa P'yŏnyangbangmunmunje'e Ŏn'gŭp," Korean Central News Agency, 8 August 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Kim Hee-sung, "North Challenges 'Hostile' Policy, Reports on Envoy," *JoongAng Ilbo*, 9 August 2002, <http://english.joins.com>.

13 August 2002

A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry says that North Korea has abided by the Agreed Framework "100 percent," including the freezing of its nuclear facilities and the storage of spent fuel rods. However, the spokesman claims that the United States has not upheld its commitment to provide light water reactors by 2003, and that it is uncertain whether the reactors will be delivered by 2008. The spokesman says the most urgent issue in implementing the agreement is not safeguards inspections in North Korea, but compensation for the "loss of electricity" due to the delay in the reactor construction. An official from South Korea's Foreign Ministry downplays Pyongyang's threat to withdraw from the Agreed Framework, saying, "It is nothing but a tactic ahead of the forthcoming negotiations with the United States and will have no influence on future talks."

—"DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Nuclear Inspection," Korean Central News Agency, 13 August 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mi'gug'ŭn Choghihaeksach'al'ŭl Ddŏdŭl'gi Chŏn'e Chŏllyŏksonshil'ŭl Posanghaeya Handa /

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Chosŏn'oemusŏngdaebyŏn'in," Korean Central News Agency, 13 August 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central Broadcasting Station, 13 August 2002, in "DPRK Demands US Keep Promise in Agreed Framework to Provide LWR," FBIS Document ID: KPP20020813000098; "North rejects Call for Inspections, Threatens to Annul Geneva Framework," *Joongang Ilbo*, 13 August 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; James Brooke, "In Diplomacy With North Korea, Some Progress, And a Setback," *New York Times*, 14 August 2002, www.nytimes.com; Shim Jae-yun, "ROK Downplays NK Threat to Scrap Nuke Accord," *Korea Times*, 14 August 2002, www.koreatimes.co.kr; *Korea Times*, 14 August 2002, in "Senior FM Official: DPRK Statement on Nuclear Inspection 'Tactic' Ahead of Talks with US," FBIS Document ID: KPP20020814000120.

13 August 2002

Philip Reeker, Deputy Spokesman for the US State Department, says, "We have stated many times that the United States will continue to abide by the terms of the accord [Agreed Framework] as long as North Korea does the same. We have emphasized that it's critical for North Korea to begin cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and to meet all of its other obligations, as stipulated in the Agreed Framework."

—Philip T. Reeker, "Daily Press Briefing," US Department of State, 13 August 2002, www.state.gov; Ser Myo-ja, "U.S. Warns North on Inspections," *Joongang Ilbo*, 15 August 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; James Brooke, "In Diplomacy With North Korea, Some Progress, And a Setback," *New York Times*, 14 August 2002, www.nytimes.com; Yonhap News Agency, 14 August 2002, in "ROK's Yonhap: U.S. Stands Firm on Nuclear Inspections," FBIS Document ID: 20020814000014.

14 August 2002

In response to the Senate testimony on 23 July by Frank Gaffney, president of the Center for Security Policy, the *Rodong Sinmun* says that North Korean missiles are "not for threatening anyone."

—"U.S. Hawkish Forces' Sophism Under Fire," Korean Central News Agency, 14 August 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Shinmundŭl Sŏnjegonggyŏg'ŭi Kushil'ŭl Maryŏnhagi Wihan Mi'gukhojŏnseryŏg'ŭi Kwebyŏn'ŭl Kyut'an," Korean Central News Agency, 14 August 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

19 August 2002

The Korean Central News Agency in Pyongyang says in an editorial that the United States should compensate North Korea for construction delays under the Agreed Framework. Under the agreement, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) is to supply two light water reactors by a target date of 2003. Since the target date will be missed, North Korea believes it should be compensated for the "lost electricity due to the unilateral noncompliance with the Agreed Framework." The commentary cites "international law and the moral point of view" as reasons the United States should provide compensation, and says that US requests for North Korea to accept IAEA inspections now are unreasonable.

—"KCNA Holds U.S. Fully Accountable for Loss of Electricity in DPRK," Korean Central News Agency, 19 August 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Mi'gug'ŭn Chogihaeksach'al'ŭl Ddŏ'dŭl'gijŏn'e Chŏllyŏksonshilbosang'e Chich'eŏpshi Nasŏya Handa/ Chosŏnjungangt'ongshin Ronp'yŏng," Korean Central News Agency, 19 August 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; KCNA, 19 August 2002, in "DPRK Press Agency Demands US 'Preserve' Agreed Framework, Compensate for Energy Loss," FBIS Document ID: KPP20020819000066.

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24 August 2002

A KEDO delegation arrives in Pyongyang to discuss the ongoing storage of the spent fuel rods that were canned as part of the Agreed Framework. The delegation includes officials from the US State Department and Department of Energy. The spent fuel rods were discharged from the nuclear reactor core in Yŏngbyŏn-kun in 1994.

—Richard Boucher, Spokesman, "Daily Press Briefing," US Department of State, 26 August 2002, www.state.gov; "US Confirms Presence of Delegation in Pyongyang," *Korea Times*, 27 August 2002, www.koratimes.co.kr; "State Department Confirms Presence of Delegation in Pyongyang," *Chosun Ilbo*, 26 August 2002, <http://nk.chosun.com>.

26 August 2002

In an interview with a South Korean Internet news provider, US Ambassador Thomas Hubbard says that the United States is not ruling out the possibility of seizing North Korean missile exports on the high seas. However, Hubbard says that the United States wants to resolve its dispute with North Korea over its missile and WMD programs through dialogue.

—Son Byŏng Kwan, et al, "Panmi'gamjŏng, 'Taehwabujŏk'i Wŏn'in Yŏjungaengsa'gŏn 'Chaep'an'gwan P'ogi' Kollan [Yŏllin Interview 69] Hubbard Chuhan Midaesa," *Ohmynews*, 26 August 2002, www.ohmynews.com; Shimi Jae-yun, "US Hints at Retaliatory Steps Against NK Exports of Missiles," *Korea Times*, 26 August 2002, www.koreatimes.co.kr; Kwon Kyung-bok, "US Ambassador Notes NK Taking Right Steps," *Chosun Ilbo*, 26 August 2002, <http://nk.chosun.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 26 August 2002, in "Further on Interview with US Ambassador Hubbard to ROK on USFK, DPRK Issues," FBIS Document ID: KPP20020826000064.

26 August 2002

While in Tokyo, John Bolton, US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, says the United States has evidence that North Korea is producing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and long-range ballistic missiles. Bolton also says that North Korea is exporting missiles and missile components.

—"Bolton Fields Queries on Iraq, North Korea," August 26 Roundtable in Tokyo, 26 August 2002, www.globalsecurity.org; Natalie Obiko Pearson, "Top U.S. Arms Negotiator Accuses North Korea of Building, Exporting Weapons of Mass Destruction —AP," *Joongang Ilbo*, 27 August 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; Kwon Kyung-bok, "John R. Bolton to Visit Seoul," *Chosun Ilbo*, 27 August 2002, <http://english.chosun.com>; "Bolton Ch'a'gwan, 'Pukhan Haek-Saenghwahang'mugi Kaebal'," *Chosun Ilbo*, 27 August 2002, <http://nk.chosun.com>.

29 August 2002

In Seoul, John Bolton, US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, says that "in addition to its disturbing weapons of mass destruction activities, North Korea also is the world's foremost peddler of ballistic missile-related equipment, components, materials and technical expertise." Bolton also says that George W. Bush's reference to North Korea as being part of an "axis of evil" was "more than a rhetorical flourish—it was factually correct." Bolton says the Agreed Framework is "in serious doubt" unless safeguards inspections begin soon, and there is "little doubt that North Korea has a chemical weapons program and "one of the most robust offensive bioweapons programs on earth."

—John R. Bolton, "North Korea: A Shared Challenge to the U.S. and the Republic of Korea," 29 August 2002, www.state.gov; Sang-Hun Choe, "Negotiator Says N. Korea Well-Armed," *Washington Post*, 29 August 2002, www.washingtonpost.com; Martin Nesirky, "U.S. Official Calls N. Korea 'Peddler' of Missile Technology,"

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Washington Post, 30 August 2002, p. 17, www.washingtonpost.com; Don Kirk, "Senior U.S. Official Underscores Bush's Criticism of North Korea," *New York Times*, 29 August 2002, www.nytimes.com; Xinhua News Agency, 29 August 2002, in "Xinhua: US Urges DPRK To Accept IAEA Atomic Inspections," FBIS Document ID: CPP20020829000040; Kim Ji-ho, "U.S. Diplomats Meet Seoul Officials on North Korea, Presidential Race," *Korea Herald*, 29 August 2002, www.koreaherald.co.kr; Kwon Kyung-bok, "State Department's Bolton Visits Cheong Wa Dae," *Chosun Ilbo*, <http://english.chosun.com>; Kwon Kyung-bok, "Bolton Says NK 'Armed to the Teeth'," *Chosun Ilbo*, 29 August 2002, <http://nk.chosun.com>; "Bolton to Arrive in Seoul Today," *Korea Times*, 27 August 2002, www.koreatimes.co.kr; Hwang Chae Hun, "Hanmi 'Puk WMD' Taech'aek Hyöb'üi (Chonghap)," Yonhap News Agency, 28 August 2002, www.yonhapnews.net; Hwang Chae Hun, "Bolton, 'Geneva Hab'üi' Mirae Uryö," Yonhap News Agency, 29 August 2002, www.yonhapnews.net.

7 September 2002

The Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting is held in Seoul. The delegations from the United States, Japan and South Korea were led by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly, Director General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Hitoshi Tanaka, and Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Tae Shik. The three sides reconfirm their goal of resolving the issue of North Korea's WMD and missile programs through dialogue, and "highlight the importance of improved implementation of the Agreed Framework." [Note: Later reports indicate that while in Seoul, James Kelly briefs the South Korean government on US intelligence regarding North Korea's uranium enrichment program.]

—"Korea - Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group Joint Statement," Press Statement, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, US Department of State, 9 September 2002, www.state.gov; "ROK, US, Japan Positively Assess Pyongyang's Move Toward Dialogue," *Korea Times*, 9 September 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "ROK, US, Japan Launch Trilateral Talks on NK," *Korea Times*, 7 September 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, "U.S., S. Korea Express Support Koizumi's Visit," Japan Economic Newswire, 7 September 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kim Ji-ho, "Three Nations to Discuss Koizumi's Visit," *Korea Herald*, 6 September 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lee Chong Hun, "[Puk Haekkaebal'gyehoek P'amun] Pyongyang Hoedamsö Pukshiin Ödönaegikkaji," *Donga Ilbo*, 17 October 2002, www.donga.com; Sö Ŭi Tong, "TCOG Hoeüi Kyölsan / Mi 'Palbbarün Pukhaengbo' Chin'üi'p'aakchuryök," *Munhwa Ilbo*, 7 September 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Kim Su Chöng, "TCOG Muöl Non'üihana/ Nampuk-Pug'il'gwangye Kaesön Sokto-Panghyang Choyulhaltüt," *Taehan Maeil*, 7 September 2002, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

10 September 2002

The *Rodong Sinmun* carries a commentary criticizing US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton's recent remarks in Seoul regarding North Korea's suspected WMD activities. The daily says Bolton's charges are "sheer lies" with the "sinister intention to justify the US hostile policy towards North Korea." The commentary claims Bolton's remarks are designed to "mislead public opinion through false propaganda to brand North Korea as a 'criminal' and to impose 'nuclear inspections'."

—"Bolton's Outbursts Under Fire," Korean Central News Agency, 10 September 2002, www.kcna.co.jp;

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"Migungmusöng Kunch'uk Mit Anbomunjedamdangch'a'gwan'üi <Anbosang Uryöyoin> Pal'ön Pi'nan / Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 10 September 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

12 September 2002

US President Bush presents visiting Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi with intelligence indicating that North Korea has been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program based on uranium enrichment. The two leaders are meeting in New York to coordinate policies on North Korea prior to Koizumi's historic meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il scheduled for 17 September. [NOTE: Koizumi reportedly does not press the issue of the secret uranium enrichment program during his talks with Kim, instead focusing on the issue on North Korea's abduction of Japanese nationals.]

—Sonni Efron, Henry Chu and Mark Magnier, "U.S. Begins Diplomatic Offensive on North Korea; The White House Asks Nations in the Region to Help Stop the Nuclear Program. China is Key," *Los Angeles Times*, 19 October 2002, p.1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, 12 September 2002, in "Bush Asks Koizumi to Convey Message to North Korea," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 13 September 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Masanobu Takagi, "Koizumi Presses Bush on Iraq," *Daily Yomiuri*, 14 September 2002, p.1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Doug Struck and Glenn Kessler, "Hints on N. Korea Surfaced in 2000; U.S. Informed East Asia Nations of Nuclear Effort," *Washington Post*, 19 October 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 September 2002

In New York, US Secretary of State Colin Powell briefs Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi about North Korea's program to develop nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium.

—Kyodo News Service, 2 December 2002, in "Tokyo Knew of N. Korean Nuclear Program Details before Summit," FBIS Document ID: JPP20021202000113.

16 September 2002

US Ambassador to Japan Howard Baker meets with a close aid to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to provide documents and information regarding North Korea's program to produce highly enriched uranium.

—Kyodo News Service, 2 December 2002, in "Tokyo Knew of N. Korean Nuclear Program Details before Summit," FBIS Document ID: JPP20021202000113.

17 September 2002

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi pays a one-day visit to Pyongyang for a summit with North Korea's National Defense Chairman and Korean Workers' Party general Secretary Kim Jong Il. The two sides discuss a number of issues including North Korea's WMD and missile development programs. During the talks, Kim Jong Il admits that North Korea had abducted Japanese citizens in the past, but he apologizes and pledges to investigate past cases and prevent it from happening again. Kim also promises to extend Pyongyang's missile flight-test moratorium indefinitely, and to resolve the concerns over North Korea's nuclear program through international agreements. Later reports speculate that Kim indirectly admitted to Koizumi that North Korea has nuclear weapons when he said, "no one knows what will happen if we fight a nuclear war against the United States."

—Howard W. French, "North Koreans Sign Agreement with Japanese," *New York Times*, 18 September 2002, p. A1,

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in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Doug Struck, "N. Korea Admits It Abducted Japanese; Disclosure Clears Way for Historic Accord," *Washington Post*, 18 September 2002, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Kim Jong Il Told Koizumi that N. Korea Has Nukes," *Daily Mainichi News*, 18 October 2002, <http://mdn.mainichi.co.jp>; Shin Yun Sök, "'Haekchönjaeng Haebwaya Miwa Uyöl'ar'a'/Kim Jong Il, Koizumi Hoedamddae Pal'ön," *Hankook Ilbo*, 19 October 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration Published," Korean Central News Agency, 17 September 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Issue of Missing Japanese," Korean Central News Agency, 17 September 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Japanese Prime Minister Arrives Here," Korean Central News Agency, 17 September 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Talks between Kim Jong Il and Koizumi Held," Korean Central News Agency, 17 September 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Choil P'yöngyang Sön'ön," Korean Central News Agency, 17 September 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

18 September 2002

US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld tells the House Armed Services Committee that he is "almost certain" North Korea has nuclear weapons and is developing long-range missiles that can strike the US mainland.
—Yonhap News Agency, 19 September 2002, in "US SecDef's 18 Sep Remark on DPRK Nuclear Capability Called 'Step Back From Earlier Statement'," FBIS Document ID: KPP20020919000009.

19 September 2002

According to a high-level official in the Japanese Foreign Ministry, IAEA officials say they are confirming North Korean plans to resume nuclear inspections.
—Kyodo News Service, 27 September 2002, in "N. Korea, IAEA Begin Talks on Nuclear Inspection," FBIS Document ID: JPP20020927000136; "'Puk-IAEA Haeksach'al Hyöpsang'/Il'gowi'gwalli Palg'hyö," *Segye Ilbo*, 28 September 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

27 September 2002

"A senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official" says that North Korea and the IAEA have begun detailed talks regarding the resumption of nuclear inspections.
—Kyodo News Service, 27 September 2002, in "N. Korea, IAEA Begin Talks on Nuclear Inspection," FBIS Document ID: JPP20020927000136; "'Puk-IAEA Haeksach'al Hyöpsang'/Il'gowi'gwalli Palg'hyö," *Segye Ilbo*, 28 September 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

29 September 2002

An IAEA spokesperson says that North Korea and the agency had begun negotiations on the return of IAEA inspectors to North Korea.
—James A. Foley, "Tokyo and Pyongyang Improve relations," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, November 2002, p. 40.

29 September 2002

The *Independent on Sunday* (London) reports that the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq has been accused "of having bargained with North Korea over stocks of plutonium." [Note: The article does not mention the origin or credibility of the accusation.]

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—Andrew Clennell, "Turkish Police Find Smuggled Uranium," *Independent on Sunday* (London), 29 September 2002, p. 17, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Early October 2002

According to *Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily*, Saudi Arabia is now actively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. "Highly-reliable sources" say that the kingdom is trying to acquire weapons, but is not seeking a production capability. According to the report, Saudi officials have approached one or two countries, possibly North Korea and/or China to purchase nuclear weapons.

—"Saudi Arabia Takes Steps to Acquire Nuclear Weapons," *Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily*, Vol. 20, No. 180, 29 October 2002.

3-5 October 2002

US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly leads a delegation to Pyongyang to discuss various bilateral issues. While in Pyongyang Kelly meets with First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sŏk Chu and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan. On the first day of the talks, Kelly offers no specific evidence, but says the United States has evidence that North Korea has been pursuing a program to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. The North Korean delegation initially denies the allegations, but on the second day of the talks, the North Korean delegation admits to having such a program. North Korean media describe Kelly's attitude as "arrogant" during the talks. Later, a "high-ranking South Korean government official" says that Kang proposed to link US nuclear suspicions and a reduction in conventional forces with the United States lifting economic sanctions and changing its hostile policy towards North Korea. [Note: US press reports suggest that the evidence regarding North Korea's uranium enrichment program is based on the discovery that North Korea has been attempting to acquire large amounts of high-strength aluminum for gas-centrifuges.]

—"US Special Envoy Leaves Pyongyang," Xinhua News Agency, 5 October 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kim Min-bai, "Government Stresses Dialogue on Nuclear Issue," *Chosun Ilbo*, 17 October 2002, <http://english.chosun.com>; Press Statement, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, "North Korean Nuclear Program," U.S. Department of State, 16 October 2002, www.state.gov; James A. Kelly, "U.S.-East Asia Policy: Three Aspects," Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., 11 December 2002, www.state.gov; Joby Warrick, "U.S. Followed the Aluminum: Pyongyang's Efforts to Buy Metal Was Tip to Plans," *Washington Post*, 18 October 2002, www.washingtonpost.com; Oh Young-hwan, "North Continued Nuclear-Arms Project," *JoongAng Ilbo*, 18 October 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; "Spokesman for DPRK FM on DPRK Visit of Special Envoy of U.S. President," Korean Central News Agency, 7 October 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Andrea Koppel and John King, "U.S.: North Korea Admits Nuke Program," CNN, 16 October 2002, www.cnn.com.

4 October 2002

The *Asahi Shimbun* reports that about three months ago North Korea disbanded the "727 Liaison Office for Japan (對日 727 連絡所)" under the Operations Department (作戰部) of the Korean Workers' Party Central Committee (朝鮮勞動黨中央委員會). The office, based in Ch'ŏngjin, North Hamgyŏng Province, was staffed with about 1,500 personnel and was responsible for spy ship operations in Japanese territorial waters. Kim Jong Il reportedly issued the order to disband the office in order to reduce the possibility of conflicts with Japan. The name of the office comes from the date of 27 July when Kim Il Sung is said to have issued instructions to encourage a revolution in

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South Korea.

—"Pyongyang Shuts Spy Ship Section," *Asahi Shimbun*, 5 October 2002, www.asahi.com; "Tainichi Kosakusen Bumon wo Kaisan ka Chosen Rodoto Sakusenbu," *Asahi Shimbun*, 4 October 2002, www.asahi.com; Kyodo News Service, 4 October 2002, in FBIS Document ID: JPP20021004000017; Shin Yun Sök, "Puk, Taeilgongjaksön Pusö Haech'e/Il'innapch'i-Goesönbak Kwallyön Nodongdangsosok '727 Yöllakso'," *Hankook Ilbo*, 5 October 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

7 October 2002

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement saying that during his 3-5 October trip to Pyongyang, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly took a "high-handed and arrogant attitude" in raising "issues of concern." According to the ministry, Kelly said that North Korea's relations with the United States, Japan and South Korea would be normalized only when North Korea meets the unilateral US demands regarding North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. The message conveyed by Kelly, according to the statement, indicates that the Bush administration is not pursuing a policy of dialogue, but rather "a hardline policy of hostility to bring North Korea to its knees by force." The ministry concludes that "such unchanged policy of the US compels North Korea to take all necessary countermeasures, pursuant to the army-based policy whose validity has been proven."

—"Spokesman for DPRK FM on DPRK Visit of Special Envoy of U.S. President," Korean Central News Agency, 7 October 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Miguktaet'ongnyöngt'üksa'nün Shimhi Amnyökchög'igo Omanhage Nawatta/Chosön'oemusöngdaebyön'in," Korean Central News Agency, 7 October 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

14 October 2002

The *Tokyo Shimbun* reports that North Korea has proposed a "technical consultation" with the IAEA to resolve suspicions over Pyongyang's nuclear program. The paper quotes a senior official in the Japanese Foreign Ministry as having said that North Korea made the proposal by fax several days after Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang on 17 September 2002.

—"Kakusatsutsu he Gijyutsukyogi Teian Nicchoshunokaidanchokugo Kitachosen, IAEA ni," *Tokyo Shimbun*, 14 October 2002, www.tokyo-np.co.jp; Yonhap News Agency, 14 October 2002, in "Japanese Daily: DPRK Proposes 'Consultation' with IAEA on Nuclear Inspection," FBIS Document ID: KPP20021014000021; "Puk, IAEAe Haeksach'al 'Kisulhyöb'ui' Cheüi," *Chosun Ilbo*, 14 October 2002, www.chosun.com.

16 October 2002

Richard Boucher, spokesman for the US State Department, announces that during high-level talks in Pyongyang held from 3-5 October, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly presented his North Korean hosts with recently acquired US evidence that indicates North Korea has been pursuing a nuclear weapons program based on uranium enrichment. According to Boucher, North Korean officials acknowledged the existence of a uranium enrichment program when meeting with Kelly. This program, Boucher claims, is a serious violation of North Korea's commitments under the Agreed Framework, the NPT, its IAEA safeguards agreement and the Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. "Over the summer," Boucher says, "President Bush—in consultations with our allies and friends—had developed a bold approach to improve relations with North Korea." Boucher continues, "In light of our concern about the North's nuclear

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weapons program, however, we are unable to pursue this approach." [Note: US press reports suggest that the evidence regarding North Korea's uranium enrichment program is based on the discovery that North Korea has been attempting to acquire large amounts of high-strength aluminum for gas-centrifuges.]

—Press Statement, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, "North Korean Nuclear Program," U.S. Department of State, 16 October 2002, www.state.gov; Joby Warrick, "U.S. Followed the Aluminum: Pyongyang's Efforts to Buy Metal Was Tip to Plans," *Washington Post*, 18 October 2002, www.washingtonpost.com.

17 October 2002

IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei expresses "deep regret" over North Korea's admission that it has been clandestinely pursuing a nuclear weapons program based on uranium enrichment. ElBaradei says that the IAEA is "urgently seeking information from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in response to this report, as well as information from the United States that will allow us to follow up on this very serious allegation."

—"IAEA Concerned about Possible DPRK Uranium Enrichment Programme: Seeking Clarification from DPRK and USA," WorldAtom Press Release PR 2002/16, 17 October 2002, www.iaea.org; "North's Nuclear Activity Remained in Veil, Says IAEA," *Joongang Ilbo*, 18 October 2002, <http://english.joins.com>.

17 October 2002

South Korea, Japan, and China stress the importance of continued engagement with North Korea following the revelation that North Korea has been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program based on uranium enrichment technology. Tokyo pledges to continue normalization talks with North Korea scheduled to resume 29 October, but Japanese officials claim that they will suspend the talks if North Korea fails to comply with the Agreed Framework. Im Söng Jun, South Korean national security adviser, says that Seoul regards the admission "as a sign North Korea is willing to resolve this problem through dialogue." In addition, according to a Blue House statement, Seoul will continue with its plan to send an aid package consisting of 400,000 tons of rice and 100,000 tons of fertilizer. However, "if public sentiment worsens here," a Seoul official says, "it will be difficult to give any additional aid." Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue says that China continues to oppose the introduction of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula but believes the issue "should be settled through dialogue and negotiations."

—Peter S. Goodman and John Pomfret, "N. Korea Weapons Disclosure Surprises Neighbors: South Korea, Japan to Continue Dialogue with Pyongyang," *Washington Post*, 17 October 2002, www.washingtonpost.com; Oh Young-Hwan, "North Continued Nuclear-Arms Program," *Joongang Ilbo*, 18 October 2002, <http://english.joins.com>.

17 October 2002

US intelligence officials claim that North Korea obtained the technology for its recently revealed uranium enrichment program from Pakistan. According to the officials, North Korea obtained gas centrifuges from Pakistan in the late 1990's in exchange for missile technology. One intelligence official describes the relationship as "a perfect meeting of interests—the North has what the Pakistanis needed, and the Pakistanis had a way for Kim Jong Il to restart a nuclear program we had stopped." The cooperation between North Korea and Pakistan reportedly began around 1997, but the officials are uncertain as to when, or if, the relationship ended. The White House has refused to comment on Pakistan's role in helping North Korea acquire uranium enrichment technology, but Asad Hayauddin, a spokesman for Pakistan's Embassy in Washington, calls the allegations "absolutely incorrect."

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Hayauddin says, "We have never had an accident or leak or any export of fissile material or nuclear technology or knowledge."

—David E. Sanger and James Dao, "U.S. Says Pakistan Gave Technology to North Korea," *New York Times*, 17 October 2002, www.nytimes.com; Joby Warrick, "U.S. Followed the Aluminum: Pyongyang's Efforts to Buy Metal Was Tip to Plans," *Washington Post*, 18 October 2002, www.washingtonpost.com.

17 October 2002

US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says he believes North Korea already has a small number of nuclear weapons and a program to produce more. He also says Pyongyang is now in violation of four separate agreements.

—Yonhap News Agency, 18 October 2002, in "ROK's Yonhap: Rumsfeld Says North Already Has 'Small Number of Nuclear Weapons'," FBIS Document ID: KPP20021018000007; "Kim Jong Il Told Koizumi that N. Korea Has Nukes," *Mainichi Daily News*, 18 October 2002, <http://mdn.mainichi.co.jp>; Kathleen T. Rhem, "Rumsfeld: U.S. Plans to Consult Allies on North Korean Nuke Violations," *American Forces Press Service*, 17 October 2002, www.defenselink.mil; Kim Chin, "Pukhan haek P'amun/ Pukhaek Ŏn'gũphan Rumsfeld Mi Kukpang Mundap," *JoongAng Ilbo*, 19 October 2002, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

17 October 2002

The Blue House (Ch'öng'wadae), the South Korean presidential residence, issues a statement regarding North Korea's admission to having a uranium enrichment program to US envoy James Kelly. Im Söng Jun, Senior Secretary to the President for Foreign Affairs and National Security, says President Kim Dae Jung considers the issue very serious and that Pyongyang's development of nuclear weapons is unacceptable. However, the government considers the candid admission a sign that North Korea is prepared to resolve the issue through dialogue. The South Korean government's position is that the issue should be resolved peacefully through dialogue. The spokesman calls on North Korea fulfill its commitments under the NPT, Agreed Framework, and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

—"A Senior Secretary to the President Remarks on North Korea's Suspected Development of Nuclear Weapons," Press Release, 17 October 2002, www.bluehouse.go.kr; "Pukhan Haekkaebal Ŭihok Kwallyöŉn Briefing," Ch'öng'wadae Soshik, 17 October 2002, www.bluehouse.go.kr; Lee Rae Un and Hwang Chae Hun, "Chöngbu 'Pukhaek Taehwahae'gyöl Ch'ujin," Yonhap News Agency, 17 October 2002, <http://bbs.yonhapnews.net>.

17 October 2002

The IAEA sends a letter to Pyongyang asking for North Korea's cooperation "in seeking clarification of reported information about a program to enrich uranium."

—"Report by the Director General on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Resolution Adopted by the Board on 29 November 2002, Document GOV/2002/60, 29 November 2002, www.iaea.org.

18 October 2002

In testimony before the National Assembly's National Defense Committee, South Korea's Minister of National Defense Lee Jun says it is still uncertain whether North Korea has completed or is operating an HEU production facility. He also says that North Korea should be able to use a uranium bomb without testing it.

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—Ch'oe Söng Uk, "'Haekkaebalgwallyön Pug'umjig'im Chöngbo, Kelly Pangbukchön Al'atta'/Ch'oe Oe'gyo-Lee Kukpang Kukhoedappyön," *Hankook Ilbo*, 19 October 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Kim Dong Hun, "Puk Haekkabal Kyehoek P'amun/Kukhoe T'ong'oet'ong'wi-Kukpang'wi Ch'okku," *Hankryoreh Shinmun*, 19 October 2002, p. 5, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Kim Dong Hun, "Han-Mi 'Puk Haekkaebal' Al'go Issötta'/Ch'oe Söng Hong Oe'gyobujangwan Palghyö," *Hankryoreh Shinmun*, 19 October 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

18 October 2002

In testimony before the National Assembly's Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee, Minister of Unification Ch'oe Söng Hong says that the South Korean government had some information regarding North Korea's uranium enrichment program before James Kelly's visit to Pyongyang the first week of October. However, Ch'oe says the government was only able to grasp the details of the intelligence in August 2002.

—Ch'oe Söng Uk, "'Haekkaebalgwallyön Pug'umjig'im Chöngbo, Kelly Pangbukchön Al'atta'/Ch'oe Oe'gyo-Lee Kukpang Kukhoedappyön," *Hankook Ilbo*, 19 October 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Kim Dong Hun, "Puk Haekkabal Kyehoek P'amun/Kukhoe T'ong'oet'ong'wi-Kukpang'wi Ch'okku," *Hankryoreh Shinmun*, 19 October 2002, p. 5, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Kim Dong Hun, "Han-Mi 'Puk Haekkaebal' Al'go Issötta'/Ch'oe Söng Hong Oe'gyobujangwan Palghyö," *Hankryoreh Shinmun*, 19 October 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

18 October 2002

South Korea's National Assembly adopts a resolution calling for North Korea to immediately abandon all programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. However, rival political parties differ on the details for addressing North Korea's nuclear program.

—Yonhap News Agency, 18 October 2002, in "ROK Nat'l Assembly Adopts Resolution on DPRK's Nuclear Weapons Development," FBIS Document ID: KPP20021018000095; "Lawmakers Unite On Issue of NK Nukes," *Korea Times*, 18 October 2002, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Nuclear Issue Divides Parties," *Korea Times*, 19 October 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Nam Chöng Ho and Pak Shin Hong, "Pukhan Haek P'amun/ Kukhoe Kukpang-T'ong'oet'ong'wi Pukhaek Hanmoksori Pinan," *Joongang Ilbo*, 19 October 2002, p. 5, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

18 October 2002

During a press conference in Moscow, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman denies press reports that Russia and China have assisted North Korea with its nuclear weapons program.

—Yonhap News Agency, 18 October 2002, in "ROK's Yonhap: Moscow Denies Press Reports on Its Support of N.K. Nuke Program," FBIS Document ID: KPP200210180001000.

18 October 2002

The IAEA sends another letter to Pyongyang asking for North Korea's cooperation "in seeking clarification of reported information about a program to enrich uranium."

—"Report by the Director General on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Resolution Adopted by the Board on 29 November 2002, Document GOV/2002/60, 29 November 2002, www.iaea.org.

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19-22 October 2002

North and South Korea hold their Eight Inter-Ministerial Talks in Pyongyang. The two sides discuss a number of economic issues, and issue a joint statement that includes, "The North and the South agreed to make common efforts to guarantee peace and security on the Korean peninsula, consistent with the spirit of the June 15 Joint Declaration, and to actively cooperate to resolve all problems through dialogue, including the nuclear issue." North Korean officials tell South Korean Minister of Unification Chŏng Se Hyŏn that Pyongyang is willing to resolve the nuclear issue if the United States first changes its hostile policy towards North Korea.

—"Joint Press Release of the Eighth Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks," 22 October 2002, www.unikorea.go.kr; "Che 8 Ch'a Nambukchangwan'gŭphoedam Kongdongbodomun," 22 October 2002, www.unikorea.go.kr; Charles Whelan, "South Fails to Extract Nuclear Pledge from North," Agence France Presse, 23 October 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Inter-Korea Talks Stalled over Nuclear Statement," Agence France Presse, 22 October 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kim In Ku, "Nambuk 'Pukhaek Taehwaro Hae'gyŏl'," *Chosun Ilbo*, 23 October 2002, <http://nk.chosun.com>; "Chŏng T'ong'il 'Puk, Chŏktae Anhamyŏn Anbomunje P'unda'," *Chosun Ilbo*, 23 October 2002, <http://nk.chosun.com>; Pak Rok Sam, "'Pukhaek Taehwa Hae'gyŏl' Kŭkchŏk T'a'gyŏl," *Taehan Maeil*, 22 October 2002, www.kdaily.com; "Pukhaekkaebal P'amun...Taehwaro Hae'gyŏl," *Chosun Ilbo*, 23 October 2002, <http://nk.chosun.com>; Lee Young-jong, "North 'Listens' to Protest of Its Bomb Program," *Joongang Ilbo*, 21 October 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; "North Fails to Respond on Nuclear Issue," *Chosun Ilbo*, 20 October 2002, <http://english.chosun.com>; "8th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks Open," Korean Central News Agency, 21 October 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Joint Press Release on 8th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks Published," Korean Central News Agency, 23 October 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Che 8 Ch'a Pungnamsanggŭphoedam'i Kkŭtnatta / Kongdongbodomun," Korean Central News Agency, 23 October 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Yonhap News Agency, 20 October 2002, in "Atmosphere at 20 Oct ROK-DPRK Ministerial Talks Reportedly 'Heavy and Serious'," FBIS Document ID: KPP20021020000016.

25 October 2002

North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says that James Kelly produced no evidence of a North Korean uranium program when he visited Pyongyang earlier this month. The statement says Pyongyang is willing to resolve the current impasse if the United States does three things: recognize the sovereignty of North Korea, assures North Korea of non-aggression, and not hinder North Korea's economic development. The spokesman says North Korea will address all US security concerns if Washington will stop its nuclear threats and sign a non-aggression pact with Pyongyang.

—"Conclusion of Non-Aggression Treaty between DPRK and U.S. Called For," Korean Central News Agency, 25 October 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Chomisa'i'ŭi Pul'gach'imjoyakch'egyŏl'i Haengmunjehae'gyŏl'ŭi Hamnijŏg'igo Hyŏnshilchŏg'in Pangdo / Chosŏnoemusŏng Taebyŏn'in," Korean Central News Agency, 25 October 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Kang Chin Ok, "Puk Oemusangdaebyŏn'in Mi'e 'Pul'ga'ch'imjoyak' Cheŭi," *Joongang Ilbo*, 25 October 2002, www.joins.com;; Sŏng Tong Ki and Yun Sŭng Mo, "Puk 'Sŏn Haekkaebal'ogi' Kŏbu," *Donga Ilbo*, 25 October 2002, www.donga.com.

29-30 October 2002

Delegations from North Korea and Japan meet in Kuala Lumpur to discuss the normalization of diplomatic

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relations. Talks end in dispute when North Korea refuses to accept Japanese demands that immediate relatives of kidnap victims be allowed to visit Japan. North Korean delegates become dissatisfied when Japan refuses to discuss or provide economic assistance without resolving the issues of past kidnappings, and North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs. In response, the North Korean delegates say that the nuclear and missile issues must be resolved in negotiations with the United States. The two sides agree to establish working groups to discuss security issues the following month.

—Howard W. French, "Japan and North Korea End Talks After Modest Progress," *New York Times*, 30 October 2002, www.nytimes.com; Doug Struck, "N. Korea Backs Away From Diplomacy," *Washington Post*, 31 October 2002, p. A15, www.washingtonpost.com; "Japan, N. Korea Clash at Opening of 2-Day Talks," *Mainichi Shimbun*, 29 October 2002, <http://japan.mainichi.com>; Howard W. French, "North Korea Rejects Demands to Abandon Nuclear Program," *New York Times*, 29 October 2002, www.nytimes.com; Tetsuya Harada and Yuji Yoshikata, "Japan, N. Korea Remain Far Apart/ Pyongyang Rejects Tokyo's requests on Abductions and Nuclear Weapons," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 30 October 2002, www.yomiuri.co.jp; Agence France Presse, 30 October 2002, in "AFP: North Korea Demands Quick End to Normalization Talks," FBIS Document ID: JPP20021030000074; Ko Sŭng Il, "Puk-II, I't'ŭljjae Sugyohyŏpsang Sokkae," Yonhap News Agency, 29 October 2002, <http://bbs.yonhapnews.net>; Ko Sŭng Il, "Puk, 'Missile'ŭn Mi'wa Haegyŏlhal Munjae," Yonhap News Agency, 29 October 2002, <http://bbs.yonhapnews.net>.

31 October 2002

The *Nihon Keizai*, a Japanese business daily, reports the United States has concluded that North Korea might be preparing to conduct an underground nuclear test in the near future. However, Yasuo Fukuda, Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary, says that the Japanese government has received no such information.

—Jiji Press, "Japan Unaware of U.S. Preparations for N. Korea N-Tests," 31 October 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kwan Tae Ryŏl, "'Puk, Chiha Haekshilŏm Kanghaeng Uryŏ' [Ilgyŏng]," *Chosun Ilbo*, 31 October 2002, <http://nk.chosun.com>.

1 November 2002

According to a "diplomatic source," the United States will soon consult with South Korea and Japan before deciding whether to impose economic sanctions against North Korea in response to Pyongyang's admission that it has a program to enrich uranium. According to the source, this issue will be discussed at the next Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting that will be in Tokyo on 8 November. Furthermore, US Secretary of State Colin Powell will visit Seoul on 11 November.

—Yonhap New Agency, "Mi, Chung'yujegong Chungdan Tŭng Taebukchejae Kyŏljŏng," *Chosun Ilbo*, 2 November 2002, www.chosun.com.

2-5 November 2002

Donald Gregg, former US ambassador to South Korea, visits Pyongyang. Gregg holds 10 hours of talks with three senior North Korean officials, and Gregg says they have adopted a "neither confirm nor deny" position on the issue of North Korea's HEU program. The Korean hosts tell Gregg that Pyongyang wants a non-aggression pact with the United States, and that it does not have to be a formal peace treaty. The former ambassador says that North Korea seems willing to take simultaneous steps with the United States to resolve the issue over Pyongyang's HEU program, and that the officials consider the Agreed Framework to still be in force, but "hanging by a thread." Gregg

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is accompanied by journalist Don Oberdorfer. [Note: Since North Korea admitted to having an HEU program in early October 2002, both Washington and Pyongyang sides have been saying that the other side must make the first move to resolve the current impasse.]

—Don Kirk, "North Korea Softens Its Tone on Nuclear Arms Agreement," *New York Times*, 7 November 2002, www.nytimes.com; John Larkin, "U.S.-North Korea Arms Deal Is Precarious, Diplomat Says," *Wall Street Journal*, 7 November 2002; Seo Hyun-jin, "Pyongyang Ready to Act in Concert with Washington over Nuke Issue," *Korea Herald*, 7 November 2002, www.koreaherald.co.kr; Chang Yong Hun, "Pukhaek, Tongshihae'gyölbangshik Ka'nünghalkka," *Joongang Ilbo*, 6 November 2002, www.joins.com; O Yöng Hwan, "[Gregg Ilhaeng Ilmuniltap] 'Pukhan, Haekkyehoek Shiindo Puindo Anhae'," *Joongang Ilbo*, 6 November 2002, www.joins.com;

3 November 2002

Three National Assembly members from the Grand National Party (한나라당) say the United States is considering ways to pressure North Korea into abandoning its nuclear weapons program. The lawmakers are part of a six-member Grand National Party team investigating North Korea's nuclear program, and the team returned from a six-day trip to the United States on 1 November. The lawmakers say the Bush administration is unlikely to obtain funding for heavy fuel oil (HFO) shipments to North Korea next year. The HFO deliveries are part of US obligations under the Agreed Framework.

—Yonhap News Agency, 4 November 2002, in "ROK's Yonhap: U.S. Considers Steps to Persuade N.K. to Abandon Nuke Program," FBIS Document ID: KPP20021104000006; Agence France Presse, 4 November 2002, in "AFP: North Korea Blasts US for Urging Economic Sanctions Amid Nuclear Fallout," FBIS Document ID: JPP20021104000070; Lee Chong Hun and Pak Min Hyök, "Pangmi Hannara Pukhaekt'üg'wiga Chönnhan 'Miüi 3 Tan'gye Chöllyak'," *Donga Ilbo*, 4 November 2002, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

4 November 2002

The Korean Central News Agency says that the United States has failed to implement the four articles of the Agreed Framework over the last eight years, and that US actions have been intended to kill the agreement. The news agency accuses the United States using nuclear threats, so therefore Pyongyang feels rightfully entitled to possessing nuclear weapons and other weapons "even more powerful." The editorial also says the hostile policy of the United States is an impediment to positive developments in Northeast Asia, and that a frank discussion to implement the Agreed Framework and to conclude a non-aggression pact is the most appropriate way to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Furthermore, Pyongyang believes that US refusal to negotiate indicates an intention to invade North Korea.

—"KCNA Urges U.S. to Have Right Option for Peace," Korean Central News Agency, 4 November 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Migug'ün Shimjünghan Sönt'aeg'üi Kiro'e Noh'yö Itta / Chosönjungangt'ongshin Ronp'yöng," Korean Central News Agency, 4 November 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Agence France Presse, 4 November 2002, in "AFP: North Korea Blasts US for Urging Economic Sanctions Amid Nuclear Fallout," FBIS Document ID: JPP20021104000070.

4 November 2002

During a series of summit meetings in Phnom Penh organized by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Chinese Premier Zhu Rong Ji, and South Korean Prime Minister Kim Sök

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Su agree that North Korean should abandon its nuclear weapons program. The three sides say they will pressure Pyongyang into resolving the issue in a peaceful manner.

—Kyodo News Service, 4 November 2002, in "Japan, China, S. Korea Urge N. Korea to Keep 1994 Accord," FBIS Document ID: JPP20021104000071; "Three Northeast Asian Leaders Discuss Ways to Resolve N. K. Nuclear Issue," *Korea Herald*, 5 November 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan, China, S. Korea Allied on N. Korea's Nuke," *Jiji Press*, 4 November 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 November 2002

A "South Korean government source" says the United States has informed the South Korean government that US analysts believe North Korean officials meant "biochemical weapons" when recently claiming Pyongyang has something "more powerful than nuclear weapons."

—Lee Kyo Kwan, "Puk, Hwahangmugi Chönbangbudae Paech'i Wallyo," *Chosun Ilbo*, 5 November 2002, <http://nk.chosun.com>.

7 November 2002

The European Union Parliament adopts a non-binding resolution to review the KEDO project to build two light water nuclear reactors in North Korea. The resolution is adopted following North Korea's admission that it has a program to produce highly enriched uranium.

—Kyodo News Service, 12 November 2002, in "EU Parliament Resolution Calls for KEDO Review," FBIS Document ID: JPP20021112000105; Kwön Tae Ryöl, "[Yuröp'üihoe Kyöl'üian] 'Taebukkyöngsurosaöp Chönmyön Chaegömt'o'," *Chosun Ilbo*, 12 November 2002, www.chosun.com.

8 November 2002

The *Segye Ilbo*, a South Korean daily, reports that North Korea has been acquiring plutonium, uranium, other metals and equipment from Kazakhstan and other central Asian countries since 1994. According to the report, North Korea has procured uranium-235, plutonium-239, as well as osmium-187, cesium-137 and strontium, which the report claims are used for reducing the size of nuclear warheads. The *Segye Ilbo* claims the information came in the form of a four-page Russian document acquired by the South Korean Embassy in Uzbekistan. The report also claims that North Korea acquired 70-80 documents that contain information regarding nuclear technologies, and that North Korea smuggled 32kg of HEU from Kazakhstan in August 2001. [Note: CNS sources indicate the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade received no such document, and there is no apparent use for osmium-187, cesium-137, and strontium in reducing the size of nuclear weapons; therefore, this report does not seem credible.]

—*Segye Ilbo*, 7 November 2002, in "Kazakhstani Report: DPRK Purchased Uranium, Plutonium From Kazakhstan," FBIS Document ID: KPP20021108000025; Chön Hyön Il and Kim Ki Dong, "Puk, K'ajahüsö Uranium Kükpibanip," *Segye Ilbo*, 8 November 2002, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Kim Ki Dong, "Changnyön'eman Uranium 32kg Panip," *Segye Ilbo*, 8 November 2002, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Pak Hye Yun, "Puk, K'ajahüsö Uranium Kükpi Kuip," *Donga Ilbo*, 8 November 2002, www.donga.com.

11 November 2002

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov says Russia has no concrete evidence that North Korea possesses or is

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developing nuclear weapons. Ivanov makes the remarks at a press conference following a meeting with South Korean Defense Minister Lee Chun. The two sides conclude an agreement to cooperate on security issues, including nonproliferation, terrorism, and the maintenance of peace and security on the Korean peninsula. —Interfax News Agency, 11 November 2002, in "Russian Defense Minister Says in Contact with DPRK on Nuclear Weapons Issue," FBIS Document ID: CEP20021111000298; ITAR-TASS, 11 November 2002, in "Russia, South Korea Sign Accord on Ensuring Peace in Asia-Pacific Region," FBIS Document ID: CEP20021112000159; "Russia Wants Proof of North Korean Nukes," *VOA News*, 11 November 2002, www.voanews.com; Cho Sŭng Jin, "Han-Rŏ 'Ch'ungdolbangjihyŏpchŏng' Ch'egyŏl," *Taehan Maeil*, 12 November 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

13 November 2002

The US National Security Council decides in favor of ending heavy fuel oil (HFO) shipments to North Korea under the Agreed Framework. The decision is in response to Pyongyang's admission in early October 2002 to having a program for highly enriched uranium. A "senior US government official" tells Reuters that a current shipment of HFO in route to North Korea will continue, but that shipments contracted for in December and January will be cancelled. The official also says that the United States expects South Korea, Japan and the European Union to concur with the US decision.

—Carol Giacomo, "US Says N. Korean Fuel Oil Deliveries Should End," Reuters, 13 November 2002, www.reuters.com.

13 November 2002

South Korea's Yonhap News Agency publishes the results of a telephone interview with a "high level North Korean." According to the official, Pyongyang will definitely consider the Agreed Framework null and void if heavy fuel oil shipments are terminated. The official said the United States has already violated three of its obligations under the agreement by failing to normalize relations, failing to cease its threats against North Korea, and failing to complete the LWR construction project by 2003. [Note: The official is probably assigned to North Korea's Permanent Mission since the article was written by a Yonhap News correspondent in New York, and officials at the mission have been granting interviews to the press.]

—Ch'u Wang Hun, "Pukhan 'Kibonhab'ŭi Sashilsang P'agina Tarŭmŏptta'," *Chosun Ilbo*, 13 November 2002, www.chosun.com.

14 November 2002

KEDO's executive board meets in New York and decides to suspend shipments of heavy fuel oil to North Korea beginning with the shipment of December 2002. [Note: The oil shipment now in route from Singapore will be allowed to continue.]

—"KEDO Executive Board Meeting Concludes – November 14, 2002," 14 November 2002, www.kedo.org; Don Kirk, "Korea Leader Backs Plan to Block Oil to the North," *New York Times*, 15 November 2002, www.nytimes.com; Yonhap News Agency, 15 November 2002, in "ROK's Yonhap: KEDO Agrees to Suspend Oil Provision to N.K. from December," FBIS Document ID: KPP20021115000008; "[KEDO] Chiphaeng'isahoe Sŏngmyŏng <Chŏnmun>," *Chosun Ilbo*, 15 November 2002, www.chosun.com; Kim Chae Ho, "[KEDO] Pukkyŏngsurosaŏp Chungdan Shisa," *Chosun Ilbo*, 15 November 2002, www.chosun.com.

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17 November 2002

A *Rodong Sinmun* commentary says that the United States has violated the Agreed Framework, and that US actions have destroyed the joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula signed by Pyongyang and Seoul. The official daily of the Korean Workers' Party claims that "US warmongers are calling for preemptive strikes against North Korea," and that this amounts to a declaration of nuclear war. The commentary concludes that the United States, as a nuclear weapons state, has a legal and moral obligation to conclude a non-aggression treaty with North Korea.

—"Rodong Sinmun on U.S. Violation of International Treaty and Agreements," Korean Central News Agency, 17 November 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mi'gug'ün Kukchejökhab'üiwa Hyöpchöngdül'ül P'a'gihan Changboin / Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 17 November 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency, 17 November 2002, in "DPRK Says US 'Violated' Agreed Framework, Calls for Nonaggression Treaty," FBIS Document ID: KPP20021117000021.

21 November 2002

A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement in response to the decision by KEDO on 14 November to suspend the delivery of heavy fuel oil (HFO) to North Korea. The spokesman describes the action as a "wanton violation of Article One of the Agreed Framework, which had a guarantee message from the US president." The statement says "the provision of HFO was the only one of four articles in the agreement that the US observed." Pyongyang also blames Washington for the delay in LWR construction, and for "working out a plan for a preemptive nuclear attack against North Korea, and for listing it as part of an 'axis of evil'."

—"DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on U.S. Decision to Stop Supplying Heavy Oil," Korean Central News Agency, 21 November 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mi'gug'üi Chung'yujegongdan'gyölchöng'ün Chomi'gibonhab'üimun Wiban / Chosön'oemusang Taebyön'in Tamhwa," Korean Central News Agency, 21 November 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central Broadcasting Station, 21 November 2002, in "DPRK FM Spokesperson Issues 21 Nov Statement on US Plans To Halt Heavy Oil," FBIS Document ID: KPP20021121000099.

25 November 2002

US Secretary of State Colin Powell says he has told Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf that Pakistan will face "consequences" if the US feels there is any "inappropriate contact" between Pakistan and North Korea.

—Stephen Collinson, "US Puts Pakistan on Notice over North Korea Nuclear Links," Agence France Press, 26 November 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US Refuses to Criticise Pakistan over North Korea Claims," Agence France Presse, 26 November 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Still Top Proliferator of Missiles: Rumsfeld," Agence France Presse, 26 November 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 November 2002

A *Rodong Sinmun* commentary says that North Korea has faithfully implemented the Agreed Framework while the United States has "wantonly violated the agreement and persistently neglected to fulfill its commitments." The daily says the key to resolving the current situation in Korea is to conclude a non-aggression pact between Washington and Pyongyang.

—"U.S. Denounced for Ditching International Agreement," Korean Central News Agency, 25 November 2002,

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www.kcna.co.jp; "Rodongshinmun Onŭl'ŭi Sat'ae'nŭn Kibonhab'ŭimun'ŭl Chonjunghalsu Ŏpnŭn Killo Ddŏmilgo Ittago Kangjo," Korean Central News Agency, 25 November 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

26 November 2002

A South Korean Ministry of Unification official says that contacts between the LWR reactor project office in Seoul and its counterpart in Pyongyang have been cut off, and that training for North Korean engineers originally scheduled for this month are now in doubt. The training on the safe operation of reactors was to be held in South Korea.

—Lee Young-jong, "KEDO Nuclear Training in Doubt," *Joongang Ilbo*, 27 November 2002, <http://english.joins.com>;

27 November 2002

US Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow says that North Korea could produce nuclear warheads in one or two years, and that the United States now believes Pyongyang's HEU program is progressing from "the development to the manufacturing stage." According to Vershbow, the United States has information about cooperation between Pakistani and North Korean technical personnel, but no evidence about Pakistani government involvement in the North Korean HEU program.

—"North Korea Could Make Nuclear Weapons in One or Two Years: US Official," Agence France Presse, 27 November 2002; "North Korea May be Capable of Making Nuclear Arms in 1-2 Years – Vershbow," Interfax News Agency Daily News Bulletin, 27 November 2002.

29 November 2002

The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution reiterating its previous calls for North Korea to cooperate with the IAEA in order to fulfill all its safeguards commitments. The resolution also requests that Pyongyang clarify recent reports of a uranium enrichment program in North Korea.

—"Report by the Director General on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Resolution Adopted by the Board on 29 November 2002, Document GOV/2002/60, 29 November 2002, www.iaea.org; Agence France Presse, 30 November 2002, in "AFP: ROK Welcomes IAEA Demand on DPRK to Abandon Nuclear Program," FBIS Document ID: JPP20021130000019; Oh Young-hwan, "Atomic Agency Said Ready to Criticize Pyeongyang (sic)," *Joongang Ilbo*, 29 November 2002, <http://english.joins.com>.

Early December 2002

According to intelligence sources cited by the Washington Times, North Korea receives 20 tons of tributyl phosphate (TBP) from a Chinese company in Dalian. TBP has commercial uses, such as making paint, ink and plastics, but the compound can also be used in reprocessing plutonium and enriching uranium. [Note: On 9 December, the *Washington Times* reported that US intelligence has discovered that North Korean government agents had approached several Chinese companies to acquire TBP, but subsequent reports on 17 and 20 December started that North Korea had actually received 20 tons of TBT.]

—Bill Gertz, "N. Korea Seeks Aid from China on Nukes," *Washington Times*, 9 December 2002, www.washtimes.com; Ok Chol, "Puk, Chungso Haekkaebalyong Hwahangmulchil Kuip Shido," Yonhap News Agency, 9 December 2002, www.yonhapnews.net; Bill Gertz, "China Ships North Korea Ingredient for Nuclear

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Arms," *Washington Times*, 17 December 2002, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Bill Gertz, "Panel to Probe China's Nuclear-Related Sales to N. Korea; Beijing Says Reports of Transfer to Pyongyang 'Not Worth Comment,'" *Washington Times*, 20 December 2002, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 December 2002

In Beijing, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin sign a joint declaration which states, "The two sides maintain that it is crucial to peace and security in Northeast Asia to maintain a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and the system for nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction." The declaration also calls on North Korea and the United States to abide by the Agreed Framework and to normalize relations.

—Xinhua News Agency, 2 December 2002, in "Xinhua Carries 'Full Text' of 2 December Sino-Russian Joint Declaration," FBIS Document ID: CPP20021202000186; "China, Russia Issue Joint Statement," *People's Daily*, 3 December 2002, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn>; Yoo Kwang-jong, "China, Russia Tell Pyeongyang to Ban the Bomb," *Joongang Ilbo*, 3 December 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; Philip P. Pan, "Putin and Jiang Criticize N. Korea Arms Program" *Washington Post*, 3 December 2002, p. A17, www.washingtonpost.com; Agence France Presse, 2 December 2002, in "AFP: More on PRC, Russia Want US to Engage DPRK; Details of Joint Declaration Given," FBIS Document ID: CPP20021202000106; "China, Russia Move Closer with Putin's Visit," *Gazeta*, 2 December 2002, www.gazeta.ru.

2 December 2002

North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun sends a letter to the IAEA in response to the IAEA Board of Governors resolution adopted on 29 November. Paek says that Pyongyang cannot accept the terms of the resolution because North Korea is under a nuclear threat from the United States. Paek accuses the agency "of acting under the manipulation of the United States," and says, "Our principal stance over the nuclear issue remains unchanged."

—Choi Won-ki, "North Rejects IAEA's Call for Nuclear Site Inspection," *Joongang Ilbo*, 5 December 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; Reuters, "N. Korea Rejects U.N. Watchdog's Call," *New York Times*, 4 December 2002, www.nytimes.com; "Paek Nam Sun Oemusang Kukchewŏnjaryŏkkigu Kyŏl'ŭi <Chŏpsuhalsu Ŏpta> Ko P'yomyŏng," Korean Central News Agency, 4 December 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Kim Jin, "Puk, IAEA Haeksach'al Kŏbu," *Joongang Ilbo*, 4 December 2002, www.joins.com; Chang Yong Hun, "Puk, IAEA Haekkaebal'gyehoek P'ogi Yogu Kŏbu," Yonhap News Agency, 4 December 2002, <http://bbs.yonhapnews.net>; Lee Je Hun, "Puk 'IAEA Kyŏl'ŭi Suyongbul'ga'," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 4 December 2002, www.hani.co.kr; "Puk, IAEA Haekkaebal'gyehoek P'ogi Yogu Kŏbu," *Chosun Ilbo*, 5 December 2002, www.chosun.com; "'Kyŏl'ŭijŏpsu Kŏbu' Wa 'Sach'al Kŏbu' Ŭi Ch'a'i," *Chosun Ilbo*, 5 December 2002, www.chosun.com; Korean Central Television, 4 December 2002, in "DPRK FM Rejects Resolution on DPRK Nuclear Program," FBIS Document ID: KPP20021204000092.

2 December 2002

A Korean Central News Agency editorial criticizes the United States for "being keen on developing nuclear weapons capable of destroying underground plants and facilities." The commentary also says the United States "is practically increasing the nuclear threat to the DPRK after listing it as part of an 'axis of evil' and a target of its preemptive nuclear attack in wanton violation of the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework and the basic spirit of the DPRK-U.S. joint statement. It is, therefore, a legitimate sovereign right for the DPRK to keep itself fully ready to

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cope with the enemy's threat."

—"KCNA Assails U.S. Development of New Types of Nukes," Korean Central News Agency, 2 December 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Saesedaehaengmugi Yŏn'gugaeballo Tŭ'rŏ'nan Mi'gug'ŭi Wisŏnjŏg'in Chŏngch'e / Chosŏnjung'angt'ongshin," Korean Central News Agency, 2 December 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

3 December 2002

USA Today reports that the Verification and Compliance Bureau of the US State Department is preparing verification measures in case an agreement is reached with North Korea to curb its HEU program.

—Barbara Slavin, "U.S. Quietly Prepares To Negotiate With N. Korea," *USA Today*, 3 December 2002, p. 15.

3 December 2002

During a televised debate in South Korea, Grand National Party presidential candidate Lee Hoe Ch'ang says that North Korea has nuclear weapons. The statement is controversial as the rival Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) calls for Lee to provide proof of the accusation or retract it because the MDP says it creates anxiety for the South Korean people and increases tensions between the two Koreas.

—Yonhap News Agency, 4 December 2002, in "ROK's Yonhap: N.K. Nuclear Program Becomes Key Issue of Presidential Campaign," FBIS Document ID: Kpp20021204000060; "FYI: ROK TVs Carry First Live TV Debate of Presidential Candidates on 3 Dec—MULTIMEDIA," FBIS Document ID: KPP20021203000083; *Hankryoreh Shinmun*, 4 December 2002, in "ROK Daily on Presidential Candidates' Stand on DPRK Nuclear Issues, SOFA Revision," FBIS Document ID: KPP20021204000050; "'Puk Haekpoyu' Pal'ŏn Nollan," *Chosun Ilbo*, 4 December 2002, www.chosun.com.

3 December 2002

At a Department of Defense press briefing, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says, "North Korea has weapons of mass destruction and is denying freedom and food and every kind of opportunity that is available to the South Korean people to the people of North Korea. It's a tragedy that it happens." Rumsfeld also says that the ruling regime in North Korea is "vicious," and that "what it is doing to the people of North Korea is criminal."

—United States Department of Defense News Transcript, "DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld And Gen. Myers," 3 December 2002, www.defenselink.mil; "Rumsfeld: North Korea is a Tragedy," *Joongang Ilbo*, 4 December 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 4 December 2002, in "ROK's Yonhap: Rumsfeld Calls Pyongyang 'Vicious Regime'," FBIS Document ID: KPP20021204000025; "Rumsfeld 'Pukhan Hyŏnshil Kŭ Chach'e'ga Pi'gŭk'," *Chosun Ilbo*, 4 December 2002, www.chosun.com.

9 December 2002

After a meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage tells the press that the United States has "patience for diplomacy to work" in dealing with North Korea. Armitage also says that US policy towards North Korea is in line with allies in the region.

—"Remarks to Journalists at the Foreign Ministry Building," Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State, 9 December 2002, www.state.gov.

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10 December 2002

Yukio Takasu, Japan's ambassador to the IAEA, says that an IAEA expert is now in Pyongyang meeting with North Korean government officials. The IAEA official was reportedly sent to Pyongyang last week.

—"IAEA Expert in 'Ongoing' Nuclear Arms Talks with North Korea," Agence France Presse, 10 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Puk-IAEA Haeksach'al Hyöpsang," *Donga Ilbo*, 10 December 2002, www.donga.com; "Pukhan-IAEA Haekhyöpsang Chinhaengchung," *Chosun Ilbo*, 10 December 2002, www.chosun.com.

10 December 2002

In response to the IAEA resolution of 29 November, the Korean Central News Agency accuses the IAEA of being biased and speaking on behalf of the United States. KCNA calls the resolution unreasonable and says the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula is a result of the Washington's hostile policy towards Pyongyang, and the United States having deployed nuclear weapons to South Korea.

—"KCNA Accuses IAEA of Speaking for U.S.," Korean Central News Agency, 10 December 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Kukchewönjaryökkigu'nün Migug'üi Taeyönja'inga / Chosönjung'angt'ongshin Ronp'yön," Korean Central News Agency, 10 December 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "'IAEA, Hanbando Haengmunje'e Pulgongjöng'<Chung'angt'ongshin>," *Joongang Ilbo*, 10 December 2002, www.joins.com;

12 December 2002

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement that says Pyongyang will "immediately resume the operation and construction of its nuclear facilities to generate electricity."

—"DPRK Gov't to Immediately Resume Operation and Constr. (sic) of Its Nuclear Facilities," Korean Central News Agency, 12 December 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Operation and Building of Nuclear Facilities to Be Resumed Immediately," Korean Central News Agency, 12 December 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Chosön'oemusöng Taeyö'n'in <Haekshisöltül'üi Kadonggwa Könsöl'ül Chükshi Chaegae>," Korean Central News Agency, 12 December 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

12 December 2002

Lee Che Sön (Ri Je Son), director general of North Korea's General Department of Atomic Energy, sends a letter to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei with a request to remove all seals and monitoring cameras that the Agency is using to monitor North Korea's nuclear freeze.

—"IAEA Urged to Remove Monitoring Cameras," Korean Central News Agency, 14 December 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Ri Che Sön Wönjaryökch'onggukchang Haekshisölgamshi'k'amera Chölsu'rül Kukchewönjaryökkigu'ege Yogu," Korean Central News Agency, 14 December 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

14 December 2002

Lee Che Sön (Ri Je Son), director general of North Korea's General Department of Atomic Energy, sends another letter to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reiterating Pyongyang's request that the IAEA remove all seals and monitoring cameras at the Yögbjön nuclear complex.

—"IAEA Urged to Remove Monitoring Cameras," Korean Central News Agency, 14 December 2002,

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www.kcna.co.jp; "Ri Che Sŏn Wŏnjaryŏkch'onggukchang Haekshisŏlgamshi'k'amera Chŏlsu'rŭl Kukchewŏnjaryŏkkigu'ege Yogu," Korean Central News Agency, 14 December 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

19 December 2002

Roh Moo Hyun (No Mu Hyŏn; 盧武鉉), a former human rights lawyer, and candidate of the Millennium Democratic Party (새千年民主黨), wins South Korea's presidential election. [Note: Roh has said he would like continue engagement with North Korea, but cannot accept North Korea developing nuclear weapons.]

—Paul Shinn, "Former Human Rights Lawyer Roh Wins South Korean Presidential Election," Associated Press, 19 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Andrew Ward, "Victory for Roh Will Create Tension with US," *Financial Times* (London), 20 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Doug Struck, "Anti-U.S. Mood Lifts South Korean; President-Elect Wants Talks With North, Challenging Bush," *Washington Post*, 20 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "No Mu Hyŏn Taet'ongnyŏng Tangsŏn/Kŭ'nŭn Nuguin'ga," *Chosun Ilbo*, 20 December 2002, p. 6, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "NDFSK Spokesman on Results of Presidential Election," Korean Central News Agency, 23 December 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

19 December 2002

The Chinese Foreign Ministry dismisses as "groundless," reports by the Washington Times that Chinese firms have sold 20 tons of tributyl phosphate to North Korea. Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao states that the *Washington Times* "often publishes ill-intentioned and irresponsible reports and these reports are also groundless. We think this report is not worth comment." [Note: Tributyl phosphate has commercial uses, but it can also be used to make weapons-grade plutonium and weapons-grade uranium.]

— Bill Gertz, "Panel to Probe China's Nuclear-Related Sales to N. Korea; Beijing Says Reports of Transfer to Pyongyang 'Not Worth Comment,'" *Washington Times*, 20 December 2002, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 December 2002

A *Rodong Sinmun* commentary says that if the United States "has a right to use nuclear weapons, then North Korea is entitled to counter it." The daily says, "The Bush administration has not implemented the DPRK-US Agreed Framework deliberately but breached it systematically. The Bush bellicose forces have led nuclear pressure upon the DPRK to a high pitch." The commentary also adds that Pyongyang has proposed a non-aggression be signed by the two sides, and that Washington should accept the proposal.

—"Rodong Sinmun on DPRK's Legitimate Right to Self-Defence," Korean Central News Agency, 20 December 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Rodongshinmun Mi'gug'ŭi Haengmugisayong'e Taeŭnghal Kwalli Itta," Korean Central News Agency, 20 December 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

21 December 2002

North Korean technicians begin removing seals and disabling monitoring cameras at the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.

—"DPRK Interferes with IAEA Safeguards Equipment," WorldAtom Press Release PR 2002/22, 21 December 2002, www.iaea.org; "Work of Removing Seals and Monitoring Cameras from Frozen Nuclear Facilities to Start," Korean Central News Agency, 22 December 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Chosŏnjug'angt'ongshinsa Podo

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Haekshisölpng'in'gwa Kamshi Camera Chegöjag'öb'ül Chükshi Kaeshi," Korean Central News Agency, 22 December 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central Broadcasting Station, 21 December 2002, in "DPRK Radio Claims Lifting Nuclear Freeze 'Not Issue of Dispute'," FBIS Document ID: KPP20021221000029; Hwang Chae Hun, "<puk Haekshisöl Pong'injegö Wallyo>," Yonhap News Agency, 25 December 2002, www.yonhapnews.net.

22 December 2002

North Korean technicians begin removing seals and disabling monitoring cameras at the temporary storage facility for about 8,000 spent fuel rods in Yöngbyön-kun.

—"Further Disruption of IAEA Safeguards implementation in the DPRK," WorldAtom Press Release PR 2002/23, 22 December 2002, www.iaea.org; Richard W. Stevenson, "North Korea Begins to Reopen Plant for Processing Plutonium," *New York Times*, 24 December 2002, www.nytimes.com; Kim Yön Kük, "[Pukhan] P'yeyölyobong 8000 Kae Pong'indo Chegö," *Chosun Ilbo*, 23 December 2002, www.chosun.com.

23-24 December 2002

North Korean technicians remove most of the seals and disables monitoring cameras at the Radiochemistry Laboratory, which is a plutonium reprocessing plant, and the fuel fabrication plant in Yöngbyön-kun.

—"Continued Disruption of IAEA Safeguards Equipment in DPRK," WorldAtom Press Release PR 2002/24, 24 December 2002, www.iaea.org; Richard W. Stevenson, "North Korea Begins to Reopen Plant for Processing Plutonium," *New York Times*, 24 December 2002, www.nytimes.com; Kim In Ku, "[Haekchaech'öri Kwajöng] Pangsahwahakshilsö Plutonium Ch'uch'ul," *Chosun Ilbo*, 23 December 2002, www.chosun.com.

24 December 2002

On the 11th anniversary of Kim Jong Il's appointment as supreme commander of North Korea's armed forces, Minister of the People's Armed Forces Kim Il Ch'öl says, "The US hawks who are pushing the situation on the Korean Peninsula to the brink of a nuclear war. If they, ignorant of their rival, dare provoke a nuclear war, the army and people of the DPRK led by Kim Jong Il, the invincible commander, will rise up to mete out determined and merciless punishment to the US imperialist aggressors with the might of single-hearted unity more powerful than A-bomb."

—"DPRK Ready to Punish Yankees in Singlehearted (sic) Unity More Powerful than A-Bomb," Korean Central News Agency, 24 December 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

27 December 2002

In Crawford, Texas, White House Spokeswoman Claire Buchan says, "The United States will not negotiate in response to threats or broken commitments," and that the United States wants Pyongyang.

—David Stout, "North Korea to Expel Inspectors, Drawing White House Criticism," *New York Times*, 27 December 2002, www.nytimes.com.

27 December 2002

The IAEA receives a letter from North Korea requesting "the immediate removal of IAEA inspectors from North Korea in light their decision to lift the 'freeze' on their nuclear facilities." IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei says, "Together with the loss of cameras and seals, the departure of inspectors would practically bring to

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an end our ability to monitor [the] DPRK's nuclear program or assess its nature."

—"IAEA Responds to DPRK Request to Remove Inspectors," WorldAtom Press Release PR 2002/26, 27 December 2002, www.iaea.org; "DPRK Government Decides to Order IAEA Inspectors Out of DPRK," Korean Central News Agency, 27 December 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Chosŏnjŏngbu Kukchewŏnjaryŏkkigu Sach'alwŏndŭl Naebonaegiro Kyŏlchŏng," Korean Central News Agency, 27 December 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

31 December 2002

Pak Ui Chun, North Korea's ambassador to Russia, suggests that North Korea will pull out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Speaking at a news conference in Moscow, Pak says, "North Korea is not currently able to meet its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—this is the fault of the United States." Pak claims that North Korea can no longer fulfill its treaty obligations because the United States has stopped heavy fuel oil deliveries and continues to threaten North Korea with a preventive nuclear strike.

—James Brooke, "South Opposes Pressuring North Korea, Which Hint It Will Scrap Nuclear Pact," New York Times, 1 January 2003, p. A9, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; James Palmer and Anne Penketh, "North Korea to Pull Out of Pact Limiting Nuclear Weapons Because of US Threats," *The Independent* (London), 1 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Song Tae Su, "Puk 'NPT Uimu Ihaengbulga'/Churŏbuktaesa Palkyŏ...IAEA Sach'aldu Puksŏ Ch'ŏlsu," *Hankook Ilbo*, 1 January 2003, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

[Back to Top](#)

2001

2001

KEDO delivers 559,613 metric tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea.

—KEDO 2001 Annual Report, p. 10, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org.

2001-2005

The EU pledges to contribute €150 million (\$130 million) for the construction of the two light water reactors in North Korea under the Agreed Framework. The EU will provide 30 million euro per year for five years.

—Yonhap News Agency, 19 November 2000, in "ROK's Yonhap: EU to Provide \$130 Mil for KEDO's Reactor Construction in N. Korea," FBIS Document ID KPP20001119000019; "EU '5 Nyŏngan KEDO 1500 Ők Chiwŏn'," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 20 September 2000, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

5 January 2001

The *Chosun Ilbo* reports that at the two Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meetings held on 30 March and 26 June 2000 respectively, the US delegation reportedly proposed to build six standard power plants instead of one of two light water nuclear reactors, under the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework. According to the documents produced from the TCOG meeting, the US delegation suggested that the said proposal will help ease North Korean power shortage in a shorter time frame and at a much less cost. However, according to the *Chosun Ilbo*, the South Korean government disagreed with the proposal saying that even though electricity supply to North Korea is a key issue of ongoing North-South dialogue, it cannot be mixed with the conditions of the 1994

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US-North Korea Agreed Framework. The United States stated its dissatisfaction with South Korea's attempt to support North Korea's electricity generating capacity on its own, disregarding the 1994 Agreed Framework. The US contention is that such a move will aggravate the US position at the negotiation table with North Korea.

—*Chosun Ilbo*, 5 January 2000, in "ROK Daily Notes US Aim to Build 6 Power Plants in DPRK, ROKG's Objections," FBIS Document ID KPP20010105000068; Lee Ha Wŏn, "Mi 'Pug'e Hwajŏn'gönsöl' Chead," *Chosun Ilbo*, 6 January 2001, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

10 January 2001

A South Korean official announces that construction of two nuclear power plants under the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework is likely to be further delayed due to contractual and funding problems. The first reactor is to be built by 2003 and the second by 2004. The US company General Electric Co. backed out of a deal to supply turbine generators for the project because the supply contract did not contain financial liabilities and compensation guarantees in case of plant accidents. KEDO has now decided to award the contract to a Japan's Hitachi-Toshiba consortium for supply of power turbines. According to the official, the contract worth \$100million will be signed within six months. The official also says that work on site preparation has almost been completed and reactor construction work is expected to begin in the later half of the year 2001. The contract with Japanese consortium would increase the pace of planning and constructing the nuclear power plants. However, according to the official, some South Korean lawmakers have opposed the Japanese firms' participation, saying it will only benefit Japan's economy, while turning the North Korean power stations into a Japanese model instead of Korean. Other South Korean lawmakers refute the contention, stressing that Japanese earnings from the contract will only be \$250 million as compared to \$1 billion contribution to the project by Japan.

—Jae Sook Yoo, "Further Delay Expected in Nuclear Reactors for North Korea," Associated Press, 10 January 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 9 January 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: 2 Japanese Firms May Supply Generators to KEDO Reactor Project," FBIS Document KPP20010109000067; "Japanese Firms to Assume Reactor Project in N.K. instead of GE," *Korea Herald*, 10 January 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Associated Press, "Further Delay over Reactors Expected," *South China Morning Post*, 10 January 2001, www.scmp.com.

13 January 2001

KEDO officials say that North Koreans have been demanding an almost six-fold pay rise since February 2000, with some 100 workers taking leave everyday to pressure KEDO. According to the officials, bargaining talks have been continuing off and on without any early conclusion in sight. The officials also say that the consortium is considering employing construction workers from Uzbekistan for the light water nuclear reactor project in North Korea.

—Kyodo News Service, 13 January 2001, in "KEDO Mulls Employment of Non-Koreans for Nuke Plant Project," FBIS Document ID JPP20010113000064.

13 January 2001

Song Min Sun, director general of North American Affairs Bureau in South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, says the idea of replacing a nuclear power plant, currently under construction in North Korea, with a thermal plant is unworkable "politically, economically and technologically." Song says, "Once, we reviewed the idea, but reached the conclusion that it is unworkable because of underlying problems regarding the

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replacement." Noting that Seoul is set to provide 70 percent of the total construction cost reaching \$4.6 billion, Song said that it should have the key voice in any possible change in the agreement.

—*Korea Times*, 14 January 2000, in "ROK Official Says Seoul Rules out Revision of Nuclear Deal with DPRK," FBIS Document ID KPP20010114000027; Son Key Young, "Seoul Rules Out Revision of LWR Deal," *Korea Times*, 14 January 2001, www.hankooki.com.

17 January 2001

US Secretary of State-designate Colin Powell tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Bush administration will adhere to the Agreed Framework, "provided North Korea does the same."

—"Bush Administration to Review N. Korean Policy: Powell," Japan Economic Newswire, 17 January 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Matthew Lee, "Powell Outlines New Foreign Policy to Adoring Lawmakers, China, Russia," Agence France Presse, 17 January 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 February 2001

KEDO issues an Authorization to Proceed, allowing KEPCO to commence negotiations with Doosan to begin preliminary work on the turbine generators for the KEDO light water reactor project. [Note: General Electric (GE) was to be the supplier of the turbine generators, but after failing to receive liability guarantees from the US Congress, GE pulled out of the KEDO project.]

—*KEDO 2001 Annual Report*, p. 10, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org.

3 February 2001

Desaix Anderson, Director General of KEDO, says that construction of the two light water nuclear reactors in North Korea would be continued even though the Bush administration has pursued the replacement of the light water reactors with conventional power plants. He dismisses media reports of replacing one LWR with a thermal plant.

—Shin Joong Dong, *Joongang Ilbo*, 4 February 2001, in "KEDO Denies Report of Substituting Thermal Plant for Reactor in DPRK," FBIS Document ID KPP20010204000047; Shin Chung Ton, "Taebuk Kyöngsuro Hwaryökpajönso Taech'e Koryöanhae," *Joongang Ilbo*, 5 February 2001, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

15 February 2001

According to the *Wolgan Chosun*, Kim Jong Il is shot in the side by one of his bodyguards. According to the report, Pak Song Pong, first vice director of the Munitions Industry Department under the Korean Workers' Party, was also shot and died on 20 February. [Note: Pak's sudden death on 20 February has been confirmed, but he shooting has not.]

—U Chong Chang, "Kim Jong Il, Yopkurie Han Pang Maja?" *Wolgan Chosun* (Seoul), 1 June 2001, <http://monthly.chosun.com>; U Chong Chang, *Wolgan Chosun* (Seoul), 1 June 2001, in "Rumor of Attack on Kim Chong Il," FBIS Document ID KPP20010524000099.

15 February 2001

KEPCO and the government of Uzbekistan sign a contract by which 250 Uzbeks will be employed to work on the KEDO light water reactor project beginning in March 2001.

—"250 Uzbek Workers to Toll on KEDO Project in N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 16 February 2001, in Lexis-

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Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Uzbek Workers to Be Deployed to KEDO Construction Site," *Korea Times*, 17 February 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19-21 February 2001

Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, meets with South Korean officials in Seoul to discuss various issues. While in Seoul, Kartman meets with Chan Sun Sup, head of South Korea's Office of Planning for the Light Water Reactor Project. The two reportedly discuss recent developments in the KEDO project, including the employment of 250 Uzbeks to work on the project beginning in March.

—"U.S. Envoy to Meet Officials in N.K. Reactor Project," *Korea Herald*, 20 February 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 February 2001

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement criticizing the hard-line policies of the Bush administration. The spokesman says that the United States and North Korea agreed to improve bilateral relations and remove distrust in the Agreed Framework, but that US calls for "conditional reciprocity" mean the United States wants North Korea to "disarm itself." The spokesman says that the United States has not sincerely implemented its commitments under the Agreed Framework, which has "caused huge losses to North Korea." Furthermore, the spokesman says the KEDO light water reactors (LWR) are unlikely to be completed by 2003, and that the United States "is obliged to compensate for North Korea's loss of electricity caused by the delayed LWR project."

—"Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on New U.S. Administration's Policy Towards DPRK," Korean Central News Agency, 22 February 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "Migukŭi Kŭ Ŏddŏn Taejosŏnjŏngch'aeg'edo Chunbidoeyŏ Itta/Oemusŏngdaebyŏnin," Korean Central News Agency, 21 February 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Yonhap News Agency, 22 February 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: DPRK FM Warns of Breaking Geneva Accord If US 'Turns Hard Line Against DPRK,'" FBIS Document ID KPP20010222000004.

21 February 2001

US government sources state that the Bush administration plans to emphasize a reduction in North Korean conventional forces, including a withdrawal of forward-deployed North Korean troops. Other US officials state that reaching an agreement with North Korea on conventional forces will be relatively easy compared to nuclear and missile issues. The Bush administration is also considering the replacement of one or both light water reactors under the Agreed Framework with conventional power plants as part of its ongoing policy review.

—"Bush to Seek Cut in N. Korea's Conventional Forces," Japan Economic Newswire, 22 February 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 March 2001

Senior lawmakers, including Henry Hyde (R-Illinois) chairman of the House International Relations Committee; Christopher Cox (R-California), chairman of the Republican Policy Committee, and Edward Markey, (D-Massachusetts), deliver a letter to the Bush administration urging the United States to reconsider its commitments under the Agreed Framework to provide North Korea with light water reactors.

—John Diamond, "Bush Is Asked To Reassess North Korea Reactor Deal," *Chicago Tribune*, 3 March 2001, p. 1.

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2 March 2001

State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says that the Bush administration plans to fulfill its Agreed Framework commitments "completely and fully."

—John Diamond, "Bush Is Asked To Reassess North Korea Reactor Deal," *Chicago Tribune*, 3 March 2001, p. 1.

7 March 2001

President George Bush states that he is not certain North Korea can be trusted to adhere to its commitments under the Agreed Framework. Speaking in Washington at a joint press conference with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, Bush says, "I do have some skepticism about the leader of North Korea. We're not certain as to whether or not they're keeping all terms of all agreements."

—Doug Struck, "U.S.-Led Plant Beset by Delays; Atomic Power Project Key to Korean Accord," *Washington Post*, 25 March 2001, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "Bush Tells Seoul Talks with North Won't Resume Now," *New York Times*, 8 March 2001, p.A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 March 2001

US Secretary of State Colin Powell announces that the United States may modify the Agreed Framework. Speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Powell says, "For the moment we are in accord with the 1994 agreement, but that doesn't prevent us from looking at aspects of it that we might wish to revisit or change." Powell says the 1994 Agreed Framework had many promising elements, but "what was not there was a monitoring and verification regime of the kind that we would need to have in order to move forward in negotiations with such a regime."

—Kenji Urakami, "U.S. May Modify 1994 Accord with N. Korea, Powell Says," Japan Economic Newswire, 8 March 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Ben Barber, "Powell Wants a Reduction on Size of N. Korea's Million-Man Army," *Washington Times*, 9 March 2001, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 March 2001

Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sends a letter to George W. Bush urging him to renegotiate the Agreed Framework with North Korea and substitute conventional power plants for the two light water reactors. Helms accuses North Korea of not upholding its commitments under the agreement.

—Jason Sherman and Amy Svitak, "Helms Pushes Harder Stance on Reactors for North Korea," *Defense News*, 12 March 2001, p. 8.

9 March 2001

KEPCO, the main contractor for the KEDO light water reactor project, announce that Donga Construction will no longer participate in the project, thus leaving its 20 percent share of the construction project to be divided amongst the other three companies subcontracted for the project.

—Yonhap News Agency, 9 March 2001, in "South Firm's Share in North's Reactor Project to be Taken on by Partners," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 March 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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10-13 March 2001

A KEDO delegation travels to Pyongyang "to participate in high-level negotiations" with North Korea officials regarding the light water reactor project.

—"KEDO Delegation Arrives," Korean Central News Agency, 10 March 2001, www.kcna.co.jp;

"Chosŏnbando'e'nerŭgigaebalgigu (KEDO) Tae'p'yodan Toch'ak," Korean Central News Agency, 10 March 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "KEDO Delegation Leaves," Korean Central News Agency, 13 March 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "KEDO Tae'p'yodan'i Ddŏnakatta," Korean Central News Agency, 13 March 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 13 March 2001, in "DPRK Radio reports Departure of KEDO Delegation," FBIS Document ID KPP20010313000113.

11 March 2001

North Korean radio says, "The people of the earth all know that there are approximately 1,000 nuclear weapons still in existence in South Korea." The report quotes a publication of the "National Democratic Front," which North Korea claims is an underground resistance organization operating in South Korea.

—Yonhap News Agency, 13 March 2001, in "DPRK Alleges US Has '1,000 Nuclear Weapons Deployed' in ROK," FBIS Document ID KPP20010313000040.

13 March 2001

The head of the North Korean delegation for inter-ministerial talks, which are scheduled to begin today in Seoul, calls his counterpart in Seoul to inform him that North Korea will have to postpone the talks. Chŏn Kŭm Chin, the North Korean representative gives no reason for the sudden postponement, but some speculate the reason may be health problems for Chŏn, the recent summit between Kim Dae Jung and George W. Bush, or the perceived US hard-line policy towards North Korea.

—"5th Inter-Korea Ministerial Talks Postponed," *Chosun Ilbo*, 13 March 2001, www.chosun.com; Lee Young-jong and Lee Soo-jeong, "North Abruptly Calls Off Meeting," *Joongang Ilbo*, 14 March 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; Associated Press, in "North Korea Cancels Talks With South Korea," *New York Times*, 12 March 2001, www.nytimes.com; Kim In Ku, "Changgwankŭp Hoedam Puk, Tolyŏn'yŏngi," *Chosun Ilbo*, 14 March 2001, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

23 March 2001

The Education Center of Unification, a South Korean think tank, issues a report stating that over 3,000 nuclear scientists are currently working in North Korea.

—"North Korea Believed to Have 3,000 Nuclear Experts, Report Says," Associated Press, 23 March 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 March 2001

The *Washington Post* reports that the North Korean nuclear project under the Agreed Framework is unlikely to be completed until 2010. According to the report, the Bush administration is looking skeptically at the project, and some key Republican senators are demanding changes. North Korea has been threatening war if the project is not carried forward. Yet, the report quotes officials involved with the project as saying that they are confident that the project will not be abandoned. Chang Sŏn Sŏp, head of South Korea's Office of Planning for the Light-Water

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Reactor Project, has said that there is no alternative to the project.

—Doug Struck, "US-Led Plant Beset by Delays; Atomic Power Project Key to Korean Accord," *Washington Post*, 25 March 2001, p. A1.

28 March 2001

Chang Sŏn Sŏp, head of South Korea's Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project, says that replacing the light-water nuclear reactors with thermoelectric power plants would be impractical. He says, "There would be difficulties in revising the Agreed Framework and the replacement would not be of help in reducing the construction period or curtailing of costs."

—Yonhap News Agency, 28 March 2001, in "Thermoelectric Power Plant Construction in DPRK 'Impractical'," FBIS Document ID KPP200010328000030; Pak Yong Hyŏn, "Puk Kyŏnsuro Hwajŏndaech'e Hyŏnshilsŏng Opsŏ/Chang Sŏn Sŏp Kihoekdanjang," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 29 March 2001, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

9 April 2001

The US State Department announces that the United States has earmarked \$95 million for fiscal year 2002 to be used on the KEDO light water reactor project. This amount marks a 73 percent increase in US contributions to KEDO from fiscal year 2001.

—Yonhap News Agency, 10 April 2001, in "North Korea: USA to Increase Funds for Nuclear Reactor Projects in 2002," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 10 April 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Mid-April 2001

The US National Security Council decides to permit a renewed authorization of certain nuclear technology transfers to North Korea under the Agreed Framework. [Note: Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham signed the authorization on 3 May 2001.]

—Michael Knapik, "Westinghouse gets Reauthorization to Send Technology to North Korea," *Nucleonics Week*, Vol. 42, No. 23, 7 June 2001, www.mhenergy.com;

17 April 2001

The *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* reports that the United States is planning to urge North Korea to accept a nuclear inspection team to "confirm the existence of a storage place for plutonium." The report also says the new US administration is seeking to replace one of the light water reactors under the Agreed Framework with a conventional power plant. [Note: The reference to "the storage place" is likely referring to the two suspect waste sites in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.]

—"U.S. to Dispatch New Nuclear Inspection Team to North," *Joongang Ilbo*, 19 April 2001, www.english.joins.com.

17 April 2001

Speaking in Washington, D.C., John McLaughlin, deputy director of the CIA, says that North Korea "probably has one or two nuclear bombs—and it may also have biological ones alongside its chemical ones."

—"News Review: North Korea Extends Missile Test Moratorium, Holds Firm on Exports," *Disarmament Diplomacy*, Issue No. 57, May 2001, www.acronym.org.uk.

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26 April 2001

Charles Kartman, a former US State Department official, is appointed new director of KEDO. Kartman will replace Desaix Anderson on 1 May 2001.

—Kyodo News Service, 26 April 2001, in "Charles Kartman Appointed to Head KEDO" FBIS Document ID JPP20010426000232.

May 2001

The United States renews for five years an authorization for the transfer of certain nuclear technology to North Korea. The authorization is issued under the Department of Energy's regulations in 10 CFR Part 810, and it allows limited technology transfers only to what is "necessary for the licensing and safe operation of the reactors and not technology enabling the design or manufacture of nuclear reactor components or fuel." [Note: According to Department of Energy documents released in March 2003, Westinghouse Co. transfers approximately 300 nuclear related documents to North Korea from May 2001 to March 2003. The 300 documents, including safety analysis reports, training documents, quality assurance documents, and construction documents, are among 3,100 nuclear related documents from Westinghouse Co. that have been approved by the Department of Energy. 100 Westinhouse documents have been blocked by the Department's export control office.]

—Michael Knapik, "New Part 810 Authorization Needed for North Korean LWRs," *Nucleonics Week*, Vol. 41, No. 45, 9 November 2000, www.mhenergy.com; Mark Hibbs and Michael Knapik, "Decisions on KEDO Project Fate Now in Hands of Bush Officials," *Nucleonics Week*, Vol. 42, No. 1, 4 January 2001, www.mhenergy.com; Wayne Washington, "US Lets N. Korea Get Nuclear Data Transfer Pact Stays in Effect," *Boston Globe*, 7 March 2003, p. A9, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; H. Josef Hebert, "U.S. Still Providing North Korea with Nuclear Information during Confrontation," *Associated Press*, 7 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 May 2001

KEDO's Executive Board names Charles Kartman as the new executive director of KEDO.

—*KEDO 2001 Annual Report*, p. 10, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org.

1-5 May 2001

A KEDO delegation visits Pyongyang to participate in "high-level expert negotiation" with North Korea. The talks are in regard to the provision of two LWRs under the Agreed Framework. It is later revealed that quality guarantee protocols are covered in the talks, and that North Korea agrees it will be the responsible party for operating the reactors, and that it will accept responsibility for any accidents at the site.

—"KEDO Delegation Here," Korean Central News Agency, 2 May 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "KEDO Delegation Leaves," Korean Central News Agency, 2 May 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Yonhap News Agency, 2 May 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: KEDO Mission Flies to DPRK to Hold High-Level Talks," FBIS Document ID KPP20010502000141; Korean Central News Agency, 2 May 2001, in "DPRK Radio Reports on KEDO Delegation's 1 May Arrival," FBIS Document ID KPP20010502000051; Korean Central News Agency, 5 May 2001, in "KEDO Experts End Round of Negotiations in Pyongyang," FBIS Document ID JPP20010505000044; "North Responsible in Reactor Mishaps," *Joongang Ilbo*, 28 May 2001, <http://english.joins.com>.

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Early May 2001

In a US Senate confirmation hearing, James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, says he does not expect the Bush administration to scrap the Agreed Framework after the policy review on North Korea is completed.

—Shin Yong Bae, "N.K. Nuclear Reactor Controversy Reviving," *Korea Herald*, 8 May 2001, www.koreaherald.co.kr.

2 May 2001

Moscow TV 6 says there have been reports in the Moscow press that 20 Russian have gone to North Korea and assumed aliases. The scientists are said to be working on the North Korean nuclear program.

—Moscow TV 6, 2 May 2001, in "Russia: Plans to Sell Military Hardware to North Korea Noted," FBIS Document ID CEP20010503000276.

3 May 2001

US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham signs a new authorization for Westinghouse to transfer certain nuclear technology to North Korea. The new five-year authorization replaces one that was issued in 1996 and was due to expire on 6 May 2001. The earlier authorization was for Combustion Engineering, which has now merged with Westinghouse. Only technology that is necessary for the implementation of the Agreed Framework can be transferred to North Korea under this authorization. Technology for "the design or manufacture of nuclear reactor components or fuel" is still banned.

—Michael Knapik, "Westinghouse gets Reauthorization to Send Technology to North Korea," *Nucleonics Week*, Vol. 42, No. 23, 7 June 2001, www.mhenergy.com.

7 May 2001

South Korean media report that the United States has decided to replace the two light-water nuclear reactors being constructed in North Korea by KEDO with thermal power stations. According to reports, President Bush has instructed Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to inform South Korea and Japan of the decision during his upcoming diplomatic trip to South Korea and Japan. However, a spokesman for the South Korean government says that the United States does not have the final decision over the replacement of the light-water reactors with conventional power plants.

—Kyodo News Service, 7 May 2001, in "South Korea Denies Reports on Change in North Korea Nuclear Energy Plans," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7 May 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lee Ch'öl Hui, "Mi, Pukhan Kyönsuro 'Hwaryökpajönso' Ro Taech'e Pangch'im," *Joongang Ilbo*, 7 May 2001, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr; Ryu Chae Hu, "Puk Kyöngsuro Hwajön Taech'e Nollan Kyesok," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 8 May 2001, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

8 May 2001

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, condemns CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin for suggesting that North Korea might have one or two nuclear weapons. According to the report, Pyongyang is shocked that the "CIA dared find fault with us groundlessly on an official occasion." The report continues, "It is a known fact that we do not have nuclear problems. The transparency of our peaceful nuclear energy program has already been confirmed."

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—"U.S. Loudmouthed 'Threat' from DPRK Rebuffed," Korean Central News Agency, 8 May 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "Bush Haengjŏngbu'ga Ddŏ'dŭ'nŭ <Pukchosŏn'wihyŏp>Sŏl'ŭl Kyut'an/Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 8 May 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 8 May 2001, in "North Korean Paper Rejects US Official's Remark on Possession of Nuclear Bombs," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 8 May 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 May 2001

The *Rodong Sinmun* criticizes IAEA Director ElBaradei for trying "to shift responsibility for the delayed construction of the light water reactors under the Agreed Framework onto North Korea." The commentary says that the United States is "chiefly responsible for the noncompliance with the Agreed Framework," and that North Korea has an urgent need to be compensated for the loss of electricity "due to the intentional delaying tactics of the US." However, the *Rodong Sinmun* also says, "There is no change in North Korea's stand to sincerely implement the Agreed Framework."

—"United States to Blame for Delayed LWR Construction," Korean Central News Agency, 15 May 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "Kyŏgsurodaesanggŏnsŏlchiyŏnch'aeg'im'ŭn Mi'gug'e Itta/Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 15 May 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "North Korea Criticizes IAEA Director-General," *Joongang Ilbo*, 15 May 2001, <http://english.joins.com>.

16 May 2001

The Korean Central News Agency releases a report on the Agreed Framework that says the light water reactors (LWR) may not be completed until 2010. The report says North Korea should be compensated for the shortfall in electricity, and that the 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) delivered per year under the Agreed Framework will not be sufficient. The HFO is supposed to compensate for the closure of North Korea's two graphite-moderated nuclear plants of 50MW(e) and 200MW(e), while each of the LWRs is to generate 1,000MW(e). North Korea says other countries may contribute to this shortfall besides the United States, but that North Korea may pull out of the Agreed Framework and reopen the graphite-moderated reactors if it does not receive compensation.

—"Report on Delay in Construction of Light-Water Reactor Project Issued," Korean Central News Agency, 16 May 2001, www.kcna.co.kr; "Chomi'gibonhab'ŭimun'e Ddarŭn Kyŏngsurogŏnsŏl Chiyŏn'e Taehan Sangbo," Korean Central News Agency, 16 May 2001, www.kcna.co.kr; Korean Central News Agency, 16 May 2001, in "DPRK's KCNA: Detailed Report on LWR Construction Delays Issued," FBIS Document ID KPP20010516000110; Yonhap News Agency, 16 May 2001, in "DPRK Report on LWR Construction Delays Viewed as 'Tactic' to Resume DPRK-US Dialogue," FBIS Document ID KPP20010517000002; Yonhap News Agency, 16 May 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: DPRK Hints at Reopening Graphite-Moderated Reactor," FBIS Document ID KPP20010516000107; AFP (Hong Kong), 16 May 2001, in "DPRK Report: LWR Delays May Lead To 'Abandoning' 1994 Agreed Framework," FBIS Document ID KPP2001051600018; "N. Korean Nuclear Deal Warning," *Washington Post*, 17 May 2001, p. 20; Ha T'ae Wŏn, "Pukhan 'Mibosangŏpsŭmyŏn Haektonggyŏl Haeje," *Donga Ilbo*, 17 May 2001, www.donga.com; Yun Chŏng Ho, "Puk, Haektonggyŏl Haeje Kyŏnggo," *Chosun Ilbo*, 16 May 2001, www.chosun.com; Ahn Sung Kyoo, "Pay for Delays, North Warns, or It Will Walk Away From Pact With U.S.," *Joongang Ilbo*, 18 May 2001, <http://english.joins.com>.

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21 May 2001

The Korean Central News Agency publishes another report stating that the United States is responsible for the delay in the KEDO light water reactor project, and must compensate North Korea for the electricity loss. The report also complains about "cock-and-bull stories about the 'revision' of the AF [Agreed Framework] and the 'provision of thermal power plants' [that] are heard from among officials of the Bush administration."

—"KCNA on U.S. Non-Compliance with Agreed Framework," Korean Central News Agency, 21 May 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mi'gukchönggwön'i Kyoch'edoeyöttago Üimu'ga Talla Chi'nün'ga/Chosönjung'angt'ongshin," Korean Central News Agency, 21 May 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 21 May 2001, in "DPRK's KCNA: KCNA on U.S. Non-Compliance with Agreed Framework," FBIS Document ID KPP20010521000062.

22-29 May 2001

An IAEA delegation travels to North Korea. The delegation meets with North Korean officials in Pyongyang on 23 to 25 May for the 16th round of negotiations on the implementation of the Agreed Framework. Olli Heinonen, director of safeguards for the IAEA in Asia, asks North Korea for a detailed program guaranteeing scrutiny of the two suspect waste sites in Yöngbyön-kun and other facilities. The negotiations end with no agreement to resume inspections, but another meeting is scheduled for October.

—"IAEA Delegation Here," Korean Central News Agency, 22 May 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Don Kirk, "North Korean Bomb: Do They Have It?" *International Herald Tribune*, 25 May 2001, www.ihf.com; Ahn Sung-Kyoo, "Three Sites in North Selected For Nuclear Control Check," *Joongang Ilbo*, 31 May 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; "IAEA Delegation Leaves," KCNA, 29 May 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "Pyongyang Rebuffs Nuclear Inspectors," *Joongang Ilbo*, 1 June 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; "Pyongyang Already Notified of Early Inspection: Interview with the IAEA Spokesman," *Joongang Ilbo*, 7 June 2001, <http://english.joins.com>.

23 May 2001

Yonhap News Agency reports that the United States will try to accelerate safeguards inspections in North Korea so that they may begin no later than next year. The *Joongang Ilbo* quotes a diplomatic source in Seoul as saying, "It seems like the US Bush administration has made up its mind to resolve the North's nuclear suspicion first among all the other matters and launch early verification process (sic)." The administration is likely taking this stand because of the delay in the LWR construction that was originally targeted for completion by 2003.

—Hwang Chae Hon, "US Accelerates Early Inquiry Into DPRK Nuclear History," Yonhap News Agency, 23 May 2001, in "US Plans to Accelerate Investigation of Suspected DPRK Nuclear History Noted," FBIS Document ID KPP20010522000174; Kim Hee Sung, "U.S. to Launch Early Nuclear Verification Process to N.K.," *Joongang Ilbo*, 23 May 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; Pak Ch'an Ku, "Mi, Puk Haeküihok Shisöl Naenyön Sach'al Ch'ujin," *Taehan Maeil*, 24 May 2001, www.kdaily.com; Lee Ha Wön, "Mi, Pukhaek Chogisach'al Yoguhal Tüt," *Chosun Ilbo*, 23 May 2001, www.chosun.com.

25 May 2001

James Kelly, US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, tells South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Im Söng Jun that talks between the United States and North Korea are likely to resume in June. Kelly makes the remarks in Honolulu during the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting. Kelly says

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the North Korean missile program will likely be the first item on the agenda.

—Kyodo News Service, 26 May 2001, in "U.S.-North Korea Talks May Resume in June: Yonhap," FBIS Document ID JPP20010526000055; Ch'oe Ch'öl Ho, "Kelly Miat'aedamdang Ch'agwanbo 'Taebuk Missile Hoedam Kot Chaegae'," *Taehan Maeil*, 24 May 2001, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

26 May 2001

James Kelly, US representative to the Trilateral Consultation and Oversight Group (TCOG), briefs his South Korean and Japanese counterparts on the US policy review of North Korea. He says, "We are in the final stage in the comprehensive review of US policy toward North Korea." All three delegations agree that consultation and coordinated policy is needed towards several issues regarding North Korea, including missiles, WMD, and humanitarian issues. The delegations reaffirm their commitment to the Agreed Framework, and express strong support for South Korea's engagement policy towards North Korea.

—"Brief Comments from Three Delegations after TCOG Talks," *Joongang Ilbo*, 29 May 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; "TCOG Issues Joint-Statement on North Korea," *Chosun Ilbo*, 30 May 2001, www.chosun.com; Ch'oe Hyŏn Su, "Han · Mi · Il Taebuk Chojŏnghoeüi/'Puk · Mi Taehwa Wŏnchömsö Chae'gae'," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 28 May 2001, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

29 May 2001

After the Trilateral consultation and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting in Honolulu, senior officials from South Korea, the United States and Japan hold an unofficial meeting to discuss North Korea policy. During the meeting, South Korean Unification Minister Im Tong Wŏn, former US Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry William Perry, and Ryozi Kato, who is later named the new Deputy Vice Foreign Minister of Japan, review the Bush administration's policy toward North Korea.

—"Unification Minister in Honolulu Unification Minister Lim Dong-Won Left for Hawaii Yesterday to Attend an Informal Yet Significant Meeting with U.S. and Japanese Experts on North Korea Policy," *Korea Times*, 28 May 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Han · Mi · Il O'nŭl Pi'gongshik Taebukchŏngch'aekhoeüi/Kelly Ch'a'gwanbodŭng Shilmuch'aegimja Ch'amsök Chumok," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 30 May 2001, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

Late May 2001

North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun tells Selig Harrison, an American scholar, that Pyongyang is reconsidering its missile flight-test moratorium. Harrison quotes Foreign Minister Paek as saying, "As to whether we will maintain the moratorium until 2003, that is yet to be decided. It depends entirely on the policy of the new administration." During his five-day visit to Pyongyang, Harrison also meets with Colonel General Lee Ch'an Pok, the North Korean representative at Panmunjom. Harrison quotes Colonel General Lee as saying, "Right now our government has not decided that we need nuclear weapons, but everybody is thinking in that direction in view of the hostile attitude of the Bush administration." Harrison concludes that the Bush administration's stance is playing into the hands of hard-liners in Pyongyang.

—John Pomfret, "North Korea Said to Warn of New Missile Tests," *Washington Post*, 4 June 2001, p. A15; John Pomfret, "A North Korean Warning on Missiles: U.S. Scholar Sees Negative Mood in Pyongyang as Bush Hardens Line," *The International Herald Tribune*, 4 June 2001, p. 9; Elisabeth Rosenthal, "North Korea Threatens to Pull Out

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of Missile Pacts," *The New York Times*, 5 June 2001, www.nytimes.com; Joe McDonald, "N. Korea Warns of Actions on Missiles," AP Online, 6 June 2001, www.ap.org.

31 May 2001

Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer says that Australia will invite North Korean officials to a nuclear safeguards training course to be held in Australia later this year. Downer says the invitation is being extended so that North Korean officials can "join regional counterparts in developing their expertise in the management and accounting of nuclear materials, to assist North Korea to meet its NPT and IAEA obligations." Downer also says that Australia "supports efforts to achieve comprehensive and verifiable cuts in the DPRK missile program."

—Yonhap News Agency, 31 May 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: Australia to Invite N.K. Officials to Its Nuclear Training Program," FBIS Document ID KPP20010531000059, 31 May 2001; "NK Officials to Attend Nuclear Safeguards Training in Australia," *Korea Times*, 1 June 2001.

June 2001

The United States and South Korea begin a joint study on confidence-building measures (CBMs) with North Korea to address Pyongyang's ballistic missiles, WMD programs and conventional forces. The joint study team reportedly completes the first part of the study in late February 2002, with 32 items to be proposed for CBMs with North Korea.

—Jong-Heon Lee, "U.S. Moves to Tackle Conventional Weapons," United Press International, 28 February 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; C.W. Lim, "US and South Korea Study Ways to Ease Tensions with North," Agence France Presse, 28 February 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kim Min-Seok, "U.S. to Join Effort to Limit North's Arms," *Joongang Ilbo*, 28 March 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; Yu Yong Wŏn, "[Han-Mi] Taebuk Kunsashilloejoch'i Maryŏn...Hotline Tŭng Hyŏpsang," *Chosun Ilbo*, 27 February 2002, www.chosun.com; Kim Kwi Kŭn, "[Han-Mi, CBM Kongdong'yŏn'gusŏnggwawa Chŏnmang]," *Chosun Ilbo*, 27 February 2002, www.chosun.com; Kim Kwi Kŭn, "Hanmi, Kunsashilloejoch'i Kongcongdaeŭng Hab'ŭi," *Chosun Ilbo*, 27 February 2002, www.chosun.com.

1 June 2001

The *Financial Times* reports that US officials are concerned about contacts between North Korean officials and senior figures in the Pakistani nuclear program. There is also evidence that North Koreans have visited a nuclear weapons site in Pakistan. Some speculate that North Korea might obtain nuclear weapons technology in exchange for ballistic missile technology.

—Stephen Fidler and Edward Luce, "US Fears North Korea Could Gain Nuclear Capability Through Pakistan," *Financial Times*, 1 June 2001, p. 1.

4 June 2001

Charles Kartman, executive director of KEDO, says the United States will not provide any compensation for delays in the construction of two light water reactors in North Korea. However, Kartman denies reports that the reactors will be replaced with conventional power plants.

—Charles Lee, "N. Korea's Demand for Compensation Rejected," United Press International, 4 June 2001.

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5 June 2001

Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Satter categorically denies that Pakistan has ever exported nuclear technology to North Korea. Speaking at a press conference, Satter stresses that Pakistan has never and will never export nuclear technology or material to any country.

—"Pakistan Denies Export of Nuclear Technology," Japan Economic Newswire, 5 June 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 June 2001

The Bush administration announces that its North Korea policy review is complete. The administration says it wants to restart talks with Pyongyang to seek "improved implementation of the Agreed Framework, verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile program, a ban on missile exports, and a less threatening North Korean conventional military posture." The administration offers incentives, such as "greater humanitarian aid, easing of economic sanctions, and unspecified political steps."

—Alex Wagner, "Bush Outlines Resuming Talks with North Korea," *Arms Control Today*, July/August 2001, pp. 23, 25; Michael Knapik, "U.S. to Pursue Better Execution of U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework," *Nucleonics Week*, Vol. 42, No 24, 14 June 2001, www.mhenergy.com; Kyodo News Service, 6 June 2001, in "Bush Wants 'Serious' Talks with N. Korea on Missiles," FBIS Document ID JPP20010606000167.

6 June 2001

North Korea criticizes the United States for suggesting in the TCOG meeting on 27 May that North Korea should submit to early IAEA safeguards inspections. Instead, North Korea feels it should be compensated for the loss in electricity due to the delay in the light water reactor (LWR) construction under the Agreed Framework. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in Pyongyang says, "The inspection is unthinkable before a great deal of the LWR project has been carried out." Furthermore, KCNA says, "It is the deserved right and option for the DPRK to restart the construction of graphite-moderated reactors for its right to existence unless compensation is made for the electricity loss resulting from the heavy delay in the LWR project..."

—"U.S. Urged to Compensate for DPRK's Loss of Electricity," Korean Central News Agency, 6 June 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency, 6 June 2001, in "DPRK's KCNA: US Urged To Compensate for DPRK's 'Loss of Electricity' Due to Delay in LWR Project," FBIS Document ID KPP20010606000016; C.W. Lim, "North Korea Warns Nuclear Accord Close to Collapse," Agence France Presse, 6 June 2001.

7 June 2001

US Secretary of State Colin Powell states that the United States is placing no preconditions on the proposed talks with North Korea. However, Powell adds that the Bush administration wants to expand the dialogue with North Korea by "putting conventional forces on the agenda and by making it clear to the North Koreans that we want to talk about missiles and missile technology and missile sales and nuclear weapons programs, but we also want to talk about humanitarian issues."

—Alex Wagner, "Bush Outlines Resuming Talks with North Korea," *Arms Control Today*, July/August 2001, pp. 23, 25; "Powell: U.S. 'Ready to Move Forward' with North Korea," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7 June 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Stephen Collinson, "No Preconditions on North Korea Talks: US," Agence France Presse, 8 June 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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9 June 2001

South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Han Sung Su says he is confident that the Bush administration will abide by the Agreed Framework. Han met with White House and State Department officials last week in Washington. Han quotes officials as saying that the new target date for transferring the two light water reactors is 2008.

—Jim Mann, "U.S. Is Seen As Ready To Fulfill 1994 North Korea Reactor Deal," *Los Angeles Times*, 10 June 2001, p. 4.

11 June 2001

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei urges North Korea to comply with IAEA requests for safeguards inspections. ElBaradei makes the request during the opening statement of the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna.

—"ROK's Yonhap: IAEA Urges North Korea to Cooperate with Inspection," 11 June 2001, in FBIS Document ID KPP20010611000100.

13 June 2001

Jack Pritchard, US special envoy for Korean peace talks, meets with Lee Hyŏng Ch'ŏl, North Korean ambassador to the UN, in New York. Pritchard explains the outline of the Bush administration's policy towards North Korea, and requests a meeting with Kim Kye Kwan, North Korean vice foreign minister. Lee responds that he will reply in one or two weeks after delivering the message to Pyongyang.

—"A Useful Start', Comments Washington on U.S.-DPRK Talks," *English Joongang Ilbo*, 14 June 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; "Not Much Enthusiasm from N.K. in Resuming Next Dialogue with U.S.," *English Joongang Ilbo*, 15 June 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; Kuk Ki Yon, "Mi, Kim Kye Kwan Kwa Hoedam Kongshikcheŭi," *Segye Ilbo*, 14 June 2001, www.segyetimes.co.kr; Steve Mufsaon, "North Korea, U.S. to Hold Talks Today on Missiles," *Washington Post*, 13 June 2001, p. A21; Alex Wagner, "Bush Outlines Resuming Talks with North Korea," *Arms Control Today*, July/August 2001, pp. 23, 25.

14 June 2001

South Korean Unification Minister Im Dong Wŏn says that South Korea has no intention of linking the supply of electricity to North Korea with the issues of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile proliferation.

—Lee Chul Hee, "No Linkage Seen in Aid to North, Nuclear Issue," *Joongang Ilbo*, 15 June 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; "Seoul Opposes Proposal to Link N.K. Energy Aid with Missiles," *Korea Herald*, 15 June 2001, www.koreaherald.co.kr.

18 June 2001

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement in response to the Bush administration's announcement on 6 June 2001 of its intention to resume dialogue with North Korea. A ministry spokesman says that the United States is attempting to "disarm North Korea through negotiations" because the administration has proposed the topics of discussion to include North Korea's nuclear weapons program, missile program and conventional military forces. North Korea claims there should be no preconditions for resuming the dialogue that has been suspended for four months. Furthermore, the spokesman says North Korea will never discuss its conventional forces as long as

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US military forces remain in South Korea, and that the first item on the agenda should be "compensation for the loss in electricity due to the delay in construction of the light water reactors under the Agreed Framework."

—"Spokesman of DPRK Foreign Ministry on Bush's Statement on Resuming Negotiations with DPRK," Korean Central News Agency, 18 June 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "Chosŏn'oemusŏngdaebyŏn'in Mihaengjŏngbuŭi <Taehwajaegaejeon>e Taehan Konghwa'gug'ŭi Ripchang Ch'ŏnmyŏng," Korean Central News Agency, 18 June 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Charles Lee, "N. Korea Rejects 'Unfair' Talks with US," United Press International, 21 June 2001; "Pyongyang Sets Agenda for US Talks," *South China Morning Post*, 19 June 2001, www.scmp.com; "U.S. Expects North Korea Talks to Continue," *South China Morning Post*, 19 June 2001, www.scmp.com; Alex Wagner, "Bush Outlines Resuming Talks with North Korea," *Arms Control Today*, July/August 2001, pp. 23, 25; John Burton, "N Korea Frosty about US Talks Plan," *Financial Times*, 19 June 2001, p. 12; Kim Yŏng Shik, "Puk Chŏllyŏkposang'yogu Anp'akk / KEDO Sŏ Chŏllyŏkchiwŏn Mi Pandaemara," *Donga Ilbo*, 19 June 2001, p. 3, www.donga.com; Kim Yong-sik, *Donga Ilbo*, 18 June 2001, in "Background of DPRK Demand for US Compensation for Power Losses Viewed," FBIS Document ID KPP20010618000122.

18 June 2001

The IAEA issues a statement that says North Korea remains in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement.

—"Nuclear Watchdog Unhappy with North Korean Safeguards," *South China Morning Post*, 19 June 2001, www.scmp.com; "IAEA Unclear If Iraq, N. Korea Respect Non-Proliferation Treaty," Agence France Presse, 18 June 2001; Christopher S. Wren, "World Briefing United Nations: Nuclear Questions for North Korea and Iraq," *New York Times*, 20 June 2001, p. A10.

19 June 2001

NBC News, quoting anonymous US intelligence sources, reports that the United States believes North Korea has built one or two nuclear bombs, but "there is no evidence it has built missile warheads."

—Robert Windrem, "How Real Is the Rogue Threat?" NBC News, 19 June 2001, www.msnbc.com.

19 June 2001

Glyn Ford, a member of the European Parliament, says that the EU will contribute \$87.5 million to the KEDO light water reactor project. Thus far the EU has contributed \$75 million to the KEDO project.

—"EU to Offer More Financial Aid to KEDO," Korean Information Service, 19 June 2001, www.korea.net; Hwang Jang Jin, "EU to Increase KEDO Contribution to \$87.5 Million," *Korea Herald*, 20 June 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 June 2001

North Korean television and radio criticize the United States for unilaterally setting the agenda for bilateral talks. The Bush administration announced on 6 June 2001 bilateral talks should resume, but the administration proposed that conventional weapons should be included on the agenda. The broadcast accuses the United States of not implementing the Agreed Framework, and reiterates the North Korean demand for compensation due to the delay in the construction of the two light water reactors.

—Korean Central Television (Pyongyang), 20 June 2001, in "DPRK TV Commentary Reiterates Need To Compensate for Electricity Loss," FBIS Document ID KPP20010620000115; Korean Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 20

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June 2001, in "DPRK Daily Decries US 'Preconditions' for DPRK-US Dialogue," FBIS Document ID KPP20010620000090; Xinhua News Agency (Beijing), 21 June 2001, in "DPRK Urges IAEA to be Impartial in Nuclear Inspection," FBIS Document ID CPP20010621000194.

20 June 2001

At a luncheon hosted by the Korea Society in New York, Charles Kartman, executive director of KEDO, says that there will be no more delays in the construction of the two light water reactors in North Korea.

—Yonhap News Agency, 21 June 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: No More Delays in Reactor Project: Kartman," FBIS Document ID KPP20010621000049.

20 June 2001

The Korean Central News Agency carries a commentary that criticizes the IAEA for joining the "hostile forces in the US attempting to suffocate North Korea to death" by calling for special inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities. The commentary emphasizes that the completeness and correctness of North Korea's initial declaration must wait until a considerable portion of the light water reactors (LWRs) is completed, and before any critical nuclear components are delivered, as stipulated under the Agreed Framework. KCNA says that IAEA Director now admits the LWR project will be delayed until 2008, and that inspections will take 3-4 years. The commentary also says that North Korea has faithfully guaranteed the IAEA's ability to "observe" (maintain the continuity of safeguards) the nuclear freeze, and that North Korea will faithfully carry out its obligations under the Agreed Framework.

—"Kukchewŏnjaryŏkkiguŭi Ch'ogibogosŏkŏmjŭng Ununŭn Chomigibonhapŭimune Paech'i/Chosŏnchungangt'ongshin Ronp'yŏng," Korean Central News Agency, 20 June 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "KCNA Urges IAEA to Abide by Its Principle of Neutrality and Impartiality," Korean Central News Agency, 21 June 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency, 21 June 2001, in "DPRK's KCNA Decries IAEA for 'Joining Hostile Forces', Urges 'Impartiality'," FBIS Document ID KPP20010621000071.

21 June 2001

South Korean Defense Minister Kim Dong Shin meets with US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in Washington, D.C. The two agree on a number of issues, including: the United States should maintain a long-term military presence in Korea to ensure regional stability; the United States and South Korea should strengthen military readiness against North Korea and develop an allied defense posture for the 21st century; and North Korea poses a threat with its nuclear and missile programs, and must submit to IAEA inspections. Secretary Rumsfeld also expresses US support for Kim Dae Jung's engagement policy towards North Korea. The two sides also agree that South Korea should take the lead in negotiating conventional arms control issues with North Korea, which seems contradictory to the results of the Bush review of policy towards North Korea announced on 6 June 2001.

—Jefferson Morris, "Rumsfeld, S. Korean Minister Agree On North Korea Policies," *Aerospace Daily*, 22 June 2001; Kyodo News Service, 22 June 2001, in "U.S., S. Korea Reaffirm Threats from N. Korea," FBIS Document ID JPP20010622000001; Yonhap News Agency, 22 June 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: S.K. to Take Initiative in Conventional Forces talks with N.K.," FBIS Document ID KPP20010622000004; Kim Kwang-tae, "Seoul Set To Take Up Conventional Weapons Issue After Kim's return," *Korean Times*, 25 June 2001, www.koreatimes.co.kr; US

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Reaffirms Security Commitment to Korea," *Korea Times*, 23 June 2001, www.koreatimes.co.kr; "[Sasöl] Han-Mi Kukpangjanggwanoedam Ihu," *Taehan Maeil*, 23 June 2001, p. 5, www.kdaily.com; *Taehan Maeil*, 23 June 2001, in "ROK Daily Views Result of ROK-US Defense Ministerial Talks," FBIS Document ID KPP20010622000108; Chin Kyöng Ho and Pak Ch'an Ku, "Nambuk Chaeraemugihyöpsang 'Sonswiun Ŭijebut'ö Chöpkün'," *Taehan Maeil*, 23 June 2001, p. 5, www.kdaily.com; Chin Kyong-ho, *Taehan Maeil*, 23 June 2001, in "Prospects for N-S Korea Negotiations on Conventional Weapons Reductions Viewed," FBIS Document ID KPP20010622000110, Yu Yong Wön, "Hanmikukpang Anbogongjoman Chaehwagin," *Chosun Ilbo*, 23 June 2001, p. 4, www.chosun.com; Yu Yong-won, *Chosun Ilbo*, 23 June 2001, in "ROK Daily Suspects Opinion Difference in ROK-US Defense Ministers' Talks," FBIS Document ID KPP20010622000101.

21 June 2001

Korean Central Television in Pyongyang repeats North Korean news reports from yesterday saying compensation for the delay in the construction of the two light water reactors under the Agreed Framework should top the agenda of bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea.

—Yonhap News Agency, 21 June 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: N.K. Reiterates Call for Compensation Issue for Talks with U.S.," FBIS Document ID KPP20010621000009.

23 June 2001

North Korea's *Minju Joson* carries a commentary criticizing the Bush administration's agenda for renewing dialogue with North Korea, saying that North Korea can never accept the US demands. The piece claims that the "top priority in the bilateral relations for the present is for the United States to deal with the issue of the delayed delivery of the light water reactors in a responsible manner."

—"Minju Joson on DPRK's Stand on Negotiations with U.S.," Korean Central News Agency, 23 June 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "Migug'üi Hyöpsangüijenün PiHyönshilchögida/Minjuchosön," Korean Central News Agency, 23 June 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency, 23 June 2001, in "DPRK's KCNA: Minju Joson on DPRK's Stand on Negotiations with U.S.," FBIS Document ID KPP20010623000044.

25 June 2001

NuclearFuel says that reports in early June 2001 about possible cooperation in the nuclear field between North Korea and Pakistan are erroneous. US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was cited as the source of the earlier reports, but a "US nonproliferation official" said a week earlier that the evidence points to cooperation in the area of solid-fuel missiles. Apparently, there is no indication of Pakistan assisting North Korea with uranium enrichment.

—Mark Hibbs, "North Korean-Pakistan Collusion Said Limited to KRL and Missiles," *NuclearFuel*, Vol. 26, No. 13, 25 June 2001, www.mhenergy.com.

25 June 2001

KEDO officials say that 21 North Korean policymakers will be invited to a briefing on 28 June at the light water reactor construction site in [Kümho-chigu], Shinp'o, North Korea. North Korean officials requested the briefing so that they could inform their superiors on the progress of the project. Cho Kyu Hyöng, deputy executive director of KEDO, will give the briefing.

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—Yonhap News Agency, 26 June 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: KEDO to Brief N.K. Officials at Reactor Construction Site," FBIS Document ID KPP20010626000003.

26 June 2001

A US State Department official states that substituting conventional power plants for the light water reactors under the Agreed Framework is "not something that we are looking at right now."

—Alex Wagner, "Bush Outlines Resuming Talks with North Korea," *Arms Control Today*, July/August 2001, pp. 23, 25.

28 June 2001

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld tells the US House Armed Services Committee that North Korea is very close to developing an ICBM, and has nuclear material needed to develop nuclear weapons.

—*Chosun Ilbo*, 29 June 2001, in "Announcement of US Missile Defense Test Reported by ROK Daily," FBIS Document ID: KPP20010629000105; Chu Yong Chung, "'Alaska'e MD Ch'öt Paech'i' Mi Kukpang 'Puk ICBM Kaebal Künjöp'," *Chosun Ilbo*, 30 June 2001, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

30 June 2001

In a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, President Bush says that Kim Jong Il is not trustworthy because "he makes his own people go hungry."

—Kyodo News Service, 1 July 2001, in "Bush Tells Koizumi N. Korea's Kim Is Untrustworthy," FBIS Document ID JPP20010701000021.

July 2001

In an issue of *Han'guksa*, a South Korean Defense Ministry magazine published by the Han'gukkunsamunjeŏn'guso twice a year, General Thomas Schwartz, commander of the United Nations Command in South Korea, calls North Korea "the major security threat in Northeast Asia." Schwartz also says "their dogged adherence to a 'military first' policy when viewed against the backdrop of a nation on the brink of complete economic and social collapse is problematic." Schwartz says, "North Korea also possesses weapons of mass destruction and continues to develop asymmetric threats."

—Tim Witcher, "North Korea Threat Grows Despite Near Collapse, Says US Commander," *Agence France Presse*, 12 July 2001; Kim Min Sök, "Schwartz 'Pukhan, Sön'gunjŏngch'it'as Kyöngje-Sahoe Wanjŏnbunggoe," *Joongang Ilbo*, www.joins.com.

Second Half of 2001

According to the CIA, North Korea "continues its attempts to procure technology worldwide that could have applications in its nuclear program."

—Central Intelligence Agency, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Weapons, 1 January Through 30 June 2001," 30 January 2002, www.cia.gov.

4-6 July 2001

North and South Korea hold the first direct meetings on export control issues regarding the supply of the light

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water reactors under the Agreed Framework. The meeting is held in Hyangsan, North Korea, and it addresses the export controls of the United States, South Korea and Japan.

—Kim Jong Suk, "The First South-North Direct Consultation on Export Control Related to KEDO Project," *TCNC Newsletter*, July/August 2001, www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr.

5 July 2001

President Bush authorizes the release of \$20 million for heavy fuel oil deliveries to North Korea under the Agreed Framework.

—"North Korea: Bush OKs \$20 Million to Deliver Fuel to Nation," *Dallas Morning News*, 6 July 2001.

6 July 2001

During a State Department briefing session, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage says that North Korea is abiding by the Agreed Framework. Armitage also urges North Korea to resume bilateral talks with the United States.

—Yonhap News Agency, 6 July 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: Armitage Urges DPRK to Resume Talks with US," FBIS Document ID KPP20010707000042.

9 July 2001

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, states, "The DPRK has never allowed 'verification' and 'inspection' as its national defense industry and military forces are vital to it [*sic*]. It will neither permit 'verification' and 'inspection' nor accept the demand for the reduction of armed forces in the future, too, but further strengthen them."

—"U.S. Urged to Properly Understand DPRK's Principled Stand Towards U.S. Proposal," Korean Central News Agency, 9 July 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "Migug'ŭn Uriŭi Wŏnch'ikchŏngnipchangŭl Ddokparo Alaya Handa," KCNA, 9 July 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Korea Central News Agency, 9 July 2001, in "DPRK's KCNA: U.S. Urged to Properly Understand DPRK's Principled Stand Towards U.S. Proposal," FBIS Document ID KPP20010709000070; "North Korea Not to Resume Talks with US under Bush's Conditions," Agence France Presse, 9 July 2001; Ch'oi Sŏn Yŏng, "Puk, 'Kŏmjŭg-Sach'al-Muryŏkkamch'uk Suyong Mothae," *Joongang Ilbo*, 9 July 2001, www.joins.com.

10 July 2001

Joe Bermudez, in an interview with *USA Today*, claims that North Korea may have mastered a new "electro-magnetic isotope separation" technique to enrich uranium, and may already have enough fissile material for 12 nuclear bombs. The report also says North Korea intends to acquire enough fissile material for 30 bombs by 2015. The speculation is from a new book edited by Henry Sokoloski, *Planning for a Peaceful Korea*. However, Bermudez admits, "It's not that I firmly believe what I wrote. I was just trying to think outside the box."

—Barbara Slavin, "Heat Is on to Check N. Korea's Nuclear Program," *USA Today*, 10 July 2001, www.usatoday.com; "USA Today 'Puk Haekp'okt'an 12 Kae Chejonŭngnyŏk'," *Joongang Ilbo*, 12 July 2001, www.joins.com.

11 July 2001

Korean Central Television in Pyongyang denounces the Bush administration's proposal for renewing bilateral dialogue. The broadcast says that if the United States truly intends to reopen dialogue, "the agenda items should

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be practical issues about implementing the articles in the DPRK-US Framework Agreement [sic] and the DPRK-US Joint Communiqué as agreed upon."

—Korean Central Television (Pyongyang), 11 July 2001, in "US 'Arrogant' Attitude Toward Dialogue With DPRK Denounced," FBIS Document ID KPP20010711000103; Vladimir Kutakhov, "DPRK Does Not Intend to resume Dialogue on US Terms—Media," ITAR-TASS, 11 July 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 July 2001

The *Chosun Ilbo* reports that between 1 January 2001 and 20 June 2001, the South Korean government borrowed W172.5 billion with an interest of W17.1 billion in order to finance its share of the LWR project in North Korea. The National Assembly has delayed legislation to levy a 3.0 percent tax on South Korean utility costs to finance the South Korean share of the project.

—*Chosun Ilbo*, 15 July 2001, in "Interest on LWR for DPRK Reaches 36.1 Billion Won," FBIS Document ID KPP20010715000002. Kim In Ku, "Pukkyöngsuro Hangukpun'dan'güm," *Chosun Ilbo*, 16 July 2001, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

16 July 2001

In response to a June 2001 report from the IAEA board of governors report, the Korean Central News Agency says the report is "once again a partial behavior and criminal attempt of the IAEA to shift the responsibility for the non-compliance with the DPRK-US Agreed Framework onto the DPRK at any cost as their remarks were timed to coincide with Bush's announcement of the US unilateral and conditional 'policy toward the DPRK'." The IAEA report suggested North Korea's refusal to allow full safeguards inspections would adversely affect the provision of light water reactors under the Agreed Framework.

—"KCNA Slams IAEA's Attempt to Shift Responsibility onto DPRK," Korean Central News Agency, 16 July 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency, 16 July 2001, in "DPRK's KCNA: KCNA Denounces IAEA's 'Criminal' Attempt to Shift Responsibility onto DPRK," FBIS Document ID KPP20010716000026.

16 July 2001

South Korean President Kim Dae Jung issues an amended presidential decree to implement and enforce the South Korean Atomic Energy Act. The changes will include the establishment of a review committee for export controls, which could affect the delivery of nuclear components and technology for the light water reactors under the Agreed Framework.

—Kim Jong Suk, "Amendment of Presidential Decree of the Act for Reinforced Nuclear Control Framework," *TCNC Newsletter*, July/August 2001, www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr.

17 July 2001

Vice Marshall Cho Myöng Rok, First Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission, enters Hospital 301 in Beijing with kidney disease, and receives a kidney transplant. Cho is later reported to be in critical condition.

—"North Korean Number Two in Critical Condition in Beijing," Agence France Presse, 11 August 2001, in "AFP Cites ROK Newspaper on DPRK Cho Myong-nok Reportedly in 'Critical Condition'," FBIS Document ID: KPP20010811000018; Choi Chae Yong, "Puk Kim Jong Il Ch'ükkün Cho Myöng Rok Widok," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, 11 August 2001, www.khan.co.kr; Shim Kyu Söck, "Cho Myöng Rok Che 1 Puwiwöňjang, 16 Il Pyongyang Kwihwan,"

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Yonhap News Agency, 17 August 2001, www.yonhapnews.co.kr; Ch'oe Wŏn Ki, "Widoksŏl Pukhan 2 Inja Cho Myŏng Rok P'arisŏ Susul," *Joongang Ilbo*, 15 October 2001, www.joins.com.

20 July 2001

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement in response to the 14 July 2001 missile interceptor test by the United States stating that North Korea must take counter-measures for self-defense, and that North Korea "will have nothing to lose even if all the points agreed upon between the DPRK and the US are scrapped."

—"U.S. Interceptor Missile Test Under Fire," Korean Central News Agency, 20 July 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "Migukŭi Missile Yokyŏkshihŏme Chawijŏktaeŭngjoch'i / Chosŏnoemysŏng Taebyŏnin," Korean Central News Agency, 20 July 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency, 20 July 2001, in "DPRK FM on US Interceptor Missile Test, Says DPRK 'Compelled' To Take Action," FBIS Document ID KPP20010720000067; Korean Central Broadcasting Station, 20 July 2001, in "DPRK Radio Reports on DPRK Foreign Minister's Answers to KCNA Reporter on US Missile Interceptor Test," FBIS Document ID KPP20010720000113; "Pyongyang Criticizes Missile-Defense Test," *Washington Times*, 21 July 2001, www.washtimes.com; "North Korea Vows Countermeasures in Reply to U.S. Test," *South China Morning Post*, 20 July 2001, www.scmp.com.

24 July 2001

According to an official at South Korea's Unification Ministry, North Korea and KEDO initial a quality assurance and warranties protocol in New York following a fifth round of negotiations held 16-24 July. The protocol is the eighth between KEDO and North Korea, and the document took four years to negotiate. The official says the formal signing of the protocol will take place in about one month.

—Yonhap News Agency, 25 July 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: KEDO, N.K. Agree on Reactor Quality Assurance Protocol," FBIS Document ID KPP20010725000059; Chu Yong Sŏng, "Puk-KEDO P'umjilbojangŭijŏngsŏ Kasŏmyŏng," Yonhap News Agency, 25 July 2001, www.yonhapnews.co.kr; "KEDO, North Korea Initial Protocol on Reactors," Korean Information Service, 26 July 2001, www.korea.net.

