Libya Nuclear Chronology

This chronology is no longer being updated.
For current developments, please see the Libya Nuclear Overview.

This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

2010-2006

20 March 2010
Libya and Russia discuss possibilities for cooperation on issues such as education, investment, and energy. Representatives from Libya's nuclear energy agency talk about energy cooperation prospects with their Russian counterparts.
—"Libya, Russia discuss boosting of cooperation in energy, economy sectors - agency," BBC Monitoring Middle East, 21 March 2010.

6 January 2010
Libyan Nuclear Energy Corporation (NEC) Chairman Ali Muhammad al-Fashut announces a "series of practical measures had been taken to begin projects aimed at using nuclear energy to produce electricity and purify water."
Formed in 2008 to advance the country's peaceful nuclear ambitions, the NEC is in the process of negotiating with potential foreign partners, and establishing a Nuclear Control Board, a commission to examine necessary legislative modifications, and a commission responsible for new nuclear facility site decisions. [Note: Reports on this story—seemingly referring to alternative translations for the same organization—variously referenced the Libyan Nuclear Energy Corporation (NEC), the Libyan Atomic Energy Board, the Libyan Nuclear Agency, the Libyan Atomic Energy Institute, or the Libyan Atomic Energy Organization as being responsible for these decisions].

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
9 December 2009
The General People’s Committee (GPCO), composed of a general secretary and representatives from twenty Libyan ministries, moves forward with a plan to develop a nuclear sector for Libya by directing the Libyan Atomic Energy Organization to commence negotiations with prospective foreign partners, prominently including France and Russia. Preliminary talks already took place earlier in the week between Muammar Qadhafi and French officials regarding the possible construction of a nuclear facility for seawater desalination.

26 October 2009
Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi declares in an interview with *British Sky News Television*: "If the Israelis have nuclear weapons [...] then it is the right of the Egyptians, the Syrians, the Saudi to have the same, even the Palestinians should have the same."

20 September 2009
*Sunday Times* reporter Simon Henderson publishes details of a letter that A.Q. Khan allegedly sent to his wife in 2003, which accuses the Pakistani government of direct involvement in Khan's nuclear black market. The *Sunday Times* story portrays the letter as Khan's back-up plan should the Pakistani government disavow knowledge of Khan's activities—the letter reportedly states: "They might try to get rid of me to cover up all the things they got done by me," and Khan reportedly urges his wife to "Get in touch with Simon Henderson...and give him all the details." The letter recounts Khan's proliferation assistance to Iran, China and North Korea, and mentions Libya in an unspecified context. It reportedly portrays Khan's proliferation assistance to these countries as both sanctioned and encouraged by the Pakistani government. In an interview with *Dawn* following the article's publication, Khan states: "I cannot comment on the report of *Sunday Times* because I have so far not gone through it," and "As the matter of my alleged involvement in nuclear proliferation is sub judice, I cannot comment on the new media report."

29 July 2009
Libya and Canada sign a memorandum of understanding regarding peaceful nuclear cooperation. Libya has already concluded similar agreements with Argentina, France, Russia, and Ukraine.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
15 July 2009
At the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi says that Libya was close to making a nuclear weapon before voluntarily dismantling its nuclear program in 2003 [See NTI Libya Nuclear Chronology 19 December 2003]. In a speech, Qaddafi calls on Iran not to pursue a nuclear weapons capability, saying: "If Iran wants to enrich uranium to make an atomic bomb, we are against this." He expresses support, however, for a peaceful nuclear program, calling it "unjust" to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear energy for civilian use.

11 June 2009
During a visit to Italy, Colonel Qadhafi says Libya has not yet been rewarded for its decision to renounce weapons of mass destruction. Qadhafi expresses Libya had hoped it would be "an example to other countries...But we have not been rewarded by the world."

26 May 2009
Libya and Ukraine sign a nuclear energy cooperation agreement. Libyan Prime Minister Baghdadi Mahmoudi notes that, "Libya has several offers for civilian nuclear cooperation, but we prefer to do it with Ukraine."

7 May 2009
Platts Nucleonics Week reports that the United States plans to review its nuclear policy towards Libya, a state which has complained in recent months that it has not been adequately rewarded for renouncing its weapons of mass destruction programs. Citing anonymous U.S. diplomatic sources, the article notes that as "part of an overall review of nuclear energy and nonproliferation policy concerning certain critical countries...the Department of State is prepared to reassess the outlook for future nuclear cooperation with Libya."

7 April 2009
Colonel Moammar Qadhafi welcomes President Barack Obama's call for a world free of nuclear weapons. Qadhafi also hails President Obama's statement that Iran is entitled to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, praising the U.S. President as "a gleam of light in the darkness of imperialism."

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30 March 2009
Colonel Moammar Qadhafi urges Arab countries at the Arab League Summit not to recognize Israel until it gives up its nuclear arsenal and allows Palestinian refugees the right to return to their homes. Qadhafi says "we cannot recognize Israel while they have nuclear weapons and we have modest weapons."

13 January 2009
Libyan officials refute the claim, made by opposition group leader Abd-al-Majid Mansur of the Al-Tabu Front for the Salvation of Libya, that the Qadhafi Regime has kept a nuclear and chemical weapons plant secret from the international community. Mansur claimed to have received information from Libyan sources that demonstrates a nuclear and chemical weapons plant run by North Korean experts in Jabal Haruj, near Al-Sabah field. Libyan officials argue Mansur "is part of the media campaign by certain circles in the opposition which have suspicious connections abroad," and have called on him to stop "attempts to defame" Libya.

21 November 2008
At a meeting in Tripoli, Argentina and Libya discuss possibilities for peaceful nuclear cooperation. The talks encompass the potential exchange of scientific research and nuclear energy technologies.

1 November 2008
According to Libyan sources, Russia and Libya sign a civil nuclear cooperation agreement during Qadhafi's visit to Moscow. Libyan Foreign Minister Abdelrahman Chalgham says the agreement will emphasize "—the design and construction of reactors and the supply of nuclear fuel," as well as medical applications of nuclear technology and nuclear waste treatment. The deal has not been officially confirmed by Russia, and AFP reports that Russian government spokesman Dmitry Peskov "said no such agreement had been signed during the meeting between Kadhafi and Putin."

16 October 2008
German Engineer Gotthard Lerch is sentenced to five-and-a-half years in prison. On 9 October 2008 Lerch confessed to accusations of helping transfer uranium enrichment components to Libya using the A.Q. Khan network from 1999-2003, and was charged with violating German trade and weapons laws. Federal Prosecutor Wolfgang Siegmund said Lerch "made highly exclusive special knowledge available" to Libya for a price of $4.7 million. The Stuttgart state court added that Lerch also admitted to supporting the production of piping systems for a South African gas ultra centrifuge facility. The IAEA believes the facility was intended for Libya's weapons

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25 August 2008
Swiss President Pascal Couchepin confirms the destruction of government documents linking Libya's former nuclear program to a family of Swiss engineers. According to Swiss officials, the U.S. urged Switzerland to destroy the files that could connect the CIA to the Tinner family. The Tinners played an important role in a clandestine operation to supply damaged nuclear equipment to Libya and Iran in order to slow their nuclear progress.

13 August 2007
Libyan Secretary for European Affairs Abd-al-Ati al-Ubaydi contests an article in the Daily Telegraph, confirming the existence of yellowcake at Sabha but emphasizing that the IAEA is aware of the stockpile [Note: the IAEA inspected the Sabha storage facility in July 2004]. The article in the Daily Telegraph had accused Libya of stalling on its promise to get rid of 1,000 tons of yellowcake. Libya says it is waiting for negotiations to be finalized before it sells the uranium.

2 June 2008
Dr. Mohamed El-Baradei, Director General of the IAEA, announces to the Board of Governors in the 2007 Annual Report that Libya has been fully compliant with the agency and has exceeded the IAEA's expectations. He notes that "Libya has recently provided additional information about the timeline of some of its past undeclared activities, which has helped the Agency gain a full picture of Libya's past and present nuclear programme and will enable the Agency to resume verification in Libya on a routine basis. [—] Libya has continued to be transparent and to provide the Agency unrestricted access."

29 May 2008
Ukrainian President Yushchenko meets with Colonel Qadhafi, seeking to bolster ties between Ukraine and Libya. Among many areas of cooperation emphasized, Yushchenko intends to help Libya build nuclear reactors and further its use of peaceful nuclear energy and technology.

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6 May 2008
Brice Hortefeux, the French Minister for Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Cooperative Development, confirms that President Sarkozy's government is moving forward with plans to help Libya build a nuclear reactor.

17 April 2008
Russia cancels Libya's $4.5 billion debt in return for ten military, energy and construction contracts worth $2.5 billion. Russia is expected to cooperate with Libya on nuclear energy soon [Note: In 1982, Russia helped Libya to build a nuclear research center and on 19 December 2007, Russia offered to help Libya pursue nuclear energy. See NTI Chronology 19 December 2007].

15 April 2008
Russian President Vladimir Putin plans to visit Libya to negotiate arms contracts and energy deals, a first for a Russian head of state. Last month Putin told the State Duma that a visit to Libya would help "iron out a financial problem with the country." Many officials believe Putin was referring to an arms-for-debt deal similar to the recent agreement with Algeria.

4 April 2008
The U.S.-Libya Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement, which was signed on 3 January 2008, enters into force. Both countries will engage in governmental and nongovernmental exchange of scientific personnel and information in such fields as alternative energies, upper atmospheric research, nuclear security, and technology innovation. The agreement will also promote good governance and increased global security efforts.

3 March 2008
Libya's Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Ibrahim Dabbashi votes in favor of UNSCR 1803, enacting additional sanctions against Iran's nuclear program. In his speech, he reinforces Libya's commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, but argues that the Security Council has not attached appropriate importance to Israeli nuclear weapons. In January 2008, Libya became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.

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19 December 2007

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov offers to help Libya in its pursuit of nuclear energy. The Russian Foreign Ministry asserts: "We are ready to help Libya realize its enduring right to attain civilian nuclear [energy]." Lavrov will visit Libya on Sunday for two days, meeting with Abdelrahman Shalgham to further discuss the issue.


10 December 2007

Colonel Qadhafi makes a high-profile visit to Paris to further Libya's $14.7 billion nuclear energy and armaments deal with France. During his visit, he will approve the purchase of $4.4 billion worth of Airbus planes, a nuclear reactor and possibly Rafale fighter jets.


