Iran Chemical Chronology

This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

2008-2004

23 January 2008
Speaking in Brussels Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalil states: "I assure you that the (chemical) weapons have no place in our defense doctrine." The context is made in the context of a discussion about Iranian actions during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 and is intended to support the proposition that Iran made no use of chemical weapons during that conflict. [This assertion may contradict a statement made at the OPCW in 1998 that Iran possessed CW in the latter stages of the war. See 18 November 1998.]
— "Jalili: Chemical weapons have no place in Iran's defense doctrine," IRNA, 23 January 2008, www2.irna.ir.

5 February 2008
In testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the Director of National Intelligence addresses the question of Iran's pursuit of WMD capabilities. On the issue of chemical weapons Mr. McConnell says: "We know that Tehran had a chemical warfare program prior to 1997, when it declared elements of its program. We assess that Tehran maintains dual-use facilities intended to produce CW agent in times of need and conducts research that may have offensive applications. We assess Iran maintains a capability to weaponize CW agents in a variety of delivery systems."

27 February 2008
Testifying before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Lt. General Michael D. Maples states: "We assess that Tehran maintains dual-use facilities intended to

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produce chemical warfare agents in times of need and conducts research that may have offensive applications.

3 March 2008
The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) releases its *Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2005*. In the section addressing Iranian chemical programs the report states: "Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued to seek production technology, training, and expertise from foreign entities that could advance its assessed chemical warfare program."

[This language differs slightly from that of the 2004 report. It does not refer to "efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents."]


3 March 2008
The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) releases its *Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2006*. In the section addressing Iranian chemical programs the report states: "We judge that Iran maintains a Chemical Warfare (CW) research and development program which began in response to Iraqi use of CW during the Iran-Iraq Qar during the 1980s. ... [Iran] continues to seek production technology, training, and expertise from foreign entities that could advance a CW program. We judge that Iran maintains a small, covert CW stockpile."

[This language differs significantly from that of the 2005 report by reintroducing the idea of an Iranian CW stockpile in violation of the CWC.]


8 April 2008
In its national statement to the 2nd CWC Review conference in the Hague, Iran highlights concerns over CW possessor states' slow progress, and possible need for extensions beyond the final allowable treaty deadline, in fulfilling their obligations to totally destroy their CW stockpiles. The statement observes that: "Failure to meet this deadline [April 2012] is a clear and serious case of non-compliance. It would also raise the concern that domestic policies have resulted in preferences for retaining certain stockpiles as 'Security Reserves.'" In addition the statement calls on member states to take "concrete measures to bring to justice those who assisted Saddam in development and use of chemical weapons." Finally the Iranians expressed their dissatisfaction with Western efforts to refocus the OPCW's industry verification activities away from Schedule 1, 2, and 3 facilities and onto Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPF) noting that: "[a]ttempts at redefining the hierarchical risks envisaged
in the Convention for three schedules of chemicals would endanger the focus of the verification regime of the Convention."


**8 July 2008**

The U.S. government designates a number of Iranian entities and individuals as being of proliferation concern under the terms of Executive Order 13382. As a result all transactions involving any of the designees and any U.S. person are prohibited and any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction will be frozen. Although Parchin Chemical Industries is designated for its import of solid rocket motor fuel precursors the company has been previously accused of involvement in the production or development of chemical warfare agents.

— Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities, 8 July 2008, www.state.gov.

**11 January 2007**

In testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. General Michael D. Maples, addresses the question of Iran's pursuit of WMD capabilities. On the issue of chemical weapons General Maples says: "Iran has a large and growing commercial chemical industry that could be used to support a chemical agent mobilization capability."


**20 to 23 January 2007**

Eight doctors from the 'Organization of Doctors Against Nuclear Weapons,' a Swedish NGO, visit Iran to study the long-term health effects of chemical weapons exposure by examining Iranian soldiers and civilians who were injured during Iran's war with Iraq in the 1980s.


**11 February 2007**

Addressing 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy in Munich, Germany, Mr. Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, states: "Repeatedly and frankly we have announced that in Iran's national security doctrine there is no room for atomic and chemical weapons as we consider them against Islamic laws."

— "No room for WMDs in Iran's national security doctrine, says Larijani," IRNA, 11 February 2007, www2.irna.ir.

**12 May 2007**

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mahdi Mostafavi says that Iran has commenced the process of filing lawsuits against all legal entities involved in facilitating the production of chemical weapons, or of helping Iraq to use CW against Iran during the 1980s.

16 May 2007
Speaking at a press conference during the Tenth Chemical Demilitarization Conference (CWD 2007) in Brussels, Belgium the OPCW Director-General. Amb. Rogelio Pfirter says: "Iran is a full member of CWC. We have carried out several inspections in Iran and so far it has proven to comply with the CWC."
— "Chemical weapons watchdog says Iran complying with CWC," IRNA, 16 May 2007, www2.irna.ir.

21 July 2007
The London Asharq al-Awsat Arabic language newspaper alleges that Syria and Iran have reached an agreement whereby in return for Syria's undertaking not to enter into peace-talks with Israel, Iran will provide Syria with assistance in the development of chemical weapons, amongst other benefits.

22 July 2007
An Iranian government spokesperson rejects allegations that have appeared in a London-based Arabic language newspaper claiming that Iran has agreed to assist Syria in the development of chemical weapons.

26 July 2007
Jane's Defence Weekly alleges that an unspecified number of Iranian missile weaponization engineers are killed in an accidental explosion during an attempt "to weaponise a 500 km [range] 'Scud C' with a mustard gas warhead" at a Syrian military facility in the vicinity of Aleppo.

27 September 2007
Speaking at the High-Level Meeting to Commemorate the Tenth Anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention at the United Nations headquarters in New York, Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki states that "[c]ertain countries are threatening world peace by maintaining stockpiles of chemical weapons" and that the "threat to world peace and international security will continue unless states that still possess chemical weapons arsenals destroy their stockpiles on schedule." The Minister went on to insist "that those countries and companies that sold chemical precursors to Saddam Hussein or otherwise facilitated the former Iraqi regimes chemical weapons program must be tried and forced to pay reparations to the victims and their families."

10 October 2007
The OPCW reports that Iran was one of 18 countries that met the deadline for submission of annual declarations regarding projected activities and anticipated production in 2008 at schedule 1 facilities. The report does not specify the nature of the Iranian facility which may be a Single Small Scale Facility, a facility for protective purposes or a facility for medical, pharmaceutical, or research purposes.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
22 October 2007

Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki calls on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to bring to justice those who supplied chemical weapons to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. He says: "Tehran requests the ICJ to take legal action against 400 companies which were involved in supplying Saddam's regime with chemical weapons in the 1980s... Legal action against companies supplying Saddam with chemical weapons will prevent expansion of such weapons."

— "Iran calls for justice against suppliers of chemical weapons to Saddam," IRNA, 22 October 2007, www2.irna.ir.

22 to 23 October 2007

The Iranian government's "national authority for the Chemical Weapons Convention" and the "Society for Chemical Weapons Victims Support (SCWVS)" jointly host the International Seminar on the Consequences of Chemical Weapons Attacks Against the Islamic Republic of Iran in Tehran. The event's program aims to address a number of CW related issues including Medical Aspects, Legal and political dimensions, Psycho-social aspects, Impact on the Environment, Defense against Chemical Weapons and Implementation of the CWC.

— www.cwconference.ir.

14 November 2007

Testifying before a hearing of the National Security and Foreign Affairs subcommittee of the House Oversight and Government Reform committee on the Regional And Global Consequences of U.S. Military Action in Iran Dr. Paul Pillar, former Deputy Director of the CIA Counterterrorism Center addresses the proposition that in the event of a US attack against Iranian nuclear facilities the Iranian government may choose to transfer chemical or biological weapons to terrorist groups for use against the US or its allies. In his testimony Dr. Pillar notes that in the past "Iran [has] not passed any of these unconventional weapons to clients or terrorist groups." "The reason is when you ask what would be the interest of such a regime to pass such weapons to another group where they would lose control, the interest simply isn't there. It's all disadvantage rather than advantage. They lose control and if they were ever used, a group that's known to be a client of Iran's — say Lebanese Hezbollah — would automatically be assumed by Washington and everyone else that they would be acting on Iran's behalf. So there's simply no advantage to it."


December 2007

Israeli analyst Dany Shoham publishes an article providing a detailed assessment of Iran's alleged CW arsenal and other WMD capabilities. The article also speculates on plans for the arsenal's use in the event of a US or Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.


Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
31 January 2006
The German Customs Office of Criminal Investigations (ZKA) and Federal Office of Criminal Investigations publishes a report on illegal arms transfers by German companies to Iran. The report claims that Iran is working to increase its stockpiles of chemical weapons.

28 February 2006
In testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. General Michael D. Maples, addresses the question of Iran's pursuit of WMD capabilities. On the issue of chemical weapons General Maples says: "we believe that Iran maintains offensive chemical and biological weapons capabilities in various stages of development."

May 2006
The US Central Intelligence Agency releases its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2004. In the section addressing Iranian programs the report states: "Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued to seek production technology, training, and expertise from foreign entities that could further Tehran's efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents." [In contrast to previous reports this one does not include assertions that Iran possesses CW agent stockpiles: see 23 November 2004 and 10 April 2003.]

4 August 2006
The US State Department announces the imposition of sanctions on seven companies, from four countries, for violating the Iran Nonproliferation Act 2000, the purpose of which is to prevent Iran acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Two Indian chemical manufacturers, Balaji Amines Limited and Prachi Poly Products Limited, are sanctioned for the sale of precursor chemicals to Iran that could have been used in the production of chemical weapons.

22 September 2006
The United Kingdom's Department of Trade and Industry issues an updated list of Iranian entities that are considered to be of potential WMD concern. These entities are end-users of goods for which an export licence has been refused on end-use grounds related to suspected WMD programs. The updated list adds three entities: Amir

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Kabir University of Technology; M/S Iran Electromotor; and Oil Industries Engineering and Construction aka LG/OIEC/OIEC. There are now forty-nine entities on the DTI’s list. The list is intended to help exporters judge which exports might potentially be of concern on end use grounds, based on previous licensing decisions. The presence of an entity on the list does not totally preclude the issuing of export licenses; fifteen entities on the list have had export licenses granted as well as refused.

4 to 8 November 2006
The Eighth Annual Course on Medical Aspects of Defense against Chemical Weapons is conducted in Tehran, the Islamic Republic of Iran. The course took place at the International Medical Centre for Training and Treatment against Chemical Weapons (IMCTTCW). It makes available to OPCW member states, the experience of Iranian physicians and facilities associated with the treatment of victims of chemical warfare, and provides medical personnel from member states with a unique opportunity to examine and learn from actual victims of chemical weapons.

19 January 2005
Speaking in Paris at the Middle East, Peace, Stability, and the Role of Iran seminar Iranian nuclear spokesman Hossein Musavian says: "Tehran has fully respected its commitments to disarmament treaties but developed countries have not acted responsibly in the areas of nuclear, chemical, and biological cooperation for peaceful purposes as stipulated in international agreements." This statement continues the Iranian tradition of criticizing western export control regimes such as the Australia Group which it sees as being noncompliant with the requirements of the CWC.

24 January 2005
Journalist Seymour Hersh publishes an article claiming that the US government "has been conducting secret reconnaissance missions inside Iran at least since last summer. Much of the focus is on the accumulation of intelligence and targeting information on Iranian nuclear, chemical, and missile sites, both declared and suspected." The information is allegedly being gathered in anticipation of military action planned for later in 2005.

28 January 2005
The United Kingdom releases its third quarterly report on Strategic Export Controls, covering the period 1 July to 30 September 2004. The report notes the issuing of a license for the export to Iran of "corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment."

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11 February 2005
The Washington Post reports that the US government is undertaking a wide-ranging review of existing intelligence on Iran in the wake of reviews of intelligence performance on Iraq prior to the US invasion of 2003. One product of this review will be a "memo focusing exclusively on Tehran's chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities — [which] will reflect an updated consensus within the intelligence community."

20 February 2005
The German Customs Office of Criminal Investigations (ZKA) believes that Iran possesses chemical weapons including "S-Lost [sulfur mustard] tabun, and prussic acid [hydrogen cyanide], perhaps also sarin and VX." Chemical weapons research and development efforts are reportedly being conducted "in small laboratories of universities, strictly guarded from the outside world." A member of the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) notes that due to this secret activity "there were no worldwide speculations about Tehran's real intentions regarding chemical weapons."

31 March 2005
The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction presents its final report to the President. The report notes that the Commission "reviewed the state of the Intelligence Community's knowledge about the unconventional weapons programs of several countries that pose current proliferation threats, including Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia. We cannot discuss many of our findings from these studies in our unclassified report, but we can say here that we found that we have only limited access to critical information about several of these high-priority intelligence targets."

24 June 2005
An Iranian parliamentary delegation, led by H.E. Mr Alaeddin Boroojerdi, Chairman of the National Security and Foreign Relations Commission of the Parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran, visits the headquarters of the OPCW in The Hague.

6 September 2005
In his opening address to the Third Regional Meeting of National Authorities of States Parties [to the Chemical Weapons Convention] in Asia, H.E. Dr. Pirouz Huseini, Director General for Political International Affairs at the Iranian foreign ministry says: "100,000 Iranians are suffering from injuries with chemical weapons they sustained during the war with Iraq,"....] "50,000 of the afflicted are in dangerous conditions and are exposed to slow death." Dr. Huseini goes on to say: "[Iran's] interest in the Convention stems from our strong belief that maintaining the international peace and security can only be achieved through the collective endeavours by the international

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community towards multilateral, non-discriminatory implementation of disarmament treaties in the field of weapons of mass destruction".


6 to 8 September 2005

In cooperation with the OPCW, Iran hosts the Third Regional Meeting of National Authorities of States Parties [to the Chemical Weapons Convention] in Asia. The meeting is attended by sixty-three participants from twenty-three regional States Parties and six participants from three States Parties from outside the region. In addition representatives from Egypt and Myanmar, both of which are not parties to the CWC attend the meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to to facilitate the exchange of information among representatives in particular in areas where collective action might be required, such as the development of effective national implementing legislation, implementation of the import and export provisions of the CWC, and improvements in the quality of declarations.


9 to 12 October 2005

An Iranian team participates in the major CW defense preparedness field exercise "Joint Assistance 2005." The exercise, jointly organized by Ukraine, the OPCW and NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) was held at the Yavoriv training site near Lviv, Ukraine.


11 October 2005

In Tehran, the Majlis Commission on National Security and Foreign Policy approves draft Chemical Weapons Convention implementation legislation [that] covers all key areas of the Convention, in particular verification of prohibited activities. The draft legislation must next be approved by the full Majlis. [see 29 September 2004]


21 October 2005

Jane's Defense Weekly quotes an unidentified "diplomatic source" alleging that Iran and Syria have concluded an agreement whereby Iran will construct a number of facilities intended to give Syria an independent capability for the production of CW agent precursors, eliminating its current dependence on imports. The report notes that a contract has not yet been officially signed. Iran will reportedly "supply Syria with reactors, pipes, condensors, heat exchangers and storage and feed tanks, as well as NDCAM equipment (to detect CW agents in the air)." The agreement to construct these facilities is allegedly the product of a series of discussions and agreements that began in February 2004.


14 November 2005

Syrian and Iranian officials are described as signing a "confidential strategic accord...which includes a sensitive
chapter dealing with co-operation and mutual aid during times of international sanctions, or scenarios of military confrontation with the West." Amongst other provisions the accord allegedly requires the Iranian government to provide "co-operation and continuous transfer of technology and equipment in the areas of weapons of mass destruction [particularly the upgrade of Syrian missile and chemical warfare capabilities]." In return Syria will reportedly "allow Iran to safely store weapons, sensitive equipment or even hazardous materials on Syrian soil should Iran need such help in a time of crisis."

23 December 2005
The U.S. State Department announces the imposition of sanctions on two Indian chemicals companies for exports to Iran. The State Department states that the exported chemicals may be of assistance to alleged Iranian CW activities. The companies are Sabero Organic Chemicals Gujarat Ltd. and Sandhya Organic Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. The State Department does not specify the chemicals or the quantities transferred.

6 January 2004
A Japanese newspaper reports that Libya and Iran "have exchanged a memorandum on cooperation in developing warheads for missiles that will carry nerve gas and technology to produce nerve gas using phosphorus trichloride." This report suggests cooperation on the production of the G group of nerve agents.

14 January 2004
In the US Fox News, quoting unnamed Iraqi sources, reports that "as many as twenty-nine warheads, some possibly armed or able to be armed with chemical weapons" have been smuggled into Iraq from Iran and are now in the hands of Iraqi resistance groups. The content of this report is confused and appears to conflate chemical weapons and plastic explosives.

27 January 2004
In Tokyo, officials from Japan and Iran meet for bilateral consultations on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. A summary posted on the website of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs states: "As for Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)/Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), both sides stressed the importance of conventions' universalization, which gains a momentum in the wake of Libyan accession to CWC, and of strengthening their national implementation by all member states. The Iranian side explained the current status of its bills to implement CWC/BWC. The Japanese side appreciated Iranian positive and constructive stance in the BWC enhancement process based upon the three-year 'work program', particularly in the Annual Meeting of the
States Parties held in November 2003."

1 April 2004
The U.S. State Department announces new sanctions on 13 foreign companies or individuals under the *Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000*. These companies or individuals were sanctioned because they "had transferred to Iran, since January 1st, 1999, either equipment and technology on the export — multilateral export control lists or items such as those on the list but falling below control list parameters or other items with the potential of making a material contribution to proscribed programs." The items transferred to Iran had the potential to assist chemical weapons, biological weapons or long-range missile programs.

7 June 2004
The United Kingdom releases its annual report on the application of national strategic export controls in 2003. The report notes the UK government's approval of exports of unspecified "toxic chemical precursors" and civil NBC protection clothing and equipment to Iran by British companies.