26 July 2001

Charles Pritchard, US special envoy for Korean peace talks, says that lack of cooperation from Pyongyang is responsible for the delays in the KEDO light water reactor project. Speaking at a hearing of the Asia and Pacific subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, Pritchard says that North Korea "must begin active cooperation soon to avoid serious delays in the KEDO project."

—"U.S. Envoy Raps N. Korea for Delay in KEDO Project," Japan Economic Newswire, 26 July 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Late July 2001

Diplomatic sources tell *NuclearFuel* that Russia has offered to provide enriched uranium and fabricated fuel assemblies for the light water reactors being constructed by KEDO in North Korea. However, KEDO and US officials say they have not been informed of any Russian plans to renew nuclear cooperation with North Korea.

—Mark Hibbs, "Russia Offered to Supply Fuel for PWR Project in North Korea," *NuclearFuel*, Vol. 26, No. 16, 6 August 2001, <http://www.mhenergy.com>.

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August 2001

According to the *Segye Ilbo*, a South Korean daily, North Korea smuggles 32kg of HEU from Kazakhstan. According to the 8 November 2002 report, North Korea has been acquiring plutonium, uranium, other metals and equipment from Kazakhstan and other central Asian countries since 1994. North Korea has reportedly been procuring uranium-235, plutonium-239, as well as osmium-187, cesium-137, and strontium, which the report claims are used for reducing the size of nuclear warheads. The *Segye Ilbo* claims the information comes from a four-page Russian document later acquired by the South Korean Embassy in Uzbekistan. [Note: CNS sources indicate the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade received no such document, and there is no apparent use for osmium-187, cesium-137, and strontium in reducing the size of nuclear weapons; therefore, this report does not seem credible.]

—*Segye Ilbo*, 7 November 2002, in "Kazakhstani Report: DPRK Purchased Uranium, Plutonium From Kazakhstan," FBIS Document ID: KPP20021108000025; Chŏn Hyŏn Il and Kim Ki Dong, "Puk, K'ajahŭsŏ Uranium Kŭkpibanip," *Segye Ilbo*, 8 November 2002, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Kim Ki Dong, "Changnyŏn'eman Uranium 32kg Panip," *Segye Ilbo*, 8 November 2002, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Pak Hye Yun, "Puk, K'ajahŭsŏ Uranium Kŭkpi Kuip," *Donga Ilbo*, 8 November 2002, www.donga.com.

1 August 2001

A broadcast in Pyongyang says that North Korea will not resume dialogue with the United States unless the United States drops its stance that "the verification of North Korea's missile and nuclear programs" be included on the agenda. Furthermore, the broadcast says that the US proposal to include conventional weapons in bilateral talks is part of a US effort to "completely disarm" North Korea.

—Kim In Ku, "Puk 'Missile Kŏmjŭng P'ogihaeya Mi-Puk Taehwa Chaegae'," *Chosun Ilbo*, 1 August 2001, www.chosun.com.

Early August 2001

According to an interview with the *Joongang Ilbo*, Senator Joseph Biden, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, meets with President George Bush, and Bush recognizes the problems he created with his remarks during President Kim Dae Jung's visit to Washington in March 2001. Biden says Bush's remarks are unintentional, and that Bush "displayed enthusiasm for reopening talks with Pyongyang." [Note: On 7 March, President Bush, speaking in Washington at a joint press conference with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, says, "I do have some skepticism about the leader of North Korea. We're not certain as to whether or not they're keeping all terms of all agreements."]

—Brent Choi, "Mr. Bush Recognizes His Mistake—Special Interview with Senator Biden," *Joongang Ilbo*, 13 August 2001, <http://english.join.com>; "North Korea Refuses to Talk to U.S.," *Arms Control Today*, September 2001, p. 40.

2 August 2001

A senior Russian official confirms the *NuclearFuel* report of late July that Russia is prepared to supply enriched uranium and fuel for the KEDO light water reactor project.

—Mark Hibbs, "Russia Offered to Supply Fuel for PWR Project in North Korea," *NuclearFuel*, Vol. 26, No. 16, 6 August 2001, www.mhenergy.com.

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2 August 2001

According to ITAR-TASS, an official from Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry says that Russia is interested in building nuclear reactor for North Korea, and that the issue will be discussed in summit talks between President Putin and National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il on 4 August 2001. The official says Russia will suggest that the reactor be financed with funds from KEDO.

—"Russia Wants to Build Nuclear Reactor for N. Korea on Border," Agence France Presse, 2 August 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 August 2001

Interfax reports that Yevgeniy Reshetnikov, deputy atomic energy minister, has said Russia is not planning to increase cooperation with North Korea in the area of power generation. According to Reshetnikov, the United States pressured Russia to abandon its plan to join KEDO. The deputy minister says that North Korea had a debt of \$5 million with the ministry, but that it had been reduced to \$1.5 million, and that he expects North Korea to pay of the debt by the end of this year.

—Interfax News Agency (Moscow), 3 August 2001, in "Russia Has No Plans to Expand Ties with North Korea in Power Engineering," FBIS Document ID CEP20010803000033; "Russian Atomic Energy Ministry Does Not Plan to Cooperate with North Korea," Interfax News Agency, 3 August 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 August 2001

Kim Jong Il holds a summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, where they discuss the planned construction of two light water reactors (LWRs) under the Agreed Framework. The details of the discussion are unknown, but there is speculation that Russia possibly proposes the sale of Russian-made LWRs to North Korea. North Korea is believed to have expressed its dissatisfaction with the project's delay, as well as its desire for compensation from the loss in electricity.

—Kyodo News Service, 4 August 2001, in "Putin, Kim Call for Adherence to ABM Pact, Sign Accord," FBIS Document ID JPP20010804000057; ITAR-TASS, 2 August 2001, in "Russia: DPRK's Kim Jong-il to Arrive in Moscow 3 Aug; Agenda Outlined," FBIS Document ID CEP20010802000321.

8 August 2001

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement saying that North Korea "can never accept the agenda items of the talks raised unilaterally by the United States out of its intention to disarm the DPRK and stifle it and will not respond to the talks with the United States before it withdraws the items." The statement is similar to several responses that have followed the 6 June 2001 proposal to resume talks with North Korea.

—"Answers Given by Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry," Korean Central News Agency, 8 August 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mi'gug'i Nae'noh'ün Hoedam'üije'rül Ch'ölhoehagi Chön'e'nün Maju Anj'ülsu Öbta / Oemusöng Taebyön'in," Korean Central News Agency, 8 August 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Kim Ji-ho, "N.K. Again Turns Down U.S.-Proposed Agenda," *Korea Herald*, 10 August 2001, www.koreaherald.co.kr.

13 August 2001

At a press conference in Moscow, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says, "By the year 2003, North Korea will have completed the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and currently possesses

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enough plutonium to develop five nuclear warheads." Rumsfeld also says, "I have already presented the view in 1998 that North Korea would establish its ICBM capability within five years. Considering the fact that North Korea has already tested a three-stage long-range missile, the completion of its ICBM development by 2003 is certain." —"US Department of Defense Says 'North Korea Will Complete Its ICBM Development Within Two Years'," *Hankook Ilbo*, 15 August 2001, p. 2, in "ROK Daily Reports US SecDef's Remarks to Russian Media on NK Nuclear Capability," FBIS Document ID: KPP20010820000109; Yun Sŭng Yong, "Migukpang 'Puk 2 Nyŏnnae ICBM Kaebal Kkŭtnaelgŏs'," *Hankook Ilbo*, 14 August 2001, www.korealink.co.kr.

13-24 August 2001

Six North Korean nuclear specialists participate in a 12-day "Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material" in Canberra and Sydney, Australia. The program also includes participants from Australia, China, South Korea, and New Zealand.

—Kim Ji Ho, "N.K. Officials Receiving Nuclear Safety Training in Australia: Amb. Heseltine," *Korea Herald*, 23 August 2001, www.koreaherald.co.kr; Kyodo News Service, 23 August 2001, in "N. Korean Officials Get Nuke Safety Training in Australia," FBIS Document ID JPP20010823000092; Park Sung Ki, "SSAC Training Course Held in Australia," *TCNC Newsletter*, 1 October 2001, www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr.

16 August 2001

First Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission Marshall Cho Myŏng Rok returns from China after having received a kidney transplant at the 301 Hospital in Beijing.

—Shim Kyu Sŏk, "Cho Myŏng Rok Che 1 Puwiwŏnjang, 16 Il Pyongyang Kwihwan," Yonhap News Agency, 17 August 2001, www.yonhapnews.co.kr.

21-25 August 2001

A high-level KEDO delegation meets with North Korean officials in Pyongyang to discuss the supply of the two light water reactors under the Agreed Framework.

—"KEDO High-Level Experts Negotiation Delegation Here," Korean Central News Agency, 21 August 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "KEDO Kowigŭpchŏnmun'gahyŏpsangdae'p'yodan Toch'ak," Korean Central News Agency, 21 August 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "Delegates in Pyongyang for Talks over Nuclear Deal," Agence France Presse, 21 August 2001; Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 25 August 2001, in "Korean Energy Organization Delegation Leaves North," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 26 August 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 August 2001

KEDO Executive Director Charles Kartman reveals that excavation work will begin in September 2001 to prepare the foundations for the light water reactors to be constructed in North Korea under the Agreed Framework.

—David R. Sands, "Construction Set for N. Korea Nuclear Plant," *Washington Times*, 30 August 2001, www.washtimes.com; "KEDO to Launch LWR Excavation Work in September," *Joongang Ilbo*, 31 August 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; "KEDO, Puk Kyŏngsuro Kulch'akkongsa Naedal Ch'akkong," *Segye Ilbo*, 31 August 2001, www.segyetimes.co.kr.

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29-30 August 2001

Government officials from the United States, South Korea and Japan meet in New York for a KEDO meeting to discuss nuclear exports. The meeting is held to coordinate policy on the transfer of nuclear facilities, equipment material and technology to North Korea under the Agreed Framework.

—Kim Jong Suk, "KEDO Export Control Consultation Meeting in New York," *TCNC Newsletter*, September/October 2001, www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr.

31 August 2001

Site preparation work for the KEDO light water reactor project is completed in [Kümho-chigu], Shinp'o, North Korea.

—*KEDO 2001 Annual Report*, p. 10, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org.

1 September 2001

North Korea's State Nuclear Safety Regulatory Commission issues the construction permit for the light water reactors to be built under the Agreed Framework. The permit is issued after the review of a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report and an Environmental Report submitted by the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) earlier this year.

—Kim Jong Suk, "DPRK SNSRC Issued CP for KEDO 2 LWRs," *TCNC Newsletter*, September/October 2001, www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr.

3 September 2001

First Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission Marshall Cho Myŏng Rok greets Chinese President Jiang Zemin during his arrival at Sunan Airport for an official state visit to North Korea. Cho was hospitalized in mid July 2001 at the 301 Hospital in Beijing to receive a kidney transplant.

—"Puk Cho Myŏng Rok P'yŏngyang Kwihwan Hwagin," *Segye Ilbo*, 3 September 2001, www.segyetimes.co.kr.

4 September 2001

During talks with visiting Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Kim Jong Il reaffirms that North Korea will maintain its flight-test moratorium for its ballistic missiles until at least 2003. The newly appointed Chinese ambassador to South Korea later reveals that Kim Jong Il says "both sides (North and South Korea) must strive to create the conditions for his trip to Seoul by the end of the year."

—"N. Korea Pledges to Continue Missile Test ban," *Middle East Newslines*, Vol. 3, No. 349, 5 September 2001; ITAR-TASS, 4 September 2001, in "North Korean, Chinese Leaders Discuss Missiles-Related Subjects" FBIS Document ID CEP20010904000127; Yu Sang Ch'öl and Oh Yŏng Hwan, "Puk Missile Palsayuye Chaehwagin," *Joongang Ilbo*, 4 September 2001, www.joins.com; "NK Reaffirms Halt to Missile Tests Until 2003," *Joongang Ilbo*, 7 September 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; "Kim Jong-Il Renews Pledge to Postpone Missile Testing: Reports," Agence France Presse, 5 September 2001; "N. Korea Pledges to Continue Missile test Ban," *World Tribune.com*, 6 September 2001, www.worldtribune.com; "Kim Jong Il 'Han'guktappang Yŏ'kŏn Chosŏnghaeya'," *Donga Ilbo*, 12 September 2001, www.donga.com; "N.K. Chairman Wants 'Right Conditions' for Return Visit," *Joongang Ilbo*, 13 September 2001, <http://english.joins.com>.

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10 September 2001

In hearings before the South Korean National Assembly's Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee, the Ministry of Unification says that \$638 million was spent on the KEDO light water reactor project between February 2000 and 31 August 2001. South Korea provided \$447 million (70 percent) and Japan provided \$191 million (30 percent) of the total. South Korea's expenditures on the project have resulted in a national debt of W150 billion in 1999, W255 billion in 2000, and W262.5 billion for the period between January 2001 and 31 August 2001. The total deficit from the project over this period is W667.5 billion. The operating expenses for KEDO during 2001 are \$18.36 million, with the United States, South Korea and Japan each contributing \$4.56 million. US expenses for heavy fuel oil for the year are \$70.32 million, and the United States has supplied North Korea with 308,000 tons of heavy fuel oil from January 2001 to 31 August 2001. The Ministry of Unification also reveals that KEDO plans to begin training North Korean technicians to operate the light water reactors under construction in North Korea. According to the Ministry, the training is to begin in February 2002, and will be divided into two steps for 529 personnel in all.

—Chu Yong Sök, "Kyöngsuro Kongbi 6ök3ch'önman Dollar Chiphaeng," Yonhap News Agency, 10 September 2001, www.yonhapnews.co.kr; "South Korea Extends \$638 Million for LWR Project So Far," *Joongang Ilbo*, 10 September 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 10 September 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: KEDO Pays KEPCO \$638 Million on Reactor Building Contract," FBIS Document ID KPP20010910000094; "Naenyön 2 Wöl Pukch'ük Kyöngsuroyowön Kyoyuk," *Chosun Ilbo*, 10 September 2001, www.chosun.com; Yonhap News Agency, 10 September 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: KEDO to Give Training to North Koreans on Reactor Operation," FBIS Document ID KPP20010910000063.

10 September 2001

Jack Pritchard, US special envoy for Korean peace talks, says that bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea should resume soon. While visiting Seoul for meetings with South Korean officials, Pritchard says that we should expect talks to begin soon now that Kim Jong Il has had recent summit meetings with Vladimir Putin and Jiang Zemin. Pritchard is in Seoul after participating in the TCOG meeting in Tokyo on 6 September.

—Hö Yöng Pöm, "Mi-Puk Taehwa Kot Shijak," *Chosun Ilbo*, 10 September 2001, www.chosun.com.

11 September 2001

KEDO Executive Director Charles Kartman postpones his trip to North Korea because of a typhoon. Kartman plans to depart for North Korea on the 13th to attend a groundbreaking ceremony for the two light water reactors in [Kümho-chigu], Shinp'o on 14 September, but cancels his travel plans after terrorists hijack four aircraft and crash two into New York's World Trade Center and another into the Pentagon.

—Kwön Kyöng Pok, "KEDO Ch'ongjang 13 Il Pangbuk," *Joongang Ilbo*, 10 September 2001, www.joins.com; "Kartman KEDO Samuch'ongjang Pangbuk Ch'wiso," *Chosun Ilbo*, 12 September 2001, www.chosun.com; Yonhap News Agency, 12 September 2001, in "KEDO Head Cancels DPRK Visit for LWR Ground-Breaking Ceremony," FBIS Document ID KPP20010912000098.

11 September 2001

Korean Central Broadcasting in Pyongyang says that the Bush administration must learn from the Clinton administration's North Korea policy, and abandon its policy of "crushing North Korea to death."

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—Ch'oe Sŏn Yŏng, "'Mi, Clinton Chŏngbu Taebukchŏngch'aeksŏ Kyohun Ch'ajaya' <Puk Pangsong>," *Joongang Ilbo*, 11 September 2001, www.joins.com.

12 September 2001

A South Korean Foreign Ministry official says that the groundbreaking work for the KEDO light water reactor project will begin as scheduled on 13 September 2001, but there will be no ceremonies. [Note: This report is erroneous; the groundbreaking ceremony is held on 14 September.]

—Yonhap News Agency, 12 September 2001, in "KEDO Head Cancels DPRK Visit for LWR Ground-Breaking Ceremony," FBIS Document ID KPP20010912000098.

12 September- 21 December 2001

Throughout the 56th UN General Assembly, the North Korean delegation repeatedly demands that the United States carry out its commitments under the Agreed Framework.

—Yonhap News Agency, 28 December 2001, in "DPRK Calls for US Fulfillment of Geneva Agreement During UN Session," FBIS Document ID KPP20011228000039.

14 September 2001

A 61-member delegation from KEDO and South Korea attends the groundbreaking ceremony for the light water reactors in North Korea.

—Agence France Presse, 14 September 2001, in "Groundbreaking Held for DPRK Reactors," FBIS Document ID KPP20010914000077; "Construction Begins on North Korean Reactors," Agence France Presse, 14 September 2001.

15-18 September 2001

North and South Korea hold the fifth round of ministerial talks in Seoul. The delegations are headed by North Korean Senior Cabinet Councilor Kim Ryŏng Sŏng and South Korean Unification Minister Hong Sun Yŏng. The two sides agree to resume construction of a railway connecting Seoul to Kaesŏng, North Korea, where the South pledged to finance the development of an industrial zone.

—"DPRK Delegation Reaches Seoul for Inter-Korean Ties," Xinhua News Agency, 15 September 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks Open," Korean Central News Agency, 16 September 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "Che 5 Ch'a Pungnamsanggŭphoedam'i Yŏllyŏtta," Korean Central News Agency, 16 September 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "5th North-South Ministerial Talks Close," Korean Central News Agency, 16 September 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "Che 5 Ch'a Pungnamsanggŭphoedam'i Kkŭt'natta / Kongdongbodomun Palp'yo," Korean Central News Agency, 16 September 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 16 September 2001, in "North Korea Lists Demands at Inter-Ministerial Talks in Seoul," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 September 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; John Gittings, "Two Koreas Put Peace Process Back on Line," *The Guardian* (London), 19 September 2001, p. 15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 September 2001

The IAEA opens its annual conference in Vienna, and IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei delivers a

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speech that includes a request for North Korea to cooperate with onsite safeguards inspections at its nuclear facilities. ElBaradei says the IAEA is monitoring the nuclear freeze under the Agreed Framework, and the conference is expected to adopt a resolution encouraging North Korea to accept inspections. ElBaradei also raises concerns about nuclear safety in North Korea.

—Kyodo News Service, 17 September 2001, in "IAEA Opens, Expected to Adopt Resolution to Inspect N. Korea," FBIS Document ID JPP20010917000129; Yonhap News Agency, 18 September 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: IAEA Urges North Korea to Fulfill Nuclear Safety Obligations," FBIS Document ID KPP20010918000006; Kyodo News Service, "IAEA Opens, Expected to Adopt Resolution to Inspect N. Korea," *Japan Economic Newswire*, 17 September 2001; Pak Che Kyun, "IAEA Ch'onghoe Kaemak / Taebuk Haeksach'al Taech'aek Nonŭi," *Donga Ilbo*, 19 September 2001, www.donga.com; "IAEA, Puke Haeksach'al Hyöpnöyök Ch'okku," *Munhwa Ilbo*, 18 September 2001, p. 2, www.munhwa.co.kr.

17-21 September 2001

During its 45th General Conference in Vienna, the IAEA adopts a resolution requesting North Korea to abide by its NPT commitments and submit to safeguards inspections.

—"States back Steps to Strengthen Agency's Main Pillars for Nuclear Verification, Safety, Technology," WorldAtom Press Release, PR 2001/22 (21 September 2001), 45th IAEA General Conference, 21 September 2001, www.iaea.org; Heo Yong Beum, "IAEA Calls for NK to Honor Nuclear Commitments," *Chosun Ilbo*, 23 September 2001, www.chosun.com; *Chosun Ilbo*, 23 September 2001, in "IAEA Urges DPRK to Honor Nuclear Commitments," FBIS Document ID KPP20010923000033; "IAEA Presses NK to grant Access to Nuclear Sites," *Korea Times*, 23 September 2001, www.koreatimes.co.kr; Hwang Jang Jin, "IAEA Calls on N.K. to Comply with Nuclear Inspection," *Korea Herald*, 24 September 2001, www.koreaherald.com; Hwang Chae Hun, "IAEA, Pukhaek 3 Tan'gye Sach'al Yogu," *Joongang Ilbo*, 25 September 2001, www.joins.com; "IAEA Airs Concern over Nuclear Safeguards in North Korea," Korean Information Service, 26 September 2001, www.korea.net.

18 September 2001

Forbes.com, citing a North Korean researcher who has fled to China, reports that North Korea has moved its entire nuclear development program to "new underground bunkers before U.S. inspections of its old facilities begin." According to the report, the underground facilities now look like a rural village through satellite imagery.

—Benjamin Fulford, "North Korea: Another Outcropping of Terrorism," *Forbes.com*, 18 September 2001, www.forbes.com; Hö Yong Pöm, "Puk, Haekshisöl Chihäünnik," *Chosun Ilbo*, 23 September 2001, www.chosun.com.

25 September 2001

The IAEA reveals that it plans a three step approach to address suspicions about North Korea's nuclear past. The first step will include an inspection of the 5MW(e) research reactor in Yöngbyön-kun and its approximate 8,000 spent fuel rods that have been canned under the Agreed Framework. The IAEA has requested that the inspections begin no later than next year. In May 2001, IAEA officials asked for North Korean compliance during a visit to Pyongyang, but North Korea has yet to respond affirmatively.

—Hwang Chae Hun, "IAEA, Pukhaek 3 Tan'gye Sach'al Yogu," *Joongang Ilbo*, 25 September 2001, www.joins.com;

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Yonhap News Agency, 25 September 2001, in "IAEA Demands 'Three-Phase Inspection' of DPRK Nuclear Facilities," FBIS Document ID KPP20010925000049.

25-29 September 2001

A KEDO delegation meets with North Korean officials in Pyongyang to conduct "high-level negotiations" regarding the construction of the light water reactors in North Korea under the Agreed Framework. [Note: These negotiations have been conducted about two or three times over the last few years.]

—"KEDO Delegation Arrives," Korean Central News Agency, 25 September 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; KEDO Taep'yodan Toch'ak," Korean Central News Agency, 25 September 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Ch'oe Sŏn Yŏng, "KEDO Taep'yodan Pangbuk," *Joongang Ilbo*, 25 September 2001, www.joins.com; Yonhap News Agency, 25 September 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: KEDO Mission Arrives in Pyongyang for Talks on Reactor Project," FBIS Document ID KPP20010925000084; Xinhua News Agency, 25 September 2001, in "Xinhua: US-Led Consortium Delegation in DPRK for Talks on Nuclear Reactors," FBIS Document ID CPP20010925000138; "KEDO Delegation Leaves," Korean Central News Agency, 29 September 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency, 29 September 2001, in "DPRK Reports on KEDO Delegation's Departure," FBIS Document ID KPP20010929000031; "Chosŏnbando Energy Kaebalgigudaep'yodani Ttŏnattda," Korean Central News Agency, 29 September 2001, www.kcna.co.jp.

26 September-6 October 2001

Cho Myŏng Rok, first vice chairman of North Korea's National Defense Commission, undergoes surgery in a Paris hospital for kidney disease. Cho reportedly received a kidney transplant at a hospital in Beijing in July 2001.

—Brent Choi, "N.K. Vice-Chairman Jo Again Hospitalized in Paris," *Joongang Ilbo*, 15 October 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; Ch'oe Wŏn Ki, "Ŭidoksŏl Pukhan 2 Inja Cho Myŏng Rok P'arisŏ Susul," *Joongang Ilbo*, 16 October 2001, p. 13, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

29 September 2001

The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) criticizes IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei for his stating on 19 September 2001 that "the agency is unable to verify the accuracy of North Korea's nuclear program." KCNA reports that, "this can not be construed otherwise than reckless acts of the riffraff to shift the responsibility for the non-compliance with the Agreed Framework on to the DPRK, defying international justice and impartiality." The report continues, "If the US had remained sincere in implementing the Agreed Framework, it would have been implemented to such a level as to enable the DPRK and the IAEA to start negotiations on verifying the accuracy and perfectness [*sic*] of the initial report on nuclear substance [*sic*]."

—"KCNA Urges IAEA to be Impartial," Korean Central News Agency, 29 September 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency, 29 September 2001, in "DPRK Decries IAEA, Japan for 'Anti-DPRK Hostile Policy'," FBIS Document ID KPP20010929000029; Yonhap News Agency, 30 September 2001, in "DPRK KCNA Urges 'Impartiality' to IAEA Regarding Inspection Request," FBIS Document ID KPP20010930000018; "Kukchewŏnjaryŏkkigunŭn Kongjŏnghaeya Handa/Chosŏnjŭngangt'ongshin Ronp'yŏng," Korean Central News Agency, 29 September 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Chŏng Yŏn Shik, "Puk, 'Haeganjŏnjoch'i Miihaeng' Palŏn Pinan," *Joongang Ilbo*, 30 September 2001, www.joins.com.

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3 October 2001

An unnamed "South Korean government official" or "diplomatic source" reports that KEDO will be able to begin negotiations with North Korea by the end of the year on the delivery of the core reactor parts for the light water reactors under construction as part of the Agreed Framework. The agreement will have to comply with the export controls of the United States, South Korea and Japan. South Korea and Japan have already presented their draft agreements, and the United States is to present its draft agreement soon. The United States has reportedly been reluctant to establishing a protocol for the transfers of critical technology and materials since North Korea has yet to submit to full safeguards inspections.

—Yonhap News Agency, 3 October 2001, in "KEDO, DPRK Likely to Begin Talks Soon for Delivery of Core Parts," FBIS Document ID KPP20011003000006; Ok Yöng Tae, "Hanbando Briefing/KEDO-Puk, Kyöngsuro Pupumindo Ilchöng Yönnae Hyöpsang," *Segye Ilbo*, 4 October 2001, p. 37, www.segyetimes.co.kr.

5 October 2001

Korean Central Broadcasting in Pyongyang criticizes the IAEA for "emphasizing the need for North Korea to cooperate with the IAEA to verify and guarantee transparency of North Korea's nuclear past through on-site inspections." The commentary also criticized the Agency for ignoring the 14th sub-critical nuclear test carried out by the United States at the Nevada test site.

—Ch'oe Sön Yöng, "Puk, 'IAEA Haengmunjesö Kongjöngghan Ipjang Chik'yöya'," Yonhap News Agency, 5 October 2001, www.yonhapnews.co.kr; Yonhap News Agency, "Puk, 'IAEA Haengmunjesö Kongjöngghan Ipjang Chik'yöya'," *Chosun Ilbo*, 7 October 2001, www.chosun.com; Yonhap News Agency, 6 October 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: N.K. Blasts IAEA's Demand for More Nuclear Inspections as Absurd," FBIS Document ID KPP20011006000013.

6 October 2001

North Korea's *Minju Joson* says that the IAEA has "thrown away its impartiality by following US demands to inspect and verify North Korea's nuclear past, while ignoring the need to inspect and verify the United States for continuing to carry out sub-critical nuclear tests in Nevada."

—"IAEA's Double Standards Rejected," Korean Central News Agency, 6 October 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "Migukhaeksihöm'e Taehan Kukchewönjaryökkiguüi 2 Chunggijun/Minju Chosön," Korean Central News Agency, 6 October 2001, www.kcna.co.jp.

7 October 2001

A *Rodong Sinmun* commentary criticizes Japan for violating the "three noes" on nuclear policy established in 1967 by allowing the United States to bring nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. The commentary also accuses Japan of having a plan to become a nuclear power and to stockpile 100 tons of plutonium by 2010.

—"Japan's 'Three Non-Nuclear Principles' Termed Deceptive," Korean Central News Agency, 7 October 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Haekchönjaengwihö'm'ül Mora O'nün <Pihaek 3 Wö'nch'ik> / *Rodongshinmun*, Korean Central News Agency, 7 October 2001, www.kcna.co.jp.

8 October 2001

A *Rodong Sinmun* commentary says that the IAEA, at the request of the United States, is trying to uncover North Korea's military bases and defense industries under the pretext of carrying out nuclear safeguards inspections.

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Furthermore, the commentary says that the United States has helped Israel acquire nuclear weapons, and that "nothing is being done to inspect and verify Japan's plutonium stockpile, which is beyond Japan's needs." The Korean Central Broadcasting Station in Pyongyang carries similar criticism during a broadcast, but adds the accusation that the United States is "violently violating the NPT spirit and demands" with a sub-critical nuclear test in Nevada on 26 September 2001.

—"Pudanghan <Kömjüng> Kwa <Sach'al>, 2 Chunggijun'ün Höyongdoelsu Öptta / Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 8 October 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "IAEA's Double Standards Unacceptable," Korean Central News Agency, 8 October 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency, 8 October 2001, in "DPRK Party Organ Decries IAEA's 'Double Standards'," FBIS Document ID KPP20011008000090; Korean Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 8 October 2001, in "DPRK Party Organ Denounces IAEA 'Impartiality'," FBIS Document ID KPP20011008000072; Yonhap News Agency, "Puk, 'Mi-IAEA, Haengmunjae Kongjöngsöng Ilhö'," *Chosun Ilbo*, 9 October 2001, www.chosun.com.

11 October 2001

Korean Central Television in Pyongyang criticizes the IAEA for "fanning (encouraging) the US hard-line policy towards North Korea." The broadcast says the IAEA has a double standard because while it is requesting inspections and verification of North Korea's nuclear program, it is not recognizing the fact that the United States conducted its 14th sub-critical nuclear test last month in at the Nevada test site.

—Han Dong Ch'öl, "Puk, 'IAEA Ka Mi Taebukkanggyöngch'aek Puch'aejil'," Yonhap News Agency, 11 October 2001, www.yonhapnews.co.kr; Korean Central Television (Pyongyang), 11 October 2001, in "DPRK TV Assails IAEA Over Nuclear Inspections," FBIS Document ID KPP20011011000090; Yonhap News Agency, 12 October 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: N.K. Blasts IAEA for Backing Washington's Hardline Policy," FBIS Document ID KPP20011012000005.

16 October 2001

In an interview at the White House with Asian journalists before departing to attend the APEC summit in Shanghai, President Bush warns North Korea "not to think that because we happen to be engaged in Afghanistan we will not be prepared and ready to fulfill our end of our agreement with the South Korean government." Bush also says that he would like to renew dialogue with North Korea but that, "I must tell you that I've been disappointed in Kim Jong Il not rising to the occasion, being so suspicious, so secretive."

—Kim Hee-sung, "Bush Gives Out Strong Warning to North Korea," *Joongang Ilbo*, 18 October 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; "Bush Interview With Yonhap News Agency in White House," *Joongang Ilbo*, 18 October 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; "[Editorials] Pyeongyang Gets Another Chance," *Joongang Ilbo*, 18 October 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; *Joongang Ilbo*, 18 October 2001, in "DPRK Urged To Consider Bush's Warning," FBIS Document ID KPP20011018000110; Yonhap News Agency, 18 October 2001, in "ROK Daily Analyzes US President's Interview With Yonhap News Agency," FBIS Document ID KPP20011018000013.

19 October 2001

During a news conference in Shanghai, President Bush says his administration would like to begin a dialogue with the government of North Korea, and that he supports South Korea's sunshine policy.

—Associated Press, "Bush Seeks Meeting with N. Korea Leader—AP," *Joongang Ilbo*, 20 October 2001, <http://english.joins.com>.

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21 October 2001

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, criticizes the United States for deploying aircraft from the USS Kitty Hawk to South Korean airbases. The aircraft carrier is usually based in Yokosuko, Japan, but it was deployed to the Indian Ocean in support of military operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al-Qaida network. The commentary says the deployment "complicates the situation" and "compels the DPRK to increase its military power with heightened vigilance."

—"U.S. Arms Buildup in S. Korea Condemned," Korean Central News Agency, 21 October 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "Namjosönesöüi Migunjöllyökkanghwarül Ömjungshi, Ch'ongdaerül Döukkanghwahalgöshida / Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 21 October 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Associated Press in "North Korea Calls for Military Alert," *Joonggang Ilbo*, 23 October 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; Nam Kwang Shik, "Puk, Namhannae Migunsaryök Chönggang Pandae," *Joonggang Ilbo*, 22 October 2001, www.joins.com; Agence France Presse, 21 October 2001, in "AFP: DPRK Vows To Increase Military Readiness Amid Stalled Inter-Korean Talks," FBIS Document ID KPP20011021000038; Yonhap News Agency, 22 October 2001, in "Radio Beijing Cites Nodong Sinmun Editorial Denouncing US Military Buildup in ROK," FBIS Document ID KPP20011022000011.

23 October 2001

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement criticizing President George Bush for comments "unbecoming for the president of a superpower." The criticism is in response to Bush's remarks on 16 October about his suspicion of Kim Jong Il. A ministry spokesman praises the thaw in US-North Korea relations at the end of the Clinton presidency, and says North Korea was prepared to abandon its missile program but that the Bush administration "attaches priority to the establishment of a missile defense system intended for world supremacy, and it felt a more urgent need to make an enemy called 'rogue state'." The spokesman says that the Bush administration's policy toward North Korea has "cooled" relations between North and South Korea, and that it has made it impossible to implement agreements between the two Koreas. Furthermore, he says that the only "normal and rational" way to reopen dialogue between the United States and North Korea is to begin with a discussion of the "practical problems related to the implementation of the Agreed Framework and the Joint Communiqué between the US and North Korea."

—"Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry Slams Bush's Remark," Korean Central News Agency, 23 October 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "Taet'ongnyöngüi Ch'emo'e Öülliji Anhnün Bush üi Kyöngsolhan Öndong / Chosön'oemusöngdaebyön'in," Korean Central News Agency, 23 October 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Kim Mee-sung, "North Condemns President Bush's Speech on N. K. Leader," *Joonggang Ilbo*, 24 October 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; Chöng Yöng Shik, "Puk, Bush Taet'ongnyöng Kijahoegyön Pinan," *Joonggang Ilbo*, 23 October 2001, www.joins.com; Kwön Kyöng Bok, "<Pukhanüi Bush Pinanbaekyönggwa Chönmang>," Yonhap News Agency, 23 October 2001, www.yonhapnews.co.kr.

30 October-3 November 2001

A KEDO delegation meets with North Korean officials in Pyongyang to hold "high-level expert" negotiations on the implementation of the Agreed Framework.

—"KEDO Delegation Arrives," Korean Central News Agency, 30 October 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "KEDO Taep'yodan Toch'ak," Korean Central News Agency, 30 October 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "KEDO Delegation Leaves," Korean

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Central News Agency, 3 November 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "KEDO Taep'yodan'I Ddöna Katta," Korean Central News Agency, 3 November 2001, www.kcna.co.jp.

Early November 2001

According to a South Korean government official, North Korea has agreed to allow IAEA inspections of its Isotope Production Laboratory in Yöngbyön-kun at the 17th working-level meeting with the IAEA in Vienna. The facility is not subject to safeguards inspections, but IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei says, "This is a step in the right direction towards the normalization of the DPRK's relations with the IAEA." However, North Korea has still not responded to an IAEA request made in May 2001 during meetings in Pyongyang to begin the process of accounting for North Korea's past nuclear activities.

—Yonhap News Agency, 2 December 2001, in "ROK Official: DPRK Allows IAEA To Inspect Nuclear Laboratory in Yongbyon," FBIS Document ID KPP20011202000005; Kim Hee-sung, "North Korea Says It Will Permit Inspection of Lab," *Joongang Ilbo*, 3 December 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; Ryu Chae Hun, "Puk, Yöngbön Haekkwallyönshisöl Sach'al Höyong," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 2 December 2001, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; O Yöng Hwan, "Pukhan, Yöngbyön Shilhömsil Sach'al Höyongk'iro," *Joongang Ilbo*, 3 December 2001, www.joins.com; Cho Chöng Chin, "Pukhan, Yöngbyön Haeg'yön'guso Sach'al Höyong," *Segye Ilbo*, 3 December 2001, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Yun Sang Hwan, "Tashi Pul'göji'nün Pukhaeksach'al," *Segye Ilbo*, 3 December 2001, p. 5, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Kim Hee-sung, "North Korea Says It will Permit Inspection of lab," *Joongang Ilbo*, 4 December 2001, <http://english.joins.com>.

13 November 2001

In a speech at the UN General Assembly, North Korean Ambassador to the UN Lee Hyöng Ch'öl says that the United States must return to the position of the former Clinton administration before North Korea will resume bilateral dialogue. Lee also says, "It is totally irrational to say the United States deploys huge armed forces around the Korean Peninsula and conducts large-scale military exercises against us to advance peace, whereas it is a 'threat to peace' that we take self-defense measures to cope with the US military threat." Furthermore, Lee says that any accusations of North Korea posing a "missile threat" are groundless.

—Kim Hee-sung, "N.K. Proposes Conditions for Dialogue with U.S.," *Joongang Ilbo*, 14 November 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 14 November 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: N.K. Tells U.S. to Go Back to Clinton's Policy on Pyongyang," FBIS Document ID KPP20011114000061; Kang Chin Uk, "Puk, UN Ch'onghoesö Taemi Taehwa Chogön Cheshi," Yonhap News Agency, 16 November 2001, www.yonhapnew.co.kr.

26 November 2001

During an appearance at the White House rose garden, George W. Bush says, "I made it very clear to North Korea that in order for us to have relations with them, that we want to know: Are they developing weapons of mass destruction? And they ought to stop proliferating."

—Mike Allen, "Iraq's Weapons Could Make It a Target, Bush Says," *Washington Post*, 27 November 2001, p. A7; Han Ki-heung and Lee Jong-hoon, "Bush Demands 'Inspections over North Korea's Mass-Destructive Weapons,'" *Donga Ilbo*, 28 November 2001, <http://english.donga.com>; Lee Jong Hun and Han Ki Hüng, "Salsangmugi Sach'al Padaya Bush, E Konggaeyogu," *Donga Ilbo*, 28 November 2001, www.donga.com.

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27 November 2001

Following a meeting in San Francisco, the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) issues a statement reiterating the commitment of the three member countries: Japan, South Korea, and the United States—to implement the Agreed Framework.

—Kyodo News Service, 28 November 2001, in "Japan, S. Korea, U.S. Urge N. Korea to Antiterrorism Actions," FBIS Document ID JPP20011128000038; Kwŏn O Yŏn, "Han.Mi.II, (sic) Puk'e Pan Terror Ch'ugajoch'I Ch'okku," *Joongang Ilbo*, 28 November 2001, www.joins.com.

28 November 2001

A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry says US demands for inspections are unreasonable and that the Agreed Framework is being indefinitely delayed. He also says that North Korea has no option but to "take necessary counter-measures."

—"Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry Assails U.S. Evermore Hostile Attitude," Korean Central News Agency, 29 November 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "Migukŭi <Sallyukmugigŏmjŭng> Chujang Pinan/Chosŏn'oemusŏngdaebyŏnin," Korean Central News Agency, 28 November 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "N. Korea Slams Calls for Arms Inspections," CNN.Com, 29 November 2001, www.cnn.com; Kim Yŏng Shik, "Pukhan 'Mijŏktaejŏngch'aek'e Kangnyŏktaeŭng'," *Donga Ilbo*, 29 November 2001, www.donga.com; Korean Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 28 November 2001, in "DPRK ForMin (sic) Spokesman Denounces US Remark on Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction Involving DPRK," FBIS Document ID KPP20011128000104.

29 November 2001

Korean Central Television in Pyongyang says that the North Korean missile program and its conventional forces are matters of national sovereignty and the right to self-defense. The broadcast also says that North Korea will not reduce its conventional forces until US forces are withdrawn from South Korea.

—Ch'oe Sŏn Yŏng, "Puk, 'Chŏkdaejŏk Puk.Migwan'gye Chawijŏk Kukpangnyŏk Yoguhae'," *Joongang Ilbo*, 29 November 2001, www.joins.com; "N. Korea Slams Calls for Arms Inspections," CNN.Com, 29 November 2001, www.cnn.com.

30 November 2001

US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says that safeguards inspections will have to begin now to prevent further delays in the construction of the LWRs in [Kŭmho-chigu], Shinp'o.

—"US Says NKorean Reactors May Face More Delays if Inspectors Not Allowed IN," Agence France Presse, 1 December 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yun Sang Hwan, "Tashi Pul'gŏji'nŭn Pukhaeksach'al," *Segye Ilbo*, 3 December 2001, p. 5, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Nicholas Kralev, "U.S. Wants Nuclear Plant Opened," *Washington Times*, 1 December 2001, www.washingtontimes.com.

December 2001

According to a South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade source, the United States offers to hold deputy minister-level talks with North Korea, but North Korea declines. The United States suggests that Jack Pritchard, special envoy for the four-party talks, and Kim Kye Kwan, North Korean vice foreign minister, participate in the talks.

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—Kim Jin, "Powell Voices Reservations on 'Sunshine' Policy results," *Joongang Ilbo*, 4 February 2002, <http://english.joins.com>.

1-4 December 2001

KEDO Executive Director Charles Kartman leads a delegation to Pyongyang. Kartman meets with Kim Sŏng Su, North Korea's director of the light water reactor project. North Korea and KEDO sign the Quality Assurance and Warranties Protocol. The protocol lays the groundwork for the participation of North Korean safety personnel in the light water reactor project. The protocol also covers the electricity supply, core parts, and the initial supply of nuclear fuel. During Kartman's stay in Pyongyang, he and North Korean officials also discuss labor issues and the need to establish a separate communication network to increase construction efficiency.

—"Protocol between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Quality Assurances and Warranties for the Implementation of a Light Water Reactor Project," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, *www.kedo.org KEDO 2001 Annual Report*, p. 10, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, *www.kedo.org*; "KEDO Executive Director and His Party Arrive," Korean Central News Agency, 1 December 2001, *www.kcna.co.jp*; KEDO Chiphaenggukchang'ilhaeng Tojak," Korean Central News Agency, 1 December 2001, *www.kcna.co.jp*; Yonhap News Agency, "Kartman KEDO Samuch'ongjang Pangbuk," *Joongang Ilbo*, 3 December 2001, *www.joins.com*; Yonhap News Agency, 1 December 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: KEDO Executive Director Visits N. Korea Sat.," FBIS Document ID KPP20011201000006; "North and KEDO Sign Agreements on Reactor Quality Assurance," *Joongang Ilbo*, 3 December 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; Chu Yong Sŏng, "Puk-KEDO P'umjilbojang'ŭi'jŏngsŏ Sŏmyŏng," *Joongang Ilbo*, 3 December 2001, *www.joins.com*; Yonhap News Agency, 4 December 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: KEDO Chief Arrives in Seoul after North Korean Trip," FBIS Document ID KPP20011204000050; Yonhap News Agency, 3 December 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: N.K., KEDO Sign Agreement on Reactor Quality Assurance," FBIS Document ID KPP20011203000047; Yu Jae-Suk, "KEDO Signs Accord with North Korea Warranting Quality of Nuclear Reactors," Associated Press, 3 December 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 5 December 2001, in "KEDO's Kartman Briefs ROK UnifMin (sic) on Meeting in P'yongyang," FBIS Document ID 20011205000042; "KEDO Progresses Despite Obstacles; Signs Accord with DPRK," *The People's Korea*, 13 December 2001, *www.korea-np.co.jp*; "KEDO Chiphaenggukchang'ilhaeng'i Ddŏ'na Kkatta," Korean Central News Agency, 4 December 2001, *www.kcna.co.jp*.

3 December 2001

In an interview with the BBC, South Korean Unification Minister Hong Sun Yŏng says, "Several North Korean hard-liners are trying to enfeeble or reverse the reconciliation process [with South Korea]." He also says that North Korean hard-liners are using South Korean enhanced security measures in the wake of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 as a pretext to exert their influence. Hong says there is "friction or tension between militarists and economists."

—"Leadership of North Is Seen in Struggle," *Joongang Ilbo*, 5 December 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; "North Korea Calls for Hight (sic) Security Alert," Agence France Presse, 5 December 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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4 December 2001

The US Department of Defense (DOD) labels North Korea the third greatest threat among countries that proliferate weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In a report submitted to Congress, the DOD ranks the proliferation threat posed by 19 states. The DOD names Russia and China as posing the highest WMD proliferation threat. North Korea ties with Iraq and Iran as posing the third greatest threat.

—Kim Jin, "U.S. Labels North Korea 3rd Most Threatening Nation," *Joongang Ilbo*, 5 December 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; Shin Ki Söp, "'Pukhan, Segye 3 Pönjjae Mi Anbowihyöpkuk' <Mi Kukpangbu>," *Joongang Ilbo*, 4 December 2001, www.joins.com; "Pukhan, Miguk Anbowihyöpkukka 3 Wi'e," *Donga Ilbo*, 5 December 2001, www.donga.com.

5 December 2001

Charles Kartman, executive director of KEDO, says that the United States and North Korea may resume dialogue soon. Kartman says Kim Kye Kwan, North Korean vice foreign minister, and Jack Pritchard, special envoy to the Korean peace talks, will likely be the participants if dialogue is to resume. He adds that North Korea's requests for compensation due to the delay in the construction of the light water reactors is not a matter for KEDO. In regard to North Korea permitting IAEA inspections of its Isotope Production Laboratory in Yöngbyön-kun, Kartman says it is not a breakthrough in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem, but it is just a hopeful sign. Kartman makes his comments in Seoul following his visit to Pyongyang.

—Brent (Won-ki) Choi, "North Korea Likely to Resume High-Level Talks with U.S. Soon, Says Kartman," *Joongang Ilbo*, 5 December 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; "Kartman, 'Puk-Mi Kowigüp Taewha'e Ch'aksuhal Tüt," *Joongang Ilbo*, 5 December 2001, www.joins.com.

6-7 December 2001

KEDO holds an executive board meeting in Seoul to discuss the light water reactor project under way in North Korea. The meeting covers the KEDO budget for 2002, and the extension of the EU's executive membership in KEDO for another five years. The EU is expected to increase its financial contribution to 20 million ECUs per year from 15 million ECUs. KEDO expenditures for 2001 are \$90.56 million.

—Yonhap News Agency, 5 December 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: KEDO Executive Board Meeting to Be Held Here Thurs.," FBIS Document ID KPP20011205000057; Chang Yong Hun, "KEDO Chiphaeng'isahoe 6-7 Il Kaech'oe," Yonhap News Agency, 6 December 2001, www.ynhapnews.net; "KEDO Progresses Despite Obstacles; Signs Accord with DPRK," *The People's Korea*, 13 December 2001, www.korea-np.co.jp.

7 December 2001

Japanese officials participating in the KEDO executive board meeting in Seoul says that Hitachi Limited and Toshiba Corporation are expected to provide the turbines for the light water reactors under construction in North Korea. The firms are expected to replace General Electric of the United States, which pulled out of the deal after failing to receive indemnification for any possible future accidents at the site.

—Jiji Press, 7 December 2001, in "Toshiba, Hitachi Expected To Supply Turbogenerators to Nuclear Power Reactor in N. Korea," FBIS Document ID JPP20011208000002.

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9 December 2001

North Korean radio and print media criticize the United States for delaying the construction of the light water reactors under the Agreed Framework. The broadcast says the United States is "pressuring North Korea to accept inspections, but under such circumstances, North Korea can no longer expect to settle issues with the US through dialogue."

—"U.S. Imperialists Warned Not to Act Rashly," Korean Central News Agency, 9 December 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mijega <Pant'ero> Rül Kushillo Chönjaeng'ül T'aekhandamyön Chingbö'l't'agyög'üi Pur'ül T'ohal'göshida/Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 9 December 2001, www.kcna.co.jp; Pyongyang Broadcasting Station, 9 December 2001, in "DPRK Radio Denounces US for Aiming at DPRK as 'Next Target' After Afghanistan," FBIS Document ID KPP20011209000033; Kang Jin Uk, "Puk 'Mijenün Hamburo Nalddwiji Malla'," Yonhap News Agency, 9 December 2001, www.yonhapnews.co.kr.

10 December 2001

The South Korean Ministry of National Defense issues a report on weapons of mass destruction, estimating that North Korea extracted 10-12kg of weapon-grade plutonium from its graphite-moderated reactors before shutting them down in 1994. The report also claims that North Korea conducted about 70 high-yield explosive tests between 1983 and 1998. However, the report states that despite the extensive testing, North Korea still lacks necessary components to construct a functional high-explosive triggering device. Furthermore, North Korea does not have the sophisticated machinery required to proceed with nuclear-related tests. Therefore, the report concludes, North Korea would need several years to weaponize a nuclear bomb.

—ROK Ministry of National Defense, *Taeryangsalsangmugi (WMD) Mundappaekkwa:Hwa Saeng Pang Missile Olmana Algo Kyeshimnikka?* (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2001), p. 93; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 18 December 2001, in "South Korea Reports North Has Enough Plutonium to Make One, Two Atomic Bombs," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 18 December 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16-29 December 2001

Kim Hui Mun, director general of North Korea's Light-Water Reactor Bureau, leads a 20-member delegation to South Korea to tour nuclear power facilities. The visit is a result of the training protocol signed by North Korea and KEDO on 20 October 2000. While in South Korea the delegation travels to Ulchin, North Kyöngsang Province to visit South Korea's No. 3 and No. 4 nuclear reactors.

—Lee Young-jong, "Nuclear Visitors in South," *Joongang Ilbo*, 18 December 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; Lee Yöng Chong, "Pukhan Wönjön Shich'altan Namhan Ipukuk," *Joongang Ilbo*, 17 December 2001, www.joins.com; Seo Soo-min, "NK Officials Visit South for Nuclear Safety Training," *Korea Times*, 17 December 2001, www.koreatimes.co.kr; Kim Ji-ho, "N.K. Officials Observing Nuke Plants," *Korea Herald*, 18 December 2001, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Yun Sang Hwan, "Kyöngsurosaop P'ul'öya hal Kwaje: Puk Choghihaeksach'al'i Köllimdol," *Segye Ilbo*, 20 December 2001, www.segyetimes.co.kr; Chang Yong Hun, "<Kyöngsuro Könsölsaop Ödikkaji Wattna>," Yonhap News Agency, 17 December 2001, www.yonhapnews.co.kr; "North Korean Nuclear Safety Training," *Korea Update*, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 2002, p. 3; Yonhap News Agency, 28 December 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: N.K.'s Two-Week Inspection of Reactors Winds Up," FBIS Document ID KPP20011228000026; Yonhap News

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Agency, 28 December 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: N.K's Two-Week inspection of Reactors Winds Up," FBIS Document ID KPP20011228000026; "Korea Nuclear Tour Ends," BBC News, 30 December 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk>.

21 December 2001

Korean Central Television in Pyongyang reports that on 12 August 1945, Japan tested an atomic bomb off the coast of Hŭngnam, South Hamgyŏng Province, in present-day North Korea. [Note: The North Korean media often cite a nuclear threat from Japan, which could be used as a pretext for North Korea's development of nuclear weapons.]

—Cho Chŏng Chin, "Il P'aemangjŏn Hŭngnamsŏ Wŏnp'okshil'ŏm," *Segye Ilbo*, 22 December 2001, p. 31, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Chŏng Yŏn Uk, "Pukhan 'Ilbon 1945 Nyŏn Haekshil'ŏm' Chujang," *Donga Ilbo*, 22 December 2001, www.donga.com.

26 December 2001

The *Jammu Daily Excelsior* of India reports that Pakistan's AQ Khan Research Laboratories, which handle Pakistan's nuclear program, have used North Korean technology to develop a missile with a "capacity far beyond the Ghauri." [Note: There is the possibility that Pakistan could have exchanged nuclear technology for North Korean missile technology.]

—B.L. Kak, "Terrorist Threat from North Korea; Pak Wants FBI to Confirm Jiadis' Involvement," *Jammu Daily Excelsior*, 26 December 2001, in "India: Daily Notes North Korea's Covert Support to Islamic Terrorists," FBIS Document ID SAP20011226000059.

28 December 2001

According to the *Tokyo Shimbun*, a Japanese government source connected with KEDO reveals that KEDO has officially notified North Korea that the light water reactors would not be completed until 2009.

—*Tokyo Shimbun*, 29 December 2001, in "'Source' Reveals Completion of KEDO Light-Water Reactors To Be Delayed Six Years," FBIS Document ID JPP20011229000006; "Delay Till 2009 Seen for Reactor Project," *Joongang Ilbo*, 31 December 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 29 December 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: Completion Date for N.K. Reactors Moved Back Six Years," FBIS Document ID KPP20011229000002.

[Back to Top](#)

2000

2000

The South Korean government issues more than W254.7 billion in treasury bonds to help finance the light water reactor project in North Korea under the Agreed Framework. Interest on the debt for the year totals W19 billion.

—Yonhap News Agency, 31 October 2000, in "ROK's Yonhap: Dong-ah, Hyundai Likely to Negatively Affect Nuclear Reactor Plan," FBIS Document KPP2001031000052; *Chosun Ilbo*, 15 July 2001, in "Interest on LWR for DPRK Reaches 36.1 Billion Won," FBIS Document ID: KPP20010715000002.

6 January 2000

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily the Korean Workers Party, warns that 'the continuation of national division is

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bringing the holocaust of a nuclear war upon our fellow countrymen." The paper claims that North and South Korea 'will get nothing but national ruin from confrontation.'

—'Korea's Reunification Is Supreme Task of Nation,' Korean Central News Agency, 6 January 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'Chogukt'ong'il Minjokchisang'ui Kwaop/Rodongshimun,' Korean Central News Agency, 6 January 2000, www.kcna.co.jp.

11 January 2000

Japan and the EU reconfirm continued cooperation on their policies toward North Korea. At ministerial-level talks held in Brussels, Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono tells the EU delegation that the stability of North Korea is vital to nuclear nonproliferation efforts.

—Kyodo News Service, 11 January 2000, in 'Japan, EU Reconfirm Cooperation on North Korea,' BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 January 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

16 January 2000

The *Sunday Telegraph* reports that North Korea is trying to obtain uranium from the Democratic Republic of the Congo's Shinkolobwe uranium mine, leading to increased suspicion that North Korea is still trying to develop nuclear weapons. According to the report, the director of a British mining company claims that several of his workers have observed North Koreans in Shinkolobwe. The report also quotes Richard Cornwall, a researcher at the South African Institute for Security Studies, as saying, 'We know that there have been North Koreans in that area and they are definitely training government forces, but whether they are soldiers or miners we do not know, and we can only speculate what they are getting in exchange.'

—Christina Lamb, 'Alarm Over North Korea's Secret Deal for Congo Uranium,' *Sunday Telegraph*, 16 January 2000.

20 January 2000

Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian tells South Korean Defense Minister Cho Song T'ae that Beijing fully supports efforts to make the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons, and that China is actively working towards that end. Chi, meeting with his South Korean counterpart in Seoul, is the first Chinese Defense Minister to visit South Korea since its founding in 1948. Chi is in Seoul from the 19 to the 23 January.

—'S. Korea Asks for China's 'Constructive Role' to Engage N. Korea,' Japan Economic Newswire, 19 January 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Chinese Defense Minister Calls for Nuclear-Free Korean Peninsula,' Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 20 January 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Hwang Yang Chun, '[Chungguk] Ch'uhaot'en Chungguk Kukpangbujang Ch'ot Panghan,' *Hankook Ilbo*, 19 January 2000, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Yu Yong Won, 'Hanjunggukpanghowdam Kunsagyoryu-Hyopnyok Hab'ui; Chung 'Shilsejangsong' Taego Panghan,' *Chosun Ilbo*, 21 January 2000, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

20 January 2000

The Swiss firm Asea Brown Boveri AG (ABB) announces that it recently signed contracts with Korea Heavy Industries and Construction Co., Ltd. and Korea Power Engineering Corporation to deliver \$200 million worth of equipment and services for the KEDO light water reactor project.

—'ABB Wins 200 Mln USD Nuclear Power Plant Contracts in North Korea,' AFX Europe, 20 January 2000, in Lexis-

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Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Swiss Firm Receives Order for Nuclear Project in N. Korea,' Japan Economic Newswire, 20 January 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

22 January 2000

North Korea says that the Washington's claim that North Korea poses a nuclear and missile threat to the United States is merely an attempt to justify a missile defense program. A commentary appearing in the *Rodong Sinmun* says that the real nuclear and missile threat is from the United States. The paper says that US 'nuclear weapons and missiles, wherever they are deployed, will be targeted at (North Korea)."

—'U.S. Anti-DPRK Smear Campaign Dismissed,' Korean Central News Agency, 22 January 2000, web.lexis-nexis.com; '<P'okt'anp'okpalshilhom>Sol'un Nukkorich'ang'anp'um/Rodongshinmun,' Korean Central News Agency, 22 January 2000, www.kcna.co.jp.

22-28 January 2000

The United States and North Korea meet in Berlin to discuss a proposed visit by a high-ranking North Korean official to Washington. The delegations are headed by US special envoy for Korean affairs, Charles Kartman, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan. According to sources close to the talks, the two sides reach an agreement on the proposed visit of a high-ranking North Korean official to Washington and a further easing of economic sanctions against North Korea. The two sides agree to meet at a later date to finalize preparations for the proposed high-level meeting in Washington. [Note: The visit of a high-ranking North Korean official to Washington is one of the recommendations laid out by William Perry in his report assessing the US policy on North Korea. Perry's report was presented to Congress on 14 September 1999.]

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 29 January 2000, in 'South Agency Views USA-North Korea Agreement to High-Level Talks,' BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 29 January 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'US, N Korea Forge Deal to Open High-Level Talks: S Korean Official,' Agence France Presse, 29 January 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

30 January 2000

The *Rodong Sinmun* cites 'an official US document' to report that Japan is 'allowing the US to use its entire territory as the latter's nuclear base.' The article says the Japanese government approved the deployment of US nuclear weapons on Japanese territory in 1960. The paper also says that Tokyo's intention of pursuing this policy is to take part in any US aggression in Northeast Asia so that it might regain its former colonial empire, with North Korea being the first target of combined US-Japanese aggression. The paper concludes that should Japan attack North Korea, it would be 'wholly responsible for the ensuing consequences.'

—'Japan Urged to Think Twice over Consequences,' Korean Central News Agency, 30 January 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'Vietnam Chonjaengshigi Ilbon'ui Haengmugibanipsung'insashil'u Ronp'yong/Rodongshinmun,' Korean Central News Agency, 30 January 2000, www.kcna.co.jp.

31 January 2000

The Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) signs a loan agreement with KEDO extending up to ¥116.5 billion in loans for the light water reactors to be constructed in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o, North Korea. [Note: The loans were originally to be provided by the Export-Import Bank of Japan, but on 1 October 1999 the Export-Import

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Bank of Japan merged with the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund to form the JBIC.]

—Kyodo News Service, 31 January 2000, in 'Bank Signs Loan Pact with KEDO for North Korean Reactors,' BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 February 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

February 2000

KEDO dispatches a 20-member 'peace maintenance corps' to protect the light water reactor construction site in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o and South Koreans working on the project. [Note: In July 1996, KEDO and North Korea signed the 'protocol governing privileges, immunities and consular protection' granting KEDO the responsibility of preserving public order at the light water reactor site and related facilities.]

—*Donga Ilbo*, 15 February 2000, in 'North Nuclear Energy Body to Send 'Peace' Corps to Construction Site,' BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 18 February 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

1 February 2000

The US, South Korea and Japan hold a meeting of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) in Seoul. The three countries discuss the results of the US-North Korea talks held in Berlin 22-28 January 2000 and agree to provide additional aid to North Korea if it takes further steps to allay international concerns over its suspected nuclear weapons program.

—Charles Lee, 'N. Korea Rejected Access to U.S. Aid,' United Press International, 1 February 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Jan Perlez, 'US, North Korea Talks on Missile Program Set for March,' *New York Times*, 31 January 2000, p. A3.

1 February 2000

Japanese State Foreign Secretary Ichita Yamamoto meets with KEDO Executive-Director Desaix Anderson in Tokyo to discuss current issues facing KEDO. Yamamoto tells Anderson, 'It is important that North Korea comply with safeguard inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as delivery of key nuclear components begins.' Desaix agrees to press Pyongyang to accept full inspections of its nuclear facilities. The two also reaffirm the need to implement the KEDO project without delay, calling it 'the most realistic and effective framework' to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons.

—Kohei Murayama, 'Japan, KEDO to Urge N. Korea over Promised Nuke Inspections,' Japan Economic Newswire, 1 February 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

1 February 2000

Desaix Anderson, executive-director of KEDO, says that the timeframe for construction of the two light water reactors has been extended by at least four years.

—Alexander Kopnov, 'Reactors to Be Built in DPRK Four Years Later than Planned,' ITAR-TASS, 1 February 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

2 February 2000

The EU's Executive Commission recommends renewing EU support for KEDO after the current agreement expires at the end of 2000. The EU's External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten, calling KEDO a vital to international nuclear nonproliferation efforts, says, 'It is only right that the EU should stand alongside the United States, Japan

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and Korea in a project as important to regional stability as KEDO." [Note: EURATOM, the EU's nuclear agency, originally signed a contract with KEDO to supply €75 million over a five-year period.]

—'Continuing EU Role in KEDO Demanded," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2 February 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Continued EU Participation in KEDO After 2000 Proposed," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 February 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

3 February 2000

The turnkey contract between KEDO and KEPCO becomes effective, and KEPCO begins construction on the two light water reactors in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o, North Korea. [Note: On 15 December 1999, KEPCO signed the turnkey contract with KEDO authorizing the commencement of construction on the actual reactors. Site preparation work began in August 1997.]

—'Full-Fledged Construction of N. Korean Reactors Began Feb. 3," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 February 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Light Water Reactor Project: Turnkey Contract," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org/au_members.asp.

3 February 2000

In an interview published by the Korean Central News Agency, North Korean Vice Premier Cho Ch'ang Dok accuses the United States of blatantly violating the Agreed Framework, and hints that North Korea might reopen its frozen nuclear reactors if it does not receive compensation for the delays in the KEDO light water reactor (LWR) project. Cho blames North Korea's recent electricity shortage on the US failure to honor its commitments under the Agreed Framework. Cho says, 'Due to the unreasonable US delaying tactics the LWR construction is not likely to be completed even in 2010, to say nothing of 2003, the (original) deadline." Cho claims that the US failure to honor its commitments has already caused a loss of 'tens of billions of KWH of electricity, bringing immeasurable adverse effect on the national economy and the people's living." Cho concludes that 'if the US does not fulfill its commitments but persistently pursues the policy of stifling the DPRK, the DPRK will be left with no option but to go its own way."

—'Jo Chang Dok Interviewed on Serious Shortage of Electricity," Korean Central News Agency, 3 February 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'Chon'gisajong'ul Kinjangshik'in Miguk'e Posangul Yogu/Cho Ch'ang Dok Puch'ongni," Korean Central News Agency, 3 February 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; David Jones, 'North Korea May Reopen Nuke Reactor; Blames U.S. for Power Outages," *Washington Times*, 4 February 2000, p. A1.

7 February 2000

KEDO's Executive Board meets in New York. The board members discuss ways to speed up construction on the two light water reactors following the 3 February threat by North Korean Vice Premier Cho Ch'ang Dok that North Korea might resume its frozen graphite moderated nuclear program if delays continue.

—Yonhap News Agency, 5 February 2000, in 'International Group to Meet Over North Korean Nuclear Project," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 5 February 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Shim Kyu Son, 'KEDO Chiphaengui 7 Il Miso Pukkyongsurogonsol Kasokhwa Nonui," *Donga Ilbo*, 7 February 2000, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

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7 February 2000

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers Party, says that North Korea's 'energy situation is strained since the nuclear freeze.' The commentary criticizes the United States for blaming rising oil prices for its difficulty in delivery the heavy fuel oil under the Agreed Framework, and says that the light water reactors will probably not be completed by 2010. The article says that North Korea 'has a choice and cannot just sit around.'

—'Kyongsurojionch'aek'im'un Miguki Chge Toelgosida/Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 7 February 2000, www.kcna.co.jp.

7 February 2000

North Korea criticizes Western press reports that North Korea has been acquiring uranium for nuclear weapons from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in return for military aid. The Korean Central News Agency dismisses the reports as 'sheer fabrication' and 'a charade intended to slander and hurt the DPRK.' [Note: Beginning in August 1999, various press agencies have reported on the presence of North Korean military personnel near the Shinkolobwe uranium mine, leading to speculation that North Korea is providing military training for Congolese troops in exchange for uranium.]

—'KCNA on Fiction of DPRK's 'Purchase of Uranium'," Korean Central News Agency, 7 February 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; '<Uranium Kuip>Solun Wanjonhan Howi/Chosonjoongangt'ongshin,'" Korean Central News Agency, 7 February 2000, www.kcna.co.jp.

15 February 2000

US President Bill Clinton sends a presidential determination to Congress stating that he could not confirm that North Korea has abandoned its pursuit of a nuclear weapons program. Under the North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999, President Clinton must confirm that North Korea is not pursuing uranium enrichment or reprocessing spent nuclear fuel before any funds in fiscal year 2000 may be used for supplying North Korea with heavy fuel oil. Clinton does, however, certify that North Korea is complying with all its commitments under the Agreed Framework. In the presidential determination, Clinton informs Congress that while evidence of North Korea's nuclear intentions is inconclusive, he is exercising his authority to waive the confirmation requirement and proceeding with the annual deliveries of heavy fuel oil.

—George Gedda, 'US Worried about North Korean Nuclear Intentions,' Associated Press, 3 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Henry Sokolski, 'Implementing the Korean Nuclear Deal: What U.S. Law Requires,' The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, www.npec-web.org/essay/6-4-00-DPRK-Sokolski.htm.

22-25 February 2000

KEDO and North Korea hold a high-level meeting in Hyangsan, North Korea to discuss various problems that might arise during the construction of the two light water reactors being constructed in [Kumho-chigu], Shimp'o. The two sides agree to open a direct passenger boat service from Sokch'o, South Korea to Yanghwa-ri, Shimp'o, North Korea for South Koreans working on the light water reactor project. [Note: The meeting is the first between KEDO and North Korea since construction of the reactors began.]

—Yonhap News Agency, 29 February 2000, in 'North Korea Agrees to Direct Route for South Reactor Workers,' BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 29 February 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'KEDO, N.K. to Hold Expert Meeting on Reactor Construction,' *Korea Herald*, 23 February 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'KEDO

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Delegation Here," Korean Central News Agency, 23 February 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'KEDO Kowi'gupchonmun'gahyopsangdaep'yodan Toch'ak," Korean Central News Agency, 23 February 2000, www.kcna.co.jp;

23 February 2000

Pyongyang accuses the United States of being responsible for North Korean power shortage. The Korean Central News Agency claims that the freeze of North Korea's nuclear program had resulted in billions of dollars in lost production, and the United States has not sufficiently compensated North Korea with heavy fuel oil promised under the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework.

—'Serious Shortage of Electricity," Korean Central News Agency, 23 February 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'Choson'ui Kinjanghan Chollyoksajong/Chosonjung'angt'ongshin," Korean Central News Agency, 23 February 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; Korea Central News Agency, 23 February 2000, in 'Serious Shortage of Electricity," FBIS Document ID KPP20000223000102.

24 February 2000

US President Bill Clinton announces that the United States will soon release \$15 million earmarked for heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea.

—'U.S. to Spend \$15 Mil. for Shipment of Heavy Fuel Oil to N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 25 February 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

7 March 2000

Japan names Kojiro Takano as ambassador to KEDO and Tokyo's representative to normalization talks with North Korea.

—'Japan Names Takano as KEDO Amb.," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 7 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

8-15 March 2000

The United States and North Korea hold high-level talks in New York to discuss various bilateral issues. The delegations, headed by Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean Affairs, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan, address a wide range of sensitive issues such as North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, delays in implementing the Agreed Framework, North Korea's designation by the State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism, and the proposed visit to the United States by a top-level North Korean official. The talks end on 15 March without any agreement between the two sides. Although the talks fail to produce an agreement, the two sides agree to resume the dialogue in the future. [Note: On 18 March, North Korea's Foreign Ministry announces that at the talks the United States acknowledged the legitimacy of North Korea's demand for compensation for electricity shortages caused by delays in the light water reactor construction. According to a ministry spokesman, discussions on the issue progressed to ways the United States could compensate North Korea for the lost electricity.]

—Sharon Behn, 'US, North Korea Set for Second Day of Negotiations on Landmark Visit," Agence France Presse, 9 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'U.S.-N. Korea High-Level Talks End Without Agreement," Japan Economic Newswire, 15 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'US, North Korea Agreement Possible of Conditions Are Ripe - Kim Gye-Gwan," Agence France Presse, 15 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com;

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'DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on DPRK-U.S. Talks," Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 189 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Pyongyang Broadcasting Station, 16 May 2001, in 'Further on DPRK Report on Delay in LWR Construction," FBIS Document ID KPP20010517000069.

9 March 2000

South Korean President Kim Dae Jung delivers his 'Berlin Declaration," which proposes governmental talks between the two Koreas, and aims to increase inter-Korean exchanges.

—'S. Korea's Kim Set to Work Directly with North," United Press International, 10 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'South Korean President Kim Dae-jung Calls for Talks with North Korea," Agence France Presse, 9 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kim Ji-ho, "Berlin Declaration' Shows Seoul's Will, Confidence in Inter-Korea Initiative," *Korea Herald*, 10 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kim Min Bae, 'Kim Taet'ongnyong 'Berlin Son'on' 4 Kaehang Palp'yo," *Chosun Ilbo*, 10 March 2000, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.com; Kim Min Bae, 'Kim Taet'ongnyong 'Berlin Son'on' Pukchiwon, Chongbuga Chikchop Nasonda," *Chosun Ilbo*, 10 March 2000, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.com.

16 March 2000

At a hearing of the House International Relations Committee, Ambassador Wendy Sherman of the State Department, states that the Agreed Framework 'continues to be our best means of capping and eventually eliminating the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons." She also announces that on 15 March, Pyongyang confirmed its agreement to allow a second inspection of the suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri in May.

—'Hearing of the House International Relations Committee," Federal News Service, 16 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

18 March 2000

US Secretary of Defense William Cohen meets with South Korean officials in Seoul to discuss various issues including the continuing military threat from North Korea. Cohen and his South Korean counterpart Cho Song T'ae vow to respond 'immediately and sternly" if North Korea attempts a military provocation ahead of the South Korean presidential elections scheduled for April.

—Jim Mannion, 'Cohen Holds Talks in Seoul on North Korea," Agence France Presse, 18 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Han Kyong Hun, 'Han-Mi Kukpangjanggwon 18 Il Hoedam," *Segye Ilbo*, 18 March 2000, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

21 March 2000

The *Rodong Sinmun* accuses the United States of raising suspicions about its nuclear program merely as a 'mean maneuver to try to evade its responsibility for having delayed the construction of the light water reactors in accordance with the DPRK-US Agreed Framework...and for even having failed to observe the schedule for the supply of heavy oil."

—'U.S. Urged to Drop Its Foolish Attempt," Korean Central News Agency, 21 March 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'Mi'gug'ui <Haeg'uihok>Sol'ul Pinan/Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 21 March 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 21 March 2000, in 'USA Said to Be Using 'Rumours' of

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Nuclear Threat as Excuse to Delay Reactors," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

21 March 2000

In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Wendy Sherman, a State Department counselor, announces that North Korea has agreed to 'recommence talks related to our concern about its missile program and to begin a new negotiation on implementation of the Agreed Framework.' Sherman does not mention whether or not the two sides have decided on a date and venue for the talks.

—'U.S., N. Korea to Resume Nuclear, Missile Talks," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

29 March 2000

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers Party, condemns the United States for intentionally delaying the implementation of the Agreed Framework and causing widespread electricity outages in North Korea. The paper warns that if the United States does not resolve the issue of compensation for the lost electricity, the DPRK will have no option but to revive its graphite moderated nuclear program.

—'U.S. Urged to Compensate for Loss of Electricity in DPRK," Korean Central News Agency, 29 March 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'Mi'gug'un Chollyoksonshilbosangjoch'l'l'ul Ch'wihaeaya Handa/Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 29 March 2000, www.kcna.co.jp.

30-31 March 2000

The US, Japan and South Korea hold a meeting of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) in Tokyo to coordinate their policies on North Korea. According to reports, the US side suggests that one of the LWRs being supplied to North Korea under the Agreed Framework should be replaced with six conventional power plants. However, the South Korean delegation disagrees with the proposal.

—'Japan Foreign Minister Is in Seoul," *Chosun Ilbo* (Seoul), 30 March 2000; *Chosun Ilbo* (Seoul), 5 January 2001, in 'ROK Daily Notes US Aim To Build 6 Power Plants in DPRK, ROKG's Objections," FBIS Document ID KPP20010105000068; Lee Ha Won, 'US Proposes Alternative Power Plants for NK," *Chosun Ilbo*, 5 January 2001, www.chosun.com; Lee Ha Won, 'Mi 'Pug'e Hwajongonsol' Chead," *Chosun Ilbo*, 6 January 2001, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

April 2000

US and IAEA technicians complete the process of canning over 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods in North Korea. A US State Department official announces on 13 June that the canning of the spent fuel rods was completed in April and that the IAEA has confirmed that the remaining rod fragments 'do not represent a proliferation concern.' [Note: North Korea removed the spent fuel rods from its 5MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon-kun.]

—Steven Mufson, 'Threat of 'Rogue' States: Is It Reality or Rhetoric?" *Washington Post*, 29 May 2000, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kim Chin, 'Miguk, Sayonghan Pukhan Haekyollyobong Pong'in Wallyo," *Joongang Ilbo*, 31 May 2000, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; 'Canning of Spent Fuel in N. Korea Completed, U.S. Says," Japan Economic Newswire, 13 June 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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1-4 April 2000

KEDO and North Korean officials meet in Hyangsan, North Korea to discuss a protocol on the training of North Korean engineers who will operate the two light water reactors once they are completed. KEDO reportedly wants the engineers trained in South Korea, but North Korea insists the training take place in any country other than South Korea. According to a KEDO official, North Korea agrees to comply with KEDO's decision to conduct the training at a South Korean nuclear plant.

—Yonhap News Agency, 27 March 2000, 'North Korea, Energy Organization to Discuss Signing of Protocol on Training,' BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 27 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; KBS Radio (Seoul), 16 April 2000, in 'North Agrees to KEDO-Designated Training Site,' BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 18 April 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'KEDO Delegation Here,' Korean Central News Agency, 1 April 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'Chosonbando'enerugigaebalgiguhypsangdae'p'yodan Toch'ak,' Korean Central News Agency, 1 April 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'KEDO Delegation Leaves,' Korean Central News Agency, 4 April 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'KEDO Hyopsangdae'p'yodan'i Ddon Katta,' Korean Central News Agency, 4 April 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), in 'Energy Group Delegation Leaves,' BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 April 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

3 April 2000

North Korea denounces what it refers to as an attempt by 'US conservative hardliners' to amend the Agreed Framework to include a 'verification devices' in order to monitor North Korea's compliance with the agreement. A report by the Korean Central News Agency states that 'if the US tries to 'amend' the agreed framework, skeptical over the DPRK measure of nuclear freezing and the Agreed Framework itself, instead of sincerely implementing it, the Agreed Framework will be bound to be abrogated.'

—'U.S. Skeptical over DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework,' Korean Central News Agency, 3 April 2000, www.kcna.co.jp.

4-7 April 2000

North Korea and Japan hold high-level rapprochement talks for the first time in eight years. At the talks, held in Pyongyang, the Japanese delegation expresses concern over North Korea's missile program and suspected nuclear weapons program.

—'N. Korea Threatens to Walk Out of Talks with Japan,' Japan Economic Newswire, 5 April 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Japan Hints at Deal, But No Progress with N. Korea,' Japan Economic Newswire, 7 April 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), 7 April 2000, in 'Japan, North Korea Agree to Resume Talks in Late May,' BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 8 April 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

9 April 2000

Diplomatic sources in Seoul announce that ongoing negotiations with North Korea on implementation of the Agreed Framework are failing to make significant progress due to Pyongyang's continuing refusal to disclose the amount of plutonium it reprocessed prior to the 1994 agreement.

—Yonhap News Agency, 9 April 2000, in 'North Korea's Refusal to Disclose Nuclear Acts Hampers Talks with USA,' BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 9 April 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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11 April 2000

Benjamin Gilman, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, and Edward Markey, ranking member of the House Commerce Committee, send a letter to President Bill Clinton expressing their concern over his 15 February decision to authorize the release of funds to be used for the delivery of heavy fuel oil to North Korea despite his stated inability to certify that North Korea is not pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program, as required by the North Korean Threat Reduction Act of 1999. In the letter, Gilman and Markey tell Clinton, 'You did not hesitate to certify the third requirement, that 'North Korea is complying with all provisions of the Agreed Framework,' If, as you explain, the 'the evidence is inconclusive whether North Korea is seeking to develop of acquire the ability to enrich uranium,' then how can you certify that North Korea is complying with all aspects of the Agreed Framework?' [Note: The White House reportedly sends a reply to the House International Relations Committee stating that in order to release the funds for the second 2000 delivery of oil, Clinton will not waive the requirement that he certify that North Korea is not pursuing a nuclear weapons program.]

—Henry Sokolski, 'Implementing the Korean Nuclear Deal: What U.S. Law Requires,' The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, www.npec-web.org/essay/6-4-00-DPRK-Sokolski.htm.

11 April 2000

Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer announces that Australia will donate an additional A\$1 million to KEDO, bringing Australia's total donations since 1995 to A\$15.8 million.

—Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade web site, 11 April 2000, in 'Australia Welcomes Inter-Korean Talks, Pledges Extra Funds for Energy Project,' BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 April 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

17 April 2000

The *Joongang Ilbo*, quoting nuclear experts, reports that North Korea possesses a superior plutonium extraction technology that South Korea never possessed. North Korea is believed to possess a know how in the area of radioactive chemicals and other sectors of the nuclear technology.

—Kim Ch'ang-yop, *Chungang Ilbo* (Soul), 17 April 2000, in 'North Korea's Technology Prowess Examined,' FBIS Document ID KPP20000417000098; Kim Ch'ang Yop, 'Pukhan, IT Sop'ut'uweonun Sujunkup,' *Joongang Ilbo*, 18 April 2000, p. 39, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

18 April 2000

The Korea Non-Life Insurance Association announces that LG Insurance will be the main insurance provider for the KEDO light water reactor project. The insurance association also announces that LG Insurance will soon conclude negotiations with KEPCO over the scope of the coverage.

—'LG Insurance Named Manager for N. Korean Reactor Insurance,' Asia Pulse, 18 April 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

20 April 2000

Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono claims that North Korea will be fully responsible if an accident occurs at one of the two light water reactors being constructed by KEDO. Speaking before the House of Councilors Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, Kono says, 'North Korea cannot avoid taking responsibility because it is an

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internationally established principle that the operator of a nuclear reactor assumes full responsibility (in the event of an accident)."

—'N. Korea Responsible If Accident Occurs at KEDO Reactors: Kono," Japan Economic Newswire, 20 April 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

20 April 2000

North Korea's Foreign Ministry calls on the United States to remove all weapons of mass destruction from South Korea. A ministry spokesman claims that despite Washington's 1992 pledge that it had removed all nuclear weapons that were deployed outside its territory, it continues to 'massively deploy nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction...in and around South Korea.' Calling the continued deployment of nuclear weapons clear evidence of the aggressive US ambitions toward North Korea, the spokesman warns that 'the Korean people and the people's army are fully prepared for any confrontation.'

—'U.S. Practical Measure for Nuclear Weapons Reduction Called For," Korean Central News Agency, 20 April 2000, www.kcna.co.jp.

24 April 2000

Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, says that the IAEA has been unable to verify the state of North Korea's nuclear program because of its refusal to comply with the safeguards agreement it signed with the agency. Speaking at the opening session of the NPT Review Conference, ElBaradei says, "the agency remains unable to verify the correctness and completeness of North Korea's initial declaration of its nuclear material subject to safeguard and cannot, therefore, provide any assurance about non- diversion from non-military to military uses."

—Nicole Winfield, 'North Korea Under Fire at Nuclear Conference," Associated Press, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'South Korea Calls on North to Join Nuclear Safeguard Regime," Agence France Presse, 26 April 2000 in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

26 April 2000

KEDO's Executive Board meets in New York to assess the implementation of the light water reactor project. At the meeting, Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, announces that he will soon travel to Beijing to request that the Chinese government assist in supplying heavy-fuel oil to North Korea.

—'U.S. to Ask China to Supply N. Korea with Fuel Oil," Japan Economic Newswire, 27 April 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

10-12 May 2000

A four member IAEA delegation led by Olly Heinonen, director general of IAEA safeguards, travels to Pyongyang to attend the 14th nuclear technology meeting between the IAEA and North Korea. The IAEA delegation reportedly calls on North Korea to submit details on its past nuclear facilities according to the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea.

—Agence France Presse, 11 May 2000, in 'IAEA: No Progress in N Korea Nuclear Talks," FBIS Document ID EUP20000511000060; Yonhap News Agency, 8 May 2000, in 'Nuclear Body Officials to Visit 10th-12th May," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 May 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'IAEA Delegation Here," Korean Central News Agency, 9 May 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'Kukchewonjaryokkigudae'p'yodan Toch'ak," Korean Central

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News Agency, 9 May 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'IAEA Delegation Leaves,' Korean Central News Agency, 13 May 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'Kukchewonjaryokkigudae'p'yodan'i Ddon Katta,' Korean Central News Agency, 13 May 2000, www.kcna.co.jp.

12 May 2000

Officials from the United States, Japan, and South Korea meet in Tokyo for a meeting of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG). The delegations are headed by Wendy Sherman, counselor of the US State Department, Chang Chae Ryong, South Korean deputy foreign minister, and Yukio Takeuchi, Japanese deputy vice foreign minister for foreign policy. In a joint statement the participants of the TCOG meeting praised Pyongyang's decision to hold separate talks with each of the three nations. The delegations also 'reiterated their continuing commitment to consult closely and the coordinate their respective policies toward North Korea.'

—Shin Yong-bae, 'Seoul, Washington, Tokyo Dovetail Positions Ahead of Their Respective Talks with N.K.," *Korea Herald*, 13 May 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kim Sung Il, 'Hanmiil 'Chongsanghoedam Hanbando P'yonghwa Kiyo,'" *Hankook Ilbo*, 13 May 2000, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

15 May 2000

An official from KEPCO, the primary contractor for the KEDO light water reactor project, announces that the current consortium of South Korean subcontractors for the project will be disbanded unless an agreement on how to divide the project is reached by the end of June. The statement is in response to complaint filed by Daewoo Construction on the same day to the Fair Trade Commission claiming that Hyundai Engineering and Construction is attempting to monopolize the third stage of construction. [Note: In 1996, Hyundai, Donga, Daewoo, and Korea Heavy Industries agreed to divide the light water reactor project 35%, 25%, 20%, and 20% respectively.]

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 15 May 2000, in 'Koreas: South Subcontractors in Dispute over North Reactor Project,' BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 15 May 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 15 May 2000, in 'Koreas: Daewoo Accuses Hyundai of North Reactor Project Monopoly,' BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 15 May 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

16 May 2000

The US House of Representatives passes an amendment to the North Korean Threat Reduction Act of 1999, entitled the 'Congressional Oversight of Nuclear Transfers to North Korea Act of 2000,' requiring House and Senate approval of the president's certification that North Korea is not pursuing a nuclear weapons program before funds will be released for heavy fuel oil deliveries for North Korea. [Note: Under the North Korean Threat Reduction Act of 1999, the president is required to certify to Congress that North Korea is not pursuing a nuclear weapons program. However, the president has the option to waive the requirement, as President Clinton did on 15 February.]

—House International Relations Committee Press Release, 'House Passes Gilman-Markey North Korea Oversight Bill,' 16 May 2000; Henry Sokolski, 'Implementing the Korean Nuclear Deal: What U.S. Law Requires,' The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, www.npec-web.org.

18 May 2000

The US House of Representatives passes an amendment to the Defense Authorization Act prohibiting the US

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government from indemnifying from liability any US company participating in the KEDO light water reactor project. The amendment is in response to General Electric's request that the White House indemnify it from any future liability before it exports \$30 million in steam turbines for the KEDO reactors. Following the House legislation, General Electric announces that it will not provide the turbines for the reactors, thus propagating further delays in the KEDO project since the reactor designs are based on using General Electric's turbines.

—Amendment No. 3, Section 1205, Prohibition on Assumption by United States Government of Liability for Nuclear Accidents in North Korea, offered by Mr. Cox, Mr. Markey, Mr. Spenser, Mr. Gilman, Mr. Knollenberg, Mr. Bereuter, reprinted along with the floor debate in *U.S. Congressional Record*, 19 May 2000, pp. H3358-H3362.

24-30 May 2000

The US and North Korea resume talks in Rome to discuss various bilateral issues as well as finalizing arrangements for a high-level visit to Washington by a North Korean official. The delegations are once again headed by Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan. At the talks, Kim claims that delays in heavy fuel oil deliveries have caused severe economic harm to North Korea, and Kartman reportedly says that Washington will consider compensating North Korea for the economic losses.

—'U.S. to Consider Compensation for Delay in KEDO Project,' Japan Economic Newswire, 25 May 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'North Korea Demands US Compensation for Electric Power Losses,' Agence France Presse, 26 May 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; *Tonga Ilbo*, 28 May 2000, in 'Pyongyang Demands Food in Indemnity for Delay in Construction of Reactor,' BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 May 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'U.S. Says U.S.-DPRK Talks Make Progress,' Xinhua News Agency, 30 May 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kim Se Won, 'Puk-Mi Hoedam/Pukoemusongbusang 'Kyongsurogonsa P'ihae Mie Posangyogu,' *Donga Ilbo*, 27 May 2000, p. 5, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr; 'Pukhan, Mie Kyongsuro Chiyon Sonshil Posangyogu,' *Joongang Ilbo*, 27 May 2000, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

25-27 May 2000

A 12-member team of US nuclear experts conducts a second inspection of the suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. [Note: The first inspection, conducted 20-24 May 1999 revealed 'an unfinished site, the underground portion of which was an extensive, empty tunnel complex.' While the inspectors did not find any evidence of nuclear activity at the Kumch'ang-ri facility, US officials, speaking after the first inspection, said that the facility could still be used to store nuclear equipment in the future, and that North Korea had plenty of time during the course of negotiations to remove any incriminating evidence.]

—'U.S. Says U.S.-DPRK Rome Talks Make Progress,' Xinhua News Agency, 30 May 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Team Finds N. Korean Underground Complex Empty, Unchanged,' Japan Economic Newswire, 31 May 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

26 May 2000

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers Party, accuses conservatives in the US Congress of purposefully delaying the implementation of the Agreed Framework. The paper says that recent legislation demanding 'compulsory House and Senate approval' of any transfer of nuclear technology to North Korea is proof that Washington is only paying lip service to the agreement. [Note: The legislation to which the article refers is an amendment to the North Korean Threat Reduction Act of 1999, entitled the 'Congressional Oversight of Nuclear

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Transfers to North Korea Act of 2000." The amendment passed the House of Representatives on 16 May.]

—'U.S. Procrastination on LWR Project Flayed," Korean Central News Agency, 26 May 2000, www.kcna.co.jp;

'Kyongsurogonsolch'aeg'im'un Mi'gug'i Chige Toelgos'ida/Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 26 May 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'DPRK Accuses U.S. of Deliberately Delaying Agreed Nuclear Project," Xinhua News Agency, 26 May 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

27 May 2000

South Korean Minister of Unification Im Dong Won pays a secret visit to Pyongyang to hold talks with Kim Jong Il. The talks last for four hours, and Im notes that Kim has a sense of humor and is respectful towards his elders. He also believes that Kim Jong Il is a much stronger leader than his father, and that he is a very good listener. According to Im, Kim directly took notes during the meeting, as if he were a student in class. [Note: Im's observations are part of a report submitted to President Kim Dae Jung upon Im's return to Seoul, which are cited in Don Oberdorfer's revised edition of *The Two Koreas*. The revised edition is scheduled for release in December 2001.]

—Ch'oe Won Ki, 'Don Oberdorfer 'Tugaeui Korea' Kaejongp'an/'Im Dong Wonssi Kukpi Pangbuk," *Joongang Ilbo*, 5 December 2001, p. 10, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; 'Spy Agency Chief Secretly Visited Pyongyang Prior to Summit," *Korea Herald*, 20 June 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

31 May 2000

State Department spokesman Philip Reeker says, 'The team [that inspected Kumch'ang-ri] found conditions unchanged since the first visit a year ago...It remains an unfinished site, the underground portion of which is an extensive empty tunnel complex." Reeker also reports that North Korea informed the inspection team that the complex was originally intended as an unspecified 'national security-related facility," but they would consider other uses for the site.

—'Team Finds N. Korean Underground Complex Empty, Unchanged," Japan Economic Newswire, 31 May 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

June 2000

During a meeting of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), the US delegation repeats the suggestion made in March 2000 about replacing one LWR under the Agreed Framework with six conventional power plants. The South Korean government disagrees with this proposal.

—Lee Ha Won, 'US Proposes Alternative Power Plants for NK," *Chosun Ilbo*, 5 January 2001, www.chosun.com; Lee Ha Won, 'Mi 'Pug'e Hwajongonsol' Chean," *Chosun Ilbo*, 6 January 2001, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

4 June 2000

Tsugio Uchinishi, a scrap yard owner from Tokyo's Nakano Ward, mails envelopes containing small amounts of monazite powder to 9 Japanese government offices and Prime Minister Mori's personal residence. Uchinishi explains in memos accompanying the radioactive material that 'seventy tons of a radioactive substance is being smuggled from Niigata Port into North Korea to produce nuclear missiles." Uchinishi claims that an associate of Hiroshi Ikeda, director of Nihon Bosei Bunka Kyokai, sold monazite to a broker who in turn transferred the radioactive material to North Korea. However, the unnamed associate told police that he refused to sell the

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substance after learning that the prospective buyer had ties to North Korea. [Note: Ikeda later admits in interviews with police that he had imported the monazite from Thailand over twenty years ago because 'it can be used in hot spas."]

—Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), 14 June 2000, in 'Japan: Man Questioned Over Radioactive Mail Sent to Government Offices," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 14 June 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Man Admits Selling 10 Tons of Radioactive Material," Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), 16 June 2000, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Gov't Ignores Radioactive Mineral Stash," Mainichi Daily News, 15 June 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Man Arrested in Radioactive Mail Case," Japan Economic Newswire, 17 June 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Japanese Suspected of Smuggling Nuclear Material to North Korea," Agence France Presse, 17 June 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

7 June 2000

Robert Einhorn, US Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, says that North Korea's nuclear weapons program continues to threaten the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region. However, according to Einhorn, Pyongyang's recent efforts to normalize relations with various countries shows that a diplomatic approach to dealing with North Korea's nuclear weapon' program, embodied in the Agreed Framework, is beginning to pay off.

—Ben Rowse, 'North Korean Nuclear Program a Key Threat to US: Official," Agence France Presse, 7 June 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

9 June 2000

A Korean Central News Agency commentary says that due to the delays in heavy fuel oil deliveries and the resulting negative economic impact on North Korea, several officials within the North Korean leadership are calling for the nullification of the Agreed Framework and restarting North Korea's indigenous nuclear program.

—'Kibonhab'uimun Pullihaengch'aeg'im'ul Ch'u'gung/Chosonjung'angt'ongshin Ronp'yong," Korean Central News Agency, 9 June 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'KCNA Accuses U.S. of Evading Its Responsibility," Korean Central News Agency, 10 June 2000, www.kcna.co.jp.

10 June 2000

An editorial in North Korea's *Pyongyang Times* says the US attempt to establish a nuclear verification system over all North Korean territory is not part of the Agreed Framework. Citing the remarks of James Lilly, a former US ambassador to South Korea, the editorial says the Agreed Framework is likely to collapse due to the US failure to honor its commitments, including its failure to deliver heavy fuel oil and the indefinite delay in the completion of the LWR project.

—'Option is Not US Monopoly," *Pyongyang Times*, 10 June 2000 in FBIS Document ID KPP20000712000096.

13 June 2000

KEDO asks the US Nuclear Regulation Commission to allow North Korean nuclear inspectors to receive technical training in the United States. After the completion of the two KEDO light water reactors, North Korean inspectors will be tasked with conducting safety checks and regulatory audits of the reactors. However, the would-be inspectors have no experience with light water nuclear reactors.

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—'U.S. Nuclear Regulators Asked to Train N. Korean Inspectors,' Japan Economic Newswire, 13 June 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

13-15 June 2000

North Korea's National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il and South Korean President Kim Dae Jung meet in Pyongyang to discuss various bilateral issues. On 14 June, the two leaders sign an agreement, the 'Joint North-South Declaration,' by which they pledge to work for reconciliation and eventual reunification of the two countries. The agreement contains a clause by which the two Koreas agree not to engage in offensive military operations against each other. Upon returning to Seoul following the historic talks, Kim Dae Jung announces that he raised the issue of international concerns over North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. According to South Korean government spokesman Park Chun Yong, President Kim Dae Jung, in a 16 June telephone conversation with US President Bill Clinton says that he comprehensively discussed the North Korean weapons development program with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il during their summit in Pyongyang. Park says, "President Kim told President Clinton that he strongly urged the North Korean leader to successfully conclude negotiations with the United States on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, and that leaving these weapon issues unsettled could impede regional peace and cooperation."

—Thomas Wagner, 'Korean Leaders Sign Agreement to Work Toward Reunification,' Associated Press, 14 June 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Charles Lee, 'Korean Summit Ends with Historic Agreement in Hand,' United Press International, 15 June 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; '2 Kims Discussed Nuclear, Missile Issues in Summit Talks,' Japan Economic Newswire, 15 June 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Howard W. French, 'Korea's 'New Day': Historic Summit Praised by All, But Concerns Remain,' *The Gazette* (Montreal), 16 June 2000, p. B1, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'President Says He Urged N.K. Leader to Resolve Nuclear, Missile Issues with U.S. at Summit Talks,' *Korea Herald*, 17 June 2000, www.koreaherald.co.kr; Ch'oe Yong Bom, 'DJ-Clinton Chonhwat'onghwa, Nambukhoedam Songkwa Tung Solmyong,' *Munhwa Ilbo*, 16 June 2000, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

19 June 2000

The US eases economic sanctions against North Korea. The measures are said to be 'the final phase of what President Clinton announced last September 17.' The end of sanctions will allow North Korea to export raw materials to the United States and allow US companies to invest in agriculture, mining, roads, ports travel and tourism in North Korea. However, since North Korea remains on the State Department's list of states sponsoring terrorism, prohibitions on the sales of high technology and dual-use goods remain intact.

—James Gerstenzang, 'U.S. Lifts Some Sanctions against N. Korea, Stops Calling It 'Rogue',' *Los Angeles Times*, 20 June 2000, p. A6, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; John Burton and Stephen Fidler, 'US Eases Sanctions against Pyongyang,' *Financial Times*, 20 June 2000, p. 14, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Ben Barber, 'White House Ends Embargo on Trade with North Korea; Action Follows Pyongyang Summit,' *Washington Times*, 20 June 2000, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Shin Yong-bae, 'U.S. Lifting of Sanctions Expected to Boost Mood of Détente on Peninsula,' *Korea Herald*, 20 June 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'US Sanction Lifting Toward NK Takes Effect,' *Korea Times*, 20 June 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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Late June 2000

The fifteen member nations of the EU agree to give the European Commission, the executive body of the EU, the authority to negotiate additional funding for KEDO with the other executive board member nations.

—Kyodo News Service, 24 July 2000, in 'EU to Discuss North Korean Reactor Funding with USA, Japan, South Korea,' BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 24 July 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

23 June 2000

US Secretary of State Madeline Albright meets with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung and Foreign Minister Lee Chong Bin in Seoul. Albright reaffirms the South Korean leaders that US troops will remain in South Korea indefinitely in order to maintain stability in East Asia.

—Barry Schweid, 'Albright Assures South Korea That U.S. Troops Will Stay,' Associated Press, 23 June 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Jane Perlez, 'Albright Says U.S. Pullout Isn't Planned in South Korea,' *New York Times*, 24 June 2000, p. A4, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

26 June 2000

KEDO holds an executive board meeting in New York. At the meeting, Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, remarks that due to current high crude oil prices, it would be difficult to provide fuel oil to North Korea by 22 October 2000, as provided by the Agreed Framework. Kartman says the United States will call for financial contributions from the international community to cover the cost of fuel oil for North Korea. In addition, KEDO sources report that financial compensation demanded by North Korea for the delay of the LWRs was not discussed in the board meeting since it is unacceptable.

—'U.S. Says Difficult to Fulfill Fuel Oil Pledge to N. Korea,' Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), 27 June 2000; 'Mi 'Taebuk Chungyugongkup Kakkun Kyakch'ul,' *Hankook Ilbo*, 28 June 2000, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

29 June 2000

US President Bill Clinton certifies to Congress that North Korea appears to be living up to its commitment under the Agreed Framework to freeze its nuclear weapons program. The presidential certification, required by Congress, authorized the release of \$20 million to be used for heavy fuel oil deliveries to North Korea.

—'Chronicle of Major Events in South and North Korea (June-July 2000),' *Korea and World Affairs*, Vol. 24, No. 3, Fall 2000, Research Center for Peace and Unification of Korea, P. 514; 'U.S. Releases 20 Million Dollars for DPRK Oil,' Xinhua News Agency, 30 June 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

1 July 2000

The North Korean Foreign Ministry announces that if the United States does not compensate North Korea for the losses incurred due to delays constructing two light water reactors, North Korea will have no choice but to revert to producing electricity using its graphite moderated reactors.

—'Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Compensation for Loss of Electricity,' Korean Central News Agency, 1 July 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'Chollyoksonshilbosangmunjehae'gyoltoeji Anh'nunda'myon Hug'yon'gamsong'no'shig'uro/Oemusongdaeyon'in,' Korean Central News Agency, 1 July 2000, www.kcna.co.jp.

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3-4 July 2000

KEDO and North Korea hold talks but fail to make progress on quality assurances and warrant protocol for the construction of light water reactors. According to a KEDO source close to the talks, 'since the negotiations are related to technical matters, the breakdown is not due to KEDO's delay of construction of the light water reactors.'
—Yonhap News Agency, 5 July 2000, in 'DPRK, KEDO Fail to Agree on Quality Protocol for Nuclear Reactor,' FBIS Document ID KPP20000705000059; 'KEDO Delegation Here,' Korean Central News Agency, 1 July 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'KEDO Tae'p'yodan Toch'ak,' Korean Central News Agency, 1 July 2000, www.kcna.co.jp.

11 July 2000

A Korean Central News Agency commentary says that if the United States fails to compensate North Korea for the loss of electricity incurred from delays in implementing the Agreed Framework, North Korea 'will be left with no option but to restart its independent nuclear power industry.'

—'Chollyoksonshilbosangmunje'nun Pandushi Hae'gyoltoeyoya Handa/Chosonjung'angt'ongshin Ronp'yong,' Korean Central News Agency, 11 July 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'Compensation for Loss of Electricity,' Korean Central News Agency, 12 July 2000, www.kcna.co.jp.

19 July 2000

Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan meet in Berlin to discuss various bilateral issues. While the talks were originally scheduled to deal with North Korea's nuclear and missile issues, Kartman and Kim use the meeting to prepare for the upcoming meeting between US Secretary of State Madeline Albright and North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun.

—Kim Ji Ho, 'Senior U.S., N.K. Officials to Meet to Prepare Foreign Ministers' Talks,' *Korea Herald*, 17 July 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Puk-Mi, Yangguk Kwanggyegaeson Pang'an Nonui,' *Segye Ilbo*, 20 July 2000, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

18 July 2000

An anonymous EU source says that the EU plans to provide at least €75 million over the next five years to KEDO to help finance the light water reactor project. According to the source, the EU will soon meet with the other KEDO executive board member nations to discuss the issue of additional funding.

—'EU to Provide \$70 Mil. For N. Korea Nuke Project,' Japan Economic Newswire, 18 July 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

28 July 2000

US Secretary of State Madeline Albright meets with her North Korean counterpart Paek Nam Sun in a closed-door meeting on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Bangkok. Albright and Paek address a variety of bilateral issues including North Korea's suspected efforts to produce nuclear weapons. Albright says her meeting with Paek, 'constitutes a substantively modest but symbolically historic step away from the sterility and hostility of the past and toward a more direct and promising approach to resolving differences and establishing common ground.' The meeting between Albright and Paek represents the highest level talks between the United States and North Korea since the Korean War.

—John Hail, 'Albright Hails 'Historic Step' Away from Hostility with North Korea,' United Press International, 28 July

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2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Albright and North Korean FM in Historic Bilateral Meeting," Channel NewsAsia (Singapore), 28 July 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'ASEAN Regional Forum: Pyongyang and US Break The Ice: Paek and Albright in Historic Handshake," *Bangkok Post*, 29 July 2000, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Nam-Puk-Mi, Haek-Missile Tung Kwangyegaeson Chinjon Uigyon Habui," *Segye Ilbo*, 29 July 2000, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

29 July 2000

Representatives from the EU and KEDO meet in Seoul prior to the KEDO executive board meeting to discuss additional contributions by the EU to the international consortium.

—'KEDO to Hold Executive Council Meeting in Seoul Monday," *Korea Times*, 28 July 2000, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

30-31 July 2000

North and South Korea hold ministerial-level talks in Seoul. At the talks, the two sides agree to reopen the South-North liaison office in the truce village of Panmunjom by 14 August 2000. They also agree to hold a new round of talks from 29-30 August.

—Phil Chetwynd, 'Inter-Korean Talks Open After Historic Week for Pyongyang," Agence France Presse, 30 July 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Phil Chetwynd, 'Two Koreas Agree Liason Offices and New Peace Talks in Pyongyang," Agence France Presse, 31 July 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Nambukyolgi' Hanbando 8 Wol Talgunda," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 2 August 2000, p. 5, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

31 July 2000

KEDO holds an executive board meeting in Seoul. At the meeting, the EU reportedly asks for one of the deputy executive director positions in exchange for a larger contribution to the consortium. [Note: The United States currently holds the executive director's seat, while Japan and South Korea, the other two founding members of KEDO, hold the deputy executive director seats.]

—Shogo Kawakita, 'EU Seeks Executive-Level Post on KEDO Board," Japan Economic Newswire, 7 August 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

August 2000

According to the *Joongang Ilbo*, US intelligence later believes that North Korea completes the final high-explosives tests for a uranium bomb.

—Lee Yong Chong, 'Miguk, 'Puk Haekp'okt'an 2 Kaebun Nongch'uk Uranium 30kg Poyu' Han'gug'e T'ongbo," *Joongang Ilbo*, 25 October 2002, nk.joins.com.

6 August 2000

Bulat Nigmatulin, Russian vice minister for atomic energy, announces that Russia is interested in joining KEDO. Nigmatulin adds that due to the inability of KEDO to gain sufficient funding for the timely construction of the two light water reactors, Russia is proposing that KEDO instead use two, less expensive Russian model reactors.

—'Russia Wants to Take Part in KEDO Project: Official," Japan Economic Newswire, 6 August 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Russia May Join KEDO," *Nuclear Review*, September 2000, no. 385, p. 12.

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9 August 2000

Chen Kuo Yuan, deputy chief head of Commission of National Cooperation in Taiwan's Economics Ministry, announces that Taiwan has given permission to the Taiwan Power Company to renew a 1997 contract with North Korea by which it would ship up to 200,000 barrels of low grade radioactive material to North Korea for storage. [Note: Taiwan backed out of the original agreement in 1998 citing North Korea's lack of proper facilities to dispose of the waste.]

—"Taiwan to Renew Nuclear Waste Disposal Pact with N. Korea," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 9 August 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Taiwan to Extend Nuclear Waste Deal with N. Korea,' Japan Economic Newswire, 10 August 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

14 August 2000

North and South Korea reopen the inter-Korean liaison office in truce village of Panmunjom. The liaison office, the only direct channel of communication between the two Koreas, had been closed since 1996.

—"Korean Reconciliation Moves Closer with Joint Liaison Office," Agence France Presse, 14 August 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Nambuk Yollaksamuso 14 Il Kaeso,' *Segye Ilbo*, 15 August 2000, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

29 August-2 September 2000

Desaix Anderson, executive director of KEDO, travels to North Korea accompanied by his two deputies, Cho Kyu Yong of South Korea and Masaaki Uno of Japan. While in North Korea, the KEDO delegation travels to Shinp'o to inspect the progress of the light water reactor construction.

—Yonhap News Agency, 30 August 2000, in 'KEDO Chief Arrives to Inspect Reactor Site,' BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 September 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'KEDO Chief Visits N.K. to Inspect Reactor Building Site,' *Korea Herald*, 1 September 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

September 2000

According to Yonhap News Agency, 80 percent of land-leveling work for the light water reactor project under the Agreed Framework has been completed in Kumho-chigu, Shinp'o. The news agency later says that the construction work might face snags due to management of a crisis facing the subcontractors, and also due to financing problems.

—Yonhap News Agency, 31 October 2000, in 'ROK's Yonhap: Dong-Ah, Hyundai Likely to Negatively Affect Nuclear Reactor Plan,' FBIS Document ID KPP20001031000052; Lee Pyong Son, 'Pukkyongsuroe Ilso 'Haekshimgisul' Ch'amyo,' *Munhwa Ilbo*, 4 September 2000, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

8 September 2000

Terusuke Terada, Japan's ambassador to KEDO, warns that the light water reactor project will continue to experience delays until North Korea allows the IAEA full access to its frozen graphite moderate nuclear facilities. Terada adds that Japan will not normalize relations with North Korea until it resolves suspicions about its nuclear program.

—Shin Yong Bae, 'Japanese Demand Inspection of North Korean Reactors,' *Korea Herald*, 9 September 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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11 September 2000

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, addressing the IAEA Board of Governors, says, 'The Agency is still unable to verify that the DPRK has declared all nuclear material which should be subject to safeguards.' 'We want access to all sites,' ElBaradei states, 'and at the moment we are just being given documents.' ElBaradei stresses that North Korea must come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement before any key nuclear components for the KEDO light water reactors will be delivered.

—'IAEA Says North Korea Not Allowing Nuclear Access,' Agence France Presse, 11 September 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

12 September 2000

The US Defense Department issues a report to Congress stating, 'While North Korea denies possession of nuclear weapons and has frozen its nuclear program at Yongbyon, we remain concerned the North could revive a weapons production program.'

—US Secretary of Defense, '2000 Report to Congress: Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula,' 12 September 2000, www.defenselink.mil.

13 September 2000

Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono meets with Chris Patten, EU external affairs commissioner, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session to convey Japan's disappointment that the EU decided not to increase financial contributions to KEDO.

—Kohei Murayama, 'Kono Displeased with EU over N. Korea Nuke Project,' Japan Economic Newswire, 13 September 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Japan Calls for More EU Contributions to KEDO,' Jiji Press Ticker Service, 14 September 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

22 September 2000

At the IAEA's 44th General Conference in Vienna, the IAEA passes a resolution calling on North Korea to 'come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, to cooperate fully and promptly with the Agency in the implementation of the safeguards agreement and to take all steps the Agency may deem necessary to preserve all information relevant to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on the inventory of nuclear material subject to safeguards.'

—Agence France Presse, 22 September 2000, in 'IAEA Urges N Korea to Comply with Safeguards Accord,' FBIS Document ID EUP20000922000174, 22 September 2000; 'IAEA Concerned Over NK Nuke Program,' *Korea Times*, 25 September 2000, www.hankooki.com; 'IAEA Concerned Over NK Nuke Program,' *Korea Times*, 25 September 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

23 September 2000

Pyongyang Radio carries a report threatening that North Korea will restart its graphite moderated nuclear program unless the United States promptly fulfills its obligations under the Agreed Framework.

—Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 23 September 2000, in 'Pyongyang Threatens End to Nuclear Freeze over Reactor Project Delays,' BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 September 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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26 September 2000

KEDO holds its fifth annual meeting in New York. At the meeting, Charles Kartman, US representative to KEDO, asks the other member states to assist the United States in financing the annual heavy fuel oil deliveries to North Korea. At the executive board meeting held a day before the general meeting, Chang Son Sop, head of South Korea's Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project, is named the new director general.

—'KEDO Opens 5th Annual Meeting in New York,' Japan Economic Newswire, 26 September 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Chang Elected KEDO Chief,' *Korea Herald*, 27 September 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Chang Named 1st Korean KEDO Chief,' *Korea Times*, 27 September 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'U.S. Requests Funds for N. Korean Oil at KEDO Meeting,' Japan Economic Newswire, 27 September 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

27 September-2 October 2000

Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan meet in New York to discuss various bilateral issues including North Korea's missile and nuclear programs and North Korea's alleged support for terrorism. Following the talks, both Kartman and Kim report progress on a number of issues.

—'U.S., North Korea Hold Talks on Missiles, Terrorism,' Japan Economic Newswire, 27 September 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'U.S., N. Korea Say Progress Made in Talks in N.Y.,' Japan Economic Newswire, 3 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'US, North Korea Wrap Up New York Talks as Landmark Visit Nears,' Agence France Presse, 3 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

28 September 2000

The Korean Central News Agency criticizes the IAEA resolution on North Korea that was passed on 22 September. The news agency calls the resolution 'a grave challenge to the sovereignty of the DPRK and a very unreasonable action which endangers the Agreed Framework.'

—'Unreasonable Resolution of IAEA,' Korean Central News Agency, 28 September 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'Kukchewonjaryokkigu'gyolui Pinan/Chosonjungangt'ongshin,' Korean Central News Agency, 28 September 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; Agence France Presse, 'North Korea Accuses US of Using IAEA to Inflate Nuclear Threat,' 29 September 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

October 2000

The US State Department begins 'seriously looking at what provisions might be necessary to include in a formal nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and North Korea.'

—Michael Knapik, 'New Part 810 Authorization needed for North Korean LWRs,' *Nucleonics Week*, Vol. 21, No. 45, 9 November 2000.

October 2000

South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials acknowledge that the US government has been proposing the provision of fossil fuel plants instead of one or both of the LWRs to be built under the Agreed Framework. The officials also say that the US government has considered alleviating North Korea's energy problems by supplying electricity from South Korea's Korea Electric Power Company, but thus far this option has

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been politically unacceptable to Pyongyang.

—Mark Hibbs, 'U.S., ROK Also Proposed Fix to Send Power North to DPRK,' *Nucleonics Week*, Vol. 41, No. 43, 26 October 2000.

9-12 October 2000

Cho Myong Rok, first vice chairman of North Korea's National Defense Commission, travels to the United States to meet with various high ranking officials. Cho, considered third in North Korea's hierarchy of power, is the highest ranking North Korean ever to visit the United States. On 9 October, Cho meets with President Bill Clinton to discuss various global and bilateral issues including North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. During the meeting, Cho reportedly delivers a letter to Clinton from Kim Jong Il putting forth a series of proposals by which the two countries can further ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. While in Washington, Cho also meets with Secretary of State Madeline Albright and Defense Secretary William Cohen. Following Cho's historic trip, the United States and North Korea issue a joint statement noting the benefits of normalized relations and stating the intention to arrange a formal peace treaty to replace the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement.

—'North Korean Envoy Holds Landmark Meeting with Clinton,' Japan Economic Newswire, 10 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; David E. Sanger, 'North Korean at White House,' *New York Times*, 11 October 2000, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'U.S., N. Korea to Issue Joint Communique Thursday,' Japan Economic Newswire, 11 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Charles Lee, 'N. Korea, US Agree to End the State of War,' United Press International, 12 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

20 October 2000

Desaix Anderson, executive director of KEDO, and Kim Hui Mun of North Korea, sign a protocol in Pyongyang on training 529 North Korean workers for the LWR project under the Agreed Framework. According to a South Korean government official, the training site is undecided and is likely to be finalized in April 2001.

—*Joongang Ilbo*, 27 October 2000, in 'DPRK LWR Workers May Train in ROK,' FBIS Document ID KPP20001027000095; Kim Yong Shik, 'KEDO-Puk, Kyongsuroyowon Unyonggyoyuk Hullyonuijongso Somyong,' *Donga Ilbo*, 21 October 2000, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

23-24 October 2000

US Secretary of State Madeline Albright travels to North Korea and meets with North Korea's leader Kim Jong Il. Albright is the highest ranking US official ever to visit North Korea and the first US official to meet with Kim Jong Il. Albright presents Kim with a letter from President Bill Clinton addressing various bilateral issues. Following her visit to North Korea, Albright informs the foreign ministers of Japan and South Korea that her talks with Kim focused on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.

—Matthew Lee, 'Albright Meets Kim Jong-Il on Historic Trip, Presents Clinton Letter,' Agence France Presse, 23 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Associated Press, 'U.S. Ends Historic Talks with North Korean Leader,' *Leader-Post* (Regina), 25 October 2000, p. E8, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Albright: Transparency of North Korean Nuclear Programme a Must,' Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 25 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; George Gedda, 'Albright Says Pyongyang Must Disclose Nuclear Program,' Associated Press, 25 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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Early November 2000

The South Korean National Assembly holds hearings on the KEDO light water reactor project amid concerns about the project's obstacles. The main problems appear to be a strike by North Korean workers at the site, potential financial shortfalls, the North Korean power grid, and the refusal of General Electric to provide technology for the reactor turbines. Many South Koreans are also concerned that the South Korean government may have to assume loan guarantees for the project.

—Lee Yong Chong, 'Taebuk Kyongsurosaop 'Kiu'ddung'," *Joongang Ilbo*, 10 November 2000, p. 9, www.joins.com; Yi Yong-chong, *Joongang Ilbo*, in 'Problems Involved in DPRK LWR Project Noted,' FBIS Document ID KPP20001110000030.

Early November 2000

Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the IAEA, says that North Korea's compliance with the IAEA safeguards would help to further facilitate its rapprochement with South Korea. He makes these remarks at the 12th meeting of the Pacific Basin Nuclear Conference (PBNC), which is held in Seoul from 29 October to 2 November 2000. Welcoming the recent diplomatic normalization talks between North Korea and the United States, ElBaradei says he hopes that the US-North Korea discussions will amicably resolve the issues related to North Korea's nuclear and missile program. Later, while speaking to the UN General Assembly on 6 November 2000, ElBaradei says that nuclear inspectors would like to start work immediately to verify and assess North Korean claims made in September 2000 that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only. ElBaradei adds that since verification may take two to three years, work should begin immediately so that the light water nuclear (LWR) project under the Agreed Framework may proceed as scheduled.

—Kil Byung Ok, 'IAEA Official Says N.K. Compliance With Nuclear Safeguards Will Foster Rapprochement,' *Korea Herald*, 3 November 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kil Byung Ok, 'IAEA Official Says N.K. Compliance with Nuclear Safeguards Will Foster Rapprochement,' *Korea Herald*, 3 November 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Edith M. Lederer, 'Nuclear Agency Hopeful for Access to N Korea Program,' Associated Press, 6 November 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

8 November 2000

Glyn Ford, a member of the European Union Parliament and the British Labor Party, says the light water reactors to be built under the Agreed Framework are unlikely to be completed before 2010. Ford visited North Korea from 31 October to 4 November, and met with Kim Yong Nam, president of the Supreme People's Assembly, and with Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun. Ford says, 'If you are going to have a seven-year delay, it would lead to a doubling of the cost.'

—Shogo Kawakita, 'KEDO Project to Be Delayed Beyond 2010, Says EU Lawmaker,' Japan Economic Newswire, 9 November 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

14-15 November 2000

Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer meets with North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun in Pyongyang. During the talks, Downer indicates that Australia would be willing to provide training and technical assistance on nuclear safeguards to North Korea.

—'Australia Wants to Train North Korea in Nuclear Safety,' Agence France Presse, 17 November 2000, in Lexis-

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Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Downer to Meet N. Korean Leaders,' *The Age* (Melbourne), 15 November 2000, p. 14, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'Australian Foreign Minister Arrives,' Korean Central News Agency, 14 November 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'Paek Nam Sun Oemusang'i Australia Oemusang'ilhaeng'ul Mannatta,' Korean Central News Agency, 14 November 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'Talks Held between Foreign Ministers of DPRK and Australia,' Korean Central News Agency, 14 November 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'Choson Oemusang'gwa Australia Oemusang'ui Hoedam,' Korean Central News Agency, 14 November 2000, www.kcna.co.jp.

19 November 2000

A South Korea government official announces that the EU has pledged €150 million (\$130 million) over the coming five years for the KEDO light water reactor project. The official says that an EU delegation visiting Pyongyang from 25-28 November 2000 is likely to inform North Korean officials of the increase in the EU's annual contribution to KEDO from €15 million to €30 million for the next five years.

—Yonhap News Agency, 19 November 2000, in 'EU to Provide 130M Dollars for Two Light Water Reactors,' BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 November 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'EU '5 Nyongan KEDO 1500 Ok Chiwon',' *Kukmin Ilbo*, 20 September 2000, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

26 November 2000

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers Party, condemns the United States for delaying the KEDO light water reactor project. According to the paper, the United States is purposefully delaying the project in an attempt to 'weaken (North Korea's) economic and military potentials and watch for a chance to stifle (North Korea) by force of arms.' The paper adds that if the delays continue, North Korea will have to take a 'corresponding measure.'

—'U.S. Urged to Fulfil [sic] Its Commitments in Good Faith,' Korean Central News Agency, 26 November 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'Shin'i Ittkye Uimu'rul Rihaenghaeya Handa / Rodongshinmun,' Korean Central News Agency, 26 November 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; 'North Korea Denounces U.S. for Delay in Building Nuclear Power Plants,' Associated Press, 26 November 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

30 November 2000

Nucleonics Week reports that General Electric (GE) might refuse to provide the turbines for the LWRs to be built in North Korea under the Agreed Framework. If GE pulls out of the project, the entire balance of plant (BOP) will have to be redesigned, and the extra work will cost several million dollars according to some analysts. The Agreed Framework requires North Korea to obtain liability insurance, but Pyongyang is not yet a member of the Vienna International Nuclear Liability Convention, and there is still no insurance for the LWR project. GE is concerned about liability in North Korea because of the weak power grid.

—Mark Hibbs, 'GE Walkaway from KEDO Would Threaten Costly BOP Redesign,' *Nucleonics Week*, 30 November 2000, pp. 16-18.

4 December 2000

Nine senior experts from KEDO meet with a three-man delegation from North Korea's Department of Nuclear Safety in the State Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the first time. The North Korean delegation is led by Kim Yong Il, director of the department. The meeting is held to introduce KEDO to North Korea's nuclear regulatory

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environment. KEDO will have to submit plans for the light water reactors to the regulatory agency to receive a construction permit. KEDO invites the North Koreans to another round of talks in April 2001.

—'North Koreans Invited to Attend More Nuclear Safety Talks in New York," Agence France Presse, 7 December 2000.

6 December 2000

During an ambassador-level KEDO executive board meeting in Tokyo, the United States, Japan, and South Korea ask the EU to increase its contribution to the light water reactor project. The EU's current share is 75 million Euros (\$68 million) over five years through 2000. At the meeting, the executive board members also discuss several pending issues, such as the increasing price of heavy fuel oil and contracting a firm to supply materials and equipment for the reactors. According to a Japanese Foreign Ministry statement released on 7 December, the executive board decided that Hitachi Ltd. and Toshiba Corp. will most likely receive contracts to provide the turbines for the reactors following General Electric Co.'s decision to back out of the KEDO project.

—Sarah Suk, 'Japan, S. Korea, U.S. Urge EU to Increase KEDO Budget," Japanese Economic Newswire, 6 December 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Hiroshi Hiyama, 'North Korean Nuclear Reactor Contract may Go to Hitachi, Toshiba," Agence France Presse, 7 December 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

7 December 2000

Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the IAEA, announces at an IAEA board meeting that North Korea is not cooperating with the Agency on inspecting its nuclear facilities and material. However, ElBaradei adds, the Agency will soon reach an agreement with KEDO on safety inspections of the light water reactors currently under construction in North Korea.

—'IAEA to Ink Accord with KEDO on N. Korea Nuclear Checks," Japan Economic Newswire, 7 December 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 December 2000

Uzbekistan becomes a member of KEDO.

—*KEDO 2001 Annual Report*, p. 10, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org; 'About Us: Member Nations," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org.

18 December 2000

Nucleonics Week, quoting Republican Party sources, reports that the new US administration headed by the President-elect George W. Bush is expected to reconsider the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework. Republican Party sources state that several key administration figures question the efficacy of the Agreed Framework. Included in this group are Secretary of State-designate Colin Powell; National Security Advisor-designate Condoleezza Rice; former ambassador to China James Lilley, who is likely director-designate of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); and Paul Wolfowitz, who may be appointed head of CIA or the Department of Defense. The official sources said that Wolfowitz and Rice are highly critical of providing two nuclear energy power projects to North Korea under the 1994 agreement. They would prefer to 'get into a transition to provide non-nuclear energy sources," which would require renegotiation of the deal with North Korea. At the same time, the sources said that Powell, Wolfowitz and Rice would take action solely regarding US policy towards Agreed

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Framework and Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). They would not attempt to force South Korea to abandon its Sunshine Policy of developing a relationship with North Korea.

—Mark Hibbs, 'Key Figures in Bush Transition Favor Stopping DPRK Reactor Deal,' *Nucleonics Week*, Vol. 41, No. 51, 21 December 2000, pp.1-2.

16 December 2000

Percy Westerlund, a senior official in charge of Korean affairs at the European Commission, reportedly meets with Desaix Anderson, KEDO executive director, in New York and informs him that the EU will increase its donations to KEDO to €100 million (\$90 million) over the next five years.

—Shogo Kawakita, 'EU Offers \$90 Mil. For KEDO Project over Next 5 Years,' Japan Economic Newswire, 19 December 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

22 December 2000

KEPCO signs a contract with Hyundai Engineering and Construction, Donga Construction, Daewoo Corp. and Korea Heavy Industries for the secondary stages of construction of the two KEDO light water reactors. The four firms are contracted to complete construction of the reactors, turbines, generators and other related facilities January 2009.

—Yonhap News Agency, 22 December 2000, in 'South Korean Corporation, Building Consortium Sign Contract on North Reactors,' BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 22 December 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; 'KEPCO Signs Contract with 4 Local Builders on N.K. Reactor,' *Korea Herald*, 25 December 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kim In Hyon, 'Puk Kyongsuro Chusolbigonsa Kyeyak,' *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 24 December 2000, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

22 December 2000

Japan and China agree to work together to have North Korea sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Chinese arms control experts agree to a proposal from their Japanese counterparts for considering ways to persuade North Korea to sign the CTBT.

—Jiji Press (Tokyo), 22 December 2000, in 'Japan, China Agree to Urge DPRK to Sign Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,' FBIS Document ID JPP20001222000080. KEDO delivers 559,613 metric tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea: *KEDO 2001 Annual Report*, p. 10, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org.

[Back to Top](#)

1999

1999

The South Korean government issues W150 billion (\$125 million) in treasury bonds to help finance the LWR project under the Agreed Framework.

—"ROK's Yonhap: Dong-ah, Hyundai Likely to Negatively Affect Nuclear Reactor Plan," Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 31 October 2000, in FBIS Document KPP2001031000052, 31 October 2000.

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1 January 1999

An official from the South Korea Ministry of Unification announces that North Korea has replaced the director of its Light-Water Reactor Bureau. According to the official, Pyongyang has recently replaced Kim Pyong Ki with Kim Song Su.

—Chu Yong Song, Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 1 January 1999, in "DPRK Reportedly Replaces Chief of LWR Project," FBIS Document FTS19990102000063, 2 January 1999; Ku Pon Yong, "Shinnyonsaro Pon Olhaeui Pukhan," *Taehan Maeil*, 4 January 1999, p. 6, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

4 January 1999

South Korean President Kim Dae Jung urges a diplomatic solution to problems arising from North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. Presiding over a National Security Council meeting, Kim says, "We need to solve the pending problems, including the North's nuclear and missile issues, through dialogue and negotiation."

—Chon Shi Yong, "President Kim Advocates Measures to Avert Crisis on Korean Peninsula," *Korea Herald*, 5 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

4 January 1999

A US government official announces that Washington is considering easing economic sanctions against North Korea if Pyongyang allows unconditional access to a suspected nuclear weapons facility in Kumch'ang-ri. According to the official, Washington is considering such measures as unfreezing North Korean assets in the United States and allowing US companies to participate in mining operations in North Korea.

—"U.S. Eyes Easing Sanctions on N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 5 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

5 January 1999

The US, China and the two Koreas hold working level consultations at the UN in New York to prepare for the upcoming fourth round of four-party talks to be held in Geneva on 18-22 January.

—Yonhap News Agency, 6 January 1999, in "Preparatory Meeting Held for Geneva Four-Party Conference on Korea," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 6 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

5 January 1999

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, condemns the United States, South Korea and Japan for postponing until June 1999 the commencement of construction on the two light water reactors in Kumho-chigu, Shinp'o, and for delaying deliveries of heavy fuel oil. In a veiled threat that North Korea might restart its nuclear program, the *Rodong Sinmun* warns, "The United States must know that if it fails to do what it should do, while continuing to insult the dialogue partner and resort to pressure on the DPRK, the DPRK, too, will do what it should do."

—"U.S. Anti-DPRK Hostile Moves," Korean Central News Agency, 5 January 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mi'gug'ui Pulsonhan Pan'gong'hwa'gukhaeng'wi Pinan/Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 5 January 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

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6 January 1999

US government officials announce that the United States has recently allocated an additional \$12 million necessary to fund the remaining 110,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil to be sent to North Korea for 1998. [Note: Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, the United States agreed to supply North Korea with 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil annually to meet North Korea's energy needs until the completion of two light water reactors. However, in 1998, the US Congress failed to allocate the funds necessary to meet the US commitment.]

—"U.S. to Pay for Remaining Fuel Oil Owed N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 7 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

7 January 1999

South Korean Defense Minister Ch'on Yong T'aek and his Japanese counterpart Housei Norota meet in Seoul to expand military cooperation to prepare for possible aggression from North Korea. The two defense ministers agree that stability in Northeast Asia requires greater transparency in North Korea's nuclear program. At the meeting, Norota also reiterates Tokyo's threat to suspend all financial contributions to the KEDO light water reactor project if North Korea test launches another long-range missile. [Note: On 31 August 1998, Tokyo suspended all financial support to KEDO after North Korea test fired a rocket over Japanese territory. Tokyo did not lift the freeze on financial contributions until late-October 1998.]

—"South Korea, Japan to Expand Defense Ties over North Korea Threat," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Tokyo Threatens to Withdraw Support for NK Nuclear Project," *Korea Times*, 7 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Zeno Park, "Japanese Defense Chief Warns Tokyo May Withdraw from Nuclear Project," Agence France Presse, 7 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Song Sang Kun, "Han - Il Kunsu Hotline Kot Kaeson...Yangguk Kukpangjanggwan Hoedam," *Donga Ilbo*, 8 January 1999, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

7 January 1999

The North Korean Anti-Nuclear Peace Committee issues a statement saying that the United States owes North Korea "tens of billions of dollars" in damages incurred from delays in oil shipments and construction of two light water reactors. The statement adds, "If the US, approaching the Geneva agreement with insincerity, continues to delay implementing it although it promised before the world, the DPRK also has no intention of observing it, suffering only losses."

—"KANPC Indicts U.S. Imperialists for Violating Geneva Agreement," Korean Central News Agency, 7 January 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Geneva Hab'uijiyonch'aektong'uro Inhan Sonshilbosang'ul Yogu/Chosonbanhaekp'yonghwawi," Korean Central News Agency, 7 January 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency, 7 January 1999, in "North Korean Anti-Nuclear Body Indictment on US "Violation" of Agreed Framework," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

9 January 1999

North Korea's *Minju Joson* says that "the DPRK-US Agreed Framework has been reduced to an empty paper" due to the US failure to live up to its commitments. The paper alleges that the true US intention behind delays in implementing the Agreed Framework and demands to inspect a suspected underground nuclear facility is to weaken North Korea prior to a declaration of war.

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—"U.S. Can Not Flee from Responsibility," Korean Central News Agency, 9 January 1999, www.kcna.co.jp;
 Mi'gug'un Hab'uimunch'aeg'im'eso Choltaero Posonalsu Obta/Minjujoseon," Korean Central News Agency, 9
 January 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

11 January 1999

North Korea's Foreign Ministry states that US suspicion of an "underground nuclear facility" is based in "groundless information," and thus, is an insult to North Korea. A ministry spokesman reiterates the demand that if the United States wants to inspect the site, it must pay \$300 million in cash. However, if the United States cannot pay in cash, the spokesman says, "it may grant the DPRK economic benefits tantamount to the amount even in any appropriate form." The spokesman adds that if the United States continues to link the issue of the suspected nuclear facility with implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea "will no longer have any interest in the agreement."

—"U.S. Urged to Pay Dlr 300 Million for Inspection," Korean Central News Agency, 11 January 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "3 Okdalla'ui Posanghandamyon Chihashisolbangmunhoyong/Oemusong Taebyon'in," Korean Central News Agency, 11 January 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

11 January 1999

Gary Samore, Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls for the National Security Council, warns that the United States might end food aid to North Korea if it does not allow inspections of a suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumchang-ri. Speaking at a seminar on nonproliferation in Washington, Samore says, "We have made it clear to the North it cannot expect to continue to receive the direct and indirect benefits of the Agreed Framework and improve relations with the United States" while denying access to a suspected nuclear facility.

—"U.S. Warns N. Korea Food Aid May End," Japan Economic Newswire, 12 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11-14 January 1999

US Secretary of Defense William Cohen meets with senior Japanese officials in Tokyo to coordinate policies on North Korea. Cohen tells the Japanese officials and press that the United States has significant evidence that a suspected facility in Kumchang-ri is related to a nuclear program and a one-time inspection would not be sufficient. However, according to Cohen, the United States is committed to resolving the issue diplomatically. On 13 January, Cohen meets with Defense Minister Housei Norota, and the two reaffirm their support for the 1994 Agreed Framework and the KEDO light water reactor project. While in Japan, Cohen comments on the 11 January statement by the North Korean Foreign Ministry that reiterated the demand for \$300 million in exchange for access to the Kumchang-ri facility. Cohen rejects the demand, saying, "We are not in the business of giving compensation. What we need to have is some verification."