16 October 2007

Libya wins a non-permanent member seat on the UN Security Council. Libya's UN Ambassador Giadalla Ettalhi notes that the country received 178 out of 192 UN General Assembly votes in its favor, including that of the United States. Libya's two-year term will begin on January 1, 2008 and it will sit with Vietnam, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica and Croatia on the Security Council.


20 September 2007

According to U.S. and Libyan officials, scientists from both countries are engaged in technical cooperation which may lead to future Libyan purchases of dual-use systems.


14 August 2007

French President Nicholas Sarkozy denies the report of a plan to sell a nuclear reactor to Libya. "It's false," he says.


9 August 2007

German officials voice their disapproval of French President Sarkozy's decision to sign a bilateral nuclear memorandum of understanding with Libya. The United States and other EU members support Sarkozy, arguing that to deny Libya nuclear technology would result in more challenging nonproliferation problems. These could include the appearance that a double standard is being applied to developing countries and the possibility of Libya acquiring technology from less trustworthy suppliers such as Iran. Supporters of the Libya-France deal maintain that neither country is violating the NPT.

— "German Minister Opposes Nuclear Aid to Middle East," Deutsche Welle, 17 December 2007; Mark Hibbs and
David Stellfox, "German Concern About Libya Deal Not Shared by U.S., Other EU Members," Platts Nucleonics Week, 9 August 2007.

6 August 2007
Colonel Qadhdhafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, claims France’s 25 July agreement with Libya constitutes a quid pro quo for the release of five Bulgarian nurses held for murder. In addition he claims the agreement includes plans for Libya to buy a nuclear reactor from France.

25 July 2007
The Libyan state news agency reports a nuclear and defense cooperation agreement between Colonel Qadhdhafi and French President Nicholas Sarkozy. The agreement, with unspecified terms, is said to accompany a memorandum of understanding on peaceful nuclear energy.

9 May 2007
German engineer Gerhard Wisser admits to smuggling nuclear supply parts into Libya as part of the AQ Khan network. He is sentenced to three years house arrest by a South African court. Wisser had participated in the illegal network between 2000 and 2004.

12 April 2007
Alexander Zolotaryov of the Russian Foreign Ministry says the Russian Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) will cooperate with Libya on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, specifically for medical purposes.
—"Russia to cooperate with Libya in peaceful uses of nuke energy," ITAR-TASS, 12 April 2007.

27 March 2007
Libyan TV announces the signature of a memorandum of understanding on scientific cooperation between Libya and the U.K. The broadcast reports that the document was signed by the director of the Libyan National Office for Research and Cooperation and the director in charge of North Africa at the British Foreign Office.

13 March 2007
The U.S. State Department declares there is "no formal pending nuclear cooperation agreement with Libya on nuclear power plants or any broader nuclear issues." However, there has been scientific cooperation between the two countries in the area of nuclear medicine.

11 March 2007
Libya announces pending nuclear agreement with U.S. aimed at electricity production, water desalination, and radiochemistry. Reportedly, the agreement will also provide opportunities for Libyan students to study nuclear

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energy at American universities.

13 October 2006
Mitutoyo Corp., a Japanese firm that manufactures precision instruments, acknowledges that it violated Japanese law by exporting instruments that can be used to produce centrifuges for uranium enrichment. Some of these instruments were found during International Atomic Energy Agency inspections in Libya in December 2003 and January 2004. Four former Mitutoyo employees that have been arrested have confessed to the charges against them.

3 October 2006
During a debate in the United Nations First Committee for Disarmament and International Security, Libyan representative Ali Berbash states that Libya agrees with the position of the Non-Aligned Movement and supports "complete and total" disarmament. Berbash cautions that nuclear weapons and peaceful nuclear programs are not the same thing and should not be treated as such. Also, he states that Libya encourages the creation of more nuclear weapons free zones, but does not feel that this is feasible in the Middle East because of Israel's nuclear weapons program. He calls on Israel to become a member of the nonproliferation regime. In addition, he feels that the "double standard" should be eliminated to prevent other states from acquiring nuclear weapons.

26 September 2006
In his book, In the Line of Fire, Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf claims that A.Q. Khan transferred about 18 tons of centrifuges, parts, materials, and drawings to Iran and Libya through Dubai.

21 September 2006
Prime Minister of South Korea Han Myeong-sook meets with Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi and Libyan Prime Minister Baghdadi Mahmudi. The main topic of discussion is a peaceful resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue. Gadhafi states that he has made efforts to convince North Korea to end their nuclear weapons program, but that it has been largely unsuccessful. Gadhafi also stated that he is not satisfied with the progress made in compensating Libya for renouncing nuclear weapons.
**14 September 2006**
The Japanese government officially files charges against Mitutoyo Corp. employees. Scomi Precision Engineering, which allegedly took part in the A.Q. Khan network, admits buying six measurement machines from Mitutoyo in 2002 and sending one of them to Dubai. Scomi denies knowing what happened to the machine after it reached Dubai. Scomi was cleared by the Malaysian government and the International Atomic Energy Agency of knowingly participating in the A.Q. Khan network.

**8 September 2006**
Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry files charges against Mitutoyo for exporting measuring machines that could be used in a nuclear weapons program, one of which was discovered in Libya during International Atomic Energy Agency inspections in 2003-2004. Later this year, the Japanese government is expected to modify its export laws. Some possible changes that are under consideration are requiring government approval for all sensitive exports to a list of certain countries, as well as taking Libya off that list.

**31 August 2006**
In order to implement the State Department decision to remove Libya from the list of states that sponsor terrorism, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security revises the Export Administration Regulations to relax export controls on goods destined for Libya. However, exports of nuclear technology to Libya will still be controlled, but civilian end-users will likely receive approval.

**29 August 2006**
Japan’s Mitutoyo Corp. is under investigation for allegedly exporting sophisticated measuring devices. One of these machines alleged to have traveled via the nuclear black market run by A.Q. Khan, was discovered in a nuclear facility in Libya by IAEA inspectors during their 2003-2004 inspections. The sophisticated measuring devices known as coordinate measuring machines, allow mechanical parts to be manufactured to very precise specifications and can be used for the manufacture of specialized equipment such as centrifuges for uranium enrichment.

**25 August 2006**
Top executives of Mitutoyo Corp. of Japan are arrested for exporting, without permission from the government, equipment useful for constructing centrifuges. Mitutoyo employed software to mask the accuracy of the

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measuring devices so they could be exported. According to Hiroyuki Murakami, a director at the Security Export Inspection Office at the Ministry of Economy, Mitutoyo could have been violating export laws for many years. Police are also attempting to find out if the devices were employed by Scomi Precision Engineering, which is suspected of having played a role in the A.Q. Khan network. The violation came to light when one of the machines was found in Libya during International Atomic Energy Agency inspections in 2003-2004. The arrests occurred due to a tip from the International Atomic Energy Agency.


17 August 2006
Japan's State Minister for Science and Technology Policy Iwao Matsuda meets with Libyan leader Muammar Gadhdfafi where they discuss North Korea's nuclear program. Gadhdfafi states that he has been calling on North Korea to end its program as Libya did, and would like other countries to aid in persuading North Korea.


7 August 2006
Under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Tajoura Research Center in Libya complete an agreement on a "sister laboratory" program.


4 August 2006
The case against Gotthard Lerch, an engineer accused of aiding Libya in developing a nuclear weapon, is dismissed after four months by a judge in Mannheim, Germany. The judge feels that Lerch's trial will not be fair due to the withholding of evidence by the prosecution.


3 August 2006
The Swiss Supreme Court allows the release of Swiss banking documents to the German government. The documents are from a South African company, which is alleged to have taken orders to manufacture parts for gas centrifuges. It has been estimated by the Swiss federal prosecutor that the company accepted a payment of $1.3 million for the order. Allegedly, A.Q. Khan mentioned the company during his statement on his nuclear black market activities, which included providing Libya with centrifuge technology.


26 July 2006
Three kilograms of fresh (non-irradiated) highly enriched uranium (HEU) is shipped from the Tajoura research
reactor in Libya to Russia. After this shipment, 20 kg of HEU were removed from Tajoura, which still contains an undisclosed amount of HEU fuel. The shipped fuel is set to arrive at the Luch research and production center in Russia where it will be converted into low-enriched uranium (LEU). The repatriation of fuel from Libya is part of a U.S.-Russian intergovernmental agreement for the conversion of foreign research reactors built under Soviet projects. This was a joint operation involving the National Nuclear Security Administration's Global Threat Reduction Initiative, Libya, Russia, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Tajoura research reactor is expected to be switched to LEU fuel in the coming months.


25 July 2006
For the first time, Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi admits that Libya was attempting to construct a nuclear weapon. Gadhafi claims that Libya had been near to accomplishing this goal. This claim is discounted by U.S. officials who state that Libya had enough uranium, but did not have the technical expertise.


30 June 2006
Due to a report presented to Congress by President Bush on Libya's renunciation of support for terrorists, the U.S. State Department revokes Libya's status as a state sponsor of terrorism.


27 June 2006
The United Kingdom and Libya sign a memorandum of peace and security, in which the British promise to aid Libya in transforming its former nuclear weapons program into a peaceful nuclear program.


16 May 2006
The Bush administration announces the full resumption of diplomatic ties with Libya. The move comes following Libya's abandonment of its nuclear and other unconventional weapon programs. Secretary Rice remarks that 'Libya is an important model as nations around the world press for changes in behavior by the Iranian and North Korean regimes.'


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27 April 2006
British citizen and businessman, Peter Griffin, is named as a suspect in the A.Q. Khan network during the trial of Gottard Lerch, another suspect of nuclear trafficking in the illicit network, in Mannheim, Germany. German prosecutors allege that Mr. Griffin and his Dubai-based company, Gulf Technical Industries (GTI), were commissioned by Mr. Lerch to purchase specialized lathes in Spain to be sent to South Africa for the manufacture of high-quality steel needed for centrifuge rotors for Libya's now dismantled nuclear weapons program.

17 March 2006
The trial of Gottard Lerch, who is suspected of aiding Libya's now defunct nuclear weapons program, begins in Mannheim, Germany. Mr. Lerch is charged with violating arms and exports laws by allegedly providing gas centrifuge technology to Libya for its clandestine nuclear weapons program.
—"German on trial over Libya arms," BBC, 17 March 2006.