19 June 2004
In Tehran, the Secretary-General of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, Hasan Rowhani, is interviewed by Al-Jazeera television. During the interview, Rowhani says: "The decision made by the Islamic Republic of Iran not to possess weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, goes back to many years and not only the near past. Therefore, even during the eight-year war Iraq imposed on us and although Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran, we did not seek the production of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons." [see 18 Nov 98.] He continues: "Our decision not to possess weapons of mass destruction is strategic because we believe that these weapons will not provide security for Iran. On the contrary, they will create big problems. Iran exerted huge efforts during the past few years to build bridges of confidence with the states of the region. We absolutely do not want to blow up these bridges by mobilizing our resources to produce weapons of mass destruction. We are confident that our possession of these weapons will force these countries to seek the support of big powers. Consequently, regional security will worsen. This will not serve our national security. Therefore, our efforts focused and continue to focus on building bridges of confidence with the states of the region before focusing on the possession of weapons of mass destruction."
— *The CBW Conventions Bulletin*, No. 65 (September 2004), p. 36.

24 June 2004
In the US House of Representatives, the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of the House International Relations Committee convenes a hearing on *Iranian Proliferation: Implications for Terrorists, their State-Sponsors and U.S. Counter-proliferation Policy*. US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security appears before the committee and says: "We believe Iran has a covert program to develop and stockpile chemical weapons. ... Although Iran has declared a portion of its CW program to the OPCW, it is time
for Iran to declare the remainder and make arrangements for its dismantlement and for the destruction of its chemical weapons."


29 June 2004

In Tehran, Speaker of the Majlis Gholamali Haddad-Adel says that Iran condemns the use of any kind of weapons of mass destruction in general and chemical weapons in particular. He announces that Iran’s Public Culture Council has designated 28 June, the day in 1987 on which the northwestern city of Sardasht was attacked by Iraqi aircraft armed with chemical weapons, as the Day of Fight Against Weapons of Mass Destruction and Chemical Weapons.


30 June 2004

In Tehran, there is a national congress on Review of the Consequences of Application of Chemical Weapons. Addressing the congress, Chairman of the Expediency Council and former President Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani says that Iran should "file our legal claims in Saddam’s court on the use of chemical weapons against our people." He continues: "The West is sensitive in the process of learning science. The ones who accuse us of seeking WMD [see 24 Jun], are active themselves in this field and try to distract people through their media. ... With all our Islamic and human capacity, we stood against the cunning, lying and ruthless enemies who claim today to be supportive of human rights and despite their efforts in expanding WMD, accuse Iran of seeking such weapons." During the congress, its secretary, Mostafa Qane’i, announces that some 100,000 Iranians have fallen victim to chemical weapons used by Iraq during the 1980-88 war. He expresses his surprise that only 45,000 Iranian chemical weapons victims have been registered by the Martyrs’ Foundation, 15 per cent of whom have been medium to severely affected and 85 per cent of whom suffer minor ailments. He adds that 18 billion tomans is spent annually on caring for the chemical weapons survivors.

— The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 65 (September 2004), p. 41.

4 July 2004

Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi says that Iran has prepared a complaint against Saddam Hussein for his invasion of Iran in 1980 and use of chemical weapons against Iran during the 1980-1988 war. Iran intends to lodge this complaint with the tribunal that will be trying Saddam Hussein on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The tribunal had its first session on 1 July 2004. Asefi says that Iran has "asked [its] charge d'affaires in Baghdad to seek explanation from the Iraqis on why the attack on Iran did not feature among the charges against [Saddam Hussein]."

— The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 65 (September 2004), p. 41.

7 July 2004

An Iranian government advisor says that Iran will refrain from pressing charges against the European states that aided Iraq’s production of chemical weapons in the 1980s in the Iraq tribunal that is prosecuting Saddam Hussein. The advisor indicates that this position is conditional on European states not increasing pressure on Iran over its nuclear program.

— The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 65 (September 2004), p. 43.

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19 July 2004
In the Israeli Knesset, Israeli chief of military intelligence research, Brigadier-General Yossi Kuperwasser says — during a Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee meeting — that "the possibility certainly exists" that Iran might provide chemical weapons to Hezbollah.

24 to 25 July 2004
The Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Mr. Rogelio Pfirter, visits Tehran. He meets with a number of Iranian government officials including the Supreme National Security Council, H.E. Dr. Hassan Rouhani, and the Foreign Minister H.E. Dr. Kamal Kharazi.

2 August 2004
In Tehran, the chairman of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council Foreign Policy Committee says that since the war with Iraq it has been the policy of Iran to take defensive measures against chemical, biological and nuclear attacks. In an interview with IRNA news agency, Seyyed Hoseyn Musavian says that the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics is responsible for enforcement of the policy.

September 2004
A report in Jane's Defence Weekly alleges that a Syrian delegation visits Iran to conclude a deal whereby Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO) will supply Syria with unspecified quantities of sodium sulphide. The chemical is reportedly intended for use in the production of mustard agent.

6 September 2004
The Iranian Ministry of Defence issues a statement attacking those states which supported Iraq's acquisition and use of chemical weapons during the 1980 to 1988 Iran-Iraq war. The statements reads in part: "Shame on those who supplied Saddam Hussein of Iraq with chemical weapons to attack Iranian soldiers (in 1980s). Today, they introduce themselves as advocates of human rights and opponents of the weapons of mass destruction... The Iranian nation, as the great victim of chemical weapons reserve the right to take legal action with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against supporters of the Iraqi dictator in his horrible crimes against Iranian soldiers."

9 September 2004
Azeri Member of Parliament Elman Mammadov says before the parliamentary commission for security and defence that Iran and Armenia are "involved in the production of chemical weapons" and that if the United Nations were to investigate the matter it could "easily prove this".

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22 September 2004
An officer in the Iranian Republic Guards appears on Iranian television to describe an ongoing military exercise, "Ashura-5." The officer claims that the exercise has demonstrated the ability of the Iranian armed forces to oppose invaders even if they are equipped with "the most destructive bacteriological and chemical weapons."

27 September to 1 October 2004
In Slovenska Lupca, Slovakia, a training course on providing assistance and protection against chemical weapons takes place at the Institute of Civil Protection. The training course is an annual event offered by the Slovak government under Article 10 of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), offering participants a basic understanding of chemical weapons protection and national capacity building so as to assist them in training civilians in protection against chemical weapons in their respective countries. Fifteen specialists and experts from ten CWC member states, including Iran, participate in the course.

9 to 13 October 2004
The Annual Course on Medical Aspects of Defense against Chemical Weapons is conducted in Tehran, the Islamic Republic of Iran. This course makes available to OPCW member states the experience of Iranian physicians and facilities associated with the treatment of victims of chemical warfare, and provides medical personnel from member states with a unique opportunity to examine and learn from actual victims of chemical weapons.
— Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, Vol. 2 No. 3 (September 2004), p. 36.

25 October 2004
In Tehran, the Iranian Cabinet approves implementing legislation for the CWC, Government spokesman Abdollah Ramezanazadeh says: "According to the draft, Iran's Customs Administration is required to declare the statistics on all the exported and imported chemicals listed in the triple tables of the related treaty to the relevant national secretariat. Based on one of the articles of the draft, except the materials listed in the treaty, production, proliferation, stockpiling, use, threat to use, direct or indirect transportation of chemical weapons, as well as assistance in setting up the related production units by anyone is banned." The bill must now be sent to the parliament for finalization.

28 October 2004
The United Kingdom releases its second quarterly report on Strategic Export Controls, covering the period 1 April to 30 June 2004. The report notes the issuing of four licenses for the export of "corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment."
23 November 2004
The US Central Intelligence Agency submits its *Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions 1 July Through 31 December 2003* in accordance with S.721 of the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act. In respect to Syria, the report states that; "Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued to seek production technology, training, and expertise from foreign entities that could further Tehran's efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents. Iran may have already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and possibly nerve agents—and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them—which it previously had manufactured. "This statement, which repeats the statements issued on this matter by the CIA for a number of years now suggests an absence of new developments."

29 November 2004
At the Ninth Conference of the States Parties (CSP) to the CWC in The Hague, Dr. Ali Khoshrou, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and Interational Affairs notes that Iran is in the process of adopting "implementation legislation [that] covers all key areas of the Convention, in particular verification of any prohibited activity."

2 December 2004
The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) holds a press conference to describe developments in Iran's national missile programs. Spokesman Ali Safavi claimed that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is engaged in the production of long range missile and chemical warheads at the Hemmat Missile Industries Complex in northeast Tehran.

6 December 2004
As part of the Peyrovan-e Velayat (followers of the supreme religious leader) military exercise Iranian troops conduct simulated defensive chemical warfare operations.
2003-2002

11 February 2003
Testifying before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice-Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, states that Iran "maintains a stockpile of chemical warfare agents and may have weaponized some of them into artillery shells, mortars, rockets, and aerial bombs." — Vice-Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Statement for the Record before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 11 February 2003, p. 12, intelligence.senate.gov.

March 2003
In Iran the Sasadja Moavenate Bazargani company receives a shipment of 120 metric tons of dimethylamine from the south African company African Amines. The company has been placed on WMD end-user watch lists by the German and Japanese governments and is suspected of involvement in Iranian missile programs. Dimethylamine can be used as a precursor for the nerve agent tabun (GA) or missile fuel. Dimethylamine also has a wide range of legitimate commercial uses including the production of detergents and pharmaceuticals. — "How Sasol firm sold WMD chemicals to Iran," Mail and Guardian Online, 18 February 2005, www.mg.co.za; "RAS: Oil-From-Coal Company Affiliate Reportedly Exported WMD Chemicals to Iran," FBIS document AFP20050218000095, 18 February 2005, www.fbis.gov.

21 March 2003

23 March 2003
A committee set up to assess the environmental impact of a US war with Iraq states that the war will cause environmental damage. The committee found that if chemical weapons were used, the water would be polluted and would endanger the lives of creatures in the Iran-Iraq border region. — "Iran: Paying for US' Anti-Iraq War-Says Iranian Official," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 23 March 2003, web.lexis-nexis.com.

25 March 2003
Iran forms a committee to deal with the threat of use of chemical weapons by Iraq in a war with the United States. — "Iran: Committee Formed to Deal with Threat Posed by Chemical Weapons," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 25 March, 2003, web.lexis-nexis.com.

7 April 2003
In response to an article appearing in the Madrid daily El Pais, the Iranian embassy in Madrid issues a statement denying that non-conventional arms such as chemical or biological weapons are part of the Iranian defense establishment.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
10 April 2003
The US Central Intelligence Agency submits its *Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, for 1 January Through 30 June 2002*. Regarding Iran, the report states: "Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Nevertheless [...] it continued to seek chemicals, production technology, training, and expertise from Chinese entities that could further Tehran's efforts at achieving an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents. Iran already has stockpiled blister, blood, and choking agents — and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them — which it previously has manufactured. It probably also has made some nerve agents." The report also states that "[d]uring the first half of 2002, Russian entities remained a key source of dual-use biotechnology, chemicals, production technology, and equipment for Iran. Russia's biological and chemical expertise makes it an attractive target for Iranians seeking technical information and training on BW and CW agent production processes." Finally the report notes that "[s]ince 1997, the US has imposed numerous sanctions against Chinese entities for providing material support to the Iranian CW program. Evidence during the current reporting period continues to show that Chinese firms still provide dual-use CW-related production equipment and technology to Iran."


27 April 2003
A non-governmental Iranian delegation departs from Iran to attend the first Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention in The Hague.


28 April 2003
In a speech to the First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention in The Hague, US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen G. Rademaker states: "[t]he United States believes Iran already has stockpiled blister, blood, and choking agents. We also believe it has made some nerve agents. We have discussed our concerns with Iran, but those concerns have not been dispelled. Those concerns need to be resolved rapidly and in the most transparent and cooperative manner possible."

Exercising its right of reply, the Iranian delegation notes that Iran did develop a CW capability in the final stages of its war with Iraq but subsequently "destroy[ed] the facilities under the supervision of the OPCW inspectors" and received a destruction certificate from the OPCW. The speaker further expresses his concerns that "the US is the only State party which has enacted national legislation clearly contrary to the Convention." He also observes that "Referring to the OPCW documents one could easily recognize the huge amounts of scheduled chemicals transferred to Israel, a non-State party which possesses chemical weapons, and has active clandestine activities."

— *United States of America National Statement to the First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons*

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
30 April 2003

Addressing the First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention in The Hague, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister of Legal and International Affairs, Dr. G. Ali Khoshro states that Iran's commitment to the convention is based on the destructiveness of these weapons, which the Iranians experienced first-hand in the Iran-Iraq War. He states that Iran "strongly believes that production, storage, and use of all chemical weapons should be totally banned." He goes on to say, "Besides its commitments to the CWC, Iran has had transparent cooperation with all members of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Organization." Khoshro states that Iran has committed to such transparency by arranging courses on the treatment of chemical weapons for the world medical community.


2 May 2003

Ali Hoseyni-Nawaz calls on all countries to take serious and coordinated measures to destroy chemical weapons. He made the comment while attending a conference at the OPCW in The Hague. He stated, "A number of countries, including the Zionist regime, are not signatories to the existing Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and have no desire to be bound by it although one decade has passed since the convention's approval." He also warned of a human catastrophe if the conference failed to act and not revise the Chemical Weapons Convention.


16 May 2003

The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) holds a news conference in London at which it accuses the Iranian government of producing chemical weapons. They name sites and individuals working on the weapons. The group states that it received the information from another Iranian opposition group, the People's Mojahideen of Iran (PMOI).


26-30 May 2003

The fifth Annual Course on Medical Aspects of Defense Against Chemical Weapons is taken by thirty-nine participants from twenty-six countries in Tehran, the Islamic Republic of Iran. The course was held at the International Medical Center for Training and Treatment against chemical Weapons (IMCTTCW). This was the
latest in a series of courses that are provided for the benefit of member states of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. These courses share the experience of Iranian physicians and facilities associated with the treatment of victims of chemical warfare. They provide attending medical personnel with a unique opportunity to examine and learn from actual victims of chemical weapons as well as to exchange information with Iranian physicians.


**August 2003**

The US Department of State Bureau of Verification and Compliance submits to Congress its report Adherence and Compliance with Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments. It addresses compliance efforts by the United States and other state parties to multilateral agreements during the period 1 December 2000 to 31 December 2001. The report states: "Iran has not submitted a complete and accurate declaration, and in fact is acting to retain and modernize key elements of its CW program. Some of these elements include an offensive R&D CW program, an undeclared stockpile and an offensive production capability. Such activities are inconsistent with the CWC."


**6 August 2003**

Iranian spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei states that Iran is opposed to weapons of mass destruction. Khamenei comments: "Nuclear weapons don't solve any problems. Furthermore, we don't agree, logically and principally, with weapons of mass destruction....We are opposed to them. At the time (of war against Iraq), in the discourse on jihad, we argued against biological and chemical weapons, and we banned them."


**17 September 2003**

Testifying before the US-Israeli Joint Parliamentary Committee, which is conducting a hearing into Iran's WMD and support of terrorism, U.S. Assistant Secretary for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter says: "We believe that Iran has not submitted a complete and accurate declaration, and in fact is acting to retain and modernize key elements of its CW program. Some of these elements include an offensive R&D CW program, an undeclared stockpile and an offensive production capability. Such activities are inconsistent with the CWC."


**22 September 2003**

Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, speaking before an annual military parade in Tehran, says: "Iran has repeatedly declared that it has taken no step toward developing access to weapons of mass destruction but is still under pressure [from certain states which support Israel]."


Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
27 September 2003
Iranian radio reports that more than 1,500 Iranians who suffered from the use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War are bringing claims against the US and other European states that supplied Iraq directly or indirectly with chemical weapons. It reports that another 2,000 victims are preparing to issue similar claims.

6-10 October 2003
In Russia, the Chairman of the OPCW Executive Council, Petr Kubernat of the Czech Republic, and a group of experts from several national delegations including Iran visit the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility at Gorny and the facilities under construction at Shchuch'ye and Kambarka. The visit had been arranged so that the delegates could familiarize themselves with the status of the facilities and with measures adopted by Russia under the revised chemical demilitarization timetable.

18 October 2003
An unidentified Middle Eastern source states that Iran and Libya signed a secret agreement on chemical weapons in October 2002. The agreement was reportedly signed in Tripoli. According to the report, Iran will provide Libya with technology for the development and production of Scud warheads capable of carrying chemical weapons as well as protective masks and other equipment.

21 October 2003
At the Eighth Conference of the States Parties (CSP) to the CWC in The Hague, the Iranian ambassador and representative to the CWC, Hossein Panahi Azar, states that Iran’s cooperation with the CWC has exceeded what is required by the treaty. He points out the fact that Iran has passed on its experience in treating casualties of chemical weapons to the world. He further states that Iran has already offered five training programs on this subject based on Iran’s experience with chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). The ambassador further notes that Iran has received numerous OPCW inspections and levels criticism at the continuing application of Australia Group export controls against states parties to the CWC.

25-29 October 2003
The sixth Annual Course on Medical Aspects of Defense against Chemical Weapons is held at the International Medical Center for Training and Treatment against Chemical Weapons (IMCTTCW) in Tehran, the Islamic Republic of Iran. There are twenty-five participants from eight countries. This was the latest in a series of courses that are provided for the benefit of member states of the OPCW. These courses make available the experience of Iranian physicians and facilities associated with the treatment of victims of chemical warfare, and provide attending

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medical personnel with a unique opportunity to examine and learn from actual victims of chemical weapons as well as to exchange information with Iranian physicians.


**30 October 2003**
In London, US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton delivers a speech to a meeting of the Bruges Group. Bolton makes several references to Iran's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and states that Iran "has robust BW, CW and missile programs." His speech includes a number of references to the adverse consequences for rogue states of continuing proliferation efforts.