—"Cohen Arrives in Tokyo for Four-Day Visit," Japan Economic Newswire, 11 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. Defense Secretary Rejects North Korean Compensation Demand," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S., Japanese Defense Chiefs Hold Talks on Security Issues," Xinhua News Agency, 13 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Cohen Says U.S. Does Not Consider Attacking N. Korea," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 13 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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12 January 1999

A *Rodong Sinmun* commentary calls on the United States to clarify "its stand about whether it will implement or break the Agreed Framework." The commentary claims that because the United States "has not faithfully implemented any of its commitments...(and) has intentionally delayed or evaded its implementation," North Korea "expects nothing any longer from the Agreed Framework."

—"Nothing Can Be Expected from DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework," Korean Central News Agency, 12 January 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "To'nun Chomihab'uimun'e Kidaerul Kolsu Obke Toeyotta/Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 12 January 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

12 January 1999

Chang Son Sop, director of South Korea's Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project, announces that it would be physically impossible to complete the light water reactors by the original target date of 2003. Chang says that due to several events, including the September 1996 incursion of a North Korean submarine into South Korea and North Korea's firing of a rocket over Japan in August 1998, the two light water reactors will not be completed for several years beyond the original target date.

—"Completion of N. Korea N-Reactors to Be Delayed," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 13 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

13 January 1999

A US State Department official announces that the United States is seeking "multiple inspections" of the suspected nuclear weapons facility under construction in Kumch'ang-ri. The official says that the United States is offering North Korea the opportunity to prove that the facility is not related to a nuclear weapons program, but, the official adds, "we are not going to pay for it." [Note: North Korea has repeatedly offered to allow a one-time inspection of the facility in exchange for \$300,000 in cash.]

—"U.S. Refuses Payment for North Korean Nuclear Inspections," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 13 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

14 January 1999

A KEDO official announces that due to difficulty in collecting funds, full-scale construction of the two light water reactors will not begin on 15 January as scheduled. Instead, construction is scheduled to begin five months later on 15 June.

—KBS Radio (Seoul), 14 January 1999, in "KEDO Organization to Delay North Reactor Construction," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

14 January 1999

A source close to the US-North Korean bilateral negotiations on a suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri, says that the 1994 Agreed Framework contains a secret supplementary memorandum by which North Korea agrees to forgo any future construction of additional graphite-moderated nuclear reactors. However, according to the source, the supplementary memorandum contains no language on inspections to resolve suspicions should they arise.

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—Kyodo News Service, 14 January 1999, in "North Korea Said to Have Pledged to Stop Work on Graphite-Moderated Reactors," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 15 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

14 January 1999

The Korean Central News Agency reports that the Agreed Framework "has already reached such an extent as it may break up of its own accord due to the US hypocritical and double-dealing attitude." The report also condemns as "impudent utterances" Gary Samore's 11 January statement that the United States may suspend food aid to North Korea if it does not allow access to the suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. Samore's statement, the report says, creates "serious threats to the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula in wanton violation of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework."

—"Sophism Reversing Black and White," Korean Central News Agency, 14 January 1999, www.kcna.co.jp;
"Midaet'ongnyongt'ukpyolbojwa'gwan'ui <sach'alhoyong> Pal'onbinan/Chosonjung'angt'ongshin," Korean Central News Agency, 14 January 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

14-16 January 1999

US Secretary of Defense William Cohen meets with South Korean officials in Seoul to coordinate policies on North Korea. Cohen and Defense Minister Ch'on Yong T'aek issue a joint statement in which they state that "combined defense readiness should be steadfastly maintained against a wide range of possible threats" from North Korea. The two defense ministers also demanded full access to a suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. At a joint press conference with Chun, Cohen says that while there is no conclusive evidence that the site is related to a clandestine nuclear weapons program, "we believe there is sufficient evidence for us to be suspicious, and the suspicions must be addressed." Chun adds that Seoul and Washington will take joint action if conclusive evidence is found that the Kumch'ang-ri facility is nuclear related.

—Pauline Jelinek, "U.S. Korea Vow Closer Military Ties against North Korean 'Threats,'" Associated Press, 14 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Seoul, Washington Ask for Full Access to Suspected DPRK Nuke Site," Xinhua News Agency, 15 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

16-17 January 1999

The US and North Korea hold closed-door negotiations in Geneva on a suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. The delegations are headed by Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan. Following the first day of talks, Kim tells reporters that neither side had budged from its original position. After the second day of talks, neither delegation comments on details of the negotiations, but a spokesman for the North Korean mission to the UN announces that the two sides will meet again on 23 January. [Note: North Korea, insisting that the site is a civilian facility, has repeatedly offered to grant a one-time inspection in exchange for \$300,000, but the United States has demanded unconditional multiple inspections of the facility. After the talks, reports surface saying that North Korea offered access to the site in exchange for 1 million tons of food aid.]

—Janet Lawrence, "US, North Korean in Talks on Suspected Nuclear Site," Agence France Presse, 16 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Elizabeth Olson, "North Korea and U.S. Meet on Inspection of Atom Plant," *New York Times*, 17 January 1999, p. A4, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S., N Korea End Nuclear Talks: To Resume Discussion Jan 23," Agence France Presse, 17 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "US, NK

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End Nuke Talks with Little Sign of Progress," *Korea Times*, 18 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Asks U.S. for 1 Mil. Tons of Food Aid," Japan Economic Newswire, 19 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

18 January 1999

Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura announces that Tokyo "will find it difficult to win public support for KEDO financing without Pyongyang allaying suspicions over the underground nuclear site" in Kumch'ang-ri.

—Kyodo News Service, 18 January 1999, in "Japan: Foreign Minister Ties North Korean Reactor Funding to Inspections," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 18 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

19 January 1999

North Korea denounces the statements by US Secretary of Defense William Cohen, on a recent visit to Seoul, that the United States would provide a nuclear umbrella to South Korea in the case of war with the North. A commentary carried on the Korean Central News Agency, says that if Cohen's comments were meant as a threat, "the US hawks should know that if they think they can survive a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula kindled by them, it would be a serious mistake."

—"What Does Cohen's Trip Show," Korean Central News Agency, 19 January 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Cohen'ui Haenggag'un Muos'ul Poyoju'nun'ga/Chosonjungangt'ongshin," Korean Central News Agency, 19 January 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

19-22 January 1999

Representatives from the United States, China and the two Koreas meet in Geneva for the fourth round of four-party peace talks aimed at replacing the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement with a formal peace treaty. For the first time the four parties meet in two earlier established subcommittees, one to address facilitating a lasting peace between the two Koreas, and the other to address reducing tension on the peninsula. The talks make little progress as North Korea reportedly renews its demand for the withdrawal of all US forces from South Korea. The four parties agree to resume talks in mid-April.

—"Korea Peninsular Talks Go into 4th Round amid Pessimism," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 19 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Geir Moulson, "Korea Negotiators Make Steady Start to Latest Peace Talks," Associated Press, 19 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Janet Lawrence, "Korean Peace Talks in Final Day, Little Sign of Progress," Agence France Presse, 22 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

19-23 January 1999

Representatives from North Korea and KEDO meet in Hyangsan, North Korea for talks on a protocol detailing the procedure for training North Korean technicians on light water reactor operations.

—"North Koreans, KEDO Open Talks on Nuclear Reactors," Agence France Press, 19 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kim Ch'ang Hyok, "Pukkyongsuro Illyok Han'gukso Yonsu...KEDO Wa Uijongsoch'egyo Hyopsang," *Donga Ilbo*, 19 January 1999, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

22 January 1999

A North Korean Foreign Ministry official says that "the second Korean war will be a nuclear war," and, the official

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adds, North Korea, "which has been living under a nuclear threat from the United States for decades, is completely ready for nuclear war." The ministry official stresses that "if there is no avoiding hostilities, and North Korea is forced to take reply measures against America's aggression, the North Korean republic is bound to win."

—Alexander Valiyev, "North Korea Ready for Nuclear War -- Official," ITAR-TASS, 22 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

23 January 1999

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, warns of "nuclear holocaust" if the United States attacks North Korea with nuclear weapons. The paper says, "The United States, which dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has not yet been hit by a single shell over the past five decades or so." "But the situation is different now," the commentary adds, "If the United States attempts to inflict a nuclear holocaust on the DPRK, its mainland will never be left unharmed, either."

—"DPRK Is Not Fearful of Nuclear Showdown," Korean Central News Agency, 23 January 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Konghwa'gug'un Haektae'gyoldo Tuyowohaji Anh'nunda/RodongShinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 23 January 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

23-24 January 1999

Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan resume talks in Geneva on a suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. While both Kartman and Kim refuse to comment on the substance of the talks, sources close to the negotiations report that North Korea has withdrawn its earlier demand of \$300 million in exchange for a one-time inspection, instead demanding that the United States provide one million tons in food aid. However, while the United States has reportedly expressed a willingness to provide additional food aid and ease economic sanctions if North Korea allows access to the suspected facility, it continues to insist that any agreement must guarantee multiple inspections. The two sides fail to reach an agreement on inspecting the site, but they agree to continue talks at a later date. [Note: Various unverified reports, commenting on details of the negotiations, surface in early February. According to a 4 February *Asahi Shimbun* report, North Korea offers to allow two "visits" to the site; however, the "visits" reportedly would not entail close inspections. Another 4 February report from Kyodo News Service quotes an anonymous source close to the negotiations as saying that the North Korean delegation suggests that the United States and North Korea establish a joint company at the disputed Kumch'ang-ri site. In such a case, the North Korean delegation reportedly says, the United States would be free to inspect the site whenever it wanted.]

—"U.S.-N. Korea Talks Resume, Focus on U.S. Measure," Japan Economic Newswire, 23 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S.-N. Korea Talks End in Geneva without Agreement," Japan Economic Newswire, 24 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Alexander G. Higgins, "U.S., North Korea End Nuclear Talks, Agree to Meet Again," Associated Press, 24 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. Offers N. Korea Food for Site Inspections," Japan Economic Newswire, 4 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Takashi Uemura, "North Korea Offers U.S. 2 'Visits' for Food," Asahi News Service, 4 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Calls for Company with U.S. at Suspected Site," Japan Economic Newswire, 5 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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25 January 1999

Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi calls on North Korea to allow international inspections of a suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri.

—Anatoli Krasnov, "Japan Asks North Korea for Inspection of Underground Project," ITAR-TASS, 25 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

27 January 1999

Representatives from the United States, Japan, South Korea, and the EU hold a KEDO executive board meeting in News York.

—"KEDO Ambassadors Gathering in N.Y. Wed.," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 26 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

28 January 1999

Commenting on a recent meeting between American and North Korean officials to discuss US access to Kumch'ang-ri, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says, "The US...hinted that it affirmatively (is) taking into account the DPRK's demand for compensation." [Note: Sources close to the 23-24 January negotiations reported that North Korea withdrew its earlier demand of \$300 million in exchange for a one-time inspection, instead demanding that the United States provide one million tons in food aid. However, while the United States reportedly expressed a willingness to provide additional food aid and ease economic sanctions if North Korea allows access to the suspected facility, it continues to insist that any agreement must guarantee multiple inspections.]

—"No Change in DPRK's Position at Underground Facility Negotiations," Korean Central News Agency, 28 January 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Oemusongdaebyon'in Chomijihashisolhyopsang, <4 Chahoedam> Kwa Kwallyonhayo Tamhwa," Korean Central News Agency, 28 January 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; Alexander G. Higgins, "U.S., North Korea End Nuclear Talks, Agree to Meet Again," Associated Press, 24 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

28 January 1999

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, accuses the United States of having no intention to fulfill its obligation under the 1994 Agreed Framework. According to the paper, the United States "had no intention to implement the Agreed Framework when it adopted it with the DPRK. It foolishly thought that the DPRK might collapse before parts of the light water reactors are provided to the DPRK." The daily continues to say that "if the US wants to break the Agreed Framework, we will not be confined only to it but will freely develop the independent power industry."

—Violated Principle of Simultaneous Action," Korean Central News Agency, 28 January 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mushidangan Chomihabuimullihaengdongshihaengdongwonch'ik/ Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 28 January 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

1 February 1999

Washington reiterates its demand that North Korea allow multiple inspections of a suspected nuclear weapons facility in Kumch'ang-ri. Commenting on the stalled bilateral talks to address the issue, State Department

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spokesman James Rubin says, "We've made clear that we need multiple site access to the Kumch'ang-ri facility in order to resolve our concerns."

—"U.S. Seeks Multiple Inspections of N. Korea Site," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

2 February 1999

US Central Intelligence Agency Director George Tenet tells the Senate Armed Services Committee that the North Korean military "has become more volatile and unpredictable." He adds that the current situation "will encourage the North to rely more heavily on risky brinkmanship in its dealings with the United States."

—"Prepared Statement of George J. Tenet Director of Central Intelligence Before the Senate Armed Services Committee," Federal News Service, 2 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

4 February 1999

Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka announces that Japan will halt all financial contributions to KEDO if North Korea test fires another long-rang missile. [Note: On 31 August 1998, Japan temporarily froze contributions to KEDO after North Korea fired a rocket over its territory. Tokyo did not resume contributions to KEDO until late October.]

—"Japan Not to Fund KEDO If N. Korea Fires Missile: Nonaka," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 4 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

6-10 February 1999

Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, meets with senior South Korean officials in Seoul to discuss progress in the four-party peace talks and US desire to gain access to North Korea's suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. On 9 February, Kartman meets with Kwon Chong Rak, director general for the North American Affairs Bureau of the South Korean Foreign Ministry, and Terusuke Terada, Japanese special envoy for Korean affairs, to coordinate US, South Korean and Japanese policies on various North Korean issues including the suspect Kumch'ang-ri facility, implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework, and the possibility of another North Korean missile test. According to a government official in Seoul, Kartman informs Kwon and Terada that the United States will not ease economic sanctions against North Korea until Pyongyang allows inspection of the Kumch'ang-ri site. Terada also reportedly says that Japan will not send additional food aid to North Korea until suspicions about the site are erased.

—"U.S. Envoy Kartman Due in Seoul Today in N. Korean Site," *Korea Herald*, 6 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "S. Korea, U.S., Japan to Hold Talks Tues. on N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 6 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "3-Way Talks on Underground Site to Open Today," *Korea Times*, 8 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "US, S Korea and Japan Begin Talks over N Korea's Nuclear Site," Agence France Presse, 8 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Lim Yun-Suk, "US likely to Lift Sanctions on N Korea if Nuclear Suspicions Cleared," Agence France Presse, 9 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kim Ch'ang Hyok, "Hanmiil Taebukchongch'aekhyop, Puk Missile Okche Kinmilhyob'ui," *Donga Ilbo*, 10 February 1999, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

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8 February 1999

US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott meets with Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Shunji Yanai in Washington and urges Japan to pay its pledged \$1 billion to KEDO as soon as possible.

—"U.S. Asks Japan to Pay KEDO as Early as Possible," Japan Economic Newswire, 9 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

9 February 1999

The Czech Republic becomes a member of KEDO.

—"About Us: Member Nations," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org.

9 February 1999

The Korea Times, quoting a South Korean government official, reports that the United States is prepared to offer North Korea up to 500,000 tons in additional food aid in exchange for access to a suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. The report claims that Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, revealed the offer in a three-way meeting with senior South Korean and Japanese officials in Seoul earlier in the day. Later in the day, a US State Department spokesman James Rubin denies the report, saying, "Our policy is to provide food on a humanitarian basis and we do not link it to other issues...We are not prepared to pay for access to the site."

—"US Moves to Offer 500,000 Tons of Grain to NK This Year," *Korea Times*, 9 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. Denies Food-for-Access Deal with DPRK," Xinhua News Agency, 9 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "James Rubin Hold State Department New Briefing," Federal Document Clearing House Political Transcripts, 9 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

9-13 February 1999

Representatives from KEDO and North Korea meet in Hyangsan, North Korea to discuss various issues related to the implementation of the KEDO light water reactor project.

—"High-Level Meeting between KEDO and North Korea over Nuclear Reactors," Agence France Presse, 8 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "KEDO-Puk Kyongsurogwallyonhyobui," *Hangyoreh Shinmun*, 9 February 1999, p. 4, in KINDS, web.lexis-nexis.com.

10-11 February 1999

Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura visits South Korea to discuss North Korea's suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. While in Seoul, Komura meets with President Kim Dae Jung and Foreign Minister Hong Sun Yong. Speaking to reporters after his two-day visit, Komura reiterates that Japan will not resume food aid to North Korea until Pyongyang resolves suspicions about the suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. Komura also states that Japan will once again freeze financial contributions to KEDO if North Korea tests another long-range missile. [Note: On 31 August 1998, Japan temporarily froze contributions to KEDO after North Korea fired a rocket over its territory. Tokyo resumed contributions to KEDO in late-October.]

—Kyodo News Service, 11 February 1999, in "Japanese Minister Reiterates Condition for Resuming Food Aid to North Korea," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 11 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "South Korean, Japanese Foreign Ministers Discuss North Korea," Agence France Presse, 11 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis,

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web.lexis-nexis.com; Kang In Tok, "Han · Il Oemuhoedam Taebukkwangye Nonui," *Kukmin Ilbo*, p. 2, in KINDS, web.lexis-nexis.com.

10-11 February 1999

Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, consults with Chinese officials in Beijing on the progress of the four-party peace talks and North Korea's suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri.

—"U.S. Envoy Discuss North Korea with Chinese Diplomats," Associated Press, 11 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

13 February 1999

Kyodo News Service, quoting US government sources, reports that Japan's Finance Ministry has insisted on loan guarantees for the \$1 billion Japan has pledged to KEDO. The ministry's insistence on loan guarantees has reportedly slowed down negotiations between KEDO executive board members on financing the light water reactor project.

—Kyodo News Service, 13 February 1999, in "Kyodo: Talks Face Difficulties Over North Korea Loan," FBIS Document FTS19990213000265, 13 February 1999.

21 February 1999

The *Tokyo Shimbun*, quoting a KEDO source, reports that the KEDO light water reactor project will not be completed until at least 2007. According to the source, delays are mainly due to stalled negotiations between KEDO executive board members on financing the project.

—*Tokyo Shimbun*, 21 February 1999, p. 1, in "KEDO Source: No Completion of DPRK Reactors until 2007," FBIS Document FTS19990222000719, 22 February 1999.

24-25 February 1999

US Secretary of State Madeline Albright tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 24 February and the House International Relations Committee on 25 February that US-North Korean relations will not improve until Pyongyang resolves suspicions over a suspected underground nuclear weapons facility in Kumch'ang-ri.

—"Testimony February 24, 1999 Madeline Albright Secretary Senate Foreign Relations F2000 Foreign Relations Budget Proposal," Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, 24 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Secretary of State Madeline Albright Testifies Before the House International Relations Committee on Budget Issues," Federal Document Clearing House Political Transcripts, 25 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

25 February 1999

The North Korean Foreign Ministry, responding to recent reports that the KEDO light water reactor project will not be completed until at least 2007, says that if such reports are true, "it means the US side's violation of the DPRK-USA Agreed Framework and...accordingly, it cannot but give rise to serious matters." In this regard the ministry calls on the US to clarify its stand on the light water reactor project, so that North Korea can "make relevant decisions according to it."

—"USA Urged to Make Clear Position," Korean Central News Agency, 25 February 1999, www.kcna.co.jp;

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"Kyongsurodaesanggonsollipchang'ul Mi'gukch'ug'e Ch'okku/Oemusogdaebyon'in," Korean Central News Agency, 25 February 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

27 February 1999

According to a 28 February report in the *Daily Yomiuri*, US government sources say that the United States is prepared to extend direct food aid to North Korea in exchange for multiple inspections of a suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. The government source reportedly says that the 100,000 tons of grain would be sent in April and an additional 100,000 would be sent again in July. These proposed food shipments would be sent directly to Pyongyang without going through the usual channel of the UN World Food Program. —Takashi Sakamoto, "U.S. to Send Food Aid Directly to N. Korea," *Daily Yomiuri*, 28 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

27 February - 15 March 1999

The United States and North Korea meet in New York for the fourth round of talks on a suspected North Korean nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. The US and North Korean delegations are once again respectively headed by Charles Kartman, special envoy for Korean affairs, and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan. According to sources close to the talks, the main point under negotiation is the amount of food aid to be provided by the United States in exchange for access to the suspected site. On 6 March, the two sides hit a stalemate, because, according to Kim, "the US side is making excessive demands which go far beyond the scope of clarifying suspicions (over the Kumch'ang-ri site)." The two sides resume negotiation on 8 March after consultations with their capitols. On 10 March, the two sides break again for consultations with their capitols. On 11 March the two delegations resume negotiations, and US State Department spokesman James Rubin announces that "there has been some progress, some headway." Despite the early setbacks, on 15 March the two sides reach an agreement, and on the following day issue a joint statement in which North Korea agrees to provide the United States with "satisfactory access to the site at Kumch'ang-ri," including multiple "visits to remove US concerns about the site's future use. The US agrees "to take a step to improve political and economic relations between the two countries." While the joint statement does not mention the specifics of the agreement, on 16 March US State Department spokesman James Rubin announces that the United States has agreed to take part in a bilateral agricultural project to improve North Korea's potato production. However, Rubin stresses that any agricultural assistance or increased food aid is for humanitarian reasons and should not be viewed as compensation for access to the Kumch'ang-ri site. — "US, North Korea Resume Talks on Nuclear Inspections," Agence France Presse, 27 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S., N Korea Remain Split over Amount of Food Aid," Japan Economic Newswire, 3 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "NK-US Talks Stall on US Inspection of Suspected Nuclear Site," *Korea Times*, 7 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency, 7 March 1999, in "North Korea-USA Talks End Seventh Day without Agreement," 8 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. Says Progress Made in U.S.-DPRK Talks," Xinhua News Agency, 11 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Full Text of U.S.-N. Korea Joint Press Statement," Japan Economic Newswire, 16 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. Says DPRK Agrees to Access to Kumchang-ri Site," Xinhua News Agency, 16 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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1 March 1999

US officials announce that Washington has agreed to Tokyo's demand that KEDO provide loan guarantees for the \$1 billion it has pledged to the consortium. [Note: In mid-February, Japan's Finance Ministry, fearing that North Korea would default on the loan, insisted on guarantees for the \$1 billion. The ministry's insistence on loan guarantees slowed down negotiations between KEDO executive board members on financing the light water reactor project.]

—Takaaki Mizuno, "U.S. Gives in to Japan on KEDO," Asahi News Service, 3 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Japan-KEDO Talks Face Difficulties over N. Korean Loan," Japan Economic Newswire, 13 February 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

Early March 1999

According to a 10 March report by the Yonhap News Agency, US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director Patrick Hughes meets with South Korean intelligence officials in Seoul. Yonhap quotes an intelligence source as saying, "(Hughes') trip this time was very meaningful." [Note: The DIA has reportedly conducted intensive reconnaissance work on North Korea's suspected nuclear and missile facilities.]

—Yonhap News Agency, 10 March 1999, in "DIA Director Reportedly Visited ROK Secretly before Perry," FBIS Document FTS19990310000046, 10 March 1999; "Mi Kukpangjongbo'bonbujang Pang'han," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 11 March 1999, p. 3, in KINDS, web.lexis-nexis.com.

4 March 1999

US President Bill Clinton issues a presidential determination, which is subsequently submitted to Congress on 5 March, verifying that "North Korea is complying with all provisions of the Agreed Framework and with the confidential minute between North Korea and the United States." Clinton also states that "North Korea is cooperating fully in the canning and safe storage of all spent nuclear fuel from its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors." [Note: On 20 October 1998, Congress passed a budget for fiscal year 1999 allocating \$35 million for heavy fuel oil deliveries to North Korea. However, the budget stipulated the funds would not be allocated until 1 March 1999, and no more than \$15 million would be allocated before 1 June 1999. Thirty days prior to each date, President Clinton must certify that North Korea is taking steps to implement the 1994 Agreed Framework and is no longer exporting ballistic missiles. Congress also specifies that "30 days before the June deadline, the White House must certify that it has reached an agreement with North Korea on the means for satisfying US concerns regarding suspect underground construction."]

— Presidential Determination No. 99-16, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 5 March 1999; "Clinton Wants 15 Mil Dtrs Disbursed for KEDO," Japan Economic Newswire, 5 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

8 March 1999

William Perry, coordinator of US policy on North Korea, travels to Seoul and meets with President Kim Dae Jung, Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Hong Sun Yong and Im Dong Won, senior presidential secretary for foreign affairs and national security. Perry, who for the past few months has been writing a review of Washington's policy on North Korea, discusses the differences between Washington's and Seoul's approach to addressing concerns arising from North Korea. After meeting Perry, Hong announces that the two sides agreed to "solve North Korea's

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nuclear and missile issues within the framework of Seoul's engagement policy."

—"Perry to Coordinate NK Policy with Seoul Officials," Korea Times, 8 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Seoul, Washington to Continue "Sunshine Policy" Toward DPRK," Xinhua News Agency, 9 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 9 March 1999, in "South Korea, USA Discuss Outlook If Package Solution to North Fails," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 9 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

9-13 March 1999

An IAEA delegation meets with North Korean officials in Pyongyang to negotiate over access to information necessary to determine the completeness and correctness of North Korea's initial declaration of nuclear material. After the talks, IAEA delegation head Demetrius Perrikos says that "nothing serious has happened" at the talks.

—"Delegation of International Atomic Energy Agency Arrives," Korean Central News Agency, 9 March 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; Alexander Valiyev, "IAEA Delegation Leaves North Korea for Beijing," ITAR-TASS, 13 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

10 March 1999

William Perry, coordinator of US policy on North Korea, meets with senior Japanese officials in Tokyo to coordinate US and Japanese policies on North Korea. Speaking to reporters after meetings with Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura, Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka and Defense Agency Director General Hosei Norota, Perry says that "any successful policy toward North Korea must be a closely coordinated joint effort of the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea."

—Shingo Ito, "US, Japan Agree for United Front against North Korean Threat," Agence France Presse, 10 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 March 1999

The *Washington Times*, citing a Department of Energy (DOE) intelligence report, reports that North Korea is currently pursuing uranium enrichment technology to be used in a nuclear weapons program. According to the DOE report, North Korea's Taesong Yushin Trading Company recently ordered two frequency converters from a Japanese company. Frequency converters provide a special electric current for gas centrifuges used for uranium enrichment. The intelligence report adds, "On the basis of Pakistan's progress with a similar technology, we estimate that North Korea is at least six years from the production of highly enriched uranium, even if it has a viable centrifuge design." "On the other hand," the report notes, "with significant technical support from other countries, such as Pakistan, the time frame would be decreased by several years." Given North Korea's support of Pakistan's missile program, the report claims that Pakistan, which obtained uranium enrichment technology from China in 1996, could very well assist North Korea in its pursuit of uranium enrichment technology. US State Department spokesman James Rubin, speaking to reporters later in the day, says that while he cannot comment on specifics of the report, Washington remains concerned about North Korea's "intentions regarding nuclear weapons, including the possibility that North Korea may be seeking uranium enrichment technology." [Note: While the transfer of the frequency converters is not confirmed, on 8 May 2003, Tokyo police raid Meishin, a Japanese company run by pro-Pyongyang Korean residents in Japan, for reportedly exporting frequency converters to North Korea.]

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—Bill Gertz, "Pyongyang Working to Make Fuel for Nukes," *Washington Times*, 11 March 1999, p.A1, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. Concerned about Nuke Moves by N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 11 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; John Larkin and Donald Macintyre, "Arsenal of the Axis: North Korea Already Supplies Missiles to Rogue States. Now It Poses a New Threat: Nuclear Proliferation," *Time Asia*, 14 July 2003, vol. 162, no. 1, www.time.com.

11 March 1999

Former US Secretary of Defense William Perry, speaking to reporters at the Brookings Institute, says that North Korea's suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri does not pose an immediate threat since it would take three to five years to produce a nuclear weapon there. However, Perry adds, North Korea "seem(s) to have other programs under way which are part of the nuclear weapons program." [Note: Perry is currently undertaking a comprehensive review of the US policy toward North Korea.]

—Robert Burns, "Former Pentagon Chief Sees Possible 'Sterner Measures' against North Korea," Associated Press, 11 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Elizabeth Becker, "Clinton Advisor Says North Korea Is Advancing Its Nuclear Program," *New York Times*, 12 March 1999, p. A11, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

12 March 1999

Pakistan categorically denies that it has assisted North Korea in obtaining uranium enrichment technology. Tariq Altaf, acting spokesman for Pakistan's Foreign Office, denounces as "false and tendentious" a *Washington Times* report on 11 March that suggests Pakistan might be assisting North Korea with uranium enrichment in return for North Korea's past support of Pakistan's missile program. The spokesman reiterates Pakistan's policy not to export sensitive nuclear technology to any other country.

—"Pakistan Denies Nuke Cooperation with DPRK," Xinhua News Agency, 12 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Pakistan Denies Nuclear Cooperation with N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 13 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

12 March 1999

The *Joongang Ilbo*, quoting a South Korean government official, reports that North Korea is removing evidence from the suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri in anticipation of a US inspection. The Seoul official says, "The USA, which has been watching the Kumch'ang-ri site, confirmed that trucks carrying construction equipment are frequently coming in and going out of this facility. This is judged as the North carrying out engineering works to remove evidence from the suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri, which has been under construction for several years." The official adds, "The US government recently informed our government of such movements. These movements seem to be a measure to prepare for the possible opening of the Kumch'ang-ri facility on case an agreement is reached at the New York talks."

—*Chungang Ilbo*, 12 March 1999, in "DPRK Suspected of 'Removing Evidence' from Kumch'ang-ri," FBIS Document FTS19990313000168; Kim Min Sok and O yong Hwan, "Puk Haekuihokshiol Sach'aldaebi Chunggoobsaegi Kongsachinhaengjung," *Joongang Ilbo*, 13 March 1999, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

13 March 1999

An official in South Korea's Planning Office for the North Korean Light-Water Reactor Project says that the cancelling

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of the spent-fuel rods from the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yongbyon-kun will be complete sometime in May or June 1999.

—*Chungang Ilbo*, 13 March 1999, in "Article Notes Sealing of Fuel Rods Expected to End Soon," FBIS Document ID: FTS19990314000166, 13 March 1999.

18 March 1999

Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi tells the Diet that Japan should be allowed to inspect the suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri in North Korea since it has pledged \$1 billion to the KEDO light water reactor project. "If Japan can check (the suspected site) for itself, it will find it easier to solicit cooperation from the Japanese people," Obuchi says, "Japan should check how plutonium development is under way (in North Korea) before it pays for the light water reactors."

—Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), 18 March 1999, in "Japanese Premier Wants Tokyo to Join US Visits to Suspected Nuclear Facility," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Obuchi: Japan Should Join North Korean Inspections," Mainichi Daily News, 19 March 1999, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Shigemi Sato, "Japan Presses to Join North Korean Underground Site Inspection," Agence France Presse, 18 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

18 March 1999

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says that while North Korea will allow the United States access to a suspected site in Kumch'ang-ri for an "inspection fee," North Korea "will take a determined countermeasure if the US raises suspicion of any other [facility]."

—"4th DPRK-U.S. Underground Facility Negotiations," Korean Central News Agency, 18 March 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Chomihyopsang Kwallyonhan Oemusongdaebyon'in," Korean Central News Agency, 18 March 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

18 March 1999

The *Yomiuri Shimbun*, quoting a source familiar with US intelligence on North Korea's nuclear developments, reports that the Kumch'ang-ri facility is not the only underground facility under construction in North Korea with suspected ties to a clandestine nuclear weapons program. The source claims that US intelligence has confirmed the construction of two large underground facilities in Chagang Province. According to the source, US intelligence has monitored many scientific and technical experts traveling to and from one of the Chagang Province facilities, leading them to believe the facility is to be used for nuclear tests. The other facility has reportedly been repeatedly visited by many North Korean military experts. The other two suspected underground facilities are located in an area known as "Ha'gap" and a location between T'aech'on-kun and Kusong in North P'yong'an Province. [Note: The second location is probably located in Kump'ung-ri (???), Kusong (???), North P'yong'an Province.]

—Chiharu Mori, *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Tokyo), 18 March 1999, p. 2, in "'Source' Notes US Suspects 4 More DPRK Nuclear Facilities," FBIS Document FTS19990318000499, 18 March 1999; Kim Kwang Hyon, "Pukhan HAekshisol 4 Kunde Uihok...Yomiuri Podo," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 19 March 1999, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

18 March 1999

South Korean Foreign Minister Hong Sun Yong calls on Japan and the United States to extend diplomatic

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recognition to North Korea. Hong says that the agreement is "just the beginning of the process of confirming whether or not North Korea has a nuclear program."

—Don Kirk, "Korea Accord Applauded: Seoul Is Delighted by U.S. Deal With the North," *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), 18 March 1999, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

19 March 1999

The Korean Central News Agency denounces recent allegations that North Korea is seeking uranium enrichment technology from Japan and Pakistan. The news agency calls the reports "a whopping lie which was invented out of an ulterior intention to charge the DPRK with violating the DPRK-USA Agreed Framework of 1994 at any cost and put pressure upon it." [Note: According to a classified DOE report quoted in the 11 March issue of the *Washington Times*, North Korea's Taesong Yushin Trading Company recently ordered two frequency converters for a Japanese company. Frequency converters have applications in gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment.]

—"KCNA on U.S. Ill-Intentioned False Propaganda," Korean Central News Agency, 19 March 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Kom'un Sokshim'eso Kku'myo'naen Kojitsjonjon/Chosonjung'angt'ongshin," Korean Central News Agency, 19 March 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; Bill Gertz, "Pyongyang Working to Make Fuel for Nukes," *Washington Times*, 11 March 1999, p.A1, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

19-21 March 1999

Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi meets with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung in Seoul to coordinate policy on North Korea. Obuchi and Kim state that they intend to fully cooperate with the United States in their future dealings with North Korea.

—Sang Hun Choe, "Leaders of Japan, South Korea Urge North Korea to Work for Peace," Associated Press, 20 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Obuchi Backs Kim's Engagement Policy," *Korea Times*, 21 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

22 March 1999

US State Department spokesman James Foley announces that the United States will send an additional 100,000 metric tons of corn and corn-soy blend to North Korea through the UN World Food Program. Foley denies any link to the increased food aid to North Korea's recent agreement to allow the United States to inspect a suspected nuclear facility in Kunch'ang-ri. [Note: In 1998, the United States sent 500,000 tons of food aid to North Korea, and the recent addition brings the 1999 total to 200,000 tons.]

—"State Department Regular Briefing," Federal News Service, 22 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "US to Give 100,000 tonnes of food aid to North Korea," Agence France Presse, 22 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Reuters, "U.S. Details Food Aid Plan for North Korea," *New York Times*, 23 March 1999, p. A11, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

24 March 1999

An IAEA official reports that critical parts of the North Korean 50MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yongbyon-kun have been missing since 1994 when IAEA inspectors first arrived at the site. The parts, vital for controlling nuclear reactions in the reactor's graphite core, could be used to construct another nuclear reactor. According to the official, the IAEA has repeatedly asked North Korea to clear up the issue in multiple bilateral meetings. Originally,

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North Korea denied it had ever built the critical reactor parts, but in subsequent meetings, according to the IAEA official, North Korea said, "it was checking into the missing parts."

—Stewart Stogel and Ben Barber, "Parts Missing in N. Korea Reactor; State Officials Knew About the Disappearance, Kept Mum," *Washington Times*, 24 March 1999, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

25 March 1999

Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka says that the recent incursion of a North Korean spy vessel into Japanese territorial waters will not affect Japan's commitment to the KEDO light water reactor project. Nonaka says that Japan "must separate this matter, since the assistance to KEDO is the scheme that includes the IAEA's inspection of a suspected North Korean nuclear facility."

—Shino Yuasa, "Japan to Keep Spy Boat Case Separate from N Korea Nuclear Talks," Agence France Presse, 25 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

26 March 1999

US North Korean Policy Coordinator William Perry confirms that his upcoming report to the Clinton administration will not include "time limits" for when the United States should consider alternatives to diplomatic engagement with North Korea. He says, "I believe military confrontation is so serious, we should exhaust every diplomatic measure." [Note: Since December 1998, Perry has been writing a comprehensive review of the US policy on North Korea.]

—Son Key-young, "No Time Limits' for Engagement Policy: Perry," *Korea Times* (Seoul), 26 March 1999, www.koreatimes.co.kr; "US Report on N Korea to Be Finished Later Than Expected," Agence France Presse, 26 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

30 March 1999

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, rebukes Japan's request to inspect a suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. A commentary printed in the paper claims that the issue of the Kumch'ang-ri site is between only the United States and North Korea. The commentary adds that Japan's request to participate in the "inspections" illustrates an ignorance of the agreement since the United States will not conduct an "inspection." Rather, the commentary points out, North Korea has granted the United States permission to "visit" the facility. The commentary also claims that North Korea will not care if the agreement is abandoned, adding that implementation "wholly depends on the US side." [Note: On 18 March, Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi said that Japan should be allowed to inspect the Kumch'ang-ri site for itself since it is funding \$1 billion of the KEDO light water reactor project.]

—"Preposterous Remarks of Dishonest Elements," Korean Central News Agency, 30 March 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Olbbajin Ilbon'ui <Sach'al'uihyang>Sori/Rodongshunmun," Korean Central News Agency, 30 March 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

30 March-3 April 1999

A team of seven US officials and nuclear experts, headed by Joel Wit of the US State Department Korea Desk, travels to Pyongyang to negotiate the itinerary and scope of agreed upon access to a suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. The experts fail to resolve the scope of US access to the site and agree to meet

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again soon to conclude negotiations.

—Yonhap News Agency, 1 April 1999, in "USA, North Korea Negotiate Access to Suspected Nuclear Facility in North," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 1 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "DPRK, U.S. Discuss Details on Visiting Underground Facility," Xinhua News Agency, 5 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "US and N. Korea Discuss Technical Issues on Nuclear Inspection," Agence France Presse, 5 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea, U.S. Fail to Reach Terms on Access to Site," Japan Economic Newswire, 6 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

7-18 April 1999

Representatives from North Korea and KEDO meet in New York for the second round of talks on the training of North Korean engineers to operate the two light water reactors to be built in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o.

—Yonhap News Agency, 8 April 1999, in "North Korea and Nuclear Development Body Begin Second Round of Talks," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 8 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kim yong Shik, "KEDO Chiphpaengisahoe Kaech'oe," *Segye Ilbo*, 5 April 1999, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

3 April 1999

A *Rodong Sinmun* commentary says that nuclear war with the United States is imminent. The editorial says that "belligerent relations between the DPRK and USA cannot be avoided because the USA is getting frantic in their moves to stifle the DPRK through a nuclear war." The commentary adds that if the United States chooses to use nuclear weapons, North Korea "will have no alternative but to take a countermeasure against it. In that case, the United States will be held wholly responsible for all consequences."

—"Bellicose Remarks of U.S. War Hawks," Korean Central News Agency, 3 April 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mi'gug'i Tobalharyo'nun Che 2 Ui Chosonch'imnryakchonjaeng'un Haekchonjaeng/Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 3 April 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

7 April 1999

Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka reiterates Japan's pledge to support the KEDO light water reactor project despite the incursion of two North Korea spy vessels into its territorial waters in March.

—"Japan to Honour Nuclear Deal with North Korea Despite Spy Ship Incident," Agence France Presse, 7 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

Early April 1999

The KEDO Executive Board meets in New York to discuss loan guarantees for the \$4.6 billion project. The United States, EU, South Korea, and Japan reportedly agree that contracts with KEDO should include the consortium's guarantee to pay back the loans if North Korea defaults. However, the United States reportedly demands assurance that it would not assume responsibility for paying back the loans even though it is a KEDO board member.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 14 April 1999, in "South Korea, USA, Japan Fail to Agree on Recovering North's Reactor Costs," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 14 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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12 April 1999

Chang Yong Shik, president of KEPCO, the primary contractor of the KEDO light water reactor project, tells reporters in Japan that the reactors to be constructed in North Korea should never use mixed oxide fuel (MOX), a mixture of uranium and plutonium.

—"South Korean Rules Out Plutonium at N. Korea's KEDO Reactors," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 12 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

14 April 1999

Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura and IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei meet in Tokyo and reaffirm their support for the KEDO light water reactor project. Komura says that Japan intends to continue its support of KEDO because "the KEDO framework is the most realistic and effective way now to stop the North from developing nuclear weapons."

—"IAEA, Japan Agree to Promote Nuke Program in N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

15 April 1999

Japan ruling Liberal Democratic Party agrees to support Tokyo's plan to provide \$1 billion to KEDO.

—Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), 15 April 1999, in "Japan: Ruling Party to Sign Contract on Nuclear Reactors to North Korea," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 15 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

23-28 April 1999

Representatives from the United States and North Korea meet in Geneva to finalize the terms of US access to a suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. The US and North Korean delegations, headed respectively by Charles Kartman, special envoy for Korean affairs, and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan, meet before the scheduled four-party peace talks, but after failing to reach an agreement, the two sides continue to meet on the sidelines for the duration of the talks. On 28 April, a source close to the talks reports that the two sides agree that a US delegation, comprising approximately 15 experts from the Departments of Defense, State and Energy, will visit the Kumch'ang-ri facility from 15 to 20 May. However, the source notes, "the period can be readjusted according to the circumstances, as the visit needs at least five to seven days."

—Yonhap News Agency, 29 April 1999, in "Government Agrees to Allow 15th-20th May US Visit to Suspected Nuclear Facility," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "15 Americans to Visit Suspected Nuke Site in N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 24 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S., N. Korea Discuss Timetable of Nuclear Inspection," Japan Economic Newswire, 25 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

24-25 April 1999

The US, South Korea, and Japan meet in Hawaii to coordinate their policies on North Korea. The three nations, taking note of the threat North Korea's nuclear and missile programs pose to regional security, agree to establish the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) to institutionalize the process of coordinating policies on North Korea.

—"ROK, US, Japan to Set Up Panel to Coordinate NK Policy," *Korea Times*, 26 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-

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nexis.com; "Japan, U.S., S. Korea to Form Coordination Group on N. Korea," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 26 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

24-28 April 1999

Representatives from the United States, China, and the two Koreas meet in Geneva for the fifth round of peace talks aimed at replacing the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement with a formal peace treaty. The four parties fail to make any progress in the talks as North Korea reportedly continues to refuse to agree on any confidence-building measures as long as the issue of US troop withdrawal from South Korea is not on the agenda. Speaking to reporters after the talks, Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan, head of the North Korean delegation, says that North Korea will continue to insist on US troop withdrawal from South Korea, and if future talks do not address that issue, North Korea would have no interest in participating. Regardless, the four parties agree to meet again in August.

—Tani Freedman, "Four Party Talks for Korean Peace Resume in Geneva," Agence France Presse, 24 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "4-Way Peace Talks End Without Progress," Japan Economic Newswire, 27 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Geir Moulson, "U.S., China, Koreas Wrap up Latest Peace Talks," Associated Press, 27 April 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

Late April 1999

South Korea's Defense Ministry submits a report to the National Assembly Defense Committee stating that "Team Spirit was never completely terminated," and the United States and South Korea could agree at any time to resume the joint military exercise. [Note: Team Spirit was suspended in 1994 as part of a deal to encourage North Korea to give up its graphite-moderated nuclear program and ease tension on the Korean Peninsula.]

—Lee Sung Yul, "Team Spirit, Combined Forces Exercise, Poised to Resume Anytime, Ministry Says," *Korea Herald*, 4 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

3 May 1999

Japan signs a contract with KEDO to provide \$1 billion to the light water reactor project. The loan, to be provided by the Export-Import Bank of Japan, must still be accepted by the Diet. [Note: The Diet approves the funding on 30 June.]

—"Japan Inks KEDO Contract to Provide 1 Bil. Dtrs," Japan Economic Newswire, 3 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Gus Constantine, "Tokyo to Help N. Korea Build 2 Reactors," *Washington Times*, 4 May 1999, p. A13, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

4 May 1999

South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, in a CNN interview, calls on the United States and North Korea to improve relations by reducing mutual threats and faithfully implementing the 1994 Agreed Framework.

—"Pres. Kim Calls on US, NK to Improve Relations by Reducing Mutual Threats," *Korea Times*, 5 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

7 May 1999

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, warns the United States that any preemptive

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attack would trigger "a total war between the DPRK and the US." In such a case, the paper says, North Korea "will mercilessly strike and annihilate" the United States.

—"Former U.S. Defense Secretary's Remarks," Korean Central News Agency, 7 May 1999, www.kcna.co.jp;
 "Mi'gug'ui Kunsajog'apsal'un Mangsang'irago Chijok/Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 7 May 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

13-14 May 1999

Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, travels to Pyongyang to make final arrangements for the 15 member team of US experts that is schedule to visit a suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri later in the month. Kartman's visit is also reportedly to arrange a meeting between Kim Jong Il and William Perry, coordinator for US policy on North Korea, during his upcoming visit to North Korea. [Note: After his visit to North Korea, Kartman travels to Seoul to brief South Korean officials about his trip. During the briefing, Kartman reportedly says that he is satisfied with North Korea's preparations for the upcoming visit of US inspectors to the Kumch'ang-ri facility.]

—"Kartman to Visit NK to Arrange Perry's Trip," *Korea Times*, 9 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Jun Kwan Woo, "U.S. Envoy to Meet with Seoul Officials Tomorrow after Visit to North Korea," *Korea Herald*, 15 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency, 16 May 1999, in "Sources in ROK Expect DPRK Nuclear Suspicion to Clear Up," FBIS Document FTS19990515001087.

13-17 May 1999

South Korean Foreign Minister Hong Sun Yong meets with US officials in Washington to encourage the United States to support a comprehensive approach to North Korea based on South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine policy." At a 17 March joint press conference with US Secretary of State Madeline Albright, Hong says that William Perry, in his upcoming trip to North Korea, will deliver a package of "attractions and incentives" to Pyongyang. Hong adds, "North Korea is well-advised to seize this opportunity."

—"Hong Urges US Congress to Support Comprehensive Approach," *Korea Times*, 14 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Matthew Lee, "US to Give 400,000 Tonnes of Food Aid to North Korea," *Agence France Presse*, 17 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; NAPSNet Special Report, 18 May 1999, www.nautilus.org/napsnet.

17 May 1999

US Secretary of State Madeline Albright announces that the United States will send an additional 400,000 tons of emergency food aid to North Korea, bringing the total food donations in 1999 to 600,000 tons. Albright, speaking at a joint press conference with South Korean Foreign Minister Hong Sun Yong, says the food aid is in response to an April request from the UN World Food Program and not related to nuclear talks with North Korea.

—George Gedda, "U.S. Raises Food Aid to North Korea," *Associated Press*, 17 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. Administration Decides to Deliver Food to DPRK Again," Korean Central News Agency, 21 May 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

20-24 May 1999

A 14-member US team, comprising nuclear scientists and officials from the departments of state, defense, and

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energy, inspects a suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. The team, headed by Joel Wit, deputy director of the State Department's office of Korean affairs, is allowed to measure the dimensions of all underground areas at the main complex, and videotape and photograph agreed above-ground facilities. They are also allowed to take soil and water samples to be analyzed for radioactive substances. Upon the completion of the inspection, State Department spokesman James Rubin announces that the team "received good cooperation from North Korean officials." On 27 May, Rubin announces that "the team found an unfinished site, the underground portion of which was an extensive, empty tunnel complex...A careful technical analysis of the team's work will now take place before further judgments can be made and reported." On 25 June, Rubin gives a more detailed account of the visit and concludes that the Kumch'ang-ri site does not violate the 1994 Agreed Framework. [Note: While the inspectors do not find any evidence of nuclear activity at the Kumch'ang-ri facility, US officials say that the facility could still be used to store nuclear equipment in the future, and that North Korea had plenty of time during the course of negotiations to remove any incriminating evidence.]

—"US Inspection Team Gets 'Good Cooperation' from North Koreans," Agence France Presse, 24 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Philip Shenon, "Suspected North Korean Atom Site Is Empty, U.S. Finds," *New York Times*, 28 May 1999, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

21 May 1999

The Korean Central News Agency says that, "The US decision to offer food to the DPRK is linked to the on-going discussions on outstanding issues between the two countries."

—"U.S. Administration Decides to Deliver Food to DPRK Again," Korean Central News Agency, 21 May 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mijongbuga Ttodashi Shingnryang'ul Chegonghagiyo Kyolchong," , " Korean Central News Agency, 21 May 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

24 May 1999

William Perry, coordinator of US policy on North Korea, Im Dong Won, South Korea's Minister of Unification, and Ryozi Kato, Japanese director general for foreign policy, meet in Tokyo to fine-tune their respective policies on North Korea. The three also discuss Perry's upcoming trip to Pyongyang and the package deal he is to present to high-ranking North Korean officials. The three say in a joint statement that they hope Perry's meetings in Pyongyang "will produce useful insights as the review of a joint approach toward North Korea moves toward a conclusion."

—"Japan, U.S., South Korea Agree on Message to North Korea," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 24 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Perry to Visit NK Today with Message from Top Leaders," *Korea Times*, 24 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Shino Yuasa, "Japan, South Korea and US Seek United Front on North Korea," Agence France Presse, 24 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

25-28 May 1999

William Perry, coordinator of US policy on North Korea, meets with senior North Korean officials in Pyongyang to present a package deal aimed at halting North Korea's nuclear and missile programs as well as reducing tension on the Korean Peninsula. Perry reportedly urges Pyongyang to halt its nuclear and missile programs in exchange for an easing of economic sanctions, increased food aid, and normalization of diplomatic relations with Washington and Tokyo. On 26 May, Perry gives Kim Yong Nam, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's

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Assembly, a letter from President Bill Clinton to be passed on to North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. The letter reportedly contains a personal proposal to end the 50-year-old economic sanctions on North Korea in return for North Korea's halting its nuclear and missile programs. Perry also delivers messages to Kim Jong Il from Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and South Korean President Kim Dae Jung.

—Shigemi Sato, "US Envoy Perry Arrives in North Korea with Carrot-And-Stick Initiative," Agence France Presse, 25 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Envoy to North Korea Delivers Clinton Letter," *New York Times*, 27 May 1999, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kyodo News Service, 29 May 1999, in "Japan, USA, South Korea Confirm 1994 Pact on North," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 31 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; NAPSNet Special Report, 2 June 1999, www.nautilus.org; "U.S. President's Special Envoy Here," Korean Central News Agency, 25 May 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "U.S. President's Special Envoy and His Party Leave," Korean Central News Agency, 28 May 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Midaet'ongnyong T'uksa Ilhaeng Toch'ak," Korean Central News Agency, 25 May 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Midaet'ongnyongt'uksa'ilhaeng'ul Wihan Yonhoega Issotta," Korean Central News Agency, 25 May 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Choson'oemusong Che 1 Pusanggwaw Midaet'ongnyongt'uksaui Hoedam," Korean Central News Agency, 28 May 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mihapchungguk Taet'ongnyongt'uksa Yonhoe," Korean Central News Agency, 28 May 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mihapchungguk Taet'ongnyong T'uksailhaeng Kwiguk," Korean Central News Agency, 28 May 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

29 May 1999

William Perry, coordinator of US policy on North Korea, meets with South Korea's Unification Minister Im Dong Won and Ryoze Kato, Japanese director general for foreign policy, in Seoul to discuss his recently concluded trip to North Korea during which he proposed a package deal to Pyongyang by which it would halt its nuclear and missile programs in exchange for an easing of economic sanctions, increases food aid, and diplomatic recognition from Washington and Tokyo. At a press conference later in the day, Perry says that he "clearly and firmly" expressed the combined concerns of the United States, South Korea and Japan over North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. However, Perry adds, "It will take some time for (North Korea) to further reflect upon the views I have expressed and for us to reflect on our visit."

—"U.S., S. Korea, Japan Discuss Result of Perry's DPRK Tour," Xinhua News Agency, 29 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Sang Hun Choe, "U.S. Envoy Says He Achieved His Goal in North Korea," Associated Press, 29 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; NAPSNet Special Report, 2 June 1999, www.nautilus.org.

31 May 1999

North Korea threatens to pull out of the 1994 Agreed Framework. The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, accuses the United States of trying to "backpedal on the Agreed Framework, crying for a new framework agreement." The newspaper adds that North Korea "can no longer pin hope on the Agreed Framework, even while sacrificing its self-reliant nuclear energy industry."

—"U.S. Stand on DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework Flayed," Korean Central News Agency, 31 May 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Chomihab'uimun'e Taehan Ripchang'un Myongbaekhada/Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 31 May 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Our Position Is Clear," *Rodong Sinmun*, 31 May 1999, in "North Korea: Party Paper Criticizes USA for Not Following Agreed Framework," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 1 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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3 June 1999

Japan's lower house of the Diet unanimously passes a bill allocating \$1 billion for the KEDO light water reactor project. The bill is passed on to the upper house of the Diet.

—Kyodo News Service, 3 June 1999, in "Japan: Lower House Approves Contribution for North Korea's Nuclear Reactors," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 3 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

7-8 June 1999

Senior US and South Korean officials meet in Hawaii to discuss recent developments in North Korea including the recent US inspection of a suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri.

—Jun Kwan-woo, "Seoul, Washington to Discuss N.K. Policy in Hawaii," *Korea Herald*, 7 June 1999, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; *Korea Herald*, 12 June 1999, in "ROK Official Comments on US-DPRK Missile Talks," FBIS Document FTS19990611000645.

7-11 June 1999

The IAEA Board of Governors meets in Vienna. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei tells the board that North Korea has made no progress in implementing its nuclear safeguards agreement since the last meeting in March. However, ElBaradei adds that two IAEA official remain in North Korea. On the final day of the meeting, the board of governors issues a report stating that while the safeguards agreement North Korea signed with the agency remains "binding and in force," the agency has been unable to "verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material" due to lack of cooperation from Pyongyang. The report adds that "there was still no progress in technical discussions with the DPRK regarding the preservation by the DPRK of information that the agency deems necessary for verification of the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration."

—Yonhap News Agency, 7 June 1999, in "UN Nuclear Body Says "No Progress" in North Korean Implementation on Accord," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency, 11 June 1999, in "IAEA Unable to Verify North Korea's Declaration of Nuclear Material," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 11 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

8-15 June 1999

North Korean vessels cross the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea on 8 Junr, apparently to fish in the crab-rich waters. South Korean Navy vessels respond by bumping the ships back across the line that separates the two countries. The tense standoff continues and comes to a head on 15 June, when the two nations, still technically at war, exchange heavy gun fire for ten minutes. The ten-minute naval clash, the largest since the 1953 Armistice Agreement, results in casualties on both sides and the sinking of a North Korean gunship. In response to the rising tension on the peninsula, the United States sends air and naval reinforcements to South Korea. [Note: North Korea does not recognize the Northern Limit Line because it was not part of the 1953 Armistice and was established unilaterally by the UN Command in Seoul following the war. On 29 June 2002, a South Korean naval vessel is sunk in a similar clash.]

—Robert Whyment and David Watts, "Korean Dispute Ends in Sea Battle," *Times* (London), 16 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 16 June 1999, in "US Military Reinforcements Arrive in South Korea," 16 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Marc Lavine, "Tensions Boil in Yellow Sea as US

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Sends Warships, Planes," Agence France Presse, 17 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Song Sang Kun, "'Puk Kyongbijong Sohae Ch'ulhyon' Yonghae Ch'imbohmaenna? Anhaenna?" *Donga Ilbo*, 10 June 1999, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr; Ch'oe Sang Yon, "Jokkyonan Pukkyonbijong Tashi Ch'imbo...Soha Nambuk Ch'oginjang Taech'i," *Joongang Ilbo*, 12 June 1999, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr; Kim Yong Bom and Lee Che Kyo, "Nambuk Sohae Kyojon Puk'oroejong Kyokt'oe," *Munhwa Ilbo*, 15 June 1999, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

9 June 1999

North Korea's Foreign Ministry announces that US inspectors found only empty tunnels at the Kumch'ang-ri site, thus proving that North Korea is faithfully implementing the 1994 Agreed Framework. However, in a veiled threat, the Foreign Ministry says that while the Kumch'ang-ri site is empty for the time being, what the tunnels will be used for in the future "depends entirely upon the attitude of the US side concerning the implementation of the DPRK-US agreement."

—"DPRK FM Spokesman on Kumchang-ri Underground Facility," Korean Central News Agency, 9 June 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Kumch'angnijihashisol Haekkw'a'nun Mu'gwan'gyehan'gos'ul Hwakchung/Oemusongdaeyon'in," Korean Central News Agency, 9 June 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

9 June 1999

William Perry, coordinator of US policy on North Korea, briefs Congress on his recent trip to Pyongyang during which he met with senior North Korean officials. Perry, who since December 1998 has been authoring a comprehensive review of the US policy toward North Korea, indicates that he will present his review to the president and Congress as early as July. [Note: Perry submits his report to Congress on 14 September.]

—Sarah Jackson-Han, "North Korea Envoy Briefs Congress, Postpones Policy Report Again," Agence France Presse, 10 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

23-24 June 1999

Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, meets with North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan in Beijing to discuss the recent visit of US inspectors to a suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri, progress of the four-party peace talks, and other issues related to the 1994 Agreed Framework. The talks also address recent reports that North Korea is preparing for another test-launch of a long-range ballistic missile.

—"U.S. and North Korea Discuss Pyongyang's Nuclear Plans," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 23 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Elisabeth Rosenthal, "U.S. And North Korea Meet on Suspected A-Site," *New York Times*, 24 June 1999, p. A5, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Robert J. Saiget, "North Korea And US Hold Second Day of Talks amid Nuclear Suspensions," Agence France Presse, 24 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

25 June 1999

Japan and South Korea hold working-level talks in Sapporo to discuss implementation of the KEDO light water reactor project. The talks focus on the contract between KEDO and KEPCO, the primary contractor for the light water reactor project.

—Kyodo News Service, 24 June 1999, in "Japan, South Korea to Hold Talks on Reactors for North," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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25-26 June 1999

The US, Japan, and South Korea hold a meeting of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) in Washington to coordinate their policies on North Korea amid rising tension on the Korean Peninsula following a naval clash on 15 June. The delegations are headed by Wendy Sherman, councilor for the US State Department, Ryozi Kato, director-general of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, and Chang Chae Ryong, deputy minister of foreign affairs and trade.

—Yonhap News Agency, 27 June 1999, in "ROK, US, Japan Repeat Pledge for Engagement Policy," FBIS Document FTS19990627000023; "Han-Mi-II Taebukchoyul 3 Ch'a Koui Chongch'aekhyobui Naeilbut'o Washington So," *Chosun Ilbo*, 24 June 1999, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

25 June 1999

US State Department spokesman James Rubin announces the US inspection team witnessed no effort by North Korea to conceal the site at Kumch'ang-ri during the May 1999 visit. He says that the site was incomplete and that there was no equipment present during the inspectors' visit. Furthermore, additional work remained to be completed, as almost all of the tunnels were still bare rock. Rubin dismisses allegations that nuclear equipment could have been removed prior to the inspectors' arrival. Rather, he says that Kumch'ang-ri was at a stage of construction at which no other equipment other than construction equipment would be expected to be present. Rubin concludes that the site does not contain a plutonium-production reactor or reprocessing plant, either completed or under construction. Given the size and configuration of Kumch'ang-ri and the type of graphite-moderated reactor North Korea previously built in Yongbyon-kun, the site is not suitable for a reprocessing plant. "Nevertheless," Rubin adds, "Since the site is a large underground area, it could support a facility in the future with substantial modifications." At present, however, Kumch'ang-ri does not violate the Agreed Framework.

—"State Department Regular Briefing," Federal News Service, 25 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

30 June 1999

Japan's upper house of the Diet approves \$1 billion for the KEDO light water reactor project, thus clearing the way for Tokyo to send the much needed funds to KEDO. Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura says that Japan hopes "North Korea will take it [the Diet approval] positively." However, Komura warns that Japan would find it difficult to send the funds if North Korea test launches another long-range missile. [Note: On 3 June, the lower house of the Diet unanimously approved the funds.]

—Kyodo News Service, 30 June 1999, in "Japan: Diet Approves Warns North Korea on Missiles," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 30 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

1 July 1999

A senior US government official says that even if North Korea test-fires another long-range missile, the United States, Japan, and South Korea should adhere to their commitments under the 1994 Agreed Framework. In the case of such a missile launch, the official says, the United States, Japan, and South Korea should "coordinate a response that will seek to, as much as possible, preserve our national security interests and not lead to the rupture of the Agreed Framework."

—Paul Flatin, "U.S. Wants KEDO Preserved Even If 2nd Missile Launched," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 July 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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2 July 1999

South Korea signs a contract with KEDO to provide \$3.2 billion for the light water reactor project. The contract is signed by Chang Son Sop, South Korea's representative to KEDO, and KEDO Executive Director Desaix Anderson. According to an official from South Korea's Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project, South Korea will provide the funds in won, at a fixed rate of 1,100 won per dollar. [Note: The contract is unanimously approved by the National Assembly on 12 September.]

—"S. Korea, KEDO Sign Agreement for Financing by Seoul," Japan Economic Newswire, 1 July 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency, 2 July 1999, in "South Korea to Pay in Won for North's Reactor Project," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2 July 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yu Kwang Chong, "Hanguk, Puk Kyongsuro Konsolbi 70% Chiwon," *Joongang Ilbo*, 3 July 1999, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

4 July 1999

Kyodo News Service, quoting a senior Japanese Foreign Ministry source, reports that Tokyo has not ruled out freezing financial contributions to the KEDO light water reactor project if North Korea test-fires another long-range missile.

—"Japan May Freeze Funding If N. Korea Launches Missile," Japan Economic Newswire, 4 July 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

6 July 1999

South Korean Ambassador to Japan Kim Sok Kyu urges Tokyo not to freeze contributions to the KEDO light water reactor project even if North Korea test-fires another long-range ballistic missile. Addressing the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's Research Committee on Foreign Affairs, Kim says that freezing KEDO funds "is not the best policy from a diplomatic point of view."

—"Japan Should Keep KEDO Program Intact: ROK Amb. Kim," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 6 July 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Envoy Concerned with Possible Freezing of KEDO Funds," Japan Economic Newswire, 6 July 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

6 July 1999

Japanese Ambassador to the United States Kunihiro Saito announces that Washington understands Tokyo's position that it would be difficult to continue funding the KEDO light water reactor project should Pyongyang conduct another long-range missile test.

—"No Gap between Japan, U.S. over KEDO, Japan Envoy Says," Japan Economic Newswire, 6 July 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

6 July 1999

KEDO's Executive Board meets in New York to resolve issues related to signing loan agreements between member states and KEDO.

—"Korea to Provide \$3.22 Billion Loan for Light-Water Reactor," *Korea Economic Weekly*, 8 July 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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13 July 1999

Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka announces that "should North Korea fire another Taepodong missile, it would be extremely difficult [for Japan] to contribute to KEDO, as gaining public understanding on funding would be hard."

—Kyodo News Service, 13 July 1999, in "Japan May Freeze Reactor Funds If North Korea Fires Missile," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 13 July 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

13-14 July 1999

Senior officials from the United States, Japan, and South Korea meet in Tokyo to coordinate policies on North Korea. During the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting, the three nations agree to work together to deter North Korea from testing another long-range ballistic missile. According to an official from the Japanese Foreign Ministry, the three nations will face similar domestic problems in funding KEDO if North Korea shows signs of preparing for a missile launch.

—Kyodo News Service, 14 July 1999, in "Tokyo, Seoul Agree to Deter North Korea's Missile Test," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 14 July 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

14 July 1999

Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi warns that "if North Korea fires [another Taepodong missile], it will be difficult to gain public understanding for our cooperation with KEDO." Addressing the lower house of the Diet, Obuchi adds, "In practical terms, that would make it very difficult for the government to contribute to KEDO."

—Koichi Iitake, "Obuchi KEDO Cut-Off an Option If Pyongyang Fires Missile," Asahi News Service, 14 July 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

Mid-July 1999

South Korea establishes sound detection stations in Kang'won Province that are capable of detecting a nuclear test explosion in North Korea. The stations, located near the demilitarized zone and consisting of four ultra-low frequency reception facilities, are set one kilometer apart and are capable of detecting explosions up to 1,000km away.

—"Seoul Sets Up Observation Station Able to Detect NK's Test of Atomic Bomb," *Korea Times*, 17 August 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

20 July 1999

LG-Caltex Oil Corp delivers 32,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea. This is the sixth oil delivery to North Korea since Pyongyang agreed to freeze its graphite moderated nuclear program in exchange for two light water reactors and 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil per year to meet its interim energy needs.

—Yonhap News Agency, 16 July 1999, in "Koreas: LG Caltex to Send Heavy Oil to North 20 July," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 16 July 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

21 July 1999

Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura meets with Desaix Anderson, executive director of KEDO, and reiterates Tokyo's position that it would find it difficult to continue funding KEDO if North Korea tests another long-

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range missile.

—Kyodo News Service, 21 July 1999, in "Japan: North Korea Reactor Body Chief Calls for Continued Contributions," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 22 July 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Japan Ready to Freeze Fund for North Korea If Missile Is Launched," Agence France Presse, 21 July 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

21 July 1999

The US House of Representatives passes an amendment to the Fiscal Year 2000 International Relations Authorization Act that predicates US nuclear cooperation with North Korea on the latter's compliance with the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and the 1994 Agreed Framework. The amendment, named the North Korea Nuclear Threat Act of 1999, passes by a 305-120 vote in the House of Representatives. The bill is based on a similar amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999, but unlike the 1999 appropriations bill, the North Korea Threat Reduction Act requires congressional approval of the President's certification that North Korea is complying with the requirements. In addition, it carries no provision for waiving the preconditions for nuclear cooperation should they not be met. [Note: Congressmen Benjamin Gilman originally proposed the North Korea Threat Reduction Act on 19 May.]

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 22 July 1999, in "US Passes Bill to Restrict Nuclear Cooperation with DPRK," FBIS Document FTS19990721001756; "North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999," Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Special Report, 20 May 1999, www.nyu.edu.

26 July 1999

US Secretary of State Madeline Albright, South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Hong Sun Yong, and Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura meet on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The three foreign ministers issue a joint statement warning Pyongyang that if it launches another long-range missile, "it would adversely affect peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and beyond, and would have serious negative consequences" for North Korea. While the three foreign ministers do not specify what consequences would follow a missile launch, Komura reiterated Tokyo's threat to freeze contributions to KEDO if Pyongyang tests another missile.

—Tom Raum, "U.S., Japan and S. Korea Join In Issueing Missile Challenge to N. Korea," Associated Press, 26 July 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kohei Murayama, "Japan Reiterates Possible Freeze of KEDO Funding," Japan Economic Newswire, 26 July 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "United States, Japan, ROK Warn N. Korea on Missile Launch," *Korea Times*, 27 July 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

26 July 1999

A North Korea Foreign Ministry spokesman says that North Korea has "sincerely fulfilled" its obligations under the 1994 the US-North Korea Agreed Framework. "The US, however," the spokesman says, "has neglected the implementation the DPRK-US Agreed Framework." The spokesman warns that "if the United States wishes to abrogate the Agreed Framework on the pretext of the DPRK's satellite launch, which has nothing to do with the framework, we will be compelled to take a relevant measure."

—"US Urged to Show Faith," Korean Central News Agency, 26 July 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mi'gug'i Shin'ui'rul Po'i'myon Shin'uiittkye Taehalgos'ida/Oemusongdaebyon'in," Korean Central News Agency, 26 July 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

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2 August 1999

The US State Department says that the United States will abide by its commitments under the 1994 Agreed Framework even if North Korea conducts another long-range missile test. State Department spokesman James Rubin says, "The Agreed Framework is a very important instrument that benefits the security of the United States...and we would intend and want to see that program and agreement continued, even if we have problems and serious concerns about the missiles."

—"State Department Regular Briefing," Federal News Service, 2 August 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

3 August 1999

New Zealand pledges an additional \$795,000 to KEDO. Foreign Minister Don McKinnon announces the pledge, saying, "KEDO is a major plank in moves to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and can also play an important role in improving relations between North and South Korea."

—"New Zealand Commits More Funds to KEDO," Japan Economic Newswire, 3 August 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

5 August 1999

South Korean Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Hong Sun Yong tells the National Assembly's Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee that Seoul intends to continue supporting the KEDO light water reactor project even if North Korea tests another long-range missile.

—Shin Yong Bae, "Hong Reaffirms KEDO Project Will Continue," *Korea Herald*, 6 August 1999, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

5-9 August 1999

Representatives from the United States, China, and the two Koreas meet in Geneva for the sixth round of four-party peace talks aimed at replacing the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement with a formal peace treaty. The talks once again fail to make significant progress reportedly due to North Korea's continuing insistence that the talks address US troop withdrawal from South Korea. Despite the lack of noticeable progress, the four nations, in a joint statement, describe the talks as "useful and productive."

—Konstantin Pribytkov, "New Round of Korea Talks Opens in Tense Air," ITAR-TASS, 5 August 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Geir Moulson, "North Korea Expresses Frustration as Latest Talks Wind Up," AAP News, 10 August 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

6 August 1999

The *Washington Times* reports that North Korea is providing military assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in exchange for uranium ore from the Congo's Shinkolabwe uranium mine. According to the paper, Pentagon intelligence agents have witnessed hundreds of North Korean military advisors training the forces of Congolese President Laurent Kabila. [In September, the South Korean Ministry of Defense submits a report to the National Assembly stating that 147 North Korean military officers are in the Democratic Republic of Congo.]

—Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "North Koreans in Congo," *Washington Times*, 6 August 1999, p. A6, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "NK Sends 442 Military Officers Overseas for Dollars," *Korea Times*, 28 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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12 August 1999

The South Korean National Assembly unanimously approves a loan of \$3.2 billion [to be paid in won] to fund the KEDO light water reactor project. The loans, to be provided through the Inter-Korea Cooperative Fund, will cover 70 percent of the estimated \$4.6 billion project.

—"House Passes KEDO Assistance Law," *Korea Times*, 12 August 1999, www.koreatimes.com; "S Korea's Parliament Approves Funds for Nuclear Reactors in North," Associated Press, 12 August 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

16 August 1999

The South Korean Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project announces that preliminary site preparation in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o will be extended until 15 December. An official from the office says that delays in negotiations among the nations responsible for financing the KEDO project have in turn delayed the conclusion of a contract between KEDO and KEPCO, the primary contractor for the project.

—"Construction of Reactors in North Delayed," *Korea Herald*, 17 August 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

16-28 August 1999

The US and South Korea hold the joint military exercise "Ulchi Focus Lens." Pyongyang condemns the exercise as a rehearsal for an invasion of North Korea, and threatens to take "corresponding measures" if the United States and South Korea insist on creating tension on the peninsula.

—"UN Generals Seek Tension-Easing Measures from North Korea," Agence France Presse, 17 August 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "DPRK FM Spokesman on "Ulji Focus Lens" Military Drill," Korean Central News Agency, 16 August 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "<Ulchi P'ok'o'su Renju> Hapdonggungsayonsub'ul Kyut'an/Chop'yongt'ong Taebyon'in," Korean Central News Agency, 16 August 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency, 16 August 1999, in "Koreas: North Foreign Ministry Decries 'Ulchi Focus Lens' Exercise," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 16 August 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

18 August 1999

South Korean President Kim Dae Jung tells visiting Japanese official Taku Yamasaki that the 1994 Agreed Framework and KEDO are vital to ensuring that North Korea does not develop nuclear weapons. Kim also urges Japan not to follow through with its threat to freeze funding for the KEDO light water reactor project if North Korea tests another long-range missile.

—"KEDO Framework Needs to Be Maintained: S Korea's Kim," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 18 August 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "2002 Nyon Woldkoptaehoe Apso Akihito Ilhwang Panghan Kidae," *Taehan Maeil*, 19 August 1999, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

23 August 1999

The *Los Angeles Times* quotes a US official as saying that "it is highly probable" that North Korean technicians are working in Pakistani nuclear labs in a continuing deal between the two countries in which nuclear technology is exchanged for missile technology and components.

—Dexter Filkins, "N. Korea Aid to Pakistan Raises Nuclear Fears," *Los Angeles Times*, 23 August 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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24 August 1999

Pyongyang claims that the United States is purposefully delaying the construction of two light water reactors in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o, and threatens to restart its graphite-moderated nuclear program if the United States continues such delays. A *Rodong Sinmun* commentary states that "the light water reactor construction is not a matter that the United States has a choice of living up to or not. It is an inescapable duty of the United States that accompanies the DPRK-US Framework Agreement." The paper adds that "forcibly connecting our peaceful launch of an artificial satellite with the light water reactor construction is no different from refusing to continue the light water reactor construction." If the United States continues to delay the construction of the light water reactors as it does now and does not actively take steps to build the light water reactors as scheduled," the commentary warns, "we will have to take corresponding steps." Later the same day, US State Department spokesman James Foley refutes the claim, saying, "The United States is meeting all of its obligations under the Agreed Framework and remains committed to the light water reactor project." Foley adds, "The burden-sharing agreement reached last August among KEDO members does not contain any commitment by the United States to contribute to the light water reactor project."

—"U.S. Attitude on LWR Project Assailed," Korean Central News Agency, 24 August 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Kyongsurodaesanggonsollo Kin'gupdaech'aek Yogu/Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 24 August 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 24 August 1999, in "North Korea Threatens Action Against Delay of Agreed Framework with USA," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 24 August 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "US Abiding by North Korea Nuclear Deal: State Department," Agence France Presse, 24 August 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

25 August 1999

Chang Son Sop, chief South Korean representative to KEDO, announces that construction of two light water reactors in Shinp'o will begin by the end of the year. According to Chang, the project will be accelerated due to North Korea's threat to abandon the 1994 Agreed Framework if construction on the reactors continues to be stalled.

—Paul Shin, "Reactor Project to Be Sped Up to Allay North Korean Complaint," Associated Press, 25 August 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

3 September 1999

KEDO's Executive Board meets in New York and agrees to try to start construction on the two light water reactors in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o by the end of the year. In this regard, the board, comprising the United States, EU, South Korea, and Japan, resolves to hold talks with KEPCO, the primary contractor of the project, as soon as possible to finalize arrangements for the commencement of reactor construction.

—"KEDO Aims to Start Work on New N. Korean Reactors by Year-End," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 4 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

6 September 1999

Mexico announces that it will donate \$100,000 for heavy fuel oil deliveries to North Korea. The pledge is made at the request of Japan.

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—"Mexico to Donate Petroleum to DPRK," Xinhua News Agency, 6 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

6 September 1999

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, warns the United States not to delay the KEDO light water reactor project, claiming, "if the construction of the light water reactor project is delayed, the United States will be held wholly responsible for it." The paper adds, "The light water reactor construction is an unavoidable commitment of the United States under the DPRK-US Agreed Framework." The daily also accuses the United States of failing to live up to certain commitments in the Agreed Framework such as its pledge to ease economic sanctions against North Korea.

—"U.S. Urged to Push Ahead with LWR Project in Responsible Manner," Korean Central News Agency, 6 September 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Kyongsurodaesanggonsol'un Mi'gug'i Ch'aeg'imjigo Haeya Handa/Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 6 September 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

7-12 September 1999

Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan meet in Berlin to discuss various bilateral issues. Kartman reportedly proposes talks between nuclear experts from the United States and North Korea to monitor and assess implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. The two sides issue a joint-statement at the conclusion of the talks in which they pledge "to preserve a positive atmosphere conducive to improve bilateral relations and to peace and security in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region."

—"North Korea's Kang to Visit U.S. for High-Level Talks," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 16 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; *Chosun Ilbo*, 18 September 1999, in "North Korea Reportedly Finishes Sealing Spent Nuclear Fuel Rods," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

12 September 1999

US President Bill Clinton, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, and Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi issue a joint statement saying that the three nations are prepared "to undertake measures to improve their respective relations" with North Korea. The three leaders issue the statement before the opening of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Auckland, New Zealand.

—"3 Nations Show Readiness to Promote Ties with N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 11 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

14 September 1999

William Perry, coordinator of US policy on North Korea, presents his report on North Korea to the Congress in which he advises Washington to take steps to normalize relations with North Korea and ease economic sanctions, while urging Pyongyang to allay international concerns about its nuclear and missile programs. In the secret report, Perry states that it is necessary for the United States to obtain a reliable guarantee from North Korea that it will suspend its nuclear and missile programs. The report also says that should North Korea abandon the 1994 Agreed Framework, it would be able to produce a "significant number" of nuclear weapons each year. Perry also issues the threat that Pyongyang "needs to understand that there are certain forms of provocative behavior that represent a direct threat to the United States and its allies and that we will respond appropriately." Both South Korea and

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Japan voice their support of the Perry Report. [Note: Perry's report is the culmination of a 10-month effort beginning in December 1999 and including multiple consultations with Seoul, Tokyo, and Pyongyang. The quotes are taken from the unclassified version of the report released on 12 October.]

—Philip Shannon, "Panel Urges Stepped-Up Attention to Ties with North Korea," *New York Times*, 15 September 1999, p. A5; "Perry Submits Report to US Congress," *Korea Times*, 15 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; George Gedda, "Perry Urges Normal Relations with North Korea If Conditions Met," Associated Press, 15 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Japan Expresses Strong Support for Perry Report," Japan Economic Newswire, 16 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; George Gedda, "Pyongyang Capable of Producing 'Significant Number' of Nuclear Weapons, Report Says," Associated Press, 12 October 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Matthew Lee, "US Warns North Korea Against Abandoning Path Towards Peace," Agence France Presse, 12 October 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

15 September 1999

North Korea accuses the United States of deploying more than 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons and a large number of depleted uranium bombs in South Korea. The accusation comes from a White Paper on US strategic weapons issued by North Korea's National Reunification Institute.

—"White Paper on Deployment of DPRK-Targeted Strategic Weapons," Korean Central News Agency, 15 September 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Konghwa'gug'ul Wihyopha'nun Chollyangmugibaebishilt'ae/Cho'gukt'ong'ilyon'guwon Paekso," Korean Central News Agency, 15 September 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

17 September 1999

US President Bill Clinton announces an easing of some US sanctions on North Korea, allowing most consumer goods to be available for exports and permitting the imports to the United States of North Korean commodities. Restrictions on the transfer of dual-use, civilian-military technology and military exports will remain in force. [Note: On 19 June 2000, the Bureau of Export Administration implements President Clinton's statement and amends the Export Administration Regulations.]

—David A. Sanger, "Trade Sanctions on North Korea Are Eased by U.S.," *New York Times*, 18 September 1999 p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Clinton Lifts North Korea Trade Sanctions; Tied to Missile Pledge," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 17 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

19 September 1999

A South Korean official announces that "the cleaning of debris and remnants in the water tank of the spent fuel rods in the No. 2 reactor [the 5MW(e) reactor] in Yongbyon-kun, has been completed, which indicates that the work of sealing the spent-fuel rods has virtually been completed."

—*Chosun Ilbo*, 18 September 1999, in "North Korea Reportedly Finishes Sealing Spent Fuel Rods," FBIS Document FTS19990919000132, 19 September 1999.

19 September 1999

A *Rodong Sinmun* commentary claims that the US talk about countering a nuclear attack by North Korea is merely intended as a pretext for a pre-emptive US nuclear strike.

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—"U.S. Anti-DPRK Provocative Remarks Blasted," Korean Central News Agency, 19 September 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mi'gug'un Choltaero Uri'rul Ojjoji Mothanda/Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 19 September 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

20 September 1999

The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a summary statement of Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei reconfirming the validity of the nuclear safeguards agreement North Korea signed with the agency in 1992. ElBaradei reports no change since the last board of governors meeting in June of Pyongyang's progress in implementing the safeguards agreement. The board of governors urges North Korea to implement the safeguards agreement as soon as possible.

—Yonhap News Agency, 21 September 1999, in "IAEA Urges North Korea to Carry Out Nuclear Safety Measures," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 21 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency, 21 September 1999, in "IAEA Expresses 'Concern' Over North Korea's Non-Cooperation," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 21 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

24 September 1999

Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi tells William Perry, coordinator of US policy on North Korea, that Japan "wholeheartedly supports the contents of the Perry Report." [Note: Perry's report, submitted to the US Congress on 14 September, calls for normalizing ties with North Korea in exchange for a pledge from Pyongyang to halt its nuclear and missile programs.]

—Kyodo News Service, 24 September 1999, in "Premier Meets US Envoy Perry, Expresses Support for North Korea Policy," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

25 September 1999

Approximately 30 delegates from the United States, Japan, South Korea, and KEPCO meet with North Korean officials in Pyongyang to discuss pending issues concerning the KEDO light water reactor project.

—Kim Ji Ho, "KEDO to Hold Experts' Meeting in N.K. Sept. 25," *Korea Herald*, 21 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

27 September 1999

At the opening session of the IAEA General Assembly, Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei says, "the agency remains unable to verify that all nuclear material subject to safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been declared to the agency." ElBaradei adds that 12 rounds of IAEA-North Korean talks have shown "no progress on important issues." Without necessary information, ElBaradei says, "it will be difficult, if not impossible, to verify in the future compliance by the DPRK with its safeguards agreement."

—Michael Thurston, "Iraq, N Korea Urged to Come Clean on Nuclear Stocks," Agence France Presse, 27 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Michael Thurston, "IAEA Laments Lack of Nuclear Cooperation by N Korea, Iraq," Agence France Presse, 27 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

29 September-1 October 1999

Representatives from KEDO and KEPCO, the main contractor for the KEDO light water reactor project, meet with

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North Korean officials to discuss technical issues related to beginning construction of the reactors. During the meeting, KEDO and North Korea sign a memorandum of understanding on environmental protection and indemnification.

—"KEDO, N. Korea to Hold Expert-Level Talks from Wed.," Japan Economic Newswire, 27 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Shin Song T'aek, "KEDO Saopkwa Nam-Pukhan Wonjaryok Hyopnyok," *Chugan'gukpangnondan*, 9 April 2001; Lee Sok U, "yongsuro Pon'gongsa T'ongshin · T'onghaeng Hyob'ui," *Taeahan Maeil*, 28 September 1999, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

30 September 1999

Mexico's donation of \$100,000 worth of heavy fuel oil to KEDO arrives in Japan en route to North Korea.

—"Mexico's Oil Donation to KEDO to Arrive in Japan," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 29 September 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

October 1999

The US Congress approves \$35 million for heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea. However, President Clinton's proposed budget for fiscal year 2000 called for \$55 million to be spent on the oil shipments.

—Yonhap News Agency, 7 October 1999, in "Koreas: US State Department Concerned Over North Reactor Body Budget," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7 October 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

1 October 1999

The IAEA adopts a resolution at its 43rd regular session of its General Assembly calling on North Korea to comply with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The IAEA urges North Korea to cooperate fully in the implementation of its safeguards commitments, and to enable the IAEA to verify North Korea's initial report on its nuclear materials subject to safeguards.

—"Implementation of the Agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Resolution Adopted on 1 October 1999 during the Ninth Plenary Meeting," International Atomic Energy Agency, 1 October 1999, www.iaea.org.

4 October 1999

CNN, citing unnamed Pentagon sources, reports that during 1994, the US planned a pre-emptive air strike against North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Complex. President Bill Clinton was reportedly briefed on the option on 15 June 1994, but before he could order the air strike, former President Jimmy Carter telephoned from Pyongyang with news that North Korea was prepared to accept a deal to curtail its graphite-moderated nuclear program.

—Wolf Blitzer and Jamie McIntyre, "Report Suggests U.S. Faced Armed Conflict with North Korea in 1994," CNN The World Today, 4 October 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

5 October 1999

KEDO holds its annual general meeting in New York. After the meeting, Marc Vogelaar, KEDO's director for public and external promotion and support, announces that KEDO is ready to begin construction on the two light water reactors. Vogelaar also tells reporters that the start up date for the first reactor is 2003.

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—"Construction of Nuclear Reactors in N Korea Gets The Go-Ahead," Agence France Presse, 5 October 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; *Chosun Ilbo*, 6 October 1999, in "KEDO: Construction of Light-Water Reactors to Start Soon," FBIS Document FTS19991006001030, 6 October 1999; "Puk Kyongsuro'gonsol Cho'man'gan Shijak," *Segye Ilbo*, 7 October 1999, p. 11, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

5 October 1999

North Korean Ambassador to India Pak Myong Ku denies that North Korea has traded nuclear or missile technologies with Pakistan. [Note: Accusations about possible exchanges of nuclear technology for missile technology surfaced when a North Korean ship was seized by Indian port authorities. The ship, suspected of heading to Pakistan, contained materials related to ballistic missiles. Pak claims that the shipment was bound for an unnamed Gulf state and carried only material to repair and service missiles. However, further evidence suggests missile trade between the two nations. For instance, the similarity of Pakistan's Ghauri missile to North Korea's Nodong suggests the former is merely an identical copy of the latter. Experts believe that if missile trade exists between the two nations, Pakistan, a nation lacking hard currency, might pay for North Korea's missile technology by exporting its superior nuclear weapons technology.]

—PTI News Agency (New Delhi), 6 October 1999, in "India: North Korean Ambassador Denies Nuclear, Missile Dealings with Pakistan," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 6 October 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

6 October 1999

US State Department spokesman James Rubin, commenting on Congress's approval of only \$35 million of President Clinton's requested \$55 million for oil deliveries to North Korea, says that the budget cut could negatively affect implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework.

—"State Department Regular Briefing," Federal News Service, 6 October 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency, 7 October 1999, in "Koreas: US State Department Concerned over North Reactor Body Budget," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7 October 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

8 October 1999

National delegations attending a conference in Vienna on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) adopt a resolution calling on North Korea, India and Pakistan to sign the treaty as soon as possible. While North Korea, India and Pakistan are the only three states with nuclear capabilities that have yet to sign the CTBT, the resolution singles out North Korea as the only nuclear capable nation that has not yet even expressed a willingness to sign the treaty.

—Yonhap News Agency, 8 October 1999, in "International Conference Urges North Korea to Sign Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 8 October 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Urged to Sign CTBT at Int'l Conference," *Korea Herald*, 9 October 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

12 October 1999

The *Times* (London) reports that for the past month North Korean military personnel have been spotted in various regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo, including the Shinkolobwe uranium mine. Hanneline De Beers, a South African researcher quoted in the report, says that while the presence of the North Koreans in Congo has been known for a while, "it is not clear whether they are providing personal security for President Kabila, training

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his fighters, or working at the uranium mine."

—Michael Dynes, "North Korea Trains Kabila Troops," *Times* (London), 12 October 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

12 October 1999

Washington releases an unclassified version of William Perry's policy recommendations for dealing with North Korea. In the report, the culmination of 10 months of research and consultations, Perry recommends that Washington take steps to normalize relations with North Korea in exchange for a reliable pledge from Pyongyang to halt its nuclear weapons and missile programs.

—"U.S. Releases Perry Report on N. Korean Policy," Japan Economic Newswire, 12 October 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; George Gedda, "Pyongyang Capable of Producing 'Significant Number' of Nuclear Weapons, Report Says," Associated Press, 12 October 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Matthew Lee, "US Warns North Korea Against Abandoning Path Towards Peace," Agence France Presse, 12 October 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

13 October 1999

The US General Accounting Office (GAO) issues a report claiming that heavy fuel oil sent to North Korea to meet its energy needs until the completion of two light water reactors has been diverted. The GAO report says, "State Department officials have acknowledged that there is some evidence that perhaps 5 percent of the heavy fuel oil has been used for unauthorized purposes." While the State Department and KEDO have monitoring equipment installed at seven approved heating and electrical generating plants in North Korea, frequent power outages severely limit the effectiveness of the monitoring equipment. [Note: GAO presented the report to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on 30 September.]

—"Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of Heavy Fuel Oil Delivered to North Korea Under the Agreed Framework," United States General Accounting Office, GAO/RCED-99-276, 30 September 1999; Yonhap News Agency, 14 October 1999, in "USA Unable to Verify Proper Use of Heavy Fuel to North Korea," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 14 October 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

13 October 1999

Benjamin Gilman, chairman of the US House of Representatives International Relations Committee, says that North Korea may be pursuing a nuclear weapons program based on highly enriched uranium despite the 1994 Agreed Framework. Speaking at a committee hearing attended by US Policy Coordinator for North Korea William Perry, Gilman says, "My greatest fear is that this unpredictable regime in Pyongyang will combine its covert nuclear weapons program with an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking the United States-and our policy will have failed to prevent it."

—"Hearing of the House International Relations Committee; Subject: U.S. Policy Towards North Korea," Federal News Service, 13 October 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency, 14 October 1999, in "US Congressman Says North Korea May Still Be Pursuing Nuclear Programme," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 14 October 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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14 October 1999

Chang Son Sop, director of South Korea's Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project, says that while KEDO-KEPCO negotiations are in the final stages, there is only a fifty percent chance that the contract will be completed in time to begin construction on the two light water reactors by the end of the year.

—"ROK Official Hints at Delay in KEDO Project," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 14 October 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

18 October 1999

North Korea condemns the upcoming "Foal Eagle" US-South Korean joint military exercise to be held from 26 October to 5 November. North Korea says, "The projected US war maneuvers are a clear indication that it is unwilling to implement the DPRK-US Agreed Framework and ease tension on the Korean Peninsula." The North also warns that "the United States must be wholly responsible for the adverse impact the war maneuvers will have on the situation on the Korean Peninsula and DPRK-US relations."

—"Projected 'Foal Eagle' War Maneuvers," Korean Central News Agency, 18 October 1999, www.kcna.co.jp;

"<Toksuri> Yonsuppinan/Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 18 October 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

20 October 1999

The North Korean Foreign Ministry calls on the United States to take steps to implement the 1994 Agreed Framework as soon as possible. A spokesman for the ministry criticizes Washington for having taken an "insincere" approach to the agreement and only paying "lip service" to its promises to construct two light water reactors and provide 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil per year until the completion of the reactors.

—"FM Spokesman on LWR Project," Korean Central News Agency, 20 October 1999, www.kcna.co.jp;

"Chomi'gibonhab'uumun 5 Nyon'gwa Kwallyonhayo Tamhwa/Oemusong Taebyon'in," Korean Central News Agency, 20 October 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

23 October 1999

South Korea's KBS Radio reports that Russian authorities are currently detaining several trains at Khasan Station because of detected amounts of radiations. The detained trains regularly traveled from Russia to Najin-Sonbong [Nason], North Korea.

—Kim Su Kwan, KBS Radio (Seoul), 23 October 1999, in "'Radioactive' Trains Said Heading for North Korea's Special Economic Zone," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 October 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

1-2 November 1999

KEDO and South Korea's Export-Import Bank hold working level talks in Seoul to finalize the loan agreement for South Korea's \$3.2 billion [to be paid in South Korean won] contribution to the light water reactor project.

—"KEDO, KEPCO to Sign Turn-Key Pact," *Korea Times*, 4 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

2 November 1999

Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono announces that Japan will resume charter flights to North Korea as the first step in easing sanctions on North Korea in exchange for addressing international concerns about its nuclear and missile programs.

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—"Japan to Ease North Korea Sanctions," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

3 November 1999

A group of senior Congressional Republicans presents a report labeling the 1994 Agreed Framework a failure. The report, written by the nine-member North Korea Advisory Group, claims that "there is significant evidence that undetected nuclear weapons development activity continues, including efforts to acquire uranium enrichment technologies and recent nuclear-related high explosive tests." Representative Ben Gilman, speaking at a press conference to unveil the report, says, "The comprehensive threat that's been posed by North Korea to our national security has increased since 1994." Gilman adds, "North Korea has not terminated or frozen its nuclear weapons program [and its] intercontinental ballistic missile program now poses a direct threat to the United States and the American people." [Note: The report, written at the request of House Speaker Dennis Hastert, contrasts sharply with William Perry's report which calls for a normalization of relations with North Korea. Congressional Democrats criticized Hastert for appointing only Republicans already critical of President Clinton's North Korean policy to write the report.]

—"N Korea Remains a Threat to Washington: US Lawmakers," Agence France Presse, 3 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; George Gedda, "Congressional Study Says North Korea Threat Increasing," Associated Press, 3 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kenji Urakami, "Republican Report Blasts U.S. Policy on N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 3 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

5 November 1999

An official from South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs questions the credibility of a report submitted by US Congressional Republicans on 3 November claiming that North Korea is actively pursuing nuclear weapons despite the 1994 Agreed Framework. The official claims that "the evidence Republicans presented is just a compilation of various suspicions which have already been raised by news media in the United States."

—"Seoul Skeptical about Report," *Korea Herald*, 5 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Mi Konghwa 'Pukhan Haekkaebal Kyesok Chunggo Itta'," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 5 November 1999, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr; "Migonghwa 'Taebukpogoso' Kwallyon Urijongbu Shigak," *Munhwa Ilbo*, 4 November 1999, p. 5, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

6 November 1999

The US completes its yearly commitment to provide 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea to meet its energy need until the completion of the first of two light water reactors being constructed KEDO.

—"U.S. Completes This Year's Shipment of Fuel Oil to N. Korea," *Korea Times*, 12 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

8-9 November 1999

The Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), comprising the United States, South Korea, and Japan, meets in Washington. The three delegations discuss coordinating policies on North Korea and implementing the comprehensive approach to North Korea recommended in the Perry Report. On 9 November, the three nations issue a joint statement in which they reaffirm their commitment to the Agreed Framework.

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—Shin Yong Bae, "Korea, U.S., Japan Urge P'yang to Take Steps to Improve Relations," *Korea Herald*, 11 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Three-Way Meeting Opens to Address Future US-NK Talks," *Korea Times*, 8 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

15 November 1999

The UN General Assembly adopts a resolution expressing deep concern over North Korea's failure to fully implement its nuclear safeguards agreement it signed with the IAEA in 1992. The resolution, adopted by a vote of 122 to 1, calls on North Korea to take all measures the IAEA deems necessary to verify the completeness and correctness of its initial declaration of nuclear material.

—"Assembly, Urging Global Cooperation with Atomic Energy Agency, Expresses Concern at Non-Compliance by Democratic People's Republic of Korea," UN Press Release GA/9657, 15 November 1999.

15-19 November 1999

Representatives from North Korea and the United States meet in Berlin to discuss various bilateral issues. According to South Korean officials, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan calls for the lifting of all US economic sanctions against North Korea and criticizes the delayed implementation of the partial lifting of US sanctions promised at the September meeting. The talks also addressed the itinerary, agenda, and various details of the proposed visit of a high-level North Korean official to the United States. The two sides adjourn the meeting on 19 November without making arrangements for a higher-level meeting or setting a date for further working-level consultations. [Note: According to a source close to the talks quoted by the Japanese Economic Newswire, the North Korean delegation criticizes the Perry Report, claiming that if North Korea to give up its missile and nuclear weapons program in exchange for only normalized relations, North Korea would be left in a "weak position." The source says that the North Korean delegation demanded that Washington show a willingness to negotiate US troop withdrawal from South Korea.]

—Yonhap News Agency, 18 November 1999, in "DPRK Calls for Lifting of Sanctions Before Meeting," FBIS Document FTS19991118000152, 18 November 1999; Michael Adler, "US, N Korea Discuss Visit to Washington," Agence France Presse, 15 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N Korea Demands Lifting Of All US Sanctions in Talks in Berlin: Report," Agence France Presse, 18 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 20 November 1999, in "North Korea, USA End Talks without Setting Date for Further Meeting," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 20 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Dissatisfied with Perry Report," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 January 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Puk Kim Kye Kwan Oemusong Busang Interview," *Segye Ilbo*, 15 November 1999, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr; "Puk · Mi Kouikuphoedam Chogi Kaech'oe," *Taehan Maeil*, 11 November 1999, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

16 November 1999

A South Korean government official says that North Korea is in the final stage of sealing over 8,000 spent-fuel rods from its 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yongbyon-kun.

—Yonhap News Agency, 16 November 1999, in "North Korea Almost Finished With Sealing Nuclear Fuel Rods," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 16 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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16 November 1999

Japan's Jiji Press reports that Pak Ok Kyong, former deputy chief of North Korea's Atomic Research Institute, recently defected to the United States. According to Jiji Press, Pak disappeared from Beijing in April while serving as a representative of the international intelligence investigation department of the Korean Workers' Party office. He subsequently requested political asylum in the United States while hiding in Ulan Bator, Mongolia. Pak reportedly has top secret knowledge about North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program.

—Shin Yong Bae, "Seoul Cannot Confirm Exile to U.S. of N.K. Nuke Expert," *Korea Herald*, 18 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; KBS Radio (Seoul), 16 November 1999, in "Ex-Nuclear Official Said to Seek Asylum in USA," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 18 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Puk Haekkaebal Haekshimgwalli Mi Mangmyongsol," *Chosun Ilbo*, 17 November 1999, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

18 November 1999

Dr. Shin Song T'aek, a researcher with the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, claims that since 1994 North Korea has stockpiled 40kg of plutonium. While this amount of plutonium is enough for 10 small nuclear weapons, Shin claims that Pyongyang will not develop several nuclear weapons due to its "one nuclear warhead strategy." Shin presents his conclusions, which are based on data from the CIA and a South Korean-US nuclear inspection team, at the Korea-Russia Defense Forum held in Seoul.

—Yonhap News Agency, 18 November 1999, in "Korea: South Researcher Claims North Has 40kg Of Plutonium," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 18 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Has Enough Plutonium for 10 Small Nuclear Bombs: Researcher," Agence France Presse, 18 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

21-22 November 1999

KEDO's Executive Board meets in New York to narrow differences between board members on a turn-key contract to be signed with KEPCO, the primary contractor of the light water reactor project. The board agrees to wrap up the turn-key contract before 15 December, the date site preparation work in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o is schedule to be completed.

—"KEDO Convenes Executive Council in New York," *Korea Times*, 22 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "KEDO Still Aims to Start Construction within 1999," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 24 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency, "South Korea, Japan, USA to Conclude Contract for North Korean Reactors," 25 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

22 November 1999

The *Washington Times* reports that U.S. intelligence agencies are concerned that the Democratic Republic of the Congo might be providing North Korean with uranium ore in exchange for training assistance provided to Congolese forces. North Korea could use the ore for a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

—Bill Gertz, "Tehran Sold Scud Missiles to Congolese; U.S. Spies Discover Systems," *Washington Times*, 22 November 1999, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

24 November 1999

The EU and North Korea hold working-level talks in Brussels to address various issues including nuclear

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nonproliferation and security on the Korean Peninsula.

—"EU, North Korea Talk Food Aid, Security Issues," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 24 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Miu Oikawa, "EU, N. Korea Hold Political Dialogue," Japan Economic Newswire, 25 November 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

29 November 1999

The US Senate passes into law the North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999 requiring the President to certify that Pyongyang is adhering to its commitments under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and the Agreed Framework before any funds may be given to KEDO. However, the Senate removes the precondition in the House version of the bill requiring congressional approval following presidential certification that North Korea is complying with the necessary requirements.

—Dianne E. Rennack, "Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current Law," CRS Report for Congress, 17 January 2001, p. 28.

December 1999

Codoleezza Rice, policy advisor to US presidential candidate George W. Bush, suggests that should Bush become president, the United States would take a more hard-line approach towards North Korea. In the January-February 2000 addition of *Foreign Affairs*, Rice says, "The United States must approach regimes like North Korea resolutely and decisively." Rice criticizes the Clinton administration for "sometimes threatening to use force and then backing down." What the United States must do, according to Rice, is clearly convey the message to Pyongyang that any attempt to use weapons of mass destruction would result in the destruction of North Korea.

—Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting National Interests," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2000, vol. 79, no. 1, pp. 45-62.

10 December 1999

North Korea denounces "conservative hard-liners of the United States" for issuing a report calling for a more confrontational approach to North Korea. The Korean Central News Agency claims that Pyongyang "will be compelled to change [its] stand if a policy, which is intended to disarm and lead the DPRK to change and 'collapse' is adopted in the US." North Korea adds, "If the US takes the road of military confrontation, we cannot but take all self-defensive measure corresponding to this." [Note: The report to which North Korea is referring, written by a group of senior Congressional Republicans, labels the 1994 Agreed Framework a failure. The report, written by the nine-member North Korea Advisory Group and presented to Congress on 3 November, claims that "there is significant evidence that undetected nuclear weapons development activity continues, including efforts to acquire uranium enrichment technologies and recent nuclear-related high explosive tests."]

—"KCNA on Remarks of U.S. Conservative Hard-Liners," Korean Central News Agency, 10 December 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

11 December 1999

Kyodo News Service reports that three Japanese firms, Mitsubishi Industries Ltd, Toshiba Corp, and Hitachi Ltd, will participate in the KEDO light water reactor project as subcontractors. According to a Japanese official quoted by Kyodo, the three firms will sign working agreements with KEPCO by the end of the month.

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—Kyodo News Service, 11 December 1999, in "Three Japanese Firms to Help Build North Korean Reactors," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 11 December 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

13 December 1999

KEDO's Executive Board meets in Tokyo and adopts a resolution allowing KEDO Executive Director Desaix Anderson to conclude a turnkey contract with KEPCO, the main contractor for the light water reactor project, on 15 December.

—"KEDO to Start N-Reactor Construction in N. Korea," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 13 December 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "KEDO Board to Begin Full Nuke Project in N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 13 December 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

Mid-December 1999

Representatives from the IAEA and North Korea meet in Vienna for the 13th round of talks addressing North Korea's failure to fully implement its nuclear safeguards agreement.

—"Still No Progress on N Korea Nuke Safely, Ahead of New Talks," Agence France Presse, 9 December 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

15 December 1999

KEDO and KEPCO sign a \$4.6 billion dollar turnkey contract in Seoul, allowing KEPCO to begin construction on the two light water reactors in Shinp'o. The contract, signed by KEDO Executive Director Desaix Anderson and KEPCO President Ch'oe Su Pyong, supercedes the preliminary works contract signed by KEDO and KEPCO in August 1997. [Note: While the turnkey contract is signed on 15 December, it does not become effective until 3 February 2000 when KEDO signs a contract with Japan's Bank of International Cooperation for \$1 billion in funding for the project.]

—"Kudos for KEDO: Contract Signed to Facilitate Construction of N-Reactors in N.K.," *Newsreview*, 18 December 1999, pp. 5-6; Sung Hun Choe, "North Korea getting Nuclear Reactors," Associated Press, 15 December 1999; "Officials Sign Landmark Deal to Build Reactors for North Korea," Agence France Press, 15 December 1999; "Nuclear Power for Peace," *Nuclear Engineering International*, October 2000, pp. 34-35; Chang Yong Hun, "<Taebuk Kyongsuro Konsolgongsa Hyonhwang>," Yonhap News Agency, 6 December 2001, www.yonhapnews.net; "North Korean Nuclear Reactor Treaty Signed in Seoul," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 15 December 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Light Water Reactor Project: Turnkey Contract," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org.

15 December 1999

Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono calls on North Korea "to fully cooperate with the IAEA and related nations to fulfill its obligations." Kono says that while Japan welcomes the signing of a turnkey contract between KEDO and KEPCO, North Korea must "clear up past suspicions over nuclear weapons developments" before KEDO will supply the reactors.

—Kyodo News Service, 15 December 1999, in "Japan Urges North Korea to Cooperate, 'Clear Up Past Suspicions'," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 15 December 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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15 December 1999

An official from South Korea's Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project announces that KEDO will not provide financial assistance to North Korea for the construction of a new electricity transmission and distribution system, which is necessary for the successful operation of the two KEDO light water reactors.

—"Gov't Denies Aid for NK Construction of Power Transmitter," *Korea Times*, 16 December 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

23 December 1999

North Korea calls on KEDO to pay compensation for losses incurred due to delays in constructing two light water reactors. A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry says, "If the reactors are not built as promised, losses stemming from freezing our own nuclear programs and the significant impact the delay has on our economy must be carefully calculated and accounted for. Other measures must also be taken to compensate us for these losses."

—"DPRK FM on Signing of Basic Contract on LWR Construction," Korean Central News Agency, 23 December 1999, www.kcna.co.jp; "Choson'oemusong Taebyon'in Kyongsurogonsol'ul Wihan Kibon'gyeyag'i Ch'egyoldoende On'gup," Korean Central News Agency, 23 December 1999, www.kcna.co.jp.

[Back to Top](#)

1998

Late 1990s

According to Outlook India.com, North Korea approaches Pakistan for "design information and technical support to set up a centrifuge enrichment plant."

—"Pak Despatched [sic] N-Material to N Korea This July," *Outlook India.com*, 6 December 2002, www.outlookindia.com.

1998

According to intelligence sources in the United States, South Korea, and Japan, North Korea constructs an explosive test site approximately 8km north of Kusong, and conducts at least two explosive tests of nuclear warhead triggering devices. [Note: CNS analysts believe this site is located in Kump'ung-ri (???), Kusong (???), North P'yon'an Province (????). While the test explosions do not entail an actual nuclear chain reaction, they would provide valuable information on whether the lens-shaped chemical explosives surrounding nuclear material in a warhead will explode simultaneously and maintain enough homogenous pressure to trigger a nuclear explosion.]

—*Yomiuri Shimbun*, 31 January 1999, p. 2, in "DPRK Succeeds in Nuclear Detonating Test," FBIS Document FTS19990131000289, 31 January 1999; *Korea Herald*, 24 November 1998, in "Anonymous Source on Evidence of DPRK Nuclear Activity," FBIS Document FTS19981123000779, 23 November 1998; Koichi Kosuge, "N. Korea Said Testing Nuke Trigger Devices," Asahi News Service, 24 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, http://web.lexis-nexis.com; Kim Min Sok, "North Korea Conducts Detonation Tests in Bid to Finish Developing Nuclear Bomb," *Chungang Ilbo*, 2 February 1999, in "Expert Claims DPRK Detonation Tests for Nuclear Bombs," FBIS Document FTS19990208000118,

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8 February 1999; Joseph S. Bermudez, "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure-Part One," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 1999, p. 38-39.

January 1998

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) issues a classified report stating that it has discovered a suspicious facility near Ha'gap, North Korea. According to the report, the facility, known as the "Ha'gap Unidentified Underground Complex," is a site "of an unconfirmed function, that possibly could be a nuclear weapons-related facility by 2003." The report states that the partially underground Ha'gap facility, which "could be intended as a nuclear production and/or storage site," contains 30 external buildings already completed, 5 external buildings in various stages of construction, and at least four tunnel entrances into the side of a hill.

—Eric Rosenberg, "U.S. Suspects North Korean Building is Nuclear Arms Facility," *Times Union* (Albany), 18 January 1998, p. F3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Joseph S. Bermudez, "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure-Part One," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 1999, p. 37.

3 January 1998

Yonhap News Agency, quoting an official of Kim Dae Jung's presidential transition team, reports that South Korean President-Elect Kim Dae Jung is urging the current South Korean government to ask Washington to share some of the light water reactor construction cost. Yonhap News Agency quotes the official as saying, "[South Korea's] burden should be reduced to the minimum in view of the financial difficulties we are suffering."

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 3 January 1998, in "South Korean Transition Team Wants USA to Share North Reactor Costs," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 January 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 January 1998

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, claims that various consultations between the United States and North Korea held in 1997 did not "come to fruition" because of the US "distrust and hostile policies against [North Korea]."

—"Confidence-Building Step Should Be Taken," Korean Central News Agency, 6 January 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mi'gug'un Shilloejosong'ul Wihan Haengdongjoch'irul Ch'wihaeya Handa/Rodongshinmun Ronp'yong," Korean Central News Agency, 6 January 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; "Measures Should Be Taken to Build Trust," *Rodong Sinmun*, 6 January 1998, in Korean Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 6 January 1998, in "Media on US Distrust, Hostile Policy Towards the Country," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 8 January 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 January 1998

LG-Caltex Oil Corp ships 22,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea. [Note: This is the eighth shipment of heavy fuel oil sent to North Korea since it agreed to freeze its nuclear program in 1994.]

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 12 January 1998, in "Koreas: LG-Caltex to Ship 22,000 Tons of Heavy Oil to North Korea," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 January 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15-18 January 1998

US Senator Carl Levin travels to North Korea to discuss progress in implementing the 1994 Agreed Framework.

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After talks with various North Korean officials, Levin visits the Yongbyon nuclear complex and verifies that North Korea is abiding by the freeze on its nuclear activities. He also confirms that the project to safely store 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods is "occurring successfully." Evans Revere, the designated head of the yet to be established US liaison office in North Korea, accompanies Levin and meets with North Korean officials to resolve matters related to setting up the liaison office. Revere does not return with Levin, remaining in Pyongyang until 25 January.

—Jason Neely, "Levin: N. Korea Nuke Shutdown on Track," United Press International, 19 January 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea 'Cautious' on Inter-Korean Dialogue: Sen. Levin," Japan Economic Newswire, 19 January 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lim Yun Suk, "US Senator Encouraged by Signs of Change in North Korea's Attitude," Agence France Presse, 19 January 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Senator to Visit Suspected N. Korean Nuke Site," Japan Economic Newswire, 15 January 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lucy S. Oh, "U.S. Officials Head to Asia to Study Crisis," *Daily Yomiuri*, 16 January 1998, p. 14, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 January 1998

Seoul announces that it will provide half of the \$45 million it promised to KEDO for preparatory work at the light water construction site in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o. Seoul says it will provide the funds from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund within the month, and the remaining 50 percent will be provided after the completion of site preparation.

—Yonhap News Agency, 16 January 1998, in "South to Provide Part of Promised Funds for North Reactor Site This Month," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 January 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kim Kwang Hyon, "Puk, Kyongsurokongsabi Nampukhyopnyokkigumso Chegong," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 16 January 1998, p. 5, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

18 January 1998

A South Korean Foreign Ministry official, commenting on a DIA classified report recently leaked to the press, announces that Seoul has yet to confirm whether or not the reported underground facility in Ha'gap, North Korea is related to a clandestine nuclear weapons program. The official says that both Seoul and Washington have been aware of the Ha'gap underground facility since 1993 but have yet to identify its function.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 18 January 1998, in "South Korean Official Says North's Nuclear Arms Development Not Confirmed," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 January 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lee Ch'ol Min, "'Puk, Chiha Haekshisol Konsol Kanungsong'/Mi Kukpangjongbo'guk Pimilmunso Kyonggo," *Chosun Ilbo*, 18 January 1998, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

20-23 January 1998

KEDO and North Korea hold expert-level talks in Pyongyang. The two sides discuss technical aspects of supplying the light water reactors.

—Korean Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 24 January 1998, in "Nuclear Energy Body Delegation Leaves after Talks," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 January 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Choson, Chosonbandoenerugigaebalgigu Chinhaeng, Pyongyangch'ulbal," Korean Central News Agency, 24 January 1998, www.kcna.co.jp.

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22 January 1998

Yu Myong Hwan, director general of the North American Bureau of the South Korean Foreign Ministry, says that Seoul has "secured information on the underground military complex in Ha'gap from both domestic and US intelligence agencies," and based on that intelligence, Seoul does not believe that the Ha'gap facility is related to a clandestine nuclear weapons program. [Note: On 18 January, the Times Union quotes a classified DIA report as saying that the partially underground facility in Ha'gap "could be intended as a nuclear production and/or storage site.]

—Yonhap News Agency, 22 January 1998, in "South's Spokesman Dismisses Report on North's Hagap Nuclear Facility," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 January 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Eric Rosenberg, "U.S. Suspects North Korean Building is Nuclear Arms Facility," *Times Union* (Albany), 18 January 1998, p. F3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lee T'ae Hui, "'Puk Ha'gap Chihashisol Haek Mugwan'/Chongbudangukcha Palkyo," *Hangyoreh Shinmun*, 23 January 1998, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

20 January 1998

US State Department spokesman James Rubin denies the report that "Ha'gap" is a nuclear-related facility. —"Ha'gapchigu Haekshisol Podo/Mi Kungmubu Nonp'yongso Puin," *Donga Ilbo*, 22 January 1998, p. 6, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

22 January 1998

US Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth meets with South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Song Yong Shik to discuss various issues related to North Korea such as preparations for the next round of four-party peace talks, the provision of food aid, and cost-sharing for the KEDO light water reactor project.

—"American, South Korean Officials Discuss North Korea," Associated Press, 22 January 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 20 January 1998, in "South Korean and US Officials to Discuss Four-Party Meeting Preparations," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 January 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Chon Sok Un, "Han · Mi · Il Taebukchongch'aek Hyobui/Idalmal Seoul So Ch'agwanbokup Hoedam" *Kukmin Ilbo*, 5 January 1998, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

2 February 1998

Yonhap News Agency quotes a senior official in President-Elect Kim Dae Jung's transition team as saying that South Korea's financial burden of the KEDO light water reactor project must be reduced from 70 percent of the total cost to 60 percent. According to the official, the presidential transition team has "demanded the government strongly urge the United States to share the financial burden for the reactor project."

—Yonhap News Agency, 2 February 1998, in "Transition Team Requests Smaller Share in DPRK Reactor," FBIS Document FTS 19980201000617, 1 February 1998.

3 February 1998

The US Department of Defense states that North Korea remains a "formidable" threat to South Korean security. In its Annual Defense Report submitted to the president and Congress, the Department also warns that "the pressure imposed by increasingly dire economic conditions in North Korea make this threat all the more unpredictable."

—US Department of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and Congress, 1998*; "U.S. Bracing for Continued N.

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Korean Threat," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 4 February 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Puk Kunsaryok At'aeso Kajang Kun Wihyop'/Mi Kukpangbu Pogoso," *Segye Ilbo*, 5 February 1998, p. 10, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

5 February 1998

US State Department spokesman James Rubin announces that the United States will not share the cost of constructing two light water reactor in [Kumho-chigu], Shimp'o. Rubin claims that despite the recent economic crisis in South Korea, it remains the world's 11th largest economy and is capable of financing a majority of the \$5.17 billion project. [Note: In 1995, South Korea agreed to finance a majority of the light water reactor construction in return for playing a central role in the project. However, the 1997 financial crisis and the subsequent IMF bailout have led Seoul to ask for larger contributions from the United States and Japan.] —Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 6 February 1998, in "US Government Will Not Share Light-Water Reactor Construction Cost, Says Official," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 February 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5-6 February 1998

KEDO's Executive Board meets in New York to discuss cost-sharing for the estimated \$5.17 billion light water reactor project. At the talks, South Korea reportedly asks the United States and Japan to fund a larger portion of the construction costs. According to one member of the South Korean delegation, "We are asking as a matter of principle the United States and Japan to take the burden off South Korea." In a statement issued at the conclusion of the two-day meeting, KEDO says the talks were "productive, and are part of an ongoing process that will continue." However, board members fail to resolve the issue of cost-sharing.

—"South Korea Asks U.S., Japan to Pay More for Nuclear Reactors," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 5 February 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KEDO Partners Hold 'Productive' Talks on Cost-Sharing," Agence France Presse, 6 February 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KEDO Partners Discuss Cost-Sharing," Agence France Presse, 5 February 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Denies Reports Seoul Wants Relief on Cost of N. Korean Reactor," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 5 February 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 February 1998

US President Bill Clinton submits a presidential determination to Congress in which he verifies that "North Korea is cooperating fully in the canning and safe storage of all spent fuel from its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and...such canning is scheduled to be completed by 1 April 1998." Clinton also confirms that "North Korea has not significantly diverted assistance provided by the United States for purposes for which it was not intended." [Note: The presidential determination is required by Congress for the allocation of funds to KEDO under the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1997.]

—Presidential Determination No. 98-14, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 9 February 1998; David Briscoe, "Clinton, Albright Give Assurances on North Korean Nuclear Project," Associated Press, 10 February 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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10 February 1998

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US Secretary of State Madeline Albright says that South Korea will be able to fulfill its financial commitment to the KEDO light water reactor project despite its recent financial crisis. Albright also presents President Clinton's presidential determination which confirms that North Korea is adhering to its commitments under the 1994 Agreed Framework.

—"Testimony February 10, 1998 Madeline K. Albright Secretary Department of State Senate Foreign Relations FY99 Foreign Policy Request," Federal Document Clearinghouse, Congressional Testimony, 10 February 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David Briscoe, "Clinton, Albright Give Assurances on North Korean Nuclear Project," Associated Press, 10 February 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Confident S. Korea, Japan Can Fund KEDO Project," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 12 February 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 February 1998

US Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth suggests that the United States might share some of the reactor construction cost. Speaking in Tokyo, Roth says, "If the US Congress receives a request from the administration to approve the cost of the light water reactors, Congress will positively review it." [Note: Up to this date, the United States has been adamant that, despite its recent economic crisis, South Korea is capable of funding the construction of the reactors, and the United States will only pay for the annual heavy fuel oil shipments as was agreed when KEDO was established in 1995.]

—Yonhap News Agency, 14 February 1998, in "USA 'Studying Ways' to Share Reactor Costs," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 February 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; *Chosun Ilbo*, 16 February 1998, p. 1, in "Seoul Daily Says USA Willing to Help with Cost of North Reactors," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 February 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Mi, Puk Kyongsuro Piyong Pun'dam Kanungsong'/Roth Kukmubuch'agwanbo Palkyo," *Munhwa Ilbo*, 14 February 1998, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

15-17 February 1998

The US and South Korea hold working-level talks in Hawaii on issues related to the Korean Peninsula. The delegations are headed by Charles Kartman, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, and Song Yong Shik, South Korean Assistant Foreign Minister. The two sides discuss food aid to North Korea, progress on the KEDO light water reactor project, and the second round of the four-party talks scheduled for mid-March. Kartman reportedly informs Song that the United States is prepared to lift economic sanctions against North Korea if the four-party talks produce results.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 15 February 1998, in "South and US Officials Discuss Four-Party Peace Conference," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 February 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lim Yun Suk, "US Considers Lifting Economic Sanctions on N. Korea," Agence France Presse, 20 February 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Isangajok Sangbong Nonui/Nambuk Taehwachaenol Cheui/Chongbu, Naedal 4 Chahwoedamso," *Joongang Ilbo*, 21 February 1998, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

16 February 1998

The *Chosun Ilbo* reports that the United States has informed South Korea that it will help fund the construction of the light water reactors in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o. According to the report, South Korea expects the United States

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to contribute up to \$400 million to the project.

—*Chosun Ilbo*, 16 February 1998, p. 1, in "Seoul Daily Says USA Willing to Help with Cost of North Reactors," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 February 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 February 1998

Kim Dae Jung is sworn in as South Korea's president. Immediately following his inauguration, Kim calls for an exchange of envoys and a summit with North Korea. Commenting on the 1991 Basic Agreement between the two Koreas that calls for cooperation and nonaggression, Kim says, "If we only carry out these agreements faithfully, we can successfully resolve inter-Korean problems and move forward on a broad path toward unification." Kim also reaffirms South Korea's commitment to the KEDO light water reactor project.

—Lim Yun Suk, "South Korea Proposes Exchange of Special Envoys, Summit with the North," Agence France Presse, 25 February 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yun Sok In and Song Han Yong, "Kim Dae Jung 15 Tae Taet'ongnyong Ch'wiim... 'Kukminjongbu' Sonon," *Hangyoreh Shinmun*, 26 February 1998, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr; "Kim Dae Jung Taet'ongnyong Ch'wiimsa Chonmun," *Kyunhyang Shinmun*, p. 6, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

26 February 1998

The South Korean sea vessel *Taewonkatamaran-ho*, transports 19 technicians and 10 tons of supplies to the light water construction site in [Kumho-chigu], Shinh'o. [Note: *Taewonkatamaran-ho* is the first ship to travel on a temporary shipping route directly connecting North and South Korea.]

—"Inter-Korean Passenger Ferry Makes First Run from South to North," Agence France Presse, 26 February 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 25 February 1998, in "South-North Shipping Route to Transport Material for Reactor Project," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 February 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Pak Yong Ch'ae, "Pundanhui Ch'ot Yo'gaekson Nambuk Chikhaeng/KEDO Kisuulchadul Susong," *Kyunhyang Shinmun*, 25 February 1998, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

27 February 1998

Taiwan's Central News Agency reports that North Korea has threatened to file a complaint with an international court if Taipower abandons its contract to ship up to 200,000 barrels of nuclear waste to North Korea. The report follows an announcement by Taipower that it is considering storing the nuclear waste on Hsiao Chiu, a small island located in the Taiwan Strait. [Note: In January 1997, Taipower and North Korea signed a contract for the storage of low-grade nuclear waste, but in December, Taiwan's Atomic Energy Council vetoed the plan, claiming that North Korea had failed to build adequate facilities for the safe storage of the radioactive material.]

—Deborah Kuo, "Pyongyang Threatens to Sue Taipower if Nuclear Deal Stalls," Central News Agency, 27 February 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Taiwan Plans to Store Nuclear Waste on Island off China Coast," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 27 February 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 March 1998

Stephen Bosworth, US ambassador to South Korea and former executive director of KEDO, says that the United States is prepared to help South Korea pay for the construction of two light water reactors in North Korea. Referring to Washington's previous stance that it was only responsible for funding the annual heavy fuel oil

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deliveries, Bosworth says, "Maybe it's time to stop thinking separately about the light water reactors and heavy fuel oil." Bosworth suggests that in order to temporarily relieve the burden on South Korea, "the United States and Japan can pay more early on and Korea can pay later on." However, Bosworth believes that the economic situation in South Korea will soon improve, and stresses that any cost-sharing would be temporary.

—"US to Temporarily Cut S. Korean Nuclear Reactor Payments," *Asia Pulse*, 3 March 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2-3 March 1998

Jean-Pierre Leng, the EU ambassador to KEDO, meets with South Korean officials and Stephen Bosworth, US ambassador to South Korea, to discuss the EU's role in the KEDO light water reactor project.

—"EU Ambassador to N. Korean Nuclear Project in Seoul," *Agence France Presse*, 2 March 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 March 1998

General John Tilelli, Commander of United States Forces Korea, says that implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework is on track and is achieving its goals of preventing a nuclear weapons program in North Korea. However, Tilelli says that the United States must uphold its commitment to provide annual shipments of heavy fuel oil to North Korea in order to ensure the success of the agreement. Speaking before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Tilelli warns that "walking back from [heavy fuel oil deliveries] will set a bad precedent and may stimulate a starting of another [nuclear] program."

—"Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee," *Federal News Service*, 3 March 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 March 1998

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, US Undersecretary of Defense Walter Slocombe says, "North Korea's extensive NBC [nuclear, biological and chemical] weapons program threatens Japan, South Korea and US forces and interests in the region."

—"Testimony March 5, 1998 Walter B. Slocombe Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Department of Defense Senate Armed Services 21st Century Security Threats," *Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony*, 5 March 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korean Weapons Threatening Japan: Slocombe," *Jiji Press Ticker Service*, 6 March 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 March 1998

North Korea's Foreign Ministry accuses the United States of not honoring the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework. In a statement carried on the Korean Central News Agency, a ministry spokesman says that North Korea has frozen its nuclear program and is allowing the safe storage of spent nuclear fuel rods, but the United States has yet to ease economic sanction against North Korea and is making little progress on the construction of two light water reactors. The spokesman adds, "Nobody can predict what will happen unless the US seeks new practical measures and takes decisive action to implement its obligations."

—"LWR Provision is U.S. Obligation= DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman," *Korean Central News Agency* (Pyongyang), 6 March 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; "North Korea Denounces Washington over Nuclear Deal," *Associated*

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Press, 6 March 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "DPRK Urges Washington Full Compliance with Nuclear Deal," Xinhua News Agency, 6 March 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 March 1998

South Korea decides to allow Japan and the United States to provide additional labor and materials for the KEDO light water reactor project in exchange for funding a larger portion of the construction cost. The South Korean government makes the decision at the first meeting of ministers responsible for security and unification under Kim Dae Jung's government.

—"S. Korea to Provide In-Kind Help in KEDO Reactors," Japan Economic Newswire, 7 March 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 March 1998

The *Chosun Ilbo* reports that KEDO has accumulated a \$47 million debt in its three years of activity.

—Pak Tu Shik, "Pittomi KEDO/Pak Tu Shik Washington T'ukp'awon (Kijasuch'op)," *Chosun Ilbo*, 9 March 1998, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; *Chosun Ilbo*, 8 March 1998, in "South Korea Daily Reports US Troubles with Growing Energy Project Debt," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 March 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Mid-March 1998

North Korea reportedly conducts military exercises in response to the growing threat it perceives from Washington, Seoul and Tokyo.

—Lim Yun Suk, "South Korea Set to Meet the North, Breakthrough in Peace Talks Unlikely," Agence France Presse, 17 March 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 March 1998

The US and North Korea meet in Berlin for bilateral negotiations before the four-party peace talks to be held 16-20 March in Geneva. The two sides reportedly discuss the gradual easing of US economic sanction against North Korea, the establishment of liaison offices and the resumption of missile talks.

—Lim Yun Suk, "US-N. Korea to Meet before Peace Talks, Seoul to Announce Aid for North," Agence France Presse, 6 March 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Sets Agenda for Meeting on Korea," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 11 March 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16-21 March 1998

Representatives from the United States, China, and the two Koreas meet in Geneva for the second round of four-party peace talks aimed at replacing the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement with a formal peace treaty. North Korea reportedly continues to set as preconditions of a peace treaty the withdrawal of all US forces from South Korea and normalization of ties between Washington and Pyongyang. The talks break down due to disagreement over whether the removal of US forces from South Korea should be included on the agenda of future talks.

—Elizabeth Olson, "Talks to End Korea Conflict Hit Another Impasse," New York Times, 22 March 1998, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lim Yun Suk, "Korean Peace Talks Unlikely to Take Place over US Troop Withdrawal," Agence France Presse, 21 March 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "First Day of

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Korean Peace Talks Adjourn in Disappointment," Agence France Presse, 16 March 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19-20 March 1998

The KEDO Executive Board meets in New York to discuss sharing the construction costs for the light water reactor project. The board fails to reach an agreement on how much each country will contribute, but according to Chang Son Sop, director of South Korea's Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project, all board members "concurred that reactor construction should not be halted under any circumstances."

—"KEDO to Have Talks in N.Y. March 19-20," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 12 March 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "S. Korea, Japan, US Undecided on Cost Sharing for N. Korea's Reactors," Agence France Presse, 25 March 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 25 March 1998, in "No Agreement on Cost Sharing of North Korean Reactor Construction," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 March 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lee Kon Yong, "Kyongsuro Piyong Pundam Non'ui/KEDO Isahoe Kaech'oe," *Taehan Maeil*, 20 March 1998, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

26 March 1998

Paul Cleveland, US ambassador to KEDO, says that due to a KEDO debt of \$47 million and a shortage of funds for heavy fuel oil shipments, the shipments of oil to North Korea could stop "in the not too distant future."

—Peter Montagnon, "Fuel Oil Supplier Seeks N Korea Cash," *Financial Times* (London), 26 March 1998, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 March 1998

North Korea accuses the United States of suspending heavy fuel oil shipments. In a Korean Central News Agency commentary, the agency says, "At a time when the light water reactors project has been postponed as divergences of opinion on cost sharing exist within the US-led KEDO, the United States has decided to tentatively suspend the supply of heavy oil for April in a bid to share even costs for heavy oil among its allied nations."

—"Mi'gug'ui 4 Wolbun Chungyugumaejamjongjungdan'ul Pinan/Chosonjung'angt'ongshin Ronp'yong," Korean Central News Agency, 30 March 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; "U.S. Perfidious Behaviour," Korean Central News Agency, 30 March 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; "North Korea Accuses United States of Delaying Oil Shipments," Agence France Presse, 30 March 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 April 1998

Taiwan's Economics Minister Wang Chih Kang announces that the agreement between Taipower and North Korea for the disposal of up to 200,000 barrels of nuclear material is still valid. [Note: In December 1996 Taiwan's Atomic Energy Council temporarily suspended the contract, claiming that North Korea did not have facilities to adequately dispose of the nuclear waste, but according to Kang, the contract has not been terminated.]

—Sofia Wu, "Nuclear Waste Pact with North Korea Remains Valid," Central News Agency, 2 April 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 April 1998

Taipower confirms that it has not abandoned the plan to ship nuclear waste to North Korea, claiming that it is

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waiting for an export permit from the Atomic Energy Council. However, according to Atomic Energy Council officials, the council must inspect the North Korean disposal site before it will issue an export permit. To date, North Korea has not allowed the council to inspect the proposed disposal site in P'yongsan-kun.

—"Nuke Deal to Go Ahead, Taipower," FT Asia Intelligence Wire, 3 April 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 April 1998

Kim Ch'ang Guk, North Korean Deputy Ambassador to the UN, calls on the United States to give a legally binding security assurance that it will not use nuclear weapons against North Korea. Kim, speaking at the UN First Committee on Disarmament, also calls on the United States to remove all nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula and remove South Korea from underneath its nuclear umbrella.

—"DPRK Calls for Security Assurance from U.S.," Xinhua News Agency, 9 April 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 April 1998

US Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering meets with Pak Chong Su, South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Im Tong Won, South Korean Senior Presidential Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Security, and requests that South Korea help fund the annual heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea. Pak and Im reportedly inform Pickering that it would be difficult to convince the National Assembly to accept the additional financial burden given the current economic crisis in South Korea. [Note: The US had originally agreed to completely fund the 500,000 tons/year of oil to North Korea until the completion of two light water reactors. However, following Congress's refusal to allocate the necessary funds, the United States has asked South Korea and Japan to share approximately \$20 million/year of the costs.]

—*Chosun Ilbo*, 8 April 1998, in "South Korea-USA 'Discord' over Cost of North's Heavy Oil," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 April 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kong Yong Un, "Mi, Kyongsurobi 70% Han'guk Pudam Konggae Yogu/Panghan Pickering Kungmu Ch'agwan," *Munhwa Ilbo*, 9 April 1998, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

10 April 1998

A senior US official announces that due to lack of funds, preparatory construction for the KEDO light water reactor project could soon halt.

—Jim Mann, "N. Korea Nuclear Deal at Risk, U.S. Fears; Financing: Officials Say That Bickering over Funding for \$5.1-Billion Reactor Project Threatens 1994 Pact," *Los Angeles Times*, 10 April 1998, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 April 1998

North and South Korea hold high-level talks in Beijing, and the South promises to follow through with its pledge to finance the construction of two light water reactors in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o, North Korea. [Note: The Beijing talks are the first high-level consultations between the two Koreas in over four years.]