16 March 2006
France signs a peaceful nuclear energy accord with Libya. Maatuk Maatuk, Libya's public works minister, states "this accord represents a qualitative leap in relations between the two countries and proves that Libya has transformed its weapons of mass destruction into constructive weapons."
—Afael el-Geblawi, "Libya signs nuclear research deal with France," Middle East Online, 16 March 2006.

15 February 2006
China denies involvement of illegal nuclear trafficking with Japan-based Mitutoyo Corporation. Mitutoyo Corporation is suspected of illegally exporting three dimensional measuring tools to Libya in 2002 through the Malaysian company, Scome Precision Engineering (SCOPE), and the A.Q. Khan network. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu Jianchao states that "after our inquiries, we felt that this issue had nothing to do with China."

27 January, 2006
The Turkish Customs Inspection Committee reports that two Turkish firms, Tekno Elektrik Sanayi and 3E Endustriyel Sanayi, engaged in illicit nuclear trafficking with Libya before its voluntary disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. A U.S. Department of Energy report states that Turkish firms supplied Libya with 6,992 centrifuge motors, 912 bottom magnets, and 19,447 ring magnets, which could have been used to produce up to seven nuclear weapons per year. Turkish officials state that the parts supplied to Libya were exported to the Gulf Technical Firm in Dubai, then to Pakistan, and then to Libya, which provides evidence of a strong link to the A.Q. Khan network.
—"They have sold materials enough for 7 nuclear weapons," Milliyet, 8 December 2005; "Two Turks Alleged to Nuclear Trafficking," Sabah, 27 January 2006.

14 January 2006
Kazusaku Tezuka, president of Mitutoyo Corporation, denies that the Mitutoyo Corporation knowingly engaged in illicit trafficking of nuclear equipment that was found in Libya by international officials after Tripoli voluntary
disbanded its WMD programs in 2004. Mr. Tezuka states that "I personally believe the intention was to handle the matter properly and there were no illegalities."

14 January 2006
Japanese firm, Mitutoyo Corporation, is suspected of illegally exporting three dimensional measuring tools to Scomi Precision Engineering (SCOPE) in Malaysia, China, and Thailand. Associates of the A.Q. Khan network are suspected of conducting illicit nuclear trafficking activities from SCOPE factories in Malaysia. The three dimensional measuring tools were allegedly shipped to Libya for its illicit nuclear weapons program from Malaysia and Dubai on an Iranian registered freighter.

2005

8 November 2005
Robert Joseph, U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, asserts that Libya's decision to voluntarily disarm its weapons of mass destruction programs was complicated and was likely influenced by "the fact that we (U.S.) were deploying hundreds of thousands of forces to the region" due to the war in Iraq.

20 October 2005
Libya signs an agreement with TVEL, a Russian company, which will provide the Tajoura nuclear reactor, near Tripoli, with low enriched uranium to produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

3 October 2005
Libyan delegate to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ma'tuq Muhammed Ma'tuq, and Syrian Othman, head of Libya's atomic energy commission, urge Israel to renounce its alleged nuclear weapons arsenal and join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

28 September 2005
At the International Atomic Energy Agency annual conference Ma'tuq Muhammad Ma'tuq, the Libyan delegation leader, meets with the chairman of the Argentinean delegation, Jose Abirca, to discuss future cooperative efforts on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

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23 September 2005
Libya is one of 16 Arab member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that signs a letter requesting that Israel’s alleged nuclear arsenal is addressed at the IAEA annual conference.

17 September 2005
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice offers praise to Abn Al-Rahman Shalgam, Libya’s Foreign Minister, for Libya’s decision to voluntarily disarm its weapons of mass destruction arsenals.
— "Media Availability with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Libyan Foreign Minister Abd Al-Rahman Shalgam Following Their Meeting (As Released by the State Department)," Federal News Service, 17 September 2005.

19 August 2005
The White House announces that Richard Lugar, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman, is scheduled to make a trip to Libya on behalf of U.S. President George W. Bush to discuss the possibility of normalizing relations between Libya and the United States. American and Libyan relations have improved recently as a result of Libya’s decision to voluntarily dismantle its weapons of mass destruction programs.

12 August 2005
Former Iranian President, Hashemi Rafsanjani, asserts that the West cannot force Iran to abandon its nuclear programs as it did to Libya and Iraq. In reference to Iran’s Western counterparts, he states that “these people think they have defeated Iran, but they should know that Iran is not a place where they can do what they did with Libya and Iraq.”
— "Ex-President Rafsanjani says IAEA statement on Iran is cruel, adds Iran is not Libya, Iraq," Associated Press, 12 August, 2005.

12 August 2005
Reporter Jason Leopold alleges that U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney has known of the existence of the nuclear black market led by Pakistani engineer, A.Q. Khan, since 1989 when he worked as U.S. Secretary of Defense. It is believed that A.Q. Khan was the supply source for Libya’s illicit nuclear weapons program. Cheney was first informed of the clandestine nuclear market by a report prepared by Pentagon analyst Richard Barlow, but reporter Leopold claims the findings of the report were “politically inconvenient” and subsequently dismissed during a time when the United States was negotiating a $1.4 billion contract to sell F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan and also viewed Pakistan as a key ally in order to support Afghan rebels fighting the Soviets.

9 August 2005
Former Netherlands Prime Minister, Ruud Lubbers, claims that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was notified in 1975 and again in 1986 regarding the existence of a nuclear black market led by Abdul Qadeer Khan, but requested that Dutch officials refrain from detaining or prosecuting the Pakistani engineer and former Urenco employee in
the Netherlands. Former Prime Minister Lubbers asserts that "the American intelligence services preferred not to arrest the man but to let him go. They thought: 'give us all the information but do not hold that man. Let him go, we will follow him and get more information.' " He alleges that the CIA abandoned the chance to prosecute A.Q. Khan because Pakistan was needed as a key U.S. ally while Afghanistan was fighting the Soviets. A.Q. Khan is believed to be the predominant supplier of nuclear technology to Libya's clandestine nuclear weapons program.


6 August 2005
Libya, which surrendered its clandestine weapons of mass destruction programs in 2003, says it will attend the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony, which marks the 60th anniversary of an atomic bomb being dropped on the city of Hiroshima.


6 August 2005
In a telephone meeting with Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, British Prime Minister Tony Blair indicates an interest in improving his country's relations with Libya, which cooled so on after Libya's voluntary abandonment of its weapons of mass destruction programs.

— "Qaddafi Receives Telephone Call from Blair," Qatar News Agency, 6 August 2005.

29 July 2005
The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) 2004 Report on Implementation of Nuclear Safeguards Measures deems that its current assessment of Libya's nuclear stance is one of consistency, compliance, and transparency after three separate reports from the director general were submitted to the Board of Governors throughout 2004 regarding the implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements. The report states that "Libya's declaration regarding its uranium conversion programme, enrichment programme, and other past nuclear related activities appears to be consistent with the information available to and verified by the Agency. Verification of the correctness and completeness of Libya's declarations is ongoing."


10 July 2005
Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's finance minister, states that the U.S. invasion of Iraq has provided a "deterrent effect" and consequently persuaded Libya to dismantle its clandestine nuclear program.

— "UK Speech by Israel's Netanyahu Warns West to Unite Versus Iran's Nuclear Threat," Sunday Times, 10 July 2005, in FBIS document EUP20050710031005.

30 June 2005
Swiss authorities transfer custody of Gottard Lerch, a German national, to German officials to face charges of
providing assistance to Libya's nuclear weapons program.

**29 June 2005**

In a national address delivered from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, American President George Bush says that the U.S. invasion of Iraq has influenced Libya's decision to dismantle its clandestine nuclear weapons program. He asserts that "before our coalition liberated Iraq, Libya was secretly pursuing nuclear weapons. Today the leader of Libya has given up his chemical and nuclear weapons programs."

**9 June 2005**

A senior IAEA official highlights recent Libyan cooperation that has aided efforts to solve the A.Q. Khan nuclear black market puzzle. Libya has relinquished two CD-roms and one computer hard drive that contain a set of drawings and manuals for P-1 and P-2 centrifuges originally sold by the A.Q. Khan network. The official asserts that Libya is the only country that has relinquished sensitive nuclear materials from the A.Q. Khan network.

**6 June 2005**

China denies accusations of cooperative efforts with Libya to produce nuclear weapons. In response to suspicions that China aided Libya's nuclear program in the past Kang Rixin, the general manager of China National Corporation, says that "our international cooperation is for the peaceful use and we strictly follow relevant rules and principles. We have no such cooperation with Iran, North Korea, or Libya."
— "Kang Rixin Says PRC has no Nuclear Cooperation with Iran, North Korea, Libya," Agence France Presse, 6 June 2005, in FBIS Document CPP20050606000061.

**30 May 2005**

France announces that it has agreed to help Libya develop a nuclear energy program for peaceful purposes.

**18 May 2005**

At the NPT review conference Chinese disarmament ambassador Hu Xiaodi praises Libya's decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. He states that "Libya's renunciation of weapons of mass destruction and acceptance of IAEA's nuclear inspection are positive achievements of international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation by peaceful means and have important significance for the consolidation and strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation mechanism."

**13 May 2005**

Germany extradites Swiss engineer Urs Tinner to Switzerland who is suspected of supplying gas-centrifuge parts to Libya between 2001 and 2003. Both Urs Tinner and his father Friedrich are accused of overseeing production of
parts used for nuclear weapons in Malaysian factories. This is part of a larger Swiss led investigation in which 15 individuals and two companies are being investigated for illegally exporting materials to Libya's nuclear weapons program.
— "Swiss Engineer in Libya Nuclear Probe to be Extradited from Germany," BBC, 13 May 2005.

3 May 2005
White House spokesman Scott McClellan urges Iran and North Korea to follow in the footsteps of Libya’s decision to voluntarily disarm its nuclear program. He advises both Iran and North Korea that "you will realize better relations if you pursue a course like Libya, and abandon your nuclear weapons programs."