**4 November 2003**
Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul says that Iran's conventional armament and its possible pursuit of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons continued to be a risk for the security of region.


**10 November 2003**
The US Central Intelligence Agency releases its *Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, for 1 January Through 30 June 2003*. In respect to Iran, the report states that: "Iran continued to vigorously pursue indigenous programs to produce WMD ... During the reporting period, Iran still focused particularly on entities in Russia, China, North Korea, and Europe." The report states: "Iran is a party to the [CWC]. Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued to seek production technology, training, and expertise from Chinese entities that could further Tehran's efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents. Iran likely has already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve agents - and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them - which it previously had manufactured." The report notes that China continues to supply Iran with dual-use equipment that might assist the alleged Iranian chemical weapons program. Finally, the report also claims that Russia may be supplying dual-use equipment and training to Iran that could be diverted for use in a chemical weapons program.


**2 December 2003**
Speaking at a conference organized by the Institute for Foreign Policy analysis and the Fletcher School's International Security Studies Program, US Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton issues a warning to Iran and a number of other states. Bolton says: "[r]ogue states such as Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya and Cuba, whose pursuit of weapons of mass destruction makes them hostile to US interests, will learn that their covert programs will not escape detection or consequences." He went on to warn that "[w]hile
we will pursue diplomatic solutions whenever possible, the United States and its allies are also willing to deploy more robust techniques, such as the interdiction and seizure of illicit goods. If rogue states are not willing to follow the logic of nonproliferation norms, they must be prepared to face the logic of adverse consequences."

19 December 2003
In a surprise development, Libya announces that it will join the Chemical Weapons Convention, destroy its existing stockpiles of chemical weapons, and end its pursuit of all WMD, and long-range missiles.

22 December 2003
In the wake of Libya’s repudiation of WMD, reports emerge that British Prime Minister Tony Blair has ordered British diplomats to negotiate with Syria and Iran on a handover of their alleged arsenals of chemical and biological weapons. A British diplomat is quoted as saying: "We are engaged in similar processes to those which got results in Libya. There is a lot going on behind the scenes and we are hopeful of progress."
— "Blair’s bid to rid Iran and Syria of WMDs," The Daily Record (Scotland), 22 December 2003, p. 4, web.lexis-nexis.com.

January 2002
The CIA releases its semi-annual Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 30 June 2001 in which the CIA charges that, "Iran, a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) States party, already has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons — including blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve agents, and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them. During the first half of 2001, Tehran continued to seek production technology, training, expertise, equipment, and chemicals from entities in Russia and China that could be used to help Iran reach its goal of having an indigenous nerve agent production capability." In addition, the report states, "Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire WMD ...technology from abroad. In doing so, Tehran is attempting to develop a domestic capability to produce various types of weapons — chemical, biological, and nuclear — and their delivery systems." The report alleges that Iran received additional assistance in its efforts from entities in North Korea, Russia and Western Europe.

6 January 2002
Former Iranian president and current head of the influential Expediency Council, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, addresses a ceremony commemorating outstanding Iranian soldiers and proclaims, "Iran was not and would not

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try to acquire unconventional weapons." He added, "Iran never wanted to confront its opponents with nuclear or chemical bombs."

9 January 2002
Speaking to IRNA, former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani is quoted as saying, "Although Iran today is one of the leading arms makers in the world, it has never been after non-conventional weapons and will never do so." Rafsanjani further states, "Iran has never thought of, and will never think of, using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against another nation." [Note: These statements of 6 and 9 January are likely a response to the latest CIA report released to the US Congress this week titled "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001" (see 2000-2001 chronology).]

24 January 2002
The Bush administration imposes sanctions on several Chinese firms allegedly for selling CBW components to Iran. According to a US State Department statement, "The penalties were imposed for the transfer to Iran since January 1, 1999 of sensitive equipment and technology controlled by the Australia Group." One unnamed US intelligence official reportedly told the Washington Times that in April 2001, US intelligence tracked one of the Chinese shipments of chemical-related goods as it made its way to Iran. The three firms penalized by the sanctions are Liyang Chemical Equipment, the China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Company, as well as Mr. Q.C. Chen. One of those firms produces glass-lined equipment; however, the reports did not mention if such equipment was transferred to Iran. The State Department statement goes on to say that "Q.C. Chen is already subject to US sanctions. In May 1997, he was among seven Chinese entities sanctioned, pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, for knowingly and materially assisting Iran's chemical weapons program through the transfer of chemical weapons precursor chemicals and/or chemical weapons-related production equipment and technology. These sanctions currently remain in place." The statement continues by claiming that the activities of Q.C. Chen and other Chinese entities have been brought to the attention of the Chinese government on numerous occasions, and that the Chinese government was informed in advance of the decision to place further sanctions on Mr. Chen and others.

25 January 2002
China demands a swift end to the US "practice" of sanctioning Chinese companies. In an official statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China proclaims that it "opposes countries that develop chemical weapons and does not aid countries to develop their chemical weapons....China prohibits the export of sensitive chemical products and their related production technology and equipment." No mention was made of the specific
companies sanctioned.

29 January 2002
In his first State of the Union address, US President George W. Bush calls Iran, Iraq, and North Korea an "axis of evil" and accuses them of supporting terrorism and seeking chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons that could threaten the United States.

30 January 2002
Iran rejects statements made by US President Bush in his State of the Union address, denouncing them as "arrogant" and as a desire for hegemony. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi states, "We, besides rejecting American accusations, believe that the world will not tolerate US hegemonic ambitions and believe Mr. Bush would do better by presenting proof of his accusation....The Islamic Republic of Iran considers these remarks as interference in its internal affairs." Mr. Kharrazi believes that "Bush is intending to divert public opinion from the Middle East issues by raising up a new subject and thereby pave [sic] the ground for the US to continue support for Israel in suppressing the Palestinian nation." Kharrazi added, "[t]he American president had better back up his assertions with evidence instead of repeating old and unfounded claims."

3 February 2002
Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, in a letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, rebuts allegations made by US President Bush during his State of the Union Address. Kharrazi notes, "Iran does not seek weapons of mass destruction and, unlike the US ally in this region, is a party to the NPT, CWC, and BWC and has signed the CTBT. As the only victim of weapons of mass destruction in the last generation, Iranian people have felt the horror of these weapons and are determined to ensure that no people will have to go through the same agony....It must be underlined that, unlike the United States, weapons of mass destruction have no place in Iran's defense doctrine. Iran is fully committed to observing all relevant international instruments on prohibition of such weapons, and its compliance has been repeatedly verified by the relevant international organizations. At the same time, Iran insists and vigorously pursues its inalienable right to develop its nuclear, chemical, and biological industries for peaceful purposes. This right is guaranteed in all relevant international instruments, and the deliberate campaign by the United States to arbitrarily deprive Iran of this right is a further violation of these regimes." Kharrazi further states that he believes that the Bush administration seeks to weaken these regimes, so that it remains "unhindered not only in developing and proliferating such weapons but more dangerously in leveling self-serving accusations against others."

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12 February 2002
US Secretary of State Colin Powell, in testimony before the US Senate Budget Committee, tries to explain President Bush's "axis of evil" statement with regard to Iran. Secretary Powell states that although the United States is wary of Iran’s continued efforts to develop WMD and the means to deliver them, "[w]e want the best for the people of Iran," and "we have offered the Iranians dialogue." Powell states further that the United States is looking for peace, not war, but "you don't find peace by sticking your head in the sand and ignoring evil where it exists."

16 February 2002
Iran successfully tests a new version of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the Muajar-4 (Mohajer 4, also called Hodhod — "a hooded bird") is advertised by Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industry Company, Havapeimasazi Iran, or HESA, as intended for communications or electronic warfare, which is a potential CBW delivery platform. The test was attended by Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani.

9 March 2002
A classified US DOD report detailing the US Nuclear Posture Review is leaked to the press. The report, presented to Congress on 8 January 2002, calls for the military to prepare contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against a potential target list of seven states, including Iran. The weapons would ostensibly be deployed in retaliation for a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack emanating from one of the aforementioned countries. While the US government is criticized for placing such a high importance on nuclear weapons in its strategic doctrine, the Bush administration counters that the new nuclear posture seeks to limit the chances of nuclear weapon use by enhancing and reinforcing the US nuclear deterrent.

10 March 2002
Iran condemns the leaked DOD nuclear posture report immediately. Former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani claims that the United States is hoping to intimidate other states. He states, "[t]he intimidating atmosphere created by the United States influences countries' security. In this atmosphere adventurers will be encouraged to create planned insecurity in the countries."

19 March 2002
In testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl Ford states that Iran has "manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons — including blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve agents, and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them. Tehran continues to seek considerable production technology, training, expertise, equipment and chemicals from entities in Russia and China that could be used to help Iran reach its goal [of] an indigenous nerve agent production capability."

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16 April 2002
US Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Issues John Wolf states that Iran is developing its WMD and missile programs with help from North Korea, China, and Russia. He also states that the United States is working to prevent Russian scientists that are assisting in the research and development efforts of CBW programs in countries like Iran.

17 April 2002
The daily Middle East News Line (Middle East Newsline) states that the United States claims Iran has begun an effort to sell missiles and equipment necessary for making CBW to its friends and allies throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Middle East Newsline appears to attribute the information to the briefing given by US Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf to members of the media on 16 April 2002. In his statement (above), however, Wolf did not claim that Iran, or any other country, markets CBW components or other materials to third countries. [Note: The Middle East Newsline only cites "US officials" when it makes its claim about Iran. However, because the article devotes a significant amount of time to the briefing given by Wolf, the reader is led to believe the information came from Wolf.]
— "Missile Rogues Seek to Become WMD Exporters," Middle East Newsline, 17 April 2002.

24 April 2002
Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems releases its updated Land-Based Ballistic Missiles Guide, which claims that Iran possesses two liquid-fueled ballistic missiles capable of launching chemical CW warheads. The Scud-B variant Shehab 2 missile and the North Korean Nodong variant Shehab-3 are capable of reaching distances up to 300km and 1,300km, respectively. A third CW-capable missile with an estimated range of 2,000km, the Shehab-4, is currently under development and expected to be operational in 2003.

29 April 2002
Austrian Defense Minister Herbert Scheibner is briefed on chemical defense reshipments by Iranian experts as he attends an expo in Tehran highlighting the achievements of the Iranian defense industry.

6 May 2002
In an address before the Foundation in Washington, DC, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John Bolton, states that Iran has a BW program that is "complemented by an even more aggressive chemical warfare program."

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9 May 2002
It is reported that Iran has large stockpiles of CW spread throughout the country.
— "What Should We Make of Iran? Does it Merit a Warm Reassessment or a Cold Hard Look," Jane's Special Reports, 9 May 2002.

9 May 2002
US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher announces that in the coming days, Armenian, Chinese, and Moldovan entities will be sanctioned pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. The sanctions will last two years. Boucher refuses to state that the sanctions involve WMD, commenting only that the items transferred to Iran were on multilateral control lists.

13 May 2002
Unnamed Western diplomatic sources claim that some US officials are holding secret talks with the Iranians, but that the Bush administration is divided over its Iran policy. Some cabinet-level officials desire to see improved relations with Iran and cite as evidence of Iran's potential its recent intelligence assistance to the United States since September 11. However, other officials state that Iran's "strategic weapons programs" are cause for concern and have priority as far as US policy is concerned.

13 May 2002
The European Union's General Affairs Council states on 13 May 2002, "The Council noted that broad agreement existed on the substance and objectives of the overall approach for developing relations with Iran, as well as commercial matters these should include a serious dialogue on questions such as terrorism, proliferation, and regional stability. It accordingly instructed the Permanent Representatives Committee to examine all the relevant elements put forward in the debate so that the General Affairs Council is in a position to take a decision at its June session.

14 May 2002
It is reported that the European Union (EU) delayed acting on the Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Iran yesterday, "amid disagreements within the EU over how to confront Iran's missile and weapons of mass destruction programs." [Note: The text of the EU's General Affairs Council on 13 May 2002 was, "The Council noted that broad agreement existed on the substance and objectives of the overall approach for developing relations with Iran; as well as commercial matters these should include a serious dialogue on questions such as terrorism, proliferation and regional stability. It accordingly instructed the Permanent Representatives Committee to examine

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all the relevant elements put forward in the debate so that the General Affairs Council is in a position to take a decision at its June session.]


**16 May 2002**

The *Federal Register* announces today that two Armenian, two Moldovan, and eight Chinese entities have been sanctioned under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2002 for transferring equipment and/or technology controlled by multilateral export control regimes. The companies sanctioned are Lizen Open Joint Stock Company and Armen Sargsian of Armenia; Liyang Chemical Equipment Company, Zibo Chemical Equipment Plant, China National Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Company, Wha Cheong Tai Company, China Shipbuilding Trading Company, China Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation, China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation, and Mr. Q.C. Chen of China; and Cuanta SA and Mikhail Pavlovich Vladov of Moldova. Liyang Chemical and Q.C. Chen were both previously sanctioned on 24 January 2002 as well.


**17 May 2002**

In an article regarding possible Cuban assistance to Iran's BW program, *Middle East Newsline* quotes unnamed US officials as stating that Iran has developed CW and is seeking assistance for BW. *Middle East Newsline* also states that a "senior [Bush] administration official...said Washington has discussed allegations that Moscow is helping Iran's ballistic missile and chemical weapons program as well as building a nuclear infrastructure that could be used for the production of chemical weapons."

— "Cuba Markets WMD Technology to Iran, Libya," *Middle East Newsline*, 17 May 2002.

**20 May 2002**

In an article primarily concerning the 16 May 2002 sanctions placed on Armenian, Moldovan, and Chinese entities, *Middle East Newsline* cites unnamed US officials as stating that Q.C. Chen and "the Chinese firms are believed [to be] involved in a project to weaponize Iranian Shihab-3 [Shehab-3] intermediate-range missiles with chemical and biological components."


**31 May 2002**

An Israeli political commentator says it is unlikely Iran is close to making a chemical warhead with an advanced fuse for their missiles.


**June 2002**

A report states that Zibo Chemical Equipment Plant (PRC), one of the companies sanctioned by the United States on 16 May 2002, was probably included on that list for transferring CW-related equipment to Iran.
June 2002
A London-based daily, the *World Tribune*, reports that "Libya has signed a $13.5 billion weapons deal with Iran for ballistic missiles with chemical warheads and the training to deploy and operate them." According to the report, the information came from an article in the Berlin-based *Die Welt*, which cites, "Western intelligence sources." The original article in *Die Welt*, however, says nothing about chemical warheads being part of this arms deal contract. Rather, it only mentions WMD and CW as an interest and capability that Libya has built up over time. While it is possible that the London article might have obtained information from its own intelligence sources, it appears that the German report is the source of the claims.


9 June 2002
An investigative journalist claims that Britain is selling Iran chemical warfare technology, primarily toxic chemical precursors. [Note: CNS Graduate Research Assistant Ben Heath contacted the journalist directly for more information, but Mr. Mackay was unable to supply any specific details or further information. He did not know what types of chemicals were shipped, who shipped them, or who they were intended for.]


17 June 2002
The EU General Affairs Council announced today that it will move forward with a Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Iran. *Middle East Newsline* had suggested in May that the decision was delayed due to concerns over Iran's WMD programs. However, in today's statement, the Council only mildly mentioned WMD by stating, "Regarding non-proliferation, the EU encourages Iran to sign, ratify, and fully implement relevant international instruments."


18 June 2002
During a question-and-answer session today at the US State Department's Noon Briefing, spokesman Richard Boucher answers a question regarding the US stance on the EU's decision to further ties with Iran: "We have maintained an ongoing discussion and dialogue with the European Union about policy towards Iran. This is a subject of frequent discussion. We have also made quite clear in this discussion our concerns, our grave concerns about Iranian behavior. That includes Iran's support for international terrorism, Iran's opposition to the Middle East peace process, its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them through ballistic missile development, and Iran's human rights record."


Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
22 June 2002
A powerful earthquake strikes northwest Iran today in the Qazvin province. The province is reportedly home to an Indian-built CW facility producing the nerve agent precursor phosphorous pentasulfide. Unnamed US officials claim the plant is a major CW facility. One report indicates that "the Iranian CW infrastructure was built as a plant for the production of pesticides in the late 1980s. Iran’s main CW production facility is located at Damghan with other plants located in Isfahan and Parchin."

24 June 2002
It is reported that "the United States suspects that one or more Iranian chemical weapons facilities could have been damaged or destroyed" in the 22 June 2002 earthquake that struck Iran. Allegedly, "the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, responsible for the nation’s WMD programs, were rushed to Qazvin to assess the damage of the earthquake to strategic facilities in the province. Army troops were also sent to help deal with any damage of the CW installations." Unnamed Iranian MPs reportedly raised concerns about the safety of these CW facilities, especially one located in Pasdaran.

Unnamed US intelligence officials were cited as stating that the facilities in Qazvin produce nerve gas and other CW. The largest facility is alleged to have been completed in 1988 under the guise of a pesticide production facility. Unnamed sources suspect there are CW installations in Damghan and Parchin as well. Allegedly operational in 1989, these facilities were designed to produce agents to be placed on warheads.

26 June 2002
Speaking before a meeting of NATO’s North Atlantic Council today, Mossad Director Ephraim Halevy states that Iran joined the CWC solely to develop a civilian chemical infrastructure that could be converted quickly to produce VX nerve gas.
— "Mosad Chief on Nuclear Threat from Iran, Iraq, Syria; Terror Threat," Yedi’ot Aharonot (Tel Aviv), 28 June 2002, p. 7; FBIS, Document GMP20020628000151, 28 June 02.

9 July 2002
During testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US Secretary of State Colin Powell allegedly reports that the United States is making progress in its efforts to prevent Russia from assisting Iran in its quest for WMD. [Note: Actual text of this statement could not be found.]
— "US Claims Progress with Russia in Halting Iranian WMD," Middle East Newsline, 10 July 2002.