—Andrew Browne, "Move to Reunite Millions; Two Koreas Take Tentative Steps Towards Reconciliation at Their

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First High-Level Talks in Four Years," *The Guardian* (London), 13 April 1998, p. 12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 April 1998

Pak Chong Su, South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, suggest that heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea may halt due to lack of funding from the United States, but Pak reaffirms South Korea's position that it "will not share the burden for the heavy fuel oil because the United States is responsible for the provision of the heavy oil."

—"South Korea: United States May Be Unable to Offer Heavy Oil to North Korea," Malaysia General News, 13 April 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 April 1998

A North Korean official reportedly says that North Korea may resume its graphite-moderated nuclear program if the United States suspends heavy fuel oil shipments.

—"KEDO Delay Said to Revive N. Korean Threat," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 15 April 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 April 1998

North Korea reportedly unseals its 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yongbyon-kun to "conduct maintenance activities," and halts the canning of spent fuel rods from the reactor. North Korea's Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam discloses the information in a meeting with a US academic on 9 May. According to Kim, North Korea decided to suspend certain aspects of the Agreed Framework due to the US failure to ease sanction against North Korea and make prompt deliveries of heavy fuel oil. [Note: On 13 May, US State Department spokesman James Rubin refutes the claims and says that the United States has "confirmed through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that [the 5MW(e) reactor's] seals remain in place and that the freeze at North Korea's nuclear complex remains in place." Rubin adds that although North Korea did suspend clean-up operations at the reactor, the canning process was completed in mid-March. Rubin says that the United States is "confident that North Korea has not violated the across-the-board freeze on its nuclear activities, and that the Agreed Framework is alive and well." However, on 25 May, Washington confirms that in mid-April, US nuclear technicians were in fact expelled from the Yongbyon nuclear complex before the canning process was completed.]

—Elisabeth Rosenthal, "North Korea Says It Will Unseal Reactor," *New York Times*, 13 May 1998, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 14 May 1998, in "USA Says North Korea Maintains Freeze at Yongbyon nuclear complex," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 14 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Expelled U.S. Technicians from Yongbyon Plant," Japan Economic Newswire, 25 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 April 1998

US Secretary of State Madeline Albright urges Japan to share some of the cost of annual heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea. Albright makes the request in a meeting with Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi. Later in the day, the Foreign Ministry announces that "Japan, at this moment, wants to concentrate its efforts on light water nuclear reactors," suggesting that Tokyo remains reluctant to share any of the cost of heavy fuel oil shipments.

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—"Albright Asks Japan to Help with Fuel Oil for N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 28 April 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

May 1998

North Korean defector Hwang Chang Yop says that the United States made a mistake in agreeing to supply 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea annually as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Hwang, speaking to Selig Harrison, says, "The policy of avoiding war over the nuclear crisis was the correct policy, but you were naïve in letting them bluff you about the potential of the nuclear program." According to Hwang, North Korea "did not have the technical or financial means to complete the 50MW(e) and 200MW(e) nuclear reactors then under construction that you were so concerned about." [Note: Hwang, a former secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, and chief architect of the North Korean ideology of *chuch'e*, is the highest ranking North Korean ever to defect. After seeking asylum in the South Korean Embassy in Beijing on 12 February 1997, Hwang warned that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons and is prepared to use them against South Korea and Japan.]

—Selig S. Harrison, "North Korea from the Inside Out," *Washington Post*, 21 June 1998, p. C1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

May 1998

The United States, Japan, and South Korea hold informal talks aimed at reducing the cost of the KEDO light water reactor project. Japan proposes that the overall budget be reduced from \$5.18 billion to \$4.5 billion.

—"Japan Urges S. Korea to Cut Plant Cost," *Nikkei Weekly*, 18 May 1998, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 May 1998

US Secretary of State Madeline Albright meets with South Korean officials to discuss funding for the KEDO light water reactor project. An official from South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade announces that Albright "said that her government will consider contributing to the construction of the light water reactors if South Korea pays for the purchase of the heavy fuel oil." Albright reportedly says that the United States will donate \$55 million for safety equipment if South Korea assists with the oil deliveries. However, according to the official, Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Pak Chong Su informs Albright that Seoul has no intention of funding the oil shipments. Despite recent difficulties in funding the KEDO project, Albright stresses that the United States will not abandon its commitments under the 1994 Agreed Framework.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 1 May 1998, in "Koreas: US to Contribute to Reactors of South Provides Heavy Fuel Oil," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 1 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Barry Schweid, "Albright Vows to Maintain Accord with North Korea," Associated Press, 1 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Differences over Cost-Sharing for N. Korea Nuclear Reactors Narrowed," Agence France Presse, 5 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 19 June 1998, in "South Korea Seeks US, Japan Talks on North Reactor Funding," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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5-10 May 1998

KEDO and North Korea hold high-level consultations at a resort hotel near Mt. Myohyang in North Korea. The two delegations discuss various issues related to the light water reactor project such as heavy fuel oil deliveries, quality guarantees for the reactors, and training for North Koreans working on the project. The delegations also set a schedule for concluding negotiations on the remaining follow-up protocols to the light water reactor supply agreement.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 1 May 1998, in "Peninsula Energy Organization to Hold Working Meeting with North 5th-10th May," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KEDO Officials Begin Reactor Talks in N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 5 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 5 May 1998, in "'High-Level Expert Meeting' Starts on Reactor, Oil Supply to North," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 May 1998

A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry condemns the United States for not honoring its commitments under the 1994 Agreed Framework, and says Pyongyang might restart its nuclear program. In a statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency, the Foreign Ministry accuses the United States of failing to ease sanctions against North Korea as promised and purposefully delaying heavy fuel oil deliveries. According to the ministry's statement, "All facts show that the DPRK has gone farther in implementing the agreement whereas the US side is not sincerely fulfilling its obligations." Given the situation, the ministry suggests that North Korea "should no longer lend an ear to the empty promises of the US side, but open and readjust the frozen nuclear facilities." The United States calls North Korea's statements "unfortunate, because they're not founded on the reality of what the United States is doing on implementing the Agreed Framework." Responding to North Korea's comment, State Department spokesman James Foley says, "The United States has fulfilled its part of the Agreed Framework and will continue to do so." Foley continues, "We expect and trust that North Koreans will continue to implement their side of the agreement."

—"U.S. Should Take Practical Steps as Soon as Possible," Korean Central News Agency, 8 May 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mi'gug'un Shilchejokhaengdongjoch'i'rul Chosokhi Ch'wihaeya Handa/Oegyobudaebyon'in," Korean Central News Agency, 7 May 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 8 May 1998, in "Pyongyang Warns USA over Non-Implementation of Nuclear Accord," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US Says N. Korea Nuclear Threats 'Unfortunate,'" Agence France Presse, 8 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 May 1998

US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering announces that the United States will soon make a heavy fuel oil shipment to North Korea. [Note: Pickering's announcement a day after a North Korean threat to reactivate its frozen nuclear program because of the apparent US failure to honor its commitments under the 1994 Agreed Framework.]

—"U.S. Vows to Ship Fuel to N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 9 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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9 May 1998

North Korea's Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam meets with Selig Harrison and announces that on 19 April North Korea unsealed its 5MW(e) nuclear reactor to "conduct maintenance activities" and suspended the canning of spent nuclear fuel rods. According to Kim, North Korea decided to suspend certain aspects of the Agreed Framework due to the US failure to ease sanction against North Korea and make prompt deliveries of heavy fuel oil.

—Elisabeth Rosenthal, "North Korea Says It Will Unseal Reactor," *New York Times*, 13 May 1998, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 May 1998

US State Department spokesman James Rubin announces that the United States, Japan and South Korea have thus far failed to rectify problems in funding and cost-sharing for the KEDO light water reactor project.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 12 May 1998, in "USA Said to Admit Differences on Financing Reactor, Heavy Fuel Oil for North Korea," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 12 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 May 1998

US State Department spokesman James Rubin refutes the 9 May claim by North Korea's Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam that on 19 April North Korea unsealed its 5MW(e) nuclear reactor and suspended the canning of spent nuclear fuel rods. Rubin says that the United States has "confirmed through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that [the reactor's] seals remain in place and that the freeze at North Korea's nuclear complex remains in place." Rubin adds that although North Korea did suspend clean-up operations related to the canning of spent nuclear fuel rods, the canning process "was essentially completed in mid-March." Rubin says that the United States is "confident that North Korea has not violated the across-the-board freeze on its nuclear activities, and that the Agreed Framework is alive and well." [Note: On 25 May, Washington confirms that in mid-April North Korea expelled US technicians from the Yongbyon nuclear complex before they could complete the safe storage of 8,000 spent fuel rods.]

—State Department Regular Briefing, Briefer: James Rubin, Federal News Service, 13 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 14 May 1998, in "USA Says North Korea Maintains Freeze at Yonbyon nuclear complex," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 14 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Expelled U.S. Technicians from Yongbyon Complex," Japan Economic Newswire, 25 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 May 1998

Kim Myong Gil, minister councilor at the North Korean Mission to the UN, says that if the United States continues to delay heavy fuel oil shipments, North Korea may reactivate its nuclear program. Kim adds that there is growing pressure in Pyongyang to abandon the 1994 Agreed Framework and revert back to North Korea's graphite-moderated nuclear technology. According to Kim, "The peaceful nuclear industry says they want to continue to develop their technology rather than replace it with new KEDO [technology]. The military people support them."

—Betsy Pisik, "N. Korea Threatens Nuclear Activity; Reactor Reopening Hinged on Fuel Deal," *Washington Times*, 14 May 1998, p. A17, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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Mid-May 1998

US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Charles Kartman travels to South Korea to discuss cost-sharing for the KEDO light water reactor project and the four-party peace talks. [Note: While Kartman was expected to reiterate the US request that South Korea help fund the heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea, Kartman reportedly does not bring up the issue.]

—"US Official Due in Seoul Amid North Korea Nuclear Concern," Agence France Presse, 14 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 14 May 1998, in "US Official in Seoul to Discuss Korean Peace Talks, Other Issues," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 14 May 14, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; *Chosun Ilbo*, 20 May 1998, in "US Envoy Says Washington Not to Ask Seoul to Share Cost of Oil for North," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 May 1998

North Korea's ambassador to China, Chu Ch'ang Chun, says that pressure is growing in North Korea to reactivate its nuclear program and resume construction of two graphite-moderated reactors. According to Chu, this growing sentiment is due to perceived US failure to honor its commitments under the 1994 Agreed Framework by delaying heavy fuel oil shipments and failing to ease economic sanctions against North Korea. Commenting on the nuclear test explosions conducted by India on 11 and 13 May, Chu says that North Korea is "opposed to the production, stockpiling and use" of nuclear weapons.

—"China Urges North Korea, U.S. to Implement 1994 Nuclear Pact," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 14 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; John Leicester, "North Koreans Call for Restarting Frozen Nuclear Program," Associated Press, 14 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Rejects Nuclear Weapons, Slams US," Agence France Presse, 14 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 May 1998

A KEDO official announces that the two light water reactors being constructed in North Korea will not be completed by the original target date of 2003.

—"Light-Water Reactors for N. Korea to Miss 2003 Deadline," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 May 1998

South Korea's Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Pak Chong Su announces that Seoul is exploring ways to reduce the cost of the KEDO light water reactor project.

—"S. Korean Govt Trying to Cut Costs of Light-Water Reactors," *Daily Yomiuri*, 24 May 1998, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 May 1998

Washington confirms that North Korea expelled US nuclear technicians and IAEA personnel from the Yongbyon nuclear complex in mid-April before they were able to complete the safe storage of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods. According to US government officials, the storage process has yet to resume.

—"N. Korea Expelled U.S. Technicians from Yongbyon Complex," Japan Economic Newswire, 25 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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28 May 1998

A Japanese Foreign Ministry official says that there is a threat of Pakistan transferring nuclear weapons technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korea's past support of Pakistan's ballistic missile program. The statement follows a nuclear test conducted by Pakistan on the same day. [Note: On 1 June, Vice Foreign Minister Shunji Yanai announces that Japan is not aware of any transfer of nuclear technology from Pakistan to North Korea.]

—Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), Pakistan: Japan to Impose Sanctions, Says Nuclear Transfer to N Korea Possible," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 29 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Kyodo News Summary," Japan Economic Newswire, 1 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; O Yong Hwan, "Pakistan Haekkisul Pukhan'e Chegong Malla," *Joongang Ilbo*, 29 May 1998, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

29 May 1998

Responding to the 28 May comment by a Japanese Foreign Ministry official that Pakistan might transfer nuclear weapons technology to North Korea, US State Department spokesman James Rubin says that the United States is not aware of any nuclear cooperation between the two countries and believes that North Korea is adhering to its commitments under the 1994 Agreed Framework.

—"State Department Regular Briefing," Federal News Service, 29 May 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 June 1998

South Korean President Kim Dae Jung calls on the United States to end economic sanctions against North Korea. In an interview conducted in Seoul, Kim says that in his upcoming visit to Washington he will urge President Clinton and Congress to end sanctions in order to ease tension on the Korean Peninsula. [Note: North Korea has threatened to abandon the 1994 Agreed Framework and restart its nuclear program if the United States does not lift economic sanctions.]

—Nicholas D. Kristof, "Seoul Leader Asks End to Sanctions on North Koreans," *New York Times*, 2 June 1998, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1-2 June 1998

KEDO's Executive Board meets in New York to discuss cost-sharing for reactor construction and heavy fuel oil deliveries. The executive board, comprised of the United States, Japan, South Korea, and the EU, also discuss ways to reduce the cost of the \$5.18 billion project. Japan reportedly proposed a new cost estimate that would reduce the total cost by \$500 million. Executive board members fail to reach an agreement on cost-sharing and new cost estimates, but they agree to continue talks in Brussels on 29-30 June.

—Akinori Uchida, "N. Korea Reactor Cost May Be Cut 500 Mil. Dollars," *Daily Yomiuri*, 1 June 1998, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Robert Reid, "Korea Board Agrees to Talk More About Nuclear Program for North," Associated Press, 2 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KEDO Fails to Work Out Cost-Sharing Accord," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 3 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 June 1998

The *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* quotes a Japanese Defense Agency internal report as saying that the recent South Asian nuclear tests might encourage North Korea to restart its nuclear program. According to the report, the Defense

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Agency believes it is possible that North Korea already possesses at least one nuclear weapon.

—"Japan Sees N. Korea Having At Least 1 Nuclear Weapon," Japan Economic Newswire, 3 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Teruaki Ueno, "Jpn: Japan Report Focuses Nuclear Fears Back on N Korea," AAP Newsfeed, 3 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Paper Raises Fear of North Korean Nuclear Weapon," *Nikkei Weekly*, 8 June 1998, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 June 1998

Japan announces that it will still provide \$1 billion to the KEDO light water project even though the total cost of the project is expected to be decreased by as much as \$500 million. [Note: Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi informs the Diet about the decision on 8 June.]

—"Japan to Pay 1 Bil. Dlr for KEDO Project as Planned," Japan Economic Newswire, 3 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan to Pay 1 Bil. Dlr for KEDO, Obuchi Says," Japan Economic Newswire, 8 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 June 1998

Georgiy Kaurov, press secretary for Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry, says that according to Russian nuclear experts, North Korea does not have nuclear weapons. Kaurov says that "if North Korea did have a nuclear bomb, it would have been tested," and such a test would have been easily detected. Kaurov adds that developing a nuclear weapon also requires hundred of test explosions without fissile material. Such tests, according to Kaurov, would have to be conducted at a special test site which would "be clearly visible from space." [Note: According to intelligence sources in US, South Korea and Japan, North Korea has constructed an explosive test site approximately 8km north of Kusong, and conducts at least two explosive tests of nuclear warhead triggering devices in 1998. CNS analysts believe this explosives test site is located in Kump'ung-ri (???), Kusong (???), North P'yon'an Province (???).]

—ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 3 June 1998, in "Russia Rules Out Possibility That North Korea Has Nuclear Weapons," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 3 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; *Chungang Ilbo*, 2 February 1999, in "Expert Claims DPRK Detonation Tests for Nuclear Bombs," FBIS Document FTS19990208000118, 8 February 1999; Joseph S. Bermudez, "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure-Part One," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 1999, p. 38-9.

5 June 1998

Washington announces that it is willing to pay for all of the heavy fuel oil to be delivered to North Korea as a substitute energy source until the two KEDO light water reactors are completed. A government official says that the United States will continue to seek cooperation from the EU and Middle Eastern countries, but if no financial support is given, the United States will pay the entire amount for the annual shipments of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil.

—"U.S. Ready to Pay All of KEDO's Fuel Oil Shipment Costs," Japan Economic Newswire, 6 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 June 1998

Charles Kartman, US deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs, meets with Lee Kun, North

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Korea's deputy ambassador to the UN, to discuss various issues including the provision of heavy fuel oil, progress on the KEDO light water reactor project, and the four-party peace talks. At the meeting, Kartman reassures Lee that the United States will continue to seek cooperation from the EU and Middle Eastern countries, but if no financial support is given, the United States will pay the entire amount for the annual shipments of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 6 June 1998, in "Koreas: US, North to Discuss Four-Way Talks, Reactors, South President's Visit," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 6 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., N. Korea to Hold Discussions in New York," Japan Economic Newswire, 6 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Tells N. Korea Delivery of Fuel Oil to Be Resumed," Japan Economic Newswire, 7 June 1998, Japan Economic Newswire, 7 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Mi, Taebuk Chungyu'gongguup Chaegae/Puk-Mijopch'okso Yaksok," *Kyungyang Shinmun*, 8 June 1998, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

8 June 1998

Lee Jong Ch'an, director of South Korea's National Security Planning Agency, says, "At this moment, we have not found any signs that North Korea has reneged on the nuclear agreement with the United States and is actively trying to resume its nuclear weapons program."

—"S. Korea Spy Chief Says North Not Developing Nukes," Japan Economic Newswire, 8 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 June 1998

Speaking at a joint press conference with US President Bill Clinton in Washington, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung says, "We have nothing to fear from North Korea." [Note: Kim, on a nine-day diplomatic trip to the United States, has encouraged the United States to lift economic sanctions against North Korea in order ease tension on the Korean Peninsula and pave the way for a lasting peace between the two Koreas.]

—Sarah Jackson-Han, "US Vows More Help for South Korea, Under Right Conditions," Agence France Presse, 10 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., South Korea to Work Together on North Korea," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 9 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Betsy Pisik, "Kim Proposes an Approach to North Korea," *Washington Times*, 9 June 1998, p. A15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 June 1998

US Secretary of State Madeline Albright and South Korean Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Pak Chong Su meet in Washington to discuss various bilateral issues. Albright and Pak agree to hold working-level talks in July on easing economic sanctions against North Korea.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 11 June 1998, in "South Korea, USA to Hold July Talks on Lifting North Sanctions," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Ben Barber, "N. Korea Sanctions Likely to Be Eased; South's President Sways U.S. Policy," *Washington Times*, 12 June 1998, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 June 1998

North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan sends a letter to US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Stanley Roth stating that North Korea will soon restart its nuclear program unless the United States

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honors its yearly commitment to supply North Korea with 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year until the completion of the KEDO light water reactor project. [Note: For 1998, the United States has thus far only supplied 152,000 tons of oil.]

—"Pyongyang Threatens to Resume Nuke Program within 1 Month," Japan Economic Newswire, 16 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 June 1998

A North Korean submarine is captured by South Korea 11.5 miles off the South Korean port city of Sokch'o. The 70-ton submarine is detected after becoming ensnared in the nets of a fishing vessel. Following the incident, South Korea places its military on the east coast on high alert.

—Marc Lavine, "South Korea on Alert as Tension Escalates Despite Landmark Talks," Agence France Presse, 22 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Don Kirk, "North Korea Sub Is Snagged off South," *International Herald Tribune*, 23 June 1998, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US Protests over Submarine during Military Talks with North Korea," Agence France Presse, 23 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 June 1998

North Korea warns the United States of unspecified "consequences" if it does not ease economic sanctions "in accordance with the Agreed Framework."

—Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 22 June 1998, in "North Korea Decries US Failure to Lift Sanctions," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lim Yun Suk, "N. Korea Warns US of 'Consequences' Ahead of Landmark Military Talks," Agence France Presse, 22 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 June 1998

The US-led United Nations Command (UNC) and North Korean military officials meet in the truce village of Panmunjom and commence the first high-level military talks in seven years. During the course of the talks, which last several weeks, the UNC delegation reportedly condemns the 22 June incursion of a North Korean submarine into South Korean waters as a violation of the 1953 Armistice Agreement.

—"US Protests over Submarine during Military Talks with North Korea," Agence France Presse, 23 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lim Yun Suk, "US and N. Korea Hold First Military Talks Since 1991 amid Tension," Agence France Presse, 23 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 30 July 1998, in "North Korea: UN to Discuss Sub Cases Today, 30th June, at Panmunjom Talks," 30 June 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23-26 June 1998

IAEA inspectors travel to North Korea to negotiate the implementation of the inspection regime agreed under the 1994 Agreed Framework. This, the tenth round of technical discussions, fails to produce any results as North Korea reportedly continues to refuse to grant the inspectors access to information necessary to determine the completeness and correctness of North Korea's initial declaration of nuclear material.

—"IAEA Delegation Here," Korean Central News Agency, 23 June 1998, www.kcna.co.jp;

"Kukchewonjaryokkigudaep'yodan Toch'ak," Korean Central News Agency, 23 June 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; *Donga*

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//bo, 14 September 1998, in "Pyongyang Remains 'Uncooperative', Atomic Agency's Top Official Says," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29-30 June 1998

KEDO's Executive Board meets in Brussels to discuss cost-sharing and reducing the total cost of the light water reactor project. The executive board decides to lower the total cost for the light water reactor construction from \$5.2 billion to \$4.6 billion and agree to meet in mid-July to formalize the new cost estimate. However, the board members fail to reach an agreement on sharing the cost of the project. [Note: Even with the new figure of \$4.6 billion, KEDO still needs at least \$300 million to cover construction costs.]

—"KEDO Lowers Cost Estimate for N. Korea Reactors," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 1 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Construction Cost of N. Korean Reactors Lowered," Japan Economic Newswire, 1 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 June 1998

Japan reiterates its pledge to provide \$1 billion to the KEDO light water reactor project. Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi says that "although the exchange rate is uncertain (depending on when the payment is actually made), Japan has expressed its intention to contribute that dollar amount."

—Koydo News Service (Tokyo), 30 June 1998, in "Tokyo Reconfirms 1Bn-Dollar Vow for North Reactors," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 July 1998

Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Shunji Yanai and his South Korean counterpart meet in Tokyo and agree to seek an early resolution on how to share the construction costs of the KEDO light water reactor project. The foreign ministers agree that US cooperation in funding the reactor construction is indispensable.

—"Japan, ROK Hope to Settle KEDO Cost-Sharing Dispute," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 2 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan, S. Korea Seek More U.S. Cooperation for KEDO," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 July 1998

The *Washington Post* reports that North Korea has recently begun maintenance work at a "plutonium separation plant" located in the Yongbyon nuclear complex. According the US officials quoted by the paper, the resumption of maintenance work is intended "to make sure Washington got the message North Korea is capable of resuming its nuclear program." [Note: The "plutonium separation plant" probably a reference to the Radiochemistry Laboratory.]

—Thomas W. Lippman, "N. Korea-U.S. Nuclear Pact Threatened; Funding Hold Up Promised Oil," *Washington Post*, 6 July 1998, p.A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Elisabeth Rosenthal, "North Korea Says It Will Unseal Reactor," *New York Times*, 13 May 1998, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 July 1998

US State Department spokesman James Rubin announces that the United States has not yet raised enough funds to meet its yearly obligation to supply North Korea with 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. By August the United States

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will have delivered 216,000 tons of oil, but Congress has yet to allocate the funds for the remaining 284,000 tons. However, Rubin states that the United States is actively seeking financial contributions from other countries and the Clinton Administration has expressed a readiness to use "certain provisions of US law" (Rubin does not give details on the "certain provisions") to come up with the additional funds. Rubin also denies a 6 July *Washington Post* report that accused North Korea of conducting maintenance work at a "plutonium separation plant." Rubin says that Washington "believe(s) that North Korea is in compliance with its obligations under the Agreed Framework."

—State Department Regular Briefing, Briefer: James Rubin, Federal News Service, 6 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. to Raise Funds for DPRK Oil Supply," Xinhua News Agency, 6 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; George Gedda, "U.S. Confident Commitments to North Korea Will Be Met," Associated Press, 6 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Nuclear Pact Not Threatened, Washington Says," Japan Economic Newswire, 7 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 July 1998

The Japanese Foreign Ministry announces that it recently proposed a compromise plan to the United States for sharing the cost of the KEDO light water reactor project. At the KEDO Executive Board meeting held in Brussels on 29-30 June, board members agreed to lower the cost of the reactor project from an estimated \$5.2 billion to \$4.6 billion. However, even with the reduced cost estimate, KEDO still lacks approximately \$350,000. Under the Japanese proposal, the United States would pay part of the remaining cost and take the leading role in raising the rest of the necessary funds. [Note: As preparatory construction in Kumho-chigu, Shinp'o is scheduled to be completed in August and reactor construction cannot begin until the issue of funding is resolved, board members are under great pressure to reach on agreement on sharing the costs of construction.]

—Kyodo News Service, 11 July 1998, in "North Korea: Japan Proposes Compromise Plan to USA on Light-Water Reactors," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 11 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 July 1998

US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Rust Deming tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States has been unsuccessful in persuading other nations to donate funds for heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea. Urging the Senate to allocate additional funds for the 1998 oil shipments, Deming says, "It is not realistic to think that the shortfall (in funding the oil shipments) will be met in the near term by contributions from abroad."

—Hearing of the East Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Federal News Service, 14 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Laura Myers, "U.S. Needs More Money for North Korea Fuel Shipments," Associated Press, 14 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Congress Asked to Fund Fuel Oil Shipment to N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 15 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Laura Myers, "North Korean Nuclear Freeze Costs Double for US," Associated Press, 15 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 July 1998

The US General Accounting Office (GAO) releases a report saying that there are many monitoring problems that affect the IAEA's "ability to determine whether North Korea is complying fully with certain aspects of the nuclear

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freeze." North Korea has not allowed the IAEA to install monitoring devices in the nuclear waste tanks, which are connected to a "complex and inaccessible piping system that, if operating, would permit the waste to be removed and/or altered." The GAO report warns that North Korea may have "secretly removed some of the nuclear waste in order to hide evidence of earlier diversions of plutonium." [Note: GAO presented the report to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on 7 July.] Commenting on the GAO report, US State Department spokesman James Rubin confirms there are "significant" discrepancies between the amount of plutonium North Korea declared and the amount discovered. Rubin adds that while the 1994 Agreed Framework remains intact, the United States will not deliver "key components" for the KEDO light water reactors until North Korea clears up discrepancies about the amount of plutonium it possesses.

—"Nuclear Nonproliferation: Difficulties in Accomplishing IAEA's Activities in North Korea," United States General Accounting Office, GAO/RCED-98-210, 7 July 1998; Philip Shenon, "North Korea Said to Block Inspection of Nuclear Sites," *New York Times*, 15 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Report: "Discrepancies" in North Korean Nuclear Plant," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 15 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; State Department Regular Briefing, Briefer: James Rubin, Federal News Service, 15 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 July 1998

The European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, Budget Committee and the Committee on Research, Technological Development and Energy allocate €15 million for the annual contribution to KEDO.

—Glyn Ford, "The EU Confirms Its Commitment to Asia," *Japan Times*, 8 August 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 July 1998

The *Chosun Ilbo* quotes a South Korean official working on the KEDO light water reactor project as saying that even through preparatory construction is scheduled to be completed in early August, construction on the actual reactors will probably not begin until October because the United States, South Korea and Japan have yet to reach a final agreement on each party's share of the construction costs.

—"N. Korea Reactor Project to Start in Oct.: Official," Japan Economic Newswire, 22 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kim In Ku, "Kyongsuro Pujigongsa 3 Kaewol Yonjang/Piyongbudam Habui Andwoe," *Chosun Ilbo*, 22 July 1998, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

22 July 1998

Desaix Anderson, executive director of KEDO, says that he is confident that the United States will be able to meet its commitment to deliver 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea. Commenting on his recent congressional testimony and request for additional fund for the oil shipments, Anderson says, "I got a strong impression from both the Republicans and Democrats that they supported this project."

—"KEDO Chief Confident N. Korea Will Get Fuel Oil," Japan Economic Newswire, 22 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 July 1998

Australia pledges an additional A\$2 million to help prevent nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula.

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According to Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, part of the contribution will be for the supply of heavy fuel oil.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 24 July 1998, in "Australia to Donate 2M Australian Dollars to North Korean Energy Programme," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 24 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KEDO Talks on Burden-Sharing to Be Held in New York Monday," *Korea Times*, 24 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 July 1998

North Korea condemns the recent deployment of a US nuclear submarine and eight P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft to the Sea of Japan (East Sea). A commentary printed in *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, says the deployment is an attempt "to drive the South Korean puppets to confrontation with the DPRK and stifle the DPRK with strength at any cost." The commentary adds that if the United States continues with its "military adventures...it will be held wholly responsible for all consequences that arise." [Note: The deployment of additional US Navy forces was at the request of Seoul. In late August, US and South Korean forces patrol the East Sea searching for North Korean mini-submarines, one of which was discovered in South Korean waters on 22 June.] —"Rodong Sinmun Castigates United States," Korean Central News Agency, 24 July 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 24 July 1998, in "North Korea Criticizes US Support for South over Submarine Incident," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 24 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; *Chosun Ilbo*, 22 July 1998, in "US Navy in Joint Hunt with South for North Submarines," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27-28 July 1998

KEDO's Executive Board meets in New York and tentatively agrees on how to share the cost of constructing two light water reactors in North Korea. South Korea will be responsible for \$3.22 billion, or 70 percent of the estimated \$4.6 billion project. Japan is to pay \$1 billion, and the remaining \$380 million will be split between the United States and EU. The board does not announce the specifics on how the \$380 will be divided between the United States and EU. [Note: The tentative agreement must still be accepted by each of the governments involved.]

—"KEDO Members Tentatively Agree on Cost Sharing," *Korea Times*, 29 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KEDO Agrees on Funding for North Korean Nuclear Reactors," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 29 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 29 July 1998, in "South Korea Agrees to Fix US Obligation for North's Reactor," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 29 July 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 August 1998

Time reports that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il is actively "pushing the construction of a new nuclear reactor--underground, to confound US spy satellites." The reactor is reportedly designed to develop "usable atom bombs, possibly including missile warheads." [Note: According to the *Times* article, some Clinton administration officials believe the reports of a new underground nuclear facility is misinformation leaked by Washington hardliners to "choke off congressional support" for KEDO heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea.]

—J.F.O. McAllister, "More Nukes: Is North Korea the Latest to Proliferate?," *Time*, 3 August 1998; "U.S. Suspects N.

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Korea of Resuming Nuclear Program: Time," Japan Economic Newswire, 5 August 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6-7 August 1998

Representatives from the United States and South Korea meet in Hawaii to discuss lifting economic sanctions against North Korea. The two sides fail to agree to what degree sanctions should be eased. An official from the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade says on 10 August that the United States did not completely rule out the possibility of easing sanctions, but "the conditions for lifting sanctions, however, is not favorable on the Republican Congress mainly because of the recent infiltration of a North Korean submarine into the South and the North's suspected transfer of missile technology." [Note: Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, the United States agreed to take steps to ease economic sanctions against North Korea.]

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 10 August 1998, in "South Korea, USA Fail to Agree on Sanctions Against North," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 10 August 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jun Kwan Woo, "Washington, Pyongyang to Open Talks in New York," *Korea Herald*, 17 August 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 August 1998

Admiral Joseph Prueher, commander-in-chief of the US Pacific Command, meets with South Korean Defense Minister Ch'on Yong T'aek and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Kim Jin Ho, and promises to make additional assets of the US Pacific Command available in order to counter any small scale North Korean military provocations, such as the recent submarine incursion.

—"US Committed to Continue Joint Operations Against NK Subs," *Korea Times*, 13 August 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 August 1998

A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry warns that North Korea might restart its nuclear program if the United States continues to delay fulfilling its obligations under the 1994 Agreed Framework. According to the spokesman, North Korea's decision will be based on the success of upcoming US-North Korean high-level talks scheduled to begin 21 August in New York. The spokesman says that Pyongyang hopes "the two sides will settle the problems smoothly at the upcoming DPRK-US high level talks lest we should take an undesirable option."

—Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 13 August 1998, in "Spokesman Says No Third Party Needed for Talks with USA," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 August 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 August 1998

The *New York Times* reports that US intelligence agencies have recently detected activity at a large underground complex, located 25 miles north of the Yongbyon nuclear complex, which they believe to be an attempt to revive North Korea's nuclear weapons program. According to the report, US spy satellites have detected "thousands of North Korean workers...swarming around the new site, burrowing into the mountainside." Other unspecified intelligence led Washington to believe that North Korea is constructing a reactor and reprocessing facility under the mountain located near the village of Kumch'ang-ri. In response to the report, a US State Department official says, "We continue to monitor the situation closely. At this time, we have no basis to conclude there has been a

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violation of the Agreed Framework." However, the official continues, "if the construction is a violation of the Agreed Framework, it would be of serious concern."

—David E. Sanger, "North Korea Site an A-Bomb Plant, U.S. Agencies Say," *New York Times*, 17 August 1998, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Builds Underground nuclear complex, U.S. Says," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 17 August 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 August 1998

Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon says that the US satellite images that show massive underground construction at a site 25 miles north of the Yongbyon nuclear complex are inconclusive. Responding to a 17 August *New York Times* article claiming that North Korea is currently constructing a new reactor and reprocessing plant, Bacon says, "Right now I do not believe we have a firm basis to conclude that they are out of compliance [with the 1994 Agreed Framework]."

—John Diamond, "U.S.: No Evidence North Korea Reneged on Nuclear Weapons Agreement," Associated Press, 18 August 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 August 1998

A US Congressional source claims that US reconnaissance satellite imagery confirms that the recently discovered underground complex in North Korea is in fact related to a nuclear program. The source says that the satellite photos show equipment particular to a nuclear facility being transported to the underground construction site.

—"U.S. Confirms N. Korea Building Nuclear Facility," Japan Economic Newswire, 19 August 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21-25 August 1998

Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, meets with North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan in New York to discuss various issues including resuming four-party peace talks, delays in heavy fuel oil shipments, and the recent discover of a suspected underground nuclear complex located 25 miles north of Yongbyon-kun. After the conclusion of the talks, both delegations refuse to comment on the details of the meetings and return to their capitals for consultations. [Note: On 30 August, the *Chosun Ilbo*, citing an anonymous source in Washington, reports that at the talks, North Korea denied that the underground facility being built is related to a nuclear weapons program and expressed willingness to allow an outside inspection. The talks are concluded on 5 September when the two sides reach a tentative package agreement.]

—"US, DPRK Hold Talks in New York," Xinhua News Agency, 21 August 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. to Ask N. Korea to Stop Building Nuclear Facility," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 August 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., DPRK End Third Day of Talks," Xinhua News Agency, 25 August 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea-U.S. Talks Enter 3rd Day," Japan Economic Newswire, 25 August 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US, NK Talks Amid Cost-Sharing Agreement Announcement," *Korea Times*, 26 August 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; *Chosun Ilbo*, 30 August 1998, in "DPRK Reportedly Willing to Show US Underground Facility," FBIS Document FTS19980830000191, 30 August 1998; Lee Min Ch'ol, "Haekshisol Uihok Yongbyon chihashisol/Puk, Mi Pangmunjosa Hoyong Shisa," *Chosun Ilbo*, 31 August 1998, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

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22 August 1998

North Korea denounces the Ulchi Focus Lens joint military exercise currently being conducted by US and South Korean troops. A Korean Central News Agency broadcast says Ulchi-Focus Lens, which is merely "a replica of the Team Spirit nuclear war exercise," is bringing the Korean Peninsula to the brink of war.

—Korean Central News Agency, 22 August 1998, in "North Reports Kim Chong-il Saying Confrontation Has Increased," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 August 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Ulji Focus Lens' Haptonggunsayonsubul Kyut'an/Rodongshinmun Ronp'yon," Korean Central News Agency, 22 August 1998, www.kcna.co.jp.

25 August 1998

South Korea's Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Hong Sun Yong submits a report to the National Assembly in which he claims that while there does not yet exist any proof the North Korea has violated the 1994 Agreed Framework, the recently discovered underground facility is most likely linked to a clandestine nuclear program.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 25 August 1998, in "South's Foreign Minister Admits No Proof on North's Suspected Nuclear Facility," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 August 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kwon Tae Yol, "Large-Scale Construction Project in Yongbyon in North Korea," *Chosun Ilbo*, 25 August 1998, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 August 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kwon tae Yol, "Puk Yongbyonso Taegyumo Chihagonsa/'Heak Kwallyonshisol Ch'ujong'," *Chosun Ilbo*, 26 August 1998, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

27 August 1998

Commenting on the recently discovered underground facility in North Korea, South Korean Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry spokesman Lee Ho Chin announces that "the government has no ground to prove that the facility is for nuclear development and the governments of South Korea and the United States share such an evaluation." However, Lee says, South Korea is "closely watching the facility with every possibility in mind, including the possibility of the facility being reserved for nuclear development."

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 27 August 1998, in "South Korean Spokesman Says No 'Solid' Proof of North's Nuclear Facility," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 27 August 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Gov't Denies NK's Development of Nuclear Facilities," *Korea Times*, 28 August 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 August 1998

North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan denies that the recently discovered underground facility in North Korea is part of a clandestine nuclear program. Speaking to US congressional staff members, Kim says that the facility is a "civilian structure." Kim reportedly reiterates the offer to allow international inspections of the site.

—Lucy S. Oh, "N. Korea Says Site Not Nuclear Facility," *Daily Yomiuri*, 30 August 1998, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; *Chosun Ilbo*, 30 August 1998, in "North Korea Reportedly Willing to Show USA Suspected Nuclear Facility," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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31 August 1998

KEDO's Executive Board postpones signing an agreement on sharing the cost of the \$4.6 billion light water reactor project after North Korea test-fires a ballistic missile over Japan. Following the missile test, Tokyo informs Seoul and Washington that it will not sign the agreement as scheduled and is currently suspending all financial support to KEDO.

—"N. Korea Reactor Cost-Sharing Accord Put on Hold," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 31 August 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Betsy Pisik, "Test Threatens Aid from Tokyo, Washington," *Washington Times*, 1 September 1998, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan Halts Air Traffic to North Korea," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 August 1998

The United States and North Korea meet in New York to continue bilateral talks on various issues including the implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework, resuming four-party peace talks, and the suspected underground nuclear facility recently discovered near Yongbyon-kun. The US and North Korean delegations are once again headed respectively by Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan. The United States reportedly demands that North Korea allow periodic inspections of the suspected underground nuclear facility currently under construction, but North Korea insists that the United States will be allowed to inspect the site only once. [Note: The meeting was supposed to continue on 1 September, but the North Korean delegation, reportedly awaiting instructions from Pyongyang, failed to show up. The talks resume on 3 September.]

—"US-N Korea Talks Resume, Clouded by Test of Missile," *Korea Times*, 1 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "High-Level N. Korea-U.S. Talks Focus on Missile Launch," *Asia Pulse*, 1 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea, U.S. to Resume Talks Thurs. in New York," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 September 1998

The US Senate votes to place tough conditions on allocating funds for KEDO. In a 80-11 vote, the Senate added an amendment to a foreign aid bill stipulating that no money would be allocated for heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea unless the president certifies that North Korea is not pursuing a nuclear weapons program and is not exporting ballistic missiles to countries on the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism.

—Jim Abrams, "Senate Votes on North Korea; Gingrich Criticizes IMF," Associated Press, 2 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Sean Scully, "Senate Exacts Price for N. Korean Acts; Move Cuts \$35 Million for Rector," *Washington Times*, 3 September 1998, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 September 1998

KEDO Executive Director Desaix Anderson meets with Keizo Takemi, Japan's state secretary for foreign affairs, and requests that Tokyo sign the cost-sharing agreement so that construction of the two light water reactors in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o can begin at the earliest date. Despite Anderson's request that Tokyo separate the KEDO issue from the 31 August missile incident, Takemi says that Tokyo cannot sign the agreement so soon after North Korea test-fired a missile over Japanese soil.

—"Japan Sky of KEDO Request on N. Korea," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 3 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis,

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<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KEDO Urges Japan to Promote N. Korea Reactor Project," Japan Economic Newswire, 3 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 September 1998

The United States and North Korea resume bilateral talks in New York. The US and North Korean delegations are once again headed respectively by Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan. The talks reportedly break down.

—"US and North Korea Fail to Reach Agreement after Critical Talks," Agence France Presse, 4 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 September 1998

Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan meet once again in New York for bilateral talks. The delegations refuse to comment on the details of what was discussed, but after the talks, Kim tells reporters, "We have come out with substantial progress." The two sides reportedly created a package of agreed upon steps, which will be finalized after approval from Washington and Pyongyang. Under the tentative agreement, the United States agrees to resume heavy fuel oil shipments, ensure that construction on the KEDO reactors begins in November, and take steps to ease economic sanctions against North Korea. North Korea agrees to resume sealing the remaining 200 spent nuclear fuel rods from its 5MW reactor, resolve suspicions about a recently discovered underground facility, participate in upcoming four-party peace talks scheduled for October, and resume missile talks with the United States. [Note: The talks, held intermittently since 21 August, have addressed various bilateral issues such as implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework, the suspected underground nuclear facility recently discovered near Yongbyon-kun, and the resumption of four-party peace talks.]

—"U.S., N. Korea Resume High-Level Talks in New York," Japan Economic Newswire, 5 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Malene Jensen, "Hopes of Accord as N Korea, US Speak of Progress at Nuclear-Related Talks," Agence France Presse, 5 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US and North Korea Tentatively Reach Deal on Several Issues: Report," Agence France Presse, 6 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. and NK Reach Tentative Accord," *Korea Times*, 8 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "High-Level North Korea-US Talks End on a High Note," *Asia Pulse*, 9 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 September 1998

North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) revises the constitution, making the National Defense Commission (NDC) the highest authority over state affairs, and making Kim Il Sung "eternal president" of North Korea. The SPA also re-elects Kim Jong Il as chairman of the NDC.

—"DPRK Socialist Constitution," Korean Central News Agency, 5 September 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; Chosonminjujuuinmin'gonghwaguk Sahoejuuihonbop," Korean Central News Agency, 5 September 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; Central Broadcasting Station, 5 September 1998, in "'Text' of North Korea's Socialist Constitution," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 8 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Nicholas D. Kristof, "Death Doesn't End Rule of Kim Il Sung, 'Eternal President'," *New York Times*, 7 September 1998, p. A5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Sang-Hun Choe, "North Korea Makes Kim Jong Il Head of State,"

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Associated Press, 5 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korean Lawmakers Re-Appoint Kim Head of Military," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 5 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 September 1998

According to Japanese Foreign Ministry sources, Tokyo is willing to resume contributions to KEDO if there is "a certain level of progress" in missile talks between the United States and North Korea.

—Kyodo News Service, 9 September 1998, in "Tokyo May Cooperate on North Korean Power Project of Progress Seen in North-US Talks," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 September 1998

Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka announces that Japan will not yet resume contributions to KEDO despite the tentative agreement reached between the United States and North Korea on 5 September. Nonaka notes the progress in the talks, but says, "We have announced our new policy toward North Korea, including the suspension of our assistance to the KEDO project--and we will stick by it."

—"Nuclear Aid to N. Korea to Stay Frozen," Japan Times, 10 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 September 1998

Charles Kartman, US special envoy to the recent US-North Korean talks, reports to the Senate on the outcome of the talks. In prepared testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, Kartman claims that he views the outcome with skepticism, saying, "We do not trust North Korean intentions." However, Kartman says that the commitments recently obtained from North Korea "will facilitate our ability to deal squarely with the issues of great and immediate concern," including the suspected underground nuclear facility, the safe storage of spent nuclear fuel rods, and North Korea's missile program. Kartman continues to say that the Agreed Framework "is still the only viable alternative we have that has a chance to keep North Korea's nuclear activities in check and keep the North engaged on other matters."

—Prepared Testimony by Charles Kartman Special Envoy Korean Peace Process Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, Federal News Service, 10 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 September 1998

North Korea's mission to the UN issues a statement granting the United States permission to inspect a suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. However, the statement stipulates, "If the US allegations are proved groundless through a visit to the site, the United States is obliged to make appropriate compensation, particularly for slandering and disgracing (North Korea)."

—Sau Chan, "North Korea Says It Will Allow US Visit to Suspected Underground Site," Associated Press, 10 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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11 September 1998

Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura implies that Japan is ready to resume contributions to the KEDO light water reactor project. Speaking to reporters in Tokyo, Komura says, We will consult with the US government closely over the issue in order to decide what to do...We know that Japan should not ruin the project in North Korea, which is the only way to have North Korea give up its nuclear weapons program." [Note: Japan froze all contributions to KEDO after North Korea test-fired a suspected ballistic missile over Japan on 31 August.]

—"Tokyo Softens Stance on Pyongyang," Asahi News Service, 11 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Shingo Ito, "Japan Backs N Korea's Reactor Project Despite Suspending Support," Agence France Presse, 11 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 September 1998

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei announces that the tenth round of technical discussions between the IAEA and North Korea (24-26 June) failed to make any progress. ElBaradei, addressing the IAEA board of governors, says that points of contention include the "preservation of information which must remain available to enable the agency to verify in the future the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's nuclear freeze declaration, and the continuous refusal by the DPRK to accept measures at the reprocessing plant." ElBaradei stresses that the IAEA must be allowed to monitor liquid nuclear waste in order to ensure that the waste--valuable evidence of North Korea's nuclear history--is not altered in any way.

—*Donga Ilbo*, 14 September 1998, in "Pyongyang Remains 'Uncooperative', Atomic Agency's Top Official Says," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Puk Haeksach'al Hyopcho anhae'/IAEA Samuch'ongjang," *Chosun Ilbo*, 15 September 1998, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

18 September 1998

The US House of Representatives adopts a foreign relations appropriations bill that cuts all \$35 million earmarked for heavy fuel oil deliveries to North Korean in 1999. The bill also carries an amendment stating that President Clinton cannot divert other parts of the foreign relations budget to fund the oil deliveries. The House bill goes farther than the recently adopted Senate bill which prevents the administration from using the \$35 million unless Clinton can certify that North Korea is not pursuing nuclear weapons and has halted all missile exports. [Note: The two houses of Congress will soon hold a joint session to coordinate their foreign relations appropriations bills.]

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 19 September 1998, in "N Korea: US Congress Fails to Approve Budget for Supplying Heavy Oil," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 September 1998

North Korea condemns the United States for alleging that an underground civilian structure is in fact a "secret underground nuclear facility." A commentary in the *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, calls the accusation "groundless slander," a "violation of (North Korea's) sovereignty," and an attempt to break the Agreed Framework. The commentary continues, "If the United States continues to delay the implementation on the framework agreement on unreasonable pretexts and puts pressure on the DPRK, we will be compelled to take relevant action and measures."

—"Sophism Will Not Work," *Rodong Sinmun*, 19 September 1998, in Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 19

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September 1998, in "Government Says US Allegations on Nuclear Facility Violation of Sovereignty," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>. "Nyongbyonjubyon Chihagujomul'un 'Haekshisol'i Anida/Rodongshinmun ronp'yong," Korean Central News Agency, 19 September 1998, www.kcna.co.jp.

20 September 1998

US Secretary of State Madeline Albright meets with Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura in New York in an attempt to urge Tokyo to remove its freeze on financial contributions to KEDO and to sign the KEDO cost-sharing agreement. Albright says that the August 31 missile incident and the KEDO light water reactor project should be dealt with separately. Komura acknowledges that "KEDO is the best means to prevent North Korea's nuclear (weapons) development" and that Tokyo does not plan to permanently withhold financial support for KEDO. However, he maintains that the financial freeze will remain in place for the time being. According to Komura, "If Japan immediately signed the agreement on the cost sharing, that would give the wrong impression to Pyongyang." [Note: Japan was scheduled to sign the KEDO cost-sharing agreement on 31 August, but indefinitely postponed the signing after North Korea fired a rocket over its territory. The cost-sharing agreement must be signed before KEDO can contract KEPCO to begin construction of the two light water reactors.]

—"U.S. Clarifies Firm Support to KEDO," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 21 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Keiji Urakami, "Japan, U.S., S. Korea to Hold Talks on KEDO," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Yutaka Sotome, "U.S.: Restart Funds for N. Korea Reactors," *Daily Yomiuri*, 22 September 1998, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, 20 September 1998, in "Japan, USA Issue Joint Statement after Security Talks - Full Text," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 22 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21-25 September 1998

The IAEA General Assembly meets in Vienna. During the opening session, South Korean Science and Technology Minister Kim Ch'ang Hui delivers a speech urging North Korea to cooperate fully with the IAEA and stressing the vital importance of obtaining information about North Korea's past nuclear activities. In this regard, Kang expresses regret that North Korea has not granted IAEA inspectors access to information necessary to determine the correctness and completeness on North Korea's initial declaration of nuclear material. On 25 September, the general assembly adopts a resolution in which the agency "expresses deep concern over the continuing non-compliance of the DPRK with the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement and calls upon the DPRK to comply fully with that safeguards agreement."

—Yonhap News Agency, 21 September 1998, in "South Korea to Ask North to Cooperate with Nuclear Inspection Regime," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 21 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Urges Nuclear Cooperation from N Korea," Agence France Presse, 25 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kim Ch'ang Hyok, "Puk, Haektonggyol Ihaengjunsu Ch'okkugyoluian Ch'aet'aek Yejong/IAEA Ch'onghwoe Kaemak," *Donga Ilbo*, 21 September 1998, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

21 September 1998

On the sidelines of the IAEA General Assembly meeting, US Energy Secretary Bill Richardson meets with Japanese Science and Technology Agency Director General Yutaka Takeyama and requests that Tokyo reconsider its decision

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to freeze financial contributions to KEDO.

—"U.S. Urges Japan to Resume Funding for KEDO Project," Japan Economic Newswire, 22 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 September 1998

Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura tells South Korean Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Hong Soon Young that Japan will observe the results of the upcoming US-North Korean missile talks scheduled to begin 1 October before deciding whether or not to sign the KEDO cost-sharing agreement. [Note: On 31 August, Japan postponed signing the agreement after North Korea fired a rocket over its territory.]

—"Tokyo to Watch N.K.-US Missile Talks before Sharing Reactor," *Asia Pulse*, 22 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Late September 1998

US Secretary of State Madeline Albright reportedly sends a letter Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura requesting that Tokyo lift its suspension of financial assistance to KEDO by 12 October. [Note: Funds for preparatory construction work in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o are scheduled to run out on 15 October, after which, preparatory construction will halt unless the board members sign the cost-sharing agreement and allocate the needed funds.]

—"US Urges Japan to Sign Nuclear Reactor Deal by Mid-October: Report," Agence France Presse, 30 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), 30 September 1998, in "North Korea: Meeting Focuses on Whether Japan Will Share Reactor Costs," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 30 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 September 1998

US Secretary of State Madeline Albright, Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura and South Korean Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Hong Soon Yung meet on the sidelines at the UN General Assembly. The three ministers reconfirm the importance of KEDO "as the most realistic and effective mechanism for preventing North Korea from advancing its nuclear program." They also jointly "deplore" the 31 August missile launch by North Korea. While Albright and Hong had hoped to persuade Tokyo to reconsider its decision to suspend all financial contributions to KEDO, Komura reiterated Tokyo's position that it is not prepared to resume financial contributions to KEDO or sign the cost-sharing agreement.

—"Korea, US, Japan Vow to Back Nuclear Reactor Project for NK," *Korea Times*, 25 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, 25 September 1998, in "Koreas: South Korea, Japan, USA Issue Joint Statement on North Korea," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 25 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 September 1998

North Korea's *Rodong Sinmun* denounces the US allegation that North Korea has built underground nuclear facilities and threatens to attack the United States for the "unpardonable encroachment upon the sovereignty and dignity of North Korea." The commentary also states that "whether the launch of our artificial satellite is used for military purposes or not, entirely depends on the attitude of the United States and other hostile forces."

—"U.S. Hit for Frantic Anti-DPRK Campaign," Korean Central News Agency, 25 September 1998, www.kcna.co.jp;

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Mi'gug'ui Pan'gonghwa'gug'apsalch'aektong'ul Kyut'an/Rodongsihinmun Ronp'yong," Korean Central News Agency, 25 September 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; "Do Not Make Unnecessary Rackets," *Nodong Simun*, 25 September 1998, in "North Korea Says Use of Satellite Launch Depends on USA and 'Other Hostile Forces,'" BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 26 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 September 1998

US government sources confirm that North Korea has resumed canning its nuclear spent fuel rods in containers. According to the source, the work should be complete within one month.

—"N. Korea Resumes Packing of Spent Fuel Rods," Japan Economic Newswire, 29 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 September 1998

Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura says, "The time has come for (Japan) to seriously consider when we should lift the suspension (of financial contributions to KEDO) and under what circumstances." Speaking to reporters, Komura adds that the international community will not understand if Japan continues to refuse to sign the KEDO cost-sharing agreement merely as retaliation for North Korea's missile test on 31 August.

—"Japan Considers Lifting KEDO Funding Suspension," Japan Economic Newswire, 29 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Toshio Jo, "KEDO Sanction Soon to Be Lifted," Asahi News Service, 29 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 September 1998

KEDO's Executive Board meets to discuss ways to alleviate an imminent funding crisis following Japan's refusal to sign the cost-sharing agreement. [Note: Funds for preparatory construction work in [Kumho-chigu], Shimp'o will run out by 15 October, after which, preparatory construction will halt unless the board members sign the cost-sharing agreement and allocate the needed funds.]

— Kyodo News Service, 30 September 1998, in "North Korea: Meeting Focuses on Whether Japan Will Share Reactor Costs," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 30 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29-30 September 1998

KEDO holds a general assembly meeting in New York, attended by representatives from 11 countries. The representatives review KEDO's annual report and discuss ways in which to alleviate funding problems. Discussions focus on Japan's recent suspension of financial contributions to KEDO following North Korea's 31 August missile test.

—"US, ROK, Japan Meet over Funding to NK Reactor," *Korea Times*, 30 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), 30 September 1998, in "North Korea: Meeting Focuses on Whether Japan Will Share Reactor Costs," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 30 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 September 1998

The US State Department announces that President Bill Clinton has allocated \$15 million for additional heavy fuel oil to be sent to North Korea. Both Houses of Congress refused to allocate funds for the oil shipments, but,

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according to State Department spokesman James Foley, Clinton used funds originally earmarked for nonproliferation and antiterrorism. Clinton says, in a statement read by Foley, that his decision is "important to the security interests of the US."

—"Clinton OK's Funds for More Fuel Oil to N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 1 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US to Buy More Fuel Oil for North Korea," Agence France Presse, 30 September 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 October 1998

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, accuses the United States of failing to implement the Agreed Framework. The editorial, carried by the Korean Central News Agency, accuses the United States of delaying construction of the two light water reactors, failing to make heavy fuel oil deliveries, and threatening North Korea with nuclear weapons. The commentary threatens that North Korea might abandon the Agreed Framework, saying, "Implementing an agreement with the United States while the latter does not have to do so does not make sense."

—"We Do Not Mind U.S. Breaking Agreement," Korean Central News Agency, 2 October 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; "Miuihoe Chung'yujagum'yesanbu'gyol'ul Pinan/Rodongshinmun Ronp'yong," Korean Central News Agency, 2 October 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency, 2 October 1998, in "North Korea Says It Does Not Fear Fracture of Agreement," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 3 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 October 1998

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, responds to a resolution adopted by the IAEA on 25 September that "expressed deep concern over the continuing non-compliance of (North Korea) with the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement." The *Rodong Sinmun* claims that the 1994 Agreed Framework supercedes the safeguards agreement, saying that "it is specified in the DPRK-US framework agreement that after considerable progress is made on the light water reactor agreement, the DPRK is to negotiate with the IAEA and implement the safeguards agreement." The article adds, "It is ridiculous for the IAEA to talk about nuclear inspection and total implementation of the nuclear safeguards accord at a time when the light water reactor project is at a standstill."

—Hong Hwang, "They Had Better Shut Their Mouths and Watch If They Have Nothing to Do," *Rodong Sinmun*, 5 October 1998, p. 6, in "North Korean Newspaper Denounces International Energy Body Resolution," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 25 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "DPRK Newspaper Criticizes IAEA," Xinhua News Agency, 5 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Denounces IAEA Call for Nuclear Cooperation," Agence France Presse, 5 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5-9 October 1998

The IAEA and North Korea hold negotiations in Vienna on North Korea's denial of access to information necessary for inspectors to verify the completeness and correctness of North Korea's initial declaration of nuclear material.

—"IAEA Negotiating with North Korea about Inspections," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 5 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Nuclear Agency, N. Korea Resume Inspection Talks," Korea Times, 6 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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8 October 1998

South Korean President Kim Dae Jung and Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi meet in Tokyo to discuss cooperation between their two countries in the 21st Century. The two leaders issue a joint declaration in which they reconfirm their commitment to uphold the 1994 Agreed Framework and recognize KEDO as the most effective mechanism to halt North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

—"Joint Declaration on New ROK-Japan Partnership for 21st Century," *Korea Times*, 8 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Summary of Japan-S. Korea Joint Declaration," Japan Economic Newswire, 8 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Hanil Kongdongsonon Yoji," *Hankook Ilbo*, 8 October 1998, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

13 October 1998

North Korea's Foreign Ministry accuses "conservative hardliners" in the United States of attempting to delay heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea. According to the ministry, if the US intention is to abolish the Agreed Framework, Pyongyang will not object.

—"If U.S. Wants to Pursue Policy of Not Implementing Framework Agreement, It Needn't Implement It," Korean Central News Agency, 13 October 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; "Chomi'gibonhab'uimun'ul Kkaeboryodo Mubanghada/Oemusongdamhwa," Korean Central News Agency, 13 October 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency, 13 October 1998, in "North Korea: Ministry Statement on Calls for Deaf Ear to US Reactor Talk," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Warns U.S. Against Cut in Oil Supply," Korea Herald, 14 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Zeno Park, "North Korea Renews Threat to Pull Out of Nuclear Accord," Agence France Presse, 14 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 October 1998

South Korean Foreign Minister Hong Sun Yong urges the US Congress to approve funds for heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea. Stressing the seriousness of the current situation to the survival of the Agreed Framework, Hong says, "In case the US neglects its part of the agreement, they will give North Korea the excuse to scrap the agreement."

—"US Urged to Back North Korean Fuel Supplies," *Financial Times* (London), 14 October 1998, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 October 1998

KEDO's Executive Board adopts a resolution extending the preparatory construction work in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o until mid-January 1999. Because Tokyo has refused to sign the KEDO cost sharing agreement, KEPCO, the main contractor for the reactor project, will provide the \$8.9 million needed for the additional work, and KEDO will repay KEPCO by June 1999. [Note: According to a South Korean official from the Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project, since KEDO will not have to halt preliminary work due to lack of funding, the actual construction of the reactors is expected to begin the first half of 1999.]

—Shin Yong Bae, "KEDO to Restart Preparations for North Korean Reactor Project," *Korea Herald*, 15 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Nuclear Power Project for N. Korea Will Resume," *Korean Industry Update*, 16 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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15 October 1998

The White House and Congress agree on a budget for fiscal year 1999 which includes \$35 million earmarked for heavy fuel oil deliveries to North Korea. Under the agreed upon budget, President Clinton must certify that North Korea is not pursuing a nuclear weapons program and has halted all ballistic missile exports before the funds can be used.

—Keiji Urakami, "White House, Congress Cut Budget Deal," Japan Economic Newswire, 16 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KEDO Survives, Changed by U.S. Budget Deal," *Korea Times*, 16 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 October 1998

In an interview with Japan's *Nihon Keizai*, former US Defense Secretary William Perry says that the recently discovered underground facility in North Korea likely contains a nuclear reactor that will be completed in four to five years.

—"N Korea Reactor May Be Ready in 4-5 Years: From US Def Sec," *Asia Pulse*, 16 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 October 1998

Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi tells Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura and Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka to take necessary measure to resume financial contributions to KEDO. According to a government official, Japan plans to sign the KEDO cost-sharing agreement with the United States, South Korea and the EU as early as next week. [Note: On 31 August, Tokyo suspended all financial contributions to KEDO after North Korea test-fired a missile that passed over Japanese territory.]

—Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), 16 October 1998, in "Government Decides to Lift Freeze on Funding for North Korean Reactors," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan Decides to Resume Funding to DPRK Reactor Project," Xinhua News Agency, 16 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan to Lift Freeze on Funding North Korean Nuclear Plants," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 16 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan Seen to Sign KEDO Funding Accord Next Week," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 16 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 October 1998

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, questions the US commitment to the 1994 Agreed Framework. The paper claims that if the United States fails to implement the agreement, "it will be wholly to blame for the consequences."

—"U.S. Will Be to Blame," Korean Central News Agency, 17 October 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency, 17 October 1998, in "North Korea: Daily Criticizes USA for Failing to Fulfill Framework Agreement," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 17 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Chomi'gibonhab'uimun'ui Ch'aeg'im'un Mi'gug'I Chigae Toelgot/Rodongshinmun Ronp'yong," Korean Central News Agency, 17 October 1998, www.kcna.co.jp.

17 October 1998

A spokesman for North Korea's Disarmament and Peace Institute says that peace on the Korean Peninsula will be

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realized "only when" the United States removes all troops from South Korea. [Note: The institute is a think tank under North Korea's Foreign Ministry.]

—"DPI Spokesman on U.S. Troop Pullout," Korean Central News Agency, 17 October 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; "<4 Chahoedam>, Mi'gunch'olsumunjejogonbu'nun Pulsunhan Chongch'ijokkido/Kunch'uk-Pyonghwayon'gusodaebyon'in," Korean Central News Agency, 17 October 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; C. W. Lim, "N. Korea Urges US Not to Raise 'Any Preconditions' in Peace Talks," Agence France Presse, 18 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 October 1998

The US Congress passes a budget for fiscal year 1999 that allocates \$35 million for heavy fuel oil deliveries to North Korea. However, the budget stipulates the funds will not be allocated until 1 March 1999, and no more than \$15 million may be allocated before 1 June 1999. Thirty days prior to each date, President Clinton must certify that North Korea is taking steps to implement the 1994 Agreed Framework and is no longer exporting ballistic missiles. Congress also specifies that "30 days before the June deadline, the White House must certify that it has reached an agreement with North Korea on the means for satisfying US concerns regarding suspect underground construction."

—"US KEDO Funding Frozen until March 1999," *Korea Times*, 21 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Tough KEDO Compromise Could Signal Beginning of the End," *Korea Times*, 20 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 21 October 1998, in "Washington Attaches 'Tough Conditions' on Heavy Oil Supply," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 22 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 October 1998

Terusuke Terada, Japan's ambassador to KEDO, signs the KEDO cost-sharing agreement in Tokyo, thus officially ending Japan's suspension of financial support for KEDO. Representatives from the United States, South Korea and the EAEC also sign the cost-sharing agreement. [Note: Japan suspended all funds for KEDO on 31 August 1998 after a North Korean rocket flew over Japanese territory.]

—"Japan Officially Lifts KEDO Freeze," *Japan Times*, 22 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan Signs Resolution Lifting Freeze on KEDO Funding," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan Unfreezing N. Korea Reactor Funds," United Press International, 21 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan Lifts Freeze on 1-B.-Dollar Contribution to KEDO," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 21 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 October 1998

Lee Gun, North Korea's spokesman for the four-party peace talks in Geneva, says that North Korea does not care if the United States abandons the 1994 Agreed Framework. Commenting on the US Congress's plan to freeze funds for KEDO until at least 1 March 1999, Lee says, "The [Agreed Framework] was signed and agreed upon because the United States wanted it. We don't care and it does not matter to us whether they stop funding or break the agreement."

—"North Korea Says It Does Not Care If US Freezes KEDO Funding," Agence France Presse, 21 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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21-24 October 1998

Representatives from the United States, China, and the two Koreas meet in Geneva for the third round of four-party peace talks aimed at replacing the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement with a formal peace treaty. This round of talks shows progress as the four parties agree to form two subcommittees to discuss establishing peace on the peninsula and reducing tension between North and South Korea. At the talks, the United States and North Korea meet in private to discuss the suspected underground nuclear facility located near Kumch'ang-ri. North Korea reportedly offers to allow the United States to inspect the site in return for compensation for infringing on its sovereignty. On 24 October, a US official announces that at the bilateral meetings, North Korea agreed to allow Charles Kartman, head of the US delegation, to visit the suspected sites as early as November.

—Lim Yun Suk, "US, N. Korea Exchange Sharp Words on No Progress in Peace Talks," Agence France Presse, 21 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lim Yun Suk, "Peace Talks to Resume as North Korea Demands US Troop Pullout," Agence France Presse, 22 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; John Zarocostas, "US, N. Korea Meet on Summit Sidelines," United Press International, 23 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "South and North Korea Move Closer to Reaching Deal," Agence France Presse, 23 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lim Yun Suk, "US Korea Specialist to Visit N. Korea over Suspect nuclear complex," Agence France Presse, 24 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lim Yun Suk, "South And North Korea Take a Step Forward Toward Achieving Peace," Agence France Presse, 25 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 October 1998

Kim Tok Ryong, a member of South Korea's National Assembly, claims that Seoul has evidence that two recently discovered underground facilities in North Korea are related to a clandestine nuclear weapons program. According to Kim, one of the facilities is located in Kumchang-ri, Taegwan-kun, and the other is located between T'aechon-kun and Kusong. Kim says the Kumch'ang-ri facility, to be completed within six years, is expected to house a reactor and a reprocessing plant. The other facility, according to Kim, is located under an island in the middle of a lake, and is already producing plutonium. However, South Korea's Unification Minister, Kang In Tok, announces that the United States and South Korea have not yet determined whether or not the facilities are in fact related to a nuclear weapons program.

—"NK Building 2 Underground Nuke Sites," *Korea Times*, 23 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 23 October 1998, in "Koreas: South's Lawmaker Says North Has Two More Nuclear Sites," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 23 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Builds Two More Nuclear Sites: S Korean Opposition," Agence France Presse, 23 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 23 October 1998, in "Koreas: South Says Status of North's Underground Facility Still Unconfirmed," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 23 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kim In Ku, "'Puk Haekshisol 2 Kot To Itta'/Kim Tok Ryong Uiwon Chujang," *Chosun Ilbo*, 24 October 1998, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

27 October-7 November 1998

The United States and South Korea hold the annual Foal Eagle joint military exercise. The military exercise, aimed at preparing for a North Korean invasion, involves 50,000 South Korean troops and 35,000 US troops. Foal Eagle

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'98 is the largest joint-military exercise since the cancellation of Team Spirit in 1993. [Note: Team Spirit was cancelled in order to encourage North Korea to sign the Agreed Framework, but since Team Spirit's cancellation, North Korea has accused the United States and South Korea of merely replacing Team Spirit with other joint military exercises.]

—Marc Lavine, "S. Korea, US to Launch Massive Joint Military Exercise Next Week," Agence France Presse, 20 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 October 1998

The US State Department announces that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Charles Kartman will lead a delegation to North Korea on 16 November to discuss inspections of suspected underground nuclear facilities. According to State Department spokesman James Rubin, the United States will demand a written commitment from Pyongyang to allow such inspections. [Note: At the recently concluded third round of four-party peace talks in Geneva, North Korea reportedly agreed to allow inspections of the sites if the United States agreed to compensate North Korea for infringing on its sovereignty if the sites are found not to be related to a nuclear program.]

—"U.S. Diplomat to North Korea for Talks on Underground Site," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 28 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; George Gedda, "U.S. Officials Plan Visit to North Korea for Talks," Associated Press, 28 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Philip Shenon, "North Korea to Let U.S. Group Visit Suspicious New Complex," New York Times, 29 October 1998, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Late October 1998

CIA Director George Tenet reportedly meets with top South Korean officials in Seoul to coordinate the US and South Korean policies on North Korea.

—"CIA Director's Secret Visit Blown Again," *Korea Times*, 1 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 October 1998

A commentary appearing in the *Rodong Sinmun* says that while North Korea hopes to see the Agreed Framework implemented in full, if the United States breaks the agreement, North Korea has nothing to lose. The commentary adds that if the United States does in fact abandon the 1994 agreement, Washington "must know that it will be held wholly responsible for all the consequences arising therein."

—"Chomihab'uimun'ul P'at'anshik'iryo'nun Rogolchog'in Pulman/Rodongshinmun Ronp'yong," Korean Central News Agency, 30 October 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central News Agency, 30 October 1998, in "North Korea Daily Slams US Move to Provoke War," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 30 October 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 November 1998

In an interview with the *Asahi Shimbun*, US Defense Secretary William Cohen says that the 1994 Agreed Framework "would be in jeopardy" if North Korea does not allow inspections of two suspected underground nuclear facilities.

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—Yoichi Kato, "Cohen: Pyongyang Must OK Inspection," Asahi News Service, 4 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 November 1998

Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Shunji Yanai urges North Korea to allow inspections of two recently discovered underground facilities with suspected ties to a clandestine nuclear program.

—Kyodo News Service, 2 November 1998, in "Japanese Official Urges North Korea to Accept Nuclear Inspections," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 November 1998

The UN General Assembly adopts a resolution calling on North Korea to come into full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement. The resolution also calls on North Korea to preserve information relevant to verifying the completeness and correctness of its initial declaration of nuclear material.

—Kyodo News Service, 3 November 1998, in "Concern Expressed over North Korea Nuclear Safety Checks," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 November 1998

North Korean Ambassador Kim Chang Guk tells the UN General Assembly that North Korea will not cooperate with the IAEA until the United States fulfills its pledge under the Agreed Framework to supply two light water nuclear reactors. [Note: On 2 November, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution urging North Korea to come into full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement.]

—"North Korea: No Nuclear Cooperation without U.S. Action," Associated Press, 5 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Wont's (sic) Cooperate with UN Agency," *Korea Times*, 6 November 1998, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

3 November 1998

South Korea's SBS Television reports that North Korean uranium, thorium, and lithium are being sold on the black market in China.

—Kim Son Il, SBS Television (Seoul), 3 November 1998, in "South TV Says North Reportedly Selling Nuclear Materials in China," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 November 1998

South Korean Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Hong Sun Yong announces that South Korea has discovered "some suspect parts of North Korea's underground facility," but, Hong adds, South Korea will not take "excessive action until we obtain a clear conclusion that the underground facility is related to a nuclear program." Hong states that until such proof comes forward, South Korea will continue to support the KEDO light water reactor project.

—Yonhap News Agency, 5 November 1998, in "Koreas: South Not to React to North Nuclear Site Unless Evidence Found," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 5 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Ch'u Sung Ho, "T'ong'ilwoegyot'ongsangwi/Kukkam Hairait'u," *Taehan Maeil*, 6 November 1998, p. 6, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

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9 November 1998

North Korea's Foreign Ministry objects to the US demand for unconditional access to two underground facilities it suspects of being related to a clandestine nuclear weapons program. The Korean Central News Agency quotes a ministry spokesman as saying that North Korea has made it clear that it would allow an inspection of the sites only if it is compensated for what it feels to be an infringement upon its sovereignty if the facilities are proven not to be related to a nuclear program.

—"Inspection' of Underground Facility is Interference in DPRK's Internal Affairs," Korean Central News Agency, 9 November 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; "Chihashisol 'Sach'al' Un Chungsangmodok/Woemusongdaebyonin Tamhwa," Korean Central News Agency, 9 November 1998, www.kcna.co.jp.

9 November 1998

KEDO adopts a resolution stipulating how the costs of constructing two light water reactors will be divided among the executive board members. Under the resolution, South Korea will finance 70 percent of the \$4.6 billion project, and Japan will provide \$1 billion. The remaining \$400 million will be provided by the United States and the EU, but the details of how much each would pay is not mentioned in the resolution.

—"KEDO Adopts Cost-Sharing Resolution on N. Korea Reactors," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 11 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "4 Nations Agree on How to Pay for N. Korean Nuclear Project," *Korean Industry Update*, 12 November 1998, p. 6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 November 1998

Washington says that it is willing to abandon the 1994 Agreed Framework unless North Korea allays suspicions that two recently discovered underground facilities are related to a clandestine nuclear weapons program. A senior US official says that "in the absence of such a solution, it is very difficult to foresee how we will be able to sustain our obligations under the Agreed Framework." The official also says that Washington has "a great body of evidence" that suggests that North Korea is in deed constructing a new nuclear facility.

—George Gedda, "U.S. Warns North Korea on Suspicious Sites," Associated Press, 10 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Carole Landry, "US Puts North Korean Nuke Agreement on the Line," *Agence France Presse*, 10 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; U.S. Urges N. Korea to Remove Nuclear Suspicions," 11 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 November 1998

Pyongyang denounces the United States for stating it has evidence that North Korea is constructing an underground nuclear facility. The Korean Central News Agency says once again that the United States may inspect the suspected site if it agrees to pay compensation should the facility be found not to be related to a nuclear program. The commentary also warns that "the United States should ponder over the serious consequences to be entailed by its ill-intentioned demand for 'inspection'."

—"U.S. Must Stop 'Inspection' Racket," Korean Central News Agency, 12 November 1998, www.kcna.co.jp.

13 November 1998

US Secretary of State Madeline Albright tells reporters that Washington believes "that the Agreed Framework is doing what it's supposed to do, which is to freeze (North Korea's) nuclear materials program." Despite concerns

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about recently discovered underground facilities with suspected ties to a North Korean nuclear program, Albright says that the United States is "at this time satisfied." [Note: Albright's comments are noticeable different from the 10 November statement of a senior government official who claimed that the United States was prepared to walk away from the Agreed Framework if North Korea did not allow inspections of the suspected sites.]

—"Albright Says U.S.-DPRK Accord Implemented as Expected," Xinhua News Agency, 13 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 November 1998

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, reports that North Korea is "not on the least fearful of the US threat that if the 'inspection' of the 'underground nuclear facility' is not allowed, the DPRK-US Agreed Framework will face crisis." "If the USA breaks the framework," the paper warns, "we will have the next option."

—"Rodong Sinmun on U.S. Brigandish Demand," Korean Central News Agency, 13 November 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; "<Chihahaekshisolsach'al>Un Mujanghaejenorimgot/Rodongshinmun Ronp'yong," Korean Central News Agency, 13 November 1998, www.kcna.co.jp.

14 November 1998

Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, meets with South Korean Assistant Foreign Minister Ch'oe Song Hong prior to his trip to North Korea. The two agree that North Korea must allow on-site inspections of its suspected underground nuclear installations.

—Yonhap News Agency, 14 November 1998, in "Koreas: South's Official Discusses North's Nuclear Issue with US Envoy Kartman," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 14 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US, South Korea Agree to Push for Access to Underground Sites in N Korea," Agence France Presse, 14 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16-18 November 1998

A US delegation, lead by Charles Kartman, special envoy for Korean affairs, meets with North Korean officials in Pyongyang to discuss inspecting a recently discovered underground facility in Kumch'ang-ri with suspected ties to a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Kartman informs North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan that Washington will reconsider its commitment to the Agreed Framework if North Korea does not allow inspections of the site. Claiming that the disputed facility is for food storage, North Korea reportedly says it will allow the inspection only if the United States pays \$300 million, but the United States rejects the offer. While little progress is made during the discussions, the two sides agree to meet again at a later date.

—Sid Balman Jr., "N. Korea Links Inspection to Money," United Press International, 18 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Pyongyang Continues Stall over Suspected Nuclear Facility," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 18 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; George Gedda, "North Korea Denies U.S. Access to Suspicious Site," Associated Press, 18 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Denied Access to Suspected North Korean Nuclear Weapons Site," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 19 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Special Envoy for Korean Peninsula Peace Talks," Korean Central News Agency, 16 November 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mi'guk Chosonbandop'yonghwahodam Chondamt'uksailhaeng Toch'ak," Korean Central News Agency, 16 November 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; "U.S. Special

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Envoy for Korean Peninsula Peace Talks and His Entourage (sic) Leave," Korean Central News Agency, 18 November 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mi'guk Chosonbandop'yonghwaodam Chondamt'uksailhaeng'i Ddonagatta," Korean Central News Agency, 18 November 1998, www.kcna.co.jp.

18 November 1998

US State Department spokesman James Rubin says that Washington is not surprised that Pyongyang refused to allow unconditional access to a suspected nuclear facility. Commenting on the recent failure of a US delegation to convince Pyongyang to allow inspections of an underground facility in Kumch'ang-ri, Rubin says that Washington is not "satisfied with the response we received." However, he adds, "This is an ongoing process. There was no expectation that we were going to resolve it right away." Rubin says that the two sides agreed to meet again "as soon as possible." [Note: During the 16 November meeting, North Korea said that it would allow inspections of the site only if the United States paid \$300 million.]

—George Gedda, "North Korea Denies U.S. Access to Suspicious Site," Associated Press, 18 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Sarah Jackson-Han, "North Korea, US to Meet Again on Suspected Nuclear Site," Agence France Presse, 18 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Philip Shenon, "North Korea Offers U.S. Access to Secret Plant, at a Steep Price," *New York Times*, 19 November 1998, p. A11, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 November 1998

Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean Affairs, tells reporters in Seoul that "there is compelling evidence that [the facility under construction in Kumch'ang-ri] is intended to be used for nuclear-related activities." Commenting on his 16-18 November meeting with North Korean officials in Pyongyang, Kartman says that North Korea demanded "compensation for the insult" of inspecting the site, but the US delegation flatly rejected idea. —"U.S. Convinced of DPRK's Nuclear-Related Activities," Xinhua News Agency, 19 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US Envoy Warns NK Nuclear Deal at Risk," *Korea Times*, 19 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Don Kirk, "U.S. Refuses to Buy North Korea Access," *International Herald Tribune*, 20 November 1998, p. 6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 November 1998

Commenting on a suspected nuclear weapons site in Kumch'ang-ri, US Defense Secretary William Cohen says that the United States is "going to need inspections of the site or sites that might be involved," and warns that North Korea's failure to comply would "call very much into question the Agreed Framework itself." —"Cohen Urges N. Korea to Grant Access to Suspected Site," Japan Economic Newswire, 20 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 20 November 1998, in "US Defense Secretary Issues 'Stern Warning' to Pyongyang on Access to Suspected Nuclear Facility," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 20 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 November 1998

South Korean President Kim Dae Jung says that there is not yet any "conclusive evidence" to prove that the underground facility in Kumch'ang-ri, North Korea is related to a clandestine nuclear weapons program. —"Kim Says No Evidence About N. Korea's Nuclear Site," Japan Economic Newswire, 20 November 1998, in Lexis-

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Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "South Korean P.M. Urges Caution over North's Alleged Nuclear Plant," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 20 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 November 1998

After his visit to Pyongyang, Charles Kartman, special envoy for Korean affairs, announces that the United States and South Korea have "compelling evidence" that the underground facilities currently under construction in Kumch'ang-ri are related to a nuclear program. However, the South Korean government denies that there is clear evidence. South Korean President Kim Dae Jung also says, "there is suspicion that the underground facilities in Kumch'ang-ri are nuclear-related, but there is no clear evidence."

—Yonhap News Agency, 20 November 1998, in "South Korean Report Details Intelligence Gathering on North Nuclear Facility," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 20 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Kartman T'uksa Ilmunlldap/'Puk Uihok Changso Kumch'ang-ri Hangot'," *Hankook Ilbo*, 20 November 1998, p. 5, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr; Lee T'ae Hui, "'Puk chihashisol Haek Kwanllyon Chunggo'/Chongbu 'Haekshisol Hwakchung'un Ajik Optta'," *Hangyoreh Shinmun*, 20 November 1998, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr; Hong Yun O, "'Puk Haekuihok Hwakchung'un Optta'/Kim Taet'ongnyong Kwiguk Hwoegyon," *Hankook Ilbo*, 21 November 1998, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

20 November 1998

US President Bill Clinton, appearing at a joint press conference with Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, dismisses as "completely unacceptably" North Korea's demand for up to \$300 million in compensation for allowing inspection of a suspected nuclear site.

—Robert Burns, "Clinton Voices New Concerns about North Korea Nuclear Weapons," Associated Press, 20 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Shigemi Sato, "Clinton Spurns North Korea's Condition on Nuclear Inspections," Agence France Presse, 20 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Transcript of Joint Statement by Clinton, Obuchi Nov. 20," U.S. Newswire, 21 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 November 1998

US President Bill Clinton and South Korean President Kim Dae Jung urge North Korea to allow inspections of a suspected underground nuclear facility at Kumch'ang-ri. Speaking at a joint press conference, Clinton says that Washington and Seoul "have strong information that raises a suspicion, but no one knows for sure what the facility is." Kim warns that the two allies "will not tolerate any development of nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass-destruction" by North Korea.

—"U.S. and Seoul Warn North Korea about Developing Nuclear Arms," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 21 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Robert Burns, "Clinton, Kim Demand Answers on Suspected Nuclear Site," 21 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 November 1998

A *Rodong Sinmun* commentary says that in order to reduce military tension on the Korean Peninsula, Washington must sign a peace treaty with Pyongyang and remove all its troops from South Korea.

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—"North Korea Urges US Troop Withdrawal, Korea Peace Treaty," Agence France Presse, 21 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 November 1998

South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, in a meeting with top government officials, says, "If North Korea's underground site is confirmed to be a nuclear weapons storage facility, we will first ask Pyongyang to remove nuclear weapons. Should it deny the call, a grave situation will take place."

—"Kim Presses NK to Allow Access to Suspected Nuke Site," *Korea Times*, 23 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 November 1998

Pentagon issues a report reviewing US strategy in East Asia. The 68-page report, titled "The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region 1998," notes that the 1994 Agreed Framework "defused a critical source of tension and deflected what could have been a military confrontation with North Korea." The report continues, "If North Korea proves unwilling to fulfill the terms of the agreement, the United States will pursue its fundamental security interests through other diplomatic and security means."

—Department of Defense, *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region 1998*, November 1998, www.dod.gov; Gus Constantine, "Cohen: U.S. Role in Asia is Resolute; Includes Engaging China, N. Korea," *Washington Times*, 24 November 1998, p. A11, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US Security Blueprint Hints at Action against N. Korea: Seoul," Agence France Presse, 25 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; John Gittings, "US Threat to Invade North Korea; A Deliberately Leaked Plan to Topple the 'Great Leader' May Backfire, Warns John Gittings in Hong Kong," *The Guardian* (London), 26 November 1998, p. 18, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 November 1998

The North Korean Foreign Ministry says that North Korea has no obligation to allow an inspection of an underground facility in Kumch'ang-ri. A ministry spokesman says that North Korea will never accept the US demand for such an inspection, calling it "a grave violation of and insult to our sovereignty and dignity." The spokesman says, however, that North Korea could allow a one-time inspection if the United States compensates it for the "groundless" insult.

—"Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Pyongyang Negotiation about Underground Facility," Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 24 November 1998, www.kcna.co.jp.

24 November 1998

Asahi News Service, quoting US and South Korean defense experts, reports that North Korea has recently tested nuclear warhead triggering devices. The report quotes the defense experts as saying they have "credible evidence" that North Korea has conducted such tests nearby the suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri several times in 1998.

—Koichi Kosuge, "N. Korea Said Testing Nuke Trigger Devices," Asahi News Service, 24 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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25 November 1998

Speaking at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei says that he regrets "to report that no tangible progress was made during the eleventh round of technical discussions between the IAEA and the DPRK which took place in Vienna from October 5-8, 1998." ElBaradei adds, "Since 1995 there has been no progress in our efforts to obtain access to the information which the agency deems necessary." [Note: On 4 December, North Korea condemns ElBaradei's statements as a cooperative attempt with US hardliners to derail the 1994 Agreed Framework.]

—"No Tangible Progress' in IAEA-N Korea Talks," Agence France Presse, 25 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 26 November 1998, in "Nuclear Watchdog Chief Criticizes North Korea for Lack of Cooperation," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 26 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Korean Central News Agency (Seoul), 4 December 1998, in "North Korean Agency Criticizes Atomic Energy Agency Report on Alleged Facility," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 5 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 November 1998

The *Rodong Sinmun* denies allegations from the United States and South Korea that an underground facility in Kumch'ang-ri is intended for nuclear weapons production. The newspaper also claims that the accusations raise tension on the peninsula and give North Korea the right to take "appropriate defensive measure."

—Korean Central News Agency, 26 November 1998, in "North Korea: Daily Warns Danger of War 'Increasing' on Peninsula," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 26 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Papers on Clinton's trip to South Korea," Korean Central News Agency, 26 November 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; "Clinton Ui Namjosenheanggakun Chonjaenghaenggak/Rodongshinmun Tung," Korean Central News Agency, 26 November 1998, www.kcna.co.jp.

28 November 1998

Top government officials from Tokyo and Seoul meet in Kagoshima, Japan and agree to take concerted steps to resolve the issue of a suspected nuclear facility under construction in North Korea.

—Kohei Murayama, "Japan, S. Korea Agree to Beef up Broad Cooperation," Japan Economic Newswire, 28 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 November 1998

After meeting with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei calls on North Korea to open suspected nuclear sites for inspection. ElBaradei says, "There is a need to clarify what the underground facility is, and we should be able to examine it through dialogue with North Korea."

—"IAEA Chief Urges N. Korea to Allow Access to Suspect Nuclear Facility," Agence France Presse, 30 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 December 1998

A spokesman for the General Staff of the Korean People's Army condemns a recently leaked Pentagon report, Operation Plan 5027, that calls for the invasion of Pyongyang and the overthrow of Kim Jong Il's regime in the event of a North Korean invasion of the South. A spokesman for the general staff of the Korean People's Army

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accuses the United States of trying to ignite a war on the Korean Peninsula. The spokesman adds that if the United States attacks the North, it will respond with an "annihilating blow" against the United States, South Korea and Japan.

—"KPA Will Answer U.S. Aggression Forces' Challenge with Annihilating Blow = Statement of KPA General Staff Spokesman =", Korean Central News Agency, 2 December 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mich'imnryakkun'ui Tojon'e Sommyolcho'in T'agyog'uro Taedap/Chosoninmingun Ch'ongch'ammobu Taebyon'in," Korean Central News Agency, 2 December 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; "KPA Will Answer US Imperialist Aggression Forces' Challenge with Annihilating Blow: Statement of KPA General Staff Spokesman," Korean Central News Agency, 2 December 1998, in "N Korea: Agency Carries Army Statement on US 'Imperialist' Challenge," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 December 1998

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei urges North Korea to comply with its safeguards agreement and allow agency inspectors access to information necessary for verifying the completeness and correctness of North Korea's initial declaration of nuclear material. Meeting with South Korea's Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Hong Sun Yong, ElBaradei also urges North Korea to allow inspections of the suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri and states that the agency will get involved with the dispute over the facility in the future. In an interview with the *Korea Herald* following the meeting, ElBaradei proposes that North Korea allow the IAEA to inspect the site in order to defuse mounting tension over the issue and prove that the site is not related to a nuclear program.

—Yonhap News Agency, 2 December 1998, in "International Atomic Energy Body Chief Urges North Korean Cooperation," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis; Jun Kwan Woo, "IAEA Offers to Inspect Suspect Underground Facility in North," *Korea Herald*, 3 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 December 1998

The EU and North Korea hold working-level discussions in Brussels to address various issues including nuclear nonproliferation on the Korean Peninsula. The meeting is attended by officials from the European Commission, the foreign ministers of Britain, Germany and Austria, and Kim Ch'un Guk, director in charge of European affairs in the North Korean Foreign Ministry. Delegates do not comment on the details on the meeting, but describe the talks as "constructive".

—Miu Oikawa Dieter, "EU-N. Korea Political Dialogue Held in Brussels," Japan Economic Newswire, 3 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 December 1998

Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon announces that Washington has not detected any signs that North Korean forces are preparing for war on the Korean Peninsula. Commenting on a 2 December statement by the general staff of the Korean People's Army threatening to annihilate the United States if it made any aggressive moves on the peninsula, Bacon says that while North Korean forces are currently involved in winter training exercises, there has not been "anything out of the ordinary going on." [Note: The 2 December North Korean statement, carried by the Korean central News Agency, was in response to a recently leaked Pentagon report, Operation Plan 5027,

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which stated that if North Korean invaded the South, the United States would not only defend the 38th parallel but also invade Pyongyang and overthrow the regime.]

—Department of Defense, DOD News Briefing, 3 December 1998, www.defenselink.mil; "U.S. Sees No Military Buildup in N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 4 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 December 1998

South Korean Defense Minister Ch'on Yong Taek says that North Korea's nuclear and missile programs remain a threat to Northeast Asia. Speaking at an annual meeting of top ranking military personnel, Chun says that South Korea must remain at full alert as tension grows over North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program.

—Lee Sung Yul, "Defense Minister Calls for Full Readiness: Against Possible Tension over N.K.'s Suspected Nuclear Arms Program," *Korea Herald*, 4 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kim Yong Bon, "Puk Naenyon Kunsaujondo To Kojiltut," *Munhwa Ilbo*, 3 December 1998, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

3 December 1998

North Korea's Vice Defense Minister Chong Ch'ang Ryol warns the United States that if it starts a war on the Korean Peninsula, "our People's Army will blow up the US territory as a whole."

—"Annihilating Blow Will be Given," Korean Central News Agency, 3 December 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; "Mujabihan Sommyolchokt'a'gyog'ul Kahalgoshida/Chong Ch'ang Ryol Inminmuryoksongbusang," Korean Central News Agency, 3 December 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; "North Korea Says It's on Full Alert for War," Associated Press, 3 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lim Yun Suk, "North Korea Escalates War of Words with US a Day before Talks," Agence France Presse, 3 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 December 1998

Seoul announces that in 1999 it plans to send an additional consul to the KEDO office in Shinp'o as construction of the reactors gets under way. [Note: Currently there are five consuls at the KEDO office: two each from the United States and South Korea, and one from Japan.]

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 4 December 1998, in "South Korea to Send One More Envoy to Nuclear Energy Body Office in North," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 4 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 December 1998

More than 100,000 North Korean soldiers, workers, and students attend a demonstration at Kim Il Sung Square in the heart of Pyongyang reportedly vowing to answer "the reckless provocation of the US imperialist aggressors with an all-out war."

—"Korean People Ready to Annihilate U.S. Imperialists," Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 4 December 1998, www.kcna.co.jp.

4 December 1998

A *Rodong Sinmun* commentary urges the North Korean Army to assume full combat readiness and warns the United States that if it makes any military provocations it will be "uprooted from this land once and for all." A similar commentary appearing in *Rodong Sinmun* on the same day denounces the continued US assertion that Kumch'ang-ri is a nuclear weapons facility, calling the allegation "a wicked plot to come up with a pretext for

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provoking a war at all cost."

—"Let Us Resolutely Crush the US Imperialists' Challenge with an Enemy-Annihilating Fighting Spirit," *Rodong Sinmun*, Korean Central News Agency, 4 December 1998, in "Party Paper Urges Army, People to Prepare for War," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "We Will Strike a Thousand-Fold Blow," Korean Central News Agency, 4 December 1998, in "North Korea Threatens to Clobber US 'Jackal' to Death," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 5 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Korean People Ready to Annihilate U.S. Imperialists," Korean Central News Agency, 4 December 1998, www.kcna.co.jp; "Kunsaronp'yongwon Mi '5027 Chakchongyehwoek' Pinan/Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 6 January 1998, www.kcna.co.jp.

4-5 December 1998

Representatives from the United States and North Korea meet in New York to discuss a suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. The US and North Korean delegations are respectively headed by Charles Kartman, special envoy for Korean affairs, and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan. After the first day of talks, Kim tells reporters that there are still "great differences in our views." He adds that North Korea has faithfully adhered to the Agreed Framework, and reiterated the demand that if the United States wants to inspect the KUMch'ang-ri site it must pay. Following the second day of talks, Kartman says, "The atmosphere is serious, and we managed to cover some ground today." However, neither he nor Kim mentions any comment on the details of the meetings.

[Note: The two delegations continue talks in Washington on 7 December.]

—Malene Jensen, "'Great Differences' with US on Nuclear Talks: North Korean," Agence France Presse, 4 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Says No Progress in Talks with United States," Associated Press, 4 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; William M. Reilly, "Officials: N. Korea-US Talks 'Serious,'" United Press International, 5 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6-7 December 1998

William Perry, coordinator for US policy on North Korea, visits Seoul to discuss North Korea's suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. During a meeting with Perry, Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Hong Sun Young reportedly urges the United States to deal with the Kumch'ang-ri issue carefully since there is no "conclusive evidence" that the facility is related to a nuclear weapons program. President Kim Dae Jung proposes to Perry a package deal that includes increasing food aid to North Korea in return for its allowing access to the Kumch'ang-ri site. A presidential spokesman quotes Kim as telling Perry, "I hope for normalization of relations between the United States and North Korea, and I think it's time to think about lifting economic sanctions against North Korea." [Note: While in Seoul, Perry also meets with Lim Dong Won, senior presidential secretary for foreign affairs and national security, Lee Jong Ch'an, director of the Agency for National Security Planning, and Defense Minister Ch'on Yong Taek.]

—"U.S. Urged to Support S. Korea's DPRK Policy," Xinhua News Agency, 7 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Should Lift Sanctions against North Korea: Kim," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Paul Shin, "Kim Proposes Package Deal to Resolve North Korea's Nuclear Issue," Associated Press, 7 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lim

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Yun Suk, "US Envoy Meets S Korean Leader over Suspected Site in North," Agence France Presse, 7 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7-8 December 1998

Representatives from the United States and North Korea meet in Washington to continue talks on a suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. As with the last meeting held in New York on 4-5 December, the United States and North Korean delegations are respectively headed by Charles Kartman, special envoy for Korean affairs, and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan. The two sides adjourn the meeting without commenting on how the talks progress, and they agree to meet again in New York on 10 December. State Department spokesman James Foley, suggesting that the United States might ease sanction in order to gain access to the disputed site, says, "The fact is that the DPRK is seeking an improved relationship with the United States. We are willing to entertain that possibility if our concerns can be addressed in the various fora in which we are negotiating." —"US, North Korea Hold Third Day of Talks on Suspect Site," Agence France Presse, 7 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., DPRK Extend Talks," Xinhua News Agency, 8 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S.-North Korean Talks on Secret Site Extended," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 8 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US Holds Out Prospect of Lifting Sanctions against North Korea," Agence France Presse, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7-11 December 1998

An high-level EU delegation travels to Pyongyang reportedly to gauge Pyongyang's willingness to implement and abide by the 1994 Agreed Framework. According to the EU delegation, the North Korean officials with whom they meet express annoyance over delays in heavy fuel oil deliveries and suggest that should such delays continue, North Korea will abandon the 1994 Agreed Framework without regret. Speaking to reporters in Beijing after the five-day trip, former Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindmans says, "We left the country with a positive impression but without any commitment on their part."

—"EU Mission to N. Korea in Pyongyang," Japan Economic Newswire, 7 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "European Union Fails to Get N Korean Concession on Nuclear Issue," Agence France Presse, 12 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Miu Oikawa Dieter, "N. Korea Voices Annoyance over KEDO Delay," Japan Economic Newswire, 15 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 December 1998

North Korea once again warns the United States against military provocation over a suspected nuclear weapons facility. As it has for the past few weeks, the Korean Central News Agency carries a series of threats and warnings aimed at the United States stating that North Korea is prepared for war and will annihilate the United States, South Korea and Japan if provoked. [Note: Washington and Seoul dismiss the escalated war of words as mere bargaining chips and do not take the threats seriously. When questioned about the recent barrage of threats, a South Korean official says, "When there are major talks scheduled, North Korea usually starts blasting us or the United States. It is their usual bargaining tactic, although they know it never works."]

—"Angry' N. Korea Ready for War with US," Agence France Presse, 8 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis,

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<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "S Korea, US Brush off North Korea War Rhetoric," Agence France Presse, 9 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8-9 December 1998

William Perry, coordinator of US policy on North Korea, visits Beijing to discuss North Korea's suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri.

—"Perry Meets with Chinese to Discuss North Korean Nuclear Issue," Associated Press, 9 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 December 1998

The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, a South Korean think tank under by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, issues a report urging US President Bill Clinton to invoke a presidential decree overriding the congressional freeze on heavy fuel oil deliveries to North Korea until 31 May. The report also calls on the United States and South Korea to offer additional food aid in exchange for access to the suspected nuclear weapons facility in Kumch'ang-ri.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 9 December 1998, in "S Korea: Foreign Affairs Body Urges USA to Delay Sanctions against North," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 9 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9-10 December 1998

William Perry, coordinator of US policy on North Korea, visits Tokyo to discuss North Korea's suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. Perry reaffirms Japanese government officials that the United States is committed to keeping close contact with Japan and South Korea on resolving the issue of North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program. In a meeting with Perry, secretary-general of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party Yoshiro Mori says that if North Korea remains secretive about the suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri, Japan may reconsider its financial contribution to the KEDO light water reactor project.

—"N. Korean Situation Critical: U.S. Envoy Perry," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 10 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Perry Briefs Japan on Suspected North Korean Nuclear Weapons Site," Associated Press, 10 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "LDP's Mori Signals Japan's Options on N. Korea," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 10 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan, U.S. to Prevent N. Korea from Possessing N-Arms," Japan Economic Newswire, 10 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 December 1998

China urges the United States to be patient in resolving the dispute with North Korea over access to a suspected nuclear weapons site. Foreign Minister Zhu Bangzao says that "although new problems have arisen, the Chinese side stresses that the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula serves the fundamental interests of all sides." Bangzao adds that China hopes "that the relevant sides can treasure the achievements already gained and continue to work through peaceful consultations to properly settle the problems."

—"China Asks US to Be Patient on North Korea," Agence France Presse, 10 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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10-11 December 1998

Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, and Kim Gye Gwan, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister, meet in New York for continuing negotiations on the suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. US State Department spokesman James Rubin says that after the talks, "the two sides recognized that progress was made and agreed to meet again as soon as possible at a venue and date to be determined." Rubin adds that "although gaps remain, the parties approached the issues in a problem-solving manner." On 12 December, sources close to the talks announce that the next round of negotiations will be held in Geneva before and after the next round of four-party peace talks scheduled for 18-22 January 1999. [Note: On 14 December a senior Clinton Administration official announces that during the course of the talks, which began in New York on 4 December, North Korea dropped its demand for \$300 million in compensation, and the United States agreed to increase humanitarian aid to gain access to the site.]

—"U.S., North Korea Resume Talks on Alleged Nuclear Installation," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 10 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., DPRK Make Progress in Talks, but Inconclusive," Xinhua News Agency, 11 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., North Korea End Talks without Agreement," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 11 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "United States and North Korea End Talks, Still at Odds," Associated Press, 11 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Philip Shenon, "North Korea Said to Drop Demand on Atom Inspection," *New York Times*, 15 December 1998, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10-11 December 1998

Government officials and security experts from the United States, Russia, and Japan meet in Tokyo for the North Pacific Security Forum. On 11 December, the three nations issue a joint statement in which they agree that North Korea's suspected nuclear and missile development does not pose an immediate threat, but rather it poses a latent threat that may surface in the future. In that regard, the three nations agree to increase cooperation on monitoring North Korea's suspected development of weapons of mass destruction.

—"Japan, U.S., Russia to Monitor N. Korea's Weapons Development," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 11 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Forum Discusses Possible Crisis on Korean Peninsula," Japan Economic Newswire, 11 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 December 1998

Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura says in a press conference that if North Korea test-fires a second rocket, Japan would find it "extremely difficult" to win public support for its pledged contributions to the KEDO light water reactor project. [Note: On 31 August, Japan temporarily suspended all financial support for KEDO following the testing of a North Korean rocket that flew over Japanese territory.]

—Kyodo News Service, 11 December 1998, in "Foreign Minister Warns of Collapse on Support for KEDO," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 December 1998

North Korea condemns South Korean Minister of National Unification Kang In Tok's recent statements calling for inspections of the suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. A report carried on the Korean Central News Agency, equates the call for "on-site inspection" with "provocation of war against the North." The report adds, "If the

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enemies dare a war against the North in this land, we will answer fire with fire and annihilate the provokers without mercy."

—Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 11 December 1998, in "North Korea Denounces South Minister's Call to View Alleged Nuclear Facility," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 12 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 December 1998

A senior Clinton administration official is quoted as saying that North Korea has dropped its demand for \$300 million in return for a one-time inspection of a suspected nuclear facility in Kumch'ang-ri. According to the official, at the latest round of US-North Korean talks, North Korea dropped its demand for direct financial compensation, and the United States agreed to increase humanitarian aid to gain access to the facility.

—"Reports: North Korea Drops Demand for \$300 Million Compensation," Associated Press, 14 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N Korea Agrees to Drop Cash Demand, US to Offer More Food Aid," Agence France Press, 14 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Philip Shenon, "North Korea to Drop Demand on Atom Inspection," *New York Times*, 15 December 1998, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 December 1998

The South Korean military detects a North Korean spy submarine at 11:15 PM about 2km from the South Korean Imp'o-ri Army Battalion in Yosu, South Cholla province. South Korean Navy vessels give chase and sink the submarine around 5:55 AM on 18 December. [Note: On 19 December, North Korea denies any wrongdoing and accuses South Korea of creating the incident in order to fuel tension on the peninsula.]

—Kevin Sullivan, "South Korea Detects, Sinks North's Spy Sub," *Washington Post*, 18 December 1998, p. A24, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "South Korea Sinks Suspected North Korean Spy Vessel," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 18 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Charges Plot in Sub Sinking," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 19 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Ko Se Uk, "Puk Chamsujong Tto Ch'imt'u/Palgyoneso Kyokch'imkkaji," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 18 December 1998, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

18 December 1998

Japan's Defense Agency presents a report to the Liberal Democratic Party that says North Korea has three suspected nuclear facilities. The three sites are said to be a nuclear reactor and reprocessing facility at Kumch'ang-ri, Tae'gwan-kun, North P'yong'an Province; a trigger device testing facility at "Kwisong;" and an underground nuclear facility at T'aechon-kun, North P'yong'ang Province.

—Kyodo News Service, "N. Korea Building 2 New Missile Launch Sites: Report," Japan Economic Newswire, 19 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Building New Missile Launch Sites: Japan," *Korea Times*, 20 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yun Sang Sam, "Puk Haeg'uihokshijol Kyumyong Pujinhaldaden Mi Naenyonch'o Kanggyongnoson Ch'wihaltut," *Donga Ilbo*, 21 December 1998, p. 10, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

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21 December 1998

Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura, speaking at the Japan National Press Club, says that maintaining support for KEDO is vital for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. [Note: Despite his statements in support of KEDO, on 11 December Komura said in a press conference that if North Korea test-fires a second rocket, Japan would find it "extremely difficult" to win public support for its pledged contributions to KEDO.]

—"KEDO Framework Needs to Be Maintained: Komura," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 21 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, 11 December 1998, in "Foreign Minister Warns of Collapse on Support for KEDO," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 December 1998

Representatives from the United States, EAEC, Japan and South Korea meet in New York for a KEDO executive board meeting.

—"KEDO to Hold Executive Board Meeting Mon. in N.Y.," Japan Economic Newswire, 18 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 December 1998

Keizo Takemi, Japan's state secretary for foreign affairs, announces that "it will be difficult to get the approval of the parliament for contributions to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) unless progress is made in connection with the suspected Kumch'ang-ri nuclear facility in North Korea."

—Yonhap News Agency, 22 December 1998, in "Japanese Minister Notes Trouble in North Korean Reactor Funding," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 22 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jun Kwan Woo, "N. Korea Missile Would Jeopardize KEDO Project, Says Japanese Official," *Korea Herald*, 23 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 December 1998

Representatives from the United States, South Korea and Japan meet in New York to coordinate their policies on North Korea. The three nations agree to maintain pressure on Pyongyang to allow inspections of a suspected underground nuclear facility in Kumchang-ri.

—"3 Allies See No Sign of N. Korean Missile Firing," Japan Economic Newswire, 23 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 23 December 1998, in "South, US, Japan Coordinate North Policy at New York Talks," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Late December 1998

US President Bill Clinton orders the disbursement of \$12 million for 108,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to be shipped to North Korea by the end of the year. The oil shipment would complete the annual commitment under the 1994 Agreed Framework to deliver 500,000 tons of oil to North Korea until the completion of the KEDO light water reactor project.

—Yonhap News Agency, 27 December 1998, in "US President Instructs Secretary of State to Disburse Heavy Oil," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Clinton Orders

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Provision of Heavy Fuel Oil for North Korea," Agence France Presse, 28 December 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

[Back to Top](#)

1997

January 1997

The EU agrees to finance part of the heavy fuel oil to be delivered to North Korea until the completion of the light water reactors. Under an agreement with KEDO, the EU pledges up to \$19 million annually for the next five years in order to help alleviate funding problems. [Note: The US agreed to supply the \$50 million/year of heavy fuel oil, but due to budget problems, the United States has been supplying only \$30 million/year.]

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 13 January 1997, in "Europe to Supply Heavy Oil," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "EU to Pay 19 Mil Dlr for Oil Shipments to Pyongyang: Report," Agence France Presse, 13 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

Early January 1997

US nuclear technicians resume storing 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods in steel canisters. The US technicians arrive in Pyongyang on 8 January under an agreement by which North Korea agrees to resume the storage activities simultaneously with the signing of two additional reactor supply agreement protocols. [Note: US technicians, under the supervision of the IAEA, began the storing the fuel rods in May 1996, but in November, Pyongyang suspended the storage process in response to Seoul's threats to delay any work on the light water reactors until Pyongyang apologized for the 18 September submarine incident.]

—"U.S. Experts to Resume Storing North Korea's Fuel Rods," Associated Press, 6 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 9 January 1997, in "US Engineers Return to Resume Fuel Rod Storage," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

8 January 1997

KEDO and North Korea sign two additional protocols to the light water reactor supply agreement. The two protocols, signed by KEDO Executive Director Stephen Bosworth and North Korean ambassador Ho Jong, cover the management of the construction site near Shinp'o and the provision of North Korean labor, good and services relating to the project. North Korea also agrees to allow US technicians to resume storing 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods in steel canisters. [Note: The two sides initialed the protocols in July 1996, but the official signing of the protocols was delayed due to rising tension on the Korean Peninsula following the 18 September submarine incident.]

—"Protocol between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Labor, Goods, Facilities and Other Services for the Implementation of a Light-Water Reactor Project," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org; "Protocol between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Site Take-over, Site Access and Use of the Site for the Implementation of a Light-Water

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Reactor Project," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org; "N. Korea, KEDO Sign Nuclear Reactors Protocols," Agence France Presse, 8 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Gus Constantine, "New Protocols Reflect Emerging Korean Thaw; Small Step Toward Light-Water Reactors," *Washington Times*, p. A11, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 9 January 1997, in "US Engineers Return to Resume Fuel Rod Storage," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; U.S., North Korea Sign New Protocols on Nuclear Reactors," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 8 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

9 January 1997

KEDO and North Korea resume talks on implementing the light-water supply agreement. The resumption of talks in New York follows the signing on 8 January of two protocols relating to the reactor supply agreement. The two sides agree to meet in February to discuss a protocol dealing with North Korea's repayment of the estimated \$4.5 billion. —"North Korea, KEDO Officials Continue Talks," Agence France Presse, 9 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 14 January 1997, in "Energy Talks on Non-Compliance to Start "Next Month,"" BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 January 1997

The Taiwan Power Company (Taipower) and North Korea sign a contract allowing Taipower to ship up to 200,000 barrels of low-grade radioactive waste to North Korea for an estimated cost of \$1,151/barrel. [Note: Seoul, worried that North Korea will dump the waste in abandoned mines near the border, strongly objects to the deal.] —Dennis Engbarth, "North Korean Agency Agrees to Dispose of Taipower LLW," *Nucleonics Week*, Vol. 38, No. 3, 16 January 1997, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Environmentalists Protest Nuclear Waste Deal with North Korea," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 14 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Taiwan to Pay North Korea 69 Million Dollars to Store Nuclear Waste," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 18 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Taiwan to Send 5,000 Barrels of Nuclear Waste to Russia," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 23 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

20-25 January 1997

The IAEA and North Korea hold negotiations for the first time since September 1996. The five-member IAEA delegation meets with representatives from North Korea's General Department of Atomic Energy to discuss North Korea's non-compliance with its safeguards agreement, and its failure to provide the IAEA with information necessary for the IAEA to verify the accuracy of North Korea's initial declaration of nuclear material. —KBS Radio (Seoul), 19 January 1997, in "Fresh Negotiations Begin with International Atomic Energy Association," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

21 January 1997

In a written statement to Congress, US Secretary of State Designate Madeline Albright says that "to date, approximately 53 percent of the spent fuel rods (roughly 4,202 of the total 8,000) have been canned and stored." Albright also informs Congress that "without ongoing US financial support, KEDO will be unable to operate or carry out its objectives, which will...contribute to rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula."

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—"53 Pct of N. Korea Nuke Fuel Rods Canned," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 22 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

22 January 1997

South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Chong Ha warns Taiwan that Seoul will take economic and political measures to cancel a deal by which North Korea agreed to dispose of up to 200,000 barrels of Taiwanese nuclear waste in P'yongsan-kun--approximately 90km from the South Korean border. Seoul contends that North Korea lacks the necessary technical facilities to properly dispose of the waste, and thus might cause environmental damage to the Korean Peninsula for many years to come.

—"Taiwan to Send 5,000 Barrels of Nuclear Waste to Russia," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 23 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Germany Denies Exporting Nuclear Waste to North Korea," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 24 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korean Experts Arrive in Taiwan for Nuclear Waste Shipment," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 27 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Cho Kang Su, "Chongbu 'Puktaeman Chug'um'ui Korae Mag'ara' Tongbunsoju," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 23 January 1997, p. 6, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

28 January 1997

KEDO Executive Director Stephen Bosworth warns that the transfer of Taiwanese nuclear waste to North Korea could seriously "hamper efforts to secure transparency of [North Korea's] nuclear program." Bosworth, however, opposes linking the nuclear waste shipment to the light water reactor project and says that the KEDO project must proceed regardless.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 28 January 1997, in "Nuclear Body Official Opposes Linkage with Taiwan Waste Issue," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

31 January 1997

South Korea threatens to abandon the KEDO light water reactor project if North Korea takes delivery of nuclear waste from Taiwan. Protesting the recently signed contract between Taipower and North Korea, South Korean Prime Minister Lee Su Song warns that if the contract is realized, "it would be difficult for the National Assembly to approve the necessary expenditures to provide the reactors to the North." [Note: Since the contract was signed on 11 January, South Korea has protested the deal, contending that North Korea does not have the necessary facilities to safely dispose of waste.]

—Zeno Park, "South Korea May Boycott Nuclear Deal with North Korea," Agence France Presse, 31 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; So Tong Ch'ol, "'Puk Haekp'yegimul Pan'ipddaen Kungmin Pulyong'/I Ch'onngni Kandam," *Taehan Maeil*, 1 February 1997, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

4 February 1997

South Korean ambassador to Austria, Lee Sung Kon, meets with IAEA Director General Hans Blix to discuss the planned shipment of Taiwanese nuclear waste to North Korea. Blix expresses concern and says that "South Korea and the IAEA need to discuss closely what they could do to thwart Taiwan's bid to export nuclear waste to North Korea from legal and moral viewpoints."

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 5 February 1997, in "South Korean Envoy Relays Concerns on Taiwan's Nuclear

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Waste to IAEA," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 February 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Cho Kang Su, "'Taeman Haek Choji Kukchegigu'e Hosu/Yuenhwan'gyonggyehwoek-IAEA Kaeipch'okku," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 6 February 1997, p. 6, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

12-13 February 1997

Representatives from KEDO meet in Tokyo to draft a protocol to the light water reactor supply agreement concerning the conditions by which North Korea will repay the loans. [Note: KEDO and North Korea hold negotiations on the protocol from 28 March to 2 May and sign it on 2 July.]

—"N. Korea and KEDO to Resume Talks as Early as Next Week," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 March 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 12 March 1997, in "Pyongyang, Energy Body to Hold 'Non-Compliance Protocol' Talks Next Week," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 March 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

16 February 1997

After an attempt on the life of North Korean defector Lee Han Yong in Seoul on 15 February, the South Korean government decides to suspend the seventh visit of a reactor survey team to [Kumho-chigu], Shimp'o, until North Korea guaranteed the team's safety. The Ministry of Unification makes the decision during an emergency meeting called by Unification Minister Kwon O Ki after the attack on Lee Han Yong.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 17 February 1997, in "South Korea to Withhold Food Aid, Reactor Work Following Killing of Defector," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 18 February 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Vladimir Kutakhov, "S. Korea Suspends Aid to Pyongyang And All Contacts with It," ITAR-TASS, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Kyongsuro Chosadan P'abuk Yubo/Shimbyonanjon Chaehwagin'dui Ch'ujin," *Joongang Ilbo*, 17 February 1997, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Lee Mi Suk, "Kyongsuro Shingnyangjiwon Tung/Taebukjongch'aek Chonmyonjong/Kinkup Anbojanggwanhwoeui," 17 February 1997, *Munhwa Ilbo*, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

17 February 1997

North Korea has sent the South Korean government a memorandum guaranteeing the safety of the 27 South Korean members of KEDO team. In response to a North Korean letter assuring the safety of a 27-member South Korean KEDO team, Pan Ki Mun, South Korea's Senior Presidential Security Secretary, announces that South Korea intends to send the survey team to [Kumho-chigu], Shimp'o as planned. Pan adds that KEDO light water project is not related to the current political tension that resulted from the attack on North Korean defector Lee Han Yong because the KEDO project is an international agreement. However, the negotiations between the two Koreas on the safety of the KEDO team's trip to North Korea are still underway, and no final decision has been made. [Note: The target date of 22 February is pushed back to 1 March as KEDO officials await an official reply from Pyongyang that it will strictly abide by the protocol signed in 1996 granting immunity and consular protection to all personnel working on the light water reactor project.]

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 17 February 1997, in "South to Join Food Aid Plan to North, Continue Reactor Work Despite Assassination Attempt," BBC Summary of World Reports, 19 February 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 19 February 1997, in "Nuclear Body Asks North Korea to Abide Strictly by Protection Protocol," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 February 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com;

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"Team to Head to North Korea to Survey Site for Nuclear Reactors," Agence France Presse, 20 February 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kim Jong Ku, "'Indojok Taebukchiwon Kyesok Kyongsurojosadando P'agyon'/Pan Ki Mun Oegyoanbosusok," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 18 February 1997, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

19 February 1997

A cargo ship carrying 15 tons of equipment to be used by the seventh KEDO site inspection team departs Pusan, South Korea on its way to Najin [Nason], North Korea. From Najin the equipment will be transported by rail to the proposed light water reactor construction site near Shinp'o. The equipment reportedly includes five drilling machines and 11 pumps.

—"Ship with Nuke Inspection Equipment Leaves for N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 19 February 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

21 February 1997

North Korea announces that it will participate in the upcoming briefing to discuss the proposed four-nation peace talks on 5 March in New York. The briefing, including delegates from the United States, South Korea, and North Korea, was originally scheduled for 29 January, but Pyongyang twice delayed the meeting claiming that the United States must first provide food aid. Pyongyang's announcement that it will participate follows a pledge of \$16 million in famine-relief aid from the United States and South Korea. [Note: The proposed four-nation peace talks, including representatives from the United States, China, and both Koreas, is aimed at replacing the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement with a formal peace treaty that would officially end the Korean War.]

—Sang Hun Choe, "North Korea Says It Will Attend Preliminary Peace Talks in New York," Associated Press, 21 February 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Andrew Pollack, "North Korea Inches Toward Talks to Finally End '50-'53 War," *New York Times*, 22 February 1997, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Early March 1997

North Korea's Nuclear Safety Monitoring Committee issues an import permit to Taipower allowing the company to import up to 200,000 barrels of low-grade radioactive material to North Korea.

—"North Korea Issues Import Permit for Taiwan Nuclear Waste," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 4 March 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

1 March 1997

The seventh KEDO survey team travels to North Korea to conduct various tests at the proposed light water reactor construction site in Shinp'o. According to KEDO officials, the seventh site survey will last five months.

—"Site Survey Team for Nuclear Reactors Due Saturday," Agence France Presse, 25 February 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

5 March 1997

Delegates from the United States, South Korea and North Korea meet in New York to discuss the proposed four-party peace talks. The US, South Korean, and North Korean delegations are respectively headed by Charles Kartman, Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Song Yong Shik, South Korean Assistant Foreign Minister, and Kim Kye Kwan, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister. The South Korean

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delegation suggests that North Korea could receive economic assistance, food aid, and more cooperation on the light water reactor project if Pyongyang participated in the four-party talks. During the five-hour meeting, described by all sides as "serious and sincere," the North Korean delegation listens to the US and South Korean proposal for the peace talks, which would also include China. After the briefing, the North Korean delegation expresses interest in the proposal and returns to Pyongyang for consultations.

—Norman Kemster, "N. Korea Hears Peace Proposal from South, U.S.," *Los Angeles Times*, 6 March 1997, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yu Haye Chu, "Puk 4 Chahwoedam Surakttaen Kyongwon/New York Solmyonghwoe," *Segye Ilbo*, 6 March 1997, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Cho Chae Yong, "4 Chahwoedam Chonmang Palgajo/New York Solmyonghwoe," *Hankook Ilbo*, 6 March 1997, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Lee Byong Son, "Puk, 4 Chahwoedam Ipchang Yubo," *Munhwa Ilbo*, 6 March 1997, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Lee Kon Yong, "Puk, '4 Chahwoedam Ch'amsok'/4 Chasolmyonghwoeso Kungjong Panung," *Taehan Maeil*, 6 March 1997, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

6 March 1997

The South Korean Foreign Ministry announces that the United States and South Korea will cancel the Team Spirit joint-military exercise for the fourth consecutive year.

—"S. Korea, U.S. to Skip 'Team Spirit' Exercises Again," Japan Economic Newswire, 6 March 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

7 March 1997

The US and North Korea resume high-level talks in New York. During the 10-hour talks the two sides discuss a variety of issues including implementation of the Agreed Framework, North Korea's ballistic missile program, and the proposed four-nation peace talks. [Note: Before this meeting, the United States and North Korea had not held high-level consultations since June 1995.]

—"U.S., N. Korea Resume High-Level Talks after 21 Months," Japan Economic Newswire, 7 March 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S., N. Korea End 10 Hours of Talks," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 8 March 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 March 1997

Kwon Yong Hae, director of South Korea's Agency for National Security Planning, says that "it is believed North Korea is trying to import Taiwan's nuclear waste as a means of camouflage for the disposal of its own nuclear waste."

—*Seoul Sinmun*, 12 March 1997, p. 2, in "South Korean Official Says North's Import of Taiwan Nuclear Waste 'Camouflage,'" BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 March 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Chin Kyong Ho, "Pukui Taemanhaek Panip Kyehwoek/Chach'ye Haekch'ori Uijang Soksyem/Kwon Angibujang," *Taehan Maeil*, 12 March 1997, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

Mid-to-Late March 1997

The US, South Korea and North Korea hold working-level consultations in New York on the proposed four-nation peace talks. The North Korean delegation reportedly says that North Korea will participate in the talks if it receives additional food aid.

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—KBS Radio (Seoul), 26 March 1997, in "North Korea Reportedly Says Its Participation in Four-Way Talks Conditional on Food Aid," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 March 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Sonni Efron, "N. Korea Wants Aid in Return for Peace Talks; But U.S. Delegates Tell Pyongyang That It Cannot Set Preconditions for the Negotiations," *Los Angeles Times*, 30 March 1997, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

17 March 1997

At the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, IAEA Director General Hans Blix reports little progress in negotiations between the IAEA and North Korea over securing necessary for the IAEA to verify the accuracy of North Korea's initial declaration of nuclear material. Many member states voice concern over the stalled negotiations and Taiwan's proposed shipment of low-grade nuclear waste to North Korea.

—"Talks Between IAEA, North Korea at Impasse," Agence France Presse, 17 March 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 19 March 1997, in "IAEA Concerns on Pyongyang Nuclear Issues Reported," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 March 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

19 March 1997

US President Bill Clinton issues a presidential determination to Congress in which he certifies that "North Korea is cooperating fully in the canning and safe storage of all spent fuel from its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors," and that "North Korea has not significantly diverted assistance provided by the United States for purposes for which it was not intended." [Note: The presidential determination is required by Congress for the allocation of funds to KEDO under the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1997.]

—Presidential Determination No. 97-20, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 19 March 1997; "USIS - Clinton Assures of Progress of KEDO Declaration," *Asia Pulse*, 21 March 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

28 March-2 May 1997

Representatives from KEDO and North Korea meet in New York to discuss a protocol setting the schedule by which North Korea will repay the cost of the light water reactors and the penalties incurred if North Korea fails to make the payments on schedule. [Note: The protocol is signed on 2 July.]

—"Korea to Sign Protocol on Light-Water Nuclear Reactors," *Asia Pulse*, 20 June 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 20 June 1997, in "North to Sign Loans Protocol on Nuclear Plants, Nuclear Talks Date Set," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 June 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

9-15 April 1997

A KEDO delegation travels to North Korea for working-level talks on preparations for the groundbreaking at the proposed light water reactor construction site. The 54 member delegation meets with North Korean government officials in Shinp'o. Upon returning to Seoul, Ch'oe Yong Jin, head of the delegation, tells reporters that KEDO and North Korea reached an agreement on entry and exit procedures for personnel working on the project. Cho'oe also reports progress in negotiations on wages for North Korean workers. However, Ch'oe says, more negotiations are necessary before the groundbreaking at the construction site. [Note: This KEDO delegation, which travels aboard the South Korean ship *Hannara-ho*, is the first to travel directly to North Korea by ship. In July 1996, KEDO and North Korea signed a protocol opening four transportation links--two by sea and two by air--between the North and South for materials and personnel related to the light water reactor project.]

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—"KEDO Delegation to Travel by Sea to North Korea," Agence France Presse, 4 April 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "KEDO Visit to Pyongyang Successful," Xinhua News Agency, 16 April 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; KBS Television (Seoul), 16 April 1997, in "Negotiating Team Says Reactor Project Expected to Be Carried Out Smoothly," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 18 April 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Chong Yon Uk, "KEDO Shilmuhyopsangdan 54 Myong/O'nul 'Ch'otpaekkil Ippuk'," *Tonga Ilbo*, 9 April 1997, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Lee Mi Suk, "Pangbuk Kyongsurohyobuidan Kwihwan," *Munhwa Ilbo*, 16 April 1997, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

12 April 1997

A high-level source in the South Korean Foreign Ministry says that the four-party talks between the United States, China, North Korea and South Korea will resume in the middle of May. The source also says that the United States and North Korea will apparently establish liaison offices in mid May. [Note: The US and North Korea do not establish the liaison offices, and the talks do not resume until December.]

—Ch'oe Sang Yon, "4 Chahoedam-Yollaksamuso Puk-Mi Naedal Habuijobkun/Puk, Sonshingnyangjiwonyogu Ch'olhoe," *Joongang Ilbo*, 13 April 1997, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

14 April 1997

KEDO selects four South Korean companies--Hyundai Engineering & Construction Company, Dong Ah Industrial Company, Daewoo Corporation, and Korea Heavy Industry & Construction Company--to construct preliminary facilities for the light water reactor project. The companies' work involves building offices and living quarters for personnel working of project, constructing roads between Yanghwa port and the reactor site in [Kumho-chigu], Shimp'o, and securing reliable sources for drinking water and electricity.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 14 April 1997, in "Firms Selected for First-Phase Work on Light-Water Reactor Project," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 April 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Lee Kwang Hee, "Hyundai Konsol Tung 4 Kaesa Puk Kyongsuro Kongsu Matt'a," *Chosun Ilbo*, 15 April 1997, p. 13, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

14 April 1997

Pyongyang condemns the United States for recent meetings with Japan and South Korea at which they discussed "military preparations" and a "joint defense posture" against North Korea. Pyongyang warns that the US attempts to contain North Korea threaten the success of the 1994 Agreed Framework.

—"There Is Nothing to Gain with Strong Arm," Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 14 April 1997, www.kcna.co.jp; Michael Dobbs, "U.S. May Boost N. Korean Food Aid; Issue Is Said to Have 'No Linkage' to Four-Party Talks," *The Washington Post*, 15 April 1997, p. A16, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

15 April 1997

The State Department announces that the United States will donate an additional \$15 million worth of food aid to North Korea. However, US officials insist that there is no linkage between the food aid and the proposed four-nation peace talks. [Note: The latest donation brings the total amount of US famine-relief aid given to North Korea since 1995 to \$33.4 million.]

—Michael Dobbs, "U.S. May Boost N. Korean Food Aid; Issue Is Said to Have 'No Linkage' to Four-Party Talks," *The*

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Washington Post, 15 April 1997, p. A16, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Tom Rhodes, "US Increases Food Aid to North Korea," *The Times*, 16 April 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

16-21 April 1997

Representatives from North Korea meet with representatives from the United States and South Korea in New York to present Pyongyang's reply to the 5 March joint briefing on the proposed four-party talks. Kim Gye Gwan, head of the North Korean delegation, says that the confidence needed for the peace talks has not yet been built. Thus, he suggests more rounds of negotiations with the United States and South Korea before the actual peace talks begin.

—"Head of DPRK Delegation on 'Four-Way Talks,'" Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 24 April 1997, www.kcna.co.jp.

22 April 1997

A Pentagon spokesman says that Washington believes that North Korea "could have generated enough plutonium to make at least one nuclear weapon" before the signing of the 1994 Agreed Framework in which Pyongyang agreed to freeze its nuclear program.

—"U.S. Concerned by Defector's Comments," United Press International, 23 April 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Andrew Browne, "Defector's Scenario Sees 'Sea of Flames' for South; Japan Would Also Be Scorched in North's Nuclear Strike," *Washington Times*, 23 April 1997, p. A11, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

24 April 1997

North Korea announces that it will participate in four-party peace talks only after the United States meets several preconditions, including additional food aid, diplomatic recognition and an easing of trade sanctions.

—Jack Burton and Nancy Dunne, "N Korea Sets Condition for Peace Talks," *Financial Times* (London), 25 April 1997, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

May 1997

The US company Duke Engineering & Services is contracted by KEDO to serve as the technical support consultant for the two light water reactors being constructed at Shinp'o.

—"B&W Canada to Supply Qinshan SGs; Other Contracts," *Nuclear News*, June 1997, vol. 40, no. 7, p. 70.

May 1997

The CIA circulates a classified report to senior US officials claiming that North Korea had planned to conduct an underground nuclear test. The report, based on interviews with Hwang Chang Yop, a recent North Korean defector, claims that the test was cancelled after warnings from the North Korean Foreign Ministry.

—Bill Gertz, "Hwang Says N. Korea Has Atomic Weapons; Pyongyang Called off Planned Nuclear Test," *Washington Times*, 5 June 1997, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

2 May 1997

KEDO and North Korea initial a protocol on the repayment schedule for the costs of the light water reactor project. Under the protocol, North Korea must make regular interest-free payments over a 17-year period beginning three years after the completion of the reactors. However, if North Korea fails to repay the loans according to the

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designated schedule, KEDO reserves the right to impose economic sanctions. [Note: Negotiations on the protocol began in New York on 28 March.]

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 3 May 1997, in "Pyongyang Initials Protocol on Reimbursing Cost of Nuclear Reactors," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 May 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "KEDO, N. Korea Initial Another Protocol," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 6 May 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

12-13 May 1997

The KEDO Executive Board meets in Tokyo and decides to allow the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) to join KEDO as a board member. The board, including representatives from the United States, Japan and South Korea, also decides to begin construction of peripheral facilities for the light water reactor project in mid-July.

—"KEDO to Give Board Membership to EU," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 13 May 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "KEDO to Begin Construction of Support Facilities in July," Japan Economic Newswire, 13 May 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

15 May 1997

The European Union and KEDO initial an agreement by which the EU will join KEDO as a board member and donate \$20 million/year to the international consortium over the next five year.

—"EU Initials Accord to Enter KEDO," Japan Economic Newswire, 20 May 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 20 May 1997, in "Agreement Initialed on EU Membership in Korean Energy Organization," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 May 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

21 May 1997

In a meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda, IAEA Director Hans Blix says that North Korea has still not provided sufficient information about its past use of spent nuclear fuel.

—"N. Korea Not Giving Full Info on Spent Nuke Fuel: Blix," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 21 May 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Fails to Cooperate with IAEA," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 May 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

22 May 1997

US Secretary of State Madeline Albright asks Congress to appropriate \$30 million in fiscal year 1998 for donations to KEDO. In a prepared statement given before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Albright says that the KEDO project is related "directly to the safety and security of the American people."

—"Prepared Statement by Madeline K. Albright Secretary of State before the Senate Appropriations Committee Foreign Operations Subcommittee," Federal News Service, 22 May 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

25-27 May 1997

IAEA Director General Hans Blix travels to Seoul to discuss North Korea's nuclear program and Taiwan's planned shipment of nuclear waste to North Korea. Blix promises that the IAEA will continue to make efforts to ensure the transparency of North Korea's past and present nuclear activities. He also reaffirms that the planned shipment of Taiwanese nuclear waste is comprised solely of low-grade nuclear material and thus not prohibited for

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international transportation.

—Debbie Kuo, "IAEA Reaffirms Taiwan's Nuke Waste is Low-Grade," Central News Agency, 27 May 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 27 May 1997, in "South's President Discusses North's Nuclear Programme with IAEA Head," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 May 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 27 May 1997, in "IAEA Head Promises Efforts for 'Transparency' of North's Nuclear Program," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 May 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

27 May 1997

Former US Defense Secretary William Perry says that he does not believe North Korea possesses nuclear weapons. Speaking at a conference in Seoul, Perry says that even though North Korea may possess "a few kilograms of plutonium," he is "confident" that North Korea does not have the necessary technology to construct a nuclear bomb.