3 May 2005
Production engineer Peter Griffin receives 50,000 pounds in libel damages after the Guardian newspaper falsely reported that he played a prominent role in setting up Libya’s nuclear weapons production program. The article, printed in February 2004, claims that Malaysian police found Mr. Griffin guilty of supplying Libya with equipment and technology that was used in nuclear weapons production, setting up a workshop in Malaysia to build centrifuge components, and creating a front company to buy necessary parts for nuclear engineering.

17 April 2005
North Korea claims that "once again the U.S. information is based on fiction and fabrication" after a March 20th Washington Post article expressed possible doubts about the credibility of U.S. statements to Japan and South Korea that North Korea had supplied nuclear materials to Libya.

7 April 2005
Ma'maar al-Qadhafi’s son, Sayf al-Islam, claims that in late 2003 "Libya was in a state where it was possible to make nuclear weapons in five years."
— "Ties with U.S. ‘before end of year’," BBC, 8 April 2005.

13 April 2005
Reports indicate that British and Libyan diplomatic relations peaked in 2003 and 2004 when Libya voluntarily relinquished its weapons of mass destruction programs. Although U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair made an historical visit to Libya in 2004, subsequent diplomatic exchanges have been less frequent and conducted by lower ranking government officials.

6 April 2005
The United States claims that it has clear evidence that North Korea exported nuclear material to Libya through a

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Pakistani broker. U.S. negotiator to the six-party talks Christopher Hill says, "We believe it was brokered through Pakistan with [North Korean] knowledge that it would end up in Libya." Hill also said that the "broker" is believed to have been the A.Q. Khan network in Pakistan.

— "U.S. has evidence of N.K. nuke exports to Libya," The Korea Herald, 7 April 2005.

5 April 2005
Mu'ammar Ghadhdhafi's son, Seif al-Islam Ghadhdhafi, uses Libya as an example for what needs to be done with North Korea. In a statement, he said, "It's not fair all the time just to press, to push North Korea. We have to give them political and economic incentives so that they will be much better." He also declines to comment on whether North Korea helped Libya with its weapons program.


31 March 2005
The Bush administration and United Nations inspectors say that the uranium found in Libya's supply most likely came from North Korea. This supports the case that North Korea has exported dangerous materials to not only Libya, but other nations as well. A large payment was directed to North Korea, presumably for the uranium hexafluoride that arrived in Tripoli in 2001. Because of the intelligence failures in Iraq, "the knockout piece of evidence" that has yet to be found is keeping many in doubt about Washington's findings.


30 March 2005
Switzerland agrees to return a German national to his home country, where he is accused of assisting Libya's past nuclear arms effort. After having been arrested in Switzerland in November, Gotthard Lerch has one more opportunity to appeal the extradition according to Switzerland's Justice Ministry. German authorities say that Lerch received up to $4.25 million to assist in Libya's uranium enrichment centrifuge development between 2001 and 2003.


25 March 2005
South Korea denies that it was informed by the United States earlier in the year about intelligence stating that North Korea was in fact paid by Libya after having exported nuclear material (namely uranium hexafluoride UF6) through Pakistan. A U.S. government spokesman said, "We are not in a stage where we can conclude there was a financial transaction between North Korea and Libya."


5 February 2005
French Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie travels to Tripoli to sign a letter of intent on military cooperation and procurement.


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February 2005
The United States Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs William Burns reiterates the US's desire to establish normalized relations with Libya and gave praise to Libya for abandoning WMD. Burns also reviewed matters of "specific concern over Libya’s past involvement in terrorism."

February 2005
Pakistani Information Minister Sheikh Rashid admits that there were nuclear proliferation and technology transfers to Iran, Libya and North Korea but nothing was admitted as far as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or other Arab states.

February 2005
A U.S. test strongly suggests that North Korea provided Libya with uranium hexafluoride gas, although the same evidence could point to Pakistan as well. Traces of plutonium are found on a canister produced at Yongbyon, yet according to IAEA tests, the canister is found to have originated from Pakistan.

January 2005
With the abandonment of WMD, Libya is called upon by Western nations like France, Germany, Canada, Britain, Italy and United States and opens its doors to better relations and economic ties. Libya is also asked to play a full role in the North African dialogue with the European Union.
— "West Beats a Path to Forgive Libya its Pariah Status," Times Online, 18 January 2005.

January 2005
In an interview asking about Iran's nuclear weapons, Al-Qadhdhafi says that Iran is an independent country and knows where its interests lie. He also calls upon countries such as the US, Britain, France, Russian, China, India and Israel to destroy their weapons.

January 2005
The General People's Congress (GPC) of Libya calls on all countries possessing Weapons of Mass Destruction to get rid of them with a vision to make the world safer. Libya also renews its call to make Africa, the Mediterranean and the Middle East WMD-free regions without exception, including Israel's nuclear arsenal.
— "Libya Calls on All Countries to Scrap WMDs," Panafrican News Agency, 13 January 2005.

January 2005
Mu'amar Qadhdhafi says that the United States and the United Kingdom have not rewarded Libya for dismantling its WMD program, although they have made pledges.

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January 2005
Poland and Libya sign a cooperation accord in the field of WMD disarmament. Polish PM Marek Belka says that his country would cooperate with Libya in transforming the WMD installations, stores and equipment and help them scrap their WMD facilities. Possibilities of implementing a more efficient cooperation in the fields of energy, armament, construction and chemical industries and other "great military cooperation opportunities" may occur.

2004
21 December 2004
Libyan ambassador to Japan states that Libya will continue its efforts to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear programs. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi urges Libya to continue to persuade North Korea to find a peaceful resolution to the nuclear issue.

24 November 2004
French President Jacques Chirac arrives in Libya to discuss France's cooperation in the development of a civilian nuclear program subject to IAEA controls.

November 2004
French Newspaper Liberation alleges that the Libyan nuclear program was not intended to serve Libya alone, but was also to serve Egypt clandestinely.

October 2004
The United States lifts most sanctions on Libya after it gives up its nuclear weapons program. However, Libya still remains on the US Department of State's list of state "sponsors" of terrorism.

September 2004
The United States removes the economic restrictions placed on Libya and renews oil imports to America from Libya.

September 2004
Japanese-made high-precision measuring instruments used for centrifuge separators in uranium enrichment are
found in a nuclear facility in Libya during inspections. Three measuring instruments, including a three-dimensional profilometer, are discovered by the IAEA in inspections earlier in the year.


15 September 2004
The parliament of Pakistan, a major supplier to Libya's clandestine nuclear weapons program, passes legislation tightening export controls aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation. The bill proposes to "regulate and control export, re-export, trans-shipment and transit of goods and technologies, materials and equipment related to nuclear and biological weapons and missiles capable of delivering such weapons." Violators of the new legislation would face up to 14 years in prison and fines of up to $285,000. The laws are designed to follow guidelines set out in a United Nations Security Council resolution of April 2004 aimed at preventing black market trading of weapons of mass destruction related materials.


9 September 2004
Former American Republican Senator and Presidential candidate Bob Dole visits Libya and meets with Colonel Qadhafi.


9 September 2004
Bill Gertz of The Washington Times reports that numerous individuals from varying countries have been implicated in the illicit smuggling network that supplied Libya's secret nuclear weapons program. These agents include Peter Griffin, a British national and former head of Gulf Technical Industries, Heinz Mebus, an engineer who helped A.Q. Khan smuggle centrifuge designs into Iran in the mid 1980s, Gotthard Lerch, a German national who tried to help Libya import specialty pipes from South Africa, Gunas Jireh, a Turkish national who Khan hired to supply aluminum casting and a centrifuge dynamo for the Libyan nuclear program, Selim Alguadis, a Turkish engineer who supplied Libya with electrical cabinets and voltage-regulator equipment, and members of the Tinners family of Switzerland, who procured assorted nuclear components from Britain, Franc, and Taiwan.


9 September 2004
Two South African men are arrested in conjunction with an investigation into the illicit nuclear trafficking of Trade Fin Engineering. Gerhard Wisser and Daniel Geiges of Krisch Engineering are arrested in connection with South Africa's investigation into illicit smuggling networks. Wisser was charged in his native Germany last month and released on bail after being charged with violating arms control legislation and "assisting treason". Wisser owns Krisch Engineering.

8 September 2004
The Government of South Africa withdraws charges against Director of Trade Fin Engineering Johan Meyer related to the sale and trafficking of nuclear weapons-related technology. Charges are reportedly dropped against Meyer in exchange for compliance in the ongoing investigation into an illicit network that has supplied proscribed nuclear technology to Libya and Iran.

7 September 2004
A statement issued by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs indicates that on 1 September 2004 a Trade Fin Engineering facility in Vanderbijlpark was searched by members of the Office of the National Director of Public Prosecutions, the South African Police Service, and inspectors as well as other South African technical advisors. Agents discovered 11 shipping containers which contained components of a centrifuge uranium enrichment plant and related documentation. Mr. Johan Meyer, director of Trade Fin Engineering, was arrested on 2 September 2004.

2 September 2004
A South African man is arrested on suspicion of playing a major role in the nuclear black market that supplied Libya’s clandestine nuclear weapons program. Arrests and raids are carried out over the previous week in South Africa, Germany, and Switzerland. Johan Andries Muller Meyer, director of a South African manufacturing firm Trade Fin, is charged with three criminal counts of trafficking in sensitive nuclear equipment.

30 June 2004
An International Atomic Energy Agency report alleging possible North Korean involvement in Libya’s discontinued nuclear weapons program is made available to The Associated Press. The report states that some equipment ordered by Libya from North Korea remains missing, leaving open the possibility that proscribed technologies may have been shipped to other states or groups. The report focuses on the origin of two cylinders of uranium hexafluoride, which some speculate may have come from the black market, Pakistan, or North Korea.

21 June 2004
IAEA officials tell Arms Control Today that Libyan officials have said that they have not received some of the centrifuge components they ordered, implying that they were duped by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan. This may signify that a third party may be in possession of proscribed materials ordered by Libya.

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19 June 2004
Japanese Senior Vice Foreign Minister Ichiro Aisawa discloses in a lecture at the Ritsumeikan University in Tokyo that he has obtained information regarding nuclear and missile technology exchanges between Libya and North Korea when he met with Colonel Qadhdhafi.

16 June 2004
The International Atomic Energy Agency decides to further investigate Libya's abandoned nuclear weapons program in order to uncover the network through which it was supplied.