19 July 2002
US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says that ten entities will be sanctioned under the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 and/or the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. Two of the entities will be sanctioned "for knowingly and materially contributing to Iran's chemical weapons program." Eight of the entities have transferred goods to Iran, including to Iran's CW program. The other
two contributed to either Iran's or Iraq's CW or advanced conventional weapons programs.

19 July 2002
Eight of the companies are Chinese state-owned firms, according to US State Department officials speaking to the Washington Times on conditions of anonymity. The officials say that some companies have sold Iran advanced conventional weaponry while others have sold CBW equipment.

24 July 2002
The US government imposes sanctions on eight Chinese companies, one Chinese individual, and one Indian individual for allegedly helping Iran and Iraq purchase advanced conventional weapons and to develop CW programs. The companies and individuals sanctioned under both the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 and the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Control Act of 1979 as amended by the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 are Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology Import and Export Corporation, China Machinery and Equipment Import Export Corporation, China National Machinery and Equipment Import Export Corporation, CMEC Machinery and Electric Equipment Export Company, CMEC Machinery and Electrical Export Company, China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import Export Company, and Wha Cheong Tai Company. The Chinese individual sanctioned is Q.C. Chen, who has been repeatedly sanctioned since 1997. The entities sanctioned only under the Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act of 1992 include China Shipbuilding Trading Company and Indian national Hans Raj Shiv.

25 July 2002
Reportedly, all but two of the companies recently sanctioned by the US government were caught selling advanced conventional goods to Iran, such as high-speed catamaran missile boats and anti-ship cruise missiles, and not CBW components. The other two cases allegedly involved BW-related goods. [see 24 July 2002]

29 July 2002
In a press conference with the Iranian foreign minister, EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana states that, even with the recent decision by the EU to widen trade and cooperation with Iran, "EU-Iran relations can never reach their full potential if we do not eliminate problems that hamper such a positive development ...One [of these problems] is nonproliferation/acquisition of weapons of mass destruction."

29 July 2002
In testimony before the US Congress today, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Vann Van Diepen states that the CWC has "helped reduce the threat from chemical weapons, resulting in international disclosure of chemical

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weapons in India, China, and Iran." Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Marshall Billingslea states, "both Iran and Syria themselves have robust chemical warfare programs and both are exploring biological weapons. Both countries can deliver these weapons by a variety of means, via short-range missile systems such as Scuds or by artillery shells, and Iran is making strides in developing the Shahab-3 medium-range missile and longer-range systems."


18 August 2002
Anonymous former US military officers reveal that the United States continued to provide Iraq with military assistance through 1988— even after the Halabja massacre— even when "American intelligence agencies knew that Iraqi commanders would employ chemical weapons in waging the decisive battles of the Iran-Iraq War...."


22 August 2002
Top Iraqi Kurdish officials from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) accuse the terrorist group Ansat al Islam (reportedly linked to Al Qaida) of conducting experiments with chemical weapons in northeastern Iraq. The group is reported to have ties to conservative elements within the Iranian government. Also the group reportedly receives weapons from Iran in an effort to pressure the PUK not to negotiate with the United States.


10-14 September 2002
An Iranian medical team trained in responding to chemical weapons participates in the first Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) exercise on the delivery of assistance (ASSISTEX I) in Zadar, Croatia. The exercise's purpose is to evaluate the level of alertness of the OPCW in dealing with a scenario where assistance is required in the event of a State Party being exposed to a chemical weapons attack. Approximately 15 States Parties, 900 personnel and 100 metric tons of equipment are involved in executing this planned exercise.


10 October 2002
At a meeting at the OPCW in The Hague, Iranian Foreign Ministry Director-General Amir Hoseyn Zamaninia calls for an international implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). He also states that the OPCW has made great achievement since its implementation in 1997 and serves as a model for multinational cooperation. At the conference, Iran is also elected vice-president of the Asian states that are parties to the CWC.

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11-13 October 2002
Iranian troops engage in a three day military exercise south of Tehran. The focus of the exercise is defense against chemical attack. Activities include confronting chemical strikes, helping the injured and decontaminating areas exposed to chemical weapons. The exercise which is attended by the head of the Expediency Council, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, is characterized as demonstrating Iranian capabilities so as to deter attacks.

14 October 2002
Baqiatalallah Medical Sciences University in Tehran holds a meeting on the medical defenses for chemical weapons. Participants in the meeting were introduced to the latest discoveries in this field.

14-17 October 2002
The fourth Annual Course on Medical Aspects of Defense against Chemical Weapons is taken by 14 participants from 12 Member States in Tehran, the Islamic Republic of Iran. This was the latest in a series of courses that make available to OPCW member states the experience of Iranian physicians and facilities associated with the treatment of victims of chemical warfare, and that provide medical personnel from Member States with a unique opportunity to examine and learn from actual victims of chemical weapons as well as to exchange information with Iranian physicians.

18 December 2002
Italian authorities seize 40 tons of morpholine, a chemical that could be used to manufacture chemical weapons. The chemical was seized on a ship that was chartered by the state-owned Iranian company Iran Shipping Lanes. The shipment originated in Antwerp and was to go to Tripoli. Libya legitimately imports approximately 15,000 metric tons of morpholine annually for use by its oil industry.

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chemicals from entities in Russia and China that could be used to create a more advanced and self-sufficient chemical warfare infrastructure."

January-June 2001
In its unclassified, semi-annual report to Congress, the CIA charges, "During the first half of 2001, Tehran continued to seek production technology, training, expertise, equipment, and chemicals from entities in Russia and China that could be used to help Iran reach its goal of having an indigenous nerve agent production capability." In addition, the report states, "Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire WMD ...technology from abroad. In doing so, Tehran is attempting to develop a domestic capability to produce various types of weapons— chemical, biological, and nuclear — and their delivery systems." The report alleges that Iran received additional assistance in its efforts from entities in North Korea and Western Europe.

9 January 2001
The Israeli Supreme Court releases a copy of its ruling against Nahum Manbar for his alleged assistance to Iran's CW program. Manbar supposedly signed a contract in 1990 with Majid Abasfor, then head of Iran's CW project, to provide know-how and equipment for the construction of a CW factory. The factory was reportedly intended for the production of highly concentrated (96 percent) thionyl chloride, used to produce nerve and mustard gas. In addition to this factory, there were reportedly others to be constructed to produce mustard gas, tabun, sarin, and soman. In 1993, Manbar purportedly signed a memorandum of understanding with Iran to provide the know-how and a list of equipment necessary to build a factory to produce binary shells filled with VX. [Note: Manbar has maintained, however, that he was involved in a highly secretive joint British/Israeli covert intelligence operation to penetrate Iran's CW program; see entries in other chronologies from early 1990s, 1993, 1994, and May 1997.]

Early March 2001
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Fath-9, in the northern Persian Gulf. During this exercise, "the chemical defense units acted quickly and neutralized the hypothetical enemy's chemical bombardment."

7 March 2001
There are unconfirmed reports that Iran seeks to make its 1,300km-range Shahab-3 capable of delivering CBW.

7 March 2001
In an address to the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Washington, DC, Dr. Jean Pascal Zanders of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute states, "According to current Iranian statements regarding
its current status of production programs, Iran destroyed its CW production plants and its munitions after the War. Iran submitted declarations on its past programs to the OPCW and declared the production of 500 tons of agents. Its declarations were certified by the OPCW in November 1999.


April 2001
In its publication Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, the US State Department names Iran as "the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2000." The State Department accuses the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) of continued involvement in planning, supporting, and executing terrorist attacks.


April 2001
M. Javad Zarif, deputy foreign minister for International and Legal Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, complains in a letter to the OPCW that certain member states of the CWC are hindered in their quest to import Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals, while certain states not party to the treaty are receiving those chemicals. He complains that external control groups impair the mission of the CWC.


1 April 2001
According to Michael Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute in Washington, DC, Iran has a "significant chemical warfare capability," which is thought to amount to several hundred tons of nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents.


8 May 2001
Iran joins China and seven other countries in calling for the disbanding of the Australia Group, the 32-member state organization created to control the export of technology that could be used in CBW production. Iran, the target of past technology transfer restrictions, claims that Australia Group policies are discriminatory and politically motivated.


18 May 2001
Iran is re-elected to the executive council of the OPCW for another two-year term. An Iranian newspaper claims that Iran has been "at the forefront of an international campaign to ban chemical weapons."


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4 June 2001
It is reported that the Iranian Fateh-110 missile, which could be armed with conventional, chemical, or nuclear warheads, has been developed with help from North Korea, using Russian and Chinese technology. The Fateh-110 is believed to have a range of at least 1500km, while efforts are supposedly being made to improve its range and accuracy.

27 June 2001
The United States imposes sanctions on the Chinese company Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology Import and Export Corporation, for its alleged transfer to Iran of technology controlled under the CWC. The sanctions bar the company, located in Nanjing, from doing business with any US government agency for two years. Jiangsu Yongli was penalized for a similar matter in May 1997. China denied the allegations in reasserting its compliance with the CWC and accused the United States of placing its domestic law above international law.

31 July 2001
Two Iranian MPs deny US allegations that Iran is producing CW: "The US is accusing Iran and Syria of producing chemical weapons, while it is ignoring the greatest producer of nuclear weapons in the region, i.e. Israel. Iran definitely has not developed such weapons, but if a country is threatened by any country’s nuclear weapons, it is logical for them to develop such weapons in self-defense."

December 2001
A report states that Iran "is seeking" nuclear weapons, "likely" has biological weapons, and "has had" chemical weapons.

January-June 2000
According to a report by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), during the first half of 2000, "...Tehran continued to seek production technology, training, expertise, equipment, and chemicals that could be used as precursor agents in its chemical warfare (CW) program from entities in Russia and China." Regarding Chinese assistance to Iran’s CW program, the reports states, "...Evidence [during this period] ...shows Iran continues to seek such assistance from Chinese entities, but it is unclear to what extent these efforts have succeeded."

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
4 February 2000
Boris Labusov, chief of the Press Center of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, denies allegations made by the CIA that Russia is continuing exports of chemical, biological, and ballistic missile production technologies to Iran. According to Labusov, the United States does not support these statements with verifiable evidence. Labusov does not comment on reports that hackers from Russian special services could have broken into the personal computer of former CIA chief John Deutch.

— "SVR Denies CIA Director’s Allegations of Continuing Exports of Rocket Technologies from Russia to Iran" Interfax, 4 February 2000.

7 February 2000
According to Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, most estimates indicate that Iran has between six and 12 Scud-B launchers, and as many as 200 Scud-B ballistic missiles, with a range of 230-310km. Other sources, including the Israel government, indicate that the number could be as high as 300 Scud-Bs with 15 launchers. US analysts reportedly say that Iran can domestically produce nearly all components of the Scud-B, except for the most sophisticated components of the guidance system and motors. Iran may also have between five and 10 Scud-C launchers, each with several missiles. This number probably includes four transporter-erector launchers (TELs) that Iran received from North Korea in 1995. The North Korean Scud-C has a range of 500km and can carry a 700kg warhead. Iran has reportedly tested the new missiles from mobile launchers near Qom, to a target area about 500km south of Shahroud. Iran may be working with Syria on developing chemical or biological warheads for the Scud-C. In addition, North Korea may have sold such technology to Iran as part of the Scud-C sale.


10 February 2000
In an article written by US Defense Secretary William Cohen and translated for and published in the German paper Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Cohen states that Iran (as well as Iraq and North Korea) are trying to manufacture nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. In addition, Cohen claims that Iran is building missiles capable of carrying these weapons.


18 February 2000
China rejects accusations that it cooperates with Iran in developing WMD, including chemical and nuclear weapons, as well as missiles.


25 March 2000
According to "knowledgeable sources," Iran will not give up its efforts to develop long-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear and chemical warheads, despite the victory of reformists in the recent Iranian parliamentary
elections.


11 April 2000
US President Bill Clinton signs the Iran Nonproliferation Act, which allows the United States to impose immediate sanctions on any country that supplies Iran with equipment or technology that can be used to develop or deliver nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

12 April 2000
An FAS report on Damghan states that it is "said to be Iran's primary chemical weapons production facility, along with facilities located at Esfahan, Parchin, and Qazvin." (The report claims that an Indian company is helping build a major plant to produce phosphorus pentasulfide, a nerve gas precursor.) However, other sources conclude that claims that Iran had chemical weapons plants at Damghan and Parchin that began operations as early as March 1988 are of uncertain reliability.


19 July 2000
A report by Turkish intelligence units claims that Iran possesses 500 tons of chemical weapons, most of which consist of nerve agents. The rest consist of blood agents.


August 2000
According to a study by Bar-Ilan University’s Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, "Iran has been hampered in its nuclear weapons programs but appears ready to use its growing arsenal of chemical bombs." The study quotes expert Michael Eisenstadt as saying that Iran has the most active chemical warfare program in the developing world, and it raises concerns that Iran may be working to develop the Russian Novichok agent.


9 August 2000
The CIA finds evidence that Iran continued to seek Chinese assistance in its chemical warfare program. However, "it is unclear to what extent these efforts have succeeded."


21 September 2000
Deputy Director A. Norman Schindler of the DCI Nonproliferation Center states in testimony to the International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, "We believe the [chemical weapons] program [of Iran] remains active despite Teheran’s decision to ratify the CWC."

— Statement by Deputy Director, DCI Nonproliferation Center, A. Norman Schindler, statement on Iran’s WMD

5 October 2000

John A. Lauder, director of the DCI Nonproliferation Center, testifies to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Iran’s pursuit of CW: "We believe the program remains active despite Tehran’s decision to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Iran has a large and growing CW production capacity and already has produced a number of CW agents, including nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents. We believe it possesses a stockpile of at least several thousand metric tons of weaponized and bulk agent." Lauder states further, "Tehran’s goals for its CW program for the past decade have been to expand its production capability and stockpiles, reach self-sufficiency by acquiring the means to manufacture chemical production equipment and precursors, and diversify its CW arsenal by producing more sophisticated and [lethal] agents and munitions."

17 October 2000

Anthony Cordesman reports that "India is assisting in the construction of a major new plant at Qazvim, near Tehran, to manufacture phosphorous pentasulfide, a major precursor for nerve gas. The plant is fronted by Meli Agrochemicals, and the program was negotiated by Dr. Mejid Tehrani Abbaspour, a chief security advisor to Rafsanjani. A recent report by German intelligence indicates that Iran has made major efforts to acquire the equipment necessary to produce Sarin and Tabun, using the same cover of purchasing equipment for pesticide plants that Iraq used for its Sa’ad 16 plant in the 1980s. German sources note that three Indian companies— Tata Consulting Engineering, Transpek, and Rallis India— have approached German pharmaceutical and engineering concerns for such equipment and technology under conditions where German intelligence was able to trace the end user to Iran."

22 October 2000

An Iranian Army newsletter states, "a one-day seminar was held to study the contents of the [Chemical Weapons Convention]...[one of the presenters at the conference said that] Iran played a sensitive role in prevention of the manufacture and use of chemical weapons on an international level. He added that Iran was in fact a strong pillar of international campaign against such weapons.’ Despite the fact that there are stockpiles of chemical weapons in the arsenal of many countries in the world, Iran does not regard possession of such weapons us a measure of military strength....Iran today is recognized as the best campaigner against chemical weapons among nations of the world. The words of the president and members of the National Committee on Prevention of Chemical Weapons prove that statement.’ At the seminar Army Brigadier Javadian...added ‘The close and all-embracing cooperation between the Army and the Convention on Prevention of Chemical Weapons is the best expression of the commitment of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the contents of the said convention’.”

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November 2000
A one-day seminar is held in Iran to study the contents of the CWC. Participants include the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of the National Committee on Prevention of Chemical Weapons, and top Army personnel. Speaking at the seminar, Secretary Abol-Hasani says, "...Iran does not regard possession of such [chemical] weapons as a measure of military strength."

November 2000
For the November 2000 edition of Synthesis, a publication of the OPCW, an Israeli academic discusses Iran's possible CW program as rationale for Israel not joining the CWC. He states, "...Iran's actions regarding CW are watched closely. After Iran deposited the instruments of ratification for the Chemical Weapons Convention in November 1997, its declaration was late, and its contents were not officially revealed. In November 1998, Iranian Ambassador Mohammed Alborzi made a major presentation at the 3rd Conference of States Parties (CSP) to the CWC in The Hague. He admitted that Iran had sought to develop the deadly weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, but claimed that "Following the establishment of the cease fire, the decision to develop chemical weapons capabilities was reversed and the process was terminated..." He also repeated complaints that the United States and other state parties have imposed limitations on access to technologies and materials that might be used in producing chemical weapons, even to CWC signatories, which in turn, was seen as an effort to maintain or even enhance a CW capability. Given its past and current policies with respect to Israel, Iranian membership on the OPCW Executive Council and the OPCW's courses in Iran did not help to increase the credibility of the regime, in Israeli eyes."

13 November 2000
Abbas Khani, head of the Iranian Legal Office for the War Veterans, claims that since 1988, over 15,000 veterans have died from an undefined "CW syndrome" as a result of Iraq's use of CW against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.

December 2000
The National Intelligence Council, a 15-member CIA-sponsored panel, releases a non-classified intelligence assessment entitled, "Global Trends 2015." According to the document, "Iran sees its short- and medium-range missiles as deterrents, as force-multiplying weapons of war, primarily with conventional warheads, and as options for delivering biological, chemical, and eventually nuclear weapons."