—Hwang Tu Hyong, "Ex-US Defense Secretary Says He Does Not Believe North Korea Has Nukes," Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 27 May 1997, in "Former US Defense Secretary 'Confident' North Has No Nuclear Weapons," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 May 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

28 May 1997

KEDO contracts Korea Telecom to provide all of the telecommunication links between South Korea and the light water reactor construction site in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o.

—KBS Radio (Seoul), 29 May 1997, in "North-South Telecommunications to Be Set Up to Facilitate Reactor Project," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 May 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

31 May-7 June 1997

A 44-member KEDO delegation travels to North Korea to negotiate construction terms for the Shinp'o light water reactor project. While various details have yet to be worked out, the two sides sign a tentative agreement on almost all major issues relating to site preparation work including mail and telecommunication services, quarantine procedures, and transportation.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 6 June 1997, in "Nuclear Mission Reaches Virtual Agreement with North Korea on Reactor Project Items," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 June 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "KEDO, North Korea Sign Land Leveling Accord," *Asia Pulse*, 10 June 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 9 June 1997, in "Further Details on 'Tentative Agreement' Reached by KEDO, North Korea," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 June 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

2 June 1997

The US General Accounting Office (GAO) presents a report to Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources stating that as of 1 April 1997, the United States had allocated \$82 million for the implementation of the Agreed Framework, including \$51 million in contributions to KEDO and \$26 million to assist North Korea in the safe storage of over 50,000kg (8,000 rods) of spent nuclear fuel. The report claims, however, that the total amount of future US expenditures for the project is unclear because reliable estimates of the project's total cost are not yet available and other countries have yet to specify the amount of their contributions. Regardless, the report assesses, the United States may have to supply more funds than originally anticipated or risk the collapse of the Agreed

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Framework. Of particular concern, the report states, is the "significant funding shortfalls" for the annual heavy fuel oil deliveries.

—"Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implications of the U.S./North Korean Agreement on Nuclear Issues," United States General Accounting Office, GAO/RCED/NSIAD-97-165, 2 June 1997.

3 June 1997

Norway pledges \$250,000 to KEDO.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 4 June 1997, in "Norway Offers to Donate 250,000 Dollars to Inter-Korean Organization," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 June 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

4 June 1997

The US House of Representatives passes a non-binding resolution calling on Taiwan to refrain from shipping low-grade nuclear material to North Korea. Taipower ignores the resolution and on 6 June announces that the shipment will proceed as scheduled.

—Lillian Wu, "North Korean Nuke Waste Plan Unchanged," Central News Agency, 6 June 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kim Sung Ung, "'Taeman Haekp'yegimul Ijon Chungdan'/Mi Hawon Ch'okkusujongan Ch'aet'aek," *Munhwa Ilbo*, 5 June 1997, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

4 June 1997

The Nuclear Assurance Corp., the US contractor in charge of the packing, clean-up, and dismantlement project at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, announces that 6,500 of North Korea's 8,000 nuclear spent-fuel rods have been packed for long-term storage. However, more than 800 rods were "seriously neglected," complicating the process. Officials from the corporation say that delays have increased the cost of packing and storage of the fuel rods from \$8 million to about \$15 million, a cost which will be paid by the United States.

—Stewart Stogel, "N. Korea Lags in Nuclear Cleanup," *Washington Times*, 4 June 1997, p. A20, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

9 June 1997

IAEA Director General Hans Blix reports to the Board of Governors that the agency cannot verify that North Korea's nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes. In the Safeguard Implementation Report, the annual report presented to the board, Blix claims that North Korea has yet to allow full-scope inspections or clarify discrepancies in its inventory of plutonium.

—"Implementation of IAEA Safeguards on 1996," IAEA Press Release, PR 97/12, 11 June 1997; R. Senthilnathan, "No Secret N-Bomb Programmes Found Last Year," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 13 June 1997, p. 15, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 11 June 1997, in "International Atomic Energy Agency Says Government Not Abiding by Nuclear Agreement," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 June 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

Late June 1997

The UN Special Assembly on the Environment adopts an agreement calling for a ban on the shipment of nuclear material to countries that lack adequate nuclear storage facilities. The agreement is passed in response to Taiwan's

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planned shipment of up to 200,000 barrels of low-grade nuclear waste to North Korea.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 1 July 1997, in "Taiwan Company Files Permit to Ship Nuclear Waste - South Korean Report," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

23 June-2 July 1997

Representatives from KEDO and North Korea hold the third round of working-level consultations on logistical aspects of the light water reactor project. The two sides reach an agreement on all unresolved technical issues such as wages for North Korean workers, communication links, the condition of roads connecting the port to the construction site, and emergency procedures. On 2 July, Stephen Bosworth, KEDO Executive Director, and Ho Jong, North Korean ambassador at large, sign four memoranda of understanding allowing construction of the reactors to begin as soon as possible. According to a joint communiqué, construction is scheduled to begin in early August.

—"Memorandum of Understanding between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Medical Services and Medical Evacuation Routes," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org; "Memorandum of Understanding between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on General Principles of Air Transport," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org; "Memorandum of Understanding between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Connection with the Protocol on Site Take-over, Site Access and Use of the Site for the Implementation of a Light-Water Reactor Project," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org; "Memorandum of Understanding between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Amend the Protocol on Site Take-over, Site Access and Use of the Site for the Implementation of a Light-Water Reactor Project," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org; "North, South Korea Hold Nuclear Reactor Talks," *Asia Pulse*, 23 June 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Lynn Berry, "North Korea Gives Go-Ahead for Nuclear Reactor Construction," Associated Press, 2 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

24 June 1997

KEDO and North Korea sign a protocol concerning the repayment schedule for the cost of the light water reactor project. Under the protocol, North Korea must repay the interest-free loans over a 17-year period beginning three years after the completion of the reactors. However, if North Korea does not adhere to the repayment schedule, KEDO reserves the right to impose economic sanctions. [Note: Negotiations on the protocol were held in New York from 28 March to 2 May.]

—"Protocol between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Actions in the Event of Nonpayment with Respect to Financial Obligations," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org; "Korea to Sign Protocol on Light-Water Nuclear Reactors," *Asia Pulse*, 20 June 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 20 June 1997, in "North to Sign Loans Protocol on Nuclear Plants, Nuclear Talks Date Set," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 June 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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30 June 1997

North Korea agrees to participate in four-nation peace talks tentatively scheduled to begin 5 August. The peace talks, aimed at replacing the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement with a formal peace treaty, will include representatives from the United States, China, and the two Koreas.

—Sarah Jackson, "North Korea 'Ready to Cooperate' with US: North Korean Official," Agence France Presse, 1 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

Early July 1997

In a letter to a Korean-American journalist, Kim Jong Il says, "In our relations with the United States, we will faithfully implement the agreed points in conformity with the idea and principle of our foreign policy. This is our invariable stand." He added that many problems still remain due to "imperialists' hostile activities."

—"Secy. [sic] Kim Jong Il Writes to Korean-American Journalist," Korean Central News Agency, 21 July 1997, www.kcna.co.jp; "North Korea's Kim Wants Improved Ties with U.S., Japan," Associated Press, 21 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

2 July 1997

Officials from the United States and North Korea meet to discuss various bilateral issues, such as implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea's missile program, and famine relief aid.

—Lynn Berry, "North Korea Gives Go-Ahead for Nuclear Reactor Construction," Associated Press, 2 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korea 'Ready to Cooperate' with US: North Korean Official," Agence France Presse, 1 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 3 July 1997, in "US-North Korea New York Meeting Ends without Result," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

10 July 1997

North Korean defector, Hwang Jang Yop concedes that he does not have proof that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons. In his first major press conference in Tokyo, Hwang says, "It is common knowledge they have these weapons, but there is no means to verify it." He adds, however, that South Korea "would be wise" to assume that such weapons exist.

—Kevin Sullivan, "Key Defector Warns Again of North Korean War Plans," *Washington Post*, 10 July 1997, p. A23, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Lacks Nuclear Proof," *New York Times*, 11 July 1997, p. A9, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

16 July 1997

Fourteen North Korean soldiers reportedly cross the military demarcation line and exchange gunfire with South Korean forces for about 20 minutes. The South Korean Defense Ministry calls the incident a "deliberate provocation" by North Korea.

—"South Korea Beefs up Forces on North Korean Border," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 17 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Mun Ch'ol, "Pimujangjidae Ch'onggyokchon/Ch'olwonso 23 Pun'dong'an Supaekpal Kyojon," *Donga Ilbo*, 17 July 1997, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Choe Won Sok, "DMZ So P'ogyokchon/Pukhangun 14 Myong Pungyeson Ch'im bom/Ch'olwon Chonbang," *Chosun Ilbo*, 17 July 1997, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

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17 July 1997

In response to the 16 July incursion of North Korean soldiers over the demarcation line, the US Senate votes to hold back \$14 million allocated to KEDO until the president certifies that North Korea has not violated the armistice for nine months.

—"Senate OKs Big Aid Bill, Will Use to Press Policy; Lawmakers Reject Criticism of China Trade, Lifting Cuba Travel Restrictions," The San Francisco Examiner, 18 July 1997, p. A13, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

18 July 1997

Minju Joson, a North Korean daily, denounces the US and South Korean reaction to the 16 July conflict in the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The commentary claims that North Korea is a victim and demands an apology from Seoul. The daily also says that North Korea has a right to retaliate. A spokesman for the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland says the "retaliatory blow will be a thousand fold punishment and will be so merciless that none of the provokers can survive."

—"Minju Joson Blasts S. Korea for Grave Military Provocation," Korean Central News Agency, 18 July 1997, www.kcna.co.jp; "South Korean Rulers Urged to Make Honest Apology" Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 18 July 1997, in "North Korean Committee Demands South's 'Honest Apology' on 16th July Incident," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "We Will Keep Our Eyes upon US Attitude," Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 18 July 1997, in "North Korea Denounces US Response to 16th July Demarcation Line Incident," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

22 July 1997

A 17-member team arrive in North Korea to begin preliminary construction for the light water reactor project in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o. The team is comprised of personnel from the Korea Electric Company (KEPCO), Korea Heavy Industry and Construction, Hyundai Engineering and Construction, Daewoo Corp and Donga Construction. Equipment and material for the preliminary groundwork at the site is scheduled to arrive in Shinp'o on 25 July, and 63 additional workers will follow on 26 July. [Note: An approaching typhoon forces the barges carrying the equipment to return to South Korea. The shipment of does not arrive until 30 July.]

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 22 July 1997, in "South Reactor Construction Team Arrives in North," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Typhoon Forces S. Korean Barges to Turn Back from Trip North," Agence France Press, 25 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "S Korean Barges Arrive in North Korea with Reactor Construction Equipment," Agence France Presse, 30 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

26 July 1997

An additional 63 South Korean technicians arrive in North Korea to begin preliminary construction for the light water reactor project in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 22 July 1997, in "South Reactor Construction Team Arrives in North," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

26-28 July 1997

At the ASEAN Regional Forum held in Kuala Lumpur, US Secretary of State Madeline Albright asks member nations

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to contribute \$30 million to KEDO over the next five years.

—Laura Myers, "Asian Help Sought in Paying for North Korean Reactors," Associated Press, 25 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. Asks ASEAN to Give 30 Mil. Dollars to KEDO," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 August 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

28 July 1997

KEDO opens a liaison office in Kumho-chigu, Shinp'o. The KEDO office, consisting of two representatives each from the United States and South Korea, and one from Japan, will ensure the safety of KEDO personnel working on the reactor project, and act as a liaison between the KEDO Secretariat in New York and North Korea.

—"S. Korean Diplomats in N. Korea for 1st Time Since 1945," *Asia Pulse*, 28 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "KEDO to Open Rep Office in N. Korea Mon.," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 25 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 25 July 1997, in "Reactor Project Office to Be Set Up," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

30 July 1997

Two South Korean barges, *Korex Champ* and *Korex Pusan*, arrive in Shinp'o carrying 9,000 tons of equipment and materials for preliminary groundwork at the for the reactor construction site. Included in the cargo are 30 pieces of heavy machinery, such as bulldozers and dump trucks, 15 light cars, and 250,000 liters of fuel. [Note: The shipment was originally scheduled to arrive on 25 July, but due to an approaching typhoon, the barges had to return to South Korea.]

—"Vessels Carrying Reactor Materials Leave for N. Korea," *Asia Pulse*, 28 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "S Korean Barges Arrive in North Korea with Reactor Construction Equipment," Agence France Presse, 30 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Typhoon Forces S. Korean Barges to Turn Back from Trip North," Agence France Press, 25 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

August 1997

KEDO and KEPCO sign a preliminary works contract allowing KEPCO to begin site preparation work in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o.

—"Light Water Reactor Project: Turnkey Contract," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org.

4 August 1997

Eight inter-Korean phone lines open, linking Seoul with the light water reactor construction site in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o.

—"Direct Phone Service Opens between Two Koreas," Xinhua News Agency, 4 August 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

5-8 August 1997

Representatives from the United States, China, and both Koreas meet in New York for preliminary consultations on the proposed four-party peace talks. Discussions focus on selecting a date and venue for the talks, setting the agenda and deciding the level of representation. The delegates fail to agree upon an agenda but agree to hold

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further preparatory consultations in September. The official four-party peace talks are to be held in Geneva six weeks after the next preparatory meeting. [Note: The four-part peace talks are aimed at replacing the 1953 Armistice Agreement with an official peace treaty ending the Korean War.]

—Ralph A. Cossa, "Korean Peninsula: Four-Way Talks to Achieve Peace at Last," *International Herald Tribune*, p. 8, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Four in Search of an Agenda," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 11 August 1997, p. 28, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Korean Peace Talks," *Mainichi Daily News*, 8 August 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; John Burton, "N Korea Joins Talks about Talks," *Financial Times* (London), 6 August 1997, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

15 August 1997

Citing "politically induced delays," Stephen Bosworth, executive director of KEDO, announces that the two light water reactors will not be completed by 2003 as originally planned. Bosworth adds that KEDO has not yet set a new target completion date.

—Sarah Jackson-Han, "N. Korean Reactor Project to Take Longer Than Expected," *Agence France Presse*, 16 August 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

17 August 1997

South Korea's Ministry of National Unification announces that US technicians have safely stored over 90 percent of the 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods removed from North Korea's 5MW reactor in May 1994. According to a ministry official, the storage process should be completed within the year.

—"North Korea's Nuclear Fuel Rods Nearly All Encased," *Associated Press*, 17 August 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com. 18 August 1997 Commenting on the start of light water reactor construction in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o, US State Department spokesman James Rubin says that "key [nuclear] components are not going to be delivered until [the United States believes] that North Korea has come into full compliance with the safeguard agreements with the IAEA. "State Department Regular Briefing," *Federal News Service*, 18 August 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

19 August 1997

KEDO holds the groundbreaking ceremony in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o, marking the start of construction on the first of two light water reactors. The ceremony is attended by over 200 people, including Stephen Bosworth, executive director of KEDO, Chang Sun Sop, chief of South Korea's Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project, Ho Jong, North Korean ambassador at large, and various other representatives from KEDO member states and contractors working on the project. Bosworth touts the groundbreaking as "the fulfillment of a promise," but Kim Pyong Ki, North Korean project manager, claims that the road ahead "is still very long and twisted." After pointing out that the groundbreaking comes 18 months late, Kim says, "It's only when the two light water reactors are completed that the suspicion of the Korean people will be removed thoroughly, and confidence built between the United States and the government of the DPRK."

—"Groundbreaking Ceremony for Reactor Held in N. Korea," *Japan Economic Newswire*, 19 August 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "KEDO Mission Departs for DPRK to Attend Reactor Event," *Xinhua News Agency*, 18 August 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Ground-breaking Ceremony for Nuclear Reactors in N. Korea," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 19 August 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korean Nuclear Project

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Launched," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 19 August 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Nuclear Power for Peace," *Nuclear Engineering International*, October 2000, vol. 45, no. 555, pp. 34-35; Chang Yong Hun, "<taebuk Kyongsuro Konsolgongsa Hyonhwang>," Yonhap News Agency, 6 December 2001, www.yonhapnews.net.

20 August 1997

The Korean Central News Agency carries a report on the works of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. According to the report, Kim says that North and South Korea must "join their efforts to promote co-existence, co-prosperity, and common interests and achieve the great cause of the country's reunification transcending the differences in ideologies and social systems." Kim continues, "We have no intention of regarding the United States as our sworn enemy. We hope to normalize the Korean-US relationship."

—"Secy. [sic] Kim Jong Il's Work Published," Korean Central News Agency, 20 August 1997, www.kcna.co.jp; C. W. Lim, "N Korean Leader Seeks Peace with US, Hints at Talks with South," Agence France Presse, 20 August 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

26 August 1997

Lee Chong Hun, president of KEPCO, the prime contractor for the KEDO light water reactor project, announces that construction of the reactors will not be completed by the target date of 2003. According to Rieh, the two reactors will take at least 107 months to complete, and if construction begins in January, as expected, the second reactor could be completed before 2006.

—"Nuclear Reactor Construction in DPRK Possibly Takes More Time," Xinhua News Agency, 26 August 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Lee Chae Hun, "Kyongsuro Wan'gongshigi 2-3 Nyongaryang Nujoildut," *Joongang Ilbo*, 27 August 1997, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

Late August 1997

North Korean diplomats, Taiwan Foreign Ministry officials and representatives from Taipower reportedly hold secret consultations in Singapore to finalize the necessary documents for the planned shipment of 200,000 barrels of low-grade nuclear waste to North Korea.

—"Taiwan, N. Korea Conduct Secret Talks on Nuclear Waste," Japan Economic Newswire, 9 September 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

5 September 1997

Barges carrying additional heavy machinery for the KEDO light water reactor project in Shinp'o depart from South Korea.

—"Seoul to Send Thanksgiving Gifts to South Korean Workers in the North," Agence France Presse, 3 September 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

10 September 1997

Taipower announces that its plans to ship nuclear waste to North Korea have not changed despite international protests.

—Sofia Wu, "No Change in Nuclear Waste Shipment Plan: Taipower," Central News Agency, 10 September 1997, in

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Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Nuke Waste Shipment on Track," FT Asia Intelligence Wire, 11 September 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 September 1997

Charles Kartman, US deputy assistant secretary of state, and Kim Kye Kwan, North Korean vice foreign minister, meet in Beijing to discuss the recent defection of North Korean Ambassador Chang Sung Kil and the proposed four-party peace talks. Kim agrees that the issues are "completely separated," and says that North Korea will participate in preparatory peace talks in New York on 18 September.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 11 September 1997, in "US Official Gives More Detail of Talks with North Korea in Beijing," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 September 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

12 September 1997

Pyongyang issues a government memorandum condemning the buildup of US and South Korean forces on the peninsula. Pyongyang says that the drastic increase in Seoul's military spending and the continuing presence of US forces in South Korea add unnecessary tension in the region and threaten the success of the proposed four-party peace talks. In the memorandum, Pyongyang states, "To prevent war and guarantee peace on the Korean Peninsula, the United States should stop instigating an arms build-up in South Korea and aggravating tensions, and should withdraw the US forces in South Korea."

—"Memorandum of the DPRK Government Exposing Arms Buildup of U.S. and S. Korea," Korean Central News Agency, 13 September 1997, www.kcna.co.jp; Korean Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 13 September 1997, in "North Korea Issues 'Government Memorandum' on South's Arms Build-Up," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 September 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

18-19 September 1997

Representatives from the United States, China, and the two Koreas meet in New York for preparatory four-party peace talks. The talks break down reportedly due to North Korea's demand for more food aid and the withdrawal of US military forces stationed in South Korea.

—Willis Witter, "Kim Jong-Il's Ascension Gathers Speed; Military Endorses N. Korean Leader," *Washington Times*, 24 September 1997, p. A15, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "War Any Time Now, N Korea Warns UN," *The Weekend Australian*, 4 October 1997, p. 14, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

19 September 1997

The US, Japan, and South Korea amend the Agreement on the Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization to allow international organizations to become members of KEDO. Following the decision, the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) joins KEDO as an executive board member.

—*KEDO 2001 Annual Report*, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, 31 December 2001, p. 10, www.kedo.org; "About Us: Member Nations," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org; "EU Joins KEDO," Xinhua News Agency, 19 September 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "EU Joins KEDO as Full Member," Japan Economic Newswire, 19 September 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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22 September 1997

IAEA Director General Hans Blix informs the Board of Governors that the process of safely storing 8,000 spent fuel rods will be completed by November, but, according to Blix, the IAEA is still unable to confirm whether or not North Korea has suspended all its nuclear activities.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 23 September 1997, in "International Body Cannot Confirm Whether North Korea Has Ceased Nuclear Activities," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 September 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

25 September 1997

Poland becomes a member of KEDO.

—"About Us: Member Nations," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org.

29 September-3 October 1997

The IAEA holds its annual conference in Vienna and once again calls on North Korea to fully comply with its safeguards agreement and turn over all information necessary for the Agency to determine the accuracy of its initial declaration of nuclear material.

—"IAEA Tightens Controls on Nuclear Materials and Hazardous Waste," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 3 October 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

Early October 1997

On 1 October, North Korea halts work on the KEDO light water reactor project after North Korean officials discover a damaged copy of the newspaper *Rodong Sinmun* containing a picture of Kim Jong Il. Upon discovery of the discarded newspaper in the living quarters of South Korean personnel, over 40 North Korean walk off the construction site, and work on the project is suspended. In the days following the incident South Korea rebukes the North's demand for an apology and postpones a trip of a 24-member survey team scheduled to arrive at the [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o site on 7 October. On 6 October, after KEDO intervention, North Korean workers return to the site and the project resumes. [Note: According to an IAEA official, a similar incident occurred when an inspection was temporarily suspended after an IAEA team member inadvertently placed a beer can on a magazine containing the image of Kim Jong Il.]

—"N. Korea Suspends Nuclear Project over Kim Jong-Il Picture Insult," Agence France Presse, 4 October 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kyong Hwa Seok, "Seoul Cancels North Korea Visit over Nuclear Reactor Dispute," Associated Press, 5 October 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Reactor Work Halted after Kim Jong Il Photos Dumped," Japan Economic Newswire, 5 October 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Newspaper Spat Halts Seoul Nuke Project," United Press International, 5 October 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Ready Resume Suspended Nuclear Reactor Work," Agence France Presse, 5 October 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

3 October 1997

North Korean Foreign Minister Ch'oe Song Hong warns the UN General Assembly that "the prevailing situation in the Korean Peninsula is so tense that a war could break out at any moment." Ch'oe adds, "This situation...demands urgently the establishment of a new peace arrangement."

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—"War Any Time Now, N Korea Warns UN," *The Weekend Australian*, 4 October 1997, p. 14, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

8 October 1997

Kim Jong Il is elected General Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party. [Note: Kim has been North Korea's undisputed ruler since his father Kim Il Sung died July 1994, but the positions of president and KWP general secretary remained vacant after Kim's death. However, on 5 September 1998, North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) revised the constitution, making the National Defense Commission (NDC) the highest authority over state affairs, and making Kim Il Sung "eternal president" of North Korea. The SPA also re-elects Kim Jong Il as chairman of the NDC in September 1998.]

—"Secretary Kim Jong Il Elected WPK General Secretary," Korean Central News Agency, 8 October 1997, www.kcna.co.jp; "WPK Central Committee, Central Military Commission Issue Special Communiqué," Korean Central News Agency, 8 October 1997, www.kcna.co.jp; Reid G. Miller, "North Korea's Kim Jong Il Assumes Party Leadership," Associated Press, 8 October 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Nikolaus Prede, "Kim Jong Il Emerges Partly from Father's Shadow," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 8 October 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Chosonminjujuuminmin'gonghwaguk Sahoejuuihonbop," Korean Central News Agency, 5 September 1998, www.kcna.co.jp.

12 October 1997

South Korea's 1997-98 *Defense White Paper* says that although it is doubtful North Korea has produced deliverable nuclear weapons, it probably has the capacity to produce "one or two rudimentary nuclear weapons."

— The Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, *Defense White Paper 1997-1998* (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, October 1997), p. 52; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 12 October 1997, in "North Korea Reportedly Continuing to Build Up Military Strength," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 October 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

21 October 1997

The eighth KEDO site survey team travels to North Korea. The 21-member team evaluates the firmness and safety of the land at the reactor construction site in [Kumho-chigu], Shimp'o. A 28-member team of KEDO and KEPCO officials also travels to Shimp'o to discuss the progress of ground preparation work with South Korean engineers working on the project.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 18 October 1997, in "Reactor Site Survey Team to Visit Soon," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 October 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "KEDO Team to Visit N. Korea Via Beijing: Yonhap," Japan Economic Newswire, 18 October 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

23 October 1997

Richard Christenson, acting US ambassador to South Korea, says that the United States will not pay any of the costs associated with building the light water reactors in [Kumho-chigu], Shimp'o, stating, "When the North Korea-US Agreed Framework was adopted in Geneva in 1994, the ROK (South Korea), the United States, and Japan agreed that the ROK and Japan would share the expenses for the LWR construction while the United States would be responsible for supplying substitute energy." Christenson adds that the US Congress has repeatedly stated that it

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will not approve any funds for KEDO that go beyond the budget for heavy oil deliveries.

—Han Chong Ho, *Munhwa Ilbo* (Seoul), 24 October 1997, p.2, in "US Envoy: US Will Not Share LWR Construction Cost," FBIS Document FTS19971024000041, 24 October 1997; Han Chong Ho, "Mi 'Kyongsurobi Hanp'un'do Monnaegetta'/Chuhan Mi Taeridaesa Palhkyo," *Munhwa Ilbo*, 24 October 1997, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

27 October 1997

The US and South Korea launch the joint-military exercise codenamed "Foal Eagle." The North Korean Foreign Ministry condemns the drill, involving a majority of the 37,000 US troops stationed in South Korea, as "the largest ever in history" and "an aggressive maneuver for a surprise attack." [Note: The US and South Korea cancelled the contentious Team Spirit military exercise in 1994 in order to entice North Korea into freezing its nuclear program, but Pyongyang charges that Team Spirit has merely been replaced by other military exercise that have grown larger in scale.]

—"US-Korean Forces Launch Fall Training Exercise, North Korea Objects," Agence France Press, 27 October 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

28 October 1997

Desaix Anderson, former US deputy secretary of state, becomes executive director of KEDO.

—"KEDO to Discuss Costs of N. Korea Reactors Friday," Japan Economic Newswire, 29 October 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

31 October 1997

KEDO's Executive Board meets in Tokyo to discuss the costs of the light water reactors based on an estimate supplied by KEPCO, the primary contractor of the project. Board members fail to finalize a figure for the cost estimate, but they reportedly make significant progress. [Note: Once the four Executive Board member-nations agree on a final estimate they may move on to discussing the contentious issue of how much of the cost will be funded by each nation.]

—"KEDO Execs Make Progress on Reactor Cost Estimate," Japan Economic Newswire, 31 October 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "KEDO Defers Decision on N. Korea Reactor Cost," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 31 October 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

31 October 1997

Addressing the first committee meeting of the 52nd UN General Assembly, a North Korean delegate says, "Attempts to keep nuclear weapons and produce new ones...cannot be justified under any circumstances."

—Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 31 October 1997, in "North Korean Delegate Speaks at UN General Assembly Committee Meeting," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 November 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

9 November 1997

A commentary printed in the *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, states that "Northeast Asia is fraught with the greatest danger of nuclear war in the world. The danger is caused by the nuclear war exercises and nuclear arms build-up of the United States, Japan, and the South Korean puppets." The commentary

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also condemns the recent US-South Korean "Foal Eagle" military exercise as a preparation for a nuclear attack on the North.

—"Who Poses Nuclear Threat?," Korean Central News Agency, 9 November 1997, www.kcna.co.jp; "Who Poses Nuclear Threat?," Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 9 November 1997, in "North Korean Paper Says USA, Japan, South Korea Pose Nuclear Threat in Korea," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 November 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 November 1997

North Korea says that the KEDO light water reactor project is "an important project...which set a milestone in the improvement of bilateral relations [between the United States and North Korea]."

—Kate Webb, "Nuclear Official Arrives to Discuss Bill for N. Korea Reactors," Agence France Presse, 12 November 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

12 November 1997

The UN General Assembly adopts a resolution urging North Korea to come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA and preserve all information the IAEA needs in order to verify the accuracy of North Korea's initial declaration of nuclear material. [Note: On 22 November, North Korea condemns the resolution as an attempt by "dishonest-minded forces of the US and IAEA to isolate and stifle the DPRK." North Korea also claims that it has fully cooperated with the IAEA and has not withheld any relevant information.]

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 13 November 1997, in "UN Adopts Resolution Urging Implementation of Nuclear Safeguards," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 November 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 22 November 1997, in "North Korea 'Bitterly Rejects' UN Resolution on Nuclear Safeguards," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 November 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

12-16 November 1997

KEDO Executive Director Desaix Anderson meets with South Korean officials to discuss the progress of preliminary construction in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o and cost sharing of the light water reactor project. In a meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Chong Ha, Anderson asks South Korea to finish negotiations with other KEDO executive board member-nations on cost sharing at the earliest possible date.

—"KEDO Director Asks Seoul to End Talks on Cost Sharing," Japan Economic Newswire, 12 November 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "KEDO Reactor Body Chief Visits Seoul for Talks," *Asia Pulse*, 12 November 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kate Webb, "Nuclear Official Arrives to Discuss Bill for N. Korea Reactors," Agence France Presse, 12 November 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

18-20 November 1997

KEDO Executive Director Desaix Anderson meets with North Korean officials in Pyongyang to discuss ways to ensure that the light water reactor project proceeds smoothly. Anderson also visits the construction site in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o to inspect progress on preliminary construction.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 16 November 1997, in "Head of Energy Organization Leaves South Korea for North Via Beijing," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 November 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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21 November 1994

Representatives from the United States, China, and the two Koreas hold preparatory consultations for the proposed four-party peace talks. At the meeting held in New York, North Korea agrees to participate in the peace talks and drops its demand for the immediate withdrawal of all US troops stationed in South Korea. The talks are to be held in Geneva beginning 9 December.

—"North Korea Agrees to Talks," *New York Times*, 22 November 1997, p. A2, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Ivan Lebedev, "North Korea and US Will Hold Talks on Korean Situation," ITAR-TASS, 25 November 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

24-25 November 1997

The KEDO Executive Board meets to finalize the cost estimate of the light water reactor project. The total cost of the project is estimated at \$5.18 billion. [Note: The Executive Board will meet in December to discuss cost sharing, but the United States reportedly has thus far refuses to share any of the construction cost.]

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 26 November 1997, in "Final Costs of Energy Project Fixed; USA Reportedly Will Not Contribute," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 November 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Reactor Project Estimated at 5.18 Bil. Dlr," Japan Economic Newswire, 26 November 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

26 November 1997

The US and North Korea meet in Washington to discuss various bilateral issues such as US food aid to North Korea, implementation of 1994 Agreed Framework, and the upcoming four-party peace talks. The US delegation is headed by Charles Kartman, deputy secretary of state, and the North Korean delegation is headed by Kim Kye Kwan, deputy foreign minister.

—Ivan Lebedev, "North Korea and US Will Hold Talks on Korean Situation," ITAR-TASS, 25 November 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

2 December 1997

The US State Department announces that the KEDO light water reactor project will not be negatively affected by the looming financial crises in South Korea and Japan.

—"Financial Crisis Won't Affect North Korean Nuclear Aid," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2 December 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

2 December 1997

South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Chong Ha meets with Stephen Bosworth, the recently appointed US ambassador to South Korea, and asks for US assistance in financing the construction of two light water reactors in North Korea.

—"S Korea Seeks US Help on Forex Crisis, Reactor Costs," Asia Pulse, 2 December 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

4 December 1997

South Korea announces that its economic crisis will not negatively affect funding for the KEDO light water reactor project. A Blue House [Ch'onghwadae] official says, "The North Korean reactor project is not only a commitment to

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the international community but an obligation...We should not change our position." [Note: South Korea committed itself to pay a majority of the estimated \$5.18 billion project, but on 3 December Seoul had to arrange a bailout package with the IMF that could exceed \$55 million.]

—"IMF Retrenchment Will Not Affect North Korean Reactors," Agence France Presse, 3 December 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

4 December 1997

Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi meets with US National Security Advisor Samuel Berger and requests that the United States share some of the construction costs for the KEDO light water reactor project.

—"Obuchi Seeks U.S. Financial Aid for Nuke Reactors," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 5 December 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

6 December 1997

IAEA Director General Mohammad Elbaradei tells the Board of Governors that the process of safely sealing 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods in North Korea will be completed in early 1998. Once the process is complete, Elbaradei says, the number of IAEA inspectors in North Korea will be reduced from four to two. Elbaradei also informs the Board of Governors that no progress has been made in collecting information necessary for verifying North Korea's compliance with its safeguards agreement.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 9 December 1997, in "Sealing of Spent Nuclear Rods to Be Completed by Spring," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 December 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

8 December 1997

The KEDO Executive Board meets in New York to discuss cost sharing for the light water reactor project. The board, comprised of representatives from the EAEC, Japan, South Korea and the United States, fails to agree on a plan for sharing the cost of the estimated \$5.18 billion project.

—"KEDO Stymied on Cost Sharing for N. Korea Reactors," Japan Economic Newswire, 9 December 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

9 December 1997

Representatives from the United States, China, and the two Koreas meet in Geneva for the first round of the four-party talks aimed at replacing the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement with a formal peace treaty. The delegations are headed by US Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, South Korean Ambassador to France Lee Shi Yong, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan.

—"First Korean Peace Talks Session Has 'Symbolic' Importance," Agence France Presse, 5 December 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Amid Muted Hopes, Korea Peace Talks Open in Geneva," Deutsche Press-Agentur, 9 December 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kim Byong Hon, "4 Chahwoedam O'nul KAemak/Geneva So/P'yonghwach'eje Chongch'ak Tung Chungchom Hyobui," *Taehan Maeil*, 9 December 1997, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

13 December 1997

Taiwanese Vice Premier Liu Chao-hsuan announces that Taipower will not ship nuclear waste to North Korea.

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Taipower signed a contract with Pyongyang in January 1997 to ship up to 200,000 barrels of low-grade nuclear waste to North Korea for storage, but Taiwan's Atomic Energy Council vetoed Taipower's plan, claiming that North Korea had failed to build adequate storage facilities.

—Central News Agency (Taipei), 13 December 1997, in "Plan to Ship Radioactive Waste to North Korea to Be Abandoned," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 December 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Taiwan to Scrap Nuclear Waste Deal with North Korea," Agence France Presse, 16 December 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Nuke Waste Deal Flounders," FT Asia Intelligence Wire, 20 December 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

16 December 1997

The South Korean Ministry of National Unification reaffirms Seoul's commitment to the KEDO light water reactor project despite the current economic crisis in South Korea. A ministry official is quoted as saying, "Just because we are facing this financial problem, we are not going to go back on every international commitment we have made. We made a promise and we will keep it."

—Vladimir Kutakhov, "South Korea Will Continue to Build Reactors in KDPR," ITAR-TASS, 16 December 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "South Korea Reassures US on Commitment to North's Nuclear Project," Agence France Presse, 17 December 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

19 December 1997

South Korean president-elect Kim Dae Jung proposes the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue based on the 1991 Basic Agreement, which pledges nonaggression, cultural exchanges, reconciliation and cooperation between North and South Korea. [Note: The Basic Agreement was signed in December 1991 but became effective in 1992.]

—"Kim Dae-Jung Proposes Resumption of Inter-Korean Talks," Agence France Presse, 19 December 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Lee Byong Son, "97 Sont'aek Kim Dae Jung Shidaeilmunildap," *Munhwa Ilbo*, 19 December 1997, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Kim Dae Jun Tangsonja Kijahwoegyonmun Yoji," *Segye Ilbo*, 20 December 1997, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

Late December 1997

The US company Combustion Engineering applies for a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to export two nuclear reactors, for "commercial operation of electricity," to North Korea.

—Federal Register, 28 January 1998, Vol. 63, No. 18, p. 4303, Doc ID: fr28jan98-124; David E. Sanger, "South Korea's Crisis Hinders Nuclear Deal with the North," *New York Times*, 5 February 1998, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

24 December 1997

KEDO and North Korea conclude the second round of talks on a protocol on quality guarantees for the two light water reactors. They fail to agree on issues such as the level of North Korean participation in evaluating the performance of the reactors and the compensation mechanism should one of the reactors fail to perform adequately. The two sides agree to meet for a third round of talks in early 1998.

—Yonhap News Agency, 25 December 1997, in "Second Round of Talks on Light-Water Reactors Concluded," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 December 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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[Back to Top](#)

1996

Late 1990s

North Korea begins to develop a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment capability.

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure-Part Two," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, August 1999, p. 45.

1996

The Philippines donates \$150,000 to Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

—Joel Vega, "Philippines: Manila Considers Funds to Dismantle N. Korea Reactors," Inter Press Service, 22 July 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

January 1996

Russian officials from the Foreign Ministry and Atomic Energy Ministry issue a report stating that between 1991 and 1994 North Korea tested high explosive nuclear warhead triggering devices over 70 times. The report also claims that North Korea is storing up to 22kg of plutonium at a facility in Yongbyon-kun.

—*Seoul Sinmun*, 5 January 1996, in "South Korean Paper Quotes Russian Report on North's Nuclear Intentions," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 January 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yu Min, "'Pukhan Haekkaebal P'ogiannunda'/Seoul Shinmun, Russia Chongbu P'yonkkabogoso Ipsu," *Taehan Maeil*, 5 January 1996, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

9 January 1996

South Korean officials announce that North Korea has started transferring 8,000 spent fuel rods to special steel containers sealed in a concrete casing. The spent fuel rods, necessary for determining the amount of plutonium North Korea has reprocessed, have been slowly corroding in a cooling pond since they were removed from a 5MW(e) reactor in May 1994. Under the Agreed Framework, the spent fuel rods are to be moved out of North Korea for inspection and safe storage upon completion of the first light water reactor.

—"N. Korea Preserving Spent Nuclear Fuel in Containers," Japan Economic Newswire, 9 January 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korea Begins Work to Safeguard Spent Fuel Rods," Associated Press, 9 January 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; *Chosun Ilbo*, 10 January 1995, p. 2, in "North Starts Dry Storage of Spent Fuel," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 January 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

13 January 1996

A South Korean official announces that Pyongyang will allow seven members of the third Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) survey team to remain in North Korea for an additional 38 days. The team was unable to complete the necessary geological survey work, including measuring the depth of the sea off the coast of Shimp'o, within the scheduled time. The third KEDO survey team arrived in North Korea on 16 December, but instead of departing on 16 January as scheduled, the seven members who were granted extensions will remain in Shimp'o until 23 February and work with the fourth survey team, which is scheduled to arrive on 16 January.

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—*Chosun Ilbo*, 14 January 1996, p. 2, in "Extended Stay Granted to Energy Body's Third Survey Team," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 January 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

14 January 1996

The Chinese freighter *Yanlong IV* departs Pusan, South Korea carrying seismic and drilling tools to Shinp'o, North Korea for the month-long Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) survey mission scheduled to begin 16 January. [Note: The survey materials are shipped to Najin and then transported to Shinp'o by rail.]

—Kim Jae Hwan, "First Shipment of Equipment for Nuclear Plants Sails to North Korea," Agence France Presse, 14 January 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Reuters, "South Korea Sends Reactor Gear to North," *New York Times*, 15 January 1996, p. A6, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 9 January 1996, in "Fourth KEDO Site Inspection Team to Visit North on 17th January," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 January 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

16 January-23 February 1996

The fourth Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) survey team travels to Shinp'o, North Korea. The 20-member team, consisting of 17 South Koreans, two Americans and one Japanese, conducts various geological tests at the proposed site for two light water reactors. During the month long mission, the team tests the quality of the earth using seismological and drilling equipment.

—"US-Led Nuclear Survey Team Arrives in North Korea," Agence France Presse, 16 January 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 14 January 1996, in "Energy Body Dispatches Fourth Site Survey Team to North," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 January 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "KEDO Survey Team Leaves DPRK," Xinhua News Agency, 24 February 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

24-29 January 1996

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) delegation meets with representatives from the General Department of Atomic Energy in Pyongyang to continue talks on North Korea's suspended nuclear operations. During the talks, the IAEA delegation visits the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex and verifies that Pyongyang has not resumed nuclear activities. Talks conclude on 29 January 1996, and North Korea agrees that the IAEA may conduct routine and ad hoc inspections of its operational nuclear sites.

—"IAEA Delegation Arrives in Pyongyang," Xinhua News Agency, 23 January 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Ivan Zakharchenko, "DPRK Agrees to Inspections of Nuke Research Facilities," ITAR-TASS, 30 January 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Puk, Shingo Haekshisol Sach'al Hoyong/Kyongsuro Hyopchong Ttarrunkot," *Chosun Ilbo*, 31 January 1996, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

February 1996

France pledges \$2 million to Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

—"France Offers to Join Int'l Nuclear Program on N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 February 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

February 1996

Japan agrees to pay approximately \$19 million for heavy fuel oil to be delivered to North Korea in April. Under the

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Agreed Framework, the United States shoulders the responsibility of financing the 500,000 tons/year of heavy fuel oil to meet North Korea's energy needs until the completion of two light water reactors. However, due to delays in enacting the necessary funding bill in Congress, several US officials, including US Ambassador to Japan Walter Mondale and Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) Director General Stephen Bosworth, have requested that Tokyo temporarily share some of the cost.

—"Japan to Pay for Fuel Supply to N. Korea," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 22 February 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Japan Paying 19 M. Dlr for N. Korean Fuel," Jiji Press Ticker Service, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

February 1996

The US and South Korea conduct 10-day joint naval exercises off South Korea's east coast and a joint bombing exercises north of Seoul. Pyongyang claims that the military exercises are preparations for war and condemns the bombing tests as target practice for dropping nuclear bombs on North Korea. While the United States and South Korea have refrained from holding the highly contentious Team Spirit exercise since the signing of the Agreed Framework, North Korea has warned that any US-South Korean joint military exercises threaten the success of the agreement.

—"U.S., South Korea to Conduct Joint Maneuvers amid Tension," Associated Press, 9 February 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Korean Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 23 February 1996, in "Commentator Justifies New Peace Mechanism Proposal," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 February 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

14 February 1996

The South Korean Defense Ministry announces that the joint US-South Korean military exercise Team Spirit will be cancelled for the third year in a row. According to a Ministry spokesman, "The decision has been made to create a more positive atmosphere for the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and as a confidence-building measure for North Korea's implementation of the Geneva nuclear agreement." However, the Ministry claims that the exercise will resume in 1997 if North Korea does not adhere to the Agreed Framework or threatens military aggression against South Korea.

—"Joint U.S.-South Korean Military Exercises Cancelled," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 14 February 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "South Korea, U.S. Not to Hold Joint Maneuver," Xinhua News Agency, 14 February 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "S. Korea, U.S. Will Not Hold Joint Exercises This Year," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 February 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

26 February 1996

The European Union pledges \$6.25 million to Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

—"EU to Fund N. Korean Nuclear Agency," United Press International, 26 February 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "EU to Provide 6.3 Mil. Dlr to KEDO," Japan Economic Newswire, 27 February 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

10 March 1996

KBS Radio in Seoul cites the Taiwanese newspaper *Lien Ho Pao* as having reported that Taiwan's Kaoshiung port

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authorities seized 35 tons of nuclear material from a North Korean ship that was en route to Pakistan. The report says Taiwanese authorities are waiting for the results of tests on a material believed to be nitroglycerin. [Note: This report is unsubstantiated and "nitroglycerin," is not a "nuclear material;" however, it could be used in the high-explosive triggering device in a bomb. It is unclear whether this shipment is related to nuclear weapons development.]

—KBS Radio (Seoul), 10 March 1996, in "Taiwan Police Seize 'Nuclear Material' from North Korean Ship," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 March 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

10 March 1996

North Korea says that US and South Korea have not actually cancelled the Team Spirit military exercise as they had claimed. The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, charges that Team Spirit has merely been replaced by recent naval and bombing exercises.

—"'Team Spirit' Drills Replaced by Other Exercises, Pyongyang Says," Xinhua News Agency, 10 March 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 10 March 1996, in "North Korean Newspaper Calls for Halt to All Military Manoeuvres in South," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 March 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

13 March 1996

North Korea establishes a working-level group to coordinate activities relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) light water reactor project. The group, tentatively called the "East Sea Atomic Reactor Project Planning Office," will have responsibilities ranging from establishing strategies for follow-up negotiations with KEDO to managing both North Korean and foreign personnel working on the reactor project in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o.

—*Hanguk Ilbo*, 14 March 1996, p. 2, in "North to Form Counterpart Body for Reactor Supply," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 March 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kim Byong Ch'an, "Puk, Wonjonkihwoektan Kusongkyehwek/Uri Kyongsuro Kihwoektan Shilmu Sangdaegiguro," *Hankook Ilbo*, 14 March 1996, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

18 March 1996

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Hans Blix reports to the IAEA Board of Governors that North Korea is not cooperating with IAEA efforts to ascertain the quantity of plutonium held at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. IAEA inspectors have made a number of attempts to photograph the facility since September 1995, in accordance with agreements reached with North Korea. However, they have been restricted from taking photographs. Blix also reports that North Korea has been slow in granting visas for IAEA inspectors.

—"North Korea Still Not Cooperating with Nuclear Inspectors: UN," Agence France Presse, 18 March 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

19 March 1996

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) executive board officially names the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) as the prime contractor for the light water reactor project. At the meeting held in Seoul, delegates from South Korea, the United States and Japan also discuss funding for the heavy oil shipments

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and the admission of the European Union to the executive board.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 19 March 1996, in "Korean Energy Organization to Commission Company to Build Nuclear Reactor," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 March 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

20 March 1996

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) Executive Director Stephen Bosworth and Korean Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) President Lee Chong Hun sign the agreement commissioning KEPCO as the prime contractor for the light water reactor project.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 21 March 1996, in "KEDO Commissions South Korean Corporation as Prime Reactor Contractor," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 March 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Cho Chae Yong, "Hanjon Chugyeyakcha Shijong/KEDO Isahwoe/Ch'ongjangdan 26 Il Pangbuk," *Hankook Ilbo*, 20 March 1996, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

26-30 March 1996

A Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) delegation, headed by Executive Director Stephen Bosworth, meets with North Korean officials in Shin'p'o to inspect the proposed construction site and discuss details of the light water reactor project. The two sides agree to hold further consultations in New York and Mt. Myohyang to conclude necessary follow-up protocols for implementing the reactor supply agreement.

—"Delegation in North Korea Discussion Building of Nuclear Plant," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 26 March 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Nuclear Consortium Leaders Visit North Korea," Agence France Presse, 26 March 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "KEDO, N. Korea to Hold Talks in New York on April 8," Japan Economic Newswire, 3 April 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

29 March 1996

North Korean Vice Marshall Kim Kwang Jin says, "What the point is now is not whether a war will break out on the Korean Peninsula, but when it will be unleashed."

—"South Korea Warns North Korea Would Face Retaliation," Agence France Presse, 30 March 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "'Hanbando Chonjaeng Pulgap'i'/Namso Puk Pyonghwahwoedam Kobunun Sonjonp'ogo," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 29 March 1996, p. 2, in KINDS www.kinds.or.kr.

5 April 1996

North Korea announces that it will no longer recognize the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea. North Korea, in the statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency, claims that the North Korean Army is taking "self-defensive measures" now that the demilitarized zone is no longer respected. While the statement offers no explanation, the South Korean Defense Ministry believes the threat to be an attempt to "wring concessions from the United States as they did by raising nuclear threats a couple of years ago."

—Reuters, "North Korea Says It Will Cease Respecting Demilitarized Zone," *New York Times*, 5 April 1996, p. A14, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

April 1996

Representatives from the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and North Korea begin

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negotiations in New York to resolve issues relating to the light water reactor supply agreement. The two sides discuss issues such as the protection of foreign engineers working on the project (8 April-22 May) and the transportation of reactor components (16 April-14 June). The talks in New York and later talks to be held near Mt. Myohyang, North Korea are aimed at concluding protocols necessary for implementing the reactor supply agreement.

—"Working-Level Talks Under Way on KEDO Reactor Project," Japan Economic Newswire, 9 April 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Catherine Touns, "U.S. Group Starts Negotiations with North Korea on Reactors," *Washington Times*, 9 April 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Pyongyang, KEDO Begin Transport Discussions," Agence France Presse, 16 April 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 April 1996

Secretary of State Warren Christopher says that the United States will not enter into any peace talks with North Korea that exclude South Korea. [Note: Washington and Seoul view North Korea's recent incursions into the demilitarized zone as an attempt to force the United States into direct negotiations to replace the current armistice agreement with a peace treaty.]

—Terence Hunt, "U.S. Says It Won't Be Bullied into Separate Talks with North Korea," Associated Press, 11 April 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 April 1996

A Pentagon report, "*Nonproliferation: Threats and Response*," highlights North Korea's ballistic missile and other weapons of mass destruction programs. The report says North Korea has "significantly advanced its nuclear program during the last 10 years." The report also says that Pyongyang has agreed to freeze and eventually eliminate its "plutonium-producing nuclear reactors and associated facilities."

—US Department of Defense, "Proliferation: Threat and Response," 11 April 1996, www.defenselink.mil.

16 April 1996

US President Bill Clinton and South Korean President Kim Young Sam propose four-party talks to replace the current armistice agreement with a peace treaty officially ending the Korean War. The proposed talks would include North and South Korea, the United States and China. North Korean ambassador to Moscow Song Sung Pil dismisses the proposal, saying, "At present other countries have no role to play on this area...There is no need for an international conference on this question." However, on 18 April, the North Korean Foreign Ministry announces that it is "examining the proposal of the US side to see whether it seeks another purpose and whether it is feasible."

—Alison Mitchell, "Clinton Visits Korea and New Peace Talks Are Proposed," *New York Times*, 16 April 1996, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Richard Lloyd Parry, "North Korea Insists It Will Only Talk to The US; Korean Conundrum; North Rejects Four-Party Conference Aimed at Bringing 'Permanent Peace' to Peninsula," *The Independent* (London), 17 April 1996, p. 8, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kate Webb, "North Korea Breaks Its Silence, Says It Is Studying Peace Proposal," Agence France Presse, 18 April 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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17 April 1996

For the second year in a row, Indonesia pledges \$325,000 to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in the form of heavy fuel oil.

—"Indonesia Pledges More Heavy Fuel for North Korea," Agence France Presse, 17 April 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

19 April 1996

Singapore announces that it will make annual contributions of \$100,000 to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) for the next three years.

—Ravi Velloor, "S'pore to Give \$141,000 a Year to Energy Body," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 20 April 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Singapore to Give 100,000 Dlr's Yearly to KEDO," Japan Economic Newswire, 19 April 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

26 April 1996

According to a 9 June report in the Japan's *Sankei Shimbun*, a North Korean official claims that North Korea has four nuclear-tipped missiles. In a meeting with US Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Hubbard, Kim Jong U, Vice Chairman of North Korea's external economy commission, threatens that if the United States does not provide food aid and technological assistance to North Korea, the people of South Korea and Japan may fall victim to four nuclear missiles. The *Sankei Shimbun* article quotes US military officials as saying they found the threat to be "rational" and reliable. [Note: On 10 June, the day after the *Sankei Shimbun* article is published, US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns dismisses the report as "preposterous."]

—"North Korea Claims to Have Four Nuclear-Tipped Missiles: Report," Agence France Presse, 8 June 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "US Denies Report on North Korean Missile Threat," Agence France Presse, 10 June 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

28 April-6 May 1996

A 13-member Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) team travels to Shinp'o to conduct an infrastructure design assessment for the proposed light water reactor site. Upon returning to Seoul, one of the team members says that due to the lack of a stable power supply, generators may have to be shipped to the construction site.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 7 May 1996, in "North Korea: Reactor Body Development Team Says Shinp'o Infrastructure Inadequate," Reuter Insurance Briefing, 8 May 1996, in IAEA Daily Press Review, 9 May 1996; "Nuclear Site Survey Team Says North Korean Preparations on Track," Agence France Presse, 7 May 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

Late April-Early May 1996

A delegation representing Japanese and Koreans who suffered from the 1945 atomic bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki meets with Korean Workers' Party Secretary Kim Yong Sun, in Pyongyang and asks him to take steps to help realize a nuclear weapons free zone in Northeast Asia.

—"Japanese, N. Korean A-Bomb Victims Agree on Nonnuke Zone," Japan Economic Newswire, 7 May 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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May 1996

The US issues an authorization for the transfer of certain nuclear technology to North Korea. The authorization is issued under the Department of Energy's regulations in 10 CFR Part 810, and it limits technology transfers only to what is "necessary for the licensing and safe operation of the reactors and not technology enabling the design or manufacture of nuclear reactor components or fuel."

—Michael Knapik, "New Part 810 Authorization Needed for North Korean LWRs," *Nucleonics Week*, Vol. 41, No. 45, 9 November 2000, www.mhenergy.com; Mark Hibbs and Michael Knapik, "Decisions on KEDO Project Fate Now in Hands of Bush Officials," *Nucleonics Week*, Vol. 42, No. 1, 4 January 2001, www.mhenergy.com.

1 May 1996

Personnel from the American firm NAC International and the Department of Energy, under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), begin safely storing 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods in North Korea. The spent fuel rods had been slowly corroding in a cooling pond near the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex since they were removed from the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in May 1994. The technicians are transferring the rods to steel canisters filled with argon gas, in which they will later be shipped to another country for safe storage and inspection. [Note: North Korea repeatedly denied the IAEA's request to conduct tests on the spent fuel rods before they were sealed inside the steel canisters.]

—"North Korea Reaches Nuclear Milestone," United Press International, 1 May 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "US Begins Removing Spent Nuclear Fuel in DPRK Plant," Xinhua News Agency, 1 May 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Eric Schmitt, "Washington Spat Threatens to Halt Disposal of North Korean Nuclear Fuel," *New York Times*, 20 April 1996, p. A11, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korea Abides by Nuclear Agreement, US Says," Agence France Presse, 3 May 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "IAEA Dissatisfied with N. Korea over Nuclear Procedure," Japan Economic Newswire, 7 May 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

2 May 1996

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) spokesman David Kyd verifies that North Korea has begun storing the 8,000 nuclear spent fuel rods. However, according to Kyd, North Korean officials have refused to let IAEA inspectors measure the plutonium levels in the rods. Kyd says that four IAEA inspectors, including a radioactivity expert, are involved in the storage process. The inspectors have only been allowed to verify whether the fuel rods have been "burnt." The IAEA has estimated that the storage of the 8,000 fuel rods will be completed by June 1997. The IAEA will continue to seek authorization to measure the plutonium through negotiations with North Korea.

—"DPRK Hindering Measurement of Spent Nuclear Fuel Rods," KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 2 May 1996; in FBIS Document FTS19960502000233, 2 May 1996; *Nuclear News*, April 1996, p. 14; Steve Pagani, "Austria: N. Korea Refuses to let IAEA Sample Nuclear Rods," Reuter Insurance Briefing, 2 May 1996, pp. 1-2, in IAEA Daily Press Review, 3 May 1996; "Puk Haek P'yeyonnyobong Pong'in Ch'aksu/Yongbyon Haekshisol 8 Ch'ongae Misaso/IAEA Kamdok," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 2 May 1996, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Chong Pyon Chin, "Puk Kwago Haekkyumyong Sashilsang Musan/P'ye Yonnyobong Sample Ch'aech'ui Tto Kobu," *Hankook Ilbo*, 3 May 1996, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

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7 May 1996

Indonesia becomes a member of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

—"About Us: Member Nations," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org.

10 May 1996

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Hans Blix submits a report to UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on the progress of IAEA-North Korean talks. According to the report, the two sides have made little progress in negotiations on securing data necessary for verifying North Korea's past nuclear activities. Further delays, Blix warns, could prevent the IAEA from ever verifying that North Korea has declared all of the plutonium in its possession.

—"IAEA Head Vents Dissatisfaction with N. Korea in Report," Japan Economic Newswire, 11 May 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

22 May 1996

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and North Korea initial a protocol granting diplomatic immunity to KEDO and KEPCO personnel working in North Korea on the light water reactor project. Talks on the protocol began in New York on 8 April.

—"US-Led Consortium, Pyongyang, Agree First Protocol," Agence France Presse, 22 May 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "KEDO, N. Korea to Initial Accord on Immunity," Japan Economic Newswire, 20 May 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "DPRK, KEDO Sign Protocol to Protect Foreign Workers," Xinhua News Agency, 23 May 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

31 May 1996

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) Executive Director Stephen Bosworth announces that site preparation work in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o will begin by the end of the year. According to Bosworth, the proposed location for the reactors "fully meets international standards [of safety]." However, due to disputes over the type of reactor to be supplied, the target completion date of 2003 for the first reactor will be delayed at least one year.

—Debra Lau, "North Korea Reactor Work to Start This Year," *The Daily Yomiuri*, 2 June 1996, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

14 June 1996

North Korea and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) initial two more protocols relating to the light water reactor supply agreement. One protocol calls for the establishment of two transportation routes, one by sea and one by air, to facilitate the transfer of reactor materials. The other protocol establishes rules for the use of satellite communications by KEDO personnel while they are in Shinp'o. Talks on these protocols began in New York on 16 April.

—"N. Korea, KEDO Ink 2 More Protocols on Reactor Project," Japan Economic Newswire, 15 June 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Pyongyang, US-Led Consortium Agree on KEDO Protocols," Agence France Presse, 14 June 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "DPRK, KEDO Sign Transportation, Communication Protocols," Xinhua News Agency, 17 June 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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21 June 1996

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that in 1995 it did not find any evidence that North Korea has diverted nuclear material. However, because the Agency remains unable to verify North Korea's initial declaration of nuclear material, North Korea is still non-compliant with its nuclear safeguards agreement it signed with the Agency in 1992.

—"Safeguards Implementation on 1995," *IAEA Newsbriefs*, July/August 1996, vol. 11, no. 3(72), p. 1; "North Korea Fails to Fulfill Nuclear-Control Obligations, IAEA Says," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 21 June 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

25 June 1996

IAEA representatives arrive in Pyongyang for the fifth round of talks with North Korea. The talks focus on the implementation of measures to preserve 8,000 spent fuel rods for future inspections, which are necessary for the Agency to determine the accuracy of North Korea's initial declaration of nuclear material.

—"Safeguards in the DPRK," *IAEA Newsbriefs*, July/August 1996, vol. 11, no. 3, p. 3; "IAEA Delegation Arrives in Pyongyang for Negotiations," Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 25 June 1996, in FBIS Document FTS19960625000159, 25 June 1996; "IAEA Taep'yodan Pyongyang Toch'ak," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 26 June 1996, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.kr.or.

2 July 1996

North Korea threatens to resume its nuclear program if heavy fuel oil shipments do not arrive on schedule. In a statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency, Pyongyang condemns a recent US congressional decision to cut the proposed \$25 million package in half, and says that if the decision adversely affects oil deliveries, "we will be compelled to reconsider our nuclear freeze."

—"N. Korea Issues Nuclear-Energy Warning," United Press International, 2 July 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

6-29 July 1996

The sixth Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) inspection team travels to North Korea to inspect the proposed light water reactor construction site in [Kumho-chigu], Shimp'o.

—"6th KEDO Inspection Team to Visit N. Korea Sat.," Japan Economic Newswire, 6 July 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; KBS Radio (Seoul), 30 July 1996, in "South's Rector Delegation, Energy Organization Team Leave North Korea," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 August 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

9 July 1996

South Korea remits \$6 million to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) for pre-project service costs. South Korea's donation completes the estimated \$9 million required by KEDO for this purpose; in 1995, Japan donated \$3 million.

—"S. Korea Sends Money for Light-Water Reactor in DPRK," Xinhua News Agency, 9 July 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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11 July 1996

North Korea and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) officially sign three protocols relating to the light water reactor supply agreement. The protocols, which were initialed on 22 May and 14 June, provide diplomatic protection for KEDO and KEPCO personnel, regulate satellite communications, and designate two transportation routes for reactor materials. [Note: Talks on the protocols were held in New York from April to June.]

—"Protocol between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Communications for the Implementation of a Light-Water Reactor Project," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org; "Protocol between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Transportation for the Implementation of a Light-Water Reactor Project," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org; "Protocol between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the Juridical Status of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org; "Protocols Signed on North Korean Nuclear Agreement," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 11 July 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "DPRK, KEDO Sign Nuclear Protocols," Xinhua News Agency, 11 July 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 12 July 1996, in "North Korea, Korean Energy Body Sign Protocols on Reactor Supply Agreement," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 July 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

16 July 1996

The Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), primary contractor of the light water reactor project in North Korea, submits a cost estimate to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). KEPCO estimates that the construction will cost at least \$5 billion, but KEDO officials say the figure is subject to further negotiations.

—"Contractor Gives Cost Estimate on N. Korean Reactors," Japan Economic Newswire, 17 July 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Japan Ponders Loan for North Korean Nuclear Reactors," *Nikkei Weekly*, 29 June 1996, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

17 July 1996

Chile becomes a member of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

—"About Us: Member Nations," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org.

19 July 1996

South Korea's National Unification Ministry approves KEPCO's construction plan for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) light water reactor project.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 20 July 1996, in "Seoul Approves Contract for Nuclear Plant," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 22 July 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

20-29 July 1996

Representatives from the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and North Korea meet near

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Mt. Myohyang, north of Pyongyang, to discuss additional follow-up protocols to the light water reactor supply agreement. The protocols under discussion will cover the management of the construction site near Shinp'o and the provision of North Korean labor, goods and services relating to the project. The North Korean delegation reportedly demands "special" wages for North Koreans working on the project. The two sides fail to initial an agreement, but talks resume in New York on 22 August. [Note: The KEDO delegation had originally planned to visit the proposed reactor site, but due to torrential rains, the trip was cancelled.]

—"Nuclear Team Arrives in North Korea," Agence France Presse, 21 July 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; KBS Radio (Seoul), 30 July 1996, in "South's Rector Delegation, Energy Organization Team Leave North Korea," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 August 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "KEDO-Pyongyang Talks Set to Resume Thursday," Agence France Presse, 20 August 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

22 July 1996

South Korea's Ministry of Finance and Economy informs the Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project that South Korea will not finance more than 60 percent (approximately \$3.5 billion) of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) project.

—*Chosun Ilbo*, 23 June 1996, p. 1, in "South Will Not Bear More Than 60 Percent of Costs of Reactors for North," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 July 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "'Puk Kyongsuro Piyong Pundam Hanguk 60% Isang Pulga'," *Chosun Ilbo*, 23 July 1996, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

24 July 1996

Stephen Bosworth, executive director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), announces that construction of the first light water reactor in [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o, North Korea will likely begin within the year.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 24 July 1996, in "Construction of Light-Water Reactor Project to Begin This Year," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 July 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

26 July 1996

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) announces that it has selected the Korea Exchange Bank, Citibank, the Bank of Tokyo and Mitsubishi Bank to handle the funding of the light water reactor project in North Korea.

—"Four Banks Chosen to Handle N Korean Nuclear Reactor Funds: Report," Agence France Presse, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "KEDO Chugorae'unhaeng/Woehannun Sonjong," *Donga Ilbo*, 27 July 1996, p. 10, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

August 1996

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards report not released to the public says that the IAEA is unable to verify North Korea's initial declaration of nuclear material under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

—Gamini Seneviratne, "All Material Accounted for, According to Recent IAEA Report," *NuclearFuel*, 12 August 1996, p.15.

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11 August 1996

A Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) official announces that KEPCO has selected Duke Engineering & Services as its technical consultant for the light water reactor project in North Korea. The US based Duke Engineering will provide technical support for various aspects of the project, including expenses, design and construction. [Note: KEPCO and Duke Engineering & Services sign a contract in May 1997.]

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 12 August 1996, in "Korea Nuclear Consortium Tentatively names Technical Consultant for North Project," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 August 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "B&W Canada to Supply Qinshan SGs; Other Contracts," *Nuclear News*, June 1997, vol. 40, no. 7, p. 70.

22 August 1996

The US Treasury Department, calling North Korea a "sponsor of terrorism," announces steps to prohibit the transfer of funds from US citizens to North Korea.

—"Pyongyang Denounces Reported US Move to Block Funds to North Korea," Agence France Presse, 30 August 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

22 August to 27 September 1996

Representatives from the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and North Korea meet in New York for the second round of talks concerning protocols on management of the [Kumho-chigu], Shinp'o reactor site and the provision of North Korean labor and services to the light water reactor project. On 27 September, the two sides agree to the terms of the protocols. North Korea agrees to provide 3.3 square miles for the construction site and related facilities. However, the most contentious issue, the wages of North Koreans working on the project, remains unresolved as the two sides decide to pass the issue on to KEPCO, the prime contractor for the project.

—"N. Korea, KEDO Resume Talks on Nuclear Reactor Project," Japan Economic Newswire, 23 August 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 24 August 1996, in "Energy Organization, North Korea Resume Protocol Talks on Reactor Site," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 August 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korean Reactor Project Talks Suspended," Japan Economic Newswire, 26 September 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 23 September 1996, in "Negotiations between Korean Energy Body and North Korea on Verge of 'Rupturing'," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 September 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 29 September 1996, in "South Korean Report on Signing of Reactor Protocols," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 September 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

24 August 1996

Japan's *Sankei Shimbun*, quoting a Japanese government official, reports that the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) will begin construction on the first light water reactor as early as November.

—"KEDO Set to Start Building Nuke Plants in N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 24 August 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

24 August 1996

The North Korean Foreign Ministry warns that Pyongyang is prepared to resume its nuclear program if Washington

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changes its North Korean policy as a result of the upcoming US presidential election.

—"N Korea Firms Nuclear Stance," *Financial Times* (London), 24 August 1996, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com

5 September 1996

Argentina becomes a member of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

—"About Us: Member Nations," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org.

16 September 1996

During the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Annual General Conference in Vienna, IAEA Director General Hans Blix states that "the IAEA remained unable to verify the initial declaration of nuclear materials made by [North Korea]...and that this is still the case."

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 17 September 1996, in "Atomic Energy Agency Accuses North Korea of Violating Nuclear Safety Regime," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 18 September 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 21 September 1996, in "International Atomic Energy Agency Concerned at North's Non-Compliance," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 September 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "O'Leary Praises North Korean Nuclear Cooperation," Agence France Presse, 17 September 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

17 September 1996

Yun Ho Jin, North Korean representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), states that North Korea "will not give the IAEA any information whatsoever" about spent fuel from its 5MW(e) nuclear reactor "until the new reactors are finished and begin operating."

—Mark Hibbs, "DPRK Won't Comply With Safeguards Until New Reactors Are Finished," *NuclearFuel*, 23 September 1996, p. 2.

18 September 1996

A North Korean submarine runs ashore in the northeastern region of South Korea. According to South Korean reports, the submarine carried 26 North Korean agents, 24 of whom are later killed by South Korean soldiers or their fellow agents. The incident sparks inflamed rhetoric from both the North and South and threatens the success of ongoing KEDO-North Korean negotiations on the light water reactor supply contract. Following the incident, South Korea cancelled a planned visit to Shinp'o by a site survey team.

—"Talks with North Korea 'In Flux' on Nuclear Project," Agence France Presse, 10 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Seoul: U.S., S. Korea to Bolster Defense," United Press International, 11 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "U.S. Urges N. Korea to Change Attitude," United Press International, 12 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Lee Tong Chae and Chu Yong Ki, "Mujangganch'op 10 Myong Kangnung Ch'imt'u/Onulsaebiyok Plastic Chamsujong Iyong," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 18 September 1996, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Saengp'oganch'op Lee Kwang Su Ilmun'iltap," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 19 September 1996, p. 27, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

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20 September 1996

As tensions on the peninsula rise following the incursion of a North Korean submarine into South Korea, Pyongyang warns against a possible surprise attack from the United States. Pyongyang condemns Washington's statement that it has a "strong plan" to prevent North Korea from possessing nuclear weapons, and warns that if Washington continues its "anti-DPRK campaign," North Korea "cannot sit idle, restricted by the agreement (Agreed Framework)." "We have nothing to lose even without the agreement. On the contrary, we will be able to continuously develop our independent nuclear power industry...without any restriction."

—Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 20 September 1996, in "US 'Strong Plan' Against Nuclear Weapons Possession Denounced," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 September 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "N Korean Media Again Says Pyongyang Can Restart Nuclear Program," Agence France Presse, 20 September 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

21 September 1996

For the fourth year in a row, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Assembly adopts a resolution stating that North Korea is in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement. While the resolution notes that North Korea has begun safely storing 8,000 spent fuel rods, it calls on Pyongyang to fully abide by its safeguards agreement.

—"Safeguards in the DPRK," *IAEA Newsbriefs*, November/December 1996, vol. 11, no. 4(73), p. 5; "N. Korea Urged to Fully Accept Nuclear Inspection," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 September 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 21 September 1996, in "International Atomic Energy Agency Concerned at North's Non-Compliance," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 September 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

23-27 September 1996

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and North Korea hold negotiations in Vienna, but the IAEA fails to persuade North Korea to comply with its safeguards agreement and allow inspections of spent nuclear fuel rods.

—Mark Hibbs, "DPRK Won't Comply With Safeguards Until New Reactors Are Finished," *Nuclear Fuel*, 23 September 1996, pp.1-2; "IAEA's Meeting with North Koreans Failed: Report," Agence France Presse, 2 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

24 September 1996

The South Korean Defense Ministry issues a statement proposing the resumption of the joint US-South Korean military exercise Team Spirit. According to the statement, Seoul will make the recommendation to Washington during bilateral security consultative talks scheduled for 31 October to 1 November. [Note: Condemned by Pyongyang as preparations for a nuclear conflict, the annual Team Spirit exercise was canceled in 1994 in order to ease tension on the Korean Peninsula in the months leading up to the Agreed Framework. The proposed resumption of the exercises comes in the wake of the mid-September incursion of a North Korean submarine into South Korea.]

—"S. Korea to Propose to U.S. Revival of Joint Drills," Japan Economic Newswire, 24 September 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Vasily Golovnin, "South Korea Moves to Resume 'Team Spirit' Manoeuvres," ITAR-TASS,

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24 September 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Seoul Seeks Restart of Joint Maneuvers," *Washington Post*, 25 September 1996, p. A26, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

1 October 1996

The US General Accounting Office (GAO) presents a report to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on the status of the 1994 Agreed Framework. The report describes the Agreed Framework as "nonbinding political agreement" with legal obligations. The report cites the State Department as saying that US "executed a nonbinding political agreement because it would not have been in the United States' interests to accept an internationally binding legal obligation to provide the reactors and interim energy to North Korea." Instead, the United States "wanted the flexibility to respond to North Korea's policies and actions in implementing the Agreed Framework flexibility that binding international agreements, such as a treaty, would not have provided."

—"Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implications of the U.S./North Korean Agreement on Nuclear Issues," United States General Accounting Office, GAO/RCED/NSIAD-97-8, 1 October 1996.

9 October 1996

South Korean President Kim Young Sam announces that construction on the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) light water reactor project will be delayed due to the mid-September incursion of a North Korean submarine into South Korea.

—"S. Korea to Suspend Aid to North, President Kim Says," Japan Economic Newswire, 9 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 October 1996

US Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord and South Korean Foreign Minister Kong Ro Myong meet in Seoul to discuss joint US-South Korean security following the mid-September incursion of a North Korean submarine into South Korea and the subsequent deaths of the North Korean crew. Despite the rising tension on the peninsula, Lord and Kong agree that the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) project should move ahead as scheduled.

—"Seoul: U.S., S. Korea to Bolster Defense," United Press International, 11 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Zeno Park, "South Korea and US Agree to Push for Dialogue with North Korea," Agence France Presse, 11 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

15 October 1996

North Korea denounces US Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord's recent trip to Seoul to discuss escalating tension on the Korean Peninsula, and warns the United States not to support South Korea's attempts to delay implementation of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) light water reactor project. According to a Foreign Ministry spokesman, "If the US administration...decided to leave the provision of light water reactors to the unilateral decision of the South Korean authorities, it will, needless to say, have a decisive influence on the implementation of the agreement." "If things go that way," the spokesman continues, "It goes without saying that the future of the DPRK-US framework agreement has already been decided."

—"North Korea Threatens to Abrogate Nuclear Deal with U.S.," Associated Press, 15 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis,

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web.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea: U.S. Jeopardizes Nuclear Pact," United Press International, 15 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

16-17 October 1996

Representatives from the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and the European Union (EU) meet in Brussels to discuss the EU becoming a member of the KEDO Executive Board. The current board members, the United States, Japan and South Korea, agree to realize the EU's membership at an early date. [Note: On 1 October, EU foreign ministers met in Luxemburg and pledged \$21 million to KEDO annually for the next five years on the condition that the EU is given a seat on the executive board.]

—"EU Seeks Korea Policy Say," Financial Times (London), 16 October 1996, p. 6, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "EU to Join KEDO at Early Date," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 18 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "EU to Have Greater Say in KEDO by Providing More Aid," Japan Economic Newswire, 1 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

24 October 1996

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) Executive Director Stephen Bosworth acknowledges that the recent elevation in tension on the Korean Peninsula could lead to delays in implementing the light water reactor supply agreement. However, Bosworth emphasizes that the KEDO framework is still intact and all parties continue to recognize its importance.

—"KEDO Framework Said Intact after Alleged Infiltration," Japan Economic Newswire, 25 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Submarine Incident Could Slow North Korean Reactor Project," Agence France Presse, 24 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Debra Lau, "Korean Peninsula Troubles May Delay KEDO Plan," *The Daily Yomiuri*, 27 October 1996, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

28 October-10 November 1996

The US and South Korea hold the annual "Foal Eagle" military exercise. North Korea condemns the exercise as a "replica of the 'Team Spirit' joint military maneuvers," and an attempt to increase military tension on the Korean Peninsula.

—"S Korea-US Troops to Stage Joint Two-Week Field Training Exercise," Agence France Presse, 9 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 27 October 1996, in "US-South Korea 'Foal Eagle' Exercise 'Open Threat' to North," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

29 October 1996

The UN General Assembly adopts a resolution calling on North Korea to adhere to its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The resolution urges North Korea to "preserve all information relevant to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the initial report of the DPRK on the inventory of nuclear material subject to safeguards until the DPRK comes into full compliance with its safeguards agreement."

—"UN Backs IAEA's Work and Calls on North Korean Cooperation," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 29 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Director-General Tells Assembly of Ever-Widening Role of IAEA in Verifying Nuclear Arms Control Agreement," Federal News Service, 29 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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31 October-1 November 1996

US Defense Secretary William Perry and South Korean Defense Minister Kim Dong in meet in Washington for an annual security meeting. Perry and Kim issue a joint security communiqué condemning "the submarine infiltration of armed North Korean commandoes" as a breach of the armistice agreement. In addition, the communiqué reaffirms the need for a "robust schedule" of joint military maneuvers, but it puts off until next year any decision on whether or not to resume the contentious Team Spirit exercise. [Note: Pyongyang condemns the Team Spirit exercise as a preparation for nuclear attacks against North Korea. Team Spirit has been cancelled since 1994 in order to reduce tension on the peninsula, but after the 18 September North Korean submarine incident, South Korea has recommended resuming the maneuvers.]

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 2 November 1996, in "Communiqué on Security Issued with USA," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 November 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Kohei Murayama, "S. Korea, U.S. to Enhance War Drills, but Not Team Spirit," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 November 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

5 November 1996

According to the *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, US and North Korean officials meet in New York to discuss various issues including the progress of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) light water reactor project. North Korea reportedly threatens to resume its nuclear program if work on the project does not begin soon.

—"North Korea Reportedly Threatening to Resume Its Nuclear Program," Associated Press, 7 November 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Chong Yon Chu, "Puk, Geneva Kibonhabui Yubo Shisa," *Hankyureh Shinmun*, 7 November 1996, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

7 November 1996

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Hans Blix expresses concern that North Korea is concealing or destroying information necessary to determine the exact amount of plutonium in its possession. Speaking to reporters after briefing the UN Security Council, Blix says, "The concern now is that although the DPRK promised that at some time in the future they will come into full compliance, time passes, and some of the evidence that will help us to establish what the quantities are may disappear."

—"Pyongyang Concealing Information on Plutonium Stocks: IAEA," Agence France Presse, 7 November 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

8 November 1996

In his first press conference since winning the presidential election, President Bill Clinton says he remains committed to "stopping the North Korean nuclear program."

—Kohei Murayama, "Clinton Vows to Stop N. Korean Nuclear Program," Japan Economic Newswire, 9 November 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

8 November 1996

US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns says that the United States is meeting its commitments under the Agreed Framework, and that there is no evidence that North Korea is not meeting its commitments. He says, "The

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Agreed Framework is going forward - it's being implemented."

—US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, "Daily Press Briefing," 8 November 1996, <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu>.

9 November 1996

South Korean President Kim Young Sam announces that South Korea will not participate in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) light water reactor project until North Korea apologizes for the incursion of a North Korean submarine into South Korea on 18 September. In an interview with the *Washington Post*, Kim says, "The implementation of the nuclear agreement on our part will be suspended for the time being."

—Kevin Sullivan, "S. Korea Demands Apology from North: Kim Suspends Nuclear Deal after Sub Incident," *Washington Post*, 9 November 1996, p. A19; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 9 November 1996, in "South's President Says Nuclear Project Aid Suspended but Not Totally Withdrawn," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 November 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

15 November 1996

North Korea threatens that it will restart its nuclear program if there are any further delays in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) light water reactor project. In a statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency, Pyongyang says, "We cannot keep the nuclear program frozen any longer only to get heavy oil shipments which can be suspended at any time."

—"N. Korea Says Nuke Freeze Dead," United Press International, 15 November 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; North Korea Threatens to Restart Nuclear Program," Associated Press, 15 November 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Teruaki Ueno (Reuter), "N. Korea Moves to Break U.S. Nuclear Agreement," *The Washington Post*, 16 November 1996, p. A22, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

17 November 1996

US Defense Secretary William Perry says that if North Korea follows through with its threat to abandon the Agreed Framework, Washington would regard it as "a very serious threat to American security." However, Perry does not mention specifically what the United States would do in such an event.

—"Perry Voices Concern Over North Korea Breaking Nuclear Agreement," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 17 November 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "US Would See As 'Serious' North Korea Nuclear Program Resumption," Agence France Presse, 17 November 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

19 November 1996

North Korea closes its liaison office in the truce village of Panmunjom.

—Richard Lloyd Parry, "Dithering in Europe Leaves Korea Staring into Nuclear Abyss," *The Independent* (London), 20 November 1996, p. 15, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Puk 'P'anmunjom Yollaksamuso 'P'yeswae'/Chungangt'ongshin Podo," *Chosun Ilbo*, 20 November 1996, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

20 November 1996

Paul Cleveland, chairman of the Board of Directors of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and US ambassador at large in charge of nuclear affairs, meets in Seoul with Chang Son Sop, director

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commissioner of the ROK Light-Water Reactor Office. Cleveland stresses that resumption of the KEDO light water reactor project is vital to security on the Korean Peninsula, but Chang says that Seoul's position is that activities relating to the reactor project will not resume until Pyongyang apologizes for the 18 September submarine incident. Chang says that South Korea cannot guarantee the safety of technicians working on the project while tension on the peninsula is so high.

—*Donga Ilbo*, 21 November 1996, p. 2, in "Light water Reactor Project Discussed at Seoul Meeting," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 22 November 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Mun Ch'ol, "Mi 'Kyongsuro Chosokchaegae Huimang'/Panghan Mi Kyongsurodaesa," *Donga Ilbo*, 21 November 1996, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.co.kr.

22 November 1996

In Manila, South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Chong Ha says that South Korea cannot proceed with the four-party talks and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) light water reactor project until North Korea apologizes for the 18 September submarine infiltration into South Korea. However, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher says it is important to continue the talks and the reactor project.

—Cho Kang Su, "'Puk Sakwa · Chaebalbangji Yaksok Sonhaengdoeya'/Han ·Mi Woemuhwoedam," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 23 November 1996, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

24 November 1996

US President Bill Clinton and South Korean President Kim Young Sam issue a joint statement reassuring North Korea that the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) light water reactor project "will be implemented." Referring to the 18 September submarine incident, the statement also calls on North Korea to "take acceptable steps...to reduce tension and avoid such provocation in the future."

—"URGENT Clinton and Kim Call on N. Korea to Help Reduce Tension," Agence France Presse, 24 November 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Tyler Marshall and David Holley, "Clinton Smooths Rift with S. Korean Leader; Diplomacy: Two Nations Still Differ on N. Korea Nuclear Policy, Peace Initiatives, as Asian Summit Opens," *Los Angeles Times*, 25 November 1996, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "4 Cha Hwoedam Chonjesopsi Ch'ujin/Chongbu, 'Chamsuham Sakon' Sagwawa'ui Yongye Ch'olhoe," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 25 November 1996, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

26-27 November 1996

US Congressman Bill Richardson meets with North Korean officials in Pyongyang to discuss the rising tension on the Korean peninsula and the survival of the 1994 nuclear accord. The two sides agree to take "action measures" to help implement the Agreed Framework and improve Washington-Pyongyang relations.

—"US Congressman, N Korean Officials Agree to Take 'Action Measure,'" Agence France Presse, 28 November 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

29 November 1996

North Korea once again threatens to restart its nuclear program. A statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency warns that "if the provision of LWRs (light water reactors) is delayed or frustrated, the DPRK-US framework agreement will be destroyed."

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—Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), in "Pyongyang Says USA 'Siding' with South to 'Delay' Supply of Reactors," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 December 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

9-28 December 1996

The US and North Korea hold working-level consultations in New York covering various issues such as the Agreed Framework, the 18 September submarine incident and the proposed four-nation peace talks. The North Korean delegation is headed by Lee Hyong Ch'ol, director of American affairs for the Foreign Ministry, and the US delegation is headed by Mark Minton, director of the State Department's Korean Affairs office. At the talks, the two sides reaffirm their commitment to implementation of the Agreed Framework. Throughout the talks, the United States stresses that North Korea must make a public display of contrition for the submarine incident in order to ease tension on the Korean Peninsula, prevent further delays in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) light water reactor project, and improve Washington-Pyongyang ties. Early in the consultations, North Korea agrees to issue a statement expressing regret over the submarine incident, but only after many days of negotiations do the sides agree on wording that is acceptable to both North and South Korea.

—"U.S., North Korea Hold 'Frank and Constructive' Talks," Associated Press, 10 December 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; Alexander Kopnov, "American-North Korean Consultations Begin in New York," ITAR-TASS, 9 December 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "N. Korea Shows Signs of Easing Stance on Sub Incident," Japan Economic Newswire, 13 December 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; Sarah Jackson-Han, "North Korea Pressed to Apologize for Submarine Incident," Agence France Presse, 18 December 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; Debra Lau, "Deal to End N. Korea-ROK Deadlock Seen Near," *The Daily Yomiuri*, 22 December 1996, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; Zeno Park, "North Korea Makes New Peace Gesture after Return of Sub Bodies," Agence France Presse, 30 December 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 December 1996

A North Korean delegation arrives in Taipei for talks on storing Taiwanese nuclear waste in North Korea.

—"Taiwan May Ship Nuclear Waste to North Korea," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 23 December 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

24 December 1996

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) announces that the European Union (EU) will officially join the organization as an executive board member in January.

—"EU to Join Board of N. Korea Nuke Group," United Press International, 24 December 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "EU Joining Nuclear Consortium Giving Reactors to North Korea," Associated Press, 24 December 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

29 December 1996

In a statement carried on the Korean Central News Agency, North Korea apologizes for the 18 September submarine incident. A Foreign Ministry spokesman, reading the statement on behalf of Pyongyang, expresses "deep regret for the submarine incident in the coastal waters of Kangnung, South Korea, in September 1996 that caused the tragic loss of human life." The statement also says that North Korea "will make efforts to ensure that such an incident will not recur, and will work with others for durable peace on the Korean Peninsula."

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—"N. Korea Apologizes to South over Submarine Incursion.," Japan Economic Newswire, 29 December 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "URGENT North Korea Apologizes," Agence France Presse, 29 December 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Nicholas D. Kristof, "'Deep Regret' Sent by North Korea," *New York Times*, 30 December 1996, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

30 December 1996

South Korea returns the remains of 24 North Korean commandoes that were killed after their submarine ran ashore near Kangnung, South Korea on 18 September. After the remains are returned, North Korea further eases tension on the peninsula by expressing its "willingness to listen...to a 'joint explanation' of the proposed 'four-way (peace) talks'" aimed at replacing the Korean armistice agreement with an official peace treaty.

—"Bodies of 24 Dead North Koreans Returned," Associated Press, 30 December 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "North Korea Makes New Peace Gesture after Return of Sub Bodies," Agence France Presse, 30 December 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

[Back to Top](#)

1995

Mid-1990s

The United States "intelligence community" estimates that North Korea has produced one, possibly two nuclear weapons.

—National Intelligence Council, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015: Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate," December 2001, released on 9 January 2002, www.cia.gov.

9-12 January 1995

Experts from the United States, Japan and South Korea meet in Washington to set up the framework for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the consortium tasked with supplying two light water reactors and 500,000 tons/year of heavy fuel oil to North Korea in exchange for Pyongyang's pledge to give up its graphite-moderated reactors and allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. The total cost is estimated at \$4 billion.

—"U.S. to Start Looking for Korean Energy Money," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 10 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Meeting on North Korean Energy Needs in Fourth Day," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 January 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Experts Finish Up Korean Energy Meeting," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 13 January 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 January 1995

The *Jerusalem Post* reports "Israel has concluded that—given current assistance from China, North Korea and Russia—Iran could achieve nuclear capability by mid-1996. The report does not say what role North Korea could play, or is playing in Iran's nuclear weapons program.

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—Steve Rodan, "What the US is Whispering to Israel about Iran," *Jerusalem Post*, 13 January 1995, p. 9, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Mid-January 1995

The United States delivers 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea. The shipment, originally expected by 1 January, was delayed after North Korea captured a downed US helicopter and its two-man crew. [Note: One crew member died in the crash and the pilot is later returned to the United States.]

—"Second U.S. Oil Shipment for North Korea," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 17 January 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "America in Asia; North Korea Takes the Money," *The Economist*, 14 January 1995, p. 36, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Mid January 1995

A delegation of US experts headed by State Department official Norman Wulf travels to Pyongyang to discuss the disposal of 8,000 spent fuel rods currently stored in a cooling pond at the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex. The US delegation is allowed to inspect the cooling pond and the graphite reactor from which the rod were removed. North Korea reportedly agrees to store the rods in dry concrete until they are shipped to a third country by 2002.

—"Second U.S. Oil Shipment for North Korea," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 17 January 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Cooperating on Nuclear Fuel-Rod Disposal - US Official," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 19 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Talks Progress, but Problems Remain in North Korea Nuclear Talks," Agence France Presse, 31 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 January to 1 February 1995

Technical experts from the United States and North Korea meet in Berlin to work out details of the delivery of two light water nuclear reactors. Pyongyang's insistence that the reactors come from a country other than South Korea reportedly threatens the success of the talks and the survival of the nuclear agreement between the United States and North Korea. However, after the meeting, the two sides release a joint statement in which they "agreed that some progress had been made," but details such as financing, the type of reactor and safety considerations have yet to be resolved.

—Steven Greenhouse, "North Balks, Threatening Korean Pact," *New York Times*, 9 February 1995, p. A7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., N. Korea, Open Talks on Nuclear-Reactor Deliveries," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 28 January 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Other Countries Agree to Participate in Korean Project," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 3 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 February 1995

US Senator Richard Lugar announces in a press conference that South Korea will pay approximately three quarters of the cost for the two light water reactors. The total cost of the reactors is approximated at \$4.5 billion.

—"Seoul to Foot Three Quarters of Pyongyang Reactor Cost," Agence France Presse, 1 February 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 February 1995

In a meeting with Clinton administration officials, IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that North Korea has

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complied with its pledge to freeze its nuclear program.

—Steven Greenhouse, "North Balks, Threatening Korean Pact," *New York Times*, 9 February 1995, p. A7, in Lexis-Nexi, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 February 1995

Washington announces that it will not accept new demands made by North Korea at talks held in Berlin 28 January to 1 February. Among the additional demands that would add \$1 billion to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) project was the provision of new power grids connecting the two light water reactors to the existing power grid.

—Steven Greenhouse, "North Balks, Threatening Korean Pact," *New York Times*, 9 February 1995, p. A7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Rejects New Korean Demand Demands for Additional Equipment," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 8 February 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 February 1995

The *Yomiuri Shimbun*, quoting a diplomatic source in Seoul, reports that the United States and South Korea are making plans to conduct the annual Team Spirit military exercises from 28 March to 2 April. The military drill has reportedly been scaled down to one-fourth of the usual size, involving about 30,000 US and South Korean soldiers.

—Ichiro Ue, "Team Spirit Exercises Planned," *The Daily Yomiuri*, 12 February 1995, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "S Korean, US Plan Military Drills Despite Warning by North," Agence France Presse, 12 February 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 February 1995

North Korea states that it will not accept light water nuclear reactors if they are provided by South Korea and warns that it has "nothing to lose" by walking away from the Agreed Framework.

—"U.S. Insists on S. Korean-Designed Reactors in Nuclear Deal," Xinhua News Agency, 17 February 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 February 1995

Washington reiterates its demand that North Korea accept South Korean designed reactors. Pyongyang has insisted that the reactors be provided by a state of its choice, but according to State Department spokeswoman Christine Shelly, the Clinton administration considers reactors designed by South Korea as "the only viable option."

—"U.S. Insists on S. Korean-Designed Reactors in Nuclear Deal," Xinhua News Agency, 17 February 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 February 1995

Ambassador Robert Gallucci, in testimony before the Asian and the Pacific Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, says that international inspectors have discovered that North Korea possesses up to 30kg of plutonium from its 5MW graphite moderated reactor. This amount, enough to build four to five nuclear weapons, is more than Western experts had suspected was in North Korea's possession.

—"Hearing of the Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee," Federal

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News Service, 23 February 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Had More Nuclear Material Than Expected," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 23 February 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 February 1995

South Korean Defense Minister Lee Yang Ho announces that South Korea and the United States will not hold the annual Team Spirit joint military exercise in March as earlier planned. Another Defense Ministry official claims that the military exercise is not cancelled but merely postponed until Washington and Seoul decide whether or not to hold it later in the year.

—"S. Korea, U.S. Cancel "Team Spirit" Exercise This Year," Xinhua News Agency, 25 February 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 March 1995

The South Korean Defense Ministry announces that South Korean and the United States will hold a six-day joint military exercise beginning 3 April. A Defense Ministry spokesman says that these maneuvers should not be mistaken as a resumption of the annual Team Spirit military exercise that was postponed in order to relieve tension on the peninsula and encourage North Korea to abide by the Agreed Framework. North Korea has threatened to revive its frozen nuclear program if Team Spirit exercises resume.

—"South Korea and U.S. Forces to Hold New War Games," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7 March 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 March 1995

The North Korean Foreign Ministry warns that the Agreed Framework will collapse unless the United States drops its demand that the two light water reactors come from South Korea.

—Korean Central Broadcasting Agency (Pyongyang), 7 March 1995, in "Nuclear Issue; DPRK Foreign Ministry Warns Against Insistence on ROK Reactors," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 8 March 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Warns Nuclear Deal Could Collapse," Associated Press, 7 March 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Alexander Valiyev, "North Korea Refuses to Accept South Korean Reactors," ITAR-TASS, 7 March 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8-9 March 1995

The United States, Japan and South Korea host a conference in New York for the establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Twenty-three nations plus the European Union attend the conference. On 9 March, the United States, Japan and South Korea sign the Agreement on the Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, officially establishing KEDO. Of the other twenty-three nations, none sign on as members, but Australia, New Zealand, and Canada pledge funds amounting to approximately \$7 million.

—"Agreement on the Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, 9 March 1995, www.kedo.org; Steven Greenhouse, "North Korea Threatens to Jettison Pact in Dispute over Reactors," *New York Times*, 9 March 1995, p. A6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Korean Energy Group Meets to Discuss Nuclear Reactor," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 8 March 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan, U.S., ROK Urge Participation in KEDO," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 9

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March 1995, in Lexis-Nexis , <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KEDO to Be Unveiled Even as Framework Agreement Falters," Agence France Presse, 9 March 1995, in Lexis-Nexis , <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KEDO Agreement Signed by US, Japan, South Korea," Agence France Presse, 10 March 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 March 1995

Steven Bosworth, a former US ambassador, is named head of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

—"American Diplomat Named to Head Korean Energy Group," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 20 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Robert Coloma, "Seoul Warns of 'Immediate Sanctions' if Pyongyang Scraps Deal," Agence France Presse, 20 March 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 March 1995

Seoul warns that the United States, Japan, and South Korea will impose "immediate sanctions" and seek UN Security Council intervention if Pyongyang does not accept a South Korean reactor model for the light water reactors to be supplied under the Agreed Framework. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) says that North Korea has until 21 April to accept the South Korean design.

— Robert Coloma, "Seoul Warns of 'Immediate Sanctions' if Pyongyang Scraps Deal," Agence France Presse, 20 March 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; O Yöng Hwan, "Kyöngsurogyeyak Shihannae An'doemyön UN Sö Taebukchejae Non'üi/Sankeishinmun Podo," *Joongang Ilbo*, 20 March 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

25-27 March 1995

Representatives from the United States and North Korea meet in Berlin to discuss implementation of the Agreed Framework. The talks, originally scheduled to run through 29 March, are suspended on 27 March reportedly to allow the two delegations to consult with their capitols. North Korea reportedly continues to insist that the two light water reactor it is to provided under the agreement must come from a country other than South Korea.

—Sid Balman Jr., "U.S. Says N. Korea Talks Not Dead," United Press International, 27 March 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Barry Schweid, "Pause Taken in Reactor Talks," Associated Press, 27 March 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S.-North Korean Talks Break Off," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 27 March 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S.-North Korean Talks to Resume Next Week in Berlin," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7 April 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 March 1995

The IAEA Board of Governors asks North Korea to permit IAEA inspectors to measure the amount of plutonium in the spent fuel of its 5MW(e) nuclear reactor and in the waste from its Radiochemistry Laboratory [reprocessing facility]. It also requests that the Agency be allowed to verify the freeze on North Korea's nuclear facilities.

—"IAEA Urges North: Allow Continued Verification," Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 30 March 1995; in FBIS document FBIS-EAS-95-061, 30 March 1995.

April 1996

Singapore pledges \$300,000 to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

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—Ravi Velloor, "S'pore to Give \$141,000 a Year to Energy Body," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 20 April 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Singapore to Give 100,000 Dlr's Yearly to KEDO," Japan Economic Newswire, 19 April 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Early April 1995

North Korea conducts maintenance on its 5MW(e) reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. IAEA Director General Hans Blix confirms that North Korea is conducting legitimate maintenance, not making preparations to restart the reactor.

—Barry Schweid, "U.S. Sees No Cause for Concern Over N. Korean Reactor Maintenance," *New York Times*, 10 April 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Finds No Refueling Move at DPRK Reactors," Xinhua News Agency, 10 April 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12-13 April 1995

Representatives from the United States and North Korea once again meet in Berlin to resolve issues relating to the implementation of the Agreed Framework. The main point of contention is whether or not South Korea will supply the two light water reactors promised to North Korea for halting its graphite moderated nuclear program. North Korea demands that the reactors come from another country, but the United States insists that South Korean reactors are the "only option." After two days of talks the meeting adjourns without any apparent resolution, but the two sides agree to meet again on 18 April after consulting with their capitols.

—"U.S.-North Korea Nuclear Talks in Berlin Bog Down," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 April 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US-DPRK Reactor Talks Adjourn," Xinhua News Agency, 13 April 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Berlin Talks between U.S. and North Korea Again Suspended," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 13 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Nuclear Talks Recessed till Tuesday," Agence France Presse, 13 April 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 April 1995

The Pentagon announces that the United States and South Korea will conduct a joint military exercise beginning in late-April and running through mid-May. According to a Pentagon official the exercise will be limited in scope, involving approximately 13,000 personnel.

—"US, South Korea to Hold Military Exercise," Xinhua News Agency, 14 April 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., South Korea to Stage Military Exercise," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 14 April 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18-20 April 1995

Representatives from the United States and North Korea meet for the fifth time in Berlin in an attempt to resolve issues relating to the implementation of the Agreed Framework. The two sides fail to reach an agreement on whether or not the two light water reactors, promised to North Korea for freezing its graphite moderated nuclear program, would be of a South Korean design. North Korea insists that the reactors come from another country, but the United States continues to claim that since Seoul is funding most if the \$4 billion project, South Korean reactors are the only option.

—Tim Weiner, "North Korea Leaves Talks on Nuclear Pact," *New York Times*, 21 April 1995, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Sid Balman Jr., "U.S., N. Korea Break Off Talks," United Press International, 20 April

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1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Walks Out of Berlin Nuclear Talks," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 20 April 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Barry Schweid, "Breakdown in Talks Leaves U.S. Displeased," Associated Press, 20 April 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Sid Balman Jr., "Tense Talks between U.S., N. Korea," United Press International, 19 April 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 April 1995

At the NPT Review Conference, South Korean ambassador to the UN, Park Su Gil, says that North Korea's noncompliance with its obligations under the NPT is a threat not only to the Korean Peninsula "but also to the whole world." Park also calls on North Korea to "faithfully implement" the Agreed Framework.

—"South Korea Backs Indefinite NPT Extension, Urges North's Cooperation," Agence France Presse, 19 April 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 April 1995

As the date arrives by which the United States and North Korea were to have reached an accord for the provision of two light water reactors, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher urges North Korea not to resume operations at its nuclear facilities and proposes high-level talks in Geneva. In Berlin, Kim Jong U, chief North Korean negotiator to the recently dissolved talks, rebuffs Christopher's proposal, saying, "We think everything that could be discussed in high-level talks has already been discussed and settled." North Korea insists that 21 April is a legally binding deadline by which a contract must be concluded, but the United States claims that it is merely a "target date."

—Barry Schweid, "Christopher Urges North Korea to Resume Talks at Higher Level," Associated Press, 21 April 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Offering to Raise Level of Talks with North Korea," *New York Times*, 22 April 1995, p. A5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Proposes Geneva Meeting with North Korea," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 21 April 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 21 April 1995, in "South and USA Discuss Prospects for Talks," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 22 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 April 1995

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman announces that Pyongyang will take a "necessary decisive measure" in order to defend North Korea's sovereignty following the breakdown of nuclear talks with the United States.

—Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 22 April 1995, in "Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Berlin Talks," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 April 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Andrew Pollack, "North Korea Threat Seen on Halt of Atom Talks," *New York Times*, 23 April 1995, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 May 1995

North Korea notifies the United States that it is willing to resume nuclear talks at a higher level as proposed by Secretary of State Warren Christopher on 21 April. The date and venue have yet to be determined. North Korea had originally rejected Christopher's proposal, insisting that 21 April was the deadline for negotiating a contract for the provision of two light water reactors.

—Sid Balman Jr., "N. Korea Agrees to Talks," United Press International, 1 May 1995, in Lexis-Nexis,

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<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Barry Schweid, "North Korea Agrees to Resume Negotiations over Reactors," Associated Press, 1 May 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Steven Greenhouse, "North Korea to Resume Nuclear Talks," *New York Times*, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 May 1995

North Korea informs the NPT Review Conference President Jayantha Danapala that it disassociates itself from any decision or document emerging from the conference.

—"N. Korea Boycotts Decision at NPT Conference: UN Spokesman," Agence France Presse, 10 May 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 May 1995

The United States, Japan, and South Korea call on North Korea not to reactivate its nuclear facilities before high-level between Washington and Pyongyang resume late in the month. Representatives from the three countries make the statement from Seoul where they are meeting to prepare for the upcoming nuclear talks.

—"U.S., Japan and South Korea Ask North Korea Not to Restart Reactors," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 10 May 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 May 1995

In an article published in the *Rodong Sinmun*, the official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, North Korea warns that it might resume operations of its nuclear facilities if the United States continues to insist on South Korean designed nuclear reactors.

—Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 13 May 1995, in "'*Nodong Sinmun*': Result of Talks Depends on USA," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 May 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Again Threatens to Reopen Old Nuclear System," Agence France Presse, 13 May 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 May-13 June 1995

The United States and North Korea meet in Kuala Lumpur to resolve issues relating to the Agreed Framework. The main topic of the negotiations is whether or not two light water reactors, promised to North Korea for giving up its graphite moderated nuclear program, will be provided by South Korea. North Korea, claiming that the South Korean reactor design is untested and unsafe, demands that the reactors come from another country, but the United States insists that since Seoul is financing more than three-quarters of the reactor project, South Korean reactors are the only option. On 13 June, after three weeks of talks, the two sides release a joint statement in which North Korea concedes that the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) retains the right to choose the provider of the reactors.

—"Joint U.S. - DPRK Press Statement," 13 June 1995, www.kedo.org; Andrew Pollack, "U.S. and North Korea Agree on Deal for Nuclear Reactors," *New York Times*, 13 June 1995, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Officials on Kuala Lumpur for Nuclear Talks with North Korea," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 19 May 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Vladimir Solntsev, "North Korea and USA Make Headway at Kuala Lumpur Talks," ITAR-TASS, 7 June 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Philip Shenon, "Breakthrough is

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Announced in U.S.-North Korea Nuclear Talks," *New York Times*, 8 June 1995, p. A7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 June 1995

IAEA Director General Hans Blix informs the IAEA Board of Governors that North Korea has serviced its 5MW(e) nuclear reactor and is expected to do the same at its Radiochemistry Laboratory [reprocessing facility].

—"DPRK Conducts Maintenance at Reactor," KBS-1 (Seoul), 12 June 1995; in FBIS document FBIS-EAS-95-112, 12 June 1995.

13 June 1995

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) officially decides to provide North Korea with two South Korean-designed light water reactors. The KEDO executive board determines that the "reference plants" for the project will be South Korea's Ulchin 3 and 4 reactors, currently under construction by the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), South Korea's state-controlled electric utility. [Note: KEDO officially names KEPCO as the main contractor for the project on 19 March 1996.]

—Andrew Pollack, "North Korea to Get Plants from Rival," *New York Times*, 14 June 1995, p. A5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "South Korea to Build Light water Reactors in North: Gallucci," Agence France Presse, 13 June 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 June 1995

New Zealand becomes a member of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

—"About Us: Member Nations," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org.

Late June 1995

Pyongyang agrees to allow US personnel to take steps to ensure the safe storage of 8,000 nuclear fuel rods that were removed from its 5MW(e) reactor in May 1994 and are slowly corroding in a cooling pond. The Department of Energy personnel will be allowed to clean the water, adjust the temperature, and encase the rods in corrosion-resistant storage containers.

—Sid Balman Jr., "U.S. Agrees with North Korea on Oil," United Press International, 29 June 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. and North Korea Make Progress Following Talks," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 30 June 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 July 1995

A South Korean government official announces that three US firms, Combustion Engineering, General Electric and Sergent and Lundy, will participate in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) light water reactor project. Sergent and Lundy will provide technical support to Korea Power Engineering Company in designing the reactors. Combustion Engineering will provide technical assistance to Korea Heavy Industries Company (KHI) and Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) in manufacturing and designing the reactor facilities. General Electric will provide technical assistance to KHI in construction of the turbine generators. The government official stresses that overall project management and infrastructural construction will be conducted exclusively by Korea Electric Power Cooperation (KEPCO).

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—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 21 July 1995, in "Three US Firms 'Expected to Participate' in Reactor Project," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 July 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Ku Söng Chae, "'Kyöngsuro' Misach'amyö Sangdangnyang Pojang/Hankukhyöng T'oesaek Uryö," *Chosun Ilbo*, 22 July 1995, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Im Min Su, "Kyöngsuro Misa Ch'amyö Pojang/Kuknae Hach'öngöpch'e Chijöngkwön Tüng Puyö," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, 22 July 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

Late July 1995

North Korea prevents a scheduled visit by KEDO's top three executives because one of them is South Korean. The KEDO delegation was to include Stephen Bosworth, KEDO executive director, and his two deputies, Ch'oe Yöng Jin and Umezu Itami, from South Korea and Japan respectively.

—"Difficulties Ahead for North/South Cooperation," *Nuclear News*, September 1995, p. 41.

26 July 1995

Italy pledges \$1.9 million to Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 26 July 1995, in "Italy pledges 1.9m dollars to Korean Peninsula Energy Development," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 July 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 July 1995

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) Executive Board, comprising representatives from the United States, Japan, and South Korea, meets in New York. The Executive Board creates three advisory committees on the light water reactor project, the supply of heavy fuel oil and the safe storage of 8,000 spent fuel rods. The newly created committees are tasked with advising and recommending appropriate measures to the Executive Board and the Executive Director regarding their respective area of focus within the KEDO project.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 1 August 1995, in "KEDO Executive Board Forms Three Advisory Groups," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 August 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 August 1995

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) holds its first general assembly. Over thirty nations attend the meeting held in New York. At the meeting, the Executive Board proposes sending a team of experts to North Korea later in the month in order to find a suitable site to construct the two reactors.

—"KEDO Opens 1st General Assembly in New York," Japan Economic Newswire, 1 August 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KEDO to Start Talks with N. Korea This Month," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 2 August 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KEDO to Select Site for Reactors in N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 August 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15-22 August 1995

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) sends a team of experts to North Korea to survey possible locations for two light water reactors. The 15-man team, including experts from the United States, Japan and South Korean and US government officials, visits Shin'p'o, a coastal city located in South Hamgyöng Province. The KEDO team reportedly has "productive and Technical consultations" with North Korean personnel from the Department of Atomic Energy. However, the team receives incomplete survey documents of the proposed area

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carried out by the former Soviet Union in the 1980s, and according to Kang Yun Kwan, a member of the KEDO team, the documents do "not have all the data needed by KEDO." Pyongyang has reportedly demanded that KEDO must pay a fee of about \$2.5 million to get the complete survey report. [Note: In 1985 Russia began conducting site surveys in [Kŭmho-chigu], Shinp'o for the construction of two VVER-440 reactors. Russia stopped the program in 1992 due to lack of funds from North Korea. At that time, North Korea had paid only \$500,000 of the estimated \$2.5 million cost of the survey results. North Korean officials from the Department of Atomic Energy informed the KEDO team that under the agreement with Russia it could not release the full results of the survey without payment.]

—"Payment Demanded for Russian Survey Data," *Nuclear News*, October 1995, p. 44; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 9 August 1995, in "KEDO Survey Team to Visit DPRK on '14th or 15th' August," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 August 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KEDO Mission Arrives in Pyongyang for Reactor Survey," Japan Economic Newswire, 16 August 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Experts Return from Survey of North Korean Nuclear Plant Site," Agence France Presse, 23 August 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KEDO Mission Has 'Productive' Talks in N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 23 August 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 23 August 1995, in "KEDO Official on Outcome of Reactor Site Survey in North," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 August 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; *Joongang Ilbo*, 27 August 1995, in "KEDO Survey Team Reports Additional Site Survey Necessary," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 August 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Wants KEDO to Pay for Russian Data," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 25 August 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 August 1995

South Korea's *Joongang Ilbo*, quoting North Korean defector Kang Myŏng Do, reports that North Korea has a secret underground nuclear facility in Kimdan-gol, Tonghŭng-ri, Tongshin-kun, Chagang Province. The defector, Kang Myŏng Do, son-in-law of North Korean Premier Kang Sŏng San, claims that he witnessed construction of the facility and was told by the project coordinator that it was a nuclear facility. [Note: In July 1994, Kang, who defected in May 1994, claimed that North Korea possessed five nuclear bombs.]

—*Joongang Ilbo*, 28 August 1995, in "Defector on Nuclear Facilities on Chagang Province, North Korea," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 August 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Has Secret Underground Nuclear Facility: Defector," Japan Economic Newswire, 27 August 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Choe Wŏn Ki, "Pukhan Kŭkpi Haekshisŏl Itta/Chagnagdo Kimdankol Chiha," *Joongang Ilbo*, 28 August 1995, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr;

11-13 September 1995

Representatives from North Korea and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) meet in Kuala Lumpur to conclude the light water reactors supply agreement. The North Korean and KEDO delegations are respectively headed by Ambassador-at-Large Hŏ Jong and Stephen Bosworth, executive director of KEDO. The talks are productive but disagreements remain over whether KEDO should finance additional projects related to the reactors such as new power grids and improved port facilities. North Korea reportedly requests an additional \$1 billion to finance the additional facilities. The two sides agree to hold working-level discussions in Kuala Lumpur

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immediately following the high-level talks.

—"Seoul Officials in US-Led Team for Talks with North Korea on Reactors," *New Straits Times* (Malaysia), 12 September 1995, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lokman Mansor, "KEDO, N. Korea Conclude Meetings," *Business Times* (Malaysia), 13 September 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KEDO Executive Board Agrees on Talks with North Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 September 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 13 September 1995, in "North Korea and KEDO Issue Joint Communiqué on Negotiations," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 September 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Second Day of Nuclear Talks Convene on Kuala Lumpur," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 September 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12-19 September 1995

The IAEA sends a team of negotiators to Pyongyang. The IAEA requests that it be allowed to expand its monitoring activities in North Korea and improve its technical capability to confirm that North Korea's maintenance of the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun and the plutonium processing facility does not reflect an attempt to revive its nuclear program.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 12 September 1995, in "IAEA Negotiations to Resume in Pyongyang," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 September 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Evan S. Medieros, "North Korea, KEDO Consortium Begin Talks on Reactor Contract," *Arms Control Today*, October 1995, p. 22; Korean Central Broadcasting Agency (Pyongyang), 13 September 1995, in "IAEA Delegation Arrives for Talks on Nuclear Facilities," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 September 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 20 September 1995, in "Atomic Energy Agency Delegates Depart after Latest Nuclear Freeze Talks," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 September 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 September 1995

A Bangkok official announces that Thailand has pledged \$300,000 to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

—"Thailand to Donate 300,000 Dlr to KEDO," Japan Economic Newswire, 13 September 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13-15 September 1995

North Korea and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) hold working-level talks in Kuala Lumpur immediately following three days of high-level discussion earlier in the week. KEDO delegation head Gary Samore says that the talks were "very successful in identifying the key issues that need to be addressed in the course of the upcoming discussions." The two sides agree to resolve the outstanding issues and conclude a light water reactor supply agreement as soon as possible.

—Lokman Mansor, "KEDO, N. Korea Experts Meet in KL," *Business Times* (Malaysia), 14 September 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 13 September 1995, in "KEDO and North Korea to Begin Work on Details of Reactor Contract," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 September 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North, South Energy Talks End," United Press International, 15 September

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1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Azman Ahmad, "N. Korea, KEDO Resolve Differences," *New Straits Times* (Malaysia), 15 September 1995, p. 7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 September 1995

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) executive board meets in Tokyo to discuss the proposed location of two light water reactor and the recently concluded expert-level talks in Kuala Lumpur.

—"KEDO Executive Board Agrees on Talks with N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 September 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 September 1995

IAEA Director General Hans Blix calls on Pyongyang to allow agency inspectors to verify the accuracy and completeness of North Korea's initial declaration of nuclear material in its possession. In his address opening the IAEA General Conference, Blix also announces that current IAEA-North Korean negotiations currently underway in Pyongyang have made little progress.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 19 September 1995, in "Nuclear Watchdogs Want to Carry Out More Checks," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 September 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 September 1995

Australia becomes a member of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

—"About Us: Member Nations," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org.

22 September 1995

Member states attending the IAEA General Conference adopt a resolution concerning nuclear safeguards in North Korea. The resolution calls on North Korea to cooperate with the IAEA to "preserve intact" all data pertinent to determining the "accuracy and completeness" of North Korea's original nuclear inventory report until North Korea "comes into full compliance with the safeguards agreement." In his opening statement, IAEA Director General Hans Blix tells the conference that unresolved concerns include the disposition of nuclear spent fuel from North Korea's 5MW(e) nuclear reactor and installation of waste tank monitoring equipment at its reprocessing plant.

—"IAEA Member States Adopted Resolutions on Nuclear Safeguards, Safety, and Technical Cooperation," IAEA Press Release (Vienna), 22 September 1995; "IAEA Urges N. Korea to Accept Nuclear Inspections," Japan Economic Newswire, 23 September 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea and Iraq Criticized at IAEA Meeting," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 22 September 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 September 1995

IAEA Director General Hans Blix reports to a special IAEA Board of Governors meeting that North Korea has denied the IAEA permission to measure the amount of plutonium in the 8,000 spent fuel rods or in the liquid waste at its Radiochemistry Laboratory [reprocessing facility]. Blix says that North Korea agreed only to allow IAEA inspectors to determine if the fuel rods were irradiated and to photograph the radiochemical lab. North Korea has indicated that it will make the examination of plutonium contingent upon progress in negotiations for a light water reactor supply contract.

—Cha Man-sun, "North Said to Refuse IAEA Demand," KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 26 September 1995; in FBIS

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document FTS19950926000152, 26 September 1995; "IAEA, North Plan Plutonium Inspection Talks," Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 12 September 1995; in FBIS document FTS19950912000103, 12 September 1995.

28 September 1995

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says, "It is self-evident that we cannot continue to unilaterally fulfill our obligation—a nuclear freeze—of the US side does not fulfill its obligation concerning the provision of light water reactors."

—Steven Greenhouse, "North Korea Issues Threat over Reactor," *New York Times*, 1 October 1995, p. A9, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 September 1995

In testimony before the National Assembly, General Kim Hong Rae, South Korean Air Force chief of staff, says that North Korea has deployed about 600 FROGs and Scuds. Kim says that North Korea has chemical weapons, and is developing nuclear weapons. General Kim also says the United States has three intelligence satellites monitoring North Korean military activities.

—Kyodo News Service, "N. Korea Said to Have Deployed Hundreds of Missiles," Japan Economic Newswire, 29 September 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Puk, Scud 6 Paekki Paech'i/Kongch'amch'ongjang Kukkam Poko," *Joongang Ilbo*, 30 September 1995, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Hwang Yu Sŏng, "'Puk Missile 6 Paekki Chakchŏn Paech'i/Kongch'amch'ongjang Kukkam Tappyŏn," *Donga Ilbo*, 30 September 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Lee Chung Kŭn, "'Puk Scud 6 Paekki Chakchŏnbaech'i/Hanbandojŏn'yŏk' I Sajŏnggwŏn/Konggunbonbu Kukkam," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, 30 September 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Hŏ Yong Pŏm, Hong Sŏk Chun, and Kwŏn Sang Ŭn, "Puk, Scud Subaekki Paech'i/Kongch'amch'ongjang Kukkamdappyŏn/Namhan Chŏn'yŏk Sajŏnggwŏn," *Chosun Ilbo*, 30 September 1995, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

30 September-Mid-October 1995

Representatives from North Korea and Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) conduct working-level talks in New York on concluding the light water reactor supply agreement. North Korea reportedly continues to demand additional funds for facilities relating to the reactors, such as roads, ports and power grids. Another issue under discussion is the repayment schedule: KEDO proposes the repayment be made over 15 years while North Korea demands that the repayment period be extended to 30 years with a 10 year grace period. Lee Yong Ho, head of the North Korean delegation, says that the contract must be signed by 21 October, the one year anniversary of the signing of the Agreed Framework in Geneva.

—Steven Greenhouse, "North Korea Issues Threat over Reactor," *New York Times*, 1 October 1995, p. A9, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KEDO and N. Korean Experts to Meet in New York," Japan Economic Newswire, 26 September 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 1 October 1995, in "North Korea Calls for Reactor Supply Contract to Be Signed by 21st October," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 October 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 4 October 1995, in "Energy Organization-North Korea Reactor Talks in New York Discuss Supply Contract," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 October 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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13 October 1995

IAEA Director General Hans Blix says in a report to the UN Security Council that North Korea has denied the IAEA inspectors permission to evaluate the plutonium levels in the nuclear spent fuel. Blix adds that North Korea has only provided the IAEA with minimal access to its Yŏngbyŏn nuclear facilities.

—"IAEA Says DPRK Not Allowing Measurement of Spent Fuel," KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 14 October 1995; in FBIS document FTS19951014000009, 14 October 1995.

16 October-Late October 1995

North Korea and Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) hold high-level talks in New York. The delegations from North Korea and KEDO, respectively headed by Ambassador Hŏ Jong and US Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, work towards concluding a light water reactor supply agreement. The two main unresolved issues under discussion are (1) the scope of facilities to be provided, and (2) the repayment schedule. After six days of talks, the two sides issue a joint statement saying, "The talks were conducted in a business-like and positive manner. Progress has been made on some key issues related to the conclusion of the LWR [light water reactor] supply agreement." North Korea agrees to allow a second KEDO team to conduct additional reactor site surveys in [Kŭmho-chigu], Shinp'o from 24 October to 4 November. According to a South Korean official, the 19-member team "will try to locate an adequate site for the projected nuclear power plant by verifying additional basic survey reports to be obtained from North Korea, conducting a concentrated safety survey of the Shinp'o region in the north and analyzing the level of difficulty involved in executing the project."

—"Nuclear Talks with N. Korea End," United Press International, 21 October 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; *Munhwa Ilbo*, 16 October 1995, in "North 'Not Opposed' to South-Style Reactors," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 October 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Kedo to Conduct Second Reactor Site Survey in DPRK," Xinhua News Agency, 21 October 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; *Munhwa Ilbo*, 17 October 1995, in "Second Reactor Site Team to Visit North Korea Early Next Week," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 October 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Kyŏngsurohyŏpsang Ilbu Chinjŏn'/Puk KEDO Ibŏnju Hoedamsokkae," *Hankook Ilbo*, 23 October 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

24 October-4 November 1995

A team of Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) experts conducts additional reactor site surveys near the North Korean coastal city Shinp'o. According to a member of the team, "after having conducted our safety survey of the region, with the aid of seismological measuring equipment, the survey team concluded that Shinp'o is equipped with favorable conditions to construct a light water power plant."

—Korean Central Broadcasting Agency (Pyongyang), 24 October 1995, in "Energy Development Organization Team in Pyongyang to Survey Reactor Site," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 October 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; *Seoul Sinmun*, 6 November 1995, p. 2, in "Nuclear Reactor Negotiations Stall over North Korean Charge on Survey Reports," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 November 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 October-15 November 1995

A team of North Korean nuclear experts visits the United States. The four-man team, headed by Chang Sang Hak, a senior official in the Department of Atomic Energy, inspects a "System 80" reactor model to verify its safety. The

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"System 80" reactor, designed by Combustion Engineering Co., is the basis for the South Korean reactors that are to be provided to North Korea. While in the United States, the North Korean team also attends a regular plenary session of the American Nuclear Society and meets with US Department of Energy officials in Washington.

—"N. Korean Nuclear Experts to Visit U.S.," Japan Economic Newswire, 26 October 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korean Mission to Visit U.S. Reactor," Japan Economic Newswire, 20 October 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 26 October 1995, in "North Korean Experts to Tour US Nuclear Facilities," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 October 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 October-12 December 1995

North Korea and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) resume high-level talks in New York. At the talks the two sides resolve contentious issues regarding the scope of the agreement and the repayment schedule. KEDO reportedly agrees that, in addition to the two light water reactors, it will finance the construction of housing facilities, a simulation training facility, a port and access roads to the proposed reactor site, adding approximately \$500 million to the project. However, the consortium refuses North Korea's demand that power transmission lines, a reprocessing plant and a training simulator be included in the deal. With regard to the repayment schedule, the two sides reportedly agree that North Korea will repay the estimated \$4.5 billion interest-free over seventeen years after a three-year grace period beginning upon completion of the first reactor. —Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 31 October 1995, in "High-level Talks on Reactor Supply Resume," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 31 October 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; John Burton, "North Korea May Sign Light water Reactors Contract by Month End," *Financial Times* (London), 15 November 1995, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea: Breakthrough Made in Nuclear Talks," Associated Press, 7 November 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 14 November 1995, in "Official Says Reactor Talks May Be Completed by End of November," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 November 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Sang Hun Choe, "U.S-North Korean Reactors Talks Near Agreement," Associated Press, 12 December 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "KEDO-N. Korea Reactor Agreement Signing Set for Friday," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 December 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 November 1995

In his annual report to the UN General Assembly, IAEA Director General Hans Blix claims that while North Korea has maintained the freeze on its nuclear activities, it must still allow IAEA inspectors "to verify effectively the accuracy and completeness," of the declared amount of plutonium in its possession. Until this is realized, Blix continues, "it is essential that all necessary steps be taken to preserve information that may be relevant to the eventual verification." North Korean Ambassador to the UN Pak Kil Yŏn dismisses Blix's remarks as "biased, subjective and unjustified."

—Robert H. Reid, "Atomic Energy Chief Says North Korea Not in Full Compliance," Associated Press, 1 November 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Nuclear Body Seeks Better Safeguards," United Press International, 1 November 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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1 November 1995

The UN General Assembly passes a resolution urging North Korea to cooperate with the IAEA to allow the successful implementation of its nuclear safeguards agreement.

—"U.N. Demands Pyongyang Cooperate with IAEA," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 2 November 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 November 1995

The IAEA announces that the measurement and safe storage of 8,000 spent fuel rods in North Korea has been delayed due to the high level of radioactive contamination in the cooling pond where the rods have been stored since May 1994.

—Kim Yong Hui, *Donga Ilbo*, 5 November 1995, p. 2, in "Atomic Energy Agency Says Sealing of Fuel Rods Delayed by 'Dangerous' Contamination," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 November 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kim Ch'ang Hŭi, "Pukhaek P'yeyŏlryobong Chiyŏnmi Kisuljin/IAEA Palkyŏ," *Donga Ilbo*, 5 November 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

17 November 1995

The US Secretary of State and the foreign ministers Japan and South Korea issue a joint statement welcoming the progress that has been made in implementing the Agreed Framework, but at the same time expressing "concern over the delay in North-South dialogue."

—"Full Text of Joint Statement of Japan, U.S., S. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 17 November 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 November 1995

Canada becomes a member of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

—"About Us: Member Nations," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, www.kedo.org.

December 1995

According to *Seoul Shinmun* (*Taehan Maeil*), about 10 director-level officials from the Russian Foreign Ministry, Atomic Energy Ministry, and others meet in secret to assess the North Korean nuclear and missile development programs. Their report concludes that the nuclear program is important for domestic political unity and therefore, North Korea will not abandon the program easily. The report also says that besides Yŏngbyŏn, North Korea has about 20 nuclear-related facilities including research institutes and facilities at military bases. Furthermore, North Korea is said to have reprocessed 7-22kg of plutonium, and is storing the plutonium in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. The report claims that North Korea has also conducted over 70 high-explosive tests in Yŏngbyŏn and nearby areas between 1991 and 1994 in an effort to test triggering devices for nuclear warheads.

—Yu Min, *Seoul Shinmun*, 5 January 1996, p. 2, in "'South Korean Paper Quotes Russian Reporter on North's Nuclear Intentions," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 January 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yu Min, "'Pukhan Haekkaebal P'ogi'anh'nŭnda'/Seoul Shinmun, Russia Chŏngbu P'yŏnggabogosoŭ Ipsu," *Taehan Maeil*, 5 January 1996, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

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12 December 1995

IAEA Director General Hans Blix announces that North Korea is not allowing inspectors to photograph nuclear facilities in the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex. According to Blix, the photographs are necessary in order to determine whether or not the facilities are being used for a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

—"IAEA Says No Developments on N. Korean Nuclear Checks," Japan Economic Newswire, 13 December 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 December 1995

North Korea and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) officially sign a contract in New York for the provision of two light water reactors. Construction of the first light water reactor and related facilities is to begin in 1996 and go on line by 2003. The second reactor is to be completed four to five years later.

—"Agreement on Supply of a Light water Reactor Project to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, 15 December 1995, www.kedo.org.

16 December 1995

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) sends a team of experts to North Korea for a month-long survey of the proposed reactor site in [Kŭmho-chigu], Shimp'o, South Hamgyŏng Province. The 16-man team consists of fourteen South Koreans and one expert each from the United States and Japan.

—"KEDO Experts Leave for North to Visit Reactor Site," Agence France Presse, 14 December 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 16 December 1995, in "Third Reactor Site Survey Team Arrives in North," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 December 1995, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

[Back to Top](#)

1994

7 January 1994

Officials from the South Korean Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Unification announce that North Korea and South Korea will exchange special envoys to discuss nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula in the middle of this month. South Korean officials hope to use this opportunity to re-open the inter-Korean talks that were suspended in 1992.

—"Koreas to Exchange Special Envoys on Nuclear Issue," Associated Press, 7 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Nambukdaehwa Idalchung Chaegae'/Chŏngbu Soshikt'ong," *Hankook Ilbo*, 8 January 1994, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

1994

According to the *Segye Ilbo*, a South Korean daily, North Korea begins to acquire plutonium, uranium, other metals, and equipment from Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries. According to the report, North Korea also procures uranium-235, plutonium-239, as well as osmium-187, cesium-137, and strontium, which the report

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claims are used for reducing the size of nuclear warheads. The *Segye Ilbo* claims this information is from a four-page Russian document acquired by the South Korean Embassy in Uzbekistan. The report also claims that North Korea later acquire 70-80 documents that contain information regarding nuclear technologies, and that North Korea smuggles 32kg of HEU from Kazakhstan in August 2001. [Note: CNS sources indicate the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade received no such document, and there is no apparent use for osmium-187, cesium-137 and strontium in reducing the size of nuclear weapons; therefore, this report does not seem credible.] —*Segye Ilbo*, 7 November 2002, in "Kazakhstani Report: DPRK Purchased Uranium, Plutonium From Kazakhstan," FBIS Document ID: KPP20021108000025; Chŏn Hyŏn Il and Kim Ki Dong, "Puk, K'ajahŭsŏ Uranium Kŭkpibanip," *Segye Ilbo*, 8 November 2002, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Kim Ki Dong, "Changnyŏn'eman Uranium 32kg Panip," *Segye Ilbo*, 8 November 2002, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Pak Hye Yun, "Puk, K'ajahŭsŏ Uranium Kŭkpi Kuip," *Donga Ilbo*, 8 November 2002, www.donga.com.

1 January 1994

President Kim Il Sung announces that North Korea and the United States have agreed on a "joint statement" which paves the way for the nuclear dispute to be "settled fairly." However, Kim says that any attempts to pressure North Korea into more concessions "may invite catastrophe." In his statements, Kim doesn't mention any details about the agreement, but in an announcement later in the day, the North Korean Foreign Ministry claims that IAEA inspectors will only be allowed to visit North Korea's seven declared nuclear facilities for a one-time inspection. —David E. Sanger, "Hint of Progress, And Warning, from North Korea," *New York Times*, 2 January 1994, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 January 1994

US officials announce that North Korea has agreed to permit IAEA inspections of its seven declared nuclear facilities once Pyongyang comes to an agreement with the Agency on "the exact procedures." According to reports, steps involve the resumption of a North Korean dialogue with South Korea in exchange for cancellation of the 1994 Team Spirit military exercise. North Korean United Nations Ambassador Hŏ Jong confirms the agreement and says that IAEA inspections will be permitted in order to "keep continuity" of international safeguards. He says that the United States and North Korea have made "some very substantial progress" during negotiations in December 1993 in New York.

—Jeffrey Smith, "North Korean Agrees to Nuclear Inspection; Tentative Pact Covers Only Declared Facilities, Not Other Suspicious Sites, U.S. Officials Say," *Washington Post*, 4 January 1993, p. A11; John J. Fialka, "North Korea, US Reach Agreement Opening Nuclear Sites to Inspection," *Wall Street Journal*, 6 January 1994, p. A8; Steven Greenhouse, "U.S. Says Deal with North Korea on Atomic Site Inspection Is Near," *New York Times*, 4 January 1994, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 January 1994

US officials say that they are likely to make the important concession of accepting North Korea's proposal of a complete one-time inspection of its seven declared nuclear facilities, in the hope that additional inspections can be agreed upon in the future. According to the officials, the United States is also considering cancellation of the annual Team Spirit military exercise.

—Jeffrey Smith, "North Korea Agrees to Nuclear Inspection; Tentative Pact Covers Only Declared Facilities, Not

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Other Suspicious Sites, U.S. Officials Say," *Washington Post*, 4 January 1993, p. A11; John J. Fialka, "North Korea, US Reach Agreement Opening Nuclear Sites to Inspection," *Wall Street Journal*, 6 January 1994, p. A8; Steven Greenhouse, "U.S. Now Seeks Just One Survey of North Korea," *New York Times*, 5 January 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 January 1994

IAEA Spokesman David Kyd says that one-time inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities are unacceptable. According to Kyd, "periodic inspections would be necessary" to ensure North Korea's compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

—"IAEA Says Regular Inspections Are Necessary in N. Korea," Agence France Presse, 5 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 January 1994

US State Department Undersecretary Lynn Davis says that the "agreement in principle" reached between North Korea and the United States to allow IAEA inspections is one of the "interim steps" before the United States will agree to a third round of talks with North Korea. Davis denies reports that the United States is prepared to accept one-time inspections of declared nuclear facilities in North Korea. Speaking at a luncheon for newspaper reporters, President Clinton also denies the reports, saying that even if the United States was prepared to make such a concession it would have to be cleared with the IAEA.

—Steven Greenhouse, "North Korea to Open Access to Nuclear Sites, U.S. Says," *New York Times*, 6 January 1994, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Agrees Access to 7 Nuclear Sites, U.S. Says," Japan Economic Newswire, 6 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 January 1994

North Korean officials meet with IAEA officials in Vienna, but they make no new offer. After the meeting, IAEA Spokesman David Kyd says that the North Korean officials only came to listen to the agency's position and report back to Pyongyang. According to Kyd, the IAEA informed North Korea that talks on inspection procedures need to be resumed.

—Robert Burns, "Koreans Listen, But Make No Proposals, at Vienna Meeting," Associated Press, 5 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 January 1994

Officials from the South Korean Foreign Ministry and National Unification Board announce that South Korea and North Korea will exchange special envoys to discuss nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula. The officials say that the two sides have yet to agree upon a date but stress that the exchange should take place before the United States reopens high-level talks with Pyongyang.