10 June 2004
The ongoing investigation by the IAEA reveals that suppliers from Turkey and Libya provided Libya's secret nuclear weapons program with technology and expertise. In March 2004 a container of Turkish-made components for Libya's uranium enrichment program arrived in Tripoli. The shipment was reported to the IAEA and arrived aboard the infamous BBC China. The Turkish parts, including centrifuge motors and frequency converters, are more sophisticated than the Malaysian parts that arrived in the same shipment. The IAEA also reports that Libyan scientists studied centrifuge equipment during a visit to "another African country", which diplomats indicate is South Africa.
— "Turks and South Africans 'Helped Libya's Secret Nuclear Arms Project'," Financial Times, 10 June 2004.

2 June 2004
International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohammed ElBaradei states that recent examinations of agency dossiers on Iran and Libya reveal possible evidence of highly enriched uranium in both countries. Though both documents are confidential and released on to IAEA Board member-states, portions of the two dossiers are leaked to the press. In Libya, the presence of highly enriched uranium was detected on centrifuges presumed to be of Pakistani origin.

1 June 2004
An International Atomic Energy Agency report implicates South Africa in the network through which Libya developed its clandestine nuclear program. The report alleges that a South African entity provided Libyan scientists with specialized engineering training.

28 May 2004
International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reveals that a shipping container loaded full of L-2 advanced uranium enrichment centrifuge components was successfully smuggled to Libya three months after Colonel Qadhdhafi announced his decision to discontinue Libya's weapons of mass destruction programs. The

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German ship, the *BBC China*, was initially seized by Italian authorities and passed on to American officials. The ship was then released with the L-2s on board and continued on to Libya. The container arrived in Libya in March 2004. The illegal shipment originated in Malaysia as part of Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan’s black market network.

**28 May 2004**
CNN reports that a leaked report from the IAEA states that highly enriched uranium was found in centrifuges in Libya’s nuclear facilities, but there was no determination as to the source of the uranium.

**23 April 2004**
As a reward for undertaking genuine and verifiable steps towards WMD program dismantlement, the United States removes Libya from the "Iran and Libya Sanctions Act," but continues to apply sanctions deriving from Libya's continued presence on the US Department of State’s state sponsors of terrorism list.

**29 March 2004**
US and British officials say they have found evidence that Libya traded nuclear and missile expertise with Egypt. Officials state that the evidence confirmed suspicions of a three-year long secret trade between Cairo and Tripoli in strategic weapons obtained from North Korea. In 2002, Egypt denied US allegations that Cairo was conducting secret missile and WMD trade with Libya. The allegations were based on satellite photographs.

**15 March 2004**
US Department of Energy and White House officials host a briefing at the Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge, Tennessee, complex where equipment retrieved from Libya’s nuclear facilities was displayed for reporters. Officials displayed a dozen uranium centrifuges from what they said was a cache of about 4,000, although the items displayed were centrifuge casings lacking rotors.

**12 March 2004**
Japanese diplomats reveal that a Japanese company supplied Libya with uranium conversion plant in 1984. The diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that the components were so large that they could not have been shipped from Japan without the government knowing about it.

**10 March 2004**
The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution recognizing Libya's cooperation with the IAEA, but noting its

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breach of its Safeguards Agreement and its acquisition of nuclear weapons designs. The resolution requests that
the Director General report Libya's past failures to meet its Safeguard Agreement obligations to the UN Security
Council for information purposes, and also requests that Libya continue to cooperate fully with the IAEA.
— IAEA Board of Governors Resolution "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's

9 March 2004
Libya signs the Additional Protocol to its NPT safeguards agreement, which grants IAEA inspectors "broader rights
of access" to Libyan nuclear sites. IAEA Director ElBaradei complimented Libya on its commitment to shift from
weapons of mass destruction to a focus on peaceful uses of nuclear applications.

8 March 2004
Libya returns 88 nuclear fuel assemblies to Russia that it had originally received between 1980 and 1984. The fuel
assemblies— bundles of rods that contain fuel used for reactors— were returned from Libya's Tajura research
center outside Tripoli. The shipment consisted of fuel components containing about 28.7 pounds of 80 percent
enriched uranium-235, and about 6.6 pounds of non-fissile uranium.

28 February 2004
Mu'amar Qadhdhafi calls for all African countries to abandon WMD.

28 February 2004
The United States announced that money from the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program could not be used to
retrain Libyan nuclear scientists because the Nunn-Lugar Act prohibits aid to countries under sanctions.
— David E. Sanger, "Bush Lifts Some Libya Sanctions; But Nuclear-Safety Aid May Face a Legal Delay," The New

28 February 2004
Malaysia denies that it aided Libya's nuclear program in any way, an accusation that surfaced after reports
revealed that a Malaysian company manufactured 14 centrifuge pieces for a client in Dubai, the United Arab
Emirates. The parts were produced for uranium-enrichment centrifuges, which could be used for both civilian and
military purposes.

24 February 2004
IAEA chief Mohammed El Baradei says the IAEA will help Libya develop nuclear technology for civilian purposes
after Libya dismantles its weapons of mass destruction.

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21 February 2004
Malaysian authorities' interrogation of one of the principal scientists involved in the Pakistani nuclear proliferation network, Bukhary Seyed Abu Tahir, yields much information about Pakistan's aid to Libya's nuclear program. Tahir reports that Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan shipped partly processed uranium (UF6) to Libya aboard a Pakistani airplane in 2001, and provided Libya's nuclear program with the fuel stock, designs, and equipment to make a bomb. The uranium shipment was one of many deliveries of nuclear components to Libya that supposedly started after a 1997 meeting in Istanbul between Khan and Libyan officials. One Turkish company supplied aluminum castings and another electrical cabinets and voltage regulators. Tahir also reports that a number of complete centrifuges, possibly P-1 models, were flown to Libya directly from Pakistan during the year following the UF6 shipment. The report mentions that a well-known German proliferator, Gotthard Lerch, tried and failed to buy pipes from South Africa for Machine Shop 1001. Tahir’s report also provides details on Project Machine Shop 1001, the codename for Libya's efforts to build a centrifuge components manufacturing shop. Tahir alleges that Peter Griffin, a British engineer investigated by authorities since the late 1970s for collaborating with Pakistan in nuclear activities, supervised the project and provided the plan and a lathe for Machine Shop 1001. Machines for the shop came from Spanish and Italian companies, and Griffin arranged for eight Libyan technicians to go to Spain to train in the machines operation. Griffin also supplied an Italian-made furnace used in refining certain centrifuge components. Khan ordered sensitive components that were later consolidated for shipment to Libya through Gulf Technical Industries, a company set up by Griffin in Dubai and partly owned by his son, Paul. Paul and Peter Griffin deny any illegal activities.

20 February 2004
Malaysian police release a report of their investigation into Scomi Precision Engineering SDN BHD (SCOPE), which has been named publicly as a supplier to Libya's secret nuclear program. The report includes many new details about the operations at the SCOPE plant and the roles played by foreign technical, manufacturing, and transshipment experts, including A.Q. Khan and his associates at the Khan Research Laboratories in Pakistan, B.S.A. Tahir in Malaysia and Dubai, and several Swiss, British, and German nationals.

20 February 2004
An IAEA report states that Libya processed uranium into a small amount of plutonium, but had not produced enriched uranium. The report says Libya's undeclared nuclear program included nuclear material and facilities, and uranium conversion and enrichment activities. Libya said it had imported 2,263 tonnes of uranium ore concentrate (UOC) between 1978 and 1981. The report finds that from the early 1980s through the end of 2003, Libya imported nuclear materials, acquired nuclear weapon designs, and conducted a wide variety of nuclear activities in violation of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Libya agrees to provide the IAEA with a full picture of its nuclear activities; and the IAEA continues an investigation into all aspects of Libya's undeclared nuclear program.

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16 February 2004
Documents handed over by Tripoli as part of its WMD dismantlement process reveal that China was the source for nuclear arms designs that passed through Pakistan and ended up in Libya. The documents consisted of instructions for assembling an implosion-type nuclear bomb that could fit on a ballistic missile. US administration officials confirmed the reports.

12 February 2004
Spanish judge Baltazar Garzon announces that Spanish companies may have supplied nuclear equipment to Libya through a secret procurement network. An investigation was launched in June 2003 after allegations surfaced that Spanish companies exported dual-use, high-precision machinery and equipment that may have aided Libya's nuclear program. Spain's intelligence agency, CNI, warned the Economy Ministry in 2001 that Spanish companies could be implicated in the underground nuclear components market. The multimillion dollar network was revealed after Libya renounced its WMD programs last December.

11 February 2004
Libyan Foreign Minister Rahman Shalgam says Libya decided more than 10 years ago not to develop weapons of mass destruction. "We had the equipment, we had the material and the know-how and the scientists. But we never decided to produce such weapons. To have flour, water and fire does not mean that you have bread."

2 February 2004
Pakistan's most prominent nuclear weapons scientist, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, admits to proliferating nuclear secrets to Libya, Iran, and North Korea during the 1980s and 1990s. Khan alleges that nuclear proliferation to Libya was committed without the Pakistani government's awareness or approval. US administration officials later say Libya paid at least $100 million for the nuclear weapons equipment it got from Khan's underground network.

22 January 2004
The United States flies the first shipment of WMD components out of Libya. The 55,000 pounds of WMD components included uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and guidance kits for Scud-C missiles that Libya had acquired from North Korea. Also included was a "full set" of nuclear weapons designs purchased from the nuclear

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network of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan. The equipment will likely be evaluated at the Oak Ridge nuclear weapons plant in Tennessee.


12 January 2004
A former chief of Israeli intelligence (Mossad), Danny Yatom, says Libya would have produced a bomb well before Iran. Yatom explained that Israel was primarily concerned about Libya's development of a nuclear-tipped missile with a 1,000-km range.


6 January 2004
Libya officially ratifies the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It signed the treaty in November of 2001.


2003-2000
27-29 December 2003
International Atomic Energy Agency head Mohammad El Baradei and a team of IAEA inspectors tour nine of Libya's 12 declared facilities associated with its nuclear program. El Baradei says Libya has only reached an experimental level in its attempts to enrich uranium.