8 December 2000
Mr. Jose Mauricio Bustani, director-general of the OPCW, calls the November 2000 report by Gerald M. Steinberg...
that appeared in Synthesis to contain "unsubstantiated allegations against the Islamic Republic of Iran and its commitment to the CWC....On the substance of the matter the Secretariat wishes to reiterate that it has no reason whatsoever to question Iran's full compliance with the CWC, and that the application of verification measures in Iran is strictly in accordance with the Convention. There are no grounds for any concern in an atmosphere of openness and transparency, and with the full cooperation of the Iranian Government. Equally, none of the 140 other States Parties has raised any such concerns within the OPCW, which is the sole competent and legitimate authority to verify compliance with the Convention...I would like to conclude with offering, once again, our sincere apologies to the Islamic Republic of Iran."

10 December 2000
Jose Bustani, director-general of the OPCW, allegedly states, "Iran fully abided by its commitments to the chemical weapons treaty and that there is no room for fear or uncertainty on the issue."

1999-1998
20 January 1999
It is reported that Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai provided secret documents to the United States alleging that at least 10,000 Russian scientists are helping Iran develop missiles and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The report allegedly states that the Russian scientists are helping Iran develop its Shehab-3 and Shehab-4 missiles, as well as a 3,600km-range S.S.-400 missile. Israel believes the missiles will be completed in 2002 and capable of carrying nuclear warheads by 2007. Details are supposedly to be revealed in the next issue of The Foreign Report.

20 January 1999
A FBIS translated excerpt states, "Nahum Manbar was not the only Israeli involved with Iran's chemical weapons programs. At the same time Manbar and his accomplices were selling materials, equipment, and technology for Iran's chemical weapons program, there was another Israeli involved in contacts with Iranian agents. Between 1992 and 1994, Moshe Regev's company was involved in selling Iran equipment, materials, know-how, and technology to manufacture mustard gas and sarin gas...Manbar and Regev did not work together...both worked with the same contacts...and both claimed to have contact with the Israeli intelligence community and defense establishment...The various branches of the defense establishment, headed by MOSAD [Mossad], spared no effort

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in accumulating evidence against Manbar. Against Regev, however, no action has been taken...[During a conversation with a Ha'aretz correspondent] Regev denied having any link whatever to the sale of chemical equipment and substances to Iran. Later, however, he did admit that he had been involved in such transactions, though he attempted to minimize his role..." [Note: There is nothing in the remainder of the article mentions anything about a confession having to do with the sale of chemical weapons technology to Iran.]


23 January 1999
The Director General of the OPCW, Jose M. Bustani, says in a visit to Tehran that "Iran is an exemplary state in the campaign against chemical weapons."


26 January 1999
The National Council of Resistance of Iran states that VX nerve agent is produced in the Construction Crusade's War Engineering Research Center.


February 1999
Iran's opposition in exile accuses Tehran of researching and developing VX nerve gas, toxic molds, and soil-contaminating agents.


February 1999
International CW inspectors from the OPCW visit Iran's chemical sites.


8 February 1999
The OPCW sends out invitations for a course on medical defense against chemical weapons to be hosted between 15-20 May at the Center for Treatment of Chemical Weapons Victims in Tehran. The course will cover nerve agents, vesicants, cyanide poisoning, phosgene poisoning, toxins, and various incapacitating agents, as well as the general medical defense against CW.


13 February 1999
The MKO reports that Iran has accelerated its CBW production program since President Khatami came to office: "Under the supervision of around 25 of their Russian counterparts, Iranian scientists have hastened their efforts to..."
develop chemical and biological weapons..." According to MKO sources, Iran is awaiting sophisticated computers to accelerate its CBW production and has already managed to produce the CW nerve agent VX, as well as anthrax and aflatoxins (biological agents/toxins). In addition to Russian scientists that are assisting Iran's program, the MKO claimed that Chinese and North Korean scientists are also "helping to further Iran's WMD capabilities..."


10 March 1999
A seminar is held for the officials and experts of the Iranian Customs and Department of Quality Control and Chemical Analysis of the National Standard Institute.

— Statement by an Iranian Official at Columbia University, 4 October 1999, p. 4.

12 April 1999
During a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Israeli Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon offers to increase military technology cooperation with Russia in exchange for tightened control of technology transfer to Iran. At the same time, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens states to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, "We know today that Russian technological information regarding nuclear capability and ballistic missiles has for months been passed from Russia to Iran. I believe that we must do what we can, in addition to the efforts by the US, to prevent this transfer of technology to Iran." According to a senior defense official, Iran is set on developing long-range surface-to-surface missiles, as well as acquiring biological and chemical weapons and achieving nuclear capability. He said that Iran would be unable to achieve these goals without Russian assistance, and that there are no indications this aid is stopping.

— "Further on Sharon's Russia Talks, Iranian Procurement," Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 13 April 1999; FBIS, Document FTS19990413001053, 13 April 1999.

13 April 1999
Israeli Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon offers additional military technology cooperation to Russia on the condition that it ceases its weapons technology exports to Iran. A senior intelligence officer states that Iran is developing a long-range, surface-to-surface missile equipped with biological and chemical warheads, and that Iran is set on developing nuclear weapons. He adds that Russian assistance is imperative to these endeavors.


15 May 1999
A center named the International Centre for Training and Treatment of the Victims of Chemical Warfare (ICTTVCW) is inaugurated in Tehran.

15-20 May 1999
The first international seminar for specialized medical training arranged by the OPCW is convened in Tehran.

July-December 1999
According to a report by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), during the second half of 1999, "...Tehran continued to seek production technology, training, expertise, and chemicals that could be used as precursor agents in its chemical warfare program from entities in Russia and China. It also acquired or attempted to acquire indirectly through intermediaries in other countries equipment and material that could be used to create a more advanced and self-sufficient CW infrastructure."

2 July 1999
It is reported that "the US intelligence community recently completed an inter-agency assessment of Iran's growing chemical weapons capabilities," and that a special White House National Security Council task force was created to monitor developments related to Iran's CW program.

25 August 1999
Iran's Defense Ministry opens a new colour [sic] and chemical manufacturing plant located at the Parchin Chemical Complex. The reported daily production capacity is two tons.

23 September 1999
The Organization for Defense Industries commenced operation of a production line for uniforms resistant to chemical agents (protective suits). [Note: Not necessarily protective suits, but something like a battle dress overgarment that resists chemical exposures.]

November 1999
The OPCW certifies the Iranian declarations submitted under the CWC.

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1998

German intelligence reports that Iran is making efforts to acquire production equipment for tabun and sarin, using three separate Indian companies as fronts: "With the aid of Indian companies, Iran is nearing the completion of a secret poison-gas plant, which was claimed by the Indian companies to be a pesticide factory." The following Indian companies were implicated: Tata Consulting Engineering, Transpek, and Rallis India. The Iranian companies involved in the building of the CW complex are Defense Industries, Shahid, Bagheri Industrial Group, and Shahid Hemat Industrial group.


Early 1998

Iran is capable of producing several CW agents, including nerve, phosgene, and hydrogen cyanide.


January 1998

An internal Israeli defense ministry report allegedly claims that Israel has maintained military-industrial ties with Iran. The report mentions three suspected business deals: (1) the supply of 58,000 gas masks by Shalon Chemical Industries after the Iran-Iraq War; (2) the supply of gas detectors by Elbit for the identification of chemical warfare agents; and (3) the installation of fire control systems on East European Tanks sold to Iran.


13 January 1998

Minister Mohsen Rafiqdust of the IRGC states in Tehran, "If the Iraqi regime deploys chemical weapons either against the Muslim combatants or Iranian civilians, the Islamic Republic would be forced to resort to chemical warfare against enemy forces...Iran has a high capability for producing these arms."


July 1998

General Wafiq Al-Sammarai, former head of Iraqi Military Intelligence, claims that Iraq used VX against Iranians during the Iran-Iraq war.


24 August 1998

The secretary of Iran's Expediency Council, Mohsen Rezai, says that if any country fires even one missile at Iran, Iran would definitely respond by firing ten. He also states, "We [Iran] do not ask for anyone's permission to equip our armed forces and we will produce all types of advanced weapons except nuclear and chemical weapons."

November 1998
Iran submits its CWC declarations.

6 November 1998
The Federation of American Scientists claims that Iran began production of chemical weapons early on in the Iran-Iraq War. Iran "manufactures weapons for blister, blood, and choking agents; it is also believed to be conducting research on nerve agents. Iran's stockpile of chemical weapons is believed to include nerve and blister agents. Iran is estimated to have an inventory of several thousand tons of various agents, including sulfur mustard, phosgene, and cyanide agents. Its production capacity is estimated at as much as 1,000 tons a year, with major production facilities located at Damghan, 300km east of Tehran. Iran is working on developing a self-sufficient CW production capacity that includes more effective nerve agents. Along with shell and bomb delivery systems, Iran may also be producing CW warheads for its Scud missile systems. With extensive foreign assistance, Tehran is obtaining technology, chemical agent precursors, production equipment, and entire production plants. Although Iran is making a concerted effort to attain an independent production capability for all aspects of its chemical weapons program, it remains dependent on foreign sources for chemical warfare-related technologies. China is an important supplier of technologies and equipment for Iran's chemical warfare program."

18 November 1998
Ambassador Mohammad R. Alborzi, director general of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, delivers Iran's CW declaration during a session of the Conference of the States Parties (CSP) to the CWC in The Hague, Netherlands. In his statement, he admits for the first time that Iran had once possessed CW, in the waning years of the Iran-Iraq War. But he claims that, "...following the establishment of cease fire, the decision to develop chemical weapons capabilities was reversed and the process was terminated." During the speech, Alborzi repeated that Iran would continue a policy that shuns CW production.

1997-1996
1997
Japanese companies make direct sales of chemicals to Iran worth more than $73 million. In addition, transfers of Japanese chemicals to Iran through intermediaries and trading companies located in Hong Kong, China, Singapore, and Malaysia are made.

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Early 1997
With Hong Kong still under British control, government customs officials raid the offices of Rex International, a local company allegedly jointly controlled by the Chinese government and Iran’s military-industrial complex. Documents seized show that the firm handled a shipment to Iran of high-grade steel pipes manufactured in China, which were suitable for use in CW manufacturing processes. The consignment was sent to a plant in Tehran run by the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), Iran's main weapons procurement agency.
— Con Coughlin, "Hong Kong Used as Conduit For Iran Arms Sales," Sunday Telegraph (London), 14 September 1997, p. 27.

January 1997
Two men are arrested on charges for attempting to ship a dual-use chemical, impregnated alumina, to Iran, in violation of the US trade embargo. The chemical can be used to make phosphorus-oxychloride, a precursor for nerve agents (e.g., tabun).

January 1997
Iran reportedly supplies Sudan with CW to use against the rebels in its conflict.

January 1997
Israeli officials tell the United States that Russian institutes and firms provide equipment and technology to Iran’s missile programs. The Israelis report that this assistance helps Iran in developing medium-range ballistic missiles that could be equipped with chemical warheads and be capable of striking throughout the Middle East. US intelligence agencies allegedly confirm the assessment.

January-February 1997
China supplies Iran with 40,000 barrels of calcium hypochlorite, a chemical-biological-radiological decontamination agent (it actually is only useful for CB decontamination). The shipment is likely destined for Iran’s Engineering Research Centre of the Construction Crusade, the government department responsible for chemical development facilities.

27 January 1997-3 February 1997
A Sudanese government official denies that Iran supplied Sudan with "chemical-tipped" missiles and other weapons to aid in the ongoing civil war.

11 February 1997
In answering questions posed by the US Senate, Secretary of State Albright states that Iran possesses chemical
weapons and that it is likely Iran possesses biological weapons and that those weapons pose a threat to US military personnel in the Gulf. According to her responses, the State Department has no knowledge that the China National Chemical Import-Export Corporation (Sinochem), or its affiliates, has transferred chemical or biological weapons technology to Iran. The State Department refused to name at an unclassified level any companies that may have transferred chemical or biological weapons technology to Iran. The State Department also has no evidence that Poly Group or Polytechnologies, or the Chinese Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (or any of their affiliates) have transferred chemical or biological weapons technology to Iran. The State Department would not respond at the unclassified level as to whether the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is involved in producing biological weapons in Iran. The State Department also has no evidence to suggest that Iran has transferred biological weapons to terrorist groups.

— "China-Iran Biological Weapons," Question for the Record Submitted by Chairman Solomon to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright — United States Senate, 11 February 1997.

11 March 1997
Iran’s parliament ratifies the Chemical Weapons Convention. [Note: According to an Iranian official delivering a statement at Columbia University on 4 October 1999, Iran ratified the CWC on 27 July 1997.]
— SIPRI, "Ratifications to the CWC," projects.sipri.se.

April 1997
Germany’s Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) (Federal Intelligence Service) reports that Iran’s chemical and missile programs are some of the most advanced in the Middle East. The BND also reports that Iran is building defense factories in Parchin, 40km south of Tehran, with Chinese assistance.

April 1997
Paula DeSutter states, "The United States believes that Iran has some weaponized biological weapons and a large chemical weapons stockpile, some of which are deployed on Abu Musa Island in the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz." She also states, "Iran is aggressively pursuing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons..." [Note: No evidence is offered to substantiate these claims.]

17 April 1997
Dozens of Iranian war veterans who claim they were disabled by chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War staged a protest in front of the German embassy in Tehran to protest the assistance Iraq received from German companies in developing its chemical weapons programs. The protest developed after Iran accused 24 German companies of giving Iraq chemical weapons technology in the 1980s.
— "Iranian War Veterans Hold Overnight Sit-In in front of German Embassy," Agence France-Presse, 17 April 1997.
May 1997
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Salman Fateh, in the Persian Gulf. The exercise includes "operations against possible attacks with...chemical weapons...containing the impacts of such agents."

5 May 1997
It is reported that Rex International Development Company Ltd., a company affiliated with the Chinese company Norinco, supplies Iran with high-grade seamless steel pipes, suitable for handling corrosive materials, and associated with CW production.
— "Hong Kong Company Caught in CW Deal," Iran Brief, 5 May 1997.

22 May 1997
The United States imposes sanctions, under the Chemical and Biological Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, on two Chinese companies, five Chinese citizens, and a Hong Kong company for providing Iran with CW precursors and manufacturing technology. The firms are Nanjing Chemical Industries Group and Jiangsu Yongli Chemical Engineering and Import/Export Group. The Hong Kong-based firm is Cheong Yee Limited. The precursors involved were thionyl chloride, dimethylamine, and ethyl chlorohydrin (nerve and mustard agent precursors), and the equipment included special glass-lined vessels. The United States makes it clear that it has "no evidence that the Chinese government was involved." Iran rejects the US charges that Chinese companies provided it with CW equipment and technology. IRNA quotes Iran's representative at the United Nations, Kamal Kharazi, as saying, "The Islamic Republic rejects all allegations of any plan to produce chemical weapons in Iran." The Chinese also reject the charges, "contending that its control of such trade is strictly enforced."

May 1997
Nahum Manbar, an Israeli national living in France, is convicted in an Israeli court for providing Iran with $16 million worth of production equipment for mustard and nerve gas between 1990 and 1995.

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May 1997
In addition, Manbar had reportedly signed a contract with a representative of the Iranian government to supply Iran with the know-how and equipment to build a plant to produce a chemical used in the production of poison gas, and to make four other types of poison gas.
— Moshe Reinfeld, "Court Rejects Appeal by Manbar," Ha'aretz, 6 December 2000; "Israeli Court rejects Appeal by Manbar Over Chemical Sales, Information to Iran," 6 December 2000; FBIS, Document GMP20001206000089, 6 December 2000.

[Note: For background information concerning this case and the involvement of Nahum Manbar in alleged UK/Israeli intelligence operations to ship chemicals to Iran, see entries in the chronologies for Early 1990s, 1993, and 1994.]

May-June 1997
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Zolfaqar-10, at Shiraz. "Another characteristic was ...mop-up of regions polluted with chemicals...and chemical bomb neutralization."

June 1997
According to a classified US intelligence report cited by the Washington Times on 30 October 1997, Chinese technicians from the Nanjing Chemical and Industrial Group complete construction of a plant in Iran for making glass-lined equipment used in CW production. Although work was completed, "raw materials" needed for operating the plant were held temporarily by the Chinese government due to problems with export control documents.

September 1997
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Zolfaqar, at Qom. The exercise features "defense operations against chemical warfare," and uses "powerful chemical defensive weapons."

11 September 1997
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright meets with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Foreign Minister David Levy, Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, and other Israeli senior aides to discuss Russian missile technology transfers to Iran. According to Israeli sources, Russia's transfer of missile know-how to Iran is a powerful technological program that entails long-term Russo-Iranian cooperation. Allegedly, this gives Tehran an enormous arsenal and the capability to manufacture missiles capable of carrying biological, chemical, or nuclear
warheads within the next two-and-a-half years.

14 September 1997
The Sunday Telegraph quotes a CIA study as saying that Iran has recently received shipments from Hong Kong of sophisticated equipment and important dual-use materials for CW manufacturing. The report points out that Chinese companies are using "front" companies based in Hong Kong to send chemicals to Iran that are banned by the CWC. [Note: Neither the Sunday Telegraph article nor the CIA report could be located.]

18 September 1997
During testimony before the Senate Committee on Intelligence, Committee Chairman Richard C. Shelby states, "China's sales of anti-ship cruise missiles, ballistic missile technology, chemical weapons materials, and nuclear technology to Iran—a hostile country that threatens US interests in an area of vital concern to the United States—endanger the lives of American soldiers, sailors and airmen."

30 September 1997
According to the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, Iran is developing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Mossad states, "Massive Russian assistance and close cooperation with Iran are enabling the Iranian regime to develop independent capabilities to produce medium-range ballistic missile systems within a very short time." Technical and human intelligence sources allegedly reveal that the Shehab-3 and -4 missiles potentially capable of delivering CW, have ranges of up to 1,240 miles. The DIA confirms Mossad's information.

October 1997
Iran conducts the Piruzi-8 military maneuvers. IRGC helicopters equipped with spray tanks fly over Iranian naval vessels, "evidently simulating a chemical or biological attack against ships at sea."