—"Koreas to Exchange Special Envoys on Nuclear Issue," Associated Press, 7 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 January 1994

North Korea and the IAEA hold "working-level" discussions on the procedures for nuclear inspections.

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—"North Korea, Nuclear Agency Resume Talks on Inspections," Associated Press, 7 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 January 1994

US Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar say that Washington will not accept a one-time inspection of North Korea's declared nuclear facilities. Instead, the Senators claim, Washington will demand continued IAEA access to all declared facilities and two suspected nuclear waste sites. Speaking at the US embassy in Tokyo, the two Senators also claim that the United States, Japan, and other countries must begin preparing for the option of imposing economic sanctions against North Korea.

—Reuters (Tokyo), "Regular Inspections Demanded," Los Angeles Times, 9 January 1994, p. A14, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Nunn Urges Preparation for Sanctions Against N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 8 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 January 1994

The IAEA and North Korea hold a second round of "working-level" discussions on the scope and content of inspections. The IAEA submits a "check list" for inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities. Items on the "check list" include examining the fuel rods at the 5MW gas-graphite reactor, taking samples, and checking seals and surveillance equipment.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 11 January 1994, in "North Korea, IAEA Fail to Make Progress; IAEA Presents Inspection List," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Cha Man Sun, KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 10 January 1994, in "North Korea, IAEA Fail to Make Progress; IAEA Presents Inspection Check List," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea, IAEA Said Still at Odds Over Inspections," Japan Economic Newswire, 10 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 January 1994

The IAEA sends a report to Pyongyang outlining its demands for unrestricted access to all seven declared nuclear sites.

—"IAEA Bids for Full Inspections of N. Korean Facilities," Japan Economic Newswire, 26 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 January 1994

US State Department Spokeswoman Christine Shelly announces that the United States will not consider a third round of high-level talks with North Korea until it resolves the issue of nuclear inspections with the IAEA. Shelly says, "If the North Korean agreement in principle to allow these inspections that they had related to us before does not result in specific arrangements with the IAEA, then there will be no third round of formal US-North Korea talks and we will have to look to alternate means to resolve this dispute." Shelly continues, "The possibility of tougher measures, of sanctions, of going to the Security Council, is still very much out there."

—"United States Calls on North Korea to Allow Inspections," United Press International, 21 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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21 January 1994

The IAEA announces that North Korea has rejected its proposed inspection procedures. IAEA Spokesman David Kyd says that the proposed procedures are necessary for IAEA inspectors to verify that North Korea is not developing nuclear weapons. North Korea urges the IAEA to accept its proposal of onetime inspections, but Kyd reiterates IAEA Director General Hans Blix's statement that these inspection procedures are not negotiable and the IAEA will not send an inspection team "unless there is a full agreement."

—David A. Sanger, "North Korea Reportedly to Balk at Inspection Terms," *New York Times*, 21 January 1994, p. A5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Urges IAEA to Accept Its Inspection Proposals," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 January 1994

North Korea's Foreign Ministry claims that the issue of "routine an ad-hoc inspections" of its nuclear facilities should only be addressed in a third round of high-level bilateral talks with the United States.

—"North Korea Justifies Its Snub of Nuclear Checks," Agence France Presse, 22 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 January 1994

North Korea warns the United States that continued pressure on Pyongyang to accept routine IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities could lead to "catastrophe." The warning, printed in the *Rodong Sinmun*, the official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, also states that North Korea's March 1993 decision to withdraw from the NPT was not revoked but merely "suspended temporarily."

—"North Korea Justifies Its Snub of Nuclear Checks," Agence France Presse, 22 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Crisis Warning; Japan Has 'All Parts for Bomb,'" *South China Morning Post*, 31 January 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 January 1994

Thomas Hubbard, chief US negotiator for talks with North Korea, visits Seoul and reiterates the US position that it will improve relations with North Korea only if Pyongyang agrees to nuclear inspections meeting all IAEA requirements.

—Ivan Zakharchenko, "US, South Korea Continue Consultations on Nuclear Problem," ITAR-TASS, 24 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 January 1994

A US official says that Washington will most likely seek sanctions against North Korea if talks with the IAEA fail to make progress soon. According to the official, if at the 22 February meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors Hans Blix reports that the IAEA cannot determine whether or not North Korea's nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes, the United States will likely move for economic sanctions.

—Rita Beamish, "U.S.: Time Is Running Out for North Korea on Nuclear Inspection," Associated Press, 25 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jacques Charmelot, "N. Korea Has Less Than a Month to Resume Nuclear Checks: US," Agence France Presse, 25 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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25 January 1994

CIA director James Woolsey tells the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that North Korea would probably resort to its MiG-23 aircraft as a nuclear weapon delivery system, rather than the Nodong-1 missile.

—Kyodo News Service, "CIA Chief Says N. Korea Would Use MiGs for Nuke Attack," Japan Economic Newswire, 26 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 January 1994

The IAEA sends a report to Pyongyang explaining its demand for unrestricted access to all seven declared nuclear facilities. According to IAEA Spokesman David Kyd, North Korea still refuses "a significant number" of the agency's inspection requirements.

—"IAEA Bids for Full Inspections of N. Korean Facilities," Japan Economic Newswire, 26 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 January 1994

US officials announce that preparations are under way to deploy Patriot Missiles in South Korea at the request of General Gary Luck, the senior commander of US forces in South Korea.

—"North Korea Assails US Plan to Put Patriot Missiles in South," Agence France Press, 28 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Pan on 'Patriot' in S. Korea made in," Xinhua News Agency, 29 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 January 1994

North Korea condemns the US plan to deploy Patriot Missiles in South Korea as an "unpardonable, grave military challenge." The Korean Central News Agency says the deployment of the missiles "increases the danger of war on the peninsula" and "impedes the progress" of talks aimed at resolving the issue of nuclear inspections. The report also says that the real purpose of the missile deployment is to pressure North Korea into accepting nuclear inspections.

—Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 28 January 1994, in "Patriot Missile Deployment in ROK 'Unpardonable'," FBIS-EAS-94-019, 28 January 1994, p. 11; "North Korea Assails US Plan to Put Patriot Missiles in South," Agence France Press, 28 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Pan on 'Patriot' in S. Korea Made in," Xinhua News Agency, 29 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 January 1994

Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the Russian General Staff, denies allegations made by the Japanese weekly *Shukan Bunshun* regarding an alleged top secret Russian report. The *Shukan Bunshun* report claims that Russian nuclear and missile scientists have assisted North Korea in the development of nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles. But Kolesnikov says that the report's alleged issuing authority, the Center for Military Strategic Analysis at the Russian General Staff, does not exist, although the General Staff does have a "center for military strategic studies." Kolesnikov lists further discrepancies within the report, including the form used, the index number cited, the incorrect placement and terminology of the security classification, and, finally, the use of a serial number originating with the USSR Council of Ministers (a numbering system not used since 1991) rather than one used by the Ministry of Defense.

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—Radio Moscow, 29 January 1994, in "Participation in DPRK Nuclear Program Denied," FBIS-SOV-94-020, 31 January 1994, p. 15; Pavel Felgengauer, "North Korea Has No Nuclear Bomb. The Publication in Shukan Bunshun Is Based on a Hoax. There will be No Official Investigation in the General Staff," *Segodnya* (Moscow), 29 January 1994, p. 1, in FBIS-SOV-94-020, 31 January 1994, pp. 15-16; Viktor Litovkin, "Russian Chief of General Staff Describes Piece in Japanese Weekly as 'Nonsense'," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 29 January 1994, p. 3, in "Army Chief on Missile Document," FBIS-SOV-94-020, 31 January 1994, pp. 16-17; "General Staff Secret Report a Brazen Fake," Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 28 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Alexander Golts, "'General Staff's Secret report' Is Crude Forge," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, Russian Press Digest, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 January 1994

The North Korean Foreign Ministry warns of "catastrophic consequences" if the United States continues to demand that North Korea accept all IAEA conditions on nuclear inspections before it will consider a third round of high-level talks. "If the United States has no intention to hold any further round of talks, North Korea, too, will have no intention to do so," a Foreign Ministry spokesman says, warning that North Korea might once again withdraw from the NPT. He also warns that Pyongyang might reverse its "declared intention to renounce the graphite-moderated reactor system."

—"North Korea Blasts United States for Reversing Nuclear Agreement," United Press International, 31 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "DPRK Issues Statement on Nuclear Issue," Xinhua News Agency, 1 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 January 1994

North Korea warns that it is prepared to renege on all promises regarding nuclear inspections if the United States goes ahead with plans to deploy Patriot Missiles in South Korea.

—"North Korea Warns US Over 'Patriots,'" Press Association, 31 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Warns It May Scrap Promise on Nuclear Inspections," Associated Press, 31 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 February 1994

North Korean President Kim Il Sung delivers a message to US President Bill Clinton expressing a desire to improve relations with the United States and vowing that North Korea will never develop nuclear weapons. The message is delivered by US evangelist Billy Graham after a six-day trip to North Korea.

—"Kim Il Sung Says Pyongyang Will Not Develop Nukes," Japan Economic Newswire, 7 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 February 1994

Accusing North Korea of intimidating the United States with its nuclear program, the US Senate calls on the Clinton administration to take a more aggressive stance towards Pyongyang. In two non-binding "sense of Congress" statements amended to the State Department authorization bill, the Senate calls on President Clinton to seek international support for economic sanctions and prepare to reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea if North Korea continues to resist IAEA inspections. The Senate also urges President Clinton to move forward with

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plans to hold the Team Spirit joint military exercises with South Korea.

—Jim Abrams, "Senate Urges Tough Stance toward North Korea," Associated Press, 1 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 February 1994

Addressing the annual meeting of South Korean diplomats, Foreign Minister Han Söng Ju says that the dispute over North Korea's nuclear program should be resolved through dialogue in order to prevent its development into a "worst case" scenario.

—"Seoul Urges Talks to Solve North's Nuclear Issue," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 February 1994

In a commentary appearing in the *Rodong Sinmun*, the official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, North Korea states that while it wants the dispute over its nuclear program resolved in "a peaceful way," it will not accept any pressure tactics from Washington. If the United States tries to pressure North Korea in allowing IAEA inspections, according to the commentary, Pyongyang's "reaction will be a hundred times stronger and carried into practical action." The statement also says that North Korea has "an expedient to counter any other option of the United States. It is not the United States alone that has the expedient, and the option is not open only for a big power."

—"We Do Not Utter Empty Words," *Nodong Sinmun*, 3 February 1994, in "'Nodong Sinmun': US 'Ganster-Like Logic' Leads North to 'Reconsider Promises,'" BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Warns Against U.S. Pressure for Nuclear Inspections," United Press International, 3 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Terry McCarthy, "North Korea Rattles The Nuclear Saber," *The Independent* (London), 5 February 1994, p. 9, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 February 1994

French Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Catherine Colonna states that due to the lack of progress in talks between Washington and Pyongyang, it is time for the UN Security Council to consider imposing economic sanctions on North Korea. On 11 February, the North Korean Foreign Ministry condemns the French statement, accusing France of encouraging military conflict in Northeast Asia "so that it may fish in troubled waters through the massive sales of weapons of destruction."

—Andrei Shtorkh, "France for UN Sanctions against North Korea," ITAR-TASS, 3 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "France Says Sanctions against North Korea Should Be Considered," Agence France Presse, 3 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Calls on United States to Act with Discretion," United Press International, 12 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 February 1994

North Korea officially informs the IAEA that it completely rejects the prospect of nuclear safeguards inspections.

—KBS-1 Radio (Seoul), 3 February 1994, in "DPRK Informs IAEA of 'Total Rejection' of Inspections," JPRS-TND-94-005, 25 February 1994, p. 51;

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4 February 1994

North Korea's ambassador to the IAEA, Yun Ho Jin, says that "North Korea cannot accept routine and ad hoc inspections."

—"Talks between IAEA and North Korea Almost 'Moribund'," Agence France Presse, 5 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Puk 'Haeksach'al ChöIch'ung Öryöpta'/Pin Chujae Ch'amsa'gwan," *Donga Ilbo*, 5 February 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Puk 'IAEA Wa Hab'üi Nanmang'/Pin Chujaech'amsa'gwan 'Yogusujun Pudam'," *Hankook Ilbo*, 5 February 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

4 February 1994

The United States, supported by Britain, France and Russia, appeals to China to put added pressure on North Korea to allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. Speaking at a UN Security Council meeting, the US Ambassador to the UN Madeline Albright also informs the Chinese representative that the United States, Britain, France and Russia will begin pressing for economic sanctions if North Korea does not open its nuclear facilities to international inspections by 21 February.

—Paul Lewis, "U.S. Urges China to Pressure North Koreans to Open Nuclear Sites," *New York Times*, 5 February 1994, p. 5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 February 1994

South Korean Foreign Minister Han Söng Ju meets with senior US officials in Washington to discuss North Korea's refusal to allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. After meetings with US Vice President Al Gore and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, Han announces that the United States and South Korea have "decided to exert all available efforts to settle the nuclear question through dialogue until the regular Board of Governors' meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)." Speaking on the possibility of calling for economic sanctions in the UN Security Council, Han says that China may not oppose sanctions but is still reluctant to support such measures, believing that the international community must first give negotiations a chance.

—"S Korean FM Set for Talks on North Korean Nuclear Impasse," Agence France Presse, 11 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; George Gedda, "U.S., Japanese Leaders Weigh Sanctions against North Korea," Associated Press, 12 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; South Korean News Agency [sic], 11 February 1994, in "South Korean Foreign Minister in USA; UN Security Council to Meet in Vienna," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 February 1994

Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, meeting with President Clinton in Washington, says that Japan is ready to support economic sanctions against North Korea if Pyongyang continues to refuse international inspections of its nuclear facilities.

—Susumu Sono, "North Korea Ready to Punish US More Seriously Than in Korean War," Agence France Presse, 12 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Sue Kendall, "US Consults with Allies Ahead of Crucial Nuclear Meeting," Agence France Presse, 13 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 February 1994

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, carries an article that warns "any US consideration

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of economic sanctions would be equivalent to a declaration of war."

—Korean Central Broadcasting Agency (Pyongyang), 12 February 1994, in "'Nodong Sinmun': 'Any Kind of Sanctions' to Be Viewed as 'Proclamation of War,'" BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Susumu Sono, "North Korea Ready to Punish US More Seriously Than in Korean War," Agence France Presse, 12 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Calls on US to Act with Discretion," United Press International, 12 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 February 1994

Vladimir Kumachev, of Russia's Institute of National Security and Strategic Research, says that North Korea has nuclear warheads. According to Kumachev, the Soviet Union learned in 1985 that North Korea was enriching "more uranium than was necessary for non-military purposes, and that secret underground bases had been set up in the mountains." Kumachev also says that Russia "still retains around 15 experts in North Korea to keep us up to date with and to monitor its nuclear program." He also claims that North Korea has "carried out tests in certain African countries under totalitarian regimes."

—"North Korea Has Nukes: Russian Defence Official," Agence France Presse, 14 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Pukhan Imi Haekshilhöm'/Russia Anboyön'gomun/'Haengmugi Poyu Haekshil'," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, 15 February 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "'Pukhan Haekt'andu Itta'/Rö Kukpangjölllyakyö'guso Kowigwalli Palghyö," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 15 February 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Rö 'Puk Kaekt'andu Poyu'/Kukpang'yön Pojwagwan/Africa'sö Imi Shilhöm Wallyo," *Segye Ilbo*, 15 February 1994, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Heangmugi-Unbansudan Puk Imi Poyujujang/Rö Chönmun'ga," *Taehan Maeil*, 15 February 1994, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

15 February 1994

Following two rounds of talks with the IAEA, North Korea agrees to allow inspections of seven declared nuclear facilities but not two suspected nuclear waste sites. According to IAEA Spokesman David Kyd, the goal of the inspections is "verify that nuclear material in these facilities has not been diverted since earlier inspections." As to the date of the inspections, Kyd says the inspectors will travel to North Korea as soon as the IAEA has made the necessary arrangements.

—"North Korea to Allow Nuclear Inspection," United Press International, 15 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Farhan Haq, "North Korea: Pyongyang And IAEA Agree on Weapons Monitoring," Inter Press Service, 15 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Agrees to International Inspection if Nuclear Sites," Associated Press, 15 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David A. Sanger, "North Koreans Agree to Survey of Atomic Sites," *New York Times*, 16 February 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Agrees to Open Nuclear Facilities to Inspection," Japan Economic Newswire, 16 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 February 1994

US and South Korean officials reaffirm their position that the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue on the nuclear situation on the peninsula is a prerequisite for the next round of high-level talks between the United States and North Korea.

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—South Korean News Agency [sic], 18 February 1994, in "USA, South Korea Reportedly Confirm Conditions for US Talks with North," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 February 1994

North Korea informs the IAEA that it will issue visas to inspectors once it talks with the United States. The IAEA condemns the North Korean demand as an attempt to "buy time."

—"N. Korea May Grant IAEA Visas after Talks with U.S.," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 February 1994

The North Korean Foreign Ministry announces that the scope of the upcoming IAEA inspections is only to guarantee the continuity of its safeguards agreement. In a statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency, the Foreign Ministry says that the inspections will be neither routine nor special inspections. The spokesman goes on to say that the "persistent" demand by the United States, Japan and South Korea for special inspections is "tantamount to an attempt to drive (North Korea) out of the (NPT)," and if such demands continue North Korea might rethink its decision to allow IAEA inspections.

—Korean Central Broadcasting Agency (Pyongyang), 21 February 1994, in "Ministry Spokesman on Accord with IAEA; Watching US Attitude," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 22 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Defines Scope of IAEA Inspections," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Threatens to Back Away from Inspection Accord," Agence France Presse, 21 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 February 1994

US and North Korean officials hold a working-level meeting to discuss the issuance of visas to IAEA inspectors. North Korea has said that it will issue visas once a third round of high-level talks with the United States is scheduled, but the United States continues to insist that the resumption of high-level talks with North Korea is contingent on Pyongyang first accepting IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities.

—"IAEA Visa Issue Appears Settled in U.S.-N. Korea Meeting," Japan Economic Newswire, 23 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 February 1994

At the IAEA Board of Governors' meeting in Vienna, North Korean officials announce that Pyongyang will allow IAEA inspections by 1 March if the United States officially suspends the annual Team Spirit military exercise and sets a date for the third round of high-level US-North Korean talks.

—"North Korea Sets Condition for Inspections of Nuclear Sites," United Press International, 24 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Urges N. Korea to Set Inspection by Month's End," Japan Economic Newswire, 24 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Charles A. Radin, "North Korea Stalls on Inspections; Makes New Demands as Deadline Passes; Material from Wire Service Was Used in This Report," Boston Globe, 24 February 1994, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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23 February 1994

In the summary statement of the Board of Governors' meeting, the IAEA urges North Korea to set a date for IAEA inspections before March.

—"IAEA Urges N. Korea to Set Inspection by Month's End," Japan Economic Newswire, 24 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 February 1994

State Department officials announce that the United States has broken off working-level talks with North Korea. According to the officials, the United States stopped the talks, which have been conducted in New York for the past week, because North Korea announced on 23 February that the United States must meet certain conditions before it would allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. US negotiator Thomas Hubbard says that he expects more talks in the near future.

—"U.S. Breaks off Talks with N. Korea on Nuke Inspection," Japan Economic Newswire, 25 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US Negotiator with North Korea Heads Back to Washington with No Accord," Agence France Presse, 25 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 February 1994

The United States and North Korea reach an agreement in which IAEA inspections of North Korean facilities will begin on 1 March. The United States agrees to hold a third round of high-level talks with North Korea starting on 31 March in Geneva. North Korea's representative to the UN, Pak Gil Yon, announces that on 1 March the United States and North Korea will take "four simultaneous steps" to resolve the deadlock on the issue. When asked about the visas for IAEA inspectors, Pak says that they are being granted "as we speak."

—Paul Lewis, "North Korea Agrees to Some U.N. Nuclear Inspections," *New York Times*, 26 February 1994, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Agrees to Nuclear Inspections form March 1," Japan Economic Newswire, 26 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Paul Lewis, "North Korea Grants Nuclear Inspectors Visas," *New York Times*, 27 February 1994, p. 6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 February 1994

North Korea issues visas to seven IAEA inspectors who will leave for Pyongyang on 27 February.

— Paul Lewis, "North Korea Grants Nuclear Inspectors Visas," *New York Times*, 27 February 1994, p. 6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 February 1994

Seven IAEA inspectors depart Vienna bound for Pyongyang. The seven-member team will conduct inspections of North Korea's seven declared nuclear facilities beginning on 1 March.

—"Inspection Team Leaves Vienna for N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 27 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

March 1994

Russia deports five North Koreans from Moscow "for showing too much interest in nuclear components."

—Warren Strobel, "N. Korea Sops for Nuke Technology in Russia," *Washington Times*, 5 July 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-

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Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Chŏng Hae Yŏng, "Puk, Rŏ Haekkisul Milsuip Kido/Missile P'oham 3 Kŏn...Taesagwanjig'wŏn 3 Myŏngch'ep'o," *Chosun Ilbo*, 6 July 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

2 March 1994

General Gary Luck, commander of US forces in South Korea, announces to Congress that the joint US-South Korean Team Spirit military exercises will be cancelled. A few hours later (3 March) the South Korean Foreign Ministry announces the cancellation in Seoul. However, both the United States and South Korea state that the cancellation of the military exercises is contingent on North Korea allowing the completion of IAEA inspections at seven declared nuclear facilities and the resumption of inter-Korea dialogue regarding nuclear issues on the peninsula. —Michael R. Gordon, "South Korea Offers Terms for Ending War Games," *New York Times*, 3 March 1994, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 March 1994

The United States announces that it will resume high-level bilateral talks with North Korea on 21 March in Geneva. Undersecretary of State Robert Gallucci will head the US delegation. According to State Department spokesman Michael McCurry, the third round of high-level talks "will aim at a thorough and broad resolution of the nuclear and other issues that separate the DPRK from the US and the rest of the international community." —Reuters, "U.S. And North Korea to Resume Talks March 21," *New York Times*, 4 March 1994, p. A15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Announces High Level Talks with N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 4 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 March 1994

IAEA inspectors begin inspections at one of North Korea's seven declared nuclear facilities. The inspections, to be conducted at all seven declared facilities, are the first such inspections in over one year. The IAEA continues to urge North Korea to allow inspections at two suspected nuclear waste sites, but currently Pyongyang is limiting the inspections to the seven declared facilities. —"UN Experts Inspect Nuclear Site," Press Association, 3 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Reuters, "U.S. And North Korea to Resume Talks March 21," *New York Times*, 4 March 1994, p. A15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 March 1994

North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sŏk Chu says that North Korea might halt IAEA inspections if the United States continues to insist on inter-Korean exchange of envoys as a precondition for canceling Team Spirit military exercises. According to Kang, "It is clear that if...the United States gives up halfway the decision to renounce the Team Spirit joint military exercises and delays the opening of the third round DPRK-US talks under an absurd pretext, we cannot satisfactorily ensure the IAEA's inspection that has already begun." —"N. Korea Says U.S. Action Could End IAEA Inspection," Japan Economic Newswire, 4 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Associated Press (Tokyo), "North Korea Asserts U.S. Endangers Pact on Atom Inspections," *New York Times*, 5 March 1994, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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11 March 1994

The United States and South Korea agree that Washington should postpone the third round of high-level talks with Pyongyang scheduled for 21 March in Geneva. Meeting in Seoul, Kim Sam Hun, South Korea's special ambassador in charge of North Korean nuclear issues, and US Undersecretary of State Robert Gallucci agree that the IAEA inspections currently underway in North Korea must be concluded prior to the third round of talks.

—Kate Webb, "Gallucci Flies into Seoul for Talks on Nuclear Impasse," Agence France Presse, 10 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "S. Korea, U.S. Discuss Delay of U.S.-N. Korea Talks," Japan Economic Newswire, 11 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 March 1994

North Korea threatens to boycott the third round of high-level talks with the United States if Washington continues to insist on "unreasonable preconditions." The North Korean Foreign Ministry claims that Pyongyang has fulfilled its commitments by resuming contact with Seoul and allowing IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. However, the United States insists that IAEA inspectors were not given sufficient access and the exchange of presidential envoys between North and South Korea has yet to be realized.

—Korean Central Broadcasting Agency (Pyongyang), 15 March 1994, in "Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Implementing North Korea-US Agreement," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Threatens to Boycott Talks with U.S.," Agence France Presse, 15 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 March 1994

IAEA inspectors leave North Korea without being able to complete the full scope of their planned inspections. According to IAEA spokesman David Kyd, "We were only able to partially fulfill our mission." The inspectors reportedly discovered seals that had been tampered with and were denied access to a site described by North Korean officials as a "Radiochemistry Laboratory" but is suspected of being used for plutonium extraction. According to officials from the United States, Japan and South Korea, inspectors were prevented from taking any samples from within the "glove box" of the suspected reprocessing facility.

—"North Korea Threatens to Halt Nuclear Inspections Again," Associated Press, 15 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Prevented Full IAEA Inspections," Agence France Presse, 15 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Blocks Key Nuclear Checks," *Toronto Star*, 16 March 1994, p. A24, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "North Korea Said to Block Taking of Radioactive Samples from Site," *New York Times*, 16 March 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; George Jahn, "Inspectors Blocked from Learning if Nuclear Fuel Was Diverted," Associated Press, 16 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 March 1994

The United States cancels high-level talks with North Korea scheduled to begin on 21 March and resumes plans to conduct the annual Team Spirit joint military exercise with South Korea. The cancellation of the talks and resumption of the military exercises come in the wake of North Korea's refusal to allow IAEA inspectors to take samples at a suspected plutonium reprocessing plant during agreed upon inspections in early March.

—Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Cancels Talks with North Korea over Atom Inspections," *New York Times*, 17 March

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1994, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Stephen Robinson, "US Retaliates after N Korea Blocks Nuclear Inspection," *The Daily Telegraph*, 17 March 1994, p. 16, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Gretchen Cook, "US Backs off after North Korea Breaks Nuclear Promise," Agence France Presse, 17 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Robert Burns, "Clinton Says Military Preparations in Korea under Consideration," Associated Press, 18 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 March 1994

Lee Ch'ung Kuk defects to South Korea. Lee, a former analyst and translator for the Ministry of People's Armed Forces Nuclear Chemical Defense Bureau, supplies South Korean officials with information about North Korea's nuclear weapons and chemical weapons programs.

—U Chong Chang, *Chugan Chosun*, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in "Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations," FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 38; "Pukhan'gun Chungsa Kwisun," *Donga Ilbo*, 19 March 1994, p. 31, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

18 March 1994

North Korea claims that recently concluded IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities were sufficient. Quoting a spokesman for the General Department in Atomic Energy, the Korean Central News Agency reports that North Korea has "permitted all the activities within the scope needed for maintaining the continuity of the safeguards," and that the IAEA was "widening its partiality...in pursuing its ill-disposed political purposes under the United States' manipulation."

—Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 18 March 1994, in "North Korean Statement Rejects IAEA View of Recent Inspections," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Says Nuclear Checks Were Satisfactory," United Press International, 18 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 March 1994

During bilateral talks between the two Koreas, North Korean delegate Pak Yŏng Su says, "Seoul is not very far from here. Seoul can be turned into a sea of fire. We will match dialogue with dialogue, and war with war."

—Cho Min Ho, "'Seoul Pulbada Toel'göt' Puk Tanjang Kŭg'ŏn/Nambuk 8 Ch'a Shilmujöpch'ok P'anmunjŏm P'yojŏng," *Segye Ilbo*, 20 March 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; R. Jeffrey Smith and Ann Devroy, "U.S. Backs Maneuvers In S. Korea," *Washington Post*, 20 March 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Will Urge U.N. To Plan Sanctions for North Korea," *New York Times*, 20 March 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Norman Kempster, "U.S. to Urge Sanctions for N. Korea," *Los Angeles Times*, 20 March 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David Osborne, "North Korea 'Ready for War'," *The Independent*, 20 March 1994, p. 16, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 March 1994

The Clinton administration decides to ask the UN to get prepared to impose economic sanctions against North Korea. According to the *Washington Post*, the United States will ask for a Security Council vote on a resolution calling for complete access to North Korea's nuclear facilities. The administration also decides to reinstate joint military exercises with South Korea. North Korea has said it will consider economic sanctions an act of war.

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—Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Will Urge U.N. To Plan Sanctions for North Korea," *New York Times*, 20 March 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; R. Jeffrey Smith and Ann Devroy, "U.S. Backs Maneuvers In S. Korea," *Washington Post*, 20 March 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Norman Kempster, "U.S. to Urge Sanctions for N. Korea," *Los Angeles Times*, 20 March 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David Osborne, "North Korea 'Ready for War'," *The Independent*, 20 March 1994, p. 16, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US to Reschedule Joint Military Exercises with South Korea," *Agence France Presse*, 20 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 March 1994

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a six-page statement in which it says that Pyongyang will pull out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) if the IAEA refers North Korea's alleged obstruction of inspections to the UN Security Council, and if the United States and South Korea go ahead with the Team Spirit military exercise. According to the statement, "If the United States avoids the talks and...resumes the Team Spirit joint military exercise in 1994, and if the IAEA widens its partiality and resorts to strong-arm politics and pressure...we will have no alternative but to carry into practice the measures declared in March last year in order to defend the sovereignty of the nation and the security of the state."

—"North Korea Threatens Withdrawal from Nuclear Treaty," *United Press International*, 20 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David A. Sanger, "North Korea Bars A-Plant Survey; Threatens to Quit Nuclear Treaty," *New York Times*, 21 March 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 March 1994

President Clinton announces that the United States will send Patriot missiles to South Korea in response to growing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Speaking to reporters in Florida, Clinton says, "We have agreed that it is our national interest and in the interest of the security if the people of South Korea and the security of our armed forces there to send Patriot missiles at this time." According to a Pentagon spokesman, the missiles will be transported by sea and reach South Korea in about 30 days.

—Jim Abrams, "Clinton Says United States Sending Patriot Missiles to South Korea," *Associated Press*, 21 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Goes to U.N. to Increase The Pressure on North Korea," *New York Times*, 22 March 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 March 1994

The United States presents a draft resolution to the UN Security Council calling on North Korea to accept additional IAEA inspections. The resolution stops short of calling for economic sanctions but leaves such an option open if North Korea does not readmit IAEA inspectors within one month.

—South Korean News Agency [*sic*], 22 March 1994, in "UN Security Council Discusses North Korean Nuclear Issues," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 23 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Paul Lewis, "China Shields North Koreans on Atom Issue," *New York Times*, 30 March 1994, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 March 1994

South Korean President Kim Young Sam places the South Korean military on high alert in response to a North

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Korean delegate's remark that North Korea could turn Seoul into a "sea of fire." Kim is scheduled to leave for Japan and China tomorrow.

—Terry McCarthy and Teresa Poole, "Seoul Forces Put on Alert as Tension with North Grows," *The Independent*, 23 March 1994, p. 10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; John Burton and George Graham, "S Korean Forces Go on Alert as N-Plant Row with North Grows," *Financial Times*, 23 March 1994, p. 24, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; T.R. Reid, "North Korea Warns of 'Brink of War'," *Washington Post*, 23 March 1994, p. A23, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Steven Greenhouse, "Christopher Says U.S. Stays Firm on Korea, But Pledges Diplomacy," *New York Times*, 23 March 1994, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 March 1994

IAEA spokesman David Kyd announces that it appears that North Korea will complete the construction of its 50MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun on schedule by the end of 1994. Kyd says it appears that North Korea is constructing a third nuclear reactor in T'aech'ŏn-kun, which is scheduled for completion in early 1996.

—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 23 March 1994, in "IAEA Spokesman Says North Korea Building Two More Nuclear Reactors," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 March 1994

According to US and European officials, North Korea may be reprocessing spent fuel through an un-safeguarded second reprocessing line at the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex. The revelation comes after IAEA inspections of the Yŏngbyŏn reprocessing plant [Radiochemistry Laboratory] during which inspectors were prevented from examining points that may connect the existing reprocessing line to the suspected second line. The existing line was placed under safeguards in 1993. It is believed that the existence of an un-safeguarded second line can allow North Korea to divert "plutonium-laden material in solution from the safeguarded line without detection." US officials say that the second reprocessing line, six months from completion, will double North Korea's plutonium production capacity.

—Mark Hibbs and Naoaki Usui, "Second, Hidden reprocessing Line feared Opened at Yongbyon Plant," *Nucleonics Week*, 24 March 1994, pp. 1-2; "North Korea Doubling Capacity to Make Plutonium, Report Says," Associated Press, 2 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Reuter, "N. Korea 'Poised' on Nuclear Arms Brink," *Toronto Star*, 3 April 1994, p. A5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Michael Gordon, "North Korea May Be Expanding Atom Site," *New York Times*, 3 April 1994, p.6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27-29 March 1994

South Korean President Kim Young Sam travels to China in order to plead with Chinese leaders to place added pressure on North Korea to resolve suspicions about its nuclear program. On 28 March China's President Jiang Zemin tells Kim that the only way to resolve the issue with North Korea is through dialogue.

—Peter Goodspeed, "China's Help Sought in North Korean Nuclear Crisis," *Toronto Star*, 28 March 1994, p. A15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Victoria Graham, "U.S., China at Odds over Security Council Statement on North Korea," Associated Press, 28 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 March 1994

China objects to a US proposed resolution to the UN Security Council calling on North Korea to readmit IAEA

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inspectors within one month. Objecting to language in the proposal threatening "further Security Council action," China suggests that the Security Council President issue a consensus statement urging North Korea to cooperate with IAEA inspectors. The statement would make no mention of possible actions taken by the Security Council if North Korea does not cooperate.

—Paul Lewis, "China Shields North Koreans on Atom Issue," *New York Times*, 30 March 1994, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 March 1994

The UN Security Council issues a presidential statement proposed by China urging North Korea to allow IAEA inspectors. The statement, read by Security Council President Jean-Bernard Merimee, differs from the US proposed resolution in that there is no mention of a deadline for North Korea to readmit inspectors. The threat of Security Council action is not as overt as in the proposed resolution, but the statement does warn that "further Security Council consideration will take place if necessary in order to achieve full implementation of the IAEA-North Korean safeguards agreement." [Note: China had warned that if the US resolution came to vote, it would use its veto power as one of the permanent five members of the Security Council.]

—J. T. Nguyen, "U.N. Issues Statement on North Korea," United Press International, 31 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. to Press North Korea over A-Site," *New York Times*, 31 March 1994, p. A11, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Paul Lewis, "U.S. and China Reach Accord at U.N. on Korean Nuclear Issue," *New York Times*, 1 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Text of U.N. Security Council Statement on North Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 1 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 March 1994

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman accuses the United States of making "false promises" and resorting to pressure tactics and condemns the UN Resolution urging North Korea to reinstate IAEA inspectors.

—KCNA (Pyongyang), 31 March 1994, in "Foreign Ministry Spokesman on US Pressure Campaign," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 April 1994

North Korea's Foreign Ministry states that the nuclear inspection dispute can be settled in direct talks with the United States, and declines a Russian proposal to resolve the matter in a multilateral forum.

—"N. Korea Responds Negatively to Russian Proposal," Japan Economic Newswire, 1 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 April 1994

US Secretary of Defense William Perry, speaking on NBC's Meet the Press, accuses North Korea of lying about its nuclear program. Perry claims that the United States is not considering a preemptive strike on North Korea's nuclear facilities "under these circumstances, at this time," and declares that while the United States has no intention of triggering a war on the Korean Peninsula, direct military action is an option if North Korea continues to refuse international inspections of its nuclear facilities.

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—Rupert Cornwell, "U.S. Defence Chief Says North Korea Is Lying about Its Nukes," *The Independent*, 4 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 April 1994

The North Korean Foreign Ministry condemns the UN Resolution calling for it to reinstate IAEA inspectors as "irrational and senseless." In a statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency, a Foreign Ministry spokesman states that "since the United States has opted...to put pressure on the DPRK, we cannot but normalize our peaceful nuclear activities." Later in the day, US State Department spokesman Michael McCurry says that Washington is not sure what exactly "normalizing" means.

—Barry Schweid, "U.S. Disturbed by Doubling of North Korea's Capacity to Produce Plutonium," Associated Press, 4 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Braven Smillie, "North Korea Spurns U.N. Request on Nuclear Inspections," Associated Press, 4 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "North Korea Rejects U.N.'s Call for Full Inspection of A-Plant," *New York Times*, 5 April 1994, p. 8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kevin Rafferty, "N Korea Says It Will Resume Nuclear Work," *The Guardian* (London), 5 April 1994, p. 10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 April 1994

North Korea shuts down its 5MW(e) reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun in preparation to begin unloading its fuel rods in May.

—David Albright, "How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?" *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September/October 1994, Vol. 50, No. 5, www.thebulletin.org.

13 April 1994

Speaking at the annual conference of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that it is critical that the IAEA have complete access to the two undeclared sites in North Korea suspected of being nuclear waste dump-sites in order to determine whether any nuclear materials have been diverted for nuclear weapons production. Blix stresses that gaining access to the radiochemical lab [reprocessing facility] and the 5MW gas-graphite reactor is also necessary to learn whether the lab has been used since February 1993. According to Blix, the IAEA is concerned that North Korea possesses more plutonium than it has reported. In the spring of 1993, it was concluded that North Korea had more plutonium than it had declared. Blix disclosed that North Korea is working on constructing a second [reprocessing] production line in the Radiochemistry Laboratory, which is expected to be completed in the near future.

—David E. Sanger, "Nuclear Agency Chief Warns of Need for Access to North Korea," *New York Times*, 15 April 1994, p. A4; Kyodo News Service, "Blix Urges Completion of N. Korean Inspections," Japan Economic Newswire, 13 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 April 1994

South Korean Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Unification Lee Yŏng Tŏk announces that South Korea has withdrawn its demand for an exchange of special envoys with North Korea as a condition for the resumption of high-level US-North Korean talks.

—"S. Korea Withdraws Demand for Exchange of Inter-Korean Envoys," Xinhua News Agency, 15 April 1994, in

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Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'T'ũksa' P'ogi/Puk'e 5 Wõlch'o'kkaji Ch'ugasach'al Suyong Ch'okku," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 15 April 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "'Sõn T'ũksa'gyohwan' Ch'õlhoe/I T'ong'ilbuch'ongni/Haek Ch'oeusõnhae'gyõl Ipchang'ũn Pulbyõn," *Joongang Ilbo*, 15 April 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

18 April 1994

In an interview with Prensa Latina News Agency, North Korean President Kim Il Sung says that North Korea has neither the intention nor the capability to develop nuclear weapons. He adds that North Korea will be forced to take self-defensive measures if the United States continued to place pressure on Pyongyang.

—Prensa Latina News Agency (Havana), 18 April 1994, in "North Korean Leader's Comments on Nuclear Capability Reported by Cuban Agency," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 April 1994

North Korea notifies the IAEA of its intention to refuel its 5 MW(e) graphite-moderated reactor in Yõngbyõn-kun "at an early date."

—"IAEA Proposes Sending a Team to Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Discuss Arrangements on Safeguards Measures," Federal News Service, 23 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 April 1994

An official from the North Korean mission to the UN reiterates Pyongyang's claim that no more inspectors will be allowed into North Korea until after the resumption of high-level US-North Korean talks. The official says, "We received all the inspections needed to guarantee the continuity of safeguards that have been agreed with the United States."

—South Korean News Agency, 20 April 1994, in "North Korean Official Says No Inspections before Talks with USA," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 April 1994

US Secretary of Defense William Perry announces that the Team Spirit military exercise will be postponed until at least November.

—David E. Sanger, "Defense Chief Says North Korea Could Soon Build 4 A-Bombs," *New York Times*, 21 April 1994, p. 7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 April 1994

US Secretary of Defense William Perry announces that North Korea is "within weeks" of removing enough fuel to make four or five nuclear weapons. Perry does not specify what evidence led the United States to this conclusion.

—David E. Sanger, "Defense Chief Says North Korea Could Soon Build 4 A-Bombs," *New York Times*, 21 April 1994, p. 7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 April 1994

The IAEA announces that it recently received a letter from North Korea stating that it plans to remove fuel rods from its largest reactor [5MW(e) reactor] in Yõngbyõn-kun. According to the IAEA, North Korea will allow the

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agency to monitor the removal but not to take any sample or conduct any tests.

—David E. Sanger, "North Korea Moves to Use Fuel for Bomb," *New York Times*, 22 April 1994, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 April 1994

US Assistant Secretary of State for political and military affairs, Robert Gallucci, announces that the United States hopes to resume working-level contacts with North Korea by May. Gallucci says, "We hope that this week we'll be able to get back to North Korea—almost certainly using the New York channel."

—South Korean News Agency, 27 April 1994, in "US Hopes to Resume 'Working-Level' Contacts with North Korea 'This Week,'" BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 April 1994

North Korea announces that it will not accept full IAEA inspections. Although IAEA inspectors will be permitted to witness the removal of the nuclear spent fuel rods from its 5MW(e) reactor in Yŏngbyŏn, they will not be allowed to take samples of the rods or to measure their radioactivity.

—R. Jeffrey Smith, "N. Korea Refuses Demand to Inspect Reactor Fuel," *Washington Post*, 28 April 1994, p. A22.

28 April 1994

North Korean Ambassador to the UN Pak Kil Yŏn accuses the United States of violating the Korean Armistice Agreement by introducing to South Korea "up-to-date military hardware, including over 1,000 nuclear weapons."

—"N. Korea Claims U.S. Breaches Cease-Fire," United Press International, 28 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 April 1994

The United States and North Korea hold working-level talks in New York. According to State Department, the United States offers to hold another round of high-level talks and suspend Team Spirit military exercises if North Korea allows additional IAEA inspections.

—Yonhap News Agency, 29 April 1994, in "Yonhap Reports DPRK-US Working Level Contact," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 April 1994

The IAEA receives a letter from North Korea denying a request to take samples when fuel is removed from the 5MW(e) reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. In the letter, North Korea reiterates that the IAEA's role will be limited solely to monitoring. According to IAEA spokesman David Kyd, North Korea's reply is "very firm.... Sampling is not in the cards at all."

—Andrew Pollack, "U.N. Says North Korea Refuses to Allow Nuclear Inspections," *New York Times*, 1 May 1994, p. 6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

May-June 1994

North Korea discharges the spent fuel from its nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.

—US Department of Defense, "Proliferation: Threat and Response," 11 April 1996, www.defenselink.mil; Kim

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Byöng Ku, et al, *Pukhaekkisulch'ongsö-I (North Korean Nuclear Issues and the LWR Project)*, KAERI/AR-552-99, Technology Center for Nuclear Control, November 1999, www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr.

2 May 1994

The US State Department says that Washington will abort all talks with Pyongyang if it removes fuel rods from a reactor without the presence of IAEA inspectors.

—South Korean News Agency [*sic*], 3 May 1994, in "USA Rejects North's Claim That Armistice Agreement is "Useless", "Invalid," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 May 1994

The IAEA sends a letter to North Korea reiterating its demand that North Korea allow full inspection of the refueling of its 5MW(e) reactor in Yöngbyön-kun. IAEA Director General Hans Blix in a letter to North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam warns that North Korea's failure to agree to IAEA inspections will be seen as evidence of North Korean efforts to develop nuclear capabilities, and will compel the IAEA to take the issue to the UN Security Council.

—KBS Radio (Seoul), 4 May 1994, in "IAEA Head Sends Telegram Urging Pyongyang to Accept Inspection Conditions," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 May 1994

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says that the IAEA's demand to set aside and measure spent fuel from the 5MW(e) reactor is "unreasonable," adding that North Korea will allow "the observation of the fuel rod replacement, containment and surveillance over all replaced fuel and other sufficient inspections for the maintenance of the continuity of safeguards." The spokesman adds that "selective" fuel rod sampling "can never be allowed because it means routine and ad hoc inspections that ignore North Korea's unique status" under the NPT following the "temporary suspension" of its withdrawal from the NPT.

—Korean Central Broadcasting Agency (Pyongyang), 3 May 1994, in "Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Inspections and IAEA's 'Unreasonable' Request," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 May 1994

The US and North Korea hold working-level talks in New York. At the talks, the United States asks North Korea to postpone the removal of nuclear fuel rods until IAEA inspectors arrive. Washington threatens to break off all talks if the IAEA is not allowed to monitor the extraction of fuel rods from the 5MW(e) reactor in Yöngbyön-kun.

—Yonhap News Agency, 10 May 1994, in "US-North Korean Working Level Contact in New York: Nuclear Issue Discussed," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 11 May 1994, in "South Reports 'Considerable Progress' in US-North Korean Talks," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 May 1994

North Korea notifies the IAEA that it has begun removing fuel rods from the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yöngbyön-kun.

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—Mary Curtis, "US Says Korean Fuel Not Diverted," *Boston Globe*, 21 May 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Proposes Sending a Team to Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Discuss Arrangements on Safeguards Measures," Federal News Service, 23 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 May 1994

The IAEA announces that it will shortly send an inspection team to North Korea to service cameras and check safeguard seals at the reprocessing plant [Radiochemistry Laboratory] and the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor at the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex. North Korea will also conduct working-level talks with the IAEA on the removal of the fuel rods from the 5MW(e) reactor. IAEA inspectors will be allowed to set aside fuel rod samples for future measurement. Inspectors will also complete some steps blocked during the March 1994 inspections, including the measurement of radioactivity and search for radioactive particles at the Radiochemistry Laboratory, but will not be able to sample "liquids from tanks used to dissolve spent fuel." The inspection team will also not be allowed to conduct formal inspections of the removal of spent fuel rods from the 5MW(e) reactor.

—R. Jeffrey Smith, "Inspectors Returning to North Korea; Team Scheduled to Resume Tests Halted in March; Access to Some Nuclear Sits Blocked," *Washington Post*, 14 May 1994; David E. Sanger, "Nuclear Agency to Send a New Inspection Team to North Korea," *New York Times*, 13 May 1994, p. 7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 14 May 1994, in "North Korea Begins Changing Fuel Rods But Says IAEA Inspections Still on," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Team Leaving Shortly to Inspect Reprocessing Plant in Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Federal News Service, 16 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 May 1994

North Korea starts unloading spent fuel rods from its 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun before the arrival of the IAEA inspectors.

—Eric Schmitt, "U. S. Delays Taking Steps Over A-Plant," *New York Times*, 16 May 1994, pp. A1, A3; David E. Sanger, "North Koreans Say Nuclear Fuel Rods Are Being Removed," *New York Times*, 15 May 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 May 1994

Clinton Administration officials announce that if North Korea has removed or "emptied" the spent fuel from the rods, the United States will seek sanctions in the UN Security Council.

—Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Delays Taking Steps Over A-Plant," *New York Times*, 16 May 1994, pp. A1, A3; John Diamond, "Perry Says U.S. Could Be Weeks Away from Crisis with North Korea," Associated Press, 18 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 May 1994

US Secretary of Defense William Perry characterizes the situation in North Korea as a "very substantial near-term crisis." According to Perry, the issue of removing fuel from a 5MW(e) reactor in Yŏngbyŏn could lead to a major confrontation if Pyongyang does not allow verification that spent fuel is not being diverted to a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

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—John Diamond, "Perry Says U.S. Could Be Weeks Away from Crisis with North Korea," Associated Press, 18 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Mid-May 1994

IAEA inspectors complete inspections of a plutonium reprocessing plant [Radiochemistry Laboratory] in Yŏngbyŏn-kun and replace the film and batteries on monitoring equipment at a nuclear reactor at the same complex.

—Michael R. Gordon, "Citing Progress, U.S. Plans New Talks with North Korea," *New York Times*, 21 May 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 May 1994

IAEA inspectors confirm that North Korea has begun removing spent nuclear fuel from its 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. While North Korea has not yet taken any measures that would prevent tests from determining the exact amount of nuclear material that has been removed, the IAEA states that immediate implementation of safeguards is necessary in order to verify whether or not spent fuel had been diverted in the past. To this end, the agency proposes sending a team to North Korea to discuss arrangements for implementing the necessary safeguards.

—Michael R. Gordon, "Team Confirms North Koreans Extracted Rods," *New York Times*, 20 May 1994, p. 9, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Proposes Sending a Team to Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Discuss Arrangements on Safeguards Measures," Federal News Service, 23 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 May 1994

The United States decides to resume high-level talks with North Korea. The decision follows an announcement by the IAEA that North Korea has not diverted any of the spent fuel it recently removed from a 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.

—Michael R. Gordon, "Citing Progress, U.S. Plans New Talks with North Korea," *New York Times*, 21 May 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Mary Curtis, "US Says Korean Fuel Not Diverted," *Boston Globe*, 21 May 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 May 1994

North Korea sends a message to the IAEA expressing its willingness to receive a team of specialist to discuss the implementation of safeguards on the 5MW(e) reactor currently being refueled. The IAEA team is scheduled to arrive on 24 May.

—"IAEA Consultation Travels to Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Clarify How to Implement Safeguards Measures in Power Reactor," Federal News Service, 24 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 May 1994

An IAEA team of specialists arrive in North Korea to discuss the implementation of safeguards on the 5MW(e) reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.

—"IAEA Consultation Travels to Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Clarify How to Implement Safeguards Measures in Power Reactor," Federal News Service, 24 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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25-27 May 1994

The IAEA and North Korea hold working level talks in Pyongyang. The purpose of the talks is to make arrangements for the implementation of necessary safeguards in order to verify that spent fuel from the 5MW(e) reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun has not been diverted. North Korea rejects the IAEA demand that it set aside about 300 fuel rods from the core to be examined at a later date.

—KCNA (Pyongyang), 28 May 1994, in "Foreign Ministry Spokesman Outlines Negotiations with IAEA," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Late May 1994

Working-level talks between the United States and North Korea break down as North Korea rejects the US demand that it set aside some of the fuel rods currently being removed from the 5MW(e) reactor so that future tests can determine if any of the spent fuel had been diverted in 1989.

—Michael R. Gordon, "Korea Speeds Nuclear Fuel Removal, Impeding Inspection," *New York Times*, 28 May 1994, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Robert Burns, "U.N. Inspectors Say North Koreans Speeding Removal of Fuel Rods," Associated Press, 28 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 May 1994

IAEA Director General Hans Blix informs UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali that North Korea is now removing fuel from its 5MW(e) reactor "at a very fast pace." In a letter to Boutros-Ghali, Blix claims that "almost half of the fuel in the reactor core has been discharged and in a pattern that has precluded the agency's ability to implement the full range of the safeguards measures required."

—Michael R. Gordon, "Korea Speeds Nuclear Fuel Removal, Impeding Inspection," *New York Times*, 28 May 1994, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Robert Burns, "U.N. Inspectors Say North Koreans Speeding Removal of Fuel Rods," Associated Press, 28 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David Albright, "How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?" *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September/October 1994, Vol. 50, No. 5, www.thebulletin.org.

28 May 1994

A team of IAEA officials sent to negotiate the implementation of necessary safeguards on the 5MW(e) reactor leave North Korea. The officials claim that North Korea "rejected all IAEA proposals put forward with the aim of maintaining the IAEA's ability to select, segregate and secure fuel rods for later measurements, so as to be able to verify the history of the reactor core."

—David E. Sanger, "North Korea Foils Efforts to Halt Its Nuclear Plans," *New York Times*, 29 May 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 May 1994

The UN Security Council issues a statement urging North Korea to set aside spent fuel rods necessary to determine if any plutonium has been diverted to a weapons program. The statement, adopted unanimously, carries less weight than a full resolution and makes no mention of economic sanctions if Pyongyang does not cooperate.

—Eric Schmitt, "U.N. Council Urges North Korea to Preserve Atom-Fuel Evidence," *New York Times*, 31 May 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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31 May 1994

The IAEA Director General Hans Blix announces that due to continued North Korean non-compliance with IAEA inspections, North Korea is "no longer [officially] in compliance with IAEA safeguards." The IAEA makes a final appeal to North Korea, asking it to stop withdrawing fuel rods from the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor and to allow international inspections to proceed. IAEA inspectors announce that key fuel rods have already been removed from the original 300 rods that are considered "vital to future measurement." In a telex to North Korea, the IAEA reiterates that it will accept two other methods of measuring the rods that remain, but according to Blix, North Korea has not accepted the proposals due to political constraints. North Korea's Ambassador to the IAEA, Yun Ho Jin announces that the refueling will continue. Yun says that 40 rods have been withdrawn under IAEA camera surveillance and placed in a storage site "pending an inspection agreement."

—R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Plans to Seek North Korea Sanctions; Pyongyang Seen Likely to Continue to Bar Inspections; IAEA Makes Last-Ditch Appeal," *Washington Post*, 1 June 1994, p. A22; Martin Walker, "North Korea 'Has Crossed Red Line,'" *Guardian* (London), 1 June 1994, p. 20, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

June 1994

The United States establishes a plan to bomb North Korea's nuclear complex in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.

—Lee Chŏng Hun, "Haech'orishisŏl Lee Chong Hun'i Pulbut'igo Chang Yŏng Shik'i Mulkkiŏntta," *Shindonga*, September 2002, www.donga.com.

2 June 1994

UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali receives a letter from IAEA inspectors stating that they can no longer verify that North Korea has not diverted plutonium to a clandestine weapons program.

—Terence Hunt, "U.S. to Seek UN Sanctions against North Korea," Associated Press, 2 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Mike Trickey, "Yeltsin Warns North Korea Not to Expect Russia's Help," *Vancouver Sun*, 3 June 1994, p. A15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 June 1994

Following the IAEA announcement that they could no longer verify that North Korea has not diverted spent fuel to a weapons program, the United States begins consultations at the UN on imposing economic sanctions. While most members of the Security Council support economic sanctions, China, a permanent member with veto power, is still reluctant to take such measures. In Beijing, Foreign Ministry spokesman, Shen Guofang says, "At this time, we do not favor resorting to means that might sharpen the confrontation."

—Terence Hunt, "U.S. to Seek UN Sanctions against North Korea," Associated Press, 2 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Mike Trickey, "Yeltsin Warns North Korea Not to Expect Russia's Help," *Vancouver Sun*, 3 June 1994, p. A15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Michael R. Gordon, "White House Asks Global Sanctions on North Koreans," *New York Times*, 3 June 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 June 1994

Russian President Boris Yeltsin warns Pyongyang that it cannot expect Russia's protection from economic sanctions or in the event of war over North Korea's suspicious nuclear activities. Yeltsin says that while Moscow would prefer a diplomatic solution to the problem, it does not feel bound by any treaties to support North Korea in the case of

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conflict.

—Mike Trickey, "Yeltsin Warns North Korea Not to Expect Russia's Help," *Vancouver Sun*, 3 June 1994, p. A15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 June 1994

The IAEA Director General Hans Blix informs the UN Security Council that the Agency is unable to verify whether North Korea has used the plutonium extracted from its 5MW(e) reactor to make nuclear weapons. According to Blix, North Korea has removed the 300 fuel rods of the "core fuel element" and mixed them up without marking their exact location in the reactor, thus making it impossible to determine the past activities of the reactor. There is no "technical way of knowing whether North Korea secretly removed fuel from the reactor in 1989 when it was shut down for 100 days and ...if plutonium [was extracted] from it." However, US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci says that although the IAEA's capability to substantiate the extent of North Korea's plutonium diversion has been "seriously eroded," it has not been destroyed.

—Paul Lewis, "U.N. Told North Korea's Nuclear Record Can't Be Retrieved," *New York Times*, 4 June 1994, p. A3; Thomas Lippman, "Nudging North Korea to Negotiate; International Group Seeks to Avoid Confrontation on Nuclear Issue," *Washington Post*, 4 June 1994, p. A14.

3 June 1994

North Korea announces that it will view economic sanctions as a declaration of war.

—Korean Central Broadcasting Agency (Pyongyang), 3 June 1994, in "Vice Foreign Minister's Statement on US-Orchestrated Pressure on Nuclear Issue," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; John Darnton, "Clinton Says That North Korea Can Still Avoid U.N. Sanctions," *New York Times*, 5 June 1994, p. 16, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 June 1994

Delegates from the United States, Japan and South Korea issue a joint statement in Washington calling on the UN Security Council to "urgently" consider economic sanction against North Korea for defying IAEA inspectors.

—"U.S., Japanese, S. Koreans Meet in Washington," United Press International, 4 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; John Darnton, "Clinton Says That North Korea Can Still Avoid U.N. Sanctions," *New York Times*, 5 June 1994, p. 16, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 June 1994

The *Rodong Sinmun*, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, warns that Pyongyang may withdraw from the NPT if Washington reneges on its agreement to hold a third round of high-level talks. In May the United States agreed to a third round of talks to resolve the nuclear issue in North Korea, but upon learning that IAEA inspectors could no longer verify that plutonium was not being diverted to a weapons program, Washington cancelled plans for the talks.

—"N. Korea Warns It May Withdraw from Nuclear Treaty," Japan Economic Newswire, 5 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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6 June 1994

US officials announce that by the end of the year North Korea could reprocess the fuel it recently removed from a 5MW(e) nuclear reactor and produce enough plutonium for four to five bombs.

—Michael R. Gordon, "North Korea Said to Have A-Bomb Fuel," *New York Times*, 8 June 1994, p. A7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>

7 June 1994

North Korea's Ambassador to the IAEA Yun Ho Jin declares that the North Korea "will never allow inspections" of two suspected nuclear waste sites in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. One of the reasons for not allowing inspections is because the United States discovered the two nuclear sites using spy satellite imagery. IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that inspecting the two sites "is even more important" for determining if North Korea has diverted plutonium, in light of the fact that North Korea has removed spent fuel from the core of its 5MW(e) reactor without allowing the IAEA to monitor the process. According to Blix, in removing the rods without allowing the IAEA to monitor the process, North Korea's "intention must have been to destroy the possibility of the [IAEA] obtaining information about the history of the core through independent measurements and thereby maintain uncertainty about the amount of nuclear material, specifically plutonium that may be present." However, North Korea's Department of Atomic Energy Director Pak Yong Nam says that the IAEA can still determine whether North Korea has diverted material from the nuclear reactor because North Korea is "preserving the technical possibility for later measurements of the fuel rods."

—David B. Ottaway, "N. Korea Forbids Inspections; 2 Nuclear Waste Sites Off-Limits, Says Envoy, Rebuffing U.S.," *Washington Post*, 8 June 1994, p. A25; "Pyongyang Boycotts Armistice Talks," *The Times*, 8 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 June 1994

North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yŏng Nam says North Korea will "guarantee [IAEA] inspections...testing, measuring, and the preservation of nuclear fuel," if the United States agrees to a third round of bilateral talks. The United States declines the offer and instead asks North Korea to comply with IAEA inspections before the United States will consider reopening bilateral talks.

—"U.S. Rejects More Talks in Standoff over Korea," *Toronto Star*, 9 June 1994, p. A20, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "Tokyo Reluctant to Levy Sanctions on North Koreans," *New York Times*, 9 June 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Charles A. Radin, "South Korea President Says Sanctions Needed to End Nuclear Dispute," *Boston Globe*, 9 June 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Before Talks with North Korea," *New York Times*, 10 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 June 1994

The United States announces that at this point it is not considering a third round of high-level talks with North Korea. According to State Department spokeswoman Christine Shelly, North Korea has passed the "point of no return" by removing by removing almost all of the 8,000 fuel rods from its 5MW(e) reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun, thus destroying vital evidence necessary for the IAEA to determine whether or not spent fuel was diverted to a weapons program when the reactor was shut down for 100 days in 1989. Despite the strong words by Shelly, the

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State Department says later in the day that the United States "remains interested in a negotiated settlement, but it's up to the North Koreans to reestablish the basis for our dialogue."

—"U.S. Rejects More Talks on Standoff over Korea," *Toronto Star*, 9 June 1994, p. A20, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Charles A. Radin, "South Korea President Says Sanctions Needed to End Nuclear Dispute," *Boston Globe*, 9 June 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 June 1994

IAEA officials announce that North Korea will have discharged all of the spent fuel rods from its 5MW(e) nuclear reactor by 10 June 1994. According to IAEA spokesman David Kyd, the fuel removal "has now been 90 percent completed." The fuel unloading has been faster than anticipated due to North Korea's possession of more unloading equipment than was previously indicated by IAEA inspections. IAEA officials claim that North Korea now has the ability to reprocess the spent fuel rods and separate out the weapons-grade plutonium by early August 1994. Kyd says that the IAEA has been unable to accept North Korea's proposal to supply the IAEA with a sample of 40 of the reactor's 8,000 fuel rods, instead of the 300 that are sought by the Agency. The proposal has been rejected because 40 fuel rods are insufficient to trace the 5MW(e) reactor's history.

—Stewart Stogel, "N. Korea Defueling Quickly, Could Make Plutonium Soon," *Washington Times*, 9 June 1994, p. A13; "China Opposes Sanctions in Korean Nuclear Row," Press Association, 8 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kevin Rafferty, "Seoul Urges China to Back Sanctions," *The Guardian* (London), 9 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 June 1994

South Korean President Kim Young Sam meets with his National Security Council and decides that economic sanctions should be used to deal with North Korea's defiance of the IAEA. He says that South Koreans must prepare for Pyongyang's response to the sanctions, which could include political turmoil or even military action.

—Charles A. Radin, "South Korea President Says Sanctions Needed to End Nuclear Dispute," *Boston Globe*, 9 June 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Pukhaek Uri Kyŏnugo Itta'/Kukkaanbohoeŭi Non'ŭi Naeyong," *Donga Ilbo*, 9 June 1994, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Puk Haekkaebal Pandŭshi Chŏji," *Hankryoreh Shinmun*, 9 June 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

9 June 1994

According to IAEA spokesman David Kyd, North Korea has removed 6,500 of the original 8,000 fuel rods from the core of its 5MW(e) nuclear reactor. Two IAEA inspectors are monitoring the fuel rods in the cooling pond. North Korea is not allowing the IAEA inspectors to take samples from the rods. According to a Western diplomat, the ability to reconstruct North Korea's nuclear history "is now lost."

—Mark Hibbs, "Low I-131 Means DPRK Reprocessing Could Begin 'Immediately'," *Nucleonics Week*, 9 June 1994, pp. 3-4.

9 June 1994

Former US President Jimmy Carter announces that he will travel to North and South Korea in the coming week to discuss "important issues of the day with leaders." Carter claims that he "will have no official status relating to the US government" and thus will not be speaking on behalf of Washington.

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—"DPRK Urges U.S. to Help Establish New Peace Mechanism," Xinhua News Agency, 10 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 June 1994

Russia agrees to cooperate with the United States on a UN resolution calling for economic sanctions against North Korea.

—Sue Kendell, "Tension Mounts over North Korea," Agence France Presse, 11 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 June 1994

The IAEA Board of Governors passes a resolution suspending technical aid to North Korea. The aid is worth roughly \$250,000 per year.

—Paul Shin, "In Latest War Preparations, Seoul Checking Civil Defense System," Associated Press, 10 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 June 1994

Selig Harrison, a scholar from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, meets with North Korean President Kim Il Sung and reportedly emerges with a North Korean offer to freeze its nuclear activities in return for unspecified concessions.

—David E. Sanger, "North Korea Quits Atom Agency in Wider Rift with U.S. and U.N.," *New York Times*, 14 June 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 June 1994

North Korea announces its "immediate withdrawal from the IAEA." In a Foreign Ministry statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency, Pyongyang announces that it "will not be bound to any rules or resolutions of the agency hereafter." While Pyongyang once again claims a "special status" under the NPT, the statement stops short of announcing a withdrawal from the treaty. The Foreign Ministry announcement comes in the wake of an IAEA resolution suspending technical assistance to North Korea. In the statement, Pyongyang reiterates its position that any UN sanctions will be viewed as a declaration of war.

—"Full Text of N. Korea's Statement on IAEA Withdrawal," Japan Economic Newswire, 13 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jim Abrams, "U.S. Moves Toward Sanctions, Warns North Korea on Inspectors," Associated Press, 13 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; J. T. Nguyen, "N. Korea Sends Pullout Notice," United Press International, 14 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Reuter, "North Korea Quits Nuclear Watchdog And Warns of War," *Toronto Star*, 14 June 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "North Korea Quits Atom Agency in Wider Rift with U.S. and U.N.," *New York Times*, 14 June 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Mid-June 1994

Russian intelligence chief Sergei Stepashin reveals that three North Koreans have been detained in the Russian Far Eastern territory of Primorskoje for seeking nuclear weapons components.

—Daniel Snider, "The Trail of N. Korea's Nuclear Bid," *Christian Science Monitor*, 17 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis,

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<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Warren Strobel, "N. Korea Sops for Nuke Technology in Russia," *Washington Times*, 5 July 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Chŏng Hae Yŏng, "Puk, Rŏ Haekkisul Milsuip Kido/Missile P'oham 3 Kŏn...Taesagwanjig'wŏn 3 Myŏngch'ep'o," *Chosun Ilbo*, 6 July 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

15 June 1994

Former US President Jimmy Carter arrives in North Korea and begins a four day trip in an attempt to diffuse the escalating tension on the peninsula over North Korea's nuclear program. While Carter is not officially representing the US government, KBS Radio in Seoul, quoting an anonymous US scholar, reports that the former president is carrying "an unofficial package deal" from Washington that offers diplomatic recognition if North Korea opens its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspectors.

—KBS Radio (Seoul), 15 June 1994, in "Former President Reportedly Has 'Package Deal' for North Korea," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Paul Shin, "Carter to Cross Border to Begin Four-Day Visit to North Korea," Associated Press, 14 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 June 1994

The United States presents the other four permanent members of the Security Council with a draft resolution calling for sanctions on North Korea. The resolution calls for five-phases of increasingly severe sanctions if North Korea continues to refuse IAEA inspections. The first phase would include the immediate halt to all UN technical and scientific projects in North Korea and an embargo on arms sales. Britain and France support the resolution, but China and Russia still seem reluctant to impose sanctions on North Korea. According to Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles Freeman, if the Security Council fails to adopt the resolution, the United States "is prepared to form a coalition outside of the Security Council."

—Rena Slama, "US Proposes UN Sanctions against N. Korea," Agence France Presse, 15 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Paul Lewis, "U.S. Offers A Plan for U.N. Sanctions on North Koreans," *New York Times*, 16 June 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 June 1994

Russia refuses to support a US draft resolution calling for phased sanctions against North Korea if it continues to defy the IAEA. Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev says that the United States failed to consult adequately with Moscow before presenting the resolution to the Security Council.

—Alessandra Stanley, "Moscow is Miffed by U.S. Draft on Sanctions," *New York Times*, 17 June 1994, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 June 1994

North Korea reiterates its threat to withdraw from the NPT following the United States's presentation of a draft resolution in the Security Council calling for phased sanctions against North Korea. According to the Korean Central News Agency, a North Korean official says, "Whether our special status following the temporary suspension of the withdrawal from the NPT is removed, or (whether) we completely withdraw from it, fully depends on future developments."

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—"North Korea Reiterates Threat to Pull out of NPT," Agence France Presse, 16 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 June 1994

North Korean President Kim Il-sung, in his talks with former US President Jimmy Carter, reportedly agrees to allow IAEA inspectors to remain at the 5MW(e) gas-graphite nuclear reactor and promises that the IAEA's monitoring equipment will stay in good condition. According to Carter, Kim also expresses an interest in replacing North Korea's gas-graphite reactor with a less proliferation prone light water reactor.

—Frank J. Murray, "Clinton Bolsters Forces But Offers N. Korea an Out," *Washington Times*, 17 June 1994, pp. A1, A16; "Kim Promises Not to Expel IAEA Inspectors," Agence France Presse, 16 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "Carter Optimistic after North Korea Talks," *New York Times*, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kate Webb, "Carter Goes into Second And Crucial Round of Talks with Kim Il Sung," Agence France Presse, 17 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 June 1994

US safeguards experts propose that the IAEA use alternative techniques to measure the plutonium in the 8,000 fuel rods removed by North Korea from its 5MW(e) nuclear reactor. According to one Western safeguards official, it is still "theoretically possible" to recreate an inventory of North Korea's fissile material "within a 90-95 percent confidence level" with North Korean cooperation.

—Mark Hibbs, "IAEA Might Still Verify DPRK Fissile Inventory, Experts Say," *Nucleonics Week*, 16 June 1994, pp. 14-15.

16 June 1994

US President Bill Clinton announces that Washington is willing reopen high-level talks with Pyongyang if it freezes its suspected nuclear weapons program in a verifiable manner.

—"Clinton: U.S. May Restore Talks with DPRK," Xinhua News Agency, 16 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Julian Beltrame, "Carter's Intervention Opens Doors to Talks: North Korean Leader Agrees to Allow Inspectors to Stay at Nuclear Facility," *Vancouver Sun*, p. A13, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Carter Reports Progress on Korea Talks Could Reopen, U.S. Says," *Toronto Star*, 17 June 1994, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "Carter Optimistic after North Korea Talks," *New York Times*, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 June 1994

Former US President Jimmy Carter informs Kim Il Sung through a videotaped message that "the sanctions process at the UN has been stopped."

—"North Korea: U.S. Moves Forward with Sanctions, Despite Progress," Inter Press Service, 17 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 June 1994

Former US President Jimmy Carter ends his four-day diplomatic trip to North Korea.

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—David E. Sanger, "Carter Visit to North Korea: Whose Trip Was It Really?" *New York Times*, 18 June 1994, p. 6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 June 1994

The Clinton administration sends a letter to North Korea saying that if it agrees to freeze "major elements" of its nuclear program and permits the IAEA to ensure the continuity of safeguards, the US will resume high-level talks and stop pursuing economic sanctions. The message is sent by Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci to his North Korean counterpart Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sök Chu.

—"U.S. Opens Channel to North Korea," United Press International, 21 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Barry Schweid, "Administration Asks North Korea to Confirm Freeze Offer," Associated Press, 21 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US Offers to Suspend Bid for UN Sanctions against North Korea," Agence France Presse, 21 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Michael R. Gordon, "Clinton Offers North Korea A Chance to Resume Talks," *New York Times*, 22 June 1994, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 June 1994

President Bill Clinton announces that North Korea has agreed to freeze its nuclear program in return for the United States resuming bilateral talks. Clinton says, "...we are informing the North Koreans that we are ready to go forward with a new round of talks in Geneva early next month."

—"North Korea OKs Nuclear Freeze for Talks," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 23 June 1994, p. 1A, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S.-North Korea: Clinton Announces Accord," Inter Press Service, 22 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 June 1994

North Korea confirms that it will fully comply with the NPT and its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, allow IAEA inspectors to remain in North Korea, maintain IAEA monitoring equipment in compliance with the NPT, and halt its nuclear activities.

—"ROK Foreign Minister: DPRK to 'Comply in Full' With NPT," Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 23 June 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-014, 13 July 1994, p. 10; "DPRK, U.S. to Resume 3rd Round Talks in Geneva," Xinhua News Agency, 23 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 June 1994

US and North Korean officials meet in New York to work out details for the upcoming high-level talks to be held in Geneva beginning 8 July. The two sides reportedly agree on the agenda for the talks.

—Sid Balman Jr., "U.S. Expects Extended Talks with N. Korea," United Press International, 24 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Ron Fournier, "U.S.-North Korean Talks to Begin July 8 in Geneva," Associated Press, 27 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 June 1994

South Korea announces that President Kim Young Sam will meet with North Korean President Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang on 25 July to discuss reducing the growing tension on the Korean Peninsula.

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—Peter Goodspeed, "Presidents of Two Koreas Plan Historic July Summit," *Toronto Star*, 28 June 1994, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 July 1994

Delegates from the United States, Japan, and South Korea hold a third round of consultations in Washington to discuss North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program. The three countries reaffirm their commitment to solving the problem through cooperation and dialogue.

—"Japan-U.S.-ROK Ties on Nuke Issue Reconfirmed," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 4 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 July 1994

Diplomats from North and South Korea meet to discuss the details of the upcoming summit between the leaders of the two countries to be held in Pyongyang on 25-27 July. The South Korean delegation will be allowed to bring 100 officials and 80 members of the South Korean press.

—Peter Goodspeed, "Korean Summit Plans Bog Down But Diplomats Do Strike Deals on Some Details of Meeting," *Toronto Star*, 2 July 1994, p. A13, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 July 1994

Officials in Seoul and Tokyo announce that the United States, Russia, and South Korea are currently working on a plan to supply North Korea with a light water nuclear reactor to replace its graphite-moderated reactor. Under the proposal, Russia would provide North Korea with light water reactor technology, and South Korea would pay the costs by waiving part of the \$1.47 billion in loans owed by Moscow to Seoul.

—Kevin Rafferty, "Plan Offers North Korea Safer Nuclear Technology; U.S., South Korea and Russia Working out Details," *Ottawa Citizen*, 9 July 1994, p. A5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Plan Discussed to Provide North Korea with Russian Reactor," Associated Press, 6 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 July 1994

Georgi Kunadze, the Russian ambassador to South Korea, says that Russia would help supply a light water reactor to replace North Korea's graphite-moderated reactor if North Korea accepts full IAEA safeguards inspections.

—Don Kirk, "U.S., N. Korea Talk," *Newsday*, 9 July 1994, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 July 1994

Kim Il Sung dies of heart failure at the age of 82. Kim's death comes during a period of bilateral negotiations with the United States to freeze the North Korean nuclear program, and shortly before a summit meeting with South Korean President Kim Young Sam that was scheduled to begin on 25 July 1994. His son, Kim Jong Il, later succeeds him as leader of North Korea.

—James Sterngold, "Death Adds a Dangerous Uncertainty to the Warming With U.S.," *New York Times*, 9 July 1994, p. 5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Kim Il Sung, N. Korea's Longtime Leader, Dies," *Los Angeles Times*, 9 July 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Kim Il Söng Chusökö Samang/Öje Saebyök Kapchagi/Pukhant'ükpyölbangsöng," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 9 July 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Hô Nam Chin, "Kim Il Söng Samang/Nambukchöngsanghwoedam Musan/P'yöngyangbangsöng 'Öje Saebyök Shimgün'gyöngsaeg'üro'," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 9 July 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

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Joongang Ilbo, 9 July 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Dr. Taeho Kim, "Kim Jong-il—North Korea's New Leader," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, September 1994, pp. 421-424.

8 July 1994

US and North Korean diplomats begin high-level talks aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis. However, only hours later, the two sides learn of Kim Il Sung's death. The talks are postponed until 5 August 1994.

—Don Kirk, "U.S., N. Korea Talk," *Newsday*, 9 July 1994, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US Fears 'Long Slog' Talks with N Korea," *Independent*, 8 July 1994, p. 12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Debra Lau, "U.S., N. Korea Resume High-Level Talks," *Daily Yomiuri*, 9 July 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Talks Between the U.S. and North Korea to Resume after Kim Funeral," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 11 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 July 1994

North Korea indefinitely postpones the North-South summit scheduled for 25-27 July. In a one sentence letter sent to South Korea, Kim Yong Sun, chairman of North Korea's Unification Policy Committee says, "Because of the unusual state of affairs on our side, which has already been made known through urgent reports, I have been instructed to inform you that the scheduled South-North summit meeting will have to be postponed."

—James Sterngold, "Korean Summit Talks Postponed as Northern Military Backs Heir," *New York Times*, 11 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Postpones Summit, Nuclear Talks with U.S. to Resume," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 11 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 July 1994

North Korea's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Kim Su Man announces that IAEA inspectors can remain at the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun, and that the recently removed fuel rods will not be processed. Kim also says that the 5MW(e) reactor will not be refueled.

—"N. Korea Will Honor Promise to Freeze Nuclear Program," Japan Economic Newswire, 12 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 July 1994

David Kay, a former IAEA inspector, says that 8,000 fuel rods removed by North Korean technicians from the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor and later placed in a cooling pond must be removed from the pond by September. If the rods are not removed by then, the international community will very likely never know how much if any spent fuel was diverted to a nuclear weapons program. According to Kay, the magnesium oxide cladding that protects the nuclear material reacts with water, and in a matter of a couple of months the cladding will break down leaking the nuclear material into the pond.

—"In Two Months, A Crucial Decision on Korean Nuclear Rods," Deutsch Presse-Agentur, 12 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 July 1994

The US Senate passes an amendment to the 1995 foreign aid bill prohibiting any aid to North Korea unless the president certifies that North Korea is not pursuing nuclear weapons.

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—"Senate Votes to Ban Aid to North Korea," Associated Press, 15 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 July 1994

During a rally held in Kim Il Sung Square in central Pyongyang, North Korea's elite pledge allegiance to Kim Jong Il, son of the recently deceased President Kim Il Sung. Meanwhile, North Korea assures the United States that it will continue the freeze on its nuclear facilities and that high-level bilateral talks will resume.

—Reuter, "North Korea Ready to Talk Discussions with U.S. to Resume," *Toronto Star*, 21 July 1994, p. A20, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 July 1994

Diplomats from the United States and North Korea meet in New York and agree to resume the third round of high-level nuclear talks on 5 August. The United States insists that North Korea must continue to honor a freeze on all nuclear activities for the duration of the talks.

—"U.S. and North Korea to Resume Talks," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 21 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Senthil Ratnasabapathy and Victor Ego Ducrot, "North Korea-United States: Talks to Resume on Nuclear Inspections," Inter Press Service, 22 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., North Korea to Resume Talks in Geneva August 5," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 22 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 July 1994

North Korean defector Kang Myŏng Do claims that North Korea has five nuclear weapons and plans to build an additional five weapons. Kang said that North Korea was using the negotiations to stall while it built missiles to deliver the weapons. Kang, who is allegedly the son-in-law of North Korea's Premier Kang Sŏng San, indicated that he had acquired his information from a "senior official at the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex." Kang says he met the official at the wedding of the official's son, and that the official revealed the information after they had been drinking alcohol. Kang also says that North Korea will announce that it has nuclear weapons after it produces about 10 bombs. This announcement comes only one week before North Korea is scheduled to meet with US officials in Geneva to discuss the North Korean nuclear program. [Note: Kang's credibility is very suspect.]

—James Sterngold, "Defector Says North Korea Has 5 A-Bombs and May Make More," *New York Times*, 28 July 1994, p. A7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Terry McCarthy, "Defector Reports N Korea Has Five Nuclear Bombs," *Independent* (London), 28 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Park Ch'an Ku, "Kwisun kang Myŏng Do-Cho Myŏng Ch'ŏl Ssi Kijahoe'gyŏn Ilmun'iltap," *Taehan Maeil*, 28 July 1994, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

29 July 1994

Kim Hyŏng Ki, a spokesman for South Korea's Ministry of Unification, states that the claims of North Korean defector Kang Myŏng Do have "not been supported by solid proof." Kang claimed that North Korea has five nuclear bombs and plans to build five more.

—Zeno Park, "S Korean Intelligence Agency Under Fire for Defector's Five-Bomb Claim," Agence France Presse, 29 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Associated Press, "Defector's 'Secrets' Downplayed; Seoul

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Says Claims N. Korea Has 5 A-Bombs Unproven," *The Phoenix Gazette*, 29 July 1994, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; John Burton, "Seoul Doubts N-Bomb Claim," *Financial Times* (London), 29 July 1994, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "No Proof That Pyongyang Has Nuclear Weapons, Seoul Says," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 29 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Dismisses Defector's North Korea Nuclear Arsenal Claim," Agence France Presse, 29 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 July 1994

The IAEA announces that, based on information currently available to the agency, the claims made by a North Korean defector are "not judged to be plausible." On 27 July, North Korean defector Kang Mǒng Do stated that North Korea has already developed five nuclear weapons and is in the process of developing five more.

—"IAEO Refutes Claims of North Korean Nuclear Bombs," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 29 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 August 1994

North Korea objects to the presence of South Korean envoy Kim Sam Hun at high-level talks in Geneva. According to the *Rodong Sinmun*, the official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, "South Korean authorities have neither a reason nor a purpose in interfering in North Korea's negotiations with the United States."

—"North Korea Accuses South of 'Interfering' in Geneva Talks," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 5 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Pukhaektonggyōl Shilhyōn'e Ch'oesōn'/Clinton Hoegyōn/Puk, Hyōpsangipchang Pulbyōn'gangjo," *Chosun Ilbo*, 5 August 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Lee Kyōng Hyōn, "Kim Il Sung Badge Tan Puktaep'yo 'Hoedam'ūn Haebwaya...'/4juman'e Chaegae Mibukhoedam'anp'ak," *Taehan Maeil*, 5 August 1994, p. 5, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Puk, Ilgwalt'agyōl Kidae/Han'guk Kansōp'ūn Pandae," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 5 August 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

5 August 1994

US and North Korean officials resume talks in Geneva following a delay due to the death of Kim Il Sung on 8 July. Hō Jong, a member of the North Korean delegation and former ambassador to the UN, says North Korea's policy has remained consistent despite Kim's death. North Korea claims it is urgent to reach an agreement because of 8,000 spent fuel rods sitting in a cooling pond in Yōngbyōn-kun. The United States has suggested that the spent fuel rods be shipped to another country. During the eight hour meeting, the two sides reportedly discussed the possibility of replacing North Korea's graphite-moderated reactor with a less proliferation-prone light water reactor.

—John Burton, "US and N Korea Climb Back in the Ring: Resumption of Talks Today in Geneva on Nuclear Issue," *Financial Times*, 5 August 1994, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Frances Williams, "Talks Offer Few Clues to Pyongyang Stance," *Financial Times*, 6 August 1994, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Debra Lau, "U.S., North Korea Resume Talks," *Daily Yomiuri*, 6 August 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Alan Riding, "No Resolution of Nuclear Issue in Korea Talks," *New York Times*, 6 August 1994, p. 5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lee Kyōng Hyōn, "Kim Il Sung Badge Tan Puktaep'yo 'Hoedam'ūn Haebwaya...'/4juman'e Chaegae Mibukhoedam'anp'ak," *Taehan Maeil*, 5 August 1994, p. 5, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

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10 August 1994

Delegations from the United States and North Korea try to resolve contentious issues regarding North Korea's nuclear activities, but the two sides have yet to reach an agreement. The two sides have agreed to replace North Korea's graphite-moderated reactor program with more proliferation resistant light water reactors, but the details of the arrangement and prerequisites for the technology transfer are not worked out at this meeting.

—"Seoul May Consider Providing Pyongyang with Light Water Reactors," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 11 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Talks Between North Korea And United States Break off," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 10 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Gallucci, Kang Hopeful in Talks on Pyongyang's Nuclear Programme," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 10 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 August 1994

The third round of high-level talks between the United States and North Korea ends with a joint declaration. In the declaration, the United States agrees to make arrangements to provide North Korea with light water reactors, and "upon receipt of United States assurances for the provision of light water reactors and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze construction of the 50MW(e) and 200MW(e) reactors, forgo reprocessing, and seal the Radiochemistry Laboratory, which will be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency." The declaration also states that the two states are prepared to improve diplomatic relations, the United States is prepared to provide North Korea with assurances against the threat of nuclear attack, and North Korea will remain a party to the NPT. While the joint declaration is a landmark cooperative effort by the two states to resolve contentious issues relating to North Korea's nuclear program, it makes only passing reference to the time-sensitive problem of the 8,000 spent fuel rods currently corroding in a cooling pond. The delegations agree to meet again on 23 September.

—"Agreed Statement between DPRK And USA," KCNA (Pyongyang), 13 August 1994, in "Agreement Reached in Geneva Talks; KCNA Carries Text of Joint Statement," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea, U.S. Prepare Joint Declaration on Nuclear Row," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "United States, DPRK Reach Landmark Agreement," Xinhua News Agency, 13 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Reuters, "Statement by N. Korea And The U.S.," *New York Times*, 13 August 1994, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Alan Riding, "U.S. And N. Korea Say They'll Seek Diplomatic Links," *New York Times*, 13 August 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N Korean Nuclear Negotiator Hails Geneva Accord," Agence France Presse, 14 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Mid-August 1994

A 34-year-old German man is arrested in Bremen, Germany for trying to sell plutonium and enriched uranium. The man, Adolf Jaekle, was in possession of 0.05mg of plutonium but promised 50 times the amount if the buyers were interested. According to a report on Germany's ARD TV, Jaekle was receiving an "operational fund" from Pyongyang. On 24 August, North Korea dismisses the accusation as groundless.

—"Bonn Expects Agreements with Russia on Nuclear Smuggling," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 19 August 1994, in

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Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Blasts German Plutonium Reports," United Press International, 24 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 August 1994

South Korea formally offers to supply North Korea with light water reactor technology if Pyongyang opens all of its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspectors. President Kim Young Sam says, "If and when the North guarantees the transparency of its nuclear activities, we are ready to support their development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including light water nuclear reactor construction, by providing them with the necessary capital and technology."

—Andrew Pollack, "South Korea Offers Nuclear Aid to North: Gesture Asks for Weaponry Assurances," *New York Times*, 15 August 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 August 1994

South Korea suggests setting up an international consortium to organize the replacement of North Korea's graphite-moderated reactor technology with the more efficient and more proliferation resistant light water reactor technology.

—"Seoul Wants Consortium to Lead North Korea Nuclear Conversion," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 16 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Han'guk"Yang Sŭng Hyŏn, "Chŏngbu, 'Taebukchiwŏn Taech'aekpan' Kot Kusŏng," *Taehan Maeil*, 17 August 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "'Han'gukhyŏng Kyŏngsuro Kwanch'ŏl'/'Kwagŏ Haek Kyumyŏng' Hanwoemu · Migungmu T'onghwa," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 15 August 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Lee Chae Kŭn, "Han · Mi · Il Consortium Pangshik/Urich'ŭk'i Taebubun Pudam," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 16 August 1994, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

18 August 1994

White House officials announce that President Bill Clinton is demanding that North Korea open two suspected nuclear waste sites to IAEA inspections before any light water reactor technology is provided.

—Steven Greenhouse, "Clinton Demanding North Korean Inspections," *New York Times*, 18 August 1994, p. A6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 August 1994

North Korea rejects the US demand that it open two suspected nuclear waste sites to IAEA inspectors. In a statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says, "We will never allow the inspection of military sites at the expense of our sovereignty to receive light water reactors. This is our unshakable will."

—Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 20 August 1994, in "The Nuclear Issue; Spokesman Reaffirms Stance on Rejecting Special Inspections," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 22 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; James Sterngold, "North Korea Turns away from Nuclear Inspection Condition," *New York Times*, 21 August 1994, p. 25, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

September 1994

Former President Jimmy Carter receives a letter from Kim Jong Il thanking Carter for visiting Kim Il Sung, giving his

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word that he will carry out all the promises his father had made, and inviting him to mediate the US-North Korean talks to be held in Pyongyang on 10 September.

—KBS-1 Television (Seoul), 10 August 2001, in "ROK's KBS-1 TV Interviews Former US President Carter on Korean Issues," FBIS Document ID: KPP20010811000003; James Sterngold, "North Korea Invites Carter to Mediate," *New York Times*, 2 September 1994, p. A7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Early September 1994

The two IAEA inspectors who remain in North Korea conduct inspections at a fuel fabrication plant and a fuel storage facility.

—"IAEA Says North Korea Has Offered to Permit Nuclear Inspections," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Delegation Visits North Korea as Two Sides Meet in Berlin," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 September 1994

Pyongyang informs the two IAEA inspectors who remain in North Korea that due to positive development with the United States, it will now consider accepting IAEA inspections.

—"IAEA Says North Korea Has Offered to Permit Nuclear Inspections," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Delegation Visits North Korea as Two Sides Meet in Berlin," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 September 1994

South Korean Foreign Minister Han Söng Ju meets with Robert Gallucci, the head US negotiator in talks with North Korea. Han insists that South Korea play a larger role in resolving the nuclear crisis in North Korea. According to Seoul, North Korea's nuclear program is a North-South issue as well as an international issue and should be dealt with accordingly. Han also conveys to the United States Seoul's concern over the speed at which Washington is normalizing relations with Pyongyang.

—"South Koreans Insist on Role in Nuclear Talks with North Korea," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 6 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; George Gedda, "U.S. Says It Remains Committed to South Korea's Security," Associated Press, 6 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 September 1994

US Secretary of State Warren Christopher assures South Korean Foreign Minister Han Söng Ju that there will be no deal with Pyongyang unless Seoul is included in the negotiations. Speaking at the State Department, Christopher says, "We can't finally resolve the nuclear issue unless and until North Korea resumes the substantive dialogue with the Republic of Korea."

—"No North Korean Nuclear Deal without North-South Negotiations," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Reassures Seoul on Nuclear Arms Talks with North Korea," *New York Times*, 8 September 1994, p. A6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 September 1994

The United States and North Korea hold simultaneous talks in Berlin and Pyongyang. The Berlin talks address

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technical and logistic issues dealing with the proposed replacement of North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors with light water reactors. In addition, the delegations in Berlin discuss the status of the 8,000 spent fuel rods currently corroding in a cooling pond. Since no high-level officials are on the US delegation, it is not empowered to negotiate, and its task is solely to exchange information. At the Pyongyang talks, the United States and North Korea discuss logistical concerns of setting up liaison missions in each other's country. Discussions range from exchanging rental prices to whether or not liaisons will be granted diplomatic immunity.

—"U.S., North Korea Hold Technical Talks on Nuclear Issues," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 10 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jim Anderson, "Expert Talks Pave the Way for High-Level US-N. Korea Negotiations," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 10 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Delegation Visits North Korea as Two Sides Meet in Berlin," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 September 1994

IAEA Director General Hans Blix announces that North Korea has indicated a willingness to allow inspections of its nuclear facilities. Speaking at the Board of Governors meeting, Blix says that Pyongyang would "permit the agency to perform most of the activities requested in view of recent positive developments in its bilateral talks with the US." Blix also reports that the two inspectors who remain in North Korea have recently conducted inspections at a fuel fabrication plant and a storage facility.

—"IAEA Says North Korea Has Offered to Permit Nuclear Inspections," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Delegation Visits North Korea as Two Sides Meet in Berlin," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 September 1994

The IAEA reports that inspections of the reprocessing facility [Radiochemistry Laboratory] in Yŏngbyŏn-kun have yielded no evidence that plutonium has been extracted there since February 1993. The conclusion is reached by analyzing nuclear samples taken from the Radiochemistry Laboratory in Yŏngbyŏn-kun during March and May 1994. There is suspicion, however, that fuel rods were processed at a second facility where inspections were not allowed. The report confirms that North Korea has not permitted inspections of two major nuclear facilities.

—"IAEA Says North Korea Has Offered to Permit Nuclear Inspections," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Puk, Haeksach'al Pŏm'ŭihwaktæ Hŏyong'/'P'yeyŏllyo Chaech'ŏri Ajik Anhae'," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 13 September 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Yu Chae Shik, "Puk Yŏngbyŏn Haekyŏllobong/Chaech'ori Hŭnjŏg'ŏpsŏ/IAEA Haeg'anjŏnhyŏpchŏng Ihaeng Ch'okku," *Joongang Ilbo*, 13 September 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

13 September 1994

The United States and North Korea end talks in Pyongyang. According to a joint statement, the talks, which started on 10 September and dealt with logistics of exchanging liaisons, "proceeded in a serious and cooperative atmosphere."

—"U.S. Talks in Pyongyang 'Cooperative,'" Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 13 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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15 September 1994

The United States and North Korea conclude talks in Berlin. During the five-day talks the two sides discussed issues relating to North Korea's nuclear program including the proposed replacement of North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors with light water reactors. The North Korean representative to the talks, Kim Chong U, says that for Pyongyang to consider such an option the United States must finance the project and North Korea must be allowed to select the type of replacement reactor. With regard to the 8,000 spent fuel rods currently corroding in a cooling pond, North Korea agrees to store the rod in a dry place where they will not be subject to corrosion but refuses to allow the United States or any other country to assist in the process.

—"U.S., North Korea and Nuclear Talks," United Press International, 15 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; James Sterngold, "Talks Leave North Korea and U.S. Split," *New York Times*, 15 September 1994, p. A11, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Frank Bajak, "Issues of Who Pays, Who Provides Reactors Linger after Talks," Associated Press, 15 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Says No Equipment for North Korea until Full Inspections," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 21 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 September 1994

The United States announces that it along with South Korea, Japan and other countries paying for the replacement reactors, reserves the right to choose which country will supply the reactors. On 15 September, North Korea stated that it should be able to select the reactor type and the supplier.

—Sang Hun Choe, "U.S. Rejects North Korea's Demand to Choose Type of Reactors," Associated Press, 16 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 September 1994

South Korea agrees to participate in an international consortium to replace North Korea's graphite moderated nuclear reactors with more efficient and proliferation resistant light water reactors.

—"South Korea Ups the Stakes on Eve of Korean Nuclear Talks," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 22 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 September 1994

The General Conference of the IAEA adopts a resolution sponsored by France that urges North Korea to open up its nuclear facilities to inspections. In the resolution, approved by 76 states, the General Conference "expresses continuing concern over the non-compliance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with its safeguards agreement...urges the DPRK to cooperate immediately with the Agency in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement and to allow the Agency to have access to all safeguards-relevant information and locations." Libya is the only state to vote against the resolution while ten states abstained.

—"IAEA Appeals to N. Korea, Expresses Concern over Nuclear Smuggling," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 23 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 September 1994

The United States and North Korea resume high-level talks in Geneva. The talks originally scheduled to begin on 8 July were suspended after the death of Kim Il Sung.

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—"Little Progress as U.S., North Korea Continue Nuclear Talks," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 24 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 September 1994

North Korea announces that at present it will not allow inspections of two sites suspected by the IAEA of containing nuclear waste. Kang Sök Chu, head of the North Korean delegation to the Geneva talks, says, "When the two sides [the United States and North Korea] create the atmosphere of confidence and establish normal relations in the future, we shall be ready to make our nuclear activities transparent."

—Konstantin Pribytkov, "No Progress at US-North Korean Talks in Geneva," ITAR-TASS, 26 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., North Korea Continue Nuclear Talks," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 26 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 September 1994

At high-level US-North Korean talks in Geneva, the United States says that North Korea must accept the South Korean light water reactor model or the talks will break down. North Korea concedes that it is up to the United States to decide.

—"U.S. Insists on Its Right to Pick Reactor," United Press International, 26 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 September 1994

The United States announces that due to a deadlock at high-level talks with North Korea the talks will be briefly suspended. The talks to resolve the dispute over North Korea's nuclear program were resumed on 23 September, but both sides report little progress.

—Alan Riding, "U.S. and North Korea Announce Pause in Talks, but No Progress," *New York Times*, 30 September 1994, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Getting to Yes with North Korea," *New York Times*, 1 October 1994, p. 22, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 October 1994

The United States and North Korea resume high-level talks in Geneva.

—Elizabeth Olson, "Negotiators Restart High-level Talks on Nuclear Issues," Associated Press, 5 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Michael R. Gordon, "North Korea and the U.S. at an Impasse," *New York Times*, 6 October 1994, p. A7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 October 1994

In a speech to the UN General Assembly, North Korea's Deputy Foreign Minister Ch'oe Su Hön says that talks with the United States to resolve the dispute over North Korea's nuclear program have entered a "new stage." Ch'oe also warns South Korea and the IAEA not to create obstacles to the third round of talks. In a reference to the IAEA's call for North Korea to allow inspections of two suspected nuclear waste sites, Ch'oe warns the IAEA not to use "pressure and threats against us, while peddling around arguments about so-called 'special inspections'."

—"N. Korea: Talks with U.S. at 'New Stage,'" United Press International, 5 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Elizabeth Olson, "Negotiators Restart High-level Talks on Nuclear Issues," Associated

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Press, 5 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jim Mannion, "North Korea Accuses Seoul of Creating Obstacles in Nuclear Talks," Agence France Presse, 5 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 October 1994

South Korean President Kim Young Sam criticizes the US approach to dealing with North Korea's nuclear program as "naïve and overly flexible."

—James Sterngold, "South Korean President Lashes Out at U.S.," *New York Times*, 8 October 1994, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 10 October 1994, in "Kim Young-Sam Says USA Is Too Ready to Compromise on North Korea," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yu Hye Chu, "'Mi, Pukhaek Tŏ Yangbohal P'ilyoŏpta'/Kim Taet'ongnyŏng," *Segye Ilbo*, 9 October 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

12 October 1994

The United States sends a draft compromise to South Korea on resolving the dispute over North Korea's nuclear program. However, the draft resolution does not contain two key South Korean demands: (1) North Korea must allow special inspections of two suspected nuclear waste sites before any light water reactor technology is provided; and (2) the light water reactor must be provided by South Korea. While the draft does not include language specifying the use of a South Korean reactor model, the United States assures South Korea that it would be allowed to take the initiative in all technical matters.

—Ivan Zakharchenko, "US Wants South Korea to Approve Compromise with North Korea," ITAR-TASS, 12 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 12 October 1994, in "The Nuclear Issue; US Draft Compromise on Pyongyang's Nuclear Issue Conveyed to Seoul," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 October 1994

Robert Gallucci, chief negotiator for the United States in high-level talks with North Korea, announces that the two sides have reached an agreement concerning North Korea's nuclear program. Gallucci does not mention any details of the agreement but says that "it is a broadly acceptable and very positive document."

—"U.S., DPRK Reach Accord on Nuclear Issues," Xinhua News Agency, 17 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Steven Greenhouse, "U.S. and North Korea Agree to Build on Nuclear Accord," *New York Times*, 18 October 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., North Korea Reach Accord on Nuclear Monitoring," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 18 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 October 1994

IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that the IAEA will need an expanded mandate in order to fulfill its role as spelled out in the bilateral agreement between the United States and North Korea. Speaking in Washington, Blix says, "The US-DPRK Geneva agreement foresees a freezing of the present DPRK nuclear program and a subsequent dismantling of installations. This will call for new IAEA verification responsibilities beyond what is required under the Safeguards Agreement."

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—"U.N. Needs New Mandate for U.S.-Korea Pact," United Press International, 20 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 October 1994

The United States and North Korea sign the Agreed Framework, an accord that specifies the actions both countries will take to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Under the terms of the agreement, a US-led international consortium will help North Korea replace its graphite-moderated reactors with two 1,000MW light water reactors. The international consortium will compensate North Korea for the freeze on its graphite-moderated reactors by supplying 500,000 tons of heavy-fuel oil annually until the new reactors come online. Second, the United States and North Korea will make efforts to normalize their economic and political relations by reducing investment and trade barriers. Third, both countries will strive towards establishing a nuclear-weapons-free-zone on the Korean Peninsula. Finally, North Korea will help strengthen the nonproliferation regime by remaining a member of the NPT. It will also allow the IAEA to implement the safeguards agreement and monitor the freeze on its nuclear facilities. However, the United States makes a concession in allowing North Korea to retain possession of 8,000 spent fuel rods instead of sending them to a third country for storage, a condition on which the United States had earlier insisted.

In 1999, a source close to US-North Korean negotiations over a suspected nuclear facility in Kümch'ang-ri reveals that the 1994 agreement contains a supplementary 10-point memorandum of understanding by which North Korea agrees to forgo any future construction of graphite-moderated reactors, and agrees that once a significant portion of the two light water reactors are completed, it will allow the IAEA access to any facility and information it deems necessary. In addition, according to *Flight International*, which later cites a "senior US DIA official," the agreement includes a secret clause that suspends the delivery of 150 North Korean Nodong missiles to Iran. [Note: It is later confirmed that the agreement includes no clause on missile deliveries.]

—"Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 21 October 1994, www.kedo.org; "Chosŏnminjujuŭiinmin'gonghwa'gukkwa Mihapchungguksaiŭi Kibonhab'ŭimun," 21 October 1994, in "Kongshingmun'gŏn – Charyo," www.kcna.co.jp; "Iranian Missile Deal with N Korea Falters," *Flight International*, 23 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "Clinton Approves a Plan to Give Aid to North Koreans," *New York Times*, 19 October 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Secret Annex to U.S.-North Korea Agreement," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 20 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S.-North Korea Accord Has a 10-Year Timetable," *New York Times*, 21 October 1994, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Alan Riding, "U.S. and North Korea Sign Pact to End Nuclear Dispute," *New York Times*, 22 October 1994, p. A5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea's Pledge on Graphite-Moderated Reactors Cited," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Takashi Uemura, "N. Korea's Concession Revealed," Asahi News Service, 10 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 October 1994

The United States and South Korea announce the suspension of the annual Team Spirit joint military exercise.

—"S Korea-U.S. 'Team Spirit' Joint Military Drill to Be Suspended," Xinhua News Agency, 21 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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26 October 1994

IAEA Director General Hans Blix states that despite North Korea's recent agreement with the United States, it is still in violation of a UN resolution calling for inspections of two suspected nuclear waste storage facilities. Speaking in London, Blix says that the Agreed Framework is a step in the right direction but it does not supersede the safeguards agreement North Korea reached with the IAEA.

—"IAEA Unhappy with U.S.-North Korea Accord," Associated Press, 26 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

November 1994

Specialists from the United States, Japan and South Korea meet to discuss the details of the project to supply North Korea with two light water reactors. South Korea proposes the Ulchin-3 and -4 reactors as reference designs.

—"Getting Down to Business on LWR Supply Details," *Nuclear News*, January 1995, p. 46.

1 November 1994

A spokesman for North Korea's Foreign Ministry says that North Korea is taking "practical steps" to implement the Agreed Framework with the United States. North Korea's Administration Council has ordered the cessation of construction on the 50MW and 200MW gas-graphite reactors. The Council has also decided to halt operation of the 5MW gas-graphite reactor and to take measures to withdraw fuel rods that were intended for refueling it. In addition, North Korea will continue to cease operations at its radiochemical lab [reprocessing facility] and other nuclear facilities.

—"Ministry Announces Freeze in Nuclear Program," Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 1 November 1994 in FBIS document FBIS-EAS-94-211, 1 November 1994; "North Korea to Stop Making Carbon Nuclear Reactors," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 1 November 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 November 1994

The UN Security Council endorses the nuclear accord reached between North Korea and the United States in October. Welcoming North Korea's voluntary decision to freeze its current nuclear program and comply with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the Security Council calls on the agency to verify the "accuracy and completeness" of Pyongyang's report of all its nuclear material. The Security Council also asks the IAEA to monitor North Korea's frozen nuclear activities.

—"U.N. Asks IAEA to Verify North Korea's Nuclear Programme," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 5 November 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 November 1994

The IAEA holds a closed-door board meeting and decides to send a small inspection team to North Korea to monitor the nuclear freeze.

—"IAEA to Discuss Nuclear Agreement with North Korea," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 11 November 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14-18 November 1994

US and North Korean experts discuss safe storage and final disposition of the 8,000 spent fuel rods. While in North

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Korea, the US experts visit the cooling pond where the fuel rods are being stored. North Korea describes the visit as "useful and constructive."

—"U.S. Experts Fly to Pyongyang to Debate Nuke Fuel Rods," Japan Economic Newswire, 12 November 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; James Sterngold, "North Korea Reports Fulfilling a Nuclear Promise," *New York Times*, 21 November 1994, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 November 1994

North Korean diplomats meet with IAEA officials in Vienna to discuss the implementation of the Agreed Framework. This meeting is the first time the two have met since North Korea withdrew from the agency in June.

—"IAEA and North Korea Confer on Implementation of Nuclear Agreement," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 16 November 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 November 1994

North Korea announces that it has taken steps to "totally freeze" its graphite moderated nuclear reactor program.

—"North Korea Reports Steps to Freeze Nuclear Programme," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 18 November 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 November 1994

The IAEA confirms that North Korea has frozen operations at the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor, the Radiochemistry Laboratory, and its fuel fabrication facility. It also confirms that construction has been stopped at the 50MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun and the 200MW(e) nuclear reactor in T'aech'ŏn-kun. The announcement follows a week-long visit of IAEA experts to North Korea.

—Reuters, "U.N. Says North Korea Halted Nuclear Program," *New York Times*, 29 November 1994, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Closes Down Nuclear Plant, IAEA Confirms," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 29 November 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1-3 December 1994

The United States and North Korea hold expert-level talks in Beijing to work out the details of the light water reactors to be supplied to North Korea. In the talks, described as serious and useful, the two sides discuss the type of reactor and possible construction sites.

—"Getting Down to Business on LWR Supply Details," *Nuclear News*, January 1995, p. 46.

16 December 1994

The United States, Japan and South Korea agree to form a consortium tasked with financing and constructing two light water nuclear reactors promised to North Korea in the Agreed Framework. The consortium is named the Korean Energy Development Organizations (KEDO) and will be based in New York.

—"US, Japanese, Korean Representatives Meet on Implementing US-N Korean Pact," Agence France Presse, 16 December 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Consortium Formed for North Korean Nuclear Reactor Project," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 17 December 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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1993

Early 1993

Russia withdraws six nuclear experts from North Korea.

—*Joongang Ilbo* (Seoul), 20 September 1993, p. 1, in "Russia Withdraws Six Nuclear Experts from DPRK," JPRS-TND-93-032, 12 October 1993, pp. 38; *Joongang Ilbo* (Seoul), 22 September 1993, p. 2, in "Russia Says DPRK 'Incapable' of Developing Nuclear Weapons," JPRS-TND-93-032, 12 October 1993, pp. 38-39; "Pukhanp'a'gyŏn Haekhakcha/Russia Ch'ŏlsujoch'i," *Joongang Ilbo*, 20 September 1993, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Pukhan Myŏtnyŏnnae Haekkaebalmothae'/Russia Wŏnjaryŏkpu/Uri Taesa'gwan'e T'ongbo," *Joongang Ilbo*, 22 September 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

Early 1993

According to North Korean defector Lee Ch'ung Kuk, North Korea develops "equipment that automatically monitors nuclear explosions" (haekp'okpal chadong kwangch'ŭkki) using indigenous technology. The equipment reportedly measures an explosions sound, light, and heat.

—U Chong Chang, *Chugan Chosun*, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in "Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations," FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 39.

January 1993

North Korea responds to the IAEA's requests for "visits" of the two suspected nuclear waste sites. It says that "a visit by officials cannot be turned into an inspection," and furthermore, that inspections of non-nuclear military facilities "might jeopardize the supreme interests" of North Korea.

—Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 276.

13 January 1993

According to David Kyd, the Information Director of the IAEA, North Korea will shut down its 5MW(e) reactor around the middle of 1993 to change the core. IAEA inspectors are expected to be there when the reactor is shut down. If they are given access to the natural uranium core of the reactor, it might be possible to determine whether any material has been removed.

—Don Oberdorfer, "Gates Remains Suspicious of N. Korea; CIA Chief Sees 'Disturbing' Attempts at Deception on Nuclear Issue," *Washington Post*, 13 January 1993, p. A17, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 January 1993

The German weekly *Focus* reports that North Korea is helping Iran develop nuclear missiles and that Iran has two 40-kiloton nuclear warheads. The report also claims that a German firm supplied guidance equipment to Iran.

—South Korean News Agency [sic], 26 January 1993, in "German Weekly Says DPRK Helping Iran Develop Nuclear Weapons," BBC Summary of Broadcasts, 29 January 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 January 1993

During a meeting of the chairs of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC), South Korean Director-General of the Foreign Ministry's American Affairs Bureau Chŏng Tae Ik formally notifies North Korea that it will resume the Team Spirit joint military exercise in March. Chŏng claims that "the Team Spirit resumption is a clear indication of

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Washington's continued determination to deter North Korea's nuclear development." The two sides left the meeting without setting a date for the next JNCC session.

—South Korean News Agency [*sic*], 25 January 1993, in "South Notifies North of Resumption of "Team Spirit" Exercise," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 January 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Nambukhaekhyöpsang Kyöllyöl/'T'im' Hullyön Chaegae Puk'e T'ongbo/Öje Haekt'ongjegongdong'wi Chöpch'ok," *Chosun Ilbo*, 26 January 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

26 January-6 February 1993

IAEA inspectors conduct the sixth round of nuclear inspections in North Korea. The purpose of the inspections is to clarify inconsistencies found in plutonium samples that were taken at an earlier date. One of the inconsistencies identified is that between "the composition and quantity of plutonium [North Korea] declared to the IAEA" and the IAEA's test results. The second discrepancy is between the isotopic composition of plutonium extracted by North Korean technicians and liquid waste samples. Prior to the inspections, North Korea said that the latter inconsistency occurred when "the solution from the basic experiment of plutonium extraction in 1975 was put together in the waste tank of the Radiochemistry Laboratory." North Korea also denies access to two undeclared sites, which are suspected nuclear waste facilities. North Korean officials argue that the sites were not included in the original list of sites subject to inspection.

—"Report: North Korea Refused to Open Nuclear Waste Plant to Inspection," Associated Press, 31 January 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Vows 'Self-Defense' Against U.S. – South Korean Exercises," Associated Press, 1 February 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Letter and Memorandum from the UN Permanent Representative of the DPRK to the President of the UN Security Council" (United Nations Security Council Document), 17 March 1993, pp. 1-10; "Pukhan, Haekp'yegijang Konggae Köbu/Yöngbyön Tüing Mishin'goshisöl 2 Kot/IAEA Sach'aldan'e," *Joongang Ilbo*, 31 January 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

29 January 1993

Son Söng P'il, North Korea's ambassador to Russia, warns that the US and South Korean Team Spirit joint military exercise scheduled for March 1993 may force North Korea to close its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection. Son says that North Korea views the exercises as preparation for a potential nuclear war and that they are incompatible with the basic clauses of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Additionally, the situation does not allow North Korea "to normally fulfill its commitments" to IAEA inspections.

—Vladimir Nadashkevich, "Kunadze Urges North Korea to Abide By Non-Proliferation Treaty," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 1 February 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Refused IAEA Nuclear Check, S. Korean Paper," Japan Economic Newswire, 31 January 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Team Spirit Chaegaehamyön IAEA Haeksach'al Köbu/Churö Pukhandaesa," *Donga Ilbo*, 31 January 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

29 January-1 February 1993

North Korea gives assurances to visiting Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Kunadze that it will not employ Russian missile and nuclear scientists and engineers. The North Korean decision follows threats by Kunadze to suspend diplomatic relations if demands not to employ Russian technicians were not met. According to reports, Russia gives the United States a detailed report about Kunadze's trip.

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—Kyodo News Service, "N. Korea Urged Not to Hire Russian Nuclear Scientists," Japan Economic Newswire, 17 February 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>

February 1993

According to a "reliable western news source," Kim Il Sung secretly meets with China's leader Deng Xiao Ping in order to ensure China's support if North Korea withdraws from the NPT. According to the report, China promises maintain North Korea's interests while playing a mediating role between Pyongyang and the UN.

—"Report: North Korea Quit Nuclear Pact with China's OK," Associated Press, 27 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "Kim Il Sung Tŭng So P'yŏng Pimilhoedam/Chinan 2 Wŏl Pangchung/Haengmunjegyŏnghyŏphwaktaedŭng Chungjŏmnon'ui," *Taehan Maeil*, 27 March 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Kim Il Sung Chinandal Kŭkpi Pangjung/Tŭng So P'yŏng Gwa Hoedam," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 27 March 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

February 1993

Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service publishes a report on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The report lists both North and South Korea as countries capable of producing nuclear weapons, but concludes that neither country possesses nuclear bombs at this time.

—Yun Kuk Han, "Namhan Haekshisŏl Pukhanboda Ap'sŏtta/Russia Taewoech'ŏppoguk 'Nambukhan Haek' Pogosŏ," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 2 November 1993, p. 8, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

2 February 1993

Western diplomatic sources announce that US intelligence suspects that the two undeclared sites in North Korea, which the IAEA visited in 1992, are key sites in North Korea's nuclear program. The sixth IAEA inspection team in North Korea requests access to the sites; the request is denied. According to one source, if the team returns with no new information on the sites, the United States will apply pressure to obtain the IAEA Board of Governors authorization for special inspections. The United States will take such a course of action because "no better rationale could be imagined [than for] a country suspected of clandestine non-peaceful (nuclear) activities [to deny] access to a non-declared site to the IAEA."

—Mark Hibbs and Naoaki Usui, "IAEA Inspected North Korean Sites U.S. Intelligence Now Says Are Key," *Nucleonics Week*, 4 February 1993, p. 18.

8 February 1993

North Korea publicly states that it might take "countermeasures of self-defense" if the United States and other countries press for inspections of certain facilities in North Korea. During the week of 1 February 1993, North Korea denies IAEA inspectors access to several of its facilities that are suspected to be part of its nuclear program. North Korea states that the sites are "non-nuclear." The denial of access marks a change in North Korea's policy towards the IAEA in which it formerly stated that IAEA inspectors could "travel anywhere in the country."

—David E. Sanger, "In Reversal, North Korea Bars Nuclear Inspectors," *New York Times*, 9 February 1993, p. A13.

10 February 1993

IAEA Director General Hans Blix formally requests that North Korea open two undeclared sites for special

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inspections. In early February 1993, the IAEA's sixth inspection team was denied access to the sites. According to North Korea, the team was denied access because the United States and South Korea decided to resume Team Spirit military exercises. North Korea is told that it must respond to the request by 18 February 1993. If North Korea refuses the request, the IAEA will call an extraordinary session of the Board of Governors before the regularly scheduled meeting set for 21 February 1993. According to US intelligence, it is believed that one of the sites houses drums of reprocessed waste that was separated at a date later than what North Korea has told the IAEA. If true, this will mean that North Korea has not declared its entire stock of separated plutonium to the IAEA. —Mark Hibbs, "IAEA North Korean Mission Ends; Blix to Seek Special Inspection," *Nucleonics Week*, 11 February 1993, p.15; Mark Hibbs, "IAEA Special Inspection Effort Meeting Diplomatic Resistance," *Nucleonics Week*, 18 February 1993, pp. 16-17; South Korean News Agency [sic] (Seoul), 12 February 1993, in "IAEA Requests Special Inspection in North Korea," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 February 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 February 1993

Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, warns that North Korea "will take a self-defensive measure if the United States and the South Korean authorities impose any unreasonable measure on us as regards the 'nuclear problem' with a view to using the problem between us and the International Atomic Energy Agency for other military and political purposes." The report continues, "The problem of nuclear inspection must, by nature, be solved between us and the IAEA."

—"North Korea Warns It Will Take 'Self-Defensive Measure,'" Associated Press, 12 February 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "'Haekshisöl Kamch'un Köt Öpta'/Pukhan, Tükpyölsacha'l Panbal," *Joongang Ilbo*, 13 February 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

16 February 1993

The IAEA announces that the analysis of plutonium samples from North Korea has revealed discrepancies and that the separation had, in fact, taken place later than 1990. Western intelligence believes that North Korea separated additional amounts of plutonium in the late 1960s using Soviet expertise. Western intelligence also believes that the hot-cell separation of plutonium took place at a different location than was declared by North Korea.

According to diplomatic sources in New York, IAEA Director General Hans Blix is facing opposition from China and Russia on conducting a special inspection in North Korea. However, the remaining three members of the Security Council (the United States, United Kingdom, and France) strongly support Blix's proposal. The special inspection will be conducted in an attempt to resolve the plutonium separation issue. After hearing objections and concerns from Brazil and India, Blix decides to "pursue persuasion" with North Korea and therefore, delay special inspections.

—Mark Hibbs, "IAEA Special Inspection Effort Meeting Diplomatic Resistance," *Nucleonics Week*, 18 February 1993, pp. 16-17.

20-21 February 1993

IAEA officials use isotopic analysis of a small batch of high-level waste provided by North Korea to determine that North Korea reprocessed spent fuel from its 5MW(e) reactor in 1989, 1990 and 1991. Officials find three different levels of americium-241 in a plutonium sample, which indicates that the material had been separated in each of

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the three aforementioned years. North Korea previously said that it separated plutonium only once in 1990. However, following the IAEA's test results, North Korea admits that it had also reprocessed "a small quantity" of plutonium in 1975. During IAEA meetings, North Korea reportedly claims that the discrepancies between its report and the IAEA's findings occurred due to contamination by material that was reprocessed in 1975. However, experts do not believe this to be an adequate explanation for the discrepancy.

—Mark Hibbs, "Isotopics Show Three North Korean Reprocessing Campaigns Since 1975," *Nuclear Fuel*, 1 March 1993, pp. 8-9.

21 February 1993

North Korean Minister of Atomic Energy Ch'oe Hak Kŭn informs IAEA Director General Hans Blix that North Korea will not allow special inspections of the two sites suspected of storing nuclear waste.

—Mark Hibbs, "IAEA Board Will Not Take North Korea Dispute to Security Council," *Nucleonics Week*, 25 February 1993, pp. 16-17.

22 February 1993

Nearly one dozen US intelligence satellite photographs of North Korean installations and deception attempts at the facilities in Yŏngbyŏn-kun are presented to a closed session of the IAEA Board of Governors. The senior North Korean representative at the meeting, Yun Ho Jin, says that the photographs are fake.

—Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 277.

22 February 1993

Lee Ch'ŏl, North Korea's permanent representative to the United Nations, says that North Korea has the right to "tear up" the IAEA safeguards agreement if inspectors continue to demand access to the two disputed sites in North Korea.

—Reuters, "N Korea Atomic Accord in Peril," *The Independent* (London), 23 February 1993, p. 12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22-29 February 1993

During the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, the North Korean representatives are shown US satellite imagery and chemical evidence indicating that North Korea had been producing plutonium from nuclear waste for a minimum of three years beginning in 1989. The imagery depicts a Soviet-style nuclear waste dump for both liquid and solid waste. The chemical evidence shows impurities in the plutonium samples, which suggests that the plutonium had been produced in three separate amounts over three years. Diplomatic officials believe that North Korea now has enough plutonium to build at least one nuclear weapon.

—David E. Sanger, "West Knew of North Korea Nuclear Development," *New York Times*, 13 March 1993, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>;

25 February 1993

The IAEA passes a resolution stating that North Korea has until 25 March to grant inspectors access to two sites suspected of being part of its nuclear weapons program. The IAEA says that access to the sites is "essential and urgent." As a concession to Chinese requests, the Board provides a one-month grace period for North Korea's

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compliance on the inspection. The Board makes it clear that if North Korea does not act, it will take the issue to the UN Security Council for international sanctions or other actions.

—Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 278; Jeffrey Smith, "North Korea Gets More Time to Accept Nuclear Inspections," *Washington Post*, 26 February 1993, p. A29, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Rejects Nuclear Inspections," United Press International, 1 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Withdraws from Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; Military Exercises, Inspections Cited," *Facts on File World News Digest*, 18 March 1993, p. 183, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David Albright, "How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?" *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September/October 1994, Vol. 50, No. 5, www.thebulletin.org.

25 February 1993

In testimony before the US Congress, newly appointed CIA Director James Woosley states that North Korea's plutonium production capability is the United States' "most grave current concern." He claims that there is a "real possibility that North Korea has manufactured enough fissile material for at least one nuclear weapon."

—Ruth Sinai, "CIA Director Says North Korea May Have Made a Nuclear Weapon," Associated Press, 24 February 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jeffrey Smith, "North Korea Gets More Time to Accept Nuclear Inspections," *Washington Post*, 26 February 1993, p. A29, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 February 1993

IAEA Director General Hans Blix sends a telex to the North Korean Foreign Ministry requesting that IAEA inspectors be permitted to travel to Yŏngbyŏn-kun on 16 March 1993 to examine the two suspected nuclear waste sites. Blix also notifies the UN Security Council of the telex.

—Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 279.

1 March 1993

North Korean broadcast media condemn the IAEA demand that it open two suspected nuclear facilities to international inspections as a "wanton infringement" of its sovereignty. Pyongyang also claims that the IAEA is being manipulated by the United States.

—"North Korea Rejects Nuclear Inspections," United Press International, 1 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 March 1993

In a message to IAEA headquarters in Vienna, North Korea refuses once again to accept special inspections of its suspected sites, ostensibly because of the Team Spirit military exercise and the "state of semi-war" in the country. IAEA Director General Hans Blix rejects North Korea's "excuses" and repeats the inspection demand.

—Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 279.

10 March 1993

North Korea sends a message to the IAEA that it is unable to accept special nuclear inspections because of the Team Spirit joint military exercise conducted by the United States and South Korea.

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—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 11 March 1993, "Refuses IAEA Inspections," in FBIS-EAS-93-047, 12 March 1993, p. 17.

12 March 1993

North Korea announces it is withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It cites the treaty's escape clause on defending supreme national interests. North Korea's two reasons for withdrawing are: (1) the Team Spirit "nuclear war rehearsal" military exercises, and (2) the IAEA demand for special inspection of two suspect sites. North Korea attaches a statement to its withdrawal notice that is sent to the three NPT depository states and the 154 NPT member states, in which it accuses the IAEA of violating its sovereignty and interfering in its internal affairs, attempting to stifle its socialism, and of being a "lackey" of the United States. According to North Korea, the United States influenced officials of the IAEA Secretariat and member states at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on 25 February 1993 to adopt a resolution requiring North Korea to open military sites to inspection that are not nuclear-related.

—Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 280; Gamini Seneviratne, "IAEA Struggling to Stand Firm and Find Face-Saver for North Korea," *Nucleonics Week*, 18 March 1993, p. 10; "Letter from Kim Yong-nam, DPRK Minister of Foreign Affairs," 12 March 1993; David E. Sanger, "West Knew of North Korea Nuclear Development," *New York Times*, 13 March 1993, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 March 1993

Following the 7th session of the 9th Central People's Committee in Pyongyang, North Korea announces its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). North Korea says the decision is made because of IAEA efforts to conduct a special inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities, and because of the resumption of the joint Team Spirit military exercise conducted by the United States and South Korea. The NPT stipulates that a nation's withdrawal becomes effective three months after the intention to withdraw is announced.

—"International News Briefs," *IAEA Bulletin*, February 1993, pp. 44-45; "North Korea More Isolationist," *The Daily Yomiuri*, 13 March 1993, p. 5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Korean Central Broadcasting Network (Pyongyang), 12 March 1993, in "CPC Decision Reported," FBIS-EAS-93-047, 12 March 1993, pp. 17-18; Korean Central Broadcasting Network (Pyongyang), 12 March 1993, in "Statement Notes Withdrawal," FBIS-EAS-93-047, 12 March 1993, pp. 18-19; Korean Central News Agency, 12 March 1993, in "KCNA Reports Statement," FBIS-EAS-93-047, pp. 19-20; Korean Central News Agency, 12 March 1993, in "News Conference on Withdrawal," FBIS-EAS-93-047, 12 March 1993, pp. 20-22.

Mid March 1993

According to a US House Republican research committee, North Korea possesses six nuclear weapons that are in "operational status."

—Task Force on Terrorism & Unconventional Warfare, House Republican Research Committee, "Iran, North Korea, and the Threat of the New Korean War, 7 February 1994, p. 10.

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17 March 1993

The North Korean Foreign Ministry sends the president of the UN Security Council a letter regarding IAEA inspections. The letter states that North Korea has made "sincere efforts" to implement the IAEA safeguards agreement by providing "the IAEA with lists of those nuclear facilities exempt from the safeguards and of scientific research institutes." In 1992, North Korea invited the IAEA to inspect both safeguarded nuclear facilities, "facilities exempt from the safeguards as well as other non-nuclear-related facilities." When requested, North Korea compiled samples of highly radioactive liquid waste at the radiochemical laboratory and the measurements of the damaged fuel at the experimental nuclear power station.

With regard to the recent analysis of plutonium samples, the IAEA secretariat has stated that "inconsistencies in principle" exist between its measurements and those included in North Korea's initial report. According to North Korea, discrepancies exist because of "the IAEA's own disregard of our conditions for the operation of facilities and the characteristic features of our nuclear activities and also from the artificial fabrication by some officials of the IAEA secretariat of the result of the inspection." North Korea says that the IAEA should take into consideration the fact that the nuclear facilities "were still at the experimental stage, [and] not in regular operation."

The letter also comments on the official IAEA-North Korean talks conducted before the fourth inspection from 2-14 November 1992. North Korea claims that during the meeting, the IAEA "attempted to 'threaten' us, saying that 'more nuclear material should be declared,' that this would be 'the last chance to modify the initial report' and that 'a tragic consequence would follow if the chances were passed up'." During the IAEA inspections in November 1992, North Korea offered the team scientific and technological explanations of how the facilities operated. It also offered the team "detailed consultations with the operators." The sixth IAEA inspection team, which was in North Korea from 26 January-6 February 1993, has said that "two inconsistencies in principle" were found in plutonium samples that required "urgent clarification." According to the IAEA secretariat, the first discrepancy was that "the composition and quantity of plutonium [North Korea] declared to the IAEA" did not correspond to the IAEA results. The second discrepancy was that the isotopic composition of plutonium extracted by the radiochemical laboratory that did not correspond to the liquid waste. North Korea says that the inconsistency occurred when "the solution from the basic experiment of plutonium extraction in 1975 was put together in the waste tank of the radiochemical laboratory."

With regard to the two undeclared facilities, North Korea says that they are not nuclear-related. The IAEA only wants to inspect the site in order "to confirm the espionage information provided by a third country." Despite the fact that the facilities were not nuclear-related, North Korea allowed inspections of the site since it was the first request IAEA Director General Hans Blix had made to North Korea. According to North Korea, the two sites are "a shop producing daily necessities" and "a military installation." After the IAEA conducted the inspection, it declared that the sites were not nuclear-related. Blix has requested additional inspections of the sites. North Korea, however, will not allow Blix to return to the sites for "formal" or "informal" visits. When North Korea requested further clarification of the legal grounds under which the IAEA may use information from a third country, the IAEA avoided the question by saying that "it takes too much time to explain it on a legal basis." North Korea objects and says that according to a "relevant article...the IAEA is not legally entitled to use 'intelligence information' from a third country in the implementation of the safeguards agreement. The IAEA is not the police and such an attempt

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by the IAEA is a breach of its own statute, the safeguards agreement, the spirit of the December 1991 meeting and the February 1992 resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors, etc." According to North Korea, a member of the IAEA mission admitted that, "the use of espionage information from a third country is not stipulated explicitly in the basic documents of the IAEA."

—"March Letter and Memorandum from the UN Permanent Representative of the DPRK to the President of the UN Security Council" (United Nations Security Council Document), 17 March 1993, pp. 1-10.

17 March 1993

The IAEA Board of Governors meets to discuss North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, as well as the line of action it should now take.

—Gamini Seneviratne, "IAEA Struggling to Stand Firm and Find Face-Saver for North Korea," *Nucleonics Week*, 18 March 1993, p. 10.

18 March 1993

The IAEA Board of Governors meets to review a resolution adopted at the 25 February 1993 meeting regarding IAEA inspections in North Korea. The resolution requests that North Korea grant the IAEA access to and information on two additional undeclared sites and that it implement the May 1992 IAEA Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/403). Based on the fact that North Korea has announced it will withdraw from the NPT "at a time when the IAEA is seeking specific clarifications regarding the correctness and completeness of the initial report on nuclear material submitted by [North Korea]," the Board of Governors approves the Secretariat's implementation of the resolution per internal document GOV/INF/683. The Board of Governors reaffirms and supports IAEA Director General Hans Blix and the Secretariat's attempt to persuade North Korea to implement the Safeguards Agreement. The Board also confirms that under document INFCIRC/403, the safeguards agreement implemented with North Korea "remains in force." The IAEA Board of Governors extends the deadline for North Korea to open two suspected nuclear waste sites to international inspections to 31 March.

—IAEA Press Release (PR 93/6), 18 March 1993; "North Korean Ambassador Says IAEA Extension Irrelevant," Japan Economic Newswire, 19 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 March 1993

Hŏ Jong, North Korean Ambassador to the UN, dismisses as irrelevant the IAEA's extension of the deadline to open two suspected nuclear waste sites to international inspections. According to Hŏ, the extension to 31 March "does not matter" and North Korea will not allow the sites to be inspected "unless the continued and increases nuclear threat of the United States is removed and the impartiality of the IAEA is restored."

—"North Korean Ambassador Says IAEA Extension Irrelevant," Japan Economic Newswire, 19 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 March 1993

Tadashi Ikeda, Director-General of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Asian Affairs Bureau, announces that Japan, the United States, and South Korea are prepared to take North Korea's refusal of IAEA inspections to the UN Security Council.

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—"N. Korea Nuke Issue may Be Brought to UNSC," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 23 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 March 1993

Newly appointed South Korean Foreign Minister Han Söng Ju leaves for talks with UN and US officials about North Korea's announcement of its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

—"S. Korean Foreign Minister Leaves for U.S., Japan," Xinhua News Agency, 23 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 March 1993

Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen announces that China opposes any international sanctions placed on North Korea for withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He says that the treaty does not call for punitive measures to "punish those who stay away or pull out." According to Qian, China also opposes raising the issue before the UN Security Council.

—Barry Schweid, "Christopher Threatens Sanctions Against North Korea," Associated Press, 25 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 March 1993

South Korean Foreign Minister Han Söng Ju meets with the Chinese representative to the UN Chen Jian in order to persuade China to support dealing with North Korea's nuclear issue in the UN. Representative Jian says that China shares South Korea's goal of a nuclear free Korean Peninsula, but it feels that North Korea's nuclear issue should be resolved first through the IAEA.

—KBS Radio (Seoul), 25 March 1993, in "South Korea Hopes China Will Persuade North Korea Not to Withdraw from NPT," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 March 1993

US Secretary of State Warren Christopher announces that the United States is considering punitive sanctions against North Korea for withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Christopher tells a House appropriations subcommittee that the sanctions might include the denial of oil, gas, and even food. According to Christopher, "There seems to be a number of ways in which pressure can be put on them. Perhaps we won't have to get to that point because they'll realize earlier on that they made a mistake in withdrawing from this convention." Christopher also discusses the option of sanctions with top officials from South Korea and Japan.

—Barry Schweid, "Christopher Threatens Sanctions Against North Korea," Associated Press, 25 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 March 1993

The *Tokyo Shimbun* reports that North Korea begins dialogue with South Korea and the United States over its nuclear program. According to the report, the secret contacts begin during a European trip by Korean Workers' Party Secretary Kim Yong Sun. The purpose of the trip is to make contact with the United States and South Korea.