19 December 2003
After nine months of secret negotiations with Britain and the United States, Libya announces its decision to disclose and dismantle its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs; to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention; to limit missiles to ranges of less than 180 miles in accordance with the Missile Technology Control Regime, and to allow international inspectors unconditional access to monitor and verify compliance. Libya announces that it will halt its WMD programs and eliminate any stockpiles of weapons or materials under full verification by the international community. Specifically, Libya agrees in principle to the requirements of the Additional Protocol of the NPT and therefore agrees to the following conditions:
Libya will provide information to the IAEA about all parts of its nuclear fuel-cycle. In addition, Libya will furnish IAEA inspectors full access to all its fuel-cycle facilities.

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• Libya will allow short-notice inspections of all buildings in all of its nuclear sites, following the issuance of a 24-hour notice by the IAEA.
• The IAEA is free to collect environmental samples at locations beyond the stated sites, as deemed necessary.
• The IAEA will have the right to monitor communications by being granted unimpeded access to all satellite systems and other forms of telecommunications. The IAEA can also install real-time viewing and observation systems at Libya's nuclear facilities.
• Libya will furnish IAEA inspectors with multi-entry visas for at least one year. Designated IAEA inspectors with valid visas will have unimpeded entry into the country.
• Libya will provide information on any research and development activities relating to its nuclear program.
• Libya will provide the IAEA with information about the manufacture and export of sensitive nuclear-related technologies, and permit the establishment of IAEA verification mechanisms at its manufacturing and export-import locations.

The Bush administration has emphasized that the United States will not offer rewards or lift sanctions until Libya actually begins dismantling its WMD.

16 December 2003
Israel expresses concern after the United States confirms that Russia is going ahead with plans to help Libya develop a civilian nuclear program.

Early October 2003
Thousands of centrifuge parts for enriching uranium are seized by US and British intelligence on their way to Tripoli. The seizure is part of the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative launched in May; the equipment found aboard German-owned freighter BBC China are proof of Libya's clandestine nuclear weapons program. Officials disclosed that the shipment came from a Persian Gulf port, but they did not name the country of origin. Other reports state that the centrifuge parts were being sent from Malaysia to Libya, via the port city of Dubai in the United Arab Emirates.

14 October 2003
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon says Libya has been trying to acquire nuclear weapons and might be the first Arab country to attain them.

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**September 2003**
The United Nations eases its decade-long sanctions after the Libyan government admits its involvement in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 and pays millions of dollars in compensation to the victims' families.

**12 June 2003**
According to diplomatic sources, America is investigating the possibility that Libya recruited Iraqi nuclear scientists who had previously worked for Saddam Hussein.

**March 2003**
Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi makes overtures to Britain and the United States on dismantling its WMD programs. The start of negotiations coincides with the US invasion of Iraq.

**11 February 2003**
CIA Director George Tenet warns that, over the past 12 months, Libya is one of a handful of countries that has moved to obtain equipment to produce weapons-grade nuclear materials and the ability to deliver them as nuclear bombs. Tenet makes special mention of Libya's increased access to dual-use technologies.

**8 January 2003**
A CIA report says that, "in 2001, Libya and other countries reportedly used their secret services to try to obtain technical information on the development of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons." The report cites Tripoli's attempts to buy a nuclear reactor from Russia and efforts to secure Moscow's assistance in developing the Tajura nuclear research center. Libya denies the charges.

**25 December 2002**
Libya denies claims by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon that Libya is receiving help from Iraqi experts for its nuclear industry.

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December 2002
The components for the L-2 centrifuges that Libya ordered from another country begin to arrive in large quantities.

11 September 2002
The United States agrees with Israeli assessments that Libya has stepped up efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon and that such efforts were aided by the lifting of UN sanctions in 1999.

6 September 2002
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon says Libya is developing long-range missiles and nuclear weapons with help from Iraq and North Korea and may be receiving financial assistance from Saudi Arabia.

6 May 2002
Undersecretary of State for arms control and international security, John Bolton, says Libya and Syria are pursuing development or have the capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction. Bolton said the United States suspects Libya of having a longstanding pursuit of nuclear weapons and, since UN sanctions were lifted in 1999, Libya has enjoyed increased access to dual-use technologies. Libya denies the allegations.

25 March 2002
In an interview with Al-Jazirah, Colonel Qadhdhafi states, "We demand the dismantling of the weapons of mass destruction that the Israelis have; we must continue to demand that. Otherwise, the Arabs will have to fight to possess that weapon."

27 February 2002
Libya denies a Canadian intelligence report that suggests the African country was determined to acquire nuclear weapons as quickly as possible, along with Iraq and Iran.

January 2002
The CIA estimates that Libya will need significant foreign assistance to acquire a nuclear weapon, but that Tripoli’s nuclear infrastructure enhancements remain a concern.

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Late 2001-Early 2002
Libya receives documents [probably from Pakistan] related to nuclear weapons design and fabrication. The documents include a series of engineering drawings relating to nuclear weapon components and the fabrication of weapons components. [In 2004, Libya tells the IAEA that it had no national personnel competent enough to evaluate the data.]

13 November 2001
Libya finally signs the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, despite a 1996 vote against it in the UN General Assembly.

9 September 2001
Libya denies a CIA report that claims Tripoli is continuing to develop a nuclear research and development program, and would require significant foreign assistance to advance a nuclear weapons option.

September 2001
The CIA reports that Libya still requires significant foreign assistance to advance a nuclear weapons option and the suspension of United Nations sanctions has accelerated the pace of Libya's procurement efforts in its drive to revive its nuclear program.

January 2001
A US Department of Defense report states that despite the fact that Libya has ratified the NPT, it has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and has long intended to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. It also asserts, however, that Libya has made little progress in its nuclear efforts and that the program lacks well-developed plans, expertise, consistent financial support, and adequate foreign suppliers. The report projects that Libya will continue to attempt to develop a nuclear infrastructure. Libya is also reported to be attempting to recruit foreign scientists and technicians to aid its nuclear efforts.

September- late 2000
Libya receives two L-2 centrifuges; more advanced than the L-1s, they use maraging steel rotors instead of aluminum rotors. Libya places an initial order for 5,000 centrifuges of this design from another country [thought to

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be Pakistan], and later raised the number to 10,000 machines. Libya intends to install a centrifuge plant to make enriched uranium. Libya starts to progressively install nine-machine, 19-machine, and 64-machine L-1 centrifuges into a large hall at Al Hashan. [The nine-machine centrifuge was completed in April 2002.]


25 September 2000
The Sunday Telegraph of London reveals that Libya acquired the first of four consignments of North Korea’s surface-to-surface Nodong missiles and launchers in July. The missiles have a range of 1,500 kilometers; a further three shipments, totaling 50 missiles and launchers, is to be delivered over the next three years. The first shipment consists of missiles that are capable of carrying conventional, nuclear, and chemical warheads and is estimated to cost approximately $500 million. Nine North Korean missile engineers and technicians will spend two years in Libya to make the missiles operational. North Korea has also agreed to build the infrastructure necessary for maintaining and storing the missiles in Libya, and to train Libyans in all aspects of missile technology over a period of five years. The missile shipment was originally thought to have been destined for Pakistan, but a detailed investigation showed that the cargo was headed to Libya via Malta. While Libya has been attempting to develop its own long-range missile, al-Fatah, it has also been engaged in extending the range of the Russian-designed Scud missile through a project called al-Jadid.


August 2000
The CIA reports that Libya continues to develop its nascent and rudimentary nuclear research and development program, but still requires significant foreign assistance to advance to a nuclear weapons option.


1999-1990
Later half of 1999
Tripoli and Moscow resume discussions on cooperation regarding the Tajura nuclear research center and on a potential power reactor deal. The completion of this civil sector project might allow Libya to conduct weapons-related research and development.


26 May 1999
A congressional report charges that China has proliferated missile technology and nuclear secrets to Libya, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.

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March 1998
The Russian Atomenergoexport company signs an $8 million contract with Libya for the partial overhaul of the Tajura nuclear research center.

24 October 1997
Russia and Libya sign an accord which includes rehabilitation of the Tajura nuclear research center, built with USSR assistance in the late 1970s.

October 1997
Russia reopens nuclear cooperation talks with Libya.

Mid-1997
Libya reportedly seeks to purchase weapons-grade fissile material on the black market in order to restart or accelerate its nuclear weapons program.

1997
Foreign manufacturers provide 20 pre-assembled L-1 centrifuges [an old version of European-designed centrifuges also known as G-1 or P-1] and components for an additional 200 L-1 centrifuges to Libya. Libya uses the pre-assembled centrifuges to begin installing a completed single centrifuge at Al Hashan. [This centrifuge was successfully tested in October 2000.]

29 November 1996
NATO comes out with a security document to prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from reaching Libya, Iraq, and Iran. Unnamed sources say the US spearheaded the approach, as it had in the past, to prevent China, North Korea, Russia, and Pakistan from supplying Libya, Iraq, and Iran with WMD.

25 November 1996
A NATO secret report leaked to Spain's El Mundo newspaper says the organization believes Libya could be
equipped to launch a nuclear attack on southern Europe by the year 2006. The document, "MC 161/96, The General Intelligence Estimate," reports that Libya planned to develop medium-range missiles capable of delivering nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads over the coming decade.

September 1996
Libya, along with Bhutan and India, votes against the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the United Nations General Assembly, on the grounds that it should provide for nuclear disarmament within a specified time.

17 April 1996
Libya denies US allegations that its manmade river project is actually a nuclear weapons plant.

April 1996
Libya is among 43 African nations to sign the African Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone Treaty.

27 January 1996
Libya's official news agency restates Colonel Qadhdhafi's position that Arab states would be justified in possessing chemical and biological weapons in order to counter Israel's nuclear arsenal.

27 January 1996
Libya urges Arab countries to use every means possible to obtain nuclear weapons after Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel's Likud party would never relinquish the country's nuclear capability.

Late 1995
According to a US intelligence report, Ukraine and Libya established strategic cooperation that involves the transfer of nuclear, missile, and other weapons technology from Ukraine to Libya. The report says Ukraine’s president, Leonid Kuchma, created a committee of top Ukrainian officials, including the minister in charge of nuclear technology, to establish comprehensive strategic cooperation with Libya.

Early November 1995
US firm Halliburton agrees to pay $2.61 million in civil penalties and $1.2 million to the US government for violating a US trade embargo by shipping oilfield equipment to Libya. Federal officials were concerned that some of the well servicing equipment sent to Libya between late 1987 and early 1990 could have been used to help develop nuclear

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It is unclear whether this equipment would have been used in missile development or strictly nuclear development.