3 November 1997
Iran completes the CWC ratification process by depositing the instrument of ratification to the secretary general of the United Nations, and accedes to the CWC.
— SIPRI, "Ratifications to the CWC," projects.sipri.se.

18 December 1997
IRNA reports that the Eastern railroad network, operated by the Bonyad-e Mostazafan va Janbazan, has purchased

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100 tank cars from Ukraine, specifically designed to transport highly toxic chemicals.

1996
The Chinese corporation SinoChem reportedly delivers 500 tons of phosphorous pentasulfide (potential precursor of VX) to Iran.

1996
Iran and India conclude a contract for construction of a pesticide plant outside Tehran.

5-10 March 1996
Iran conducts the Zafar (Victory) military exercise in the Sistan-Baluchestan province near the Pakistan border, which includes simulated chemical weapons attacks on Iranian forces and "defensive operations including repelling chemical attacks."

8 March 1996
It is reported that "US intelligence officials have concluded that companies in China are providing Iran with several factories suited for making deadly poison gases...." In addition, Iranian "military-related organizations" are allegedly buying glass-lined vessels for mixing chemical precursors, special air-filtration equipment, and the technology to manufacture these items indigenously from China.

29 March 1996
According to a paper published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Iran possesses the "largest stockpile of chemical weapons in the third world." The paper cites several intelligence agencies and claims that it is unlikely Iran will pursue any aggressive military ground maneuvers.

22-25 April 1996
Iran holds its first Regional Seminar on the National Implementation of the CWC in Tehran in order to familiarize governments with their rights and obligations under the treaty. The 15 countries represented at the seminar are Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Oman, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Yemen. Along with the various workshops presented, the participants are also invited to a "trial inspection" to see how the procedure was conducted under CWC regulations. The mock inspection is

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conducted at the Shahid Razkani chemical factory in Tehran. Senior officials from two NGOs—SIPRI and the Harvard-Sussex Program—also attended the seminar.


April 1996
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Fateh, in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz: "Exercise participants completed systematic and nonsystematic air defense of chemical, microbic, and nuclear exercise."

6 May 1996
In a written response to questions posed by the United States Senate, the Defense Intelligence Agency states, "Iran has an active chemical warfare program. It produces a variety of agents and may have s much as 2,000 tons of agent in its stockpile. It has continued to upgrade and expand its chemical production infrastructure and chemical munitions arsenal since signing the CWC in 1993. As part of this expansion, Iran is making long-term capital improvements to its CW program, suggesting that it intends to maintain a CW capability well into the future." The report goes on to say that: while there is a danger of state sponsors of terrorist groups "provid[ing] such weapons to terrorists if they wish....we have no conclusive information that any sponsor has the intention to provide these weapons to terrorists."

10 May 1996
In a written response to questions posed by the US Senate, the CIA states, "Iran's CW program is already among the largest in the third world, yet it has continued to expand and become more diversified, even since Tehran's signing of the CWC in January 1993. Iran's stockpile is comprised of several thousand tons of CW agents, including sulfur mustard, phosgene, and cyanide agents, and Tehran is capable of producing an additional 1,000 tons of these agents each year. In addition, Iran is developing a production capability for the more toxic nerve agents and is pushing to reduce its dependence on imported raw materials. Iran has various dissemination means for these agents, including artillery, mortars, rockets, aerial bombs, and possibly, even Scud warheads." The report goes on to say that while there is a danger of countries such as Iran, Libya, and Syria aiding terrorists in creating chemical or biological weapons, the CIA currently has "no evidence of state sponsors providing chemical or biological weapons, or the technologies to produce them, to terrorist groups...

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Summer 1996

June 1996

23 June 1996
A report appears that Iran has concluded a "secret multi-million pound deal with the Indian government which will supply banned materials used to manufacture poison gas." Under the agreement, India will reportedly build a sophisticated chemical plant at Qazvin, which will be used to produce phosphorous pentasulfide, a dual-use chemical that could be used in CW production. [Note: At some point, the deal collapsed and was never fulfilled]. — Con Coughlin Chief, "Iran in Secret Chemical Weapons Deal With India," Sunday Telegraph, 24 June 1996.

July 1996

July 1996
While responding to questions by the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, the DIA and CIA presented their latest estimates on the Iranian CW program. It is estimated that Iran holds over 2,000 tons of sulfur mustard, phosgene and cyanide agents, and is currently working on developing nerve agents. The agents are most likely to be delivered through artillery shells, mortars, and bombs. — Laurie H. Boulden, "CIA, DIA Provide New Details on CW, BW Programs in Iran and Russia," Arms Control Today, Vol. 26, August 1996, pp. 32-33.

July-December 1996
According to a DCI report from June 1997, during this period, China provides "considerable CW-related assistance"
to Iran, including production equipment and technology.

**November 1996**
During war games, Iranian naval forces hold mine exercises in the Persian Gulf and defensive/simulative exercises to address potential CW attacks in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

**November 1996**
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Piruzi-7, in the Persian Gulf: "Among the programs carried out...were...chemical attack and detoxification."

**4-10 November 1996**
Cypriot and US officials are calling for greater scrutiny at Cypriot ports so that materials that can possibly be used from the Iranian WMD program are not shipped through Cyrus.

**21 November 1996**
According to a classified document cited in the *Washington Times*, Iran reportedly acquired about 400 tons of chemical weapons precursors from China (probably the aforementioned phosphorus pentasulfide). Iran claims any such accusations are unfounded.

**December 1996**
Iran is allegedly developing a 3,500km-range ballistic missile that could carry a 700kg chemical or biological warhead.

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1995-1990

By 1995
"...Most outside experts [believe] Iran [is] able to mass produce sarin and tabun nerve gases, and persistent nerve gas in the form of V-agents."

1995
Orders from the Chinese firm Nocino paid for by Razak Laboratories in Tehran and the Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries company in Tabriz, and brokered by Iran’s International Movalled Industries Corporation (Imaco), are not delivered. The orders consisted of 49 metric tons of alkyl dimethylamine, used in making detergent, and 17 metric tons of sodium sulfide, a chemical used in a variety of chemical processes, but also in making mustard gas.

January 1995
A circulated CIA report to US administration officials reportedly claims that Iran is working on a binary nerve gas warhead and is trying to acquire the capability to deliver CBW agents with ballistic missiles. The United States is concerned with the increased contact between Iran and North Korea, and Iran's recent $40 billion arms buying spree, which included the purchase of tanks, artillery, fighters, and Scud-B and Scud-C missiles from North Korea. Iran also develops its own ballistic missiles and encourages North Korea to develop a new generation of ballistic missiles.

30 January 1995
A German intelligence report claims that Iran is close to creating a chemical weapons factory with the help of three Indian companies. Tata consulting engineering, Transpek, and Rallis India were all involved in approaching German companies for "corrosion-resistant enamel reactors, pipes and pumps, all crucial in the chemical production process of sarin and tabun." The companies claim that they are involved in pesticide production research in Iran. Although the report does not identify the location of this new chemical weapons complex, it does state that until date Iranian CW production has developed around factories in Qazun, al-Razi, Bashwir, and Damghan.

February 1995
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Shahamat-73, in the Persian Gulf. The exercise involves "defense operations against chemical and microbiological attacks."
— Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R.

March 1995
The United States imposes sanctions on three Chinese front companies in Hong Kong for having shipped nerve gas precursors and production equipment to Iran. The three companies are identified as Asian Ways Limited, WorldCo Limited, and Mainway International.
— "Iranian Oil Pays Chinese Arms and CW," Iran Brief, 2 June 1997, p. 9; "Firms Linked in Sale of Technology to Iran," Hong Kong South China Morning Post, 26 April 1995; FBIS, Document HK2604050295.

March 1995
US Secretary of Defense William Perry announces that Iran has deployed CW on islands near the Strait of Hormuz. Although Iran acknowledges the military build-up at the entrance to the Persian Gulf, it denies the assertions that CW are involved.

7 March 1995
Peter Walaschek, arrested in Croatia, for selling 90 tons of CW precursors from a Baltimore company to Iran in the late 1980s, will not face charges for his crimes in the United States. Walaschek was arrested on a warrant issued by the Interpol and was consequently extradited to his native Germany. German authorities are not obligated to extradite their own citizens and as a result Walaschek will not face US authorities. He claims that the thiodiglycol he arranged to be shipped was not used for chemical weapons and was instead used for textile production.

22 March 1995
The Iranian mission at the UN rejected any US claims that Iran was deploying chemical weapons in its military buildup in the islands on the Straits of Hormuz. It admitted to a military buildup that started in October 1993 for "defensive purposes." The Iranian military was deployed as a response to increasing American troops in Gulf to keep Iraq in check.

1 April 1995
According to Western intelligence agencies, Iran and Libya agree to cooperate in the development of long-range ballistic missiles. Libya allegedly offers to pay Iran $31 million for material and know-how that Iran received from North Korea, China, and various Western sources. This could include equipment for a liquid fuel plant. Supposedly,
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1 June 1995

Jane's believes that although Iran's leadership once highly regarded the strategic capabilities of chemical weapons, it now appears to have downgraded this perception. Nonetheless, Jane's reports that Iran continues to heavily invest in chemical weapons: "Defenses against chemical attack were initially poor. In 1984, UN inspectors found that even specialized Iranian CW defensive teams had only respirators, thin rubber gloves, and plastic laundry bags for protection." Iran was able to purchase respirators from South Korea and Spain, and atropine injectors from the Netherlands.

— "Special Report, Chemical and Biological Warfare Programmes," Jane's Intelligence Review — Special Report, 1 June 1995, p. 15.

1 June 1995

Jane's claims Damghan "is the location of a chemical warhead production facility... It has several characteristics of chemical weapons plants: isolation, links to transportation lines and security. The facility at Damghan is hidden by trees, downwind from town, surrounded by fallow fields, and linked to the railroad by a spur. The perimeter road lies just outside the grove of trees. There are no signs of bunkers, so munitions are probably moved by rail to arsenals on a regular basis. Although reports state that 155mm artillery shells are the major product, the plant reportedly also loads other weapons with nerve gas. According to Critical Mass, by Burrows and Windrem, Scud-B warheads have been loaded with nerve gas at this facility. Since the missiles are assembled 130km to the southwest in Semnan, which lies on the same rail line, it would take little effort to ship the missiles to Damghan before they are deployed."


1 June 1995

Jane's reports that while "there is no hard evidence" that Iran can deliver chemical or biological weapons on its missiles, "it seems likely that Iran has the capability. A report that Iran tested a chemical warhead in the late 1980s cannot be confirmed."


July 1995

According to Iranian opposition elements, a fire breaks out at the Chemical National Koshavarz factory near Qazvin. The unidentified sources claim that the facility was a CW production site, and that some 2,500 people were poisoned from the fire's emissions.


July 1995

Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Piruzi-6, at the Northern Persian Gulf. The exercise involves "dealing with injuries from chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks."

— Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter R.

**July 1995**
IRGC helicopters equipped with spray tanks overfly Iranian naval vessels in a military exercise, "evidently simulating a chemical or biological attack against ships at sea."

**August 1995**
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Beyt ol-Moqaddas, at the Kermanshah Province. The "Shim-Mim-Re defense units" participate in the exercise.

**1 November 1995**
In Congressional testimony, Dr. Gordon Oehler, director of the CIA's Nonproliferation Center, alleges that Iran is "spending large sums of money on long-term capital improvements to its chemical weapons program." He also says that Iran "is developing a production capability for precursor chemicals it needs to support chemical agent production, and within several years may be virtually independent of imported raw materials."

**27 December 1995**
The CIA accuses Iran of inflating its WMD capabilities and claims that it is soliciting help in such endeavors from countries like China.

**Mid-1990s**
Anthony Cordesman states, "Iran's efforts to equip plants to produces V-agent nerve gases seem to have been delayed by US, British, and German efforts to limit technology transfers to Iran, but Iran may have acquired the capability to produce persistent nerve gas during the mid-1990s."

**1994**
Japanese companies reach their highest level of chemical sales to Iran, when they record direct sales worth close to $100 million.

**1994**
Iran reportedly initiates nerve agent production.

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1994
Iran purchases mustard and nerve gas precursors from China. The deal is reportedly brokered by Nahum Manbar, the Israeli businessman implicated in a UK/Israeli intelligence operation to penetrate the Iranian chemical procurement network.

1994
Reports surface that Syria is cooperating with Iran in the development of ballistic missiles designed to carry chemical warheads.
— Ahmed S. Hashim, *Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence, Case Study 1: Syria*, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998, p. 9.

1994
Anthony Cordesman states that Iran begins "production of nerve gas weapons...no later than 1994."

April 1994
According to analysis conducted by *Jane's International Defense Review*, Iran possesses several chemical agents as well as the capability to mass produce mustard gas, blood agents, and some nerve agents. Modes of delivery include artillery, missiles, and aircraft and Iranian forces are also reported to have trained for chemical warfare.

July 1994
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Fajr-7, in the northern Persian Gulf. Participating forces in the exercise include "chemical, biological, and radiological units."

September 1994
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Kheybar-73, in the Persian Gulf. Troops "carried out special operations to neutralize enemy chemical attacks."

September 1994
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Falaq-2, in the Persian Gulf. The exercise entails the

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"implementation of a chemical offensive and counteroffensive."

15 November 1994

Peter Walascheck is arrested by Croatian officials for making illegal attempts to supply chemical weapons to Iran in the late 1980s. Walascheck, a German national, fled to Croatia in 1988 after he pled guilty to trying to organize a deal with the Baltimore-based Alcolac Inc. to ship thiodyglycol (a known mustard agent precursor) to Iran.
— "Fugitive Involved in Illegal Export of Chemical is Caught," The Baltimore Sun, 15 November 1994, p. 2B.

17 November 1994

German Customs Intelligence (ZKA) reports that Iran is making attempts to buy peripheral items, such as heating units, which as well as being used in pesticide plants, have applications in the development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering CBW. The ZKA documents also warn companies to be on their guard against Iranian inquiries regarding chemicals that can be used to produce rocket fuel. Iran supposedly seeks fine-grained aluminum powder, ammonium perchlorate, and hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB). Exporters are warned to be on the alert for direct or indirect approaches from two Iranian state enterprises, believed to be acting as procurement agencies for Iran’s Defense Industries Organization.

Late 1994

The IRGC begins to deploy 155mm guns to Abu Musa and reportedly possesses CW there as well. [Note: The 155mm was the typical artillery round used in the West for chemical agent fill during the US offensive CW program.]

Early 1993

According to a report released by the Russian Federal Intelligence Service, Iran establishes the "industrial production...of sarin."

1993

Iran increases chemical defensive and offensive warfare training.

1993

Rafsanjani reportedly creates a chemical weapons-related entity, the Special Industries Organization (SIO). This 250-man agency is independent of the Council of Ministers.

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1993

According to the Israeli Supreme Court’s ruling, Nahum Manbar signs a memorandum of understanding with Iran to provide the know-how and a list of equipment necessary to build a factory to produce binary shells filled with VX. [Note: Binary shells for VX would pose some tricky engineering problems, which probably wouldn’t be solved until they actually produce VX itself and arm shells. After that stage is the issues of fuzing, and designing a system to combine a liquid (QL) with solid sulfur and expect it all to react the way one would want, with the short time involved in ballistic trajectory.]


[Note: For background information concerning this case and the involvement of Nahum Manbar in alleged UK/Israeli intelligence operations to ship chemicals to Iran, see the chronology for the Early 1990s.]

6 January 1993
The Bush administration denies the company BP Chemical export licenses to sell Iran a large chemical plant. The sale was primarily denied because of concerns that hydrogen cyanide, a CW agent, can be produced by the plant during the manufacturing process.


13 January 1993
Iran signs the Chemical Weapons Convention.

— SIPRI, "Signatories to the CWC," projects.sipri.se.

15 January 1993
Title XVI of the US Department of Defense Authorization Act places Iran under the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (PL 101-513). Under this act, the United States opposes, and seeks that other states oppose, transfers of goods or technology to Iran that would contribute to its acquisition of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, or destabilizing numbers of advanced conventional weapons.


29 March 1993
According to Western intelligence sources, North Korea and Iran are engaged in a cooperative effort to develop a ballistic missile system capable of carrying nuclear and chemical warheads. Iran reportedly provided North Korea $500 million for the missile program.


April 1993
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Piruzi-4, at the Northern Persian Gulf. The exercise involves "chemical, biological, and radiological operations."

19 April 1993
US intelligence sources confirm that Iran is now capable of delivering CBW using ballistic and short-range missiles, due to advances in "packaging technology." It is believed that anthrax and sarin warheads have been fitted to Iran's Scud-Cs or other ballistic missiles. The Semnan missile facility reportedly produces five tons of nerve gas per month, which is then shipped to the main missile assembly plant at Isfahan, where it is assembled in warheads and fitted onto Iranian-built Scud-Bs.
— "Iran's CW Programs," Mednews, 19 April 1993, p. 4.

May 1993
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Arvand-6, at Shiraz. Participating forces in the exercise carry out "anti-chemical activities."

20 May 1993
The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (FSB) reports that Iran has the industrial production capability for sarin and mustard gas. According to the FSB reported quoted in Jane's Information Group, "a plant for the production of pesticides which could be used as precursors in the manufacture of nerve-paralyzing and blister producing toxic substances operates not far from the capital."

10 August 1993
US intelligence officials are concerned about a Chinese ship—the Yinhe—in Iranian waters, which they believe is loaded with precursors for Iran's chemical weapons program. Chinese officials deny that the ship's cargo is carrying anything that violates international laws on chemical weapons. The ship left the Chinese port of Dalian [probably Dalian] on 15 July and one US intelligence official was quoted as saying, "we know these chemicals are bound for Iran's chemical weapons plants and it is a lot of tonnage, tens of tons." Also, according to Lt. Commander Bruce Cole from the US Navy's Central Command, the Yinhe is specifically carrying thiodiglycol and thionyl chloride.