—KBS Radio (Seoul), 11 April 1993, in "Japanese Paper: North Korea in Secret Contact with ROK and USA on Nuclear Issue," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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Late March 1993

North Korea sends a letter to the UN announcing that it will not attend the UN Disarmament Conference to be held in Kyoto starting on 13 April. This will mark the first time North Korea has been absent from the conference since it began in 1990. Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the topics to be discussed at the conference. —"N. Korea Boycotts Conference," *The Daily Yomiuri*, 10 April 1993, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, 9 April 1993, in "North Korea Reportedly Not Sending Representatives to Disarmament Conference," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 March 1993

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement that says, "We will be compelled to take a powerful self-defensive measure" if the United States and other nations request that the UN Security Council impose punitive sanctions on North Korea. —Reuters, "North Korea Defies Order to Allow Nuclear Inspection," *Toronto Star*, 30 March 1993, p. A15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 March 1993

North Korea refuses to allow inspections of two suspected nuclear waste sites in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. —David A. Sanger, "Atomic Energy Agency Asks U.N. To Move Against North Koreans," *New York Times*, 2 April 1993, p. A2, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Reuters, "North Korea Bends a Little on Nuclear Inspections Today Is Deadline for Disputed Sites," *The Gazette* (Montreal), 1 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 March-1 April 1993

The IAEA Board of Governors convenes a special meeting to discuss developments in North Korea. The Board concludes that North Korea is not complying with the terms of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA and, in accordance with Article 19 of the agreement, approves a resolution to call for the UN Security Council to intervene. The resolution claims that "the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material [to] nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." Only China and Libya vote against the resolution. The United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom also issue individual statements calling on North Korea comply with its safeguards agreement and reverse its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). —"Inspection Refusal goes to UN Security Council," *Nuclear News* Vol. 36 No. 7, 1 May 1993, pp. 54-55; David A. Sanger, "Atomic Energy Agency Asks U.N. To Move Against North Koreans," *New York Times*, 2 April 1993, p. A2, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 April 1993

According to Kim Kwang Sŏp, North Korea's envoy in Vienna, the IAEA resolution to refer the North Korean nuclear issue to the UN Security Council is an "unreasonable step," and will not resolve the problem but only lead to more confrontation. In order to deal with the development, according to Kim, North Korea will take necessary self-defense measures for its own security. —South Korean News Agency (Seoul), 1 April 1993, in "North And South Korean Officials React to IAEA Vote," BBC

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Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Reuters, "North Korea Bends a Little on Nuclear Inspections Today Is Deadline for Disputed Sites," *The Gazette* (Montreal), 1 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 April 1993

During a defense industry conference in Seoul, Shin Sŏng T'aek, a researcher at the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses, says that North Korea is developing a nuclear warhead for its ballistic missiles. Shin says that North Korea will not conduct a full-scale nuclear test, but that North Korea has already conducted secret nuclear-related tests underground.

—"Puk, Haekt'an Missile Changch'ak Chikchŏn'/Kukpangyŏn Shin Sŏng T'aek Paksa," *Segye Ilbo*, 3 April 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

4 April 1993

The North Korean Foreign Ministry accuses the United States and the IAEA of applying double standards. A foreign ministry spokesman claims that the IAEA had carried out 115 inspections in South Africa without reporting any suspicions, but after only six inspections North Korea is being reported to the UN Security Council.

—"Inspection Refusal goes to UN Security Council," *Nuclear News Vol. 36 No. 7*, 1 May 1993, pp. 54-55.

6 April 1993

North Korea's Foreign Ministry accuses some officials of the IAEA secretariat and some member nations of deliberately ignoring North Korea's reasonable proposal and patient efforts to settle the nuclear issues. Even after declaring its intent to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the North Korea points out that it was prepared to let the IAEA monitor its nuclear installations and prevent any diversion of nuclear materials for bomb-making.

—Leon V. Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 59.

6 April 1993

IAEA Director-General Hans Blix briefs the UN Security Council on the IAEA's inability to verify North Korea's nuclear production based on the denial of access to two suspected nuclear waste sites in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.

—"North Korea: Council Expresses Concern at Nuclear Situation," Inter Press Service, 8 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 April 1993

The UN Security Council expresses concern over North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Stopping short of sanctions in light of China's threat to veto any punitive measures against North Korea, Security Council President Jamsheed Marker of Pakistan calls on the IAEA to resume negotiations with North Korea.

—"North Korea: Council Expresses Concern at Nuclear Situation," Inter Press Service, 8 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "DPRK Opposes Submitting Nuclear Issue to Security Council," Xinhua News Agency, 10 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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9 April 1993

Kim Jong Il is named chairman of North Korea's National Defense Commission. As the head of the commission, Kim will now oversee North Korea's military affairs.

—K.P. Hong, "North Korean Heir Bolsters Power with New Defense Post," Associated Press, 9 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 April 1993

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman expresses Pyongyang's opposition to the IAEA's having brought the issue of North Korean compliance before the UN Security Council. The spokesman claims that the issue is one to be dealt with through US-North Korean bilateral talks.

—"DPRK Opposes Submitting Nuclear Issue to Security Council," Xinhua News Agency, 10 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 April 1993

Speaking at an annual meeting of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, IAEA Director-General Hans Blix reiterates the call on North Korea to open the two suspected nuclear waste sites to international inspections. However, taking a softer stance than he has in the past, Blix claims that if North Korea is refusing inspections for national security reasons, the IAEA will consider excluding military facilities from inspections.

—"IAEA's Blix Takes Softer Stance on N. Korea," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 14 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Wants To Resume Agreed Inspections in N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Chief Says North Needs To Open to Inspections To Gain Trust," Associated Press, 14 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 April 1993

A Japanese Foreign Ministry official announces that North Korea has rejected Japan's offer for bilateral talks on North Korea's nuclear program and its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

—"N. Korea Refuses Japan's Offer for Talks on Nuclear Issue," Japan Economic Newswire, 15 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Rejects Bilateral Talks," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 16 April 1993, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 April 1993

A South Korean government official announces that South Korea and the United States have agreed to consider high-level US-North Korean talks in order to persuade Pyongyang not to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 17 April 1993, in "Yonhap: USA Agrees to High Level Contacts with DPRK," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 April 1993

South Korea announces that it will not resume dialogue or economic cooperation with North Korea until the suspicions of its nuclear activity are resolved.

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—"Seoul Rules Out Dialogue, Economic Cooperation with DPRK," 20 April 1993, Xinhua News Agency, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 April 1993

General Robert RisCassi, Commander US Forces Korea, tells the US Senate Armed Services Committee that North Korea is unstable politically and economically, and that North Korea could launch an invasion of South Korea. RisCassi says that North Korea considers its nuclear weapons program as the key to state survival, and that North Korea appears to be selling missiles, missile technology and chemical and biological weapons to countries in the Middle East for oil and hard currency.

—Douglass Jehl, "U.S. Agrees to Discuss Arms Directly With North Korea," *New York Times*, 23 April 1993, p. A5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, "U.S. Commander in S. Korea Sees Threat from N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 22 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lee Kyöng Hyöng, "'Pukhan'gunbu'nün Kim Jong Il Mitchi Anhnünda'/RisCassi Saryöggwan Mi Sangwön Chöng'önyoji," *Taehan Maeil*, 23 April 1993, p. 6, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

22 April 1993

The IAEA acquiesces to limited inspections of the North Korean nuclear installations.

—Leon V. Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 62.

22 April 1993

In a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in Bangkok, South Korean Foreign Minister Han Söng Ju says that Seoul would drop its long-standing opposition to Washington-Pyongyang talks if China, in return, agrees not to veto a UN Security Council resolution calling on North Korea to comply with international nuclear inspections and remain a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

—Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 283

22 April 1993

US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff announces that the United States and North Korea will soon begin high-level talks to discuss Pyongyang's nuclear activities and decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Tarnoff announces that he will represent Washington at the talks, but he does not indicate the date and location at which the talks are to be held.

—"U.S., DPRK to Hold High-Level Talks," Xinhua News Agency, 22 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 April 1993

In a telephone interview with South Korea's Yonhap News Agency, an anonymous North Korean official at the North Korean Embassy in Cairo says that North Korea has already decided to cancel its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The South Korean media also report that a diplomatic source in Hong Kong has recently met North Korean officials in China who have also made this statement.

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—"North Korea Denies Report of Plans to Rejoin Nuclear Pact," Associated Press, 23 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Report: North Korea Rescinds Decision to Withdraw from Nuke Treaty," Associated Press, 22 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Pyongyang Return to Atom Pact Reported," *Los Angeles Times*, 23 April 1993, p. A14, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Puk, Haekkŭmjoyak Pokkwī Kyŏlchŏng'/K'airojujae Konggwan'wŏn Hwag'in," *Taehan Maeil*, 23 April 1993, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

22 April 1993

North Korean Ambassador to the UN Pak Kil Yŏn denies reports that North Korea has decided to return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Pak says, "There is no change in [North Korea's] position."

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 23 April 1993, in "North Korean UN Ambassador Denies Reports of Return to Nuclear Treaty," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kim Su Chong, "Puk, T'alt'oech'ŏlhoe Puin," *Hankook Ilbo*, 24 April 1993, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

23 April 1993

Kono Yohei, a "top Japanese government spokesman," says Japan does not see any evidence that North Korea is preparing a military attack against South Korea. The statement is in response to General Robert Riscassi's testimony before the US Senate Armed Services Committee on 21 April 1993.

—Kyodo News Service, "Japan Sees No Sign N. Korea Preparing to Invade South," Japan Economic Newswire, 23 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 April 1993

Vice Marshall Ch'oe Kwang, chief of the general staff of the Korean People's Army, claims that North Korea will take a "countermeasure for self-defense" if the UN imposes sanctions for its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

—"N. Korea Military Chief Warns Against U.N. sanctions," Japan Economic Newswire, 24 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 April 1993

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council hold informal consultations to discuss drafting a resolution to call on North Korea to allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities and reconsider its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

—Debra Lau, "UNSC Takes up North Korea," *Yomiuri Shimbum*, 29 April 1993, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 April 1993

The IAEA announces that North Korea has expressed its intention to allow IAEA inspectors to return, but the exact date of the visit has not been decided. An IAEA source claims that the purpose of the visit will be limited to checking "the cameras and other inspection equipment" installed at declared nuclear facilities.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 30 April 1993, in "North Korea Reportedly Expresses Intent To Allow IAEA Experts To Visit," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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May 1993

According to North Korean defector Lee Ch'ung Kuk, North Korea begins construction of "the Nuclear Watch Guard Post" at Solbong in Man'gyongdae-kuyŏk, Pyongyang. "The Nuclear Watch Guard Post" is reportedly completed in November.

—U Chong Chang, Chugan Chosun, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in "Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations," FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 38.

May 1993

Negotiations between North Korea and Iran over the sale of up to 150 Nodong missiles reach "an advanced stage" before the flight-tests of the Nodong on 29-30 May. However, a DIA official claims the sale is scrapped as part of a secret side agreement when the United States and North Korea sign the Agreed Framework in October 1994.

—"Iranian Missile Deal with N Korea Falter," *Flight International*, 23 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 May 1993

A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman claims that Pyongyang will not accept any resolution drafted by the UN Security Council calling on North Korea to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). According to the spokesman, any such resolution would be an intolerable infringement upon North Korea's sovereignty.

—"DPRK Urges U.N. Not to Pass Draft Resolution Against It," Xinhua News Agency, 1 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 May 1993

North Korea accepts the proposed visit of IAEA inspection team comprising of two inspectors and one technician, to carry out maintenance work on the safeguard equipment installed at the North Korean nuclear facilities. North Korean Minister of Atomic Energy Ch'oe Hak Kŭn said that refueling of the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor would not take place soon because refueling was still in "the stage of technical and practical preparation."

—David Albright, Kevin O'Neil, *Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security Press, 2000), p. 271.

2 May 1993

North Korea informs the United Nations that it will participate in the NPT Preparatory Committee scheduled to begin on 10 May.

—KBS Television (Seoul), 2 May 1993, in "North Korea Reportedly to Attend 10th May Nuclear Treaty Meeting," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 May 1993

North Korean Information Minister Kim Ki Yong announces that North Korea will rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) if the following conditions are met: (1) the IAEA must remain neutral; (2) the IAEA must give assurances that military facilities will remain closed to foreign inspections; (3) the United States must guarantee that it will not use nuclear weapons against North Korea; and (4) the United States must withdraw all

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nuclear weapons and facilities from South Korea.

—Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), 3 May 1993, in "North Korean Minister Sets Out Conditions for Rejoining Nuclear Treaty," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Early May 1993

About one month before the 12 June deadline for North Korea's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) withdrawal to become effective, a North Korean diplomat at Pyongyang's UN Mission in New York telephones Kenneth Quinnones, the US State Department's country officer for North Korea, and asks for a US-North Korea meeting. On further consideration, the State Department takes the North Korean initiative as a hopeful sign of eagerness to avoid a confrontation over the nuclear issue. The administration later decides to move ahead with talks.

—Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 283-284.

5 May 1993

United States and North Korean emissaries meet in Beijing to lay the groundwork for high-level bilateral talks dealing with North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

—Reuters, "U.S. And N. Korean Envoys Meet over Nuclear Issue," *Los Angeles Times*, 6 May 1993, p. A7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 May 1993

State Department Spokesman Joe Snyder says, "The United States is willing to meet with North Korea to help resolve the current situation involving actions North Korea has taken in the nuclear area," but he refuses to comment on the details of the meeting.

—Reuters, "U.S. And N. Korean Envoys Meet over Nuclear Issue," *Los Angeles Times*, 6 May 1993, p. A7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 May 1993

North Korea strongly denounces the proposed UN resolution that urges North Korea to stay within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). North Korea threatens unspecified additional measures if the UN passes the resolution and the IAEA identifies a violation by North Korea.

—"North Korea has Eased Slightly, But Not Yielded," *Nuclear News*, Vol. 36 No. 8, June 1993, p. 23.

7 May 1993

France, the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom present a resolution to the UN Security Council calling on North Korea "to honor its nonproliferation obligations under the treaty and comply with its safeguards agreement with IAEA." Brazil and Pakistan, both nonparties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), express concern over the language and propose amending the resolution. China has opposed any consideration of North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT in the Security Council, but according to diplomatic sources, the backers of the resolution had gained Beijing's assurance that it would abstain from the vote and not veto the resolution. Due to lack of support for the document as it is, the Security Council decides to defer action on the resolution.

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—"Security Council Defers Demand That North Korea Remain in Nuclear Treaty," Agence France Presse, 8 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 May 1993

North Korea approves a visit by three IAEA officials.

—"IAEA Wa Sach'alchaegae Non'üi/Puk Taep'yodan Kot P'a'gyön/Hö Jong Pukhanbudaesa," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 14 May 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

10-14 May 1993

An IAEA ad hoc inspection team visits North Korea to perform technical work related to maintenance and replacement of the safeguards equipment installed at North Korean nuclear facilities. When questioned about when fuel rods would be removed from the 5MW(e) reactor, North Korean officials claim that they cannot determine the specific date due to "technical problems." Samples from the fuel rods are necessary to determine how many times spent fuel has been removed from the reactor core for possible plutonium reprocessing.

—David Albright, Kevin O'Neil, *Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security Press, 2000), p. 271; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 20 May 1993, in "North Korea Reportedly Refusing to Change Reactor Fuel Rods," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 May 1993

The UN Security Council passes a resolution calling on North Korea to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The resolution passes by a vote of 13 to 0, with China and Pakistan abstaining. The resolution urges North Korea to "honor its nonproliferation obligations under the treaty and comply with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA as specified by the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of February 12, 1993," which calls on North Korea to accept special inspections at two suspected nuclear waste sites not included in Pyongyang's initial list of declared facilities. While the resolution stops short of imposing sanctions on North Korea, it states that the Security Council will consider further action if necessary.

—"U.N. Urges Pyongyang to Accept Nuclear Inspections," Japan Economic Newswire, 12 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Disarmament: U.N. Urges North Korea to Reverse Withdrawal Decision," Inter Press Service, 11 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.N. Asks North Korea to Reverse Nuclear Proliferation Decision," Agence France Presse, 11 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 May 1993

While visiting South Korea, US Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry says that the number of US troops stationed in South Korea will remain the same and the United States will not consider reductions until North Korea rejoins the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and adopts more peaceful policies.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 11 May 1993, in "US Deputy Defence Secretary Discusses DPRK Nuclear Issue in South Korea," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 May 1993

North Korea's Foreign Ministry issues a statement condemning the UN Security Council resolution calling on North

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Korea to rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). According to the statement, if the Security Council "puts unjust pressure on us in the form of sanctions and so forth, we can only regard this as a declaration of war." North Korea insists that the issue can only be resolved through bilateral talks with the United States.

—Korean Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 12 May 1993, in "North Korea Denounces UN Resolution," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>;

13 May 1993

In a telephone interview with South Korea's Yonhap News Agency, Hŏ Jong, North Korea's deputy ambassador to the UN, says North Korea and the IAEA will soon discuss the resumption of North Korea's nuclear facilities.

—"Pyongyang Signals Readiness to Negotiate with IAEA," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Wa Sach'alchaegae Non'ŭi/Puk Taep'yodan Kot P'a'gyŏn/Hŏ Jong Pukhanbudaesa," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 14 May 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

13 May 1993

Speaking before the NPT Preparatory Committee, North Korean Ambassador to the UN Pak Kil Yŏn claims that the United States has been using the IAEA to spy on North Korean military facilities. He also states that any international sanctions will be met with "effective self-defense measures."

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 14 May 1993, in "North Korean Envoy Addresses Nuclear Treaty Preparatory Committee," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 May 1993

South Korea's top intelligence agency, the Agency for National Security Planning, submits a report to the National Assembly's National Defense Committee in which the agency claims North Korea could possess two or three nuclear bombs by 1994 or 1995 unless the international community blocks its nuclear activities.

—"N. Korea May Have Nukes by 1994, Intelligence Agency Says," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 May 1993

US State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher announces that the United States and North Korea will hold high-level meetings beginning 2 June in an attempt to persuade Pyongyang to rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The US and North Korean delegation will be headed respectively by Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Robert Gallucci and First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok Chu. Pyongyang announced on 12 March that it will withdraw from the NPT after the three-month waiting period required by the treaty.

—Sid Balman Jr., "U.S., North Korea to Discuss Nuclear Weapons Treaty Enforcement," United Press International, 25 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., North Korea to Hold High-Level Meeting," Xinhua News Agency, 25 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 May 1993

According to a senior State Department official, the United States has not ruled out the use of sanctions against North Korea. Although the United States has agreed to hold high-level talks with North Korea, the official says that

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there will be "absolutely no discussion" about improving relations "until the North Koreans comply fully with the demands with regard to the NPT, the inspection regime of the IAEA, and the North-South denuclearization agreement."

—"U.S. Says Sanctions Still Possible Against N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 26 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 May 1993

Speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Robert Gallucci says that in the upcoming high-level talks with North Korea, the United States might be willing to offer concessions if Pyongyang rejoins the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and allows IAEA inspectors to return. Without mentioning details, Gallucci says, "What we're prepared to do is to address concerns that we regard as legitimate security concerns that they have raised to date," but, Gallucci continues, "There is nothing on the table that would affect the security of South Korea."

—Ruth Sinai, "U.S. Hints at Concessions of North Korea Opens Nuclear Facilities," Associated Press, 26 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Douglas Jehl, "U.S. May Bargain with Korea on Atom Issue," *New York Times*, 27 May 1993, p. A6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 June 1993

After three lower-level exchanges to set up the US-North Korea talks on the nuclear issue, Robert L. Gallucci, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, and North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sök Chu meet at the UN headquarters in New York on 2 June 1993. The meeting remains inconclusive, and according to the State Department, the two sides make "no significant progress." However, Kang describes the talks as "sincere" and the two sides agree to meet again on 4 June 1993.

—Don Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Reading, 1997), pp. 284-285; "U.S., North Korea Meet on Nuclear Issue," United Press International, 2 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "No Progress Made in Discussions between U.S., DPRK," Xinhua News Agency, 3 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 June 1993

The United States and North Korea meet at the US mission to the UN for the second meeting of high-level talks dealing with North Korea's nuclear program and decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The meeting ends without any agreement, but the head of the North Korean delegation Kang Sök Chu says that "the talks haven't failed yet," and he expects the next round of talks before 12 June, the date at which North Korea's announces withdrawal from the NPT becomes effective.

—Don Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Reading, 1997), pp. 284-285; "U.S. DPRK Adjourn Talks on Nuclear Issue," Xinhua News Agency, 4 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Louis Meixler, "U.S., North Korea Fail to Break Nuclear Deadlock," Associated Press, 4 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 June 1993

US officials led by Kenneth Quinones, the North Korea country officer in the State Department, resume unofficial

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dialogue with North Korean officials in a New York coffee shop on 7 June 1993.

—Don Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Reading, 1997), pp. 285-286.

7 June 1993

US State Department Spokesman Mike McCurry announces that the United States and North Korea will resume high-level talks on 10 June.

—"U.S., DPRK to Hold Another Round of Talks," Xinhua News Agency, 7 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. and North Korea to Resume Nuclear Talks," Associated Press, 7 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 June 1993

The United States and North Korea resume high-level talks after the held on 2 and 4 June failed to produce an agreement. According to Kang Sŏk Chu, head of the North Korean delegation, the "negotiations were serious but not conclusive." The two sides agree to meet for a fourth round of talks on 11 June.

—Don Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Reading, 1997), pp. 285-286; "DPKK, U.S. to Continue Nuclear Talks," Xinhua News Agency, 10 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 June 1993

Robert Gallucci and Kang Sŏk Chu decide on a six-page joint statement. The key points of the statement are American security assurances, an agreement to continue their official dialogue and, in return, a North Korean decision to suspend its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for "as long as it considers necessary." [Note: According to North Korea, this decision does not return North Korea to IAEA safeguards. North Korea characterizes its position as somewhere between full-member and non-member status. However, the IAEA considers North Korea subject to full safeguards.]

—R. Jeffrey Smith, "N. Korea Won't Quit Nuclear Ban Treaty; Inspection of Two Key Sites Still Rejected," *Washington Post*, 12 June 1993, p. A1; Don Oberdorfer, *Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Reading, 1997), pp. 285-286; J. T. Nguyen, "North Korea Postpones Decision to Abandon Nuclear Treaty," United Press International, 11 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; John Wright, "North Korea Remains in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," Associated Press, 12 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 June 1993

The United States responds to the North Korean decision to suspend withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) through a unilateral statement on 12 June 1993, saying that it would regard additional reprocessing, any break in the continuity of nuclear safeguards or a withdrawal from the NPT as harmful and inconsistent with the US efforts to resolve the nuclear issue through dialogue.

—Leon V. Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 64.

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17 June 1993

North Korean ambassador to China Chu Ch'ang Chun says that North Korea will reopen its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection when the agency proves that it is impartial and not a tool of the United States.

—"N. Korea Throws Nuclear Issue in IAEA Court," Agence France Presse, 17 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 June 1993

South Korean Foreign Minister Han Söng Ju says that the UN Security Council will impose sanctions against North Korea unless North Korea resolves the problem of allowing IAEA inspectors to return.

—"North Korea's Nuclear Inspection Issue Must Be Resolved within Weeks," Agence France Presse, 24 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 June 1993

The United States and North Korea agree to resume high-level talks on North Korea's nuclear activities on 14 July in Geneva. Robert Gallucci and Kang Sök Chu will be the respective heads of the US and North Korean delegations.

—"U.S., DPRK to Resume Talks," Xinhua News Agency, 28 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., North Korea to Discuss Nuclear Inspections Next Month," United Press International, 28 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Nuclear Talks to Resume July 14," Associated Press, 28 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 June 1993

The IAEA receives a letter from North Korean Minister of Atomic Energy Industry Ch'oe Hak Kün that says that North Korea will not negotiate with the IAEA until after high-level talks with the United States scheduled for 14 July.

—South Korean News Agency [*sic*], 2 July 1993, in "DPRK Reportedly Rejects IAEA Proposal for Discussions before Talks with USA," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 July 1993

US Secretary of State Warren Christopher warns North Korea that if it is using ongoing talks with the United States as a stalling tactic in order to further develop its nuclear weapon program the talks will be broken off. In a press briefing, Christopher says, "The discussion will continue only as long as they appear to be productive."

—Barry Schweid, "Christopher Warns North Korea about Stalling on Nuclear Controls," Associated Press, 2 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Christopher Says U.S. to Press Trade Issue at Summit," Asahi News Service, 2 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 July 1993

While on a visit to Japan, President Bill Clinton says, "The United States has no intention at this moment or in the future of weakening its security ties in the Pacific." Clinton continues, "The United States will maintain troops in South Korea and keep providing nuclear deterrence to its allies."

—"Clinton Vows to Keep Troops and Nuclear Deterrence in South Korea," Agence France Presse, 6 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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14 July 1993

The United States and North Korea hold high-level talks in Geneva. Robert Gallucci, head of the US delegation, says that the seven hour meeting was "useful". The two sides agree to meet again on 16 July. While neither side comments on the details of the negotiations, it is believed that, during this meeting, North Korea proposes replacement of its gas-graphite nuclear reactors with comparatively less proliferation-prone light water nuclear reactors.

—Leon V. Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 68; Alexander Higgins, "U.S., North Korea Report Progress in High-Stakes Talks," Associated Press, 14 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Progress Reported in Nuclear Talks with North Korea," Agence France Presse, 14 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., North Korea Discuss Nuclear Treaty," United Press International, 14 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 July 1993

The United States and North Korea hold a second round of high-level nuclear talks. Robert Gallucci and Kang Sök Chu, the heads of the delegations, agree that the talks were productive. The two sides agree to meet again on 19 July.

—Leon V. Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 68; "U.S., N. Korea to Continue Nuclear Talks on Monday," Japan Economic Newswire, 16 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Alexander Higgins, "U.S., North Korea Raise Hopes of Breakthrough," Associated Press, 16 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 July 1993

The United States and North Korea reach an agreement and draft a joint statement on North Korea's nuclear program. In the joint statement, the United States pledges to consider ways to replace North Korea's gas-graphite nuclear reactors "as part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue, and on a premise that a solution to the provision of light water nuclear reactors is feasible." Kang Sök Chu, head of the North Korean delegation, says the proposal to replace the graphite moderated reactors is to demonstrate to the international community that North Korea "has no intention to develop nuclear weapons."

—Leon V. Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 69; "U.S. to Help DPRK Restructure Civil Reactors," Xinhua News Agency, 19 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Alexander Higgins, "U.S., North Korea Announces Compromise to Ease Nuclear Tensions," Associated Press, 19 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Roundup: Great Progress Achieved in DPRK-U.S. Talks," Xinhua News Agency, 21 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 July 1993

South Korean Foreign Minister Han Söng Ju warns North Korea that if it does not allow international inspections within two months the United Nations will impose sanctions.

—Kyodo News Service, "S. Korea Warns North Not to Drag out Nuclear Issue," Japan Economic Newswire, 22 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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3-10 August 1993

IAEA inspectors return to North Korea for the first time since North Korea's 12 March declaration that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The three-member team replaces monitoring equipment and conducts other unspecified routine inspections, but they are not allowed to visit the two suspected nuclear waste sites in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.

—"IAEA Inspectors Arrive in Pyongyang for Nuke Checks," Japan Economic Newswire, 3 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> Alison Smale, "IAEA Inspectors in North Korea," Associated Press, 3 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>

4 August 1993

The South Korean Prime Minister proposes to his North Korean counterpart that the two countries resume meetings of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission, which was tasked with setting up an inter-Korean bilateral nuclear inspection regime. Hwang proposed the meeting be held on 10 August at the truce village of Panmunjom.

—"S Korea Proposes Resumption of Inter-Korean Nuclear Talks," Agence France Presse, 4 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 August 1993

South Korean Unification Minister Han Wan Sang says that South Korea will not assist North Korea in acquiring light water nuclear reactors until the suspicions about its nuclear activities are resolved.

—South Korean News Agency [*sic*], 4 August 1993, in "South 'Would Help' North with New Reactor if Nuclear Issue Resolved," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 August 1993

North Korea rebuffs South Korea's proposed resumption of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) talks. Citing the joint US-South Korean Team Spirit military exercise as the obstacle to resuming the JNCC talks, a Pyongyang spokesman says, "If the South side has the intention to resolve the nuclear problem through dialogue with us, it must discontinue nuclear war exercises incompatible with this."

—"N Korea Scuttles Plan to Resume Inter-Korean Nuclear Talks," Agence France Presse, 9 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 August 1993

The IAEA announces that during the recent trip to North Korea inspectors were only allowed to service monitoring equipment. According to IAEA Spokesman David Kyd, "the overall degree of access granted is still insufficient for the agency to discharge its responsibilities." He also says that the IAEA has made no progress in gaining access to two suspected nuclear waste sites located in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.

—Michael Lindman, "IAEA No Nearer to Getting Access to Top-Secret N. Korean Sites," United Press International, 13 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 August 1993

The United States and South Korea commence the joint military exercise "Ulchi Focus Lens." The exercise will last ten days and involve approximately 12,000 US and South Korean troops. North Korea condemns the exercise as

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"nuclear war games."

—"S Korea, U.S. Start Computer War Games Despite N Korea's Opposition," Agence France Presse, 17 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 August 1993

The IAEA sends a letter to Pyongyang in response to North Korea's acceptance of an offer to begin negotiations over the reinstitution of nuclear safeguards inspections in Korea. The IAEA proposes that it send a five-member delegation, headed by the deputy director of the agency's Nuclear Safety Management Bureau, to Pyongyang for talks.

—"IAEA to Send Mission for Nuclear Talks in Pyongyang," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Puk Haekhyöpsang Bbarümyön Saedalch'o Chaegae," *Taehan Maeil*, 21 August 1993, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Pukhan Haeksach'al Hyöb'üi/Taep'yodan P'a'gyön'k'iro/IAEA, Puk'e T'ongbo," *Joongang Ilbo*, 21 August 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

1-3 September 1993

The IAEA and North Korea hold consultations on nuclear safeguards as part of an agreement reached earlier between the United States and North Korea in Geneva. North Korea says they will address the issue of inspections of two suspected nuclear waste sites once the question of IAEA neutrality is resolved.

—"Atomic Energy Spokesman on Talks With IAEA," Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 8 September 1993 in FBIS document FBIS-EAS-93-172, 8 September 1993; "IAEA, North Korea Resume Nuclear Talks in Pyongyang," Japan Economic Newswire, 1 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; KBS Radio (Seoul), 2 September 1993, in "IAEA and DPRK Begin Negotiations on Vienna on Inspection of Nuclear Facilities," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 September 1993

David Kyd, a spokesman for the IAEA, says that the Agency has finished its internal discussions of the North Korean nuclear problem, and has decided to draft a report for submission to the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council in case North Korea refuses to allow inspections.

—"Pukhaeksach'al Hyöpsanggyölgwa/Anbori'e Pogobangch'im/IAEA," *Segye Ilbo*, 11 September 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

15 September 1993

North Korea is currently building facilities for six SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) near its Yöngbyön nuclear complex. There are already 47 SAM positions within a 6km radius of the complex.

—"Pukhan Yöngbyön Iltae E Missile Kiji Könsöl—Haeksisölböho Taebi," *Joongang Ilbo*, 15 September 1993, www.joins.com.

15 September 1993

At a counselor-level meeting in Beijing, the United States informs North Korea that high-level bilateral talks will not resume until North Korea resumes dialogue with South Korea and cooperates with the IAEA.

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—KBS Television (Seoul), 21 September 1993, in "North Reportedly to Quit NPT if Nuclear Issue Referred to UN," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 September 1993

At secret working-level talks in New York, the United States strongly urges North Korea to resume negotiations with the IAEA.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 27 September 1993, in "'Secret' Talks Held 'on Several Occasions Last Week' in New York," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 September 1993

The State Department announces that North Korea has not met the conditions necessary to resume bilateral talks. The United States had previously set the conditions that North Korea must reopen dialogue with South Korea and cooperate with the IAEA.

—"North Koreans Balk at U.S. Conditions for Renewed Talks," Associated Press, 17 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 September 1993

The South Korean media report that a Russian nuclear specialist believes North Korea is incapable of producing a nuclear weapon within "one or two years." According to reports, Mikhail Ryzhov, chairman of Russia's Committee for International Relations of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, delivered this information to the South Korean Embassy in Moscow. Ryzhov said, "North Korea, having no capability of producing nuclear weapons, pretends to the outside world that the North Korean development of nuclear weapons is pending. The Russian nuclear specialists are of the general opinion that North Korea is trying to use this as a bargaining chip for negotiations with the United States." [Note: The FBIS translation says within "a few years" while the Korean press reports say within "one or two years."]

—*Joongang Ilbo*, 22 September 1993, p. 2, in "Russia Says DPRK 'Incapable' of Developing Nuclear Weapons," JPRS-TND-93-032, 12 October 1993, pp. 38-39; "'Pukhan Myötnyönnae Haekkaebalmothae'/Russia Wönjaryökpü/Uri Taesagwan'e T'ongbo," *Joongang Ilbo*, 22 September 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Pukhanhaek Kisullyök Han'gye/1~2 Nyönnae Kaebal Mothae/Russia P'yöngga," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 23 September 1993, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Kyodo News Service, "N. Korea Can't Make Nuclear Weapons, Russian Expert Says," Japan Economic Newswire, 22 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>

22 September 1993

North Korea warns that it might once again decide to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Describing the preconditions set by the United States for the resumption of bilateral talk as "unilateral" and "self-opinionated," North Korea says that if the preconditions remain, "we will have no alternative but to reconsider all the measures we have taken, presupposing negotiations with the United States."

—"North Koreans Balk at U.S. Conditions for Renewed Talks," Associated Press, 17 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "North Korea Renews Threat to Leave NPT," Agence France Presse, 22 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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25 September 1993

North Korea's Atomic Energy Minister Ch'oe Hak Kŭn informs IAEA Director General Hans Blix that North Korea is rejecting the IAEA's offer to restart consultations in October 1993 due to efforts to put North Korea's nuclear program on the agenda of the IAEA's General Conference.

—Mark Hibbs and Naoaki Usui, "IAEA General Conference May Face North Korean Controversy Friday," *Nucleonics Week*, 30 September 1993, pp. 1-2.

25 September 1993

South Korean President Kim Young Sam, speaking in Japan, says that sanctions against North Korea will be "unavoidable" if Pyongyang fails to resolve suspicions about its nuclear activities.

—"South Korean President Warns of Sanctions Against North Korea," United Press International, 25 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> David E. Sanger, "North Korea Won't Budge on Nuclear Stance," *New York Times*, 27 September 1993, p. A9, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 September 1993

Addressing the opening session of the IAEA general assembly, IAEA Director General Hans Blix puts North Korea's refusal to allow inspections of its nuclear facilities at the top of the agenda. He says that "as long as our suspicions are not met with credible findings and additional inspections of sites, the IAEA cannot rule out that some nuclear material has been diverted."

—"U.S. General Warns North Korea Amid Report of Secret Talks," Agence France Press, 28 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 September 1993

North Korea accuses the IAEA of being impartial with regard to its inspections and of trying "to open up our military installations under the manipulation of a superpower." North Korea continues, "We reject any attempt to make inspections on the basis of fabricated intelligence information provided by a third country."

—"N. Korea Expresses Resentment at IAEA 'Partiality,'" Agence France Presse, 30 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 October 1993

The IAEA General Assembly passes a resolution that calls on North Korea to "cooperate immediately with the Agency in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement." The resolution notes the IAEA's "grave concern that North Korea has failed to discharge its safeguards obligations and has recently widened the area of non-compliance by not accepting scheduled Agency ad hoc and routine inspections as required by the safeguards agreement." The resolution receives 72 votes in favor, 11 abstentions, and negative votes by Libya and North Korea.

—Mark Hibbs, "Pyongyang May End IAEA Access to Monitored Sites, Envoy Says," *Nucleonics Week*, 7 October 1993, pp. 1, 10-11; "IAEA Adopts Resolution on N. Korea Nuke Inspections," Japan Economic Newswire, 1 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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2 October 1993

North Korean Prime Minister Kang Sŏng San sends a letter to his South Korean counterpart proposing working-level talks at the border village of Panmunjom. [Note: This sudden proposal is possibly a reaction to the preconditions set forth by the United States before it will reengage Pyongyang in bilateral talks.]

—"Pyongyang Proposes Talks with Seoul, Dialogue with Washington: Analysts," Agence France Presse, 3 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 October 1993

The North Korean Foreign Ministry rejects the resolution passed by the IAEA general assembly on 1 October calling on North Korea to resolve all suspicions about its nuclear program. The Foreign Ministry says that North Korea "decidedly rejects the 'resolution' ... as wanton encroachment on the sovereignty of the DPRK." North Korea reiterates that it believes the only way to resolve the nuclear problem is through bilateral talks with the United States.

—"North Korea Rejects IAEA Resolution, Calls for Talks with U.S.," Agence France Presse, 4 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 October 1993

In a closed-door meeting held in New York, senior officials from the United States, South Korea, and Japan discuss the option of using economic sanctions against North Korea in order to persuade North Korea to clear up suspicions about its nuclear weapons program.

—"U.S. Allies Mull Sanctions Against N. Korea," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 8 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 October 1993

KBS-1 Radio in Seoul reports that France believes North Korea has developed nuclear weapons. According to the report, the South Korean Embassy has revealed that France has analyzed satellite imagery of North Korea's nuclear facilities, and concluded that North Korea has developed nuclear weapons because the nuclear facilities do not have electrical transmission lines. The ROK Embassy reportedly received the information from the Foreign Security General Bureau, a French military intelligence agency.

—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 10 October 1993, in "French Satellite Confirms DPRK Nuclear Development," JPRS-TND-93-032, 12 October 1993, p. 39.

11 October 1993

US Congressman Gary Ackerman meets with North Korean President Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang to discuss North Korea's refusal to allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities. Upon arriving in Seoul the following day, Ackerman says that Kim listened "very strongly and clearly" when he conveyed the US position. Ackerman also says that the North Korean leader condemned the IAEA for pressuring it to accept ad hoc inspections of its nuclear facilities.

—"U.S. Solon Says Pyongyang Raps IAEA Inspection Demand," Japan Economic Newswire, 12 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Congressman Crosses DMZ after Talks with Kim Il-Sung," Agence France Presse, 12 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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12 October 1993

North Korea's Atomic Energy Minister accuses the IAEA of forging a letter from the UN Secretariat calling for international pressure to be placed on North Korea to open its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections. The minister claims that UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had no knowledge of the letter which was, as he described, a conspiracy by some officials in the IAEA and UN Secretariat "for the purpose of doing harm to the DPRK." According to the minister, this action destroys the credibility of the IAEA, and thus shows that the "nuclear problem" can only be resolved through bilateral talks with the United States.

—"N. Korea Charges IAEA Forged Letter on Nuclear Issue," Japan Economic Newswire, 12 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., S Korea Discussing Patriot Deployment Amid N Korean Nuke Fears," Agence France Presse, 14 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 October 1993

IAEA Spokesman David Kyd announces that the monitoring equipment set up in North Korea's declared nuclear facilities will run out of film in November and the IAEA has not been allowed to service all of the equipment. Kyd states, "We are coming up on something of a technical deadline, and North Korea has not been responsive at all. At this point, we have no access to the sites at all."

—David A. Sanger, "U.S. Warns North Koreans of U.N. Action on Nuclear Inspections," *New York Times*, 15 October 1993, p. A9, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 October 1993

IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that since North Korea has continued to delay IAEA access to check monitoring equipment, any assurance that North Korea is not diverting nuclear materials to weapons purposes has been diminishing. In the spring of 1993, the IAEA's main concern was the presence of undeclared plutonium and North Korea's non-acceptance of special inspections. The concern now is that the declared facilities and materials could also be diverted from peaceful purposes.

—"Pyongyang Ready to Resume Nuclear Inspections; U.S. Reports New Talks," Agence France Presse, 22 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Mid-October 1993

Peter Hayes, an Australian nuclear expert, conducts a 15-day visit to North Korea, during which he meets with several high ranking officials about North Korea's nuclear program. After the visit, Hayes says that "North Korea's main aim in challenging the International Atomic Energy Agency is to normalize or at least upgrade its political and economic relations with the United States."

—Paul Shin, "North Korea Tells Nuclear Expert It Will OK Routine IAEA Inspections," Associated Press, 26 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 October 1993

North Korea and the United States allegedly hold secret talks to discuss the resumption of IAEA's ad hoc inspections. The ongoing talks are reportedly held between North Korea's Deputy Ambassador to the UN Hŏ Jong and Kenneth Quinones, the State Department's North Korea Desk Officer. North Korea agrees to negotiate on the nuclear issue in exchange for US diplomatic recognition. The United States hints that it may consider suspending

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Team Spirit military exercises with South Korea if North Korea "shows a positive attitude" and accepts IAEA inspections before the end of October 1993.

—"N Korea Holding Secret Talks with U.S. on IAEA Checks," Japan Economic Newswire, 22 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "Pyongyang Ready to Resume Nuclear Inspections; U.S. Reports New Talks," Agence France Presse, 22 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> Tim Weiner, "U.S. in Quiet Talks with North Korea," *New York Times*, 27 October 1993, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> Chŏng Yŏn Ju, "Pung'mi 'Haeksach'al' Kŭkpijŏpch'ok/New York'sŏ/Pukhan, Sach'al'dan Ipukuk T'ahyŏb'an Cheshi," *Hankryoreh Shinmun*, 22 October 1993, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Chŏng Hae Yŏng, "Mibuk Makhuhaekhyŏpsang Chinhaeng/Wŏlmalshihan Ap'tugo Ch'aenŏl Ch'ongdong'wŏn," *Chosun Ilbo*, 22 October 1993, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

20 October 1993

According to North Korean defector Lee Ch'ung Kuk, North Korea tests a nuclear warhead triggering device. Approximately 50 personnel from the Nuclear Defense Bureau observe the test explosion in Yŏmso-gol, Sŏg'am-ri, P'yong'wŏn-kun, South P'yong'an Province.

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure-Part One," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 1999, p. 41; U Chong Chang, *Chugan Chosun*, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in "Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations," FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 38.

24 October 1993

The United States and North Korea reportedly reach an agreement in which North Korea will allow full inspections of its nuclear facilities in exchange for diplomatic recognition from the United States. Reportedly, the agreement was reached through secret working level talks in New York between Hŏ Jong and Kenneth Quinones. As a first step, North Korea is expected to allow IAEA inspectors to service monitoring equipment by 1 November. However, disagreements remain as to whether all of North Korea's suspected nuclear facilities will be open to inspection or just those which have been declared.

—Kelley Smith Tunney, "Reports: U.S.-North Korea Agree to Resolve Nuclear Disputes," Associated Press, 24 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> Ruth Sinai, "North Korea Offers Limited Inspections in Return for Recognition," Associated Press, 27 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Late October 1993

IAEA cameras set up to monitor North Korea's declared nuclear facilities run out of film.

—Andrew Katell, "UN Cameras Stop Working in North Korea, U.S. Threatens Security Council Action," Associated Press, 1 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 October 1993

South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sŏng Ju denies reports that South Korea and the United States are considering canceling Team Spirit military exercises. Han says, "There is no decision on it, there is no discussion at the moment between the Republic of Korea and the United States." South Korea and the United States are expected to make a decision concerning the joint military exercise in the 25th annual US-South Korean Security Consultative Meeting scheduled for 3 and 4 November.

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—"S. Korea Denies Plan to Cancel 'Team Spirit' Exercise," Japan Economic Newswire, 27 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "Team Spirit Maneuvers to Stay: S. Korean FM," Agence France Presse, 27 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 October 1993

The IAEA announces that North Korea will allow inspectors to conduct routine maintenance of surveillance equipment but that it continues to block more thorough inspections of its suspected nuclear facilities.

—Tim Weiner, "Shift on Cameras by North Koreans," *New York Times*, 30 October 1993, p. A3; "Report: North Korea to Allow International Inspectors Access," Associated Press, 30 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

November 1993

The United States offers to assist North Korea with monitoring personnel and technical support for the upcoming refueling of the North Korean 5MW(e) gas-graphite reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. It also offers to replace North Korea's gas-cooled reactors with US light water reactors if the latter provides the IAEA with blanket access to its nuclear facilities.

—Mark Hibbs, "U.S. Might Help North Korea Refuel Reactor," *NuclearFuel*, 8 November 1993, pp. 1, 14-15.

1 November 1993

The UN General Assembly passes a nine-point resolution urging North Korea to "cooperate immediately with the IAEA in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement." The resolution is passed with 140 in favor, North Korea voting against, and nine abstentions.

—"Daily Publishes UN Resolution on Nuclear Issue," *Korea Times* (Seoul), 3 November 1993 p. 4 in FBIS document FBIS-EAS-93-211, 3 November 1993; Andrew Katell, "UN Cameras Stop Working in North Korea, U.S. Threatens Security Council Action," Associated Press, 1 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "U.N. Urges N. Korea to Comply with IAEA Inspection," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 November 1993

A senior Pentagon official states that the United States believes that North Korea is not currently converting fuel for use in a nuclear weapon. Although the IAEA cameras that were monitoring a declared nuclear facility ran out of film in late October, according to the official, "US intelligence agencies have determined that the North Koreans are not processing plutonium."

—Robert Burns, "Pentagon Satisfied Korea Not Reprocessing Nuke Fuel," Associated Press, 1 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> Andrew Katell, "UN Cameras Stop Working in North Korea, U.S. Threatens Security Council Action," Associated Press, 1 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 November 1993

According to US Ambassador Rick Inderfurth, "Unless the continuity of safeguards is maintained, the US will not continue its discussions with [North Korea] and will be forced to return this issue to the UN Security Council for

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further action."

—Andrew Katell, "U.S. Threatens to Break off Ties with North Korea," Associated Press, 2 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 November 1993

The IAEA announces that the Agency will not send an inspection team to North Korea following the latter's refusal to permit full-scope inspections. IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that a country "cannot pick and choose which aspects of inspection programs it would permit to go ahead." He informs the UN General Assembly that "it remained possible that [North Korea] was trying to build a nuclear bomb."

—Paul Lewis, "U.N. Atom Agency Says North Korea Resists Treaty," *New York Times*, 2 November 1993, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Stanley Meisler, "N. Korea Still Suspected of Making Nuclear Arms; Military: U.N. Agency Says Pyongyang Has Refused to Permit Inspections. Sanctions Remain a Possibility," *Los Angeles Times*, 2 November 1993, p. A4, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 November 1993

US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin says that the United States will not hold any more talks with North Korea until it opens two suspected nuclear waste sites to international inspections and reopens dialogue with South Korea. Speaking while on a diplomatic trip to Japan, Aspin says, "We will not have a third round of our dialogue with the North Koreans unless they play by the rules."

—"Aspin Says No More Talks until N. Korea Allows Checks," Japan Economic Newswire, 3 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> Robert Burns, "Aspin Leaves Next Move on Nuclear Issue to North Korea," Associated Press, 3 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3-4 November 1993

The United States and South Korea hold the 25th annual Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul. At the meeting the two sides express "serious concern" about North Korea's military buildup and nuclear activities, but they agree not to make a final decision for the present on whether or not to hold the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises scheduled for spring.

—"S. Korea, U.S. Agree Not to Make Any Decision on 'Team Spirit' Exercise," Xinhua News Agency, 4 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> South Korean News Agency [sic], 4 November 1993, in "Joint Communiqué Issued on Security Consultative Meeting," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 November 1993

In a television interview, President Bill Clinton says that "North Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb." When asked if the United States is considering a preemptive strike against North Korean nuclear facilities, President Clinton responds, "I don't think I should discuss any specific options today."

—"Clinton Warns North Korea Cannot Be Allowed to Build Bomb," Press Association, 7 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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9 November 1993

The United States and North Korea meet in New York to discuss resuming high-level talks about North Korea's nuclear program. A US official present at the talks does not comment on the details of the meeting but says that the date of the third round of high-level talks has yet to be decided.

—"U.S., N. Korea Discuss Resuming High-Level Talks," Japan Economic Newswire, 10 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "U.S., North Korean Officials Meet in New York," Agence France Presse, 10 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 November 1993

North Korea proposes a "package deal" to the United States for resolving suspicions about its nuclear activities. The deal states that when the United States to renounce its "nuclear threat and hostile policy" towards Pyongyang, North Korea will "fully comply" with its IAEA safeguards agreement and accept inspections. North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sök Chu accuses the United States of always "demanding [North Korea] to move first," and states that under the "package deal" both sides will take steps simultaneously.

—"Seoul Rejects Pyongyang's "Package Deal" for Settling Nuclear Row," Agence France Presse, 12 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Proposes Package Solution to Resolve Nuclear Dispute," United Press International, 11 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>;

12 November 1993

South Korea rejects North Korea's proposed "package deal" claiming that North Korea must allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities and reopen dialogue with Seoul before the United States makes any concessions.

—"Seoul Rejects Pyongyang's "Package Deal" for Settling Nuclear Row," Agence France Presse, 12 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 November 1993

The United States and South Korea begin the annual "Foal Eagle" military exercise despite warning from Pyongyang the day before that the exercises would jeopardize efforts to resolve questions about its nuclear activities.

—"U.S., South Korea Begin Military Exercises Despite North's Protest," Associated Press, 15 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 November 1993

US President Bill Clinton meets with South Korean President Kim Young Sam to discuss Clinton's announces "new approach" to dealing with North Korea's nuclear program. After the meeting, Clinton states that if Pyongyang meets its demands, "the door will be open on a wide range of issues." At the request of President Kim, Clinton does not publicly announce the details of his proposed new approach. According to reports, the United States is prepared to call off the Team Spirit joint military exercise if North Korea allows IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities.

—"U.S. Offers North Korea Swap for Nuclear Inspections," United Press International, 22 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> Robert Burns, "Clinton Says U.S. Ready to Resolve Differences with North Korea," Associated Press, 23 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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24 November 1993

The United States and North Korea meet in New York for what is described as "low-level working" talks aimed at resolving Pyongyang's continuing reluctance to allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. According to reports, the United States offers North Korea a package of incentives to allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities, including financial assistance and cancellation of Team Spirit military exercises.

—"U.S., North Korean Officials Meet on Nuclear Inspection," United Press International, 24 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> Andrew Katell, "U.S. Offers Improved Relations If North Korea Cooperates," Associated Press, 24 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "U.S. DPRK Hold Informal Talks," Xinhua News Agency, 3 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 November 1993

North Korea's Foreign Ministry suggests that North Korea will withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) if the United States does not agree to third round of negotiations on the nuclear issue. A Foreign Ministry spokesman says that "if the US intends to nullify the principles of the North Korea-US joint statement and discontinue talks, there will be no need for us to suspend and longer the effectuation of our withdrawal from the NPT."

—"North Korea Threatens to Withdraw from Nuclear Treaty," United Press International, 29 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Says No Dialogue under Pressure," Agence France Presse, 30 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 November 1993

CIA Director James Woosley says that the United States cannot rule out the possibility that North Korea has already developed a nuclear weapon.

—"North Korea Could Go to War over Nuclear Row: CIA Director," Agence France Presse, 1 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 December 1993

North Korea issues the following six demands the must be met before it will allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities: (1) the United States must give a written assurance that it will not use nuclear weapons against North Korea; (2) the United States must permanently remove all nuclear weapons from South Korea; (3) the annual "Team Spirit" military exercises must be cancelled for good; (4) the current armistice on the Korean Peninsula must be replaced with a permanent peace treaty; (5) the United Nations must stop referring to North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism; and (6) the United Nations must back the North Korean proposal calling for the reunification of the two Koreas.

—"North Korea Makes Six Demands of U.S. to Resolve Nuclear Dispute," United Press International, 2 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "N. Korea Offers U.S. 6-Point Solution on Nuclear Issue," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 December 1993

IAEA Director General Hans Blix informs the IAEA's Board of Governors that unless North Korea permits the IAEA to inspect the 40 seals affixed in 1992, the Agency will be unable to verify that North Korea's nuclear materials have

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not been modified or removed. Photographic records of activities at the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex are incomplete, as the surveillance cameras have run out of film. The IAEA tells North Korea that it needs to verify the complete physical inventory, reconcile the discrepancies, put new film in cameras, count the number of fuel rods, and design a method for safeguarding the refueling of the core of the 5MW(e) gas-graphite reactor. Director General Blix says that Pyongyang's continuing refusal to allow IAEA inspections raises suspicions about North Korea's "peaceful uses" of nuclear power.

—Mark Hibbs, "IAEA Says It Must Examine Seals to Affirm North Korean Compliance," *Nucleonics Week*, 23 December 1993, pp. 2-3; "Fresh Call on North Korea to Allow Nuclear Inspections," *Agence France Presse*, 2 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David A. Sanger, "U.N. Agency Finds No Assurance on North Korean Atomic Program," *New York Times*, 3 December 1993, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 December 1993

The United States and North Korea meet in New York for working level talks dealing with inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities. State Department spokeswoman Christine Shelly refuses to mention specifics of the meeting, but describes it as "an informal exchange." Reportedly, at the meeting, North Korea said that IAEA inspectors could have unlimited access to most of its nuclear facilities.

—"U.S. DPRK Hold Informal Talks," *Xinhua News Agency*, 3 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "U.S., North Korean Officials Discuss Nuclear Standoff," *United Press International*, 3 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "N. Korea Reportedly Accepts Int'l Nuclear Inspections," *Japan Economic Newswire*, 4 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 December 1993

Quoting a Defense Department official, the *Washington Post* reports that even if IAEA inspections immediately resumed in North Korea, the international community would never know the exact amount of plutonium in North Korea's possession. The official refers to the classified National Intelligence Estimate, in which the CIA also claims that there is a "better than even" chance that North Korea already possesses a nuclear bomb.

—R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Analysts Are Pessimistic on Korean Nuclear Inspection," *Washington Post*, 3 December 1993, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "N. Korea Unlikely to Allow Inspections Warns Intelligence Report," *Agence France Presse*, 3 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> Stephen Engleberg and Michael R. Gordon, "Intelligence Study Says North Korea Has Nuclear Bomb," *New York Times*, 26 December 1993, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 December 1993

North Korea offers the IAEA unlimited access to five of its seven declared nuclear facilities and limited access to the other two—a 5MW(e) gas-graphite nuclear reactor and a reprocessing facility [the Radiochemistry Laboratory]. North Korea says that the IAEA can replace the film and batteries in the cameras but not check the seals at these facilities.

—Mark Hibbs, "IAEA Says It Must Examine Seals to Affirm North Korean Compliance," *Nucleonics Week*, 23 December 1993, pp. 2-3.

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6 December 1993

As part of the sixth high-level delegation to North Korea in 15 months, Iranian Defense Minister Mohammad Fourouzndeh visits North Korea to discuss technological cooperation. The visit is for a meeting of a joint commission on economic, scientific and technical cooperation established in 1992. According to reports, there is extensive cooperation between the two countries in the areas of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

—"N. Korea's Air Force Chief Visits Iran for Closer Ties," *Washington Times*, 25 February 1994; Ed Blanche, "North Koreans Visit Iran To Step Up Military Cooperation," Associated Press, 24 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> "Alarm Sounded Over Missile Plans Involving Tehran and North Korea," *Mideast Mirror*, Vol. 7, No. 237, 7 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> Task Force on Terrorism & Unconventional Warfare, House Republican Research Committee, "Iran, North Korea, and the Threat of the New Korean War, 7 February 1994, p. 6.

6 December 1993

US President Bill Clinton and the IAEA announce that North Korea's offer to allow the IAEA access to some of its nuclear sites is inadequate and unacceptable. The North Korean proposal denies access to two sites, a nuclear reactor and a suspected reprocessing plant, which, according to the IAEA, are the sites that most likely to be used in a clandestine nuclear weapons program. IAEA spokesman David Kyd says that "there must be unrestricted access to all declared sites" and that "restrictions on the two facilities are not negotiable."

—Ruth Marcus and R. Jeff Smith, "Clinton, U.N. Agency Dismiss N. Korean Nuclear Inspection Offer," *Washington Post*, 7 December 1993, p. A19; Robert Burns, "Clinton, U.N. Agency Call Korean Nuclear Offer Inadequate," Associated Press, 6 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Michael R. Gordon, "U.N. Atom Agency Rejects Offer by North Korea," *New York Times*, 7 December 1993, p. A6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 December 1993

US and North Korean officials meet in New York to discuss the continuing dispute over international inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities. At the meeting, the United States reiterates its position that North Korea must open all of its nuclear facilities to international inspections and resume dialogue with South Korea.

—Helen Thompson, "U.S. Officials Continue Talks with North Koreans," United Press International, 10 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Must Accept Full Nuclear Inspection, U.S. Says," Japan Economic Newswire, 11 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 December 1993

The North Korean Foreign Ministry warns that bilateral talks with the United States will fail unless Washington accepts North Korea's proposal of limited access to its nuclear facilities.

—"North Korea Warns Talks Will Fail Unless U.S. Accepts Offer," Associated Press, 10 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 December 1993

US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin says that North Korea might have succeeded in making a nuclear bomb. Speaking on the news program "Meet the Press," Secretary Aspin suggests that North Korea may have the

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technical capabilities to fashion a crude nuclear weapon. Secretary Aspin continues to say that there is no evidence that North Korea has or is currently constructing a nuclear weapon.

—Eric Schmitt, "A Nuclear Weapon for North Korea?" *New York Times*, 13 December 1993, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jim Abrams, "Aspin Says North Korea Not Building New Bombs," Associated Press, 13 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 December 1993

US and North Korean officials meet in New York to discuss Pyongyang's continuing refusal to allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities. According to a North Korean official, the two sides discuss "simultaneous steps" the two sides can take in order to overcome the impasse in negotiations. US officials announce on 24 December that at the meeting North Korea agrees to allow IAEA inspections of all seven of its nuclear facilities. However, North Korea insists that it must still work out the details of the inspections in a separate agreement with the IAEA. —"U.S. Officials Meet with DPRK Representatives," Xinhua News Agency, 20 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Robert Burns, "Korean Says Negotiators Discussing 'Simultaneous' Steps to End Impasse," Associated Press, 20 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jim Mann, "N. Korea Nears OK on Nuclear Checks; Diplomacy: in Secret Talks with U.S., Pyongyang Says It Will Allow Inspections. But Details Need to Be Worked Out with International Agency. Gap with South Korea Remains.," *Los Angeles Times*, 24 December 1993, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 December 1993

UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali visits North Korea "to explore whether the UN might be of assistance (and) to help defuse any escalation of the crisis." North Korea's Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam tells Boutros-Ghali that there is no need for UN intervention since Pyongyang is engaged in direct talks with the United States. —David Thurber, "U.N. Chief Crosses into North Korea for Nuclear Talks," Associated Press, 24 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Reuters, "N. Korea Tells U.N. Chief His Mediation Isn't Needed; Diplomacy: Visit by Boutros-Ghali Aims to Defuse Nuclear Crisis. But Pyongyang Greets Him with Criticism," *Los Angeles Times*, 25 December 1993, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 December 1993

The Clinton administration says that it will seek international economic sanctions against North Korea if Pyongyang refuses to allow IAEA inspections of all its nuclear facilities.

—Barry Schweid, "Administration Will Seek Sanctions Despite Chinese Objections," Associated Press, 27 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 December 1993

Tom Hubbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, meets with North Korean Ambassador Hŏ Jong at the UN headquarters in New York. The two discuss ways in which to overcome the impasse in resolving the issue of IAEA inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities. According to a North Korean Foreign Ministry announcement on 30 December, the two sides are close to reaching an agreement. The Foreign Ministry spokesman says that the United States expressed a willingness to cancel Team Spirit military exercises in exchange for North Korea allowing IAEA inspections of all its nuclear facilities.

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—Andrew Katell, "U.S., North Koreans Meet at U.N. on Nuclear Dispute," Associated Press, 29 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Announces Breakthrough in Nuclear Talks," United Press International, 30 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; George Gedda, "Both Sides Say Talks Yield Progress in Nuclear Issue," Associated Press, 30 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

[Back to Top](#)

1992

1992

According to Im Yŏng Sŏn, a former North Korean Army lieutenant who defected to South Korea on 11 August 1993, North Korea attempts to hide a dismantled nuclear reactor from IAEA inspectors. Im says he heard that hundreds of North Korean engineers died in the underground accident.

—"2 N. Korean Missile Bases Allegedly Target Japan," Jiji Press, 24 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 24 August 1993, in "Defector Claims DPRK Coup Attempt, Executions," FBIS-EAS-93-162, 24 August 1993, p. 23; Kim Hŭi Ch'ŏl, KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 24 August 1993, in "Says Long-Range Missile Bases Built," FBIS-EAS-93-162, 24 August 1993, p. 23.

1992

North Korea reportedly shuts down its Pakch'ŏn Uranium Milling Facility located in P'akch'ŏn-kun (博川郡), North P'yŏng'an Province (平安北道). The facility, also known as the "April Industrial Enterprise," reportedly has the capacity to produce 210 metric tons of uranium per year.

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure-Part One," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 1999, p. 40; Chang Chun Ik, *Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng*, (Seoul: Sŏmundang, 1999), pp. 132-133; Kim Pyŏng Ku et al., *Pukhaekkisulch'ongsŏ-I* (Taejŏn: Technology Center for Nuclear Control, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, November 1999), www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr.

6 January 1992

North Korean Ambassador Chŏn In Chan informs IAEA Director General Hans Blix that North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement before the end of January 1992.

—"Investigation into German – Korean Link," *Nuclear Engineering International*, James Varley, ed., February 1992, vol. 37, no. 451, pp. 7-8.

6 January 1992

US President George Bush and South Korean President Roh Tae Woo announce that they will cancel the Team Spirit joint military exercises if North Korea "fulfills its obligation" to the IAEA and South Korea for inspections of its nuclear facilities.

—David E. Sanger, "In Nuclear Deal, Seoul Halts War Game with U.S.," *New York Times*, 7 January 1992, p. A8.

7 January 1992

North Korea formally expresses its intention to sign an IAEA safeguards agreement. North Korean Ambassador

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Chŏn In Ch'an says Pyongyang will sign the agreement by the end of the month.

—Paul Shin, "North Korea To Sign Nuclear Safeguards," Associated Press, 7 January 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Pukhan, Chuna Haekhyŏpchŏng Sŏ'myŏng/Chu Austria Taesa Onŭl Palp'yohaltŭt," *Chosun Ilbo*, 7 January 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Im Tong Myŏng, "Puk, Wŏlmal Haekhyŏpchŏng Sŏ'myŏng/Chuodaesa Hoeg'yŏn/Sach'alshigi IAEA Hyŏb'ŭi Kyŏlchŏng," *Chosun Ilbo*, 8 January 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Haekkyŏpchŏng 29~30 Ilkke Sŏ'myŏng/Chubin Pukhandaesa Hoe'gyŏn," *Segye Ilbo*, 8 January 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

7 January 1992

South Korea's Ministry of Defense announces that the joint military exercise Team Spirit will be cancelled this year.

—"'Team Spirit' Chungji/Kukpangbu Palp'yo/Pukch'ŭk 'Haeksŏ'myŏng-Sach'alsuyong' Allyŏwa," *Taehan Maeil*, 8 January 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

21 January 1992

US-North Korean high-level political meetings commence at the US Mission to the United Nations in New York. The North Korean delegation is headed by Korea Workers Party Secretary for International Affairs Kim Yong Sun. The US delegation is lead by Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Arnold Kanter. Kanter's "talking points" have been approved in advance by a US State Department interagency committee, as well as by the South Korean and Japanese governments. These points include urging North Korea to permit IAEA inspections and to give up its nuclear weapons option. North Korea responds by agreeing to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement.

—Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 266-267.

30 January 1992

North Korea signs the IAEA safeguards agreement. North Korea's Deputy Minister for Atomic Energy Industry Hong Gŭn P'yo says that North Korea will abide by the agreement fully. [Note: North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly does not ratify the agreement until 9 April 1992. The IAEA inspections process comprises four distinct phases. The first requires North Korea to submit an official report of its existing nuclear facilities. During the second phase, the IAEA will conduct a series of ad hoc inspections to verify the aforementioned list, as well as gather some initial data about the nuclear program. Third, North Korea and the IAEA will sign various subsidiary agreements and attachments to the accord describing inspection procedures for specific facilities. And fourth, the IAEA will begin routine inspections designed to ensure that the nuclear facilities are not being used for military purposes.]

—Steven R. Weisman, "North Korea Signs Accord on Atom-Plant Inspections," *New York Times*, 31 January 1992, p. 2; Ken Olsen, "North Korea Signs International Nuclear Accord, But Concerns Remain," Associated Press, 30 January 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Pukhan Haeksach'al' Ŭddŏn Chŏlch'a Palbna/Palhyo 30 Illae Hyŏnhwangbogo Ŭimu," *Kyungnyang Shinmun*, 30 January 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Im Tong Myŏng, "Pukhan, Ŭje Haekhyŏpchŏng Sŏ'myŏng/Puktaep'yo '1 Nyŏnnae Pijun'," *Chosun Ilbo*, 31 January 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

February 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix presents his three-year campaign to achieve "universal adherence to treaties blocking additional countries from obtaining nuclear weapons" to the UN Security Council.

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—R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.N. Agency Launches Drive to Halt Nuclear Proliferation," *Washington Post*, 18 February 1992, p. A14.

February 1992

US satellite imagery reveals that North Korea is digging "deep tunnels" around the nuclear complex in Yŏngbyŏn. Some analysts believe this is part of a program to harden the facility against possible South Korean or US attacks. Others believe the tunnels may be part of a program to hide materials or components from IAEA inspectors. South Korea's ambassador to the United States, Hyŏn Hong Chu, cites North Korea's extensive missile production as "corroborative evidence" that North Korea is determined to develop nuclear weapons.

—Bill Gertz, "North Korea Digs Tunnels for Nuclear Arms," *Washington Times*, 21 February 1992, p. A9.

February 1992

According to a US expert, "the North Korean missile development program proceeded in parallel with the nuclear development program," and "therefore, we assume that a weapon ultimately would be mated with a missile delivery system." Some Bush administration officials believe North Korea may be only months away from acquiring a nuclear bomb. Some also believe that North Korea might export it.

—Dan Oberdorfer, "N. Korea Seen Closer To A-Bomb; U.S. Officials Say Weapon Capability May Come in Months," *Washington Post*, 23 February 1992, pp. A1, A26.

February 1992

Nuclear Engineering International reports that, following a tip-off from the CIA, the German BND intelligence service is investigating engineering company Leybold AG for allegedly supplying five specialized industrial furnaces to North Korea for use in its suspected nuclear weapons program. Two furnaces are electron beam furnaces, two are "laboratory furnaces," and the fifth is described as a "small laboratory furnace." The BND suspects that the first four furnaces reached North Korea via India or Pakistan while the fifth is believed to have arrived through East Germany.

—"Investigation into German – Korean Link," *Nuclear Engineering International*, James Varley, ed., February 1992, vol. 37, no. 451, pp. 7-8.

3 February 1992

North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Pak Kil Yŏn says that North Korea will likely ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement within six months.

—"North Korea Says It Will Allow Nuclear Inspections Soon," Associated Press, 3 February 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 February 1992

North Korea officially approves the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" that was signed by the North and South Korean Prime Ministers in December 1991.

—"Nambuk Pihaekwasŏn'ŏn/Pukhan, Kongshikchŏk Sŭng'in," *Joongang Ilbo*, 6 February 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

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Mid-February 1992

US officials meet with North Korean diplomats in Beijing. It is believed that the United States informs North Korea that it has until June 1992 to accept international inspections of its nuclear facilities.

—Edward Neilan, "U.S. Gives Ultimatum to N. Korea on Nukes," *Washington Times*, 25 February 1992, p. A8; Kelley Smith Tunney, "Sources: U.S. Urges June Deadline in Nuclear Dispute," Associated Press, 24 February 1992, in Lexis-Nexis Academic University, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 February 1992

The North Korean Standing Committee agrees that the IAEA safeguards agreement should be ratified.

—Gamini Seneviratne, "Inspections Could Start in June, North Korean Envoy Tells IAEA," *Nucleonics Week*, 27 February 1992, p. 6.

24 February 1992

Douglas H. Paal, a senior advisor to President George Bush, meets with South Korean government officials to discuss North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program. He announces that the United States has set June 1992 as the deadline for North Korea to open its nuclear facilities to international inspections. US Congressman Stephen Solarz suggests that the United States may have to use force to coerce North Korea to allow international inspections. In a commentary printed in *Rodong Sinmun*, North Korea writes off Congressman Solarz's remarks as "absurd remarks" meant to aggravate tension over the nuclear issue.

—Edward Neilan, "U.S. Gives Ultimatum to N. Korea on Nukes," *Washington Times*, 25 February 1992, p. A8; Kelley Smith Tunney, "Sources: U.S. Urges June Deadline in Nuclear Dispute," Associated Press, 24 February 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Korean Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 24 February 1992, in "North Korea Condemns US Congressman's 'Gibberish' on Nuclear Inspection," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 February 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 February 1992

An IAEA official announces that the IAEA is close to reaching an agreement with North Korea to allow a team of experts to visit North Korea's nuclear facilities. Although North Korea has not ratified the IAEA safeguards agreement, O Ch'ang Rim, North Korean Ambassador to the IAEA, says, "There is no possibility that it will be rejected." O says that North Korea will ratify the agreement in early April and inspections will probably be able to begin in June.

—Rupert Cornwell and Michael Wise, "Pyongyang 'Months off Nuclear Bomb'," *The Independent* (London), 26 February 1992, p. 10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Puk 4 Wöl Haekpijun-6 Wölbut'ö Sach'al'/Pukhandaep'yo Ilchöng Ch'öt Konggae," *Joongang Ilbo*, 26 February 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

25 February 1992

CIA Director Robert Gates announces that North Korea's nuclear program is so advanced that it could produce a nuclear weapon in as little as two months. Speaking to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Gates claims that North Korea is already operating a nuclear facility with the apparent sole purpose of producing plutonium, and a fuel reprocessing plant capable of separating weapon-grade plutonium is nearing completion.

—Rupert Cornwell and Michael Wise, "Pyongyang 'Months off Nuclear Bomb,'" *The Independent* (London), 26

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February 1992, p. 10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Reuters, "N. Koreans to Have Bomb in Months, CIA Warns," *Vancouver Sun*, 26 February 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 February 1992

The IAEA Board of Governors reaffirms its right to conduct special inspections of undeclared nuclear sites. It says that inspections will only occur on "rare occasions." The IAEA has not yet performed such an inspection. IAEA spokesman David Kyd announces that the Board has agreed on a plan that requires all nations with full-scope safeguards agreements to begin submitting preliminary designs of nuclear facilities to the IAEA once the decision to construct them is made. At its next meeting in June 1992, the Board will discuss a plan for mandatory reporting of imports and exports of nuclear material and sensitive non-nuclear equipment.

—Michael J. Wise, "UN Agency Tightens Rules for Nuclear Inspections," *The Independent* (London), 27 February 1992, p. 14, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 February 1992

A "US official" says that "large trucks have been 'hauling things away' from a facility that US intelligence officials believe is designed to make plutonium." [Note: This is probably a reference to the "Radiochemistry Laboratory" in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.]

— R. Jeffrey Smith, "N. Koreans Accused of Arms Ploy; Trucks Reported Hauling From A-Site," *Washington Post*, 28 February 1992, p. A29, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 February 1992

According to North Korean Ambassador to IAEA O Ch'ang Rim, international inspectors may start examining North Korean nuclear facilities by May 1992. The United States believes that North Korea is removing items from its plutonium production facility.

—R. Jeffrey Smith, "North Koreans Accused of Arms Ploy; Trucks Reported Hauling From A-Sit," *Washington Post*, 28 February 1992, p. A29.

3 March 1992

While talking with South Korean soldiers, US Ambassador to South Korea Donald Gregg suggests that North Korea might be relocating nuclear installations from Yŏngbyŏn-kun. Gregg states, "Some satellite pictures show trucks and trains coming in and out of Yŏngbyŏn. It would be easier to hide things in North Korea than in Iraq."

— Cayman Kim, "U.S. Steps Up Pressure on N. Korean Nuclear Plan," Japan Economic Newswire, 7 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 March 1992

During a three-day visit to Seoul, US Assistant Secretary of Defense James Lilley says that the UN may have to become involved if North Korea does not allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities by June. In a meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Sang Ok, Lilley reiterates the US position that it will not remove any troops from the Korean Peninsula until North Korea resolves the issue of nuclear inspections. He also claims that North Korea should allow South Korea inspections of its nuclear facilities.

—"Seoul Accuses North Korea of Stalling Nuclear Inspections," Associated Press, 4 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis,

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<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Cayman Kim, "U.S. Steps Up Pressure on N. Korean Nuclear Plan," Japan Economic Newswire, 7 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 March 1992

North Korea announces that its Supreme People's Assembly will ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement in April 1992. North Korean Ambassador to IAEA, O Chang Rim, says that international inspections will begin "most probably at the beginning of June 1992."

—"North Prepares to Ratify Nuclear Safeguards Accord; Denounces U.S.," Associated Press (Tokyo), 8 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Asia's Powerful Upstarts," *The Economist*, 14 March 1992, p. 47; "Pukhan Naedal 8 Il Haekpijun/Chung'angt'ongshin Podo," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 9 March 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

11 March 1992

In a press release given at the United Nations, North Korea reiterates that it has "neither the capacity nor the intention to develop nuclear weapons." North Korea also states that it will ratify the nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA and allow inspectors at the earliest possible date.

—"DPRK Reaffirms Stand on Nuke Weapons," Xinhua News Agency, 11 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 March 1992

North and South Korea reach an agreement to conduct mutual inspections of their nuclear facilities. The agreement, reached after three months of negotiations at the border village of Panmunjom, marks the first time North Korea accepts a specific timeframe for the implementation of inter-Korean nuclear inspections. The agreement stipulates that the two countries will create a Joint Nuclear Control Commission on 19 March at which they will "make joint efforts" to work out the details and procedures for mutual inspections by 19 May. According to the agreement, the two countries will commence mutual inspections within 20 days of finalizing a document on the procedures.

—"Two Koreas Vow To Check Each Other's Nuclear Facilities," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "South Korea Signs Nuclear Accord; North To Sign," Associated Press, 16 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 March 1992

Quoting a 1990 top secret KGB document submitted by Former KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov, the Russian Weekly *Argumenty i Fakty* reports that in 1990, the KGB received reliable information that North Korea had successfully developed a nuclear detonative device at the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex. The KGB document also stated that all nuclear development was conducted under the direct command of Kim Jong Il.

—"1990 KGB Report Hints N. Korea Completed Nuclear Bomb," Japan Economic Newswire, 15 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Mid-March 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix says, "In a place like North Korea with no nuclear power stations, it's hard to see a

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legitimate use for a reprocessing plant. It's also hard to see, anywhere, a legitimate economic reason for building uranium enrichment plants. Adding such capacity adds to the proliferation risk."

—Tom Wilkie, "Inspectors on Korean Bomb Hunt," *The Independent* (London), 22 March 1992, p. 14, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 March 1992

The United States informs North Korea that it will impose sanctions if North Korea does not allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities. The United States and South Korea believe that North Korea is stalling inspections in order to move its nuclear facilities underground. According to the United States, several convoys of trucks have left Yŏngbyŏn.

—"Sanctions Threat to North Korea on Nuclear Arms," *Daily Telegraph* (London), 17 March 1992, p. 14, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 March 1992

South Korea announces that it will urge North Korea to accept expanded powers of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) when the commission convenes for the first time on 19 March. South Korea wants the JNCC to be able to conduct forced inspections of facilities suspected of hiding nuclear-related material or technology even if the facility is not declared.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 17 March 1992, in "South Korea Wants Forced Inspection of North's Nuclear Sites," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 March 1992

During a visit to Seoul, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev confirms that Russia has halted all financial and technical support to North Korea for nuclear plants.

—"Kozyrev Asks Japan-Russia Cooperation on N. Korea Nukes," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Hallŏ Puk Haeksach'al Kongdongnoryŏk/Oemuhoedam/Uhojoyak Yeltsin Panghanddae Ch'e'gyŏl," *Donga Ilbo*, 28 March 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

19 March 1992

North and South Korea hold the first meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) at Panmunjon. The commission, consisting of seven delegates from each country, is headed by North Korean Foreign Ministry Ambassador at large Ch'oe U Jin and South Korean Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security Chancellor Kong Ro Myŏng. At the meeting, South Korea presents a proposal calling for regular inspections of declared nuclear sites in addition to challenge inspections of undeclared sites. The North Korean proposal focuses on getting international guarantees for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and calls for inspections of US military bases located in South Korea. The two sides fail to reach an agreement on the procedures of mutual inspection and decide to meet again on 1 April.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 19 March 1992, in "First Inter-Korean Nuclear Control Committee Meeting Reveals 'Divergent Views'," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Joint Nuclear Control Commission Formed," Xinhua News Agency, 19 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 17 March 1992, in "South Korea Wants Forced Inspection of North's Nuclear Sites," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 March 1992

According to South Korean Prime Minister Chŏng Wŏn Shik, the issue surrounding international inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities cannot be resolved solely through pressuring North Korea; countries must also engage Pyongyang through dialogue.

—"Japan, S. Korea Agree More Top-Level Talks Necessary," Japan Economic Newswire, 26 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

April 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix informs North Korea that if it does not declare its "radiochemical facility," he will request the UN Security Council to demand special inspections of the site. [Note: This is a reference to the "Radiochemistry Laboratory."]

—Ann MacLachlan, "North Korea Files Initial Report With IAEA; Declares Reprocessing Facility," *Nucleonics Week*, 7 May 1992, pp. 8-9.

1 April 1992

North and South Korea hold the second meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC). South Korean Co-Chairman Kong Ro Myŏng claims that South Korea cannot accept the North Korean demand that in return for inspections at its facility in Yŏngbyŏn, North Korean inspectors should have full access to US military bases located in South Korea. Kong says, "We have already offered the North a comprehensive idea on mutual nuclear inspection that the North could easily agree to if only it really meant to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula."

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 3 April 1992, in "South Korea Loses Interest in Pilot Nuclear Inspection," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 April 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 April 1992

North Korea's envoy to the United Nations, Han Shi Hae, informs Japanese reporters that North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) will ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement soon.

—"Jiang and Miyazawa Go Bump," *The Economist*, 11 April 1992, pp. 31, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 April 1992

North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly ratifies the IAEA safeguards agreement. According to IAEA regulations, North Korea is required to allow international inspections of its facilities within 90 days. It is also required to list all of its nuclear facilities within 30 days of the last day of the month after it ratifies the safeguards agreement. William Dirks, IAEA Deputy Director General, says that the IAEA will go to the UN Security Council if North Korea fails to list all of its nuclear facilities for inspection.

—Mark Hibbs, "Pyongyang Still Not Reporting Reprocessing Unit at Yŏngbyŏn," *Nucleonics Week*, 23 April 1992, pp. 15-16; David E. Sanger, "North Korea Assembly Backs Atom Pact," *New York Times*, 10 April 1992, p. A3.

10 April 1992

North Korea presents the safeguards agreement to IAEA Director General Hans Blix at the Agency's headquarters

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in Vienna.

—Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 267; "'6 Wölbut'ö Haeksach'al Patketta' / Pukhan Chŏn In Ch'an Taesa," *Segye Ilbo*, 12 April 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

11 April 1992

The Korean Central News Agency reports that Russian scientists have assisted North Korea's Institute of Atomic Energy in constructing a nuclear cyclotron, a device used for accelerating and separating charged subatomic particles.

—"Russia Helped Build North Korea's Nuclear Cyclotron: KCNA," *Agence France Presse*, 11 April 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 April 1992

In a rare interview with an American reporter, North Korean President Kim Il Sung claims that North Korea "does not have any nuclear weapons . . . And, what is more, we don't need nuclear weapons." He also says that North Korea is willing to receive international inspectors at its nuclear facilities and all that needs to be arranged is the procedural formality of informing the IAEA.

—Mark Lerner, "Leaders Rethink Isolation to Ease Economic Binds," *Washington Times*, 15 April 1992, p. A11; "'We Don't Need Nuclear Weapons'," *Washington Times*, 15 April 1992, p. A11, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 April 1992

According to Ch'oe Chong Sun, head of the North Korean Ministry of Atomic Energy's Foreign Affairs Bureau, three nuclear facilities in North Korea will be opened for international inspection. The facilities include a 5MW research reactor built in 1986, and the 50MW and 200MW reactors, which are currently under construction. Ch'oe denies that North Korea has a reprocessing plant. On 9 April, IAEA Director General Hans Blix suggested that if North Korea does not declare the facility, "then the [IAEA] can turn to the United Nations Security Council for help."

—Bill Lamp, "N. Korea Says It Is Studying A-Bomb Process," *United Press International*, 14 April 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Tamotsu Tsukuda, "North Korea to Open 3 N-Plants to IAEA Checks," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 15 April 1992, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "North Korea Assembly Backs Atom Pact," *New York Times*, 10 April 1992, p. A3.

Mid-April 1992

North Korean television shows parts of the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex and reports that three nuclear plants will be open for IAEA inspections. The report, however, denies that there is a reprocessing plant at the complex.

—Nate Thayer, "Leader Kim Feted for Birthday; Reportedly Wants to Open U.S. Embassy," *Associated Press*, 15 April 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 April 1992

A meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) between North and South Korea breaks down without even an agreement on when to meet next. According to a South Korean official, the North Korean delegation

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"opposed our offer for inspections based on reciprocity and demanded unilateral full inspections. They further refused special inspections." The official also claimed that the North Korean delegation introduced the demand that the two countries "jointly cope with external nuclear threats." The North Korean delegation did not respond to the South Korean proposal for more JNCC meetings to be held on 24 and 28 April.

—"Seoul Official Sees Pyongyang Deception," United Press International, 23 April 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Stalemate Continues at South-North Korea Nuclear Talks," United Press International, 23 April 1992, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Haek Sanghosach'al l'gyŏn Motchophyŏ/Nambuk Haekkongdong'wi 3 Ch'ahoeŭi," *Taehan Maeil*, 22 April 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

4 May 1992

Twenty-five days ahead of schedule, North Korea provides the IAEA with a 150-page "initial declaration" of its nuclear facilities and materials. The report says "gram quantities" of plutonium were separated from damaged spent-fuel rods in 1990 at an industrial-scale reprocessing facility still under construction. Although the IAEA does not release the report, it reportedly includes the following facilities and materials: nuclear material and design information; a research reactor and critical assembly at the Institute of Nuclear Physics (under IAEA safeguards); a sub-critical facility at Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang; a fuel rod fabrication plant and storage facility in Yŏngbyŏn-kun; a 5MW(e) nuclear reactor; a "Radiochemistry Laboratory" under construction in Yŏngbyŏn-kun; a 50MW(e) nuclear plant under construction in Yŏngbyŏn-kun; a 200MW(e) plant under construction in T'aechŏn-kun, North P'yŏng'an Province; and a plan to build three 635MW(e) nuclear reactors. Two uranium mines and two facilities for uranium milling are also listed. This list closely matches Western estimates of the scope of North Korea's nuclear program.

—"Inspections Under Full-Scope Safeguards Agreement Proceed: Safeguards Inspection to DPRK," *IAEA Newbriefs*, Vol. 7, No. 3, June-July 1992, p. 3; Mark Hibbs, "North Korea Thought to Have Separated PU in the 1970s with Soviet Help," *Nuclear Fuel*, 22 June 1992, pp. 15-16; Michael Mazarr, *North Korea And The Bomb* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 83; David Albright, "How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?" *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September/October 1994, Vol. 50, No. 5, www.thebulletin.org; "Pukhan Haekshisŏl Ch'ŏt Pogosŏ Chech'ul," *Hankryŏreh Shinmun*, 5 May 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

7 May 1992

As a means of ensuring that the IAEA team does not "miss anything" during inspections, US officials provide IAEA Director General Hans Blix and his top aides intelligence briefings in September 1991, March 1992, and 7 May 1992. During the last briefing, Blix is given a "virtual reality" tour of the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex. US officials place a great deal of emphasis on the reprocessing facility, which North Korea has identified as a "radiochemical laboratory."

—Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 268-269.

11-16 May 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix arrives in Pyongyang prior to the IAEA inspection team to meet with North Korean Prime Minister Yŏn Hyŏng Muk, Minister of Atomic Energy Ch'oe Hak Kŭn and first Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sŏk Chu. Blix is reassured that the inspectors will be allowed access to any site in North Korea

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regardless if it is listed in the initial declaration submitted on 4 May 1992 to the IAEA. In the course of the meetings, Blix visits the unfinished nuclear reprocessing laboratory in Yöngbyön-kun. After seeing the site, he reports that North Korea is building a nuclear reprocessing facility capable of processing spent fuel into plutonium. He says that North Korea has already produced a "tiny quantity" of plutonium. However, the quantity is much less than what is required to build a nuclear weapon. According to North Korea, the reprocessing plant will be used to produce mixed-oxide fuel for future fast-breeder reactors. North Korea also expresses interest in building gas-graphite reactors because it can do so indigenously.

—David Albright, "North Korea's Plutonium Puzzle," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November 1992, pp. 36-40; "Inspections Under Full-Scope Safeguards Agreement Proceed: Safeguards Inspection to DPRK," *IAEA Newbriefs*, Vol. 7, No. 3, June-July 1992, p. 3; Ann MacLachlan, "Blix Says North Korean Laboratory Could Become Reprocessing Plant," *Nucleonics Week*, 21 May 1992, pp. 7-8; Michael Mazarr, *North Korea And The Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation*, (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 79; T.R. Reid, "N. Korean Plutonium Plant Cited; Pyongyang Building Reprocessing Facility," *Washington Post*, 17 May 1992; Lee Chae Süng, *Pukhan'ül Umjig'i'nün Technocrat* (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 114.

12 May 1992

The Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) meets for the fourth time. Unlike past meetings, North and South Korea make progress in finalizing a document of procedures for mutual inspections by the set date of 19 May. North Korea withdraws its demand that the two sides adopt a separate protocol based on the pledges to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula before negotiating an inspections regime. South Korea agrees to alter the language regarding the subjects of inspections from "sites suspected of nuclear capabilities" to "nuclear weapons and nuclear bases." The two sides agreed to begin drawing up the text of the agreement on 15 May.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 12 May 1992, in "South's JNCC Chairman Says Both Sides Compromised on Nuclear Inspection," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 May 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Acts Putting Brake on Resolution of Nuclear Issue," Korean Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 11 May 1992, in "North Korean Media on 'Pressing' Need To Inspect US Bases," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 May 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 11 May 1992, in "South Korea Plans To Compromise in Nuclear Inspection," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 May 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Mid-May 1992

Following a meeting between IAEA Director General Hans Blix and North Korean Prime Minister Yöñ Hyöng Muk and Minister of Atomic Energy Ch'oe Hak Kün, North Korea says that it is willing to consider eliminating certain elements of its nuclear program if foreign countries provide "the required assistance." Blix says that he is concerned about North Korea's nuclear program and the possibility that it will develop a nuclear bomb with special emphasis on reprocessing spent reactor fuel into plutonium. Yon denies that North Korea is interested in nuclear weapons. However, he says that North Korea is interested in using modern light water reactors rather than the heavy water reactors (whose by-products can be more easily reprocessed to produce plutonium).

—Jeffrey Smith, "North Korea May Consider Reducing Atom Program," *Washington Post*, 20 June 1992, p. A14.

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13-15 May 1992

During North Korean-Japanese normalization talks, Japan demands that North Korea immediately implement IAEA inspections. A deadlock in the talks arises from Japanese demands over the reprocessing facility in North Korea. The talks are conducted by North Korean chief negotiator Lee Sam Ro and Japanese Ambassador Noboru Nakahira. Following the talks, IAEA Director General Hans Blix travels to Japan to prepare for the 25 May 1992 inspections of North Korea's facilities. While in Japan, Blix informs officials that North Korea used hot cells to separate plutonium in 1990. He tells Japanese Science and Technology Minister Kanzo Tanigawa that the IAEA team will verify whether North Korea actually used the cells. North Korean officials have told Blix that the "Radiochemistry Laboratory" was completed in 1987 and that a "very small amount" of plutonium had been separated there. According to Blix, the reprocessing lab that he saw during his earlier visit was missing some equipment. However, no facilities were under construction during his visit.

—Naoaki Usui, "Reprocessing Issue Sets Up Road Block to Japanese-North Korean Talks," *Nuclear Fuel*, 25 May 1992, pp. 13-14; Sheryl Wudunn, "North Korean Site Has A-Bomb Hints," *New York Times*, 17 May 1992, p. A1.

15 May 1992

North and South Korea hold working-level talks on drafting an agreement on the procedures for a inter-Korean nuclear inspection regime but fail to make any progress. Reneging on the concession it made earlier in the week, North Korea once again insists that the two sides must finalize an agreement on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula before negotiating an inspection regime. According to Pan Ki Mun, the chief South Korean delegate, North Korea "also insists on a detailed report on where and how many US nuclear weapons were deployed in South Korea, if indeed they have been pulled out."

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 15 May 1992, in "North-South Talks Fail To Make Progress on Nuclear Inspection Issue," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 May 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 May – 7 June 1992

IAEA inspectors conduct the first round of nuclear inspections in North Korea. During the inspections of facilities in Yŏngbyŏn-kun, the team is able to verify the location of fissionable materials as stated in North Korea's "initial declaration," which was submitted to the IAEA on 4 May 1992. In doing so, they visit the "Radiochemistry Laboratory." The team discovers that the building is only 80 percent complete, and that the equipment inside is only 40 percent ready for full-scale production. According to one IAEA official, "the works inside the building are 'extremely primitive' and far from ready to produce quantities of plutonium needed for a stockpile of atomic weapons." The IAEA team also inspects a 5MW(e) research reactor that came online in 1986, and a 50 MW(e) power plant under construction. According to Blix, earlier reports, which stated that there is electrical equipment around the nuclear reactor, are false. Rather, he saw "poles on which lines could be mounted." The North Koreans informed him that they are attempting to develop a civil nuclear power program using natural uranium and graphite. IAEA inspectors discover an isotope production laboratory, which was not included in North Korea's initial declaration to the IAEA. North Korean officials, saying that the laboratory is used solely to separate isotopes for medical purposes, allow the IAEA to inspect the facility. Inspectors discover seven hot cells within the facility.

—David Albright, "North Korea's Plutonium Puzzle," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November 1992, pp. 36-40; Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 268-269;

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"North Korea/U.S.," *Nucleonics Week*, 11 June 1992, pp. 11-12; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 1994, pp. 78-79; "IAEA Sach'aldan Ipukuk," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 23 May 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

27 May 1992

The fifth meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission fails to produce any agreement between North and South Korea on mutual nuclear inspections. The two sides even fail to set the date for the next meeting, making it practically impossible to conduct mutual inspections by the original deadline of mid-June. The South Korean delegation proposes that the next meeting be held on 29 May in order to keep alive the possibility of conducting mutual inspections by mid-June. The North Korean delegation, however, rejects the proposed date because of the on-going IAEA inspections, and proposes the next JNCC meeting be held on 16 June. South Korea does not agree to this, and the two sides decide to set the date through contacts between the inter-Korean liaison offices in Panmunjom.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 27 May 1992, in "Fifth JNCC Fails to Set Date for Next Round of Talks," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 May 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Summer 1992

North Korea constructs a third nuclear waste storage facility at the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex.

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 1994, p. 79.

June 1992

Defector Kim Tae Ho reportedly hears that North Korea has used "red mercury from the Soviet Union" to reprocess 6-10kg of plutonium. Kim, who defects in April 1994, says he heard this information from the "import-export director (輸出入課長)" of the "Korea Sixth Equipment Trading Company (朝鮮第6設備輸出入會社)," which Kim says imports materials and equipment for North Korea's nuclear program. [Note: Kim made no mention of this until three years after he defected in 1994, and there are inconsistencies in Kim's testimony.]

—Kim Min Sŏk, "'Puk, 93 Nyŏn Chŏp'okchŏn Haekshilhŏm Sŏnggong'/94 Nyŏn Kwisun Kim Tae Ho Ssi Chŭng'ŏn," *Joongang Ilbo*, 9 June 1997, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Kyodo News Service, "N. Korea Has Missile Base Targeted at Tokyo: Defector," Japan Economic Newswire, 9 June 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Hong Sŏng Ch'ŏl, "'Puk Haek Missile Kiji Kŏnsŏl'/Kwisun Kim Tae Ho Ssi Shin'angganjŭngsŏ Palghyŏ," *Donga Ilbo*, 9 June 1997, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Chŏn Chae U, "'Puk, Chŏp'okchŏn Haekshilhŏm Sŏnggong'/Haekt'andu 2 Ki Chejoga'nŭng Plutoniumdo Hwakpo," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 9 June 1997, p. 7, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Kyodo News Service, "N. Korea Has Missile Base Targeted at Tokyo: Defector," Japan Economic Newswire, 9 June 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Aims Missiles at Tokyo: Defector," United Press International, 9 June 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

June 1992

At the IAEA annual meeting, the North Korean representative informs the IAEA that North Korea's reprocessing facility should be retained "for the sake of the country's prosperity and economic growth."

—R. Jeffrey Smith, "N. Korea May Consider Reducing Atom Program," *Washington Post*, 20 June 1992, p. A14.

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1 June 1992

During US-North Korean consular-level talks in Beijing, North Korea claims that it has produced a small amount of plutonium, but it will stop reprocessing plutonium if the IAEA provides light water reactor technology and enriched uranium to be used solely for industrial uses. According to a North Korean official, Pyongyang made the same offer to IAEA Director General Hans Blix.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 7 June 1992, in "Korean Nuclear Issues; Yonhap Reports North Korean Offer to USA Over Plutonium Production," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 June 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 11 June 1992, in "South Wants Yongbyon Facility 'Scrapped'; Joint Nuclear Talks to Resume," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 June 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 June 1992

Reporting on his May trip to North Korea and the results of IAEA inspections, IAEA Director General Hans Blix claims that the nuclear fuel reprocessing facility under construction in North Korea is a factory, not an experimental laboratory. Blix quotes a North Korean official as saying that "without a guarantee for the introduction of advanced technology from abroad and stable supplies of nuclear fuel, we cannot give up our present nuclear policy." According to Blix, North Korea "responds favorably" to the IAEA's proposal that it switch its nuclear program from graphite-moderated to light-water reactors. Blix also says that "the North Korean side had explained that the Radiochemistry Laboratory, which is at issue, is aimed at the completion of the nuclear fuel cycle for the purpose of supplying their own nuclear fuel and that it had already started research on a fast-breeding reactor and composite nuclear fuel."

—Choe Maen Ho, *Donga Ilbo*, 11 June 1992, p. 1, in "Blix Reports on May DPRK Nuclear Inspections: North Intent on Current Policies," FBIS-EAS-92-113, 11 June 1992, p. 14; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 11 June 1992, in "South Willing to Share Technology," FBIS-EAS-92-113, 11 June 1992, pp. 14-15; "Pukhanhaek Chaech'ŏrishiŏl/Taehyŏnggongjang Kyumoyŏtta," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 11 June 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

11 June 1992

South Korea announces that it is willing to share nuclear technology with North Korea if Pyongyang accepts South Korean nuclear inspectors and abandons its reprocessing facility. According to Kim Chae Sŏp, director-general of international organizations at the Foreign Ministry, "The Government policy is that Seoul will promote exchanges and cooperation with Pyongyang depending on the progress of inter-Korean relations and nuclear negotiations."

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 11 June 1992, in "South Willing to Share Technology," FBIS-EAS-92-113, 11 June 1992, pp. 14-15.

15 June 1992

At the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, member states discuss North Korea's nuclear situation. The Board agrees that all nuclear-related facilities must be reported at least 180 days prior to construction. Previous regulations required 60 days prior notice.

—Roland Prinz, "U.N. Agency Report: North Korea Not Close to Making Nuclear Bomb," Associated Press, 15 June 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North-IAEA Conclude Nuclear Inspection Accord," Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 10 July 1992 in FBIS document FBIS-EAS-92-133, 10 July 1992.

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15 June 1992

According to IAEA spokesman David Kyd, the North Korean technology that the IAEA saw in Yŏngbyŏn-kun was "30 years old." North Korea's nuclear facilities have shoddy designs, and the radiation shielding systems, cranes, protective devices, waste disposal sites and safety control systems are "seriously defective." Therefore, the IAEA disagrees with CIA reports that North Korea will be able to produce a nuclear weapon in the very near future. However, before making an accurate assessment, the IAEA must conduct additional inspections.

—Roland Prinz, "U.N. Agency Report: North Korea Not Close to Making Nuclear Bomb," Associated Press, 15 June 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Choe Maen Ho, *Donga Ilbo* (Seoul), 15 June 1992, p. 1, in "IAEA Finds DPRK Nuclear Safety 'Defective'," FBIS-EAS-92-115, 15 June 1992, pp. 20-21.

15-19 June 1992

At the IAEA Board of Governor's meeting in Vienna, 22 of the 35 Board members support South Korea's demand that North Korea allow inter-Korean inspections of nuclear facilities.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 19 June 1992, in "Yi Sang-ok Says Inspection Basis for Nuclear Aid," FBIS-EAS-92-119, 19 June 1992, pp. 14-15.

16 June 1992

The IAEA reports that there is a possibility of conducting special inspections on undeclared nuclear facilities in North Korea. The report follows statements given by IAEA director General Hans Blix at the Board of Governors' meeting that he had obtained North Korea's agreement to accept inspectors at unreported nuclear facilities.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 17 June 1992, in "Nuclear Issues; Yonhap Says North Agrees to IAEA Inspection of Unreported Facilities," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 18 June 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 June 1992

The South Korean government decides not to provide light water reactor technology with North Korea because Pyongyang's establishment of a reprocessing capability at the "Radiochemistry Laboratory" is in violation of the "Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."

—"Haekpalchŏn Kyŏngsuro Kisul/Chŏngbu, Puk'e Chegong Anhae," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 16 June 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

18 June 1992

At a press conference following the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, O Chang Rim, head of the North Korean delegation, advocates continued bilateral negotiations between the North and South as stipulated by the Joint Nuclear Control Committee (JNCC). According to O, the major obstacle to the North-South talks is South Korea's refusal to allow North Korean inspections of US military bases in the South. North Korea fears that these bases may house nuclear weapons. O also says that North Korea will continue to cooperate with the IAEA on inspections, but that construction of the Yŏngbyŏn Radiochemistry Laboratory will continue despite international concern.

—Korean Central Broadcasting Agency (Pyongyang), 21 June 1992, in "IAEA Governors Meet; Delegation Attends: Chief Delegate Gives Speech," FBIS-EAS-92-120, 22 June 1992, pp.17-18; Korean Central Broadcasting Agency (Pyongyang), 21 June 1992, in "Holds News Conference," FBIS-EAS-92-120, 22 June 1992, pp. 18-19; Chu Sŏp Il,

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"'Yöngbyön Haekshisölgongsa Chungdanmothanda'/Pukhandaep'yo Hoe'gyön," *Segye Ilbo*, 19 June 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

19 June 1992

South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Sang Ok announces that until North Korea accepts inter-Korean bilateral nuclear inspections, South Korea will not give it any nuclear-related technical assistance. "Pyongyang's acceptance of ad hoc inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is positive, but it must accept inter-Korean inspection as well in order to completely dispel the global suspicion and concern about its nuclear arms development."

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 19 June 1992, in "Yi Sang-ok Says Inspection Basis for Nuclear Aid," FBIS-EAS-92-119, 19 June 1992, pp. 14-15.

19 June 1992

A South Korean source claims that South Korea is considering omitting military facilities as subjects of challenge inspections in the proposed inter-Korean nuclear inspections regime. According to the source, South Korea will present a revised proposal at the upcoming meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC).

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 19 June 1992, in "Seoul Considering Excluding Bases," FBIS-EAS-92-119, 19 June 1992, p. 15.

21 June 1992

An anonymous South Korean official announces that Russia has informed the United States and South Korea that it is considering a plan to stop supplying North Korea with any military equipment, including defensive weapons. According to the official, Russia is taking this measure in order to put more pressure on North Korea to resolve questions about its nuclear capabilities and allow inter-Korean inspections. The official also claims that Russia is considering completely abandoning its military alliance treaty with North Korea.

—Ko Tae Yong, KBS-1 Television (Seoul), 21 June 1992, in "Russia Reportedly To Stop Arms Supply to DPRK," FBIS-EAS-92-120, 22 June 1992, pp. 23-24.

30 June 1992

North and South Korea meet for the sixth JNCC talks and once again fail to make any progress on an inter-Korean nuclear inspection regime. Insisting that suspicions of North Korean nuclear activities had grown since IAEA inspections, the South Korean delegates claim that inter-Korean relations cannot improve until North Korea resolves remaining questions about its nuclear program. The two sides do agree to meet again on 21 July.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 30 June 1992, in "North Reacts 'Fiercely' to Linkage of Nuclear And Other Issues," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 July 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Korean Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 30 June 1992, in "North's Nuclear Committee Chairman on 'Deadlocked' Talks," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 July 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

July 1992

According to Lee Ch'ung Kuk, a North Korean defector who worked at the Ministry of People's Armed Forces Nuclear Chemical Defense Bureau, three North Korean military officers visit Russia and Ukraine. The officers visit

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nuclear and chemical warfare facilities and observe three nuclear explosions. According to Lee, who claims to have prepared a report of the team's observations, the nuclear tests are used to test the performance of North Korean-made "equipment for automatically monitoring nuclear explosions." [Note: President Yeltsin had ordered a freeze on all nuclear tests in light of improving diplomatic relations with the United States, so this report is dubious].
—U Chong Chang, *Chugan Chosun*, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in "Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations," FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 39.

4 July 1992

In an interview published by Yonhap News Agency, US Ambassador to South Korea Donald Gregg says that the United States would open military bases in South Korea to inspections if North Korea reciprocates. Gregg states, "We Americans would open our military bases to North Korean inspection in return for their opening installations in the North to South Koreans." Gregg's statement marks the first time the United States indicated that it might open its military bases to North Korean inspectors.

—"Report: U.S. To Open Military Bases to North Korean Inspections," Associated Press, 4 July 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 July 1992

IAEA inspectors arrive to begin a second round of international inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities. The inspections will focus on the reprocessing facility in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. The team will also investigate the status of North Korea's plutonium production, storage operations, and reactor safety. The second round of IAEA inspections will continue through 17 July.

—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 6 July 1992, in "IAEA Starts Second Nuclear Inspections in North Korea," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 8 July 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6-16 July 1992

IAEA inspections conduct the second round of nuclear inspections in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.

—"Pukhaek 2 Ch'asach'al Wallyo/Kukchewŏnjaryŏkkigu," *Donga Ilbo*, 17 July 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

10 July 1992

North Korea accepts a subsidiary arrangement to the April safeguards agreement with the IAEA. North Korea has not yet approved attachments to the agreement. The purpose of the attachments is to specify the facilities that will be routinely inspected and the length and frequency of the inspections.

—"North-IAEA Conclude Nuclear Inspection Accord," Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 10 July 1992 in FBIS document FBIS-EAS-92-133, 10 July 1992.

21 July 1992

The seventh meeting of the JNCC fails to make any progress in establishing an inter-Korean nuclear inspections regime. North Korean delegates continue to complain about the South's insistence on resolving the suspicions of the North's nuclear activities, but Kong Ro Myŏn, South Korean Chairman to the JNCC, states that South Korea will not alter its principle of "nuclear solution first, economic cooperation later." This issue is highlighted by the fact that North Korean Deputy Premier Kim Dal Hyŏn is currently touring industrial facilities in the South. The next JNCC

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meeting is set for 31 August.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 21 July 1992, in "North Complains about South's Nuclear-Economic Cooperation Link," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 July 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 July 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix informs the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs that the IAEA "would not have any hesitation" in identifying North Korea's reported Radiochemistry Laboratory as "a reprocessing plant in the terminology of the industrialized world."

—David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "North Korea's Plutonium Puzzle," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November 1992, pp. 36-40.

August 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix, testifying before the US Congress, says that North Korea has "emphatically denied" separating additional amounts of plutonium.

—Mark Hibbs, "IAEA Special Inspection Effort Meeting Diplomatic Resistance," *Nucleonics Week*, 18 February 1993, pp. 16-17.

23 August 1992

South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Sang Ok meets with his Chinese counterpart Qian Qichen in Beijing. According to Qian, China has repeatedly asked North Korea to allow IAEA inspections.

—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 23 August 1992, in "South Korean Foreign Minister Holds 'Friendly' Talks in Beijing," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 August 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; KBS-1 Television (Seoul), 24 August 1992, in "No Tae-u Speaks on Normalizing Ties," FBIS-EAS-92-164, 24 August 1992, pp. 17-18.

28 August 1992

A South Korean Foreign Ministry source says that China has informed South Korea that Beijing will not provide North Korea with any support for the development of nuclear energy or nuclear weapons.

—"Chungguk, Pukhan'e Haekchiwŏn Anhandu/Mu'gigaebal-Wŏnjaryŏkpalchŏnkkaji/Han'guk'e Yaksok," *Joongang Ilbo*, 28 August 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

31 August 1992

The eighth JNCC meeting fails to make significant progress towards a mutual nuclear inspections regime on the Korean Peninsula, but the North Korean delegation changes its position and agrees to discuss inspection regimes before anything else. The North Korean delegation also expresses interest in inspections of military installations. However, disagreements persist over the reprocessing plant located in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. South Korea continues to demand that North Korea dismantle the facility immediately, but North Korea claims that recent IAEA inspections have cleared up any remaining suspicions.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 1 September 1992, "Pyongyang Shows 'Unprecedented Flexibility' at Nuclear Meeting," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 September 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Korean Joint Control Commission Remains Deadlocked," United Press International, 31 August 1992, in Lexis-

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Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Nambuksanghohaeksach'al/Kyujöng Tüng Chölch'ung Shilp'ae/Haekt'ongjegongdong'wi," *Joongang Ilbo*, 31 August 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

31 August-15 September 1992

IAEA inspectors conduct the third round of inspections in Yöngbyön-kun. IAEA spokesman David Kyd says that the IAEA's inspections will focus on North Korea's plutonium reprocessing program. In preparation for the visit, North Korea hurriedly installed transmission lines and other related equipment at the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor. During the inspection, the team is given limited access to two suspected nuclear-related sites in Yöngbyön-kun. North Korea had not declared the sites in the initial declaration submitted to the IAEA in May 1992. One of the sites is a two-story building that has been partly covered by large mounds of earth and landscaping prior to the inspectors arrival so as to appear as a one-story building. However, US satellite imagery captured the construction of the building prior to the inspection, and it revealed that the first-story of the building contained thick-walled vaults made of reinforced concrete, which is suitable for nuclear waste storage. When the IAEA inspection team requests access to this portion of the building, the North Koreans inform them that it does not exist. They are permitted limited access to the second-story of the building, which is found to house heavy weapons, including tanks and missiles on mobile carriages. The North Koreans refuse to allow a formal and thorough inspection of the building based on grounds that it is a military site and thus exempt from inspection. The IAEA, however, does not accept such exemptions. [Note: The building has been designated as "Building 500" by US intelligence, and reportedly contains large nuclear waste storage cells on the first floor.] During the inspection, the North Korean government denies access to some facilities in Yöngbyön-kun, and also blocks direct communication between IAEA headquarters and its representatives in North Korea.

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr, "North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 1994, p. 78; Mark Hibbs, "Pyongyang Again Stalling IAEA Safeguards Implementation," *Nucleonics Week*, 10 September 1992, pp. 13-14; Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 274-275; "IAEA Pukhaeksach'al/Onülbut'ö Yölhültong'an," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 31 August 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

September 1992

At a press conference in Vienna, North Korean ambassador-at-large O Ch'ang Rim refuses to answer questions about the status of the reprocessing plant in Yöngbyön-kun. When asked whether the facility has been test-operated, O replies only that it is "under construction" without elaboration.

—David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "North Korea's Plutonium Puzzle," *Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists*, vol. 48, no. 9, November 1992, pp. 36-40.

14 September 1992

A South Korean official announces that Seoul is willing to go ahead with limited economic cooperation with North Korea before the two countries resolve the issue of mutual nuclear inspections. This announcement signifies a change in the previous South Korean principle of "nuclear solution first, economic cooperation later."

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 14 September 1992, in "Seoul Eases Conditions on Economic Cooperation with North," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 September 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap

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News Agency (Seoul), 21 July 1992, in "North Complains about South's Nuclear-Economic Cooperation Link," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 July 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 September 1992

O Ch'ang Rim, North Korean Ambassador to the IAEA, claims that North Korea will agree to inter-Korean nuclear inspections only if US military facilities in South Korea are also subject to inspection. He also states that North Korea will continue construction on a reprocessing plant.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 17 September 1992, in "North To Continue Work on Nuclear Plant," FBIS-EAS-92-181, 17 September 1992, p. 26.

18 September 1992

According to IAEA Director General Hans Blix, North Korea has agreed to allow IAEA inspections of all nuclear facilities. Regardless, verification that North Korea is not pursuing a nuclear weapons program will be difficult to attain. The IAEA believes that construction at an alleged nuclear reprocessing plant has been stopped. However, the IAEA Board of Governors says that "suspicion of nuclear development remains."

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 19 September 1992, in "IAEA's Blix Speaks on Verification," FBIS-EAS-92-183, 21 September 1992, p. 14.

October 1992

According to the *Chelyabinski Rabochij* newspaper, over 60 Russian researchers attempt to leave for North Korea, but they are detained at the Sheremetyevo-2 Airport near Moscow. The group includes over 40 researchers from the Machine Design Bureau in Miass. The paper quoted officials in the Russian security ministry as saying the group was able to design a nuclear warhead for a missile. The *Christian Science Monitor* later reports the number of scientists is 64. The *Hankook Ilbo* later reports the engineers are nuclear specialists that have been approached to design a nuclear warhead for ballistic missiles.

—ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 4 February 1993, in "Defense Workers Reportedly Tried to Go to DPRK," JPRS-TND-93-005, 12 February 1993, pp. 14-15; Daniel Sneider, "The Trail of N. Korea's Nuclear Bid," *Christian Science Monitor*, 17 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Pukhanhaeng Rŏ Kwahakcha/Haekt'anjejo Chŏnmun'ga/Rŏ Ilganji Podo," *Hankook Ilbo*, 9 February 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Rŏ Kukpangyŏn'guwŏn 60 Myŏng/Changnyŏn 10 Wŏl Ipuk Shido," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 5 February 1993, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

8 October 1992

At a press conference following the US-South Korean Security Consultative Meeting held 7-8 October in Washington, DC, US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney says that there is intelligence of "sufficient quality" to suggest that North Korea is close to developing a nuclear weapon. Cheney adds that the United States will not remove any more of the 37,400 troops from South Korea until the North stops developing nuclear weapons. After Cheney's statements, South Korean Lieutenant General Kim Chae Ch'ang says that previous IAEA inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities have raised "serious and clear" suspicions that North Korea is nearing completion of a reprocessing plant that would supply enough nuclear material for a bomb.

—Jane A. Morse, "DPRK Nuclear Weapon Capability Remains Top US, ROK Concern," United States Information Agency, 8 October 1992, in Federation of American Scientists News, <http://fas.org>; Reuters, "U.S., in Pact with

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South Korea, Delays Further Troop Withdrawal," New York Times, 9 October 1992, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Chuhanmi'gun 2 Dan'gyech'ölsu Yubo/Puk Haekp'ogi Anh'ülddaen," *Taehan Maeil*, 8 October 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Team Spirit' Chaegae/Han-Mi'gunsawi/Pukhan 'Haek' P'ogiddaen Chungdan," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 8 October 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 October 1992

A working-level meeting of the JNCC fails to make any substantive progress on inter-Korean nuclear inspections. The two sides continue to disagree on what type of facilities will be subject to inspections. According to a South Korean official, Seoul is prepared to take other measures if Pyongyang continues with its "delaying tactics." —"Government Shelves North-South Economic Talks," United Press International, 14 October 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 14 October 1992, in "North And South Fail To Agree on Nuclear Inspections," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 October 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Haeksach'al Taesang Chölch'ungshilp'ae/Öje nambuk Haekt'ong'wi Chöpchok," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, 15 October 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 October 1992

A meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) fails to make any progress on setting up a mutual nuclear inspection regime between North and South Korea. According to the Chairman of the South Korean delegation Kong No Myong, the two sides do "not even mention" specifics about the inspections regime. Instead, discussions focus on the US-South Korean decision to resume the Team Spirit joint military exercises. The North Korean delegation demands that South Korea cancel Team Spirit before it will discuss mutual inspections, and the South Korean delegation insists that they will continue to make preparations for the military exercise unless the JNCC makes substantial progress in setting up an inter-Korean inspections regime.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 22 October 1992, in "Inter-Korean Nuclear Talks Stall as North Demands Halt to Team Spirit," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 October 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Inter-Korea Nuclear Talks See No Progress," United Press International, 22 October 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Sangho Haeksach'al Shilshidoemyön Team Spirit Chungji Kömt'o/Hyön Ch'ongni Taebuksöhan," *Joongang Ilbo*, 22 October 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 October 1992

During working-level talks of the JNCC, North Korea reiterates the threat to withdraw from all inter-Korean dialogue unless Seoul cancels preparations for the Team Spirit military exercises by December. Due to this impasse, the two sides fail to make any progress on setting up a bilateral nuclear inspection regime on the Korean Peninsula.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 29 October 1992, in "Nuclear Talks Fail as North Renews Call for Cancellation of Team Spirit," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

November 1992

The *Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists* reports that IAEA officials are unenthusiastic about the prospects of North and South Korean bilateral inspections. They fear that a mutual inspection regime, with inferior technical information, could eventually be considered as an alternative to IAEA safeguards. The report quotes a senior German official,

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who supports the IAEA's position and is against any proposed inter-Korean regime that would ban plutonium reprocessing, as saying, "Both uranium enrichment and plutonium [separation and] recycling are legitimate civil nuclear activities. It should suffice to put any such facilities [in both Koreas] under IAEA safeguards." The report also states that IAEA experts believe North Korea is capable of processing "much larger amounts of nuclear material" than it is currently admitting. In order to verify the declared amount of reprocessed plutonium, the IAEA has requested samples of nuclear fuel from North Korea. North Korea, however, denied the request because it reportedly cannot provide any samples until the fuel is unloaded from the reactors in early 1993.

—David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "North Korea's Plutonium Puzzle," *Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists*, vol. 48, no. 9, November 1992, pp. 36-40; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 5 December 1992, in "IAEA 'Having Difficulty' with Nuclear Inspections in DPRK," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 November 1992

The North Korean foreign ministry issues a statement saying that North Korea may stop IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities if South Korea and the United States do not terminate their joint Team Spirit military exercises.

—"Pukhan, Kukchehaeksach'al Kōbudo Shisa/Oegyobu Sōngmyōng," *Joongang Ilbo*, 3 November 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 November 1992

South Korea announces that it will consider canceling the upcoming Team Spirit military exercises scheduled for Spring 1993 if inter-Korean nuclear inspections occur before the December round of prime ministers' talks. According to Kong Ro Myōng, the South Korean spokesman for negotiations with North Korea, "if mutual nuclear inspection is realized before the coming round of the South-North [*sic*] Prime Ministers' talks scheduled to start in Seoul on 21 December, we could consider shelving Team Spirit again next year. If the deadline is to be met, regulations for mutual inspection must be worked out by the end of this month. If the North does not respond it will be inevitable for us to conduct the exercise."

—James Kim, "Seoul Says Team Spirit Exercise Could Be Shelved," United Press International, 3 November 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Seoul May Call Off Exercises If Nuclear Checks Realized," Japan Economic Newswire, 3 November 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 3 November 1992, in "South Offers To Cancel Team Spirit If Mutual Inspections Held by December," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 November 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Pukhanhaengmunje Hae'gyōlha'myōn Team Spirit Chungdan'gōmt'o/Kong Ro Myōng Namjjok Taebyōn'in," *Hankryoreh Shinmun*, 4 November 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 November 1992

During the fourth round of IAEA inspections, IAEA Director General Hans Blix telephones chief inspector Willi Theis at the Yōngbyōn nuclear complex. According to Blix, the IAEA possesses indisputable evidence that a trench had been dug and later covered up between the reprocessing plant and the "one-story building" whose basement is believed to be a nuclear waste storage facility. He also informs Theis that there is clear evidence that North Korea has attempted to camouflage a nearby outdoor nuclear waste facility. He instructs Theis to inform the North Koreans that they must declare these sites as nuclear facilities and permit inspections. Theis immediately summons two senior nuclear officials at the Yōngbyōn complex and attempts to work with them on amending

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North Korea's initial declaration to the IAEA. They cooperate with the intention of including the waste sites in the report with as little admission of error as possible.

—Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 275; Kelley Smith Tunney, "North Koreans Said Trying to Hide Nuclear Building," Associated Press, 1 December 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 November 1992

The North Korean senior nuclear officials who have been working with IAEA chief inspector Willi Theis accuse him of being "an agent of the CIA" and performing inspections "on the basis of instructions from the US State Department." They then refuse to cooperate further with Theis.

—Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 275.

18 November 1992

The Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) once again fails to make any progress on mutual nuclear inspections between North and South Korea. North Korea continues to threaten suspension of all negotiations between the two countries, including the prime ministers' talks in December, if South Korea does not cancel the Team Spirit military exercises scheduled for spring 1993.

—John Burton, "N. Korea Threatens To Quit All Talks," *Financial Times* (London), 19 November 1992, p. 6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Korea Nuclear Talks See No Progress," United Press International, 18 November 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 November 1992

During a meeting of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC), North Korea repeats its demand that South Korea cancel the US-South Korean joint military exercise Team Spirit before Pyongyang will discuss any specifics on a inter-Korean nuclear inspection regime. Chairman of the South Korean delegation Kong Ro Myŏng insists that North Korean must open at least one site to inspections before Seoul will consider cancellation of the military exercises.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 27 November 1992, in "Inter-Korean Mutual Nuclear Inspection Talks Fail," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 November 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 November 1992

North Korean Minister of the Atomic Energy Ch'oe Hak Kŭn, Ambassador O Ch'ang Rim, and other North Korean officials meet with IAEA Director General Hans Blix to discuss North Korea's implementation of its nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Blix is believed to notify North Korea that it has not declared all of its nuclear facilities and asks the North Korean officials to "sincerely implement the nuclear agreement." [Note: Many analysts suspect that North Korea has hidden nuclear facilities because it refused to allow an IAEA special inspection team to enter the country right after the fourth round of inspections was completed.]

—Cha Man Sun, KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 3 December 1992, in "IAEA's Blix Says Talks with DPRK Beneficial," FBIS-EAS-92-234, 4 December 1992, p. 19; Cha Man Sun, KBS-1 Television Network (Seoul), 1 December 1992 in "IAEA Said to Uncover Unreported Nuclear Facilities in DPRK," FBIS-EAS-92-231, 1 December 1992.

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December 1992

The IAEA team conducts its fifth inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities.

—Cha Man Sun, KBS-1 Television Network (Seoul), 4 December 1992.

December 1992

North Korea's Nuclear Chemical Defense Bureau begins constructing a nuclear/chemical warfare training site in Onjŏng-ri, Sŏngch'ŏn-kun, South P'yŏng'an Province. [Note: In 1991, the Bureau began annual training exercises for senior officers to deal with a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula.]

—U Chong Chang, *Chugan Chosun*, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in "Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations," FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 40.

December 1992 to March 1993

According to North Korean defector Lee Ch'ung Kuk, the director of the Machine Supplies Department of the Nuclear Chemical Defense Bureau, and the chief of the Machine and Equipment Manufacturing Section of the "Anti-Nuclear/Anti-Atomic Analysis Team" travel abroad to observe nuclear facilities and purchase parts necessary for North Korea's nuclear program.

—U Chong Chang, *Chugan Chosun*, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in "Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations," FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 39.

Early December 1992

According to North Korean defector Lee Ch'ung Kuk, Marshall Ch'oe Kwang, chief of the General Staff of the Ministry of People's Armed Forces, announces the decision to construct a "Nuclear Watch Guard Post" in Solbong and an "Integrated Command Post for Nuclear Warfare" at Mt. Chidang.

—U Chong Chang, *Chugan Chosun*, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in "Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations," FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 38.

Early December 1992

Kim Dal Hyŏn leads a delegation to Iran for the signing of a military agreement worth several hundred millions of dollars to develop a new missile that is capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The agreement stipulates that Iran will provide North Korea with \$500 million to "jointly develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles." The agreement also provides for missile flight tests in Iran, and the cooperation of Libya in order to obtain western electronics systems from Libya's al-Fatah program. The al-Fatah program is reported to have the support of German firms and technical experts.

—"Puk, Nodong 1 Ho Iran Chaegong/Sajŏnggŏri 1 Ch'ŏn km Sugi/Mi Ŭihoe Pogoso," *Chosun Ilbo*, 17 July 1993, www.chosun.com; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 16 July 1993, in "U.S. Report on DPRK-Iran Missile Deal Cited," FBIS-EAS-93-138, 21 July 1993, p. 33.

2 December 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix presents the fourth inspection report to the Board of Governors. The report suggests that several nuclear sites in North Korea were not originally disclosed. Blix states that the inspection team inspected seven reported nuclear sites, two nuclear storage sites, and two unreported sites that were selected at

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random.

—Cha Man Sun, KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 3 December 1992, in "IAEA's Blix Says Talks with DPRK Beneficial," FBIS-EAS-92-234, 4 December 1992, p. 19.

4 December 1992

At the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, 17 countries including the United States, Russia, and Britain urge North Korea to accept unconditional IAEA inspections and simultaneous mutual inspections with South Korea. Referring to a statement issued by the North Korean Foreign Ministry in November, the countries also stated that they would not accept any attempt to link nuclear inspections with the Team Spirit military exercises. North Korean Ambassador at large Ch'oe Chang Im assures the IAEA that North Korea will accept inspectors even if Team Spirit is not cancelled. The Board of Governors decides unanimously to discuss the North Korean nuclear situation as a separate agenda item at the next board of Governors meeting to be held in February 1993.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 5 December 1992, in "North to Accept Nuclear Inspection," FBIS-EAS-92-235, 7 December 1992, p. 20; "Taebuk Sangho Haeksach'al Ch'okku/'T'imhullyŏn Tŭng Chŏngch'imunje Yŏn'gye Pulyong," *Hankook Ilbo*, 5 December 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

8 December 1992

Russian special forces board a jet before it is to take off from a Moscow airport, and arrest 36 "senior weapons scientists" as they attempt to travel to North Korea. The scientists are said to be from a "number of nuclear weapons research institutes, including the top secret Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 facilities in the Urals." North Korea offered to pay the scientists between \$1,500 and \$3,000 a month. [Note: No author and no article title on SCMP piece.]

—Matthew Campbell, "Russians Storm Jet to Stop Korean Bomb," *Sunday Times*, 20 December 1992; *South China Morning Post*, 21 December 1992, p. 1; KBS-1 Radio (Seoul), 20 December 1992, in "Pyongyang Attempt to Hire Russian Scientists," FBIS Document FBIS-EAS-92-245, p. 32, Yonhap News Agency, 21 December 1992, in "Plans to recruit Nuclear Scientists," FBIS Document FBIS-EAS-92-245, p. 32, Yonhap News Agency, 21 December 1992, in "Hong Kong Paper Cited," FBIS Document FBIS-EAS-92-245, pp. 32-33; "Rŏ, Haekchŏnmun'ga 36 Myŏng Pukhanhaeng Chŏji/Pukhansŏ Koyongch'och'ŏng," *Taehan Maeil*, 21 December 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

10 December 1992

The twelfth session of the JNCC fails to produce any progress towards mutual nuclear inspections on the Korean Peninsula. The US-South Korean decision to resume Team Spirit in spring 1993 continues to be the main point of contention. The North Korean delegation insists that Seoul and Washington cancel Team Spirit by 15 December, while the South Korean delegation claims that Team Spirit will be cancelled if Pyongyang agrees to allow the first mutual inspection before the prime ministers' talks scheduled for 21-24 December.

—"Inter-Korean Nuclear Talks Bog Down," Agence France Presse, 10 December 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Korean Sides Meet on Nuclear Controls," Xinhua News Agency, 10 December 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 14 December 1992, in "JNCC Joint Contact 14th December Contacts may Be Suspended," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 December 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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14 December 1992

IAEA inspectors arrive in North Korea for the fifth round of nuclear inspections.

—"Puk Haeksach'aldan P'yöngyang'e," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 15 December 1992, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 December 1992

The thirteenth session of the JNCC fails to make any progress on an inter-Korean nuclear inspections regime due to contentious debates over the Team Spirit military exercises scheduled for spring 1993. The North and South Korean delegations fail to even agree on the date of the next meeting.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 17 December 1992, in "Inter-Korean Nuclear Talks "Virtually" End for Year," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 18 December 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Inter-Korea Nuclear Talks Remain Deadlocked," United Press International, 17 December 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Late December 1992

IAEA Director General Hans Blix requests "visits" to clarify the nature of the two suspected nuclear waste sites in Yöngbyön-kun and to conduct tests.

—Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 276.

Late 1992

According to Im Yöng Sön, a former North Korean Army lieutenant who defected to South Korea on 11 August 1993, North Korea executes 10 general officers for a failed coup attempt. The Security Bureau of the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces reportedly discovered the coup plans.

—Yonhap News Agency, 24 August 1993, in "Defector Claims DPRK Coup Attempt, Executions," FBIS-EAS-93-162, 24 August 1993, p. 23; Jon Swain, "Crisis in the Land of Fear," *Sunday Times*, 5 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Terry McCarthy, "North Korea 'Coup' Fuels Security Fears; Defector's Story of Failed Military Takeover Adds to Speculation over Pyongyang's Regional Ambitions," *The Independent*, 26 August 1993, p. 15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

[Back to Top](#)

1991

1991

Russian nuclear physicists secretly travel to North Korea. According to defector Lee Ch'ung Kuk, the physicists are accommodated in P'ot'onggang-kuyök (普通江區域), Pyongyang and stay for an unknown amount of time.

—U Chong Chang, *Chugan Chosun*, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in "Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations," FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 40.

1991

North Korea's Nuclear-Chemical Defense Bureau begins annual training exercises for senior officials on how to cope with a nuclear war.

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—U Chong Chang, *Chugan Chosun*, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in "Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations," FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 40.

1991-1993

Kim Il Sung sends special envoys to meet with former President Jimmy Carter. The envoys invite Carter to visit Pyongyang because the US government will not recognize or negotiate with Kim Il Sung. Carter continues to ask the White House for approval to visit, but is denied until the nuclear crisis in June 1994.

—KBS-1 Television (Seoul), 10 August 2001, in "ROK's KBS-1 TV Interviews Former US President Carter on Korean Issues," FBIS Document ID: KPP20010811000003.

9 January 1991

During summit talks in Seoul with President Roh Tae Woo, Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu says that Japan will formally request that North Korea sign an IAEA safeguards agreement when Japanese and North Korean delegations meet later in the month to discuss the normalization of diplomatic relations.

—"Il, Pukhan'e 'Haek Hyöpchöng' Ch'okku'k'iro/Han-II 1 Ch'a Chöngsanghoedam," *Taehan Maeil*, 10 January 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

10 January 1991

During a meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Sang Ok, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama says that Japan will not compromise over the issue of nuclear inspections when Tokyo holds talks to normalize bilateral ties with Pyongyang.

—"Pukhan 'Haeksach'al' Suyonghaeya Sugyo," *Segye Ilbo*, 11 January 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

17 January 1991

US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon says the United States has no thoughts or intention of threatening North Korea with nuclear weapons.

—Chöng Yönn Ju, "'Pukhan'e Haek Wihyöp Ŭisaöptta'/Mi Solomon Ch'agwanbo Palghyö," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 19 January 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

26 January 1991

North Korea's Foreign Ministry condemns the joint US-South Korean military exercise "Team Spirit" as a "test nuclear war against the northern half of Korea." The exercise has been held since 1976.

—"North Korea Condemns U.S-South Korean Joint Military Exercise," United Press International, 26 January 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Pukhan Team Spirit Pinan/Nambuk Yaehwa'nün Kyesokhaltüt," *Joongang Ilbo*, 29 January 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

30-31 January 1991

During a two-day meeting between Japan and North Korea at which the two countries begin negotiations to normalize diplomatic relations, chief Japanese delegate Noboro Nakahira urges North Korea to accept IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. The North Korean delegation reiterates its position that it will not allow inspections until the United States removes all nuclear weapons from South Korea.

—"N. Korea Rejects Japan's Call on IAEA Check," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 31 January 1991, in Lexis-Nexis,

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<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japan, North Korea Still Far Apart at Normalization Talks," Asahi News Service, 31 January 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

February 1991

Radio Havana reports that Cuba has signed new nuclear cooperation agreements with Mexico and North Korea. —Radio Havana, 10 February 1991, in "Cuba; New Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with Mexico and North Korea," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 February 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

February 1991

At an IAEA council meeting, South Korea requests that the IAEA "take punitive measures against North Korea" for failing to sign an IAEA safeguards agreement. Australia then proposes a resolution asking North Korea to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement.

—Ch'oe Maeng Ho, "Pukhan 'Haeg'anjŏnhyŏpchŏng Ch'egyŏl' T'ongbo/IAEA Soshikt'ong," *Donga Ilbo*, 8 June 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Choe Maeng-ho, *Donga Ilbo*, 8 June 1991, p. 1, in "DPRK Reportedly to Sign Nuclear Accord," FBIS-EAS-91-111, 10 June 1991, p. 16.

21 February 1991

During a North Korean diplomatic mission to Japan, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama urges North Korea to conclude a nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Kim Yong Sun, the Korean Workers Party Secretary for International Affairs, states that South Korea must simultaneously allow international inspections of the nuclear facilities on its territory before North Korea will allow any inspections. Former Japanese Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa urges North Korea to hold bilateral talks with the United States in order to overcome the impasse in allowing IAEA inspections.

—"N. Korea Slams Maneuvers But Will Strive for Peace, Kim," 21 February 1991, Japan Economic Newswire, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korean Official Optimistic on Talks with Japan," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 February 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 February 1991

In Japan, Kim Yong Sun, the Korean Workers Party Secretary for International Affairs, says that North Korea will accept nuclear inspections only if US military bases in South Korea also receive inspections.

—"North Korea: U.S. Bases Check in Exchange for Showing Nuclear Facilities," United Press International, 22 February 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Namhan'giji Konggaeha'myŏn Pukhan Haek Sach'al Hŏyong'/Pang'il Kim Yong Sun Chujang," *Chosun Ilbo*, 23 February 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

26 February 1991

At the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, 16 of the 35 governors call on North Korea to sign a nuclear safeguards agreement. North Korea claimed that it would not sign an agreement until the United States promised not to launch a preemptive nuclear attack.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 27 February 1991, in "IAEA Governors Ask North Korea To Sign Nuclear Safeguards Accord," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 March 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

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6 March 1991

US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Carl Ford hails Japan's moves to improve relations with North Korea, but states that Japan should not normalize relations until Pyongyang consents to IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities.