1 November 1995

According to the Jerusalem Post, Iraqi nuclear scientist Ja'afar Dhia Ja'afar arrived in Libya to lead a group of experts and engineers from Iraqi military industries in installing a small nuclear enrichment kiln in the area of Sidi Abu Zarik, approximately 380 kilometers south of Tripoli. The Iraq-Libya cooperation allegedly began with a secret visit by Ra’ad Id Aldafi, from Libyan military industries, to Baghdad on August 30, 1995. The Jerusalem Post goes on to say that contracts for Iraqi scientists to work in Libya were passed off as contracts for these scientists to lecture in Libyan universities and institutions. Unnamed experts suggest that Iraqi nuclear fuel could reach Libya by sea within weeks, and that Iraqi experts in Libya could begin enriching it after installing more small or medium-sized kilns.


2 October 1995

A Pakistani nuclear physicist claims to have created a cheap and simple uranium enrichment process that Pakistan used to make nuclear material, and that countries including Libya approached him for the technology. Mohammad Qadeer Husayn, a professor of nuclear physics at the Federal Government Urdu Science College in Karachi, Pakistan, says his method involves a liquid rather than gaseous form of uranium that can be separated in an ultracentrifuge, a piece of equipment that is found in many types of laboratories and that costs about $50,000. US experts said the design was not feasible.


30 August 1995

Ra'ad Id Aldafi, from Libyan military industries, allegedly visits Baghdad and begins an era of Iraq-Libya military cooperation. Supposedly, Iraq hopes to shift its nuclear program to Libyan territory.


10 August 1995

Libya announces it will buy an unspecified amount of uranium from Kazakhstan. It is unclear whether the material is weapons grade. Kazakhstan denies the deal.


Later in 1995

At the NPT Review and Extension Conference, Libya eventually supports an indefinite extension of the treaty, despite Israel's continued refusal to sign it.
July 1995
Libya makes "a strategic decision to reinvigorate its nuclear activities, including gas centrifuge uranium enrichment."

24 April 1995
A Libyan radio report announces that, during a summit held with Algeria, the two sides called for ways to enable non-nuclear countries to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

14 August 1994
German police seize a large shipment of weapons-grade nuclear material apparently smuggled from the former Soviet Union and headed to terrorists or the governments of Libya, Iran, Iraq, or North Korea.

17 July 1994
A report in The Independent (London) alleges that Iraqi-born arms dealer and British citizen Ishan Barbouti faked his own death to escape German and US investigations into his activities as an intermediary in Libyan efforts to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons.
— "After-Life of an Arms Dealer; a Key Figure in Passing Western Nuclear Technology to Libya May Have Faked His Death," The Independent (London), 17 July 1994.

28 June 1994
In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, CIA Director James Woolsey expresses his concern that Libya, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea may try to acquire nuclear warheads or material from Russian organized crime gangs.

20 June 1994
The Sunday Times reports that countries such as Libya, Iran, and Iraq were using British universities to develop knowledge for nuclear weapons production.

18 June 1994
Robert Gates, former director of the CIA, expresses concern in an editorial that Libya is likely to be a recipient of any North Korean nuclear technology and weapons proliferation.

23 February 1994
In response to a British report that said Libya would have a workable atomic option within 10 years, Libya announces that it does not possess, and is not pursuing, the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

14 December 1993
North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung has plans to sell a long-range, nuclear-capable missile, and the production facilities to manufacture it, to states like Libya, Iran, and possibly Pakistan.

19 July 1993
The United States is concerned about potential sales of North Korea's long-range Nodong 1 missile and nuclear-capable Scud-B and Scud-C missiles to Libya, Iran, and Syria. In congressional testimony, CIA Director James Woolsey states that if such sales were to take place, Libya would be able to reach US bases and allied capitals in the Mediterranean. The Nodong is of prime concern because it can be fitted with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in addition to conventional warheads. US officials and missile experts are also troubled by North Korea's export of missile technology and managerial know-how, which would allow these countries to produce the missiles indigenously. Some analysts say North Korea is already selling complete production plants to the three countries via Lyongaksen Import Corp., but other experts indicate that North Korea, up to this point, has only assisted in setting up assembly facilities. North Korea is reportedly helping Libya construct a Scud production line at a facility near Tripoli called the Central Repair Workshop, which may begin pilot production of the Nodong 1 missile by next year.

16 May 1993
Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi says in an interview that Libya would never develop or seek to purchase nuclear weapons and that it would never use weapons of mass destruction against Israel.

14 April 1993
Ukraine's deputy foreign minister Boris Tarasyuk announces that chemicals for nuclear fuel bound for Libya were seized by customs officers. Tarasyuk says a Western embassy had told authorities that the final destination was Libya. Chemicals in the shipment were ammonium chloride from the Moscow firm Paveks, and they were to be loaded on a ship at the Black Sea port of Ilchevsk for transport to Varna in Bulgaria.
— Hobart Mercury, 14 April 1993.

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11 December 1992
Iraqi nuclear engineer Moayyad Hassan Naji al-Janabi, who fled Iraq for Jordan in 1992, was shot and killed in Amman as he went to collect visas for a teaching post in Libya. The nature of the teaching post is unclear.

17 September 1992
The Jerusalem Post says China is in the process of selling nuclear reactors to Libya and Iran.

28 April 1992
A RAND report prepared for the Department of Defense says China has sold lithium hydride, a chemical that can be used in manufacturing nerve agents, missile fuel, and nuclear weapons, to Libya.

27 March 1992
Russian President Boris Yeltsin prepares to sell Libya an air defense missile system armed with SA-10 missiles; one version of the missile is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, although it is unclear whether this is the version being sent to Libya. The SA-10 is the equivalent of the US Patriot missile and can engage six targets simultaneously up to 100 km away at a height of between 25 and 18,000 meters.

Spring 1992
German firm Leybold AG is again caught attempting to send Libya a furnace used for the production of super-hard metal alloys of the type used in guided missiles and nuclear weapons. The furnace seized in Rotterdam was allegedly for use in Libya's al-Fatah ballistic missile program. [Note: See 1991 entry.]

3 February 1992
Libya has opened all its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspectors to prove it has no secret nuclear weapons production project. IAEA Director General Hans Blix said Libya had expressed willingness to implement safeguards against diversion of nuclear technology to military uses.

23 January 1992
German customs officials at Frankfurt airport seize US-made atomic program equipment on a plane bound for Libya. The equipment was confiscated in December of 1991, but the announcement was withheld pending enquiries in the United States. The shipment included laser equipment and a range of dual-use equipment. The intended recipient was an office in Libya that German experts say is a known procurement agency for the Libyan missile program. The items had been obtained from an US manufacturer by a Dutch company.

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20 January 1992
Former Soviet nuclear scientist Igor Cherniyev claims that he has been working on a top secret Libyan nuclear research program since September 1991, earning more than $10,000 per month. He tells the newspaper that three other Russian nuclear scientists have been working with him and that Libya is using "the most modern Western technology at the site, deep in the Awabi desert." Cherniyev previously worked for the Institute of Nuclear Research near Moscow. Libya subsequently denies these charges. Libya has referred to these scientists as eye specialists; Libya’s Health Ministry issued a communiqué saying a medical team of 11 eye specialists from Ukraine were working in Libya.

8 January 1992
The top nuclear official in Moscow, Vyacheslav Rosanov of the I.V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, says Libya has twice offered jobs at its Tajura Nuclear Research Center to two Russian nuclear scientists. The first offer was made in the summer of 1991 and the second in late 1991. Both scientists were offered a salary of $2,000 a month, but both declined. Kurchatov officials confirmed the report, but Libya denies making the offers.

13 December 1991
US Secretary of State James Baker voices his fears that Libya may be among nations trying to recruit unemployed Soviet scientists to work on nuclear weapons programs.

26 November 1991
The Washington Post reports that Libya is attempting to recruit Soviet scientists to bolster its nuclear weapons program.

22 November 1991
British Defense Secretary Tom King says that Libya is among a group of 20 countries that could soon possess nuclear weapons.

November 1991
According to a prosecutor in northern Italy, Swiss police confiscate 66 pounds of Soviet uranium allegedly destined
for countries using East Bloc technology, such as Iraq or Libya.

**October 1991**
US and Israeli officials become increasingly concerned about the possibility of nations such as Libya attracting Soviet scientists to aid their nuclear programs.

**September 1991**
The US Customs Service investigates allegations that the US company Halliburton exported nuclear detonator devices to Libya.

**July 1991**
Media reports allege that the Bank of Credit and Commerce International helped finance the purchase of nuclear weapons components for Libya.

**17 February 1991**
A USA Today report alleges that Libya is building underground bunkers to store nuclear and chemical weapons. The Independent of London reports that the bunker is located 25 miles outside Tripoli. Libya denies these reports that same day.

**1991**
German firm Leybold AG attempts to send Libya a furnace used for the production of super-hard metal alloys of the type used in guided missiles and nuclear weapons. Leybold tells German customs agents who seized the shipment that the furnace is for Libyan domestic aluminum smelting, but an internal memorandum circulated among Leybold's management reveals that the furnace was to be camouflaged and sent to Maktab el Buhut Attacknia, a front for Libya's ballistic missile research facility in Tripoli.

**3 July 1990**
A Christian Science Monitor article reports that Brazil and Argentina may be willing to sell nuclear technology to Libya due to economic hardship.
18 June 1990
Qadhafi urges Libyan students and scientists to accelerate the country’s efforts to reach space and produce nuclear weapons.
— "Libyan Leader Urges Speed on Nation’s Atom Bomb," Toronto Star, 18 June 1990.

29 April 1990
Colonel Qadhafi calls for the production of nuclear weapons by Libya.

Mid-April 1990
Colonel Qadhafi calls for the inclusion of a nuclear component in the development of a multifaceted deterrent force.

1989-1980

October 1989
British subject Derek Smith is arrested in Athens for carrying 5.5 pounds of uranium, which he claimed was a sample from a 550-pound batch from South Africa. He offered the uranium to Libya for $90,000 per pound. The arrest prevents a larger shipment from reaching Libya. Smith was reportedly suffering from radiation sickness when apprehended.

14 June 1988
Libya bans the manufacture of nuclear weapons as part of a charter aimed at achieving world peace.

January 1988
A West German investigation into possible nuclear materials delivered to Libya and Pakistan from West Germany widens.