15 August 1993
Representatives from the Hong Kong-based Guanzhou Ocean Shipping Company state that US allegations regarding their ship, the Yinhe (Milky Way), carrying chemical weapons precursors are completely false. They are also calling upon inspectors from a neutral third company to inspect the ship's cargo for any illicit materials. The company's spokesman, Mr. Cao Zang, also corrects US allegations that the ship was loaded in Dalian. He claims that the voyage of Yinhe originated from the port of Xingang (near Beijing) and that the ships regular route includes Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore, Jakarta, Dubai, Damman [sic Dammam], and Kuwait.
— Chris Dobson, "'Blockade' Ship's Cash Call," South China Morning Post, 15 August 1993, p. 5.

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September 1993
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Sahand-1, at Marand. Participating forces in the exercise include "antichemical forces."

3 September 1993
Mr. Wu Jianmin from the Chinese Foreign Ministry states that initial Sino-Saudi (joint) inspections of the Yinhe reveal no traces of CW precursors of thiodiglycol or thionyl chloride as accused by the United States. Several US inspectors are acting as technical advisors to the Saudi members of the inspection team. Saudi Arabia allowed the Iran-bound ship to dock at Dammam after other Gulf ports refused to let it enter their territory for inspections.

6 September 1993
China accuses the United States of acting as a "self-styled world cop" after members of a joint Sino-Soviet inspection team found no CW precursor on the Yinhe. A certificate designating the fact that the ship was not carrying any such materials was signed by representatives from China, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Officials from the US government refuse to issue an apology because they believe that their government was acting in good faith on the intelligence provided.

9 September 1993
Arab and Kurdish opposition sources in London report that Iraq has sold large amounts of arms and ammunition to Iran, including missiles and chemical weapons, in exchange for foreign currency.

November 1993
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Wa al-Fajr-1, in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Participating forces in the exercise include "chemical, biological, and radiological units."

1992-1994
The Israeli paper Ha’aretz reports that between 1992 and 1994, Moshe Regev’s company was involved in selling Iran equipment, materials, know-how, and technology to manufacture mustard gas and sarin.

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**14 January 1992**

Israel's Defense Minister Moshe Arens is quoted as saying, "It is clear that a number of countries, specifically Iran and Libya, have medium-range missiles with chemical warfare capability and are trying to obtain nuclear capability. In the Middle East today, there must be 1,000 missiles in Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, most with a range to hit Israel."


**28 March 1992**

Testifying before the Armed Services sub-committee of the US House of Representatives, CIA director Robert Gates states that Iran could develop Scud missiles tipped with chemical weapons within a few years. He also claims that the Iranian CW program currently remains at a crude level.


**15 August 1992**

Some reports indicate that recently tested Syrian missiles were allegedly purchased from North Korea. However, senior Israeli officials claim that Syria is working with Iran to produce Scuds on its own, including those with chemical warheads.


**October 1992**

Iran conducts a military exercise, code name Kheybar-3, in the Persian Gulf. The exercise involves "operations to neutralize enemy chemical attacks."


**November 1992**

Iran conducts military exercises at Yazd. These are the "first comprehensive exercises to counter chemical weapons...."


**15 November 1992**

Iran approves the international convention banning chemical weapons that was passed unanimously by the First Committee of the UN.

— Sue Fishkoff, "UN Committee Passes Chemical Weapons Ban," *Jerusalem Post*, 15 November 1992
21 December 1992
According to US, French, and German officials, Germany is enjoying an export "bonanza" to Iran. Germany's Federal Export Agency reports an 80 percent approval rate for licenses of dual-use equipment to Iran, which fall on the C-list of controlled technology. Critics of Germany's export control policy complain that much of the equipment shipped to Iraq and subsequently used in nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile applications, appear on the C-list.

January 1991
The CIA, working with a "friendly" Middle Eastern intelligence agency, reports that North Korea appears to be supplying Scud missiles—some modified to carry chemical warheads—to Syria, Libya, and Iran. According to these sources, North Korea has agreed to build new facilities in Iran to assemble three types of Scud missiles. The CIA has reported North Korea's activities to the US State Department.

28 April 1991
A Bush administration official states that "the fact is that both sides used chemical weapons" against Halabja in 1988.

Early 1990s
Iran intensifies its effort to develop its CW capabilities and may begin producing nerve agents like sarin and tabun.

Early 1990s
The British intelligence agency MI6, supposedly with the help of the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, allegedly exports chemicals through China to Iran to be used to manufacture CW. Reportedly, the office of "[f]ormer Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd...approved a British intelligence operation in the early 1990s which helped furnish Iran with the components and technologies for making mustard gas and other lethal nerve agents." A former British intelligence officer, Richard Tomlinson, disclosed the information to the public and said he was involved in the operation. Tomlinson claimed that "[th]e aim was to use these deals to gain intelligence about Iran's military network and 'disrupt' its weapons-of-mass-destruction programme." Tomlinson's overall credibility can be questioned for a number of reasons, and the story is denied by the British government, but there is some corroborating evidence that this particular account is legitimate. One source is that of Nahum Manbar, an Israeli businessman jailed for his involvement in selling chemicals to Iran. Manbar, in his defense, claimed that he did so with the full knowledge of Mossad.

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**Early 1990s**

Explosions at factories in Germany and Switzerland blow up fermenting equipment that was bound for Iran. The explosions are believed to have been detonated by a foreign intelligence service.


**15 March 1990**

Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati tells the Conference on Disarmament that Iran "cannot risk our security and give up the CW option now in exchange for a weak convention at the end." He defines that option as "convert[ing] capabilities and expertise in the field of chemical weapons acquired during the course of the war into practice as a deterrent vis-à-vis immediate and potential threats."

— Conference on Disarmament, Document CD/PV.543, pp. 11-12.

**May 1990**

The Pentagon releases a report derived from "highly classified sources" about Iran's complicity in the CW attack on the Iraqi Kurdish village of Halabja that began during the Iran-Iraq War on 15 March 1988. "The intelligence findings," argues the Pentagon report according to the *New York Times*, "indicate that Iranian forces used more than 50 chemical bombs and artillery shells during what turned out to be Iran's last offensive...The study asserts that Iran may have been the first to fire artillery shells filled with deadly cyanide gas into Halabja when Iranian commanders mistakenly believed Iraqi forces were occupying the city..." Unnamed officials explained that Iran's claim that the victims at Halabja suffered cyanide attacks was one piece of evidence that Iran had perpetrated a CW attack because, according to US assessments, Iraq had never employed cyanide before. In addition, "Kurdish leaders in Halabja determined that they were being fired upon with chemical ordnance from Iranian positions to their east as well as from Iraqi positions to the west."


**27 May 1990**

Baltimore-based Alcolac International is fined almost $438,000 for the 1988 export of 430 drums of thiodiglycol to Iran in violation of the US Export Administration Act.


Back to Top

**1989-1988**

1988-1989

Some reports indicate that Iran begins to test-fire Scuds with chemical warheads.

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1989
Aviation Week & Space Technology reports an attempt to export chemical weapons to Iran from Newark, New Jersey or New York City. The article does not specify the actors involved in the attempted transshipment.

1989
Iran purchases 60 tons of thionyl chloride, a mustard gas or nerve agent precursor from India.

January 1989
Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati declares at the Paris Conference, after the cease-fire with Iraq, that Iran "never resorted to chemical weapons use, even in retaliation."

4 January 1989
The SIPRI yearbook claims that Iran is among the nine countries that possesses or is adamant on acquiring chemical warfare capability.

7 January 1989
At the UNESCO headquarters Ali Akbar Velayati, the Iranian foreign minister, made severe remarks against Iraq for using chemical warfare against Iranians.

8 January 1989
At the five-day Conference on the Banning of Chemical Weapons in Paris, Iraq is accused of diverting attention from its CW use by stating that Israel destabilized the security balance in the Middle East by introducing nuclear capabilities. Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran's foreign minister, makes an emotional speech on behalf of CW victims and asks the Western states not to look away again.

8 January 1989
W. Seth Carus is cited in the New York Times as stating that Iran commenced its CW development in the 1980s as a consequence of Iraqi use. The have also allegedly used "small quantities of poison gas" that was supposedly taken from Iraqi troops.

9 January 1989
An unnamed US CW expert claims that Iran sold Libya the CW it used against Chad. He states that the Iraqi attack at Halabja was abetted by Iranian use of CW, especially the blood agent cyanide, which Iraq has not produced. The Iranian foreign minister refutes such claims by stating the Iraqi CW capabilities had improved in include all sorts of CW agents, including cyanide. [Note: Such reports that claim cyanide played any role during the Iran-Iraq War are still speculative.]

8 February 1989
Senate Minority Leader Robert J. Dole and two other senators introduce separate bills that would suspend patent and trading rights for foreign firms found to be supplying chemical weapons ingredients to Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, or other developing nations with concealed capability to use chemical weapons.

9 February 1989
At a Senate committee meeting, CIA Director William Webster provides the first official US government accusation that Iran is producing CW, stating that the country began production of CW agents and munitions in the mid-1980s. He declares that Iran is "stockpiling a variety of chemical warfare agents for various battlefield missions [and] producing and amassing a variety of munitions that can be used as delivery systems for chemical agents. The agents are mustard, blood agents and nerve agents, and the munitions are bombs and artillery shells." Webster also says that foreign firms are helping less developed states, such as Iran and others, to develop ballistic missiles to deliver chemical and biological weapons.
— William Webster, prepared statement before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 9 February 1989; See also Robert Gillette, "CIA Chief Cites Firms' Weapons Aid to 3rd World," *Los Angeles Times*, 10 February 1989, p. 13.

9 February 1989
Webster also states, "The intelligence community has evidence that Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran and also against Iraqi Kurds. Iran, too, employed chemical weapons against Iraqi troops." Later in his testimony, he states, "the proliferation of chemical weapons affects the prospects for peace and stability in the Middle East. Of particular concern are Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Libya, nations that have either used chemical weapons or have been associated with terrorist activities. Iraq has produced chemical warfare agents since the early 1980s, with Syria and Iran beginning chemical agent and munition production shortly afterward....These same countries are also quietly producing and amassing a variety of munitions that can be used as delivery systems for chemical agents; bombs, artillery shells, artillery rockets and in some cases, battlefield missiles, have been filled with chemical agents."

Senator Sasser, questioning Webster, asks, "Is there any evidence that these nations, other than Iraq—which really broke the moral ban against the use of chemical weapons...are prepared to use these weapons now to supply..."
terrorists or in any other way other than to protect themselves defensively?” Webster responds, “I think that there is no current evidence that any of these nations are encouraging the use of chemical agents by terrorist groups that they have supported presently or in the past. But there is an ambivalence, particularly in the Middle East, about the use of chemical weapons. They have difficulty understanding our sense of chemical weapons. They have difficulty understanding our sense of outrage and horror at its use.”


10 January 1989
The Iranian foreign minister claims that it is willing to sign a ban on chemical warfare, even if Iraq did not do so.

12 January 1989
Juwhan [probably Juhwan] Yun, a Korean American, is arrested while trying to purchase missiles and bombs filled with nerve [agent?] case for resale abroad. Yun claims he acted on behalf of Charles Caplan, a British entrepreneur. Caplan just finished serving a nine-month prison sentence in Britain for planning to sell gun silencers to Libya through his company, Domino Avionics. One of the undercover agents involved in the arrest states that at one point, Yun claimed that the nerve gas was actually headed toward Iran. Sarin cannot be legally exported from the United States and Yun stands guilty of violating the Arms Export Control Act. The arrest was the result of a seven month international multi-agency investigation.

12 January 1989
An anti-chemical weapons declaration is signed by 149 countries sign, reaffirming global commitment to stand by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Although many critics claim that the final document was not as strongly worded as they would have liked, the six point declaration shows another step towards a chemical warfare taboo around the world.

14 January 1989
Intelligence analysts conclude that West German companies are playing a lead role in supplying countries such as Iran, Libya and Syria with key CW technology. Officials in Washington, DC have lodged over 15 diplomatic protests with Bonn over the past two years. A former official with the Defense Department, Stephen D. Byren, states that, "from the point of few of leakage of technology, they are the biggest problem...the majority of the technology bandits come from Germany." On a more positive note, officials believe that Germany has been paying more attention to its export policies of late and has made concerted effort to stop technology proliferation to rogue states.

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23 January 1989

Iranians are continuing a CW program with Libyan cooperation. According to US experts consulted by *Middle East Defense News*, Iran supplied Libya with "mustard and nerve agents Qaddafi used against Chad in 1987." The report also refers to a 4 December 1988 visit by Iranian minister of heavy industries—Behzad Nabavi—to Tripoli with regards to discussions over a pesticide (which the report claims is a euphemism for CW) factory.


24 January 1989

Policymakers on Capitol Hill pledge to place diplomatic and economic sanctions on countries that attempt to pursue a CBW program. While testifying before Congress, the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Maj. Gen. (retd.) William F. Burns claimed that Iran is one of the five countries known to be stockpiling "poison gas."


26 January 1989

Lurgi, a West German company working on industrial installations, also consulted with Iran over a pesticide plant. Lurgi claims that the factory cannot produce any chemical weapons.


29 January 1989

In a defining article, the *New York Times* outlines the Iranian scheme to purchase precursor material from the West for its CW program. One of the key players in this scheme was Seyed Harim Ali Sobhani, a diplomat operating out of the Iranian embassy in Bonn. His operations were uncovered partly as a result of the Walascheck investigation by US customs authorities. Sobhani approached a German company, Chemco G.m.b.H., to buy thiodyglycol from Alcolac International, based out of Baltimore. Thiodyglycol is a known precursor for CW (primarily mustard) production. Three shipments of the substance were purchased and were routed through Europe and Southeast Asia to cover their targeted destination. Peter Walascheck was an employee with Chemco who helped conclude the business deal and was consequently arrested in Baltimore. On 1 December 1988 he forfeited his bail and escaped to Germany.

The report also states the US administration officials believe Iran furthered its CW program through the aid of certain Japanese companies. Alcolac exported three shipments of thiodyglycol. The first two, weighing about 90 tons each, reached Iran but the third shipment, weighing 120lbs, was intercepted by US authorities, who substituted the chemical with water.

2 February 1989
Iran and Czechoslovakia release a joint communiqué that condemns any use of chemical weapons and praised the recent conference on banning CW that took place in France.
— "Iran in Brief; Communiqué on Czechoslovak Prime Minister’s Visit to Iran," IRNA report in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 February 1989.

9 February 1989
William Webster, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Asian and Western European companies have been involved in supplying Iran with ingredients to build a CW infrastructure.

Webster also states that even though Iraq used CW against Iraqi Kurds, Iran also used chemical weapons against Iraqi forces and has been involved in CW production since the 1980s. Webster also claims, "The chemical weapons of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya have a number of common traits: All have been given high priority by their governments and have been cloaked in secrecy. The production complexes have been accorded strict security. In many instances, attempts have been made to conceal them as legitimate industrial facilities. Assistance by foreign suppliers has been crucial to their development in all cases. Assistance provided by foreign suppliers, many of whom were fully witting of their intentions of the Middle East countries to produce chemical weapons, has been the key element that has enabled these weapons—these nations to develop a capability to produce chemical weapons within a few years. And without this assistance, these Middle East countries would have been unable to produce chemical weapons. Foreign suppliers have provided the following types of assistance: Technical and operations expertise, constructing production facilities, supplying precursor chemicals supplying production equipment, supplying parts for munitions, and training personnel."

With specific reference to Iranian CW program, Webster states that after being attacked by Iraqi troops, "...Iran began to produce chemical agents and munitions, later using them in retaliation against Iraqi troops. Iran's chemical weapons production facility is located in the vicinity of Tehran. Iran produces the blister agent, mustard, blood agents, and nerve agents and, like Iraq, has filled bombs and artillery with these agents. Repeated chemical attacks by Iraq against Iranian troops prompted Tehran to seek foreign assistance to quickly establish its own production program. Western European and Asian firms responded by providing chemical processing equipment and chemical precursors. Despite the cease-fire with Iraq, Iran is continuing to expand its chemical warfare program." Webster did however clarify that despite developing CW, there is no evidence that Iran would supply terrorists with such weapons or use them in anything but a defensive manner.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
10 February 1989
Alcolac International Inc., a Baltimore-based firm accused of illegally exporting chemical weapon precursors to Iran, pleads guilty to violating the US Export Control Administration Act. The company is accused of helping export almost 120 tons of thiodyglycol to Iran and in a statement released it claims that it "deeply regrets its unintentional role in efforts to misuse" the material by Iran.

23 February 1989
According to a fact sheet released by the US Department of Commerce, export controls will be placed on 23 chemicals and five classes of biological agents. Secretary of Commerce, Robert A. Mosbacher states, "These controls are necessary to stop the spread of chemical and biological weapons...following this action, we will continue reviewing our policy related to chemical and biological weapons agents, including soliciting maximum multilateral cooperation."

The 23 chemicals in question are listed as: 1) Diethyl Methylphosphonite; 2) N, N-Diisopropyl-B-Amino-Ethanol (nerve agent precursors); 3) Methyl Benzilate; 4) 3-Quinuclidinone; 5) Benzilic Acid (BZ precursors); 6) Diethyl-N, N-Dimethylphosphoramide; 7) Diethyl Ethylphosphonate; 8) Diethyl Phosphate; 9) Dimethyl Ethylphosphonate; 10) Ethyl phosphinyl Dichloride; 11) Ethyl phosphinyl Difluoride (Ethyl Phosphorous Difluoride); 12) Ethyl Phosphonyl Dichloride; 13) Ethyl Phosphonyl Difluoride; 14) Hydrogen Fluoride; 15) Methyl Phosphinyl Dichloride; 16) Methyl Phosphinyl Difluoride (Methyl Phosphorous Difluoride); 17) Phosphorous Pentachloride (nerve agent precursors); 18) Pinacolone; 19) Pinacolyl Alcohol; [nerve agent precursors (soman, GD); 20) QL (O-Ethyl-2-Diisopropylamino-ethyl Methylphosphonite—VX precursor); 21) Triethyl Phosphite; 22) Potassium Cyanide (nerve agent, also cyanide-based precursors, respectively); and 23) Arsenic Trichloride (lewisite or other arsenical precursor).

With regards to biological agents, all Class 3, 4, and 5 agents will be subject to foreign export control and about half of Class 2 will face such controls as well. Biological agents are classified by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare according to their pathogenicity and hazard level.
— Chemical and Biological Warfare, Press release, Record Number 55193, 23 February 1989.

28 February 1989
According to the British Foreign Office, the new European ban on eight key CW precursors’ transfer to Iran, Iraq, and Libya will be strictly enforced by the United Kingdom. A strong incentive behind this measure is the increasing chemical weapons proliferation in the Middle East and recent news of the Libyan CW program that was abetted by West German companies.

20 March 1989
US Customs Commissioner William von Raab maintains that the shipment of ammonium perchlorate (rocket fuel component) was "clearly headed for Iran." He says that the shipment was seized with the help of Dutch authorities last year because it had been transferred from an American vessel to an Iranian ship.

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23 March 1989
US officials hold up a $92 million federally financed loan for a Nevada chemical company after learning that the company was linked to the export of ammonium perchlorate seized aboard a ship bound for Iran in 1988. The seized ammonium perchlorate shipment would have enabled Iran to fuel approximately 300 missiles. The company under scrutiny is Pacific Engineering & Production Co. of Henderson, Nevada. Pacific Engineering officials deny any knowledge of how the ammonium perchlorate got to that point, saying that the chemical was sold to a US company, Girindus Corp. of Tampa, Florida. Girindus Corp. officials also deny any knowledge or intent to sell the rocket fuel precursor to Iran. Girindus Corp. cites in a lawsuit seeking the return of the chemical that they had sold the ammonium perchlorate to a Swiss company, the Inter-Commerce Truehand, Handels & Franz.

28 March 1989
Girindus Corporation loses its bid to win the release of 1,144 drums of ammonium perchlorate seized by Dutch police in February 1988. Girindus argues that after it sold the ammonium perchlorate to a Swiss company, it did not know of efforts to ship the chemical to Iran. US Customs Service officials, however, argue in court that Girindus Corp. had prepared false shipping documents. Girindus Corp. is a subsidiary of Girindus S.A. of Switzerland.

30 March 1989
Talking on a panel about the dangers of CBW proliferation in the Middle East, W. Seth Carus comments that "...the Iranians may have had a small [CW] program prior to the start of the Gulf War in 1980, but it’s fairly clear that the main impetus for their program was the war with Iraq. The first substantial stocks of chemical agents that the Iranians acquired probably came from unexploded ammunition that the Iraqis had dropped on the Iranians."
— W. Seth Carus (speaker), "The Danger of Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Middle East," B’nai B’rith Symposium, 30 March 1989.

May-June 1989
According to the Arab Press Service (APS), Iran negotiates with the People’s Republic of China to jointly develop the proposed new M-9 and M-11 ballistic missile series. APS reports claim that both of the new Iranian-Chinese missiles were being developed to take chemical or nuclear warheads, and "while this may not be the intention of the Iranian government, expert sources repeated their caution that this was not yet feasible for Iran either. China is not expected to allow either nuclear technology or advanced warhead technology—such as it exists in the PRC—to go to Iran."

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9 May 1989
Krabs A.G., a Swiss company, pulls out of a deal to help build a pesticide plant in Iran because of fears that the factory could potentially develop chemical weapons.

19 May 1989
Juhwan Yun, the Korean-American businessman accused of trying to sell nerve gas to Iran, is convicted of conspiracy but acquitted on charges to export the gas to Iran. He faces up to five years in prison.

17 May 1989
Krebs & Co. AG, a Swiss contractor, drops plans to build a production plant for fertilizers and pesticides in Iran after American officials raised concerns that the plant could ultimately be used to make poison gas. The plant was supposed to produce phosphorous pentasulfide, which can be used in the manufacture of [VX nerve agent] as well as very toxic pesticides.
— "Krebs Pulls Out of Iranian Project," Chemical Week, p. 5; Peter Coombes, "Good Guys, Sometimes," Chemical Week, 17 May 1989, p. 3.

Mid-1989
Iran establishes a significant CW production capability.
— Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iranian Chemical and Biological Weapons," CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment, 30 July 1997, p. 24. [Note: This estimate is unsupported by documentation in this article.]

Mid-1989
Anthony Cordesman states, "Iran established at least one large research and development center under the control of the Engineering Research Center of the Construction Crusade [Jaha e-Sazandegi], had established a significant chemical weapons production capability by mid-1989."

1 July 1989
Officials from the State Trading Corporation in Bombay, India, admit that in March, they sold about 60 tons of thionyl chloride to Iran for approximately $50,000. There are also rumors floating around that State Trading Company's supplier—Transpek Private Ltd.—plans to sell Iran about 257 tons more of the chemical in the coming months. Thionyl chloride is a dual-use precursor that can be used in pesticide production as well as developing chemical weapons capability (e.g., nerve agents).

10 July 1989
Confronted by evidence provided by US officials, Helmut Kohl's German government admits that yet another West German-based firm, the Iranian-controlled Rheineisan Chemical Products in Dusseldorf, has assisted Iran's attempt to acquire chemical weapons. Rheineisen was allegedly brokering a shipment of 257 tons of thionyl chloride (used
to make mustard gas or nerve agents) to Tehran via Dubai on an unflagged vessel.

10 July 1989
Washington pressures a German firm and an Indian firm to pull out of a deal to sell 257 tons of thionyl chloride to Iran.

September 1989
Iran declares in its plenary statement at the Canberra conference that its chemical industry "never took any measure to divert its products for production of chemical weapons" during its war with Iraq.

October 1989
In a report to Congress, the US Commerce Department calls for an expansion of chemical export controls, adding new chemicals to the list of 13 commonly used chemicals that require export licenses and banning others from shipment to Libya, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Under the new controls, companies wishing to ship phosphorous trichloride, trimethyl phosphite, or thionyl chloride to any country (other than New Zealand, Australia, Ireland, Japan, Switzerland, and those in NATO) will have to apply for an export license. Banned shipments to Libya, Iraq, Iran, and Syria include those carrying potassium hydrogen fluoride, ammonium hydrogen fluoride, sodium fluoride, sodium bifluoride, phosphorous pentasulfide, sodium cyanide, triethanolamine, disopropylamine, N,N-diethylethanolamine, and sodium sulfate. The Commerce Department hopes the controls will go into effect within 30 days.

1988
Spain supplies Iran with 200,000 respirators.

1 January 1988
In a review of foreign radio broadcasts, Tehran Radio states, "Last week, the foreign radios spread a lie that our country’s Prime Minister, Mr. Musavi, in his budget speech to the Islamic Majlis, had announced that Iran has started manufacturing chemical weapons. The foreign radios rapidly magnified this fabricated news and reflected it across the world." After playing an audio tape of a BBC news report in Persian, Tehran Radio states, "As you heard, the state-controlled BBC radio claims that the Islamic Republic of Iran has begun manufacturing chemical weapons. The state-controlled radio of America [VOA], broadcasting a similar report, also claimed that Iran's prime minister had confessed to manufacturing chemical weapons....[The foreign radios] even went so far that the state-

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controlled BBC radio claimed that Iran had placed chemical weapons at the disposal of Libya in exchange for a certain type of missile. Such fabrications of foreign radios demonstrate the sinister nature of these radios, which use a fabricated report as a base for fabricating more news.


3 January 1988
An Afghan rebel being trained in combat tactics at a training camp in Iran comments on CW training he received:

"In conducting combat training operations, we were often forced to use chemical weapons [such as] tear gas cartridges and grenades. Once I was severely poisoned. Since that time, my eyes water constantly. Occasionally, when we did not go out at night to the range but stayed in school, chemical weapons alarms were conducted. In various parts of the barracks tear gas grenades exploded and blank cartridges were fired. We had to jump out of bed instantly, put on our masks, grab our weapons, and apply ourselves to perimeter defense. Those who did not manage to put on their gas masks were seriously poisoned." [Note: This report was taken by a Soviet newspaper by an Afghan rebel that defected to the communist Afghan government in Kabul.]


5 January 1988
US officials state that Libya has acquired CW from Iran for use against Chad.


11 January 1988
IRNA cites Iranian military communiqué 3078 at 1630 GMT as accusing Iraq of firing shells containing CW at Iranian troops stationed near Sardasht yesterday. The report indicates a few soldiers were injured. This is the first reported CW attack of the year.


13 January 1998
Minister Mohsen Rafiqdust of the IRGC states in Tehran, "If the Iraqi regime deploys chemical weapons either against the Muslim combatants or Iranian civilians, the Islamic Republic would be forced to resort to chemical warfare against enemy forces....Iran has a high capability for producing these arms."


14 January 1988
During a televised news conference today, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Minister Rafiqdust
commented on the lack of meaningful action by the international community to end Iraq’s use of CW. He states that “this time if chemical weapons are deployed against us, we will not hesitate to teach the enemy a telling lesson.” IRNA reported his comments as saying the “Islamic Republic would be forced to resort to chemical warfare,” and that Iran has a “high capability for producing these arms.”


19 January 1988
US intelligence sources report that US allies were among the states that exported a total of $1.5 billion in military equipment to Iran in 1987. The largest supplier of arms to Iran in 1987 was China, which shipped $600 million worth of artillery, ammunition, and Silkworm missiles. China also reportedly sold industrial machinery needed to indigenously produce weapons to Iran. North Korea sold $400 million in military hardware to Iran in 1987, including artillery, fast patrol boats, and Soviet-design Scud surface-to-surface missiles. Spain and Portugal sent $150 million worth of military equipment to Iran; Japanese firms $100 million in spare parts and trucks; West German and Swiss firms chemical warfare defensive gear; and Warsaw Pact countries $340 million worth of military hardware. Available sources show no evidence of Soviet arms transfers to Iran. The totals were compiled as part of an updated Pentagon analysis of foreign military transactions with Iran.


30 January 1988
During a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran, Rafsanjani praises the British Foreign Office report that states Iraq started the war with Iran, was the first to attack commercial shipping, and was the first to deploy chemical weapons. He states that Iran has yet to use chemical weapons.


February 1988
Iran begins domestic production of Deraksh-6, a chemical decontamination and anti-chemical bomb system. It is manufactured by the Isfahan Construction Jihad.


February 1988
A Kuwaiti press release states, "'Iran has officially decided to use poisonous gases, including units equipped with nerve gas, in a major offensive in the Basra marshes to come at the end of March.'"

— Kuwait KUNA in English, 26 February 1988; FBIS Document.
February 1988
The Italian magazine *Panorama* allegedly charges, "China had supplied Iran with chemical materials and other poisonous gases for military uses," including mustard and other "chemical gases" in January and February of this year.
— Kuwait KUNA (in English), 26 February 1988, FBIS Document, 29 February 1988. [Note: The original source for this, the article in *Panorama*, could not be located.]

February 1988
China denies the accusations.

3 February 1988
"The second and most modern decontamination and anti-chemical bombing system, known as Deraksh 6, has been manufactured by the experts of the War Support and Engineering Headquarters of the Esfahan Construction Jihad....One of the designers of this equipment [states]...'In view of the experience gained during the past few years in the construction of equipment for neutralizing chemical bombs, we have succeeded in preventing damage inflicted on the fighters through enemy chemical bombing. However, in view of the length of the fronts and the existence of lofty heights, especially on the western fronts, we decided to manufacture more modern equipment with greater and better application. Recently this equipment has been manufactured and made ready for use, and its mass production as already started.' He said, 'this equipment comprises a container with a capacity of 1,000 liters, and a limiter system, which can be filled with surface water, and two exit pipes which installed by means of a pylon and a flexible hose in the back of the vehicle, which can completely empty all the contents of the tank in four minutes. Another characteristic of this equipment is that it can directly use the power of vehicle engines, and the gearbox installed on the equipment, which can transfer the contents to the pumps, through which one can direct the contents with a greater range at the bombed areas.'"

12 February 1988
West German government representatives apparently reached a deal to exchange hostages Rudolf Cordes, a German, and Terry Anderson, an American, for either Mohammed Ali Hamadei (awaiting trial for the 1985 TWA hijacking and the murder of a US Navy diver) or his brother, Abdul Hadi Hamadei (security chief of Hizballah), along with $3 million in ransom and proof that 17 convicted Shiite bombers held in Kuwaiti jails are in good health. However, Iran reportedly stepped in at the last moment and ruined the deal by demanding that on top of those concessions West Germany would need to supply Iran with CW technology, weapons, money, and future political concessions.
24 February 1988

*Jane's Defense Weekly* reports that with Syrian help, Iran is capable of producing CW.

March 1988

Iran has CW plants in operation at Damghan and Parchin.

March 1988

Anthony Cordesman claims that "reports [are uncertain] that Iran had chemical weapons plants at Damghan and Parchin that began operation as early as March, 1988, and may have begun to test fire Scuds with chemical warheads as early as 1988-1989."

March 1988

According to Israeli intelligence sources, Iran acquires several dozen Soviet-made ground-to-ground SS-21 missiles that put all of Iraq's oil-production centers within Iranian firing range. The missiles are sufficiently accurate to strike Iraqi troop concentrations with poison gas without creating the fear that a misfire could hit Iran's own forces.

3 March 1988

The Iranian Ambassador to Japan states that "if Iraq had been punished for starting the war or for development of chemical weapons, we believe the new [attacks on civilian targets in Iranian cities] would not have happened....Japan should not follow a wait-and-see policy and follow the majority."

4 March 1988

US and Dutch authorities last weekend confiscated a cargo of CW [precursors?] being diverted through Europe to Iran from the US

9 March 1988

The Chinese Embassy in Kuwait denies reports in the media that China has supplied Iran with CW. A statement handed to the press "categorically denies these reports and affirms that they have no basis in truth and are mere tendentious calumnies."

12 March 1988

IRNA reports that five people were wounded yesterday when an Iraqi plane dropped CW bombs on the village of
Garmab, near Bakhtaran.

14 March 1988
Iran urges the UN in a letter to the Secretary General to take "effective and immediate measures" to halt Iraq's CW attacks and other immoral actions against Iran. It also rebuked the UN for its "unjustifiable silence and indifference" to Iraq's "savage crimes." Iran claims Iraq used CW against civilian targets on 11 March and condemned the "passive and aloof reaction of the UN" as having "caused the continuation and escalation of Iraqi war crimes." Unless the UN acts, Iran will "forcefully resort to appropriate and effective retaliatory measures in our defense."

16-18 March 1988
According to a study conducted by the Pentagon, Iran uses CW (in addition to Iraq), most likely cyanogen chloride, during an attack on the Kurdish village of Halabja, Iraq. The attack begins on 15 March with the Iranian Val Fajr-10 offensive. According to US intelligence findings, Iran drops more than fifty artillery shells and aerial bombs loaded with cyanide on the village. Iraq uses CW, including mustard, extensively in this attack.

16-18 March 1988
Ali Shafii, a spokesman from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), accuses Iraq of using chemical weapons in Halabja: "The Iraqis, using planes and artillery equipped with chemical weapons releasing mustard gas, cyanide and other types, caused 5,000 innocent people of Halabja and the area to die." Iranian authorities claim that their own troops survived by wearing gas masks. Iran's parliament Speaker, Hashemi Rafsanjani, declares, "We have the technology to produce chemical weapons and, although we have not exploited this yet, we will not remain idle forever."
— Andrew Bilski, Maclean's, 4 April 1988, p.18.

16-18 March 1988
According to Iraq, 88 of its soldiers were wounded in the Iranian attack on Halabja.
— "Fifteen Iraqi soldiers Flown to London, Vienna for Treatment," Associated Press, 11 April 1988. [Note: It is uncertain how these Iraqi soldiers were wounded. Some reports indicate that they may have potentially been injured through Iraq's own use of CW in this attack.]
16-18 March 1988
Facts on File reports the sequence of events as follows: Iran claims to have taken the town of Halabja as part of a three-pronged offensive by its forces and Kurdish fighters. Iraqi government forces collapsed and were taken prisoner after a battle around the town of Dojaila. At that point, the Iraqi garrison was apparently "arrested" by Dojaila's Kurdish population. Some survivors of the fighting claim that the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan had encircled Halabja. Western experts claim that the Kurdish role in the capture of the town might explain why the chemical attack occurred, especially since it was punitive rather than tactical in nature. Accounts of both survivors and Iranian officials agreed that Iraqi warplanes bombed the town with a combination of conventional and chemical weapons between 16-17 March. Some of the victims included Iranian Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) troops who had just entered the town when the Iraqi aircraft began bombing the town with CW. Most of the Iranians survived uninjured because of CW protective gear. The US states that Iran also may have used CW in attacking Halabja, however, according to Facts on File, this is the only claim that Iran used CW in Halabja.

16 March 1988
Robert Pelletiere, a former CIA analyst, claims that Iran gassed the villagers of Halabja on 15 March before entering the city.

16 March 1988
IRNA reports at 1800 GMT that Iraq has bombed Halabja with CW which meant that "some 4,000 residents...were killed."

16-17 March 1988
IRNA claims that Iraqi planes attacked Kurdish villages near Marivan with CW on 16 and 17 March, killing an unspecified number of civilians.

17 March 1988
Iran claims that it seized two border towns in northeast Iraq despite heavy Iraqi CW counterattacks. Tehran Radio claims that Iraqi forces used chemical bombs against the Iraqi cities of Dojaila and Halabja, "killing many defenseless residents." The report states that 4,000 civilians in Halabja alone have been killed in the Iraqi CW attacks on 16 March.

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17 March 1988
Tehran Radio reports that the "Iraqi regime, totally disappointed because of repeated