—"Japan - N. Korean Ties Conditional on Nuke Verification," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 7 March 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11-12 March 1991

In Tokyo for the second round of normalization talks, the North Korean delegation led by Vice Foreign Minister Chŏn In Ch'ŏl rejects a Japanese request that North Korea sign an IAEA safeguards agreement before normalizing diplomatic relations and receiving compensation for Japanese colonialism.

—Naoaki Usui, "North Korea Rejects Japanese Plea to Sign NPT Safeguards Agreement," *Nucleonics Week*, 14 March 1991, p. 5; Lee Nak Yŏn, "Haeksach'alchŏnhubosang l'gyŏn Yŏ'jŏn/Pukhan'il Su'gyohodam," *Donga Ilbo*, 12 March 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Lee Nak Yŏn, "Pukhan Haek sach'al Suyongmunje Su'gyo Chŏnjejo'gŏn Anida," *Donga Ilbo*, 13 March 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

18 March 1991

According to a senior Japanese official, the United States urges Japan to press North Korea to allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities. Japan and North Korea are currently conducting talks on normalizing their diplomatic relations. According to the Japanese official, "the US asked us to be firm" on making the issue a precondition of normalizing relations.

—Shiro Yoneyama, "U.S. Urges Japan To Press N. Korea on Nuclear Inspection," Japan Economic Newswire, 19 March 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 March 1991

The *Rodong Sinmun*, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, publishes an editorial that declares North Korea will not submit to IAEA safeguards inspections unless the United States withdraws its nuclear weapons from South Korea.

—"Chuhanmi'gun Ch'ŏlsu'jŏn Haeksach'al Kyesok Pulhŏ'/Pukhan," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 20 March 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

April 1991

The Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Company begins operations. [Note: The plant in Hamhŭng is suspected of being a dual-use facility that processes monazite and other rare earth metals.]

—"International Chemical Corporation," Korean Central News Agency, 18 November 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Kukchehwahakhab'yŏnghoesa Hŭit'oryujep'um Saengsan, Kukcheshijangdŭl'edo Ch'ulp'um," Korean Central News Agency, 18 November 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

12 April 1991

South Korean Defense Minister Lee Chong Ku says that South Korea is prepared to respond with force if North Korea does not accept nuclear safeguards inspections. He says North Korea is expected to acquire nuclear

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weapons by 1995 or 1996, and that strong counter-proliferation measures would be appropriate. The remarks are later retracted by the Defense Ministry, but North Korean President Kim Il Sung says that the announcement is a "virtual declaration of war."

—"Sabyŏng Pongmudanch'uk Kōmt'o/Lee Kukpang/Pang'wibyŏngjedo Kaesŏndŭng P'oham," *Hankook Ilbo*, 13 April 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Charles Lane, "A Knock on the Nuclear Door," *Newsweek*, 29 April 1991, pp. 38-40; "Pukhan Haekshisŏl Ŭngjin P'ilyo/Lee Kukpang Pal'ŏn Mulŭi Ch'wisŏ Sodong," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 13 April 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

16 April 1991

Vladlen A. Martynof of the Soviet Academy of Sciences announces that all Soviet supplies to the North Korean facility at Yŏngbyŏn will be cut if North Korea continues to deny IAEA inspections. [Note: The Soviet Union supplies fuel rods for the IRT-2000 research reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.]

—David A. Sanger, "Furor in Seoul Over North's Atom Plant," *New York Times*, 16 April 1991, p. A3; "Pukhan Haeksach'al Kōbuddaen So Haeg'yŏllyo Konggŭp Chungdan/So Kowi'gwalli," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 16 April 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

16 April 1991

At the Soviet Union's request, China urges North Korea to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 16 April 1991, in "China 'Urging' North to Sign Nuclear Agreement," FBIS Document FBIS-EAS-91-073, 16 April 1991, p. 19.

24 April 1991

In testimony before the National Assembly, South Korean Defense Minister Lee Chong Ku explains his remarks earlier in the month that were interpreted to mean South Korea was prepared to conduct pre-emptive strikes against North Korea's nuclear facilities. Lee says that his remarks were made in an effort to strongly encourage Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons program, and that in case North Korea does acquire nuclear weapons, he will do everything he can to prevent war by using every possible means within the US-South Korean military alliance.

—"Hanbo Pijagŭm Ch'ujŏkhara/Chilmun/'Pukhan Haek'ŭngjing' Ŭn P'ogi Ch'okkuhan'gŏt/Tappyŏn," *Joongang Ilbo*, 25 April 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

24 April 1991

Lee Ch'ŏl, North Korea's ambassador to Geneva, says that Pyongyang is prepared to sign a nuclear safeguards agreement as soon as the nuclear threat against North Korea is removed, and that North Korea will not allow inspections until US military bases in South Korea are also inspected.

—"Pukhan, So Amnyŏg'edo Haeksach'al Kōbu/Chujeneba Taesa," *Taehan Maeil*, 25 April 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

29 April 1991

In testimony before the National Assembly, South Korean Defense Minister Lee Chong Ku says that North Korea will probably be able to complete construction of its plutonium reprocessing facility by 1993.

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—"'Pukhan'üi Haek Chaech'öri Shisöl/93 Nyön Wan'gongdoel'göt'/I Kukpang Kukhoe Tappyön," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, 30 April 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

May 1991

Mid-level North Korean diplomat Ko Yöng Hwan defects to South Korea and reports that North Korea has "vast underground plants" for the manufacture of missiles and the testing of nuclear weapons.

—Michael Breen, "N. Korea Goes Underground with Nuclear Plants," *Washington Times*, 25 October 1991, p. A11.

May-June 1991

South Korean intelligence claims that North Korea conducts tests on a triggering device for a nuclear bomb in Yöngbyön.

—John Fricker, publisher, *Milavnews*, Vol. 30, No. 357, July 1991, pp. 19-20.

2 May 1991

The Korean Central News Agency strongly criticizes the United States for trying to force North Korea to allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities.

—"Mi Haeksach'al Amnyök/Pukhansö Maengbinan," *Donga Ilbo*, 3 May 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

9 May 1991

The *Rodong Sinmun*, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, publishes an article that says North Korea does not have nuclear weapons and that North Korea has had no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons since signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 12 December 1985.

—Lee Yöng Kün, "Pukhan 'Haek Öbtta'/Rodongshinmun Chujang," *Donga Ilbo*, 10 May 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

20-22 May 1991

During Japanese-North Korean normalization talks held in Beijing, Noboru Nakahira, Japan's special ambassador, says that North Korea must accept full-scope safeguards before Japan will normalize relations. Japan withholds \$600 million in economic assistance and possible payment of war reparations for its occupation of Korea during the Second World War. The North Korean delegation, which includes Vice Foreign Minister Chön In Ch'öl, rejects Japan's demand. According to Chön, diplomatic relations between the two countries are necessary before North Korea will consider inspections of its nuclear facilities.

—George Leopold and Naoaki Usui, "N. Korea Rejects Reactor Probes," *Defense News*, 27 May 1991, pp. 4, 37; "'Il Haeksach'alyogu Pudang'/Pukhandaep'yo Chujang," *Hankook Ilbo*, 21 May 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

23 May 1991

Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vitaly Churkin states that the USSR strongly believes that North Korea should fulfill its obligation as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and promptly sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Churkin claims that North Korea's stated precondition that the United States remove its nuclear presence on the Korean Peninsula is a demand "which is not directly related to the NPT." However, Churkin states that the USSR believes that the United States and North Korea should compromise in order to "create a more favorable and constructive atmosphere" for the signing of a safeguards agreement.

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—Igor Peskov and Rostislav Gertsev, "Korea Should Sign an Agreement with IAEA - Spokesman Says," ITAR-TASS, 23 May 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, www.kinds.or.kr.

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24 May 1991

Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Taizo Watanabe reiterates Japan's demand that North Korea accept IAEA safeguards.

—Naoaki Usui, "Pyongyang Refuses NPT Safeguards, Japanese Normalization Deadlocked," *Nucleonics Week*, 30 May 1991, pp. 17-18.

30 May 1991

An IAEA spokesman reports that in a letter to IAEA Director General Hans Blix, North Korea expressed a willingness to resume talks on a safeguards agreement. The letter noticeably lacked any reference to US nuclear weapons in South Korea. [Note: In the past North Korea has stated that the removal of US nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula is a precondition for concluding a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.]

—Moscow Radio in Korean, 30 May 1991, in "DPRK Reported for Nuclear Talks," in FBIS-SOV-91-105, 31 May 1991, p. 21.

1 June 1991

According to Kyodo News Service, Kim Il Sung tells a group of visiting Japanese journalists that both North Korea and South Korea should have nuclear inspections. "Inspections should be made simultaneously, not only on our

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side, which does not have nuclear weapons, but in South Korea, which has them."

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 3 June 1991, in "DPRK Reportedly to Build New Scud Missile," JPRS-TND-91-009, 24 June 1991, pp. 7-8.

7 June 1991

A delegation of senior North Korean diplomats led by Chin Ch'ung Kuk meets with IAEA Director General Hans Blix in Vienna. North Korea says it will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement and allow international inspections of all of its facilities, including facilities in Yŏngbyŏn-kun that the United States suspects are being used to build nuclear weapons. Officials from both sides are scheduled to meet in July 1991, and the agreement should be ready for approval by 1 September 1991. According to IAEA representative Hans Friedrich Meyer, North Korea will sign an inspection agreement as soon as technical matters, such as inspections scheduling and procedures, are negotiated.

—"North Korea Said Willing to Sign Accord on Nuclear Inspection," Agence France Presse, 8 June 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "North Korea Agrees to Nuclear Plant Inspections," *New York Times*, 9 June 1991, p. 10; Gamini Seneviratne, "North Korean Safeguards Pact and Iraq Status to IAEA," *Nucleonics Week*, 13 June 1991, pp. 14-15; Vladimir Solntsev, "DPRK Ready to Sign Accord with IAEA on Nuclear Safeguards," ITAR-TASS, 8 June 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Pukhan, 'Haeg'anjŏnhyŏpchŏng Ch'egyŏl' T'ongbo/IAEA'e T'ŭksa Pona," *Taehan Maeil*, 9 June 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Ch'oe Maeng Ho, "Pukhan 'Haeg'anjŏnhyŏpchŏng Ch'egyŏl' T'ongbo/IAEA Soshikt'ong," *Donga Ilbo*, 8 June 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Choe Maeng-ho, *Donga Ilbo*, 8 June 1991, p. 1, in "DPRK Reportedly to Sign Nuclear Accord," FBIS-EAS-91-111, 10 June 1991, p. 16.

8 June 1991

North Korea insists on altering some of the wording in the standard IAEA safeguards agreement before signing it. —KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 8 June 1991, in "Unconditional Signing Urged," in FBIS-EAS-91-111, 10 June 1991, p. 16.

10 June 1991

South Korean officials announce that South Korea will seek an IAEA resolution calling on North Korea to sign a safeguards agreement "immediately" despite Pyongyang's recent pledge to sign an agreement by 1 September 1991. The officials claim that there need to be further diplomatic effort at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting beginning on 17 June because "there remain some problems that make it hard to trust North Korea."

—Yonhap (Seoul), 10 June 1991, in "South to Seek Resolution on Inspecting North," in FBIS-EAS-91-111, 10 June 1991, pp. 16-17.

10 June 1991

A senior South Korean Foreign Ministry official denies as "unfounded" a 7 June *Los Angeles Times* report that the United States is consulting with Seoul about removing its nuclear weapons from South Korea in order to entice North Korea into allowing international inspections of its nuclear facilities and giving up any possible nuclear weapons capabilities. The official claims that the position of South Korea is to deal with the issue of US nuclear weapons separately from "North Korea's liability as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty."

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—Yonhap (Seoul), 10 June 1991, in "U.S. Paper's Report on Nuclear Weapons Viewed," in FBIS-EAS-91-111, 10 June 1991, p. 17.

10 June 1991

Twenty political parties and public organizations in North Korea release a joint statement calling for the removal of the nuclear threat from the Korean Peninsula. In the statement, the organizations claim that the presence of over 1,000 nuclear weapons deployed by the United States in South Korea "constitutes the main cause which creates dangers not only for the existence of the Korean people, but also to the peace and security of Asia." They also state that if North Korea allows nuclear inspections, the United States must open its nuclear bases in South Korea to international inspections at the same time. First Vice-Chairman of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee Vladimir Tolstikov expresses his support of the joint statement and reiterates the demand that the United States remove its nuclear weapons from South Korea.

—KCNA (Pyongyang), 11 June 1991, in "Twenty Organizations Issue Nuclear Statement," in FBIS-EAS-91-112, 11 June 1991, pp. 9-11; "International Inspections in U.S. Nuclear Bases in South Korea Must Be Made at the Same Time," KCNA (Pyongyang), 11 June 1991, in "International Inspection of U.S. Bases Urged," in FBIS-EAS-91-114, 13 June 1991, p. 4; KCNA (Pyongyang), 13 June 1991, in "Soviet Official Interviewed on Nuclear Inspections," in FBIS-EAS-91-114, 13 June 1991, p. 7.

10 June 1991

The North Korean delegation abruptly leaves an IAEA meeting after Japanese Ambassador Tetsuya Endo begins questioning North Korea as to why it has been so reluctant to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement. Endo had also asked the North Korean delegation to clarify a few points regarding their responsibilities as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Endo asked whether North Korea would allow IAEA inspections of all its nuclear facilities. Representatives from Australia, Canada, and other countries support Endo's line of questioning.

—Im Tong Myŏng, *Chosun Ilbo* (Seoul), 11 June 1991, p. 2, in "North Reportedly Walks Out on IAEA Meeting," in FBIS-EAS-91-113, 12 June 1991, p. 21; Kyodo (Tokyo), 11 June 1991, in "IAEA: Government Agrees to Nuclear Inspections," in FBIS-EAS-91-112, 11 June 1991, p. 9.

11 June 1991

North Korean Ambassador Chin Chong Guk, speaking to South Korean journalists, claims that North Korea will sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA without insisting, as it had in the past, that the United States remove all nuclear weapons from South Korea. He claims that North Korea has dropped the precondition because of the stated possibility of bilateral negotiations with the United States on the issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 11 June 1991, in "North May Sign Nuclear Accord Unconditionally," in FBIS-EAS-91-112, 11 June 1991, p. 23.

11 June 1991

The North Korean ambassador to Geneva demands that the United States remove all nuclear weapons from South Korea even if North Korea signs a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Claiming that the removal of nuclear weapons is of vital importance even though it is no longer stated as a precondition for signing a safeguards

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agreement, the ambassador says, "One should not look at this issue unilaterally. We are also hoping the US will move."

—Kyodo (Tokyo), 12 June 1991, in "Envoy: U.S. Must Rid South of Nuclear Weapons," in FBIS-EAS-91-113, 12 June 1991, pp. 10-11.

11 June 1991

Pak Kil Yŏn, head of North Korea's observer mission to the UN, calls for simultaneous inspections of nuclear facilities in North Korea and South Korea.

—Yonhap (Seoul), 11 June 1991, in "Envoy Urges 'Simultaneous' Nuclear Inspections," in FBIS-EAS-91-113, 12 June 1991, p. 21.

14 June 1991

The Japanese government welcomes North Korea's announcement that it will allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities. However, Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman Taizo Watanabe says that it remains unclear whether North Korea will sign the safeguards agreement unconditionally.

—"Government 'Cautious' on DPRK Nuclear Pledge," Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), 14 June 1991 in FBIS document FBIS-EAS-91-115, 14 June 1991.

14 June 1991

North Korean special envoy to the IAEA Chin Chung Kuk announces at the Board of Governor's meeting that North Korea is ready to sign a safeguards agreement opening its nuclear facilities to international inspections. According to Chin, a North Korean delegation will travel to Vienna in mid-July to meet with the IAEA in order to finalize the text of the agreement. In September, the text of the agreement is to be submitted to the board for approval. North Korea dropped the long-standing precondition that the United States remove all of its nuclear weapons from South Korea because, as Chin indicated, the presence of US nuclear weapons in South Korea is a bilateral issue to be dealt with in separate talks between the United States and North Korea.

—*Korea Times*, 14 June 1991, p. 1, in "North's Envoy to IAEA Criticizes Japan," in FBIS-EAS-91-115, 14 June 1991, pp. 10-11.

14 June 1991

Lee Kye Paek, chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean Social Democratic Party, issues a statement reiterating the demand, made in the joint statement by 20 political parties and organizations, that the United States remove the nuclear threat on the Korean Peninsula before North Korea will allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities.

—"U.S. Nuclear Arms in South Korea Must Be Opened to the Public and Inspection of Them Be Made, States KSDP (Korean Social Democratic Party) Chairman," KCNA (Pyongyang), 14 June 1991, in "Yi Kye-paek Reiterates Nuclear Inspection Stand," in FBIS-EAS-91-116, 17 June 1991, pp. 14-15.

15 June 1991

Asahi Television in Japan reports there are about 20 North Koreans studying at the Soviet Union's Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna. The report cites sources at the institute.

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—"Soryŏn Pukhan Haek Kisolcha Yangsŏng," *Hankryoreh Shinmun*, 18 June 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; *Korea Daily*, 17 June 1991, p. 1, in "Soviets Training DPRK Nuclear Scientists," FBIS-EAS-91-117, 18 June 1991, pp. 21-22.

20 June 1991

According to North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yŏng Nam, North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement soon. However, North Korea will not allow inspections until: (1) inspections are conducted to verify the removal of US nuclear weapons allegedly stationed in South Korea, and (2) North Korea receives "legal assurances" that the United States will not pose a nuclear threat against it.

—Don Oberdorfer and T.R. Reid, "North Korea Issues Demand for Mutual Nuclear Inspections," *Washington Post*, 21 June 1991, p. A19.

26 June 1991

A South Korean "military intelligence official" says that evidence of high explosives tests for nuclear weapons has been discovered in the area around Yŏngbyŏn.

—"Pukhan Yŏngbyŏnsŏ Kop'okpalshilhŏm/Haengmugigaebal Chŏndangye Ch'ujŏng/Kundangguk Hwag'in," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 27 June 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

July 1991

North Korea begins a three-year development plan for science and technology. The plan is placed under the direction of Kim Jong Il and includes a national meeting of North Korean scientists in October 1991. The scientists draft a plan with targets for 2000 that include the development of advanced technologies in the fields of computers and atomic energy.

—Lee Chae Sŭng, *Pukhan'ŭl Umjig'i'nŭn Technocrat* (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), pp. 56-57.

10 July 1991

The Soviet Union informs South Korea that it has suspended all technical support for North Korea's nuclear program, including the supply of nuclear fuel rods. [Note: The fuel rods are for the IRT-2000 research reactor, which requires enriched uranium.]

—"So, Pukhan'e Haeg'yŏllyo'gonggŭp Chungdan/Urijŏngbu'e T'ongbo," *Taehan Maeil*, 11 July 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

10 July 1991

North Korea says that it wants an additional clause in the IAEA safeguards agreement that will release it from mandatory inspection if: (1) there are nuclear weapons in South Korea, and (2) there is a nuclear threat against North Korea.

—"Government May Propose Special IAEA Meeting," Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 14 June 1991 in FBIS Document FBIS-EAS-91-117, 18 June 1991.

10 July 1991

South Korean Defense Minister Lee Chong Ku tells the National Assembly that if North Korea accepts international inspections of its nuclear facilities and proves that it has abandoned its nuclear weapons program, South Korea will

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consider simultaneous inspections of both countries' military facilities.

—John Fricker, publisher, *Milavnews*, Vol. 30, No. 357, July 1991, pp. 19-20; "Pukhan Haek Kaebal Wanjŏnp'ogiddaen/Nambuk Kunsashisŏl Tongshisach'al," *Hankryoreh Shinmun*, 11 July 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

10-15 July 1991

North Korea holds talks with the IAEA to determine the terms of the safeguards agreement.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 9 July 1991, in "South Korea Reports North Sends Negotiators to Sign IAEA Accords," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 July 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 July 1991

North Korea initials a safeguards agreement with the IAEA but has yet to officially sign it. According to the head of the North Korean Foreign Ministry working delegation to the IAEA, although the draft of a nuclear safeguards agreement has been completed, implementation may still remain a problem. The fact that the United States poses a "nuclear threat" to North Korea could create problems in implementing the IAEA safeguards agreement.

—Andrew Mack, *Pacific Research*, Vol. 4, No. 3, August 1991, p. 14; KCNA (Pyongyang), 18 July 1991, in "Delegation Head Briefs Newsman on IAEA Issue," FBIS-EAS-91-138, 18 July 1991, p. 11.

26 July 1991

Admiral Charles R. Larson, Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Command, says that it is difficult to predict the outcome of North Korea's nuclear program but that most intelligence estimates indicate North Korea will be able to produce an atomic bomb by 1995. He describes North Korea's nuclear program as, "My greatest security concern in the region."

—John Fricker, publisher, *Milavnews*, Vol. 30, No. 358, August 1991, pp. 17-18; Andrew Mack, *Pacific Research*, Vol. 4, No. 3, August 1991, p. 14; "Pukhan 90 Nyŏndae Chungban Haekpoyu/Mi T'aep'yŏngyangsaryŏnggwan Palghyŏ," *Joongang Ilbo*, 27 July 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

30 July 1991

The North Korean Foreign Ministry proposes the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In the proposal it suggests that Seoul and Pyongyang jointly declare the peninsula a nuclear-weapon-free-zone and call on the nuclear weapons states to guarantee the nuclear-free status.

—Yonhap (Seoul), 1 August 1991, in "Discussion on North Denuclearization Proposed," in FBIS-EAS-91-149, 2 August 1991, p. 17; "Naenyŏn'kkaji Hanbando Pihækchidaehwa/Pukhan Oegyobu Cheŭi," *Donga Ilbo*, 30 July 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

August 1991

Ko Yŏng Hwan, a mid-level North Korean diplomat and former interpreter for Kim Il Sung who defected in May 1991, identifies underground missile manufacturing plants where nuclear weapons tests are conducted. One is the January 18th Machine Plant in Kagam-ri, Kaech'ŏn-kun, South P'yŏng'an Province. Another is at Man'gyŏngdae, where ground-launched anti-ship missiles are produced.

—"Defector on North's Nuclear Development," *Seoul Shinmun*, 9 October 1991, p. 5, in JPRS-TND-91-017, 7

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November 1991, pp. 8-9; Michael Breen, "N. Korea Goes Underground with Nuclear plants," *Washington Times*, 25 October 1991, p. A11.

1 August 1991

Responding to the 30 July North Korean proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free-zone on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea indicates, for the first time, that it will consider talks on nuclear nonproliferation with North Korea only after North Korea accepts full international inspections of all its nuclear facilities including those at Yŏngbyŏn.

—"Korean Nuclear Move," *Financial Times* (London), 2 August 1991, p. 4; Yonhap (Seoul), 1 August 1991, in "Discussion on North Denuclearization Proposed," in FBIS-EAS-91-149, 2 August 1991, p. 17; *Korea Times*, 2 August 1991, p. 1, in "Further on Denuclearization Proposal," in FBIS-EAS-91-149, 2 August 1991, pp. 17-18; "Hanbando Haekkunch'ungmunje Yŏn'gye/Chŏngbu, Tanggukchahoedam Cheũik'iro," *Hankryoreh Shinmun*, 2 August 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

3 August 1991

South Korea announces a three-step plan that includes asking North Korea to sign a joint declaration to make the Korean Peninsula a nuclear-weapons-free zone. First, North Korea would accept inspections of its nuclear facilities, and then North and South Korea would jointly issue a declaration to establish a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The third step would include high-level talks and multilateral support from countries in the region. The proposal may suggest simultaneous IAEA inspections, or a system by which the two Koreas may conduct bilateral inspections.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 4 August 1991, in "Seoul Considers Joint Denuclearization Offer," FBIS-EAS-91-150, 5 August 1991, p. 32; "Hanbando 3 Tan'gye Pihaekchŏngch'aek Ch'ujin," *Joongang Ilbo*, 4 August 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

5 August 1991

South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Sang Ok says that South Korea has no plan to develop nuclear weapons, and no plan to use military force against North Korean nuclear facilities, even if Pyongyang refuses to accept full nuclear safeguards inspections.

—"Pukhan Haeksach'al Kŏbuhaedo Han'guk, Haekkaebal Koryŏ'anhae/I Oemu Oejihoe'gyŏn," *Joongang Ilbo*, 6 August 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

7 August 1991

The *Yomiuri Shimbun* reports that in bilateral normalization talks later this month, the Japanese government will link financial compensation to North Korea for past Japanese colonialism with North Korea's completion of an IAEA safeguards agreement.

—Mark Hibbs and Naoaki Usui, "Chinese Signature on NPT May Pressure North Korea," *Nucleonics Week*, 15 August 1991, pp. 14-16; Kang Ch'ŏn Sŏk, "Il, 'Kyŏnghyŏppangshik Paesang' Chean/Pukhan'gwa Su'gyohodamddae," *Chosun Ilbo*, 8 August 1991, p. 5, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

7 August 1991

A "high-level official in the South Korean government" says that the United States is seriously considering the withdrawal of its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea in order to encourage North Korea to accept nuclear

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safeguards inspections.

—"Mi'gun Chönsulhaek Ch'ölsu T'ongbohandüt/Mi, Han'gug'e/Pukhan Haeksach'al Chokchin Wihae," *Hankryoreh Shinmun*, 8 August 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

Late August 1991

An anonymous North Korean defector says North Korea has been building a "major reprocessing facility to reprocess plutonium" in Yöngbyön. The defector also claims that North Korea had previously built a small-scale experimental reprocessing facility, and may have already reprocessed some plutonium. According to Joseph Bermudez, the defector worked for 20 years at North Korea's Ministry of Public Security, and was the president of the Taeyang Trading Company under the Korean Workers Party when he defected in May 1988. He was reportedly the deputy director of the Ministry of Public Security's Supply Section, Third Engineering Bureau, from 1983 to 1987. During this time, he was "responsible for supplying materials to major construction projects, especially projects under the nuclear program."

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "N Korea on Way to 'Decisive' Weapon," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 16, No. 15, 12 October 1991, p. 653.

September 1991

Twenty-three IAEA member states adopt a strong resolution to allow the IAEA to conduct "special" inspections (inspections on demand) in addition to ones regularly scheduled. The resolution is partially aimed at North Korea, whose continued refusal to allow IAEA inspections is causing real concern at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna. North Korea calls the resolution a hostile act and delays efforts to cooperate with the IAEA. According to North Korean defector Ko Yöng Hwan, the North Korean government never had any intention of allowing international inspections; rather it only signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to buy time for its nuclear weapons program. Ko says North Korea's program is only "one or two years away from producing a crude enriched-uranium bomb." Ko also claims North Korea has an underground nuclear research facility at Pakch'ön. [Note: The underground facility may be at Pakch'on Air Base.]

—Mark Hibbs, Anne MacLachlan and Naoaki Usui, "North Korean Weapons Suspicions Bring Heated Discussions at IAEA," *Nucleonics Week*, 19 September 1991, p. 14; Michael Mazarr, *North Korea And The Bomb: A Case Study In Nonproliferation*, (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 81; Don Oberdorfer, "North Korea Balks at Nuclear Accord; Government Cites Outside 'Pressure,' Says Signing Is Still Possible," *Washington Post*, 17 September 1991, p. A10; John Fricker, publisher, *Milavnews*, Vol. 30, No. 360, October 1991, p. 17; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "N Korea on Way to 'Decisive' Weapon," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 16, No. 15, 12 October 1991, p. 653.

3 September 1991

At the Defense Ministry in Seoul, 12 US government officials, including members of the CIA, brief the South Korean government on North Korea's nuclear program. This reportedly is the first time that the United States formally shares this intelligence with South Korea. The 89-member South Korean delegation includes representatives from a number of government agencies.

—"Mi 'Puk Kaekkaebal' Sölmyöng/Kukpangbusö/Kunsajöngbo Ch'öt Kongshik Briefing," *Donga Ilbo*, 3 September 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Pukhan Su'nyönae Haengmujang'/Hanmi Kunsabogohoe/Kaebalchöji Kongdongnoryök Hab'üi," *Donga Ilbo*, 4 September 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

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12 September 1991

IAEA Board of Governors passes a resolution calling on North Korea to quickly ratify the safeguards agreement and move without delay from signature to actual implementation. The resolution, spearheaded by Japan, Australia and 15 other countries, including the United States and USSR, passes with a vote of 27 to 1, with only Cuba voting against it. In response to this resolution, North Korea's ambassador to the IAEA, O Chang Rim, refuses to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement. A few days after the resolution passes, the North Korean Foreign Ministry denounces the resolutions as a "wanton encroachment" on North Korean sovereignty. In the statement the Foreign Ministry claimed that North Korea would sign the accord "if pressure put upon us is removed."

—Don Oberdorfer, "North Korea Balks at Nuclear Accord; Government Cites Outside 'Pressure,' Says Signing Is Still Possible," *Washington Post*, 17 September 1991, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>;
"Haekhyöpchöng Ch'okkuan Ch'aet'aek/IAEA/Pukhansöñ Hanbando Haeg'iyu Nansaek," *Chosun Ilbo*, 13 September 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

Mid-September 1991

IAEA Director General Hans Blix meets with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to suggest plans to pursue more aggressive inspections of nuclear states suspected of violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He says he would like to create a unit of the IAEA that would analyze information gathered from national intelligence operations, such as images from spy satellites, in order to inspect sites within a country even if they have not been placed under IAEA safeguards. During the meeting, US Energy Secretary James Watkins says that the United States supports a more aggressive inspection regime to uncover clandestine nuclear weapons programs as sanctioned by the NPT. The Soviet Union and European Union also support the proposal.

—Paul Lewis, "U.N. Maps Plan to Nab Atomic Cheats," *New York Times*, 11 October 1991, p. A10; Michael Wise, "UN Tightens Checks on Nuclear Arms," *The Independent* (London), 21 September 1991, p. 11, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Olivia Ward, "New Curbs Urged on Nuclear Arms," *Toronto Star*, 22 October 1991, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Late September 1991

According to KBS-1 Television in Seoul, North Korean President Kim Il Sung claims that North Korea will accept IAEA inspections of its facilities if US facilities in South Korea are also inspected. [Note: This is the first time that Kim Il Sung has spoken personally about international inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities.]

—Chon Yo-ok, KBS-1 Television Network Broadcast (Seoul), 2 October 1991, in "Kim Il-song Cited on Allowing Nuclear Inspections," in FBIS-EAS-91-192, 3 October 1991, pp. 19-20.

27 September 1991

US President George Bush announces that the United States will withdraw all short-range land- and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea. However, there is no precise schedule for their removal. According to North Korean Prime Minister Yöñ Hyöng Muk and Vice Foreign Minister Chöñ In Ch'öl, North Korea will sign a safeguards agreement after all nuclear weapons are removed from South Korea.

—Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Decides to Withdraw A-Weapons From S. Korea; North Korea to Be Pressed to Halt Program," *Washington Post*, 19 October 1991, pp. A1, A19; Bill Gertz, "North Korea Fortifies Air Defenses; Fears U.S.-led Strike on Nuclear Arms Plant," *Washington Times*, 28 November 1991, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis,

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<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "Bush's Arm Plan; Asia Exhibits Support and Quiet Misgivings," *New York Times*, 29 September 1991, p. 14, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 September 1991

According to Korean Workers Party Secretary Kim Yong Sun, in order for North Korea to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement, the United States should guarantee that it will never use nuclear weapons against North Korea.

—Clayton Jones, "US Arms Plan Puts Pressure on North Korea," *Christian Science Monitor*, 2 October 1991, p. 6;
"Pukhan 'Haeksach'al Suyong'yong'üi'/Misö Haengmugi Taebuk Pulsayong Pojang Cho'gön," *Chosun Ilbo*, 30 September 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

October 1991

North Korea convenes a national meeting for scientists as part of a three-year development plan for science and technology that began in July 1991. The scientists draft a plan with targets for 2000 that include the development of advanced technologies in the fields of computers and atomic energy.

—Lee Chae Süng, *Pukhan'ül Umjig'i'nün Technocrat* (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), pp. 56-57.

2 October 1991

North Korean Prime Minister Yöŋ Hyöŋ Muk tells the UN general Assembly in New York that once all US nuclear weapons are withdrawn from South Korea in accordance with President Bush's declaration that the United States would withdraw its nuclear weapons from overseas, it will be possible for Pyongyang to sign a nuclear safeguards agreement.

—Kim Süng Yöŋ, "'Nambuk Chöŋsanghoedam Kaech'oe Ka'nüŋsöŋg'/Pukhan Yöŋ Hyöŋ Muk Yu'en'yöŋsöl," *Chosun Ilbo*, 4 October 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

4 October 1991

South Korean President Roh Tae Woo warns North Korea that if it continues with its nuclear weapons program and refuses international inspections, international sanctions may be imposed on North Korea.

—"Measures to Stop North N-Arms Program Planned," Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 4 October 1991 in FBIS-EAS-91-193, 4 October 1991.

21 October 1991

Addressing the UN General Assembly in a review of his annual report, IAEA Director General Hans Blix reiterates that the IAEA needs means other than inspections of declared nuclear facilities to determine whether a state is developing a clandestine nuclear weapons program. "If a state fails to declare nuclear installations—as Iraq did—the inspectors must learn through other sources where to look." Speaking of the ability of Iraq to work clandestinely on a nuclear weapons program, he said, "What we can learn from these lessons is that the ability of the regular inspections under the NPT to uncover possible undeclared nuclear installations and material would increase drastically if the IAEA were to be routinely provided with relevant information available to member states—that is, through satellites."

—Olivia Ward, "New Curbs Urged on Nuclear Arms," *Toronto Star*, 22 October 1991, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis,

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<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA: Greater Need for Nuclear Plant Verification," *Europe Energy*, No. 366, 31 October 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 October 1991

A South Korean official announces that North Korea is likely to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement when the IAEA Board of Governors meets in February 1992.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 21 October 1991, in "North 'Likely To Sign' IAEA Agreement in Feb," FBIS-EAS-91-204, p. 19.

22 October 1991

North Korea informs the United Nations that all nuclear weapons must be removed from South Korea before it can sign the IAEA safeguards agreement. The European Union, Australia, United States, Poland, Austria, Japan, Romania, New Zealand, Finland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and South Korea agree that North Korea should immediately sign the agreement and allow inspections of its nuclear facilities. South Korean Ambassador No Chang Hui expresses "serious concern" that North Korea is delaying signing the IAEA safeguards agreement.

—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 23 October 1991, in "North Sticks to Nuclear Signing Stance at UN," FBIS-EAS-91-205, 23 October 1991, p. 27.

22 October 1991

In Pyongyang, North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong Muk says that North Korea will not yield to pressure to allow nuclear inspections.

—"Amnyog'uihan haeksach'al Kyolk'o Ŭnghalsu Ŏptta/Pukhan Yon Ch'ongni Palghyo," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, 23 October 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

23 October 1991

In a meeting with South Korean Prime Minister Chong Woon Shik, North Korean Prime Minister Yon Hyong Muk presents a new set of conditions that must be met in order for North Korea to allow international inspections of its facilities. These conditions include: (1) South Korea's renunciation of the US "nuclear umbrella"; and (2) discontinuation of US flights over Korea and port calls to South Korea by planes and ships containing nuclear weapons.

—Steven R. Weisman, "North Korea Adds Barriers to A-Plant Inspections," *New York Times*, 24 October 1991, p. A3.

Late 1991

North Korea begins concealing its nuclear waste storage activities at "Building 500" by burying pipes connecting the building to the nearby radiochemical laboratory, and later by building up the earth around the facility to conceal the entire lower level, which is suspected of housing large waste storage cells. [Note: When IAEA inspectors visit the two-story "Building 500" in 1992, the building appears to have only one level.]

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 1994, p. 79.

1983-November 1991

North Korea conducts about 80 high explosives tests that are believed to be part of its nuclear weapons

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development program.

—Lee Shin U, "Pukhan Haekkaebal/Hanbando Töp'ch'in Sae 'Kinjangbogo'," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 18 June 1990, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

1 November 1991

The *Rodong Sinmun*, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, publishes a commentary that says even if the United States withdraws its nuclear weapons from South Korea, Pyongyang will still feel threatened if Seoul remains under the protection of the US "nuclear umbrella."

—"'Haeg'usan' Ittnūnhan Sach'al Kōbubangch'im/Puk Rodongshinmun," *Donga Ilbo*, 2 November 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

8 November 1991

South Korean President Roh Tae Woo declares that South Korea will not manufacture, possess, or use nuclear and chemical weapons. Roh also urges North Korea to make the same pledge.

—T. R. Reid, "S. Korean Leader Pledges Policy of No Nuclear Arms; Communist North Korea Asked to Make Same Commitment," *Washington Post*, 8 November 1991, p. A27, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Patrick Minn, "Roh's Non-Nuclear Plan May Boost Rapprochement with North," *Agence France Presse*, 8 November 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Raymond Whitaker, "Roh Denounces Nuclear Arms on Korean Peninsula," *The Independent* (London), 9 November 1991, p. 16, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "No Taet'ongnyōng Pihaekhwāsōn'ōn," *Hankook Ilbo*, 9 November 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Chuhan Chisanghaek Wōnjōn'iyong/Hanmihyōb/ūi/Kungnaesō Haech'ae...Nongch'uk Uranium Ch'uch'ul," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 9 November 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

10 November 1991

In response to Roh Tae Woo's anti-nuclear declaration, the *Rodong Sinmun*, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, says the declaration is insignificant because it did not mention US nuclear weapons in South Korea. The commentary, which was carried by the Korean Central News Agency, claims that Roh "intends to reduce the Korean nation to a nuclear hostage of the United States."

—Kyodo News Service, "N. Korea Blasts S. Korean Nuclear-Free Statement," *Japan Economic Newswire*, 10 November 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 November 1991

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement that says Roh Tae Woo's anti-nuclear declaration is "nothing new." The ministry spokesman says that the only way to create a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula is for the United States to hold direct talks with North Korea "instead of trying to avoid its responsibility by manipulating its junior agent [South Korea]." The statement criticizes Roh's declaration for not mentioning the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons in South Korea.

—Kyodo News Service, "North Korea Rejects Seoul's Denuclearization Offer," *Japan Economic Newswire*, 12 November 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "No Taet'ongnyōng Pihaekhwa Chean/Pukhan'oe'gyobu Kōbu Sōngmyōng," *Hankryoreh Shinmun*, 13 November 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

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25 November 1991

North Korea's Foreign Ministry issues a statement saying that North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement as soon as the United States begins to remove its nuclear weapons from South Korea. North Korea proposes a direct meeting with the United States to discuss simultaneous inspections of North Korean facilities and US nuclear sites in South Korea.

—Don Oberdorfer, "North Korea Shifts Stance on Inspection; Proposal Would Hinge on U.S. Nuclear With Drawals," *Washington Post*, 27 November 1991, p. A19; Kathy Chenault, "North, South Korea Close Gap on Nuclear Inspection Issue," Associated Press, 25 November 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Has Begun To Withdraw Nuclear Weapons, Report Says," Associated Press, 28 November 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 November 1991

North Korean Ambassador to China Chu Chang Chun reiterates the proposal initially made on 25 November 1991, which stated that North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement following the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from South Korea.

—David Holley, "N. Korea Opens Door to Nuclear Facilities Pact," *Los Angeles Times*, 28 November 1991, pp. A1, A13.

28 November 1991

Citing unnamed Bush administration officials, the *Washington Times* reports that North Korea is strengthening air defenses around the nuclear facilities located in Yŏngbyŏn-kun in anticipation of a possible US or South Korean air strike. The caliber of the anti-aircraft guns is not specified.

—Bill Gertz, "North Korea Fortifies Air Defenses; Fears U.S.-led Strike on Nuclear Arms Plant," *Washington Times*, 28 November 1991, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

December 1991

During the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, Director General Hans Blix suggests that the IAEA create a separate agency or department to collect and analyze intelligence data from member states to help monitor undeclared nuclear activities. His suggestion is met with little enthusiasm. In the past, the United States has refused to give the IAEA intelligence information for security reasons. The IAEA prepares to make another request for intelligence information at the next Board of Governors meeting scheduled for 24 February 1992. If the request is granted, only two IAEA staff members will have access to the information. During the meeting, South Korean representatives reportedly ask the Agency to cease technical support for North Korea's nuclear program. Support for the North's nuclear program was granted in connection with ongoing IAEA inspections of the small reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. The IAEA currently has plans to spend more than \$300,000 in North Korea on five major projects in 1992, and will assist North Korean scientists in areas ranging from uranium ore exploitation to finding industrial uses for radioactive isotopes.

—Mark Hibbs, "Special Inspections: A Transatlantic Turf War for Post-Iraq Powers," *Nucleonics Week*, 30 January 1992, pp. 14-16; Michael Mazarr, *North Korea and the Bomb* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 82.

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11 December 1991

The Prime Ministers of North and South Korea make separate proposals for a nuclear-free Korea. The proposals are the first to be introduced at an official meeting and are more similar than any past proposals. Both call for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and a ban on manufacture, possession or deployment of nuclear weapons. There remain, however, some points of contention. The South Korean proposal calls for the destruction of nuclear reprocessing plants and uranium enrichment facilities in North Korea. The North Korean proposal demands a ban on US nuclear protection of South Korea and calls for the withdrawal of all US troops and a halt to the annual Team Spirit joint military exercises. Despite the differences, North Korean Prime Minister Yŏn Hyŏng Muk describes South Korea's willingness to denuclearize as "a step forward."

—C.W. Lim, "Rival Koreas Present Joint Surprise Proposals for Nuclear Free Korea," Associated Press, 10 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 December 1991

North and South Korea sign an historic accord in which the two nations pledge non-aggression and officially recognize each other's existence. The two nations remain divided on the nuclear issue, but both have stated as goals a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons. Bilateral talks on nuclear issues are set for later in December.

—Paul Blustein, "Two Koreas Pledge to End Aggression," *Washington Post*, 13 December 1991, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kelly Smith Tunney, "Rival Koreas Reach Historic Agreement on Rapprochement," Associated Press, 12 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Reconciliation Accord Ends Inter-Korean Tension," Japan Economic Newswire, 13 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Haekkwallyŏn Nambuksŏn'ŏn(an)," *Hankook Ilbo*, 12 December 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

Mid-December 1991

North Korea informs visiting US Congressman Stephen Solarz that it is ready to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement and allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities.

—"Reassure North Korea on Arms," *New York Times*, 28 December 1991, p. 12.

18 December 1991

South Korean President Roh Tae Woo announces that South Korea is nuclear-free, effectively confirming the withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons.

—Shigemi Sato, "North Korea Snubs South Korea's Nuclear-Free Declaration," Agence France Presse, 20 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Pyongyang Skeptical Over S. Korea Non-Nuclear Claim," Agence France Presse, 22 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kelley Smith Tunney, "North Announces Intention to Sign Nuclear Safeguards; Solarz Skeptical," Associated Press, 23 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 December 1991

North Korean President Kim Il Sung announces that North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement as soon as it is assured that US nuclear weapons have been removed from South Korea, and that inspections of North Korean facilities will be conducted simultaneously with those of US facilities in South Korea.

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—Steven R. Weisman, "Leader of North Korea Denies Atom Arms Plan," *New York Times*, 20 December 1991, p. A14.

20 December 1991

North Korea ignores South Korean President Roh Tae Woo's announcement two days earlier that South Korea is free of nuclear weapons. A commentary in *Rondong Sinmun*, the newspaper of the ruling Workers Party, says, "If the United States truly wants peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Asia and the rest of the world, it should show this by practical deeds for denuclearization of the peninsula."

—Shigemi Sato, "North Korea Snubs South Korea's Nuclear-Free Declaration," Agence France Presse, 20 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 December 1991

The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement saying that North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement as soon as the United States confirms it has removed all nuclear weapons from South Korea.

—Kelly Smith Tunney, "North Announces Intention to Sign Nuclear Safeguards," Associated Press, 23 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Puk, Haeksö'myöngsach'alsuyong Ch'önmyöng/Pug'oe'gyobu Söngmyöng/Nam 'Haekpujae' Misö Hwaeg'in'gidae," *Donga Ilbo*, 23 December 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

23 December 1991

South Korean President Roh Te Woo says he is opposed to the United States and North Korea holding direct talks over North Korea's nuclear program.

—"Mibuk Chikchöphyöpsang Pandae/No Taet'ongryöng," *Segye Ilbo*, 24 December 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

26 December 1991

According to North Korean UN Ambassador Hŏ Jong, North Korean officials have begun negotiating with the IAEA on the nature and timing of inspections. He indicates that North Korea believes ratification of the IAEA safeguards agreement is inevitable. However, if the IAEA adopts more condemnatory resolutions, as it did in the September 1991 Board of Governors meeting, "this issue will be ruined." Hŏ also states that while Pyongyang welcomes South Korean President Roh Tae Woo's statement that South Korea was free of nuclear weapons, he says he cannot "100 percent believe this."

—Michael Mazarr, *North Korea And The Bomb: A Case Study In Nonproliferation*, (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 82; "N. Korea to Start Talks with IAEA," Agence France Presse, 26 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Mun Il, "Sach'al'amnyögg'e Pulman/Chuyu'en Pukhan Taesa," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 26 December 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

26 December 1991

South Korean spokesman Lee Dong Bok says that during North-South Korean talks, North Korea promised to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement and permit international inspections of its nuclear facilities "at an early date." South Korea demands that the North do so by 15 January 1992. North Korea is no longer demanding that the

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United States officially confirm the withdrawal of its nuclear weapons from South Korea.

—"North Korea Vows Atom Inspections," *New York Times*, 27 December 1991, p. A3; Reuters, "2 Koreas Narrow Differences But Nuclear Issue is Unsettled," *Los Angeles Times*, 27 December 1991, p. A6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 December 1991

North Korea's chief delegate to the Joint Nuclear Control Commission talks with South Korea, Ch'oe U Chin, comments on the South's demand that it sign the safeguards agreement by 15 January 1992, saying that the "imposition of a timetable on [North Korea] is an interference with [its] national integrity."

—C.W. Lim, "North Korea Pledges to Sign Accords in Prelude to Nuclear Inspections," Associated Press, 26 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; C.W. Lim, "North Korea Promises to Sign Nuclear Safeguards Agreements," Associated Press, 26 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

[Back to Top](#)

1990

Early 1990s

North Korea begins to develop a new uranium mine in the area of Shinp'o (新浦市), South Hamgyŏng Province (咸鏡南道).

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part One," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 1999, p. 40.

Early 1990s

The second nuclear waste storage facility at the Yŏngbyŏn Nuclear Complex becomes operational. The facility, designated as "Building 500" by the US Central Intelligence Agency, has two primary levels, the upper consisting of a large warehouse and the lower housing large waste storage cells.

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 1994, p. 79.

Early 1990s

North Korea constructs and begins to operate a uranium milling facility in Pyŏngsan-kun (平山郡), North Hwanghae Province (黃海北道). The milling facility is reportedly near the P'yŏngsan Uranium Mine. [Note: The milling facility is later reported to be an asset of the Namch'ŏn Chemical Complex (南川化學聯合企業所).]

—ROK National Intelligence Service, "Pukhanŭi Uranium Kwang Kaebal Shilt'ae," 27 April 1999, www.nis.go.kr; Yonhap News Agency, Chapter Eight "Kunsa," in *2002 Pukhan Yŏn'gam* (Seoul: Yonhap News Agency, 2002).

Early 1990

North Korea obtains US military manuals related to defense against nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare. The manuals are reportedly entitled: *NBC Handbook*, *NBC Ground Influence*, and *NBC Flame Influence*. The manuals were published in 1986, 1988, and 1989 respectively. The manuals are stored at a Korean Workers Party archives storage site near the Koryo Hotel in Pyongyang. Defector Lee Chung Kuk begins to work on translating the manuals

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around September 1992. [Note: The Koryo Hotel is located on Changgwang Street (蒼光거리), Tonghŭng-dong (東興洞), Chung-kuyŏk (中區域), Pyongyang.]

—U Chong Chang, *Chugan Chosun*, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in "Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations," FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 38

1990s

Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan, head Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratory in Kahuta, visits North Korea at least 12 times. [Note: In October 2002, reports reveal that North Korea and Pakistan cooperate in a barter deal trading Nodong missiles for uranium-enrichment materials and technologies.]

—"Pak Despatched (sic) N-Material to N Korea This July," *Outlook India.com*, 6 December 2002, www.outlookindia.com.

1990

The Soviet Union halts exports of nuclear equipment and fuel to North Korea after warning it to accept full-scope IAEA safeguards.

—Naoki Usui, "Pyongyang Refuses NPT Safeguards, Japanese Normalization Deadlocked," *Nucleonics Week*, Vol. 32, No. 22, 30 May 1991, pp. 17-18.

1990

The "uranium refinement facility" in P'yŏngsan-kun, North Hwanghae Province becomes operational. The facility can reportedly convert uranium ore into UO₂. [Note: According to Bermudez, some sources claim the facility becomes operational in 1986, while others claim 1990.]

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 1994, p. 75.

1990

"An official" from the German firm Leybold is reportedly in North Korea. [Note: North Korea acquired a Leybold annealing furnace in 1987.]

—Mark Hibbs, "Agencies Trace Some Iraqi URENCO Know-How to Pakistan Re-Export," *Nucleonics Week*, Vol. 32, No. 48, 28 November 1991, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1990

Kim Il Sung reportedly says, "Since we do not know when the United States may ignite a nuclear war, we should make thorough preparations against this."

—U Chong Chang, *Chugan Chosun*, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in "Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations," FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 38.

1990

Kim Jong Il reportedly says, "We, too, should prepare against emergency nuclear warfare by introducing the advanced countries' nuclear technologies at an early date."

—U Chong Chang, *Chugan Chosun*, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in "Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations," FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 38.

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5 January 1990

Representatives from the United States and North Korea meet in Beijing to discuss security issues. At the meeting, the US representatives urge North Korea to sign an agreement with the IAEA in order to remove any suspicions about a clandestine nuclear program. North Korea contends that such an agreement is a matter only to be discussed with the IAEA. The North Korean representatives also invite the United States to join in trilateral talks with the two Koreas to discuss a nuclear weapons free zone on the Korean peninsula. According to the North Korean delegation, the United States was not prepared to discuss such an issue. The North Koreans ask the United States to cancel the Team Spirit military exercise and to withdraw US forces from South Korea.

—"US, N. Korean Reps Meet in Beijing," Japan Economic Newswire, 6 January 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "DPRK on Its Contact with US," Xinhua News Agency, 9 January 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Miguk – Pukhan Beijingsö 6 Ch'a Chöpch'ok," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 7 January 1990, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.jp; "Mi- Pukhan Saehae Ch'öt Woegyojöpch'ok/Öje Pukkyöngsö/Kunsahullyön-Haek Munje Tüng Köron," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 6 January 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Hanbando Pihaekhwa 3 Chahoedam Cheüi/Pukhan – Mi Pukkyöngjöpch'oksö," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, 9 January 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

11 January 1990

According to sources in the South Korean Ministry of Defense, the South Korean government will propose a four-step disarmament program with North Korea that would include the suspension of any North Korean nuclear weapon production, as well as North Korea joining and adhering to nuclear safety agreements.

—Nambuk Kunchuk 4 Tangyeon Maryön/Kukpangbu/90 Nyöndae Chungban Chuhanmigun Ch'ölsu Taebi," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 12 January 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

1 February 1990

Moscow Radio reports that North Korea recently began construction of a nuclear power plant project in the northern part of the country with Soviet assistance. The project is to include four nuclear reactors capable of producing a total of 1,760MW(e) (440MW(e) per reactor). [Note: The site is at Shinpo, South Hamgyöng Province, but only preliminary work is conducted before the project is abandoned. The site is later selected for the two light water reactors provided under the Agreed Framework.]

—"So Bangsong 'Pukhan Wönjön Uriga Chiwön'gönsöl' Podo/Chigüm Pukhan'esön," *Hankook Ilbo*, 12 February 1990, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "N. Korean Reportedly Building Nuclear Plant," *Japan Economic Newswire*, 5 February 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Tim Johnson, "Japan Calls on N. Korea to Allow Nuke Inspections," *Japan Economic Newswire*, 9 February 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Reportedly Building Nuclear Plant," *Japan Economic Newswire*, 5 February 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea's Nuclear Programme, *Janes Intelligence Review*, September 1991, p. 409.

February 1990

The IAEA Board of Governors advises North Korea to sign the Full-Scale Safety Measure Agreement by June 1990. If signed, the agreement will be able to confirm whether North Korea has the capability to develop nuclear weapons.

—"North Korea's Nuclear Development Is Dangerous," *Seoul Shinmun* (Seoul), 7 March 1990, p. 2, in "North Asked

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to Use Nuclear Energy Peacefully," in FBIS-EAS-90-049, 13 March 1990, p. 24; Wihömsürön Pukhan'üi Haek Kaebal (Sasöl)," *Taehan Maeil*, 7 March 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

February 1990

North Korea selects Shinp'o, South Hamgyöng Province as the site for light water reactors to be provided by the USSR under a deal that was signed in December 1985 as a quid pro quo for Pyongyang's signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). [Note: The USSR later abandons the deal, but the site later becomes the location for two light water reactors under the Agreed Framework.]

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 1994, p. 77; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part One," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 1999, p. 40.

February 1990

Professor To Sang Rok, the so-called "father of the North Korean nuclear program," dies at the age of 87. To is buried in a national patriots' cemetery in Pyongyang.

—Lee Chae Süng, *Pukhan'ül Umjig'i'nün Technocrat* (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 108.

7-9 February 1990

While meeting with US Secretary of State James Baker, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze announces that North Korea is very close to concluding a nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA. However, North Korea has not wavered from its position that it will not sign the agreement until the United States removes nuclear weapons from South Korea. The United States rejects this demand due to North Korea's larger conventional forces on the Peninsula. Baker expresses US concern over North Korea's refusal to allow IAEA inspections.

—Andrew Mack, "The Nuclear Card," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 31 May 1990, p. 24; "'Official Text of Soviet-American Statement'," ITAR TASS, 10 February 1990, in "Statement on Talks between Shevardnadze and Baker," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 February 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Shevardnadze Hanbando Munje Tappyön," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 13 February 1990, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Mi So Woemu Hanabando Hyöpüi: Ilji Podo Pukhan Wönjön'e Uryöpyömyöng," *Donga Ilbo*, 10 February 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

8 February 1990

Tokai University Professor Toshifumi Sakata announces that he and fellow researchers have discovered proof of large nuclear facilities being constructed near Yöngbyön. By comparing photos taken by a French satellite in June 1986 and September 1989 of the same area surrounding Yöngbyön, Sakata and his associates discovered the construction of several large concrete buildings, believed to be a reactor, staff housing, and possibly a reprocessing plant.

—"N. Korea Said Expanding Nuclear Facility," Japan Economic Newswire, 8 February 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "First Picture Shows North Korea N-Plant," *The Daily Yomiuri*, 9 February 1990, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korean Nuclear Facilities May Include Fuel-Processing Plant," Asahi News Service, 9 February 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Chae Ŭi Sök, "Pukhan Wönjönhaek'yöllö Chaech'öri Shisöl/Pul Wisöng Ch'wal'yöng Hwag'in," *Segye Ilbo*, 10 February 1990, p. 6, in

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KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Cho Yang Uk, "Pukhan Haek Shisöl Könsöl Hwag'in/Il Tonghaedae," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 9 February 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Lee Tong Chu, "Il Pukhan Yöngbyön Wönjön Wisöngsajin Punsölk/Pul Wisöng SPOT Ch'wal'yöng," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, 9 February 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

9 February 1990

Japanese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Taizo Watanabe, in a meeting with foreign correspondents, urges North Korea to sign an agreement with the IAEA as soon as possible in order to verify the peaceful use of reported nuclear facilities. This statement comes after Tokai University scientists discover the construction of a large nuclear complex, believed to include a reprocessing plant, near Yöngbyön. [Note: This is a reference to the Radiochemistry Laboratory.]

—Tim Johnson, "Japan Calls on N. Korea to Allow Nuke Inspections," Japan Economic Newswire, 9 February 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 February 1990

North Korean broadcast media report that the North Korean government "regrets" it will have to suspend all dialogue with South Korea because of the Team Spirit military exercise.

—"Pukhan Nambuktaehwa Chungdan Sön'ön/Pyongyang Pangsong T'onghae Palp'yo/Team Spirit Kiganjung," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, 9 February 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

15 February 1990

The *Yomiuri Shimbun* reports that North Korea is calling for removal of nuclear weapons from South Korea as a condition for accepting IAEA inspections. The newspaper quotes an unidentified North Korean source as having said, North Korea has a right to self-develop nuclear for the peaceful purposes. Nuclear weapons in South Korea are different."

—"Pukhan Haek Kamshi Surak/Han'gunghae Haek Ch'ölgöwa Yön'gye," *Joongang Ilbo*, 15 February 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Pukhan, Haeksach'al Surakcho'gön Han'guk Haengmugi Ch'ölgö Yogu," *Hankook Ilbo*, 16 February 1990, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr

22 February 1990

According to the newspaper *Izvestia*, Vladimir Kryuchkov, head of the KGB, issues a memo to the Soviet leadership that says North Korea "has completed the development of its first atomic explosive device." According to the memo, the development was completed at the nuclear research center in Yöngbyön.

—Yevgenia Albats, *Izvestia*, 24 June 1990, p. 4, in ?Pyongyang and the Bomb: When Did Moscow Hear?? Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 20 July 1994, p. 16, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Report Suggests N. Korea Has Nuke Weapon," United Press International, 23 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Verbatim: And that Was in 1990," *Air Force Magazine*, Vol. 77, No. 8, August 1994, www.afa.org; Warren Strobel, "N. Korea Shops for Nuke Technology in Russia," *Washington Times*, 5 July 1994, p. A1.

23 February 1990

While in Japan, a spokesman for the USSR's Ministry of Foreign Affairs says that North Korea is an independent state in which the Soviet Union cannot exercise its influence, and the USSR has no intention to do so.

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—Soryŏn 'Pukhan Naejong Kansŏp'anhae' Woemubu Taebyŏn'in/Taenam Kunsajŏk Wihyŏp Ŏpsŏ," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 24 February 1990, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

23 February 1990

In Tokyo, US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney says that it would be helpful if the USSR encourages North Korea to comply with its nuclear nonproliferation agreements.

—"Mi 'A-T'ae Kunsaryŏk Yakhwaŭido Ŏpta'/So, Pukhan'e Taehwahwaktae YudoHaldŭt," *Hankook Ilbo*, 24 February 1990, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "'Taebukhan Mugi'gonggŭp So'nŭn Chehanhaeya' Cheney, IIsŏ Yŏnsŏl," *Taehan Maeil*, 24 February 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

23 February 1990

South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jŏng Hun tells the National Assembly's National Defense Committee that North Korea is building nuclear facilities in Yŏngbyŏn-kun on a large scale and that North Korea could produce nuclear weapons in the mid-1990s. Minister Lee also says that North Korea is extending the range of its Scud missiles to over 500km.

—"Nambuk Kunch'ukhyŏpsang Ch'ujin/I Kukpang, 3 Tan'gyero/Sangho Shilloeguch'uk Hotline Sŏlch'ido," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, 24 February 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

23 February 1990

At the IAEA Board of Governors, North Korea clarifies that it will not sign a safeguards agreement because of nuclear weapons in South Korea, and because of the Team Spirit joint military exercise in South Korea.

—"Pukhan, Haek Anjŏn Kŏmjŭng Kŏbu/Hyŏpchŏngjoindo Pandae," *Taehan Maeil*, 25 February 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Haek Anjŏn Hyŏnjigŏmjŭng Pukhansŏ Tashi Kŏbu/IAEA Isahoe," *Segye Ilbo*, 25 February 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Pukhan'ŭi Haek Anjŏn Kŏmjŭng Kukche'gigu Yogu Kŏbu/IAEA Isahoe'sŏ," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 24 February 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

26 February 1990

North Korea admits building nuclear power plants, but denies reports that it is developing nuclear weapons. The Korean Central News Agency says that North Korea is constructing nuclear power plants to meet the rapidly growing domestic demand for electricity, but that all research is conducted for peaceful purposes according to IAEA guidelines.

—Pukhan, Haekpaljŏnso Kŏnsŏl Shiin/Chung'angt'ongshin 'Pyŏnghwajŏk Mokjŏkwihae Wŏnjaryŏkto Yŏn'gu," *Chosun Ilbo*, 27 February 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Pukhan Wŏnjŏn'gŏnsŏl Shiin: Chungang T'ongshin Haengmugi Kaebalŭn Puin," *Joongang Ilbo*, 27 February 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

March 1990

North Korea later reports that it reprocesses 90-100 grams of plutonium from damaged fuel rods that were removed from its 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn.

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, August 1999, p. 43; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 1994, p. 78.

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1 March 1990

Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennady Gerasimov says that when North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 26 December 1985, the Soviet Union agreed to provide North Korea with technical assistance to build four nuclear power reactors.

—Choe Ŭi Sŏk, "So, Pukhan Wŏnjŏn'gŏnsŏl Chiwŏn/Kerashimo'p'ŭ Taebyŏn'in," *Segye Ilbo*, 3 March 1990, p. 6, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "So, Pukhan Wŏnjŏn Kŏnsŏl Chiwŏn," *Kyungnyang Shinmun*, 2 March 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

2 March 1990

The *Tokyo Shimbun* quotes Japanese government sources as having said that North Korea will allow IAEA inspections if US troops are withdrawn from South Korea. The report says North Korea's attitude takes into account the removal of US nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea.

—"Kukchegigu Haek Kaebal Sach'al/Pukhan, Migun Ch'ŏlsuwa Yŏn'gye," *Joongang Ilbo*, 2 March 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

15 March 1990

China's Energy Minister says there is no evidence that North Korea is building facilities that will enable it to produce nuclear weapons.

—"Pukhan Haengmu'gi Kongjang Kŏnsŏl/Chungguk Energy Pujang Puin," *Joongang Ilbo*, 15 March 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

15 March 1990

A radio broadcast in Moscow reports that USSR geologists will participate in the construction of nuclear power plants in North Korea.

—"Pukhan Wŏnjŏn Kŏnsŏlsaŏp/So Chijilhakjadŭl Ch'amyŏ," *Hankook Ilbo*, 18 March 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; ["News on Soviet-Korean Relations" program under the "Annals of Friendship" program], Moscow International Service in Korean, in "USSR To Help Site DPRK Atomic Power Plant," FBIS-SOV-90-055, p. 14, 21, March 1990.

26 March 1990

Media reports announce that South Korea and the USSR will accelerate moves to establish full diplomatic relations. The announcement follows a week-long trip to the USSR by Kim Young Sam, co-chairman of South Korea's Democratic Liberal Party.

—Mary Dejevsky, "Moscow Hastens Seoul Ties," *The Times*, 27 March 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 March 1990

The US Department of Commerce announces that the West German company Degussa A.G. will be fined \$800,000 for exporting to countries, including North Korea, nuclear sensitive materials without US approval. US officials believe that between 15 September 1986 and 15 October 1987, Degussa A.G. made several shipments of US-origin zirconium to North Korea, Czechoslovakia, and Italy. [Note: Zirconium is used in the manufacture of uranium fuel

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rods.]

—"German Company Fined Over Nuclear Material," United Press International, 28 March 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Södökhoesa Pukhan'e Haegwöllyo Such'ul/80 Manbul Pöl'gümhyöng," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, 29 March 1990, p. 5, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

1 April 1990

The Japanese newspaper *Nihonkeizai Shinbun* reports that North Korea is now considering whether it should accept IAEA safeguards inspections of facilities in Yöngbyön. The report cites European sources that claim Pyongyang is thinking about joining the international inspections regime later this year.

—"Pukhan Yöngbyönwönjön Shisöl/Kukjchesach'al Suyonggömt'o," *Donga Ilbo*, 2 April 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; O Tae Chin "The Goal North Korea Seeks to Achieve Behind Its Nuclear Development," *Chosun Ilbo* (Seoul), 3 April 1990, p. 2, in "Steps Urged to Counter North's Nuclear Threat," FBIS-EAS-90-068, 9 April 1990, pp. 37-8; "Pukhan'üi 'Haeksoksem' (Kijasuch'öp)," *Chosun Ilbo*, 3 April 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

5 April 1990

On a second day of talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze, US Secretary of State James Baker asked for the USSR's cooperation in encouraging North Korea to halt its nuclear development. Both sides agree that North Korea should sign an IAEA safeguards agreement.

—"Mi, So Hanbando'gunsa Kyunhyöng Hyöp'üi/Yangguk Woemuhoedam," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 6 April 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "So 'Nambukhan Chungjaeyök Yong'üi'/Shevardnadze Hanbandosödo Kunch'ukkanöng," *Joongang Ilbo*, 6 April 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Kim Byöng Mu, "Sosö Han'gukkwa Kukkyosuriphamyön Mido Taebuksu'gyo Chunbi Katch'ul'göt," *Segye Ilbo*, 7 April 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

12 April 1990

Henry Rowen, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the US Department of Defense, tells reporters that the United States believes North Korea is building a reprocessing facility to separate plutonium for nuclear weapons.

—"Pukhan, Haegyöllyo Chaech'örigongjang Könsölchung'/Rowen Mi'gukpangch'a'gwanbo," *Hankook Ilbo*, 14 April 1990, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Pukhan, Haekjaech'örigongjang Könsöl/Mi Kukpangch'a'gwanbo," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 13 April 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

15 April 1990

Tetsuya Endo, representative of the Japanese Mission in Vienna, urges North Korea to comply with IAEA agreements, but North Korea demands that nuclear-weapon states sign a treaty with non-nuclear weapon states forbidding the use of nuclear weapons against the latter. North Korea says that in return for this treaty, it will allow inspection of its facilities. International experts believe that North Korea's request is merely a delaying tactic to allow it to develop nuclear weapons.

—Pang In Ch'öl, "Pukhan, 'Haek Pulsayong Pojünghyöpjöng' Yogu/Tonggyöngshinmun Podo," *Joongang Ilbo*, 15 April 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Yi Yun Song, Seoul Television Service (Tokyo), 15 April 1990, in "DPRK

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Offers Condition for Nuclear Verification," FBIS-EAS-90-073, 16 April 1990, p. 20; "Haek Sayonggŭmjihyŏpjŏng Yogu/ Pukhan, Haekkŏmjŭng Surakchŏ'gŏn," *Taehan Maeil*, 17 April 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

18 April 1990

During the fifth annual joint conference of the Korean Atomic Industrial Forum held in Seoul, Boris Semenov, Deputy Director General of the IAEA, says that North Korea will probably sign the IAEA safeguards agreement by September 1990. Semenov says that the IAEA and North Korea have been negotiating over the agreement and that three or four paragraphs have been completed to the satisfaction of both parties.

—"Pukhan, 'Haeg'anjŏnhyŏpjŏng' 9 Wŏl'e Kaiphal Tŭt/IAEA Samuch'ajang Chŏnmang," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 19 April 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Yonhap News Agency, 18 April 1990, in "IAEA Expects North Compliance by September," FBIS-EAS-90-075, 18 April 1990, p. 22.

26 April 1990

The United States and North Korea hold diplomatic talks in Beijing, the eighth round of talks between the two sides since December 1988. The sides discuss the return of the remains of US soldiers from the Korean War, an improvement in relations between the United States and North Korea, and an improvement in relations between Seoul and Pyongyang. According to the *Donga Ilbo*, a South Korean daily, the United States urges North Korea to comply with IAEA safeguards commitments.

—"Asian News: U.S., North Korea Resume Contact," Japan Economic Newswire, 28 April 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lee Jae Ho, "Pukhan, Miwa Taesŏlt'ongno Yuji' Kyŏ'nyang/3 Kaewŏlman'ŭi Pukkyŏng 8 Ch'ajŏpch'ok Ŭimi," *Donga Ilbo*, 29 April 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

9 May 1990

According to the *South China Morning Post*, some foreign diplomats in Pyongyang doubt reports that North Korea will be able to produce nuclear weapons within two years using its facilities at Yŏngbyŏn. The diplomats say that North Korea could be building bogus facilities that appear to be a nuclear power plant and a reprocessing facility to use as bargaining chips.

—"Pukhan Yŏngbyŏnwŏnjŏn Ka'jja'il Kanŭngsŏng/Hong Kong Chi Podo," *Donga Ilbo*, 9 May 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Pukhan Wŏnjŏn Shisŏl Ŭijangmullo Ch'ujŏng," *Joonggang Ilbo*, 9 May 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

15 May 1990

The United States and North Korea hold a ninth round of diplomatic talks in Beijing. According to a source in the South Korean Foreign Ministry, the agenda includes North Korea's compliance with the IAEA safeguards.

—"Haek Hyŏpjŏnggaip Non'ŭihandŭt/Woemubu Tanggukja," *Taehan Maeil*, 17 May 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Kim Byong Mu, "Mi, Pukkyŏngsŏ Pukhan'gwa Chŏn'gyŏk 9 Ch'ajŏpch'ok/Kwan'gye'gaesŏn Husokchoch'i Yogu," *Segye Ilbo*, 17 May 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

19 May 1990

During an interview following an academic conference in Washington, Choe U Jin, deputy director of North Korea's Institute of Disarmament and Peace [under the Foreign Ministry] says that North Korea cannot comply with IAEA

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safeguards unless the United States assures that it will not threaten North Korea with nuclear weapons. Choe strongly denies that North Korea is developing of nuclear weapons.

—Kim Ho Jun, "Pangmihaksuldan, Han'gukt'ŭkp'awŏn'gwa Hoe'gyŏn Naeyong," *Taehan Maeil*, 21 May 1990, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Byŏn Sang Gŭn, "Misŏ Han'gukhaekch'ŏlsu Anha'myŏn Pukhan, Haeg'anjyŏnhyŏp Kaip Kŏbu/Pukhan Kunch'ug'yŏn Busojang," *Donga Ilbo*, 21 May 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Maeng Hyŏng Gyu, "Pukhan 'Mi Wŏnhaedo Su'gyoanhae'/'Pundan'goch'akhwa Uryŏ'," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 21 May 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Kim Ho Jun, "Pukhan, Misŏ Sugyŏ Wŏnhaedo Pul'ŭng," *Taehan Maeil*, 21 May 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

22 May 1990

A "Japanese government source" says that as a condition for signing an IAEA safeguards agreement, North Korea is seeking a written assurance from the United States that Washington will not attack North Korea with nuclear weapons. In return, North Korea will agree to accept IAEA inspections.

—"Pukhan, Haekshisŏl Kŏmjŭng Chŏnje Mi Pugkonggyŏk Munsŏhwayogu," *Syege Ilbo*, 23 May 1990, p. 6, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

24 May 1990

"A high-ranking US official" says that North Korea is threatening to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The official also says that Pyongyang's threat to withdraw will be discussed during US-USSR summit talks next week, and that the United States will ask the Soviet Union to exert its influence on North Korea to help resolve this issue.

—Kim Ho Jun, "Pukhan, 'Heakpihwaksanjoyak' T'alt'oe Wihyŏp/Haeg'anjŏnbojanghyŏpjŏng Ch'egyŏl Kŏbu," *Taehan Maeil*, 26 May 1990, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Kim Byŏng Mu, "Pukhan, Haek Hwaksan'gŭmjijoyak T'alt'oe Wihyŏp/Mi, So'e Yŏnghyangnyŏkhaengsa Chongyong," *Segye Ilbo*, 26 May 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

4 June 1990

South Korean President Roh Tae Woo meets with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in San Francisco, where they agree in principle to establish diplomatic relations, and "to expand economic, scientific, and technical links." The meeting infuriates the North Korean leadership, and seriously worsens already deteriorating North Korea-USSR bilateral relations. North Korean media later criticized Roh for his "flunkeyist, submissive and traitorous trip," and also say, "Our people cannot but have a doubt about the attitude of the Kremlin which sat face-to-face with such a dictator." Gorbachev emphasizes that North Korea's nuclear development should be stopped.

—Martin Fletcher, "Moscow Ties with Seoul to Thaw Ice," *The Times*, 6 June 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Joe Joseph, "North Korea Hits at 'Traitorous Pair'," *The Times*, 8 June 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Martin Fletcher, "Boost for 'Gorby' as Mania Factor Continues," *The Times*, 5 June 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lee Sang Ch'ŏl, "Hanjung Chŏngsanghoedamdo Ch'ujin/No Taet'ongnyŏng 'P'ihalsuŏpnŭn Kwaje Chunggukto Kŏmt'o'," *Chosun Ilbo*, 8 June 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

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14-15 June 1990

During his visit to Washington on his way back from the IAEA Board of Governors held in Vienna, South Korea's Minister of Science and Technology Chŏng Kŭn Mo says that North Korea has notified the IAEA that it will send a delegation to the IAEA in mid July 1990 to discuss signing the IAEA safeguards agreement. He estimates that North Korea is likely to sign the safeguards agreement before August when the NPT Review Conference is to be held in Vienna. He also announces that the USSR cancelled the sale of four nuclear reactors to North Korea.

—Kim Ho Jun, "So, Pukhan'e Wŏnjarop'anmae Chungdan/Pangmi Chŏngkwakich'ŏ," *Taehan Maeil*, 16 June 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "So Wŏnryŏn Pukhan P'anmae Ch'wiso/Chŏng Kwagich'ŏng Palghyŏ," *Donga Ilbo*, 17 June 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Yi Chang Sun, "Shocks and Ripple Effects of 'Speculation on the North's Manufacturing of Nuclear Weapons on Six Months," *Seoul Shinmun* (Seoul), 19 June 1990, p. 5, in "Daily Speculates on North's Nuclear Capability," in FBIS-EAS-90-122, 25 June 1990, p. 31; Margaret L. Ryan, "IAEA Plans Quick Vote If Pact Made on North Korean Safeguards," *Nucleonics Week*, 21 June 1990, pp. 7-8.

16 June 1990

Fred Ikle, undersecretary of defense for policy in the Reagan administration, says that Korea can become a nuclear power after unification by taking over North Korea's current nuclear program.

—"Nambukhan T'ong'ilddaen Hanbando Haengmujang," *Chosun Ilbo*, 17 June 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

17 June 1990

The *Sunday Times* reports that the USSR has recently informed the United States that East Germany and Romania have sold "enriched uranium and sensitive nuclear materials to North Korea. The report also says that the Soviet Union has estimated that North Korea could have nuclear weapons within six months.

—James Adams, "Russians Sound Nuclear Warning of North Korea," *Sunday Times*, 17 June 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Pak Sŭng Jun, "Pukhan, Yŏnnae Haekjejo Ka'nŭng/Sosŏ Mi'e Chŏngbo Chegong," *Chosun Ilbo*, 18 June 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

18 June 1990

The US State Department denies reports that North Korea will be capable of producing nuclear weapons within six months.

—"Mi, Pukhan Haek Poyusŏl Puin/Kungmubu 'So Mi T'onmgbo Sashilmugŭn'," *KyunghyangShinmun*, 19 June 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "'Pukhan Haengmugi Sashilhwag'in Chag'ŏp'/Chŏngbudanggukcha 'Tangjangboyu Hoeŭijŏk'," *Hankook Ilbo*, 19 June 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

18 June 1990

The *Kukmin Ilbo*, a South Korean daily, reports there are about 3,000 nuclear physicists and technicians working in North Korea's atomic energy field.

—Lee Shin U, "Pukhan Haekkaebal/Hanbando Tŏpch'in Sae 'Kinjangp'ago'," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 18 June 1990, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

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20 June 1990

South Korea's Minister of Science and Technology Chŏng Kŭn Mo says that from a technological perspective, it would seem difficult for North Korea to produce nuclear weapons before the end of this year. Chŏng says he is skeptical about this possibility.

—"Pukhan, Haengmugigaebal 'Yŏnnae' En Hoeŭijŏk/Chŏng Kwagich'ŏjanggal Palg'hyŏ," *Joongang Ilbo*, 20 June 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

20 June 1990

A Japanese official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs says that neither North Korea's acceptance of the IAEA safeguards agreement nor progress in inter-Korea talks are necessary for normalizing Japan-North Korea diplomatic relations.

—Kim Se Wŏn, "Il, Pukhan'gwan'gye Chŏkkŭk Kaesŏn/Chungsanwoesang Haek Anjŏnhyŏpchŏng Kaip Chŏnjejo'gŏn Anida," *Donga Ilbo*, 21 June 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

21 June 1990

At a symposium sponsored by the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C., Selig Harrison of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace says that the United States has 60 nuclear weapons for F-16s fighter-bombers stored at Kunsan Air Base in South Korea. Harrison says the United States has also deployed 21 "nuclear mines," 40 eight-inch nuclear artillery pieces, thirty 155mm nuclear artillery pieces, and 20 Lance missiles with nuclear warheads in South Korea.

—Chŏng Yŏn Ju, "Chuhanmi'gun Haekpoyu Hyŏnhwang Hwag'in," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 23 June 1990, p. 6, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

22 June 1990

In a report submitted to the National Assembly's National Defense Committee, Defense Minister Lee Sang Hun says that he expects North Korea to complete construction of its plutonium reprocessing facility in Yŏngbyŏn by the end of the year, and that North Korea will be able to produce nuclear weapons by the mid-1990s.

—Yonhap News Agency, 22 June 1990, in "South Korean Defence Minister on Team Spirit Review, North's Nuclear Capability," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 June 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Pukhan, 90 Nyŏndae Chungban Haengmugi Chejo'/ Lee Kukpang, Sang'wi Pogo," *Taehan Maeil*, 23 June 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "'Team Spirit Chŏnmyŏn Chaegŏmt'o'/Pukhan, 90 Nyŏndae Chungban Haekkaebal," *Hankook Ilbo*, 23 June 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

25 June 1990

General Louis C. Menetrey, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and Commander, United States Forces Korea, says that North Korea is still at the early stages of nuclear weapons development and production, but it is highly probable that North Korea has deployed chemical and biological weapons.

—"Pukhan Haekkaebal Kich'odan'gye/Menetrey Saryŏnggwan," *Segye Ilbo*, 26 June 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "'Pukhan Haekkaebal Kich'odan'gye'/Saenghwahak Paech'i Kanŭngsŏ K'ŏ," *Hankook Ilbo*, 26 June 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

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26 June 1990

South Korean Prime Minister Kang Yŏng Hun tells the National Assembly that South Korean nuclear experts are skeptical about the possibility of North Korea being able to produce nuclear weapons by the end of the year. Kang also said that he would do his best to find out the possibility of North Korea acquiring nuclear weapons, and cooperate with the IAEA.

—"Nambuk Pulgach'im Sŏn'ŏn Chŏkkŭkkŏmt'o'/Hong T'ong'ilwŏn Kukhoedappyŏn," *Hankook Ilbo*, 27 June 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Oegyo-T'ong'ilbunya Taejŏngbujilmun-Tappyŏnnaeyong (Kukhoenog'ŭm 26 Il Pŏnhoeŭi)," *Hankook Ilbo*, 27 June 1990, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

3 July 1990

South Korea's National Unification Board submits a report to the National Assembly that says the Board is working to pressure North Korea into signing a full-scope IAEA safeguards agreement.

—"Pukhan Haekkaebal Taebich'aek Kanggu/T'ongilwŏn, Kukhoejaryo/Nambuk Kunbi't'ongje Shilhyŏn Noryŏk" *Taehan Maeil*, 4 July 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

10 July 1990

At the G-7 meeting in Houston, Texas, the participants issue a statement requesting North Korea to sign an IAEA safeguards agreement.

—Kim Byŏng Mu, "Pukhan Haekhyŏpchŏng Kaip Ch'okku/G7 Chŏngsanghoedam," *Segye Ilbo*, 12 July 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

13 July 1990

In Honolulu, Admiral Huntington Hardisty, Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command, tells Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama that he is concerned that North Korea could be independently developing a production facility for nuclear weapons. Hardisty made his remarks in a discussion about North Korea's construction of a plutonium reprocessing facility.

—"Pukhan Haengmugi Uryŏ Tokcha Kongjang Kŏnsŏl Kanŭngsŏng," *Chosun Ilbo*, 15 July 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

15 July 1990

In response to US demands that North Korea sign the IAEA safeguards agreement, North Korea says that it is prepared to sign the agreement if the United States removes its nuclear threat to North Korea. Pyongyang claims it signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) under the assumption that it would lead to a nuclear weapons free zone on the Korean Peninsula.

—Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 16 July 1990, in "North Korea Will Sign IAEA Treaty if USA Removes Nuclear Threat," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 July 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Pyongyang Demands Removal of U.S. Nuclear Threat," Xinhua News Agency, 16 July 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 July 1990

The *Yomiuri Shimbun* cites a "US nuclear expert" as having said that the Soviet Union has recently suspended its

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support to North Korea for the construction of nuclear power plants. The plants were part of a quid pro quo for North Korea signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in December 1985.

—Cho Yang Ok, "So, Pukhan Wŏnjŏn'gonsŏl Wŏnjo Tonggyŏl," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 21 July 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

21 July 1990

A Japanese Foreign Ministry source says North Korea would like to propose direct talks with the United States as a precondition for agreeing to IAEA on-site inspections. According to the source, North Korea claims that it will sign the IAEA's safeguards agreement if the United States: 1) promises not to launch a nuclear attack against it, and 2) withdraws nuclear weapons from South Korea.

—"N. Korea Wants Direct Talks On Nuclear Inspections," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 July 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Taemi Chikchŏptaehwa-Han'gukpaech'i Haek Ch'ŏlgŏ Chŏnjero/Pukhan, Haek Hŏnjangjosa Cheŭi," *Hankook Ilbo*, 22 July 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Pukhan, Mi'e Haek Sach'allon'ŭi Cheŭi/Washington Tangguk Hwag'in," *Taehan Maeil*, 22 July 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

30 July 1990

US government sources say the United States has rejected a North Korean request that the United States negotiate the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from South Korea as a precondition for North Korea's acceptance of IAEA safeguards inspections.

—"U.S. Rejects N. Korean Conditions on Nuclear Inspection," Japan Economic Newswire, 31 July 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Mi, Pukhan Haekhyŏpsang'an Kŏbu," *Hankook Ilbo*, 1 August 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

15 August 1990

Leonard Spector of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace says that North Korea will be able to produce weapon-grade plutonium within five years. Spector says that North Korea has the nuclear reactors and is now building a reprocessing facility to produce the plutonium.

—"Haengmugi Wŏllyo Plutonium/Pukhan 5 Nyŏnnae Saengsan'ganŭng/Migukhakja Chujang," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 17 August 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

22 August 1990

At the Nuclear Nonproliferation Review Conference, Japanese envoy Mitsuro Donowaki, in a clear reference to North Korea, expresses "major concern" that some signatories of the treaty have failed to sign safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

—"Japan Urges China, France to Join Nuclear Accord," Japan Economic Newswire, 22 August 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2-3 September 1990

During Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Pyongyang, North Korea warns the USSR that Pyongyang is prepared to produce nuclear weapons if Moscow establishes diplomatic relations with Seoul.

—Vladimir Nadashkevich and Georgi Shmelev, "Visit by Soviet Foreign Minister to People's Korea," ITAR-TASS

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News Agency, 3 September 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, "Soviet Paper reports N. Korean Threat to Develop N-Arms," Japan Economic Newswire, 29 November 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Ch'ae Ŭi Sŏk, "Soryŏn'i Han'guk'kwa Kukkyo Suriphandamyŏn/Pukhan 'Haengmugi Chach'e Saengsan' Kyŏnggo," *Segye Ilbo*, 30 November 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Cho Yang Uk, "Pukhan, So'e 'Haekkaebal' Kyŏnggo/p Wŏl Oemuhoedamsŏ/Han-So Sugyo Pulman P'yoshi," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 30 November 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

17-21 September 1990

The IAEA holds the 34th session of its General Conference in Vienna. During the conference, 15 countries including the United States, the USSR, and Japan demand that North Korea sign an IAEA safeguards agreement.

—Yuri Kozlov, "34th Session of IAEA General Conference," ITAR-TASS News Agency, 17 September 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Mi-So, Pukhanhaekhyŏpchog Ch'okku/IAEA... 15 Kaeguk Ipchang P'alp'yo," *Hankook Ilbo*, 20 September 1990, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Ch'oe Maeng Ho, "Kukchewŏnjaryŏkkigu/Pukhan'e Yugam P'yomyŏng/Haeg'anjŏnhyŏpchŏng Kip'i Pinan," *Donga Ilbo*, 22 September 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

18 September 1990

North Korea's broadcast media accuse the United States of "slandering North Korea and making absurd accusations in connection with the safeguards agreement pursuant to the NPT." North Korea says it is willing to sign the safeguards agreement if the United States ceases its nuclear threats.

—Korean Central Broadcasting Station, 18 September 1990, in "North Korea Explains Its Refusal to Sign Nuclear Safeguards Agreement," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 September 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 September 1990

While meeting with Japan's former Deputy Prime Minister Shin Kanemaru and Vice Chairman of the Japanese Socialist Party Makoto Tanabe, North Korean President Kim Il Sung declines to discuss North Korea's refusal to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Kim claims that North Korea has no intentions of manufacturing nuclear weapons, and if North Korea is to be subject to inspections, so should South Korea.

—"Kim Il Sung Denies North Korea Has Nuclear Capability," Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), 26 September 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lee Dong Chu, "Chogit'ong'ilgiun Nop'agagoitta/Kimjusŏk, Haengmugijejonŏngnyŏkto Ŭbsŏ," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, 27 September 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

7 October 1990

A "high-level source" in the South Korean government says that China has recently been strongly encouraging North Korea to sign an IAEA safeguards agreement.

—"Haeg'anjŏnhyŏpjŏng Sŏmyŏnggaebang Chugu/Chungguk, Pyk'e Kongshik Kwŏnyu," *Chosun Ilbo*, 8 October 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

18 October 1990

Soviet sources" say the USSR has suspended all assistance for the construction of nuclear power plants in North

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Korea until Pyongyang is willing to accept IAEA safeguards inspections.

—Kyodo News Service, "Moscow Stops Nuclear Aid to N. Korea Till Checks Allowed," Japan Economic Newswire, 18 October 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Haeksach'al Surakhal Ddaeggaji So, Pukhan Wŏnjŏnjiwŏn Tonggyŏl'/Il Kyodot'ongshin Podo," *Segye Ilbo*, 20 October 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

22 October 1990

Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs says it will request North Korea's agreement to inspections of its nuclear facilities in Yŏngbyŏn-kun by Japanese officials if North Korea continues to refuse IAEA inspections.

—Kang Su Ung, "Pukhan Haeksach'al Kŏbuddaen Yŏngbyŏn Sach'al Yogu Kŏmt'o/Il Woemusŏng," *Taeahan Maeil*, 23 October 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

25-26 October 1990

During a regional IAEA seminar in northern Japan, IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that North Korea is likely to sign the safeguards agreement within the next six months because there is "nothing left to discuss" in the ongoing negotiations. However, Blix also says that Pyongyang is seeking a guarantee that the United States will not attack North Korea with nuclear weapons.

—Naoaki Usui, "Blix Says North Korea Is Close to Finalizing Its NPT Safeguards," *Nucleonics Week*, Vol. 31, No. 45, 8 November 1990, p. 14, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Late October 1990

According to a "source in Japan's Foreign Ministry," US military intelligence officials brief Japanese officials on the North Korean nuclear weapons program. The US officials say that North Korea has a large nuclear reactor and reprocessing facility in Yŏngbyŏn-kun that will give North Korea the capability to produce three-six nuclear weapons per year by 1995.

—Lee Nak Yŏn, "'Pukhan, 95 Nyŏn Haekt'an Kanŭng'/Mi, Pug'il Kwan'gyegaesŏn Uryŏ P'yomyŏng," *Donga Ilbo*, 17 November 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Pukhan, haekt'an Chejosŏlbi Katch'wŏ/95 Nyŏnkkaji 3~6 Kae Poyuganŭng," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 17 November 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

2 November 1990

A spokesman for Japan's Foreign Ministry says that North Korea and the IAEA agreed on the terms for on-site nuclear inspections in July, but says he believes North Korea has yet to accept inspections because the United States has yet to meet its demand not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea.

—Kyodo News Service, "N. Korea Agrees to Inspection of Nuclear Facilities," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 November 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Pukahŭn Kukchehaeksach'al Tong'ŭi/IAEA Samuch'ongjang," *Donga Ilbo*, 3 November 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Cho Yang Ok, "'Pukhan, Haeksach'al Tong'ŭi/IAEA Kukchang/Mi Haengmugi Pulsayong Chŏnje," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 3 November 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

3 November 1990

The South Korean Foreign Ministry says the South Korean government believes there is no foundation to reports that North Korea and the IAEA have concluded an agreement for the inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities.

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—"Ölmana Sashil'inji Hwag'inhal P'ilyoitta/Oemubusö Palghyö," *Joongang Ilbo*, 3 November 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

8 November 1990

South Korea's Ministry of National Defense releases its annual *White Paper*. The report says North Korea will probably be able to produce nuclear weapons by 1995. Furthermore, the reprocessing facility under construction in Yöngbyön-kun should be able to reprocess large quantities of plutonium within one or two years.

—"Pukhan Hwasaengbangmugi Kaebal Churök/95 Nyönkaji Haekboyu Kanüng," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 8 November 1990, p. 14, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Pukhan Pyöngnyök Namhan'üi 1.5 Pae/Chönggyugun 99 Manmyöng," *Joongang Ilbo*, 8 November 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Pukhan, Yöndaegüpkaji Hwahakpudae'/Sangbigun'ün Lan/üi 1.5 Pae," *Hankook Ilbo*, 9 November 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

9 November 1990

North Korea's *Rodong Sinmun*, the official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, calls for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula. The article says North Korea has no nuclear weapons and that Pyongyang has always pursued anti-nuclear and anti-war policies.

—Vladimir Nadashkevich, "North Korea Favours a Nuke-Free Zone on Korean Peninsula," ITAR-Tass News Agency, 9 November 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Hanbando Pihaekchidae Ch'okku/Pukhan Rodongshinmun," *Donga Ilbo*, 11 November 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

16 November 1990

According to a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement released by the North Korean Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations, North Korea will accept the IAEA safeguards agreement after the Korean peninsula is transformed into a nuclear weapons-free zone, and the United States withdraws its nuclear forces from the region. The statement also says that North Korea "can sign a nuclear safeguards agreement only on condition that the United States gives legal assurances that it would not resort" to the use of nuclear weapons against North Korea.

—Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, "North Korea: The Next Nuclear Nightmare?," *Arms Control Today*, March 1991, p. 10; Pak Yöng Hüi, "'Chuhanmigun Haekkwa Tongshijosa'/Pukhan, Haeksach'al Chogön Cheshi," *Segye Ilbo*, 17 November 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Miguk kwa Hyöpsang Twi Haeksach'al Suyong," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 17 November 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

24 November 1990

Following a US-IAEA-North Korean meeting in China, US Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon receives a report that states North Korea may sign the IAEA safeguards agreement in order to improve relations with the United States and Japan.

—"N Koreans to Abide by NPT," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 24 November 1990, p. 1019.

14 December 1990

South Korean President Roh Tae Woo meets with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow. In response to a question about North Korea's refusal to sign an IAEA safeguards agreement, Gorbachev says the Soviet Union is

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completely against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

—Kyodo News Service, "Highlights of S. Korean-Soviet Joint Declaration," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 December 1990, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kim Yŏng Han, "Naenyŏn Pom Panghan Shisa/Korŭbi/Pukhan Haekkyŏpchŏnggaip Ch'okku," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 15 December 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Yun Kuk Han, "hanbando Muryŏksayongbaeje Sŏn'ŏn/Gorbachev Hoedam," *Hankyoreh Shinmun*, 15 December 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

26 December 1990

The *Sankei Shimbum*, a Japanese daily, reports that a facility under construction in Yŏngbyŏn is undoubtedly a nuclear reprocessing facility for the production of nuclear weapons.

—"Pukhan Yŏngbyŏn Wŏnjaryŏg'yŏn/Haekkaebalshilsŏl Hwakshil/Il San'gyŏngshinmun Podo," *Joongang Ilbo*, 26 December 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "Pukhan Yŏngbyŏnyŏn'guso Haekchejoshisŏl Punmyŏng/Il Sank'eishinmun Podo," *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, 26 December 1990, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; "pukhan, Wŏnp'okchejo Kŏŭi Hwakshil/Ilchi," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 26 December 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; North Korea Advisory Group, Report to the Speaker, US House of Representatives, November 1999; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., *The Armed Forces of North Korea* (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001) p. 227; Mun Hui-sang, "How North Korea and South Korea Are Heading for Arms Reduction," *Sisa Journal* (Seoul), online version, 5 July 2000, translated in FBIS Document ID KPP20000710000086.

[Back to Top](#)

1989-1941

1970s

North Korea begins geological surveys in North P'yŏng'an Province, South P'yŏng'an Province, North Hamgyŏng Province, and North Hwanghae Province. Survey teams are later able to confirm the existence of uranium deposits in Musan-kun, North Hamgyŏng Province; P'yŏngsan-kun, North Hwanghae Province; Sunchŏn, South P'yŏng'an Province; and P'yŏngwŏn-kun, North P'yŏng'an Province.

—ROK National Intelligence Service, "Pukhanŭi Uranium Kwang Kaebal Shilt'ae," 27 April 1999, www.nis.go.kr; Yonhap News Agency, Chapter Eight "Kunsa," in *2002 Pukhan Yŏn'gam* (Seoul: Yonhap News Agency, 2002).

15 April 1969

The North Korean Air Force shoots down a US Navy EC-121 reconnaissance plane in international air space over the Sea of Japan, killing all 31 crewmembers.

—Chuck Downs, *Over the Line* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1999), pp. 146-148.

1968

The USSR supplies North Korea with a 0.1MW critical assembly. The critical assembly is installed in Yŏngbyŏn.

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, August 1999, p. 41.

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18 January 1968

Thirty-one North Korean commandos secretly cross the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on a mission to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung Hee. The commandos approach within about 800m of the presidential residence, but fail to assassinate Park. All but one of the commandos are eventually killed or commit suicide. Thirty-one South Koreans die in the fire fights, and 44 are wounded. North Korea later denies it is responsible for the attack, claiming the perpetrators are South Korean citizens rising up against the government.

—Chuck Downs, *Over the Line* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1999), pp. 121-122; 124.

23 January 1968

North Korea captures the *USS Pueblo* off Wönsan on North Korea's east coast. North Korea claims the ship was in North Korea's territorial waters, but the United States claims it was in international waters. One American crewman dies and 82 are captured by the North Korean Navy. North Korea releases the crew exactly 11 months later.

—Chuck Downs, *Over the Line* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1999), pp. 122-146; "U.S. Warned Not to Forget Lesson from 'Pueblo' Incident," Korean Central News Agency, 23 January 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Migug'un <Pueblo> Hoüi Kyohun'ül Itchi Mar'aya Handa/Oegug'indül'üi Panhyang," Korean Central News Agency, 23 January 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Anti-U.S. Education Intensified in DPRK," Korean Central News Agency, 23 January 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Chosön'esö'üi Panmi'gyoyang," Korean Central News Agency, 23 January 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

1966-67

Kim Il Sung issues directive to develop nuclear warheads for missiles.

—Interview with North Korean defector by CNS senior research associate Daniel A. Pinkston, 1 November 2001, Seoul.

1967

The Soviet-supplied 2MW(th) IRT-2000 research reactor begins regular operation. The reactor is used to produce radioactive isotopes for medicine, industry, and scientific research.

—Alexander Zhebin, "Political History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Cooperation," in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds., *The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia* (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 31; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Programme," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 3, No. 9, September 1991, p. 406; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 1994, p. 77; KAERI, "Pukhanüi Haekkwallyöñ Yöñ'guhwaltong," www.kaeri.re.kr.

Mid 1967

The total number of US nuclear weapons deployed in the Pacific theater peaks at about 3,200 weapons, with about 2,600 of them in South Korea and Okinawa.

—Robert S. Norris, William N. Arkin and William Burr, "Where They Were," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 55, No. 6, November/December 1999, p. 30.

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Late 1960s

North Korea procures a "25 Mev Betatron."

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, August 1999, p. 44.

1965

North Korea establishes the "Nuclear Physics Research Institute," which is also known as the "Atomic Energy Research Institute and College of Physics." [Note: According to South Korea's Atomic Energy Research Institute, this institute was established in 1964.]

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, August 1999, p. 43.

1965

According to Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., who cites a South Korean report, North Korea establishes the "Radioactive Isotope Utilization Research Institute" in Ch'öngjin, North Hamgyöng Province. [Note: This is probably a reference to the "Isotope Production Laboratory (同位元素生産加工研究所)" in the YöngbyöN Nuclear Research Center, or possibly the "Nanam Branch of the Atomic Energy Research Institute (原子力研究所)," which is in Nanam-kuyöK (羅南區域), Chöngjin, (清津市).]

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 1999, p. 37.

1965

North Korea begins to operate its IRT-2000 nuclear research reactor that it received from the Soviet Union.

—Kim Byöng Ku, et al., *Pukhaekkisulch'ongsö-I (North Korean Nuclear Issues and the LWR Project)*, KAERI/AR-552-99, Technology Center for Nuclear Control, November 1999, www.tncn.kaeri.re.kr.

May-June 1965

North Korea completes the installation of a Soviet-supplied IRT-2000 nuclear research reactor in YöngbyöN-kun (寧邊郡), North P'öng'an Province (平安北道). The 2MW(th) IRT-2000 research reactor is a pool-type reactor that has the capacity to use highly enriched uranium as fuel. At about the same time, the USSR also supplies North Korea with a small 0.1MW critical assembly for the same location. The reactor undergoes two years of testing before beginning regular operations in 1967. [Note: North Korean engineers later increase the reactor's capacity from 2MW(th) to 4MW(th), and then to 8MW(th).]

—Gregory Karouv, "A Technical History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Relations," in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds., *The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia* (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 16; Alexander Zhebin, "Political History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Cooperation," in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds., *The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia* (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 31; ROK Ministry of Unification, *Pukhan Kaeyo 2000* (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, December 1999), p. 414; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Programme," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 3, No. 9, September 1991, p. 406; KAERI, "Pukhanüi Wönjaryök'iyonggaebal Hyönhwang," March 1999, www.kaeri.re.kr; KAERI, "Pukhanüi HaekkwallyöN

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Yŏn'guhwalton," www.kaeri.re.kr; Hong Yun O, "Haekshisŏl 18 Kos'e Illyŏk 3,000 Myŏng," *Hankook Ilbo*, 24 October 1994, p. 27, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

June 1965

Dr. Lee Sŭng Ki (이승기) is named the director of the Atomic Energy Research Institute. [Note: Lee is best-known for his work in chemistry, and he is the inventor of the synthetic fabric "vinalon." Lee is named director of the Academy of Sciences, Hamhŭng Branch in April 1984. This branch of the academy is a suspect chemical weapons R&D facility.]

—Lee Chae Sŭng, *Pukhan'ŭl Umjig'i'nŭn Technocrat* (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 150.

15 August 1965

The Soviet-supplied IRT-2000 research reactor in Yŏngbyŏn goes critical. The reactor's capacity is 2MW(th). [Note: The date is noteworthy as the 20th anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japanese colonial rule.]

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, August 1999, p. 41.

Mid-1960s

According to Ko Yŏng Hwan, who defected from North Korea in 1991, Pyongyang obtains nuclear equipment from Austria and France for its underground nuclear facility in Pakch'ŏn-kun, (博川郡), North P'yŏng'an Province (平安北道). [Note: Pakch'ŏn-kun is also the site of a North Korean air base.]

—"North Korea Suspected of Building Second Nuclear Arms Base," Agence France Presse, 29 October 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; KBS Television (Seoul), 13 September 1991, in "In Less than Five Years North Korea Will Collapse from Within," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 18 September 1991, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1964

China assists North Korea in conducting a uranium mining survey of the entire country, revealing large deposits of commercial grade uranium ore near "Unggi-kun (웅기군)," North Hamgyŏng Province (咸鏡南道); Hamhŭng (咸興市), South Hamgyŏng Province (咸鏡南道); Haegŭmgang-ri (海金剛里), Kosŏng-kun (高城郡), Kangwŏn Province (兩江道), and P'yŏngsan-kun (平山郡), North Hwanghae Province (黃海北道). [Note: According to North Korea, the survey revealed four million tons of commercial grade ore, but Bermudez believes the claim to be "undoubtedly exaggerated." "Unggi-kun" is an old name for a section of what is now known as the "special administrative city of Nasŏn (羅先直轄市), which borders on Russia.]

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Programme," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 3, No. 9, September 1991, pp. 406, 411; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part One," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 1999, pp. 38, 41; Lee Shin U, "Pukhan Haekkaebal/Hanbando Tŏp'ch'in Sae 'Kinjangbogo'," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 18 June 1990, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

1964

North Korea constructs and opens its "Nuclear Physics Research Institute (核物理學研究所)" in Yŏngbyŏn-kun (寧邊郡), North P'yŏng'an Province (平安北道). The institute begins research on nuclear materials and fuel,

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physics, and engineering with a specific focus on nuclear reactors.

—KAERI, "Pukhanŭi Haekkwallyŏn Yŏn'guhwaltong," www.kaeri.re.kr.

1964

The Kim Chaek University of Technology (金策工業大學) establishes courses related to nuclear technology.

—Lee Chae Sŭng, "Scud Missile Such'ullo 'Oehwa'bŏr'i'/Mugi (Pukhanŭi San'ŏp)," *Segye Ilbo*, 11 March 1992, p. 12, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

February 1964

The nuclear research complex in Yŏngbyŏn-kun, North P'yŏng'an Province is completed.

—Hong Yun O, "Haekshisŏl 18 Kos'e Illyŏk 3,000 Myŏng," *Hankook Ilbo*, 24 October 1994, p. 27, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Lee Shin U, "Pukhan Haekkaebal/Hanbando Tŏp'ch'in Sae 'Kinjangbogo'," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 18 June 1990, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

April 1964

With the assistance of Soviet nuclear specialists, North Korea opens its Nuclear Research Complex in Yŏngbyŏn-kun, North P'yŏng'an Province.

—ROK Ministry of Unification, *Pukhan Kaeyo 2000* (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, December 1999), p. 414; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Programme," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 3, No. 9, September 1991, p. 406; Michael J. Mazaar, *North Korea and the Bomb* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 25; So Yong-ha, "Capacity for Nuclear Weapons Development," *Hoguk*, July 1989, pp. 119-122, in "North's Nuclear Capability Assessed," FBIS-EAS-89-148, 3 August 1989, pp. 23-26.

1963

Construction of the Soviet-supplied IRT-2000 nuclear research reactor begins in Yŏngbyŏn under the supervision Soviet nuclear scientist Vladislav Kotlov.

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, August 1999, p. 41.

1963

North Korea establishes a nuclear engineering department at the National Defense College in Hyesan, Yanggang Province. [Note: This report is unsubstantiated.]

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part One," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 1999, p. 38.

1963

The P'yŏngsŏng Institute of Science begins to offer a course in nuclear physics.

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part One," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 1999, p. 39.

5 October 1963

During the graduation ceremony for the 7th class of the Kim Il Sung Military College (金日成軍事綜合大學), Kim Il

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Sung says, "We don't have nuclear weapons. But we can stop [the attack of] nuclear weapons by digging and going underground."

—Chang Chun Ik, *Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng* (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 116; So Yong-ha, "Capacity for Nuclear Weapons Development," *Hoguk*, July 1989, pp. 119-122, in "North's Nuclear Capability Assessed," FBIS-EAS-89-148, 3 August 1989, pp. 23-26.

January 1962

North Korea establishes atomic energy research institutes in Yŏngbyŏn-kun and Pakch'ŏn-kun, North P'yŏng'an Province.

—Chang Chun Ik, *Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng* (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 116; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 1994, p. 77.

January 1962

North Korea procures an IRT-2000 research reactor from the USSR.

—Lee Chŏng Hun, "Haek Chaech'orishisŏl Lee Chong Hun'i Pulbut'igo Chang Yŏng Shik'i Mulkkiŏntta," *Shindonga*, September 2002, www.donga.com.

1962

North Korea begins construction for the installation of a Soviet-supplied IRT-2000 nuclear research reactor.

—Chang Chun Ik, *Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng* (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 123; KAERI, "Pukhanŭi Wŏnjaryŏk'iyonggaebal Hyŏnhwang," www.kaeri.re.kr; KAERI, "Pukhanŭi Haekkwallyŏn Yŏn'guhwaltong," www.kaeri.re.kr.

4 December 1962

Kim Il Sung says the whole nation should be "turned in to a fortress...as a guarantee of survival against nuclear attack."

—So Yong-ha, "Capacity for Nuclear Weapons Development," *Hoguk*, July 1989, pp. 119-122, in "North's Nuclear Capability Assessed," FBIS-EAS-89-148, 3 August 1989, pp. 23-26.

December 1962

The Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party adopts a policy to strengthen the military along "four lines." The party seeks to: 1) improve political and technical discipline in the military; 2) modernize the military; 3) "arm" all the people with "class conscientiousness and military technology"; and 4) fortify the "whole country." The military modernization program is a response to the modernization program in South Korea that followed the 1961 military coup d'état. The North Korean military modernization program includes expanded missile procurement and import substitution plans for arms production in general.

—Chang Chun Ik, *Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng* (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 246; ROK Ministry of Unification, *Pukhan Kaeyo 2000* (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, December 1999), pp. 160-161; 262-263.

1961

North Korea begins construction of the Yŏngbyŏn Nuclear Research Complex in Yŏngbyŏn-kun (寧邊郡), North

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P'yŏng'an Province (平安北道).

—KAERI, "Pukhanŭi Wŏnjaryŏk'iyonggaebal Hyŏnhwang," www.kaeri.re.kr.

6 July 1961

In Moscow, Nikita Khrushchev and Kim Il Sung sign the "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." Article One of the treaty provides that "Should either of the Contracting Parties suffer armed attack by any State or coalition of States and thus find itself in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal."

—"Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," signed in Moscow, 6 July 1961.

11 July 1961

In Beijing, Chou En Lai and Kim Il Sung sign the "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." Article Two of the treaty provides that "In the event of one of the Contracting Parties being subjected to the armed attack by any state or several states jointly and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting party shall immediately render military assistance by all means at its disposal."

—"Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," signed in Beijing, 11 July 1961.

11-18 September 1961

During the Korean Workers' Party Fourth Party Congress (第4次大會), Professor To Sang Rok, the so-called "father of the North Korean nuclear program," emphasizes that North Korea should conduct research and develop specialists in the field of atomic energy.

—Lee Chae Sŭng, *Pukhan'ŭl Umjig'i'nŭn Technocrat* (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 110; ROK Ministry of Unification, *Pukhan Kaeyo 2000* (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, December 1999), pp. 104, 113.

1960s-early 1970s

North Korean technicians learn plutonium-reprocessing techniques while receiving training at Soviet plutonium separation facilities and laboratories. At the same time, the Soviet Union provides a number of hot cells as part of the agreement to supply the IRT-2000 research reactor.

—Mark Hibbs, "North Korea Thought to Have Separated PU in the 1970s With Soviet Help," *Nuclear Fuel*, Vol. 17, No. 13, 22 June 1992, pp. 15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1960

According to the *Rodong Sinmun*, which cites "an official US document," the Japanese government approves the deployment of US nuclear weapons on Japanese territory.

—"Japan Urged to Think Twice over Consequences," Korean Central News Agency, 30 January 2000, www.kcna.co.jp; "Vietnam Chŏnjaengshigi Ilbon'ŭi Haengmugibanipsŭng'insashil'u Ronp'yŏng/Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 30 January 2000, www.kcna.co.jp.

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Circa 1960-1961

Near the end of the Eisenhower administration, the United States has about 600 nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. There are about 800 at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa.

—Robert S. Norris, William N. Arkin and William Burr, "Where They Were," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 55, No. 6, November/December 1999, p. 30.

1960s

North Korea begins basic research and experiments in the field of atomic energy.

—KAERI, "Pukhanŭi Wŏnjaryŏk'iyonggaebal Hyŏnhwang," www.kaeri.re.kr.

1960s

The split in Sino-Soviet relations encourages North Korea to increase domestic production and to implement import substitution programs for weapons. North Korea establishes factories in sectors with extensive defense applications such as metallurgy, machine tools, precision machinery, automobiles, tractors, communications equipment, and shipbuilding. [Note: Indications of deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations first begin to emerge in 1960.]

—ROK Ministry of Unification, *Pukhan Kaeyo 2000* (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, December 1999), pp. 177-178.

1959

North Korea and the Soviet Union sign a nuclear cooperation treaty whereby the USSR agrees to provide technical assistance in the establishment of a nuclear research center in North Korea. [Note: The center is later established in Yŏngbyŏn-kun, North P'yŏng'an Province.]

—Alexander Zhebin, "Political History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Cooperation," Chapter Four in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds., *The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia* (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 30; KAERI, "Pukhanŭi Wŏnjaryŏk'iyonggaebal Hyŏnhwang," www.kaeri.re.kr; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Programme," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 3, No. 9, pp. 404-411; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 1994, p. 77.

1959

The US Air Force deploys a squadron of Matador nuclear cruise missiles to South Korea. The missiles have a range of 1,100km.

—Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 479.

29 January 1959

The United Nations Command in Seoul reveals that the United States has stationed nuclear weapons in South Korea.

—Chang Chun Ik, *Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng* (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 116.

September 1959

North Korea signs a nuclear cooperation agreement with China, and additional protocols on the peaceful use of nuclear energy with the USSR.

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—Harry Gilman and Norman Levin, *The Future of Soviet and North Korean Relations* (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, October 1984), p. 2; KAERI, "Pukhanüi Haekkwallyöŏn Yöŏn'guhwaltong," www.kaeri.re.kr.

7 September 1959

North Korea concludes an agreement with the USSR on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

—Lee Chae Süng, *Pukhan'ül Umjig'i'nün Technocrat* (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), pp. 432, 461; Lee Shin U, "Pukhan Haekkaebal/Hanbando Töp'ch'in Sae 'Kinjangbogo'," *Kukmin Ilbo*, 18 June 1990, p. 4, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

January 1958

The United States deploys 288-mm nuclear artillery and Honest John nuclear missiles to South Korea.

—Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 479.

January 1958

The USSR helps North Korea establish the "Atomic Weapons Training Center" in or near Kilchu-kun, North Hamgyöŏng Province, under the Korea People's Army.

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 1994, p. 79; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part One," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 1999, p. 38.

Early 1958

The United States deploys nuclear weapons to South Korea for the first time. The weapons are in the form of "atomic artillery, Honest John missiles, bombs, and atomic demolition munitions."

—Robert S. Norris, William N. Arkin and William Burr, "Where They Were," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 55, No. 6, November/December 1999, p. 30; Michael J. Mazaar, *North Korea and the Bomb* (New York: St. Martin's Press, May 1995), p. 20.

August 1957

The Eisenhower administration approves NSC 5702/2, which includes a provision for the stationing of nuclear weapons in South Korea.

—Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 478.

1956

North Korean nuclear specialists begin training in the USSR. Most of the specialists study at institutes of higher education including the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute, the Bauman Higher Technical School, and the Moscow Energy Institute. The most qualified of the North Korean specialists work at the nuclear scientific research facilities in Dubna and Obninsk. Over 300 nuclear specialists, including 20 with doctorate degrees, and more than 150 advanced specialists are believed to have been trained during the period of cooperation between North Korea and the USSR.

—Gregory Karouv, "A Technical History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Relations," in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds., *The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia* (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 17; So Yong-ha, "Capacity for Nuclear Weapons Development," *Hoguk*, July 1989, pp. 119-122, in "North's Nuclear Capability Assessed," FBIS-EAS-89-148, 3 August 1989, pp. 23-26.

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1956

North Korea establishes the "Radiochemistry Research Institute" (放射化學研究所), which is also known as the "Radioactive Chemistry Institute" or the "Radioactive Chemistry Research Institute."

—Hong Yun Ho, "Haekshisöl 18 Kos'e Illyök 3,000 Myöng," *Hankook Ilbo*, 24 October 1994, p. 27, in KINDS, www.kinds.com; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 1994, p. 77; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, August 1999, p. 43.

1956

The United States begins to deploy nuclear weapons to bases in Guam, Hawaii, and Okinawa.

—Robert S. Norris, William N. Arkin and William Burr, "Where They Were," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 55, No. 6, November/December 1999, p. 30.

February 1956

North Korea signs the founding agreement and charter of the USSR's "United Institute for Nuclear Research," which is established in the city of Dubna to serve as an international research center for socialist countries. [Note: The official name of the institute is the "Joint Institute for Nuclear Research."]

—Alexander Zhebin, "Political History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Cooperation," Chapter Four in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds., *The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia* (New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 28-29; KAERI, "Pukhanüi Wönjaryök'iyonggaebal Hyönhwang," www.kaeri.re.kr; KAERI, "Pukhanüi Haekkwallyön Yö'n'guhwaltong," www.kaeri.re.kr; So Yong-ha, "Capacity for Nuclear Weapons Development," *Hoguk*, July 1989, pp. 119-122, in "North's Nuclear Capability Assessed," FBIS-EAS-89-148, 3 August 1989, pp. 23-26.

March 1956

North Korea and the Soviet Union sign an agreement on the organization of "joint nuclear research (聯合核研究所組織에 관한 協定)." The agreement enables about 30 North Koreans to go to the USSR for training in nuclear technology. Pyongyang also decides to establish the Radiochemistry Research Institute (放射化學研究所). [Note: One source, Kim Wö'n Hong of the *Taehan Maeil*, says the agreement was signed in February 1956.]

—Chang Chun Ik, *Pukhan Haek-Missile Chönjaeng* (Seoul: Sömundang, May 1999), p. 116; Lee Chae Söng, *Pukhan'ül Umjig'i'nün Technocrat* (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 458; KAERI, "Pukhanüi Haekkwallyön Yö'n'guhwaltong," www.kaeri.re.kr; "'Pukhaek' Twi'e Sum'ün 4 Kae Chönsul/Höman (T'ükpyöl'gigo)," *Donga Ilbo*, 23 March 1994, p. 7, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

26 March 1956

North Korea becomes a participating member of the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, which opens in Dubna, near Moscow.

—Hong Yun O, "Haekshisöl 18 Kos'e Illyök 3,000 Myöng," *Hankook Ilbo*, 24 October 1994, p. 27, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Chang Chun Ik, *Pukhan Haek-Missile Chönjaeng* (Seoul: Sömundang, May 1999), p. 116; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 1994, p. 77; Joseph S.

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Bermudez, Jr., "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part One," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 1999, p. 41.

April 1955

During the second plenary session of the North Korean Academy of Sciences, the decision is made to establish the "Atomic and Nuclear Physics Research Institute (原子 및 핵物理學研究所)."

—Chang Chun Ik, *Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng* (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 116; KAERI, "Pukhanŭi Haekkwallyŏn Yŏn'guhwaltong," www.kaeri.re.kr; Kim T'ae U, *Haeg'ŭl A'nŭn Taet'ongnyŏng'i P'ilyohada* (Forthcoming).

June 1955

Six representatives from the North Korean Academy of Sciences participate in an Eastern European scientific conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

—KAERI, "Pukhanŭi Haekkwallyŏn Yŏn'guhwaltong," www.kaeri.re.kr; Michael J. Mazaar, *North Korea and the Bomb* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 25; So Yong-ha, "Capacity for Nuclear Weapons Development," *Hoguk*, July 1989, pp. 119-122, in "North's Nuclear Capability Assessed," FBIS-EAS-89-148, 3 August 1989, pp. 23-26; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Programme," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 3, No. 9, September 1991, p. 405.

Late 1955

North Korea conducts national nuclear defense exercises for military forces in rear areas.

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, February 1994, p. 79; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part One," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 1999, p. 38.

Early 1953

According to the *Pyongyang Times*, which cites "newly declassified documents," President Dwight Eisenhower "insists on the use of nuclear weapons in the Korean War."

—Kim Un A, "US Attempted Atomic Warfare in Korea," *Pyongyang Times*, 24 August 2002, www.times.dprkorea.com.

31 March 1953

During a Special National Security Council Meeting, President Eisenhower outlines two goals if atomic weapons are to be used during the Korean War. Despite the lack of good tactical targets, using atomic weapons will be worth the cost if the US can "achieve a substantial victory over the communist forces, and get to a line at the waist of Korea." President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles agree that the taboo surrounding nuclear weapons would have to be destroyed.

—"For Eisenhower, 2 Goals if Bomb Was to Be Used," *New York Times*, 8 June 1984, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 April 1953

According to a Special Intelligence Advisory Committee Estimate, the communist forces would recognize the use of

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atomic weapons as "indicative of Western determination to carry the Korean War to a successful conclusion." However, the report is unable to conclude whether or not this would be sufficient to coerce the communist forces to make the concessions necessary for reaching an armistice arrangement. The report says, "We believe the communist reaction would be in large part determined by the extent of damage inflicted."
 —"For Eisenhower, 2 Goals if Bomb Was to Be Used," *New York Times*, 8 June 1984, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 May 1953

During a National Security Council Meeting, Generals Bradley and Hull recommend that the use of atomic weapons would be necessary if military operations are expanded outside of Korea. President Eisenhower expresses his belief that using tactical atomic weapons against Chinese Communists in dugout bunkers will be more cost effective than current conventional weapons.

—"For Eisenhower, 2 Goals if Bomb Was to Be Used," *New York Times*, 8 June 1984, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 May 1953

During a National Security Council Meeting, President Eisenhower concludes that if the US wishes to pursue a more positive action on North Korea, the war will need to be expanded beyond Korea and it will be necessary to use atomic weapons. Eisenhower expresses concern about the Soviet response, but dismisses any Chinese retaliation as "the blow would fall so swiftly and with such force as to eliminate Chinese Communist intervention."

—"For Eisenhower, 2 Goals if Bomb Was to Be Used," *New York Times*, 8 June 1984, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 May 1953

US Secretary of State Dulles meets with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. During talks, he says that if the Korean armistice negotiations fail, "the United States would probably make a stronger, rather than a lesser military exertion, and that this might well extend the area of conflict." This veiled threat is expected to be relayed to the Chinese.

—Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Papers Tell of '53 Policy to Use A-Bomb in Korea," *New York Times*, 8 June 1984, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 July 1953

The Korean War Armistice is signed, but South Korean President Rhee Syngman refuses to sign the document. Some people believe that President Eisenhower's implicit threats to use nuclear weapons result in the armistice. North Korea later accuses the Eisenhower administration of developing "22 plots to use atomic weapons against North Korea and other socialist countries." [Note: The armistice fails to define the military demarcation line off the west coast, and the UN Command later unilaterally extends the line between western islands controlled by the UN Command and South Korean forces, but North Korea has not officially recognized this line. This disputed area has witnessed several naval clashes between the North and South Korean navies.]

—"Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the One Hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the Other

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Hand, Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea," signed at Panmunjŏm, 27 July 1953; Rosemary J. Foot, "Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict," *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 3, Winter 1988/1989, pp. 92-93; Rosemary J. Foot, *The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 1985), pp. 204-231; Peter Hayes, *Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 12-16; "Rodong Sinmun on U.S. Nuclear Strategy for Aggression," Korean Central News Agency, 16 March 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; "Migug'ŭi Ch'imnyakchŏkhaekchŏllyag'e Taehae P'ongno/Rodongshinmun," Korean Central News Agency, 16 March 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Chang Chun Ik, *Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng* (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 115.

1952

China sends scientist Wang Gan Chang to North Korea to "collect radioactive material."

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "N Korea—Set To Join the 'Nuclear Club'?" *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 12, No. 12, 23 September 1989, p. 594.

27 January 1952

In a private hand-written memorandum, President Truman considers the possibility of using nuclear war to end the stalemate in the cease-fire talks in Panmunjom. "This means all-out war. It means that Moscow, St. Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostok, Peking, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Darien, Odessa, Stalingrad and every manufacturing plant in China and the Soviet Union will be eliminated." The memo becomes publicly available in 1972.

—"Truman, in 1952 Memos, Considered Nuclear Strike," *New York Times*, 3 August 1980, p.22, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 May 1952

In a private hand-written memorandum, President Truman addresses his concerns over the failure of the Korean truce talks. "Now do you want an end to hostilities in Korea or do you want China and Siberia destroyed? You may have one or the other; whichever you want, these lies of yours at this conference have gone far enough. You either accept our fair and just proposal or you will be completely destroyed." This memo becomes publicly available in 1972.

—"Truman, in 1952 Memos, Considered Nuclear Strike," *New York Times*, 3 August 1980, p. 22, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Mid-1952

The Joint Chiefs of Staff ask President Truman to authorize the deployment of "non-nuclear components to forward areas" in Pacific theater bases under US control (Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, and Okinawa) in case the security situation worsened in East Asia.

—Robert S. Norris, William N. Arkin and William Burr, "Where They Were," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 55, No. 6, November/December 1999, p. 30.

October 1952

North Korea establishes the Academy of Sciences (朝鮮科學院).

—Lee Chae Sŭng, *Pukhan'ŭl Umjig'i'nŭn Technocrat* (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), pp. 47, 455.

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November 1952

North Korea's Academy of Sciences holds its first general meeting.

—Lee Chae Sŭng, *Pukhan'ül Umjig'i'nŭn Technocrat* (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 455.

1 December 1952

North Korea's Academy of Sciences holds its opening ceremony.

—Lee Chae Sŭng, *Pukhan'ül Umjig'i'nŭn Technocrat* (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), pp. 42, 455.

December 1952

North Korea establishes the Atomic Energy Research Institute (原子力研究所) under the Academy of Sciences (朝鮮科學院). The institute begins to conduct research on radioactive isotopes for use in industry, agriculture, and medicine. The institute is placed under the administrative control of the Cabinet's Atomic Energy Bureau (原子力總局) in January 1974.

—ROK Ministry of Unification, *Pukhan Kaeyo 2000* (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, December 1999), p. 414; Hong Yun O, "Haekshisöl 18 Kos'e Illyök 3,000 Myöng," *Hankook Ilbo*, 24 October 1994, p. 27, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

1951

China sends scientist Wang Gan Chang to North Korea to "collect radioactive material."

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "N Korea—Set To Join the 'Nuclear Club'?" *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 12, No. 12, 23 September 1989, p. 594.

12 January 1950

Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivers a speech before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., and says that South Korea is outside the US defense perimeter in East Asia. Many people have interpreted the speech as a signal that the United States would not intervene in the case of a southward invasion on the Korean peninsula, and thus a "green light" to Kim Il Sung to launch the Korean War.

—Dean Acheson, "Crisis in China—An Examination of United States Policy," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XXII, 23 January 1950, pp. 111-118; Bruce Cumings, "'The Speech': Achesonian Deterrence at the Press Club," Chapter 13 in *The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II, The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 408-428; Donald Stone MacDonald, *The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 50.

May 1950

According to the Pyongyang Times, which cites "newly declassified documents," President Harry Truman "reveals his intention to use atomic bombs in Korea."

—Kim Un A, "US Attempted Atomic Warfare in Korea," *Pyongyang Times*, 24 August 2002, www.times.dprkorea.com.

25 June 1950

The Korean People's Army crosses the 38th parallel to start the Korean War.

—Bruce Cumings, "Who Started the Korean War? Three Mosaics," Chapter Eighteen in *The Origins of the Korean*

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War: Volume II, The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 568- 621; Stanley Weintraub, "Day One," Chapter Three in *MacArthur's War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), pp. 24-37; Carter Eckert, et al., *Korea Old and New: A History* (Seoul: Ilchokak Publishers, 1990), pp. 344-346; Donald Stone MacDonald, *The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 50.

7 July 1950

According to the Pyongyang Times, which cites "newly declassified documents," General Douglas MacArthur "stresses the need to use atomic bombs in a secret phone call to President Truman."

—Kim Un A, "US Attempted Atomic Warfare in Korea," *Pyongyang Times*, 24 August 2002, www.times.dprkorea.com.

17 July 1950

General Douglas MacArthur tells US Army Department officials in Tokyo about his plan for an amphibious invasion behind enemy lines and to "destroy North Korea." MacArthur also says he sees "a unique use of the atomic bomb—to strike a blocking blow" in case China entered the war.

—Bruce Cumings, "Introduction: The Course of Korean-American Relations, 1943-1953," in Bruce Cumings, ed., *Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship 1943-1953* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983), p. 53.

20 November 1950

According to the Pyongyang Times, which cites "newly declassified documents," the "US National Security Council meets in a special session and discusses the use of atomic bombs in Korea."

—Kim Un A, "US Attempted Atomic Warfare in Korea," *Pyongyang Times*, 24 August 2002, www.times.dprkorea.com.

30 November 1950

During a press conference, President Truman is asked if the United States would consider using the atomic bomb in Korea, and he replies, "There has always been active consideration of its use. I don't want to see it used. It is a terrible weapon, and it should not be used on innocent men, women and children who have nothing to do with this military aggression—that happens when it's used." The statement is very controversial, and draws strong international criticism, even from US allies.

—Stanley Weintraub, *MacArthur's War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), pp. 257-259; Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War," *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 3, Winter 1988/1989, pp. 65-66; Peter Hayes, *Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991), p. 11.

9 December 1950

General Douglas MacArthur "requests commander's discretion to use atomic weapons."

—Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II, The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 750.

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24 December 1950

General Douglas MacArthur sends a list of targets to the Pentagon and asks for 34 atomic bombs to create "a belt of radioactive cobalt across the neck of Manchuria so that there could be no land invasion of Korea from the north for at least 60 years."

—Stanley Weintraub, *MacArthur's War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), pp. 263-264; Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II, The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 750; Peter Hayes, *Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 9-10.

1949

Ch'oe Hak Kŭn (최학근) departs to study at Moscow University. Ch'oe also studies later at the United Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna. Ch'oe is appointed minister of the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry in December 1986.

—Lee Chae Sŭng, *Pukhan'ŭl Umjig'i'nŭn Technocrat* (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), pp. 113-114.

April 1949

According to the *Pyongyang Times*, which cites "newly declassified documents," President Harry Truman "reveals his intention to use atomic bombs in Korea."

—Kim Un A, "US Attempted Atomic Warfare in Korea," *Pyongyang Times*, 24 August 2002, www.times.dprkorea.com.

September 1948

The Pyongyang Engineering College is established. In January 1951, the name is changed to "Kim Chaek University of Technology (金策工業大學)." The school later establishes departments in nuclear engineering, precision machinery, and nuclear electronics. A research academy and graduate school are established at the university in 1956.

—Lee Chae Sŭng, *Pukhan'ŭl Umjig'i'nŭn Technocrat* (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), p. 103.

1947

The USSR surveys North Korea's monazite mines with the assistance of "Dr. Chao Yang." Soon the Soviets expanded the mines and began to import large quantities of monazite. Production was suspended during the Korean War, but is believed to have restarted after the armistice was signed in 1953.

—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "N Korea—Set To Join the 'Nuclear Club'?" *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 12, No. 12, 23 September 1989, p. 594.

1947-June 1950

The Soviet Union sends engineers and technicians to North Korea to conduct surveys for uranium deposits. North Korea ships about 9,000 tons of uranium to the USSR during this period.

—Chang Chun Ik, *Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng* (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 114; Hong Yun O, "Haekshisŏl 18 Kos'e Illyŏk 3,000 Myŏng," *Hankook Ilbo*, 24 October 1994, p. 27, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.

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6 August 1945

The Enola Gay, a US Army Air Corps B-29 bomber, drops the atomic bomb "Little Boy" on Hiroshima.

—Richard Rhodes, "Tongues of Fire," Chapter 19 in *The Making of the Atomic Bomb* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).

8 August 1945

According to Korean Central Television in Pyongyang, Japan tests an atomic bomb off the coast of Hŭngnam (興南市), South Hamgyŏng Province (咸鏡南道), which is now part of North Korea. [Note: The North Korean media often cite a nuclear threat from Japan, which could be used as a pretext for North Korea's development of nuclear weapons. The City of Hŭngnam was incorporated into the City of Hamhŭng (咸興市) in 1950.]

—Cho Chŏng Chin, "Il P'aemangjŏn Hŭngnamsŏ Wŏnp'okshil'ŏm," *Segye Ilbo*, 22 December 2001, p. 31, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Chŏng Yŏn Uk, "Pukhan 'Ilbon 1945 Nyŏn Haekshil'ŏm' Chujang," *Donga Ilbo*, 22 December 2001, www.donga.com.

9 August 1945

Bock's Car, a US Army Air Corps B-29 bomber, drops the atomic bomb "Fat Man" on Nagasaki.

—Richard Rhodes, "Tongues of Fire," Chapter 19 in *The Making of the Atomic Bomb* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).

15 August 1945

Japan unconditionally surrenders to the United States, ending World War II. Korea is liberated from Japanese colonial rule. General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, later issues General Order Number One, which includes a provision for Soviet and US military forces to accept Japanese surrender on the northern and southern sides of the 38th parallel. Although the surrender arrangements are intended to be temporary, two separate states emerge on the divided peninsula.

—Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 457; Carter Eckert, et al., *Korea Old and New: A History* (Seoul: Ilchokak Publishers, 1990), pp. 327-343; Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 5-7; Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-1947* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp.117-126; Donald Stone MacDonald, *The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 44-50; "General Order No. 1, September 7, 1945 [Excerpt]," in *The United States and the Korean Problem: Documents 1943-1953* (New York: AMS Press, 1976), p. 3.

May 1941

According to Korean Central Television in Pyongyang, Japan mobilizes about 100 physicists to develop nuclear weapons. [Note: The North Korean media often cite a nuclear threat from Japan, which could be used as a pretext for North Korea's development of nuclear weapons.]

—Cho Chŏng Chin, "Il P'aemangjŏn Hŭngnamsŏ Wŏnp'okshil'ŏm," *Segye Ilbo*, 22 December 2001, p. 31, in KINDS,

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www.kinds.or.kr; Chŏng Yŏn Uk, "Pukhan 'Ilbon 1945 Nyŏn Haekshil'ŏm' Chujang," *Donga Ilbo*, 22 December 2001, www.donga.com.

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