October 1987
A Belgian arms dealer says that Libya sent agents to test samples of plutonium he was offering to sell on the black
September 1987
The official Libyan news agency JANA reports that Qadhdhafi has urged all Arab states to develop nuclear weapons to protect themselves against Israel. "Now that the Israelis possess the atomic weapon, the Arabs have nothing before them except to work day and night to possess the atomic weapon in order to defend their existence."

26 August 1987
Jane's Weapons Systems reveals that Libya possesses SS-1 Scud, SS-21, and Frog-7 surface-to-surface missiles, all of which can carry nuclear warheads.

August 1987
Chad military forces report that they have driven Libyan forces out of Chad. Libya reportedly wanted to occupy the region for suspected uranium deposits.

22 June 1987
Reuters quotes Colonel Qadhdhafi as saying, "the Arabs must possess the atom bomb to defend themselves until their numbers reach one thousand million, and until they learn to desalinate water, and until they liberate Palestine."

22 March 1987
Qadhdhafi pledges to join the Warsaw Pact and deploy Soviet nuclear missiles along Libya's coast if the US attacks Libyan territory.

12 May 1986
The Advertiser reports that a Soviet ambassador has said that the USSR may build a nuclear plant for Libya.

March 1986
In an interview with an Indian newspaper, Colonel Qadhdhafi states that Libya will never help Pakistan acquire nuclear weapons. "We consider nuclear weapons production a great mistake against humanity," he says.
27 February 1986
Italian airman Giuseppe Franchi, a noncommissioned officer in the Italian Air Force working at a NATO nuclear missile base command center, is arrested on suspicion of selling secret documents and disclosing classified information to Libyan agents.

February 1986
Qadhdhafi states that he will deploy nuclear-tipped, long-range Soviet missiles if he feels a US attack is imminent.

12 October 1985
A Washington Post report alleges that the Soviet Union will supply Libya with a nuclear power center.

October 1985
The Soviet news agency TASS reports that Libya and the Soviet Union agree on a "long-term program" of trade and economic cooperation. Qadhdhafi wants to include nuclear technology as part of the agreement.

November 1984
In response to US pressure, the Belgian firm Belgonucleaire declines a $1 billion contract to take over Libya’s nuclear reactor engineering contract and supply much of the needed equipment. Soon thereafter, the Soviet Union reaffirms its commitment to construct an 880-megawatt power station to be located in the Surt region. The cost of the Soviet project is estimated at $4 billion, to be paid over a 15-to-18-year period.

23 October 1984
The Libyan state press agency says that the country is in serious talks with the Soviet Union regarding the construction of nuclear power stations.

October 1984
The US government exerts pressure on Belgium not to follow through on a deal to supply Libya with nuclear technologies.

July 1984
Nuclear suppliers meet in London to discuss tightening restrictions on nuclear exports to countries of concern, including Libya.

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May 1984
The Libyan government offers the Belgian firm Belgonuclaire a contract to build two 440-megawatt nuclear power plants.

May 1984
Belgium and Libya are expected to sign a nuclear cooperation pact.

10 June 1983
The Organization of African Unity says that South Africa and Libya have the ability to deploy nuclear weapons.

February 1983
Former CIA officer Edwin P. Wilson testifies that he attempted to sell nuclear weapons, nuclear fuel, plans, and equipment to Libya in 1980. The CIA later declares the plans worthless.

1983
The US government prohibits the training of Libyans in nuclear science. Some 200 Libyans had previously been studying nuclear technology in the United States.

8 September 1982
The Reagan administration tells Congress that it intends to create a list of 63 countries that will require specific government permission to purchase sensitive nuclear technologies. Libya is reported to be on the list.

July 1982
Former CIA officer Edwin P. Wilson is arrested on charges of aiding Libyan terrorists. Wilson claims to have knowledge of Libya's efforts to produce nuclear weapons.

1982
Libya attempts to purchase a plant for manufacturing uranium tetra fluoride from the Belgian firm Belgonuclaire. The Carnegie Endowment alleges that the only feasible use for such a plant is to produce uranium hexafluoride, the feedstock for a centrifuge uranium enrichment program underway in Pakistan. Libya has no declared nuclear facilities that require uranium tetra fluoride. The purchase is declined.

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12 September 1981
The New York Times announces that the Reagan administration has become increasingly concerned about a possible alliance between Libya and the Soviet Union, and the possible sale of West German missiles to Libya.

12 March 1981
Official Moroccan sources report that the Libyan government signed a contract with the German firm ORTAG for the purchase of nuclear-capable medium-range missiles. The technical director of ORTAG denies that such a contract exists. Libya claims that the missile program is separate from the nuclear program and therefore not a danger to other countries.

28 February 1981
The IAEA reports that Libya's pledge to put its Soviet-built nuclear reactor under safeguards will allow it to prevent the use of civilian technology for military purposes.

19 January 1981
The Washington Post reports that Libyan financing for the Pakistani nuclear program may have been supplanted by Saudi Arabian financing.

January 1981
Libya creates a Ministry for Atomic Energy, alleging that it is dedicated to "peaceful purposes." It also signs a nuclear cooperation agreement with Argentina and Pakistan.

1981
Libya reportedly declines an offer by former-CIA agent Edwin Wilson to supply it with 20% enriched uranium because it requires an enrichment level of at least 80%.

12 November 1980
A Christian Science Monitor article alleges that Libyan leader Muammar Qadhdhafi is seeking an independent nuclear capability. Libya is said to be preparing for possible war with Israel, Egypt, or the United States.

4 August 1980
A *Christian Science Monitor* article alleges that Libya purchased 300 tons of partially refined uranium ore from Niger, which it later passed on to Pakistan. Libya, it is suspected, hopes to receive nuclear weapons technology from Pakistan in exchange for this aid.

February 1980
India reports that the Soviet Union is considering an Indian proposal for a joint project to build a nuclear power plant in Libya.

1980
Libya reaches an agreement with the IAEA to place all of Libya's nuclear installations under international inspection.

1980s
Most of the network of nuclear trade relations Libya has tried to establish with Pakistan, India, the Soviet Union, Belgium, Argentina, and Brazil atrophy or fail by this time. Libya’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, however, continues.

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1979-1968
25 November 1979
The *Washington Star* reports that Pakistan acquired some 100 tons of yellowcake from Libya. The uranium, which is not subject to IAEA safeguards, was reportedly first purchased from Niger by Libya and then sent to Pakistan.

September 1979
Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq denies that his country is working with Libya to build a nuclear bomb for the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

**16 April 1979**
Former US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer Cord Meyer alleges that Colonel Qadhdhafi sent aid to China in 1971 in the hope of being able to later purchase nuclear weapons technology from China.

**April 1979**
The US government cuts off aid to Pakistan in response to its development of nuclear weapons and reports that Libya and Saudi Arabia helped finance the Pakistan nuclear program in exchange for access to the resultant technology.

**1979**
Libya's Soviet-supplied research reactor at Tajura begins operation.

**1978**
Libyan emissaries travel to India in an effort to purchase atomic weapons. The Libyans offer to pay India's entire foreign debt (estimated at $15 billion) in exchange for a nuclear weapon. The offer is rejected.

**4 October 1978**
Moscow confirms earlier reports that it has agreed to provide Libya with a nuclear power complex.

**December 1977**
Libya reportedly contracts with the Soviet Union to construct a 440,000-kilowatt nuclear power plant. Libya is to pay $330 million of its oil earnings for the plant.

**1977**
Cooperation between Libya and Pakistan begins. Libya provides financial assistance to Pakistan and later delivers uranium yellowcake from Niger in the hope that Pakistan will share the results of its nuclear program with Libya.

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August 1976
A White House official includes Libya in a list of countries that are "interested in going nuclear."

March 1976
France and Libya reach an accord on the construction of a nuclear power plant in Libya.

1976
Negotiations are held between France and Libya for the purchase of a 600-megawatt reactor. A preliminary agreement is reached, but strong objections from the international community lead France to cancel the project.

June 1975
A US government report alleges that Libya sought to buy nuclear power facilities in the United States but was rebuffed; it then turned to the Soviet Union.

June 1975
Libya and the Soviet Union sign an accord for the establishment of a "center for peaceful purposes in Libya, including a small reactor."

26 May 1975
Libya ratifies the NPT and declares all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

May 1975
Libyan and Russian officials discuss possible cooperation on peaceful nuclear technology, including building a nuclear power plant in Libya.

April 1975
In an interview with the Sudanese newspaper As Sahafa, Qadhafi hints that he hopes to transform Libya into a nuclear power, saying, "Nuclear weapons are no longer a secret."

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January 1975
Colonel Qadhdhafi announces that he plans to entice Arab scientists away from the United States and other Western countries to help make Libya a nuclear power. A member of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council has started making offers to entice scientists to move to Libya.

February 1974
France reportedly discusses with Iraq and Libya the exchange of nuclear reactors for oil.

Late 1973
Libya attempts to purchase 20 calutrons to enrich uranium from Thomson-CSF. The deal, apparently supported by top company officials, is blocked by the French government because enrichment technology would obviously be of use to an undeclared nuclear weapons program.

October 1973
At a secret meeting in Paris, Libya and Pakistan allegedly seal a pact to build an "Islamic Bomb" using Pakistani expertise and Libyan petrodollars. It has never been established whether the nuclear technology Libya acquired was in exchange for the several hundred million dollars it invested in Pakistani nuclear weapons research.

1970s
Libya cancels plans to build a 440-megawatt, Soviet-supplied reactor near the Gulf of Sidra.

1970s
Libya acquires the 10-megawatt nuclear research reactor at Tajura from the Soviet Union. The reactor operates under IAEA safeguards.

1970s
Libya unsuccessfully attempts to purchase nuclear weapons from China.
As part of this effort, Qadhdhafi dispatches his second in command, Major Abdelsalam Jalloud, on a series of clandestine trips to China to procure atomic weapons.
In the years between signing the NPT and ratifying it, Libya reportedly purchased several hundred tons of natural uranium from French-controlled mines in neighboring Niger, without subjecting the material to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Some reports estimate that Libya purchased more than 1,200 tons of yellowcake from Niger.

18 July 1968

Under the regime of King Idris al-Sanusi, Libya signs the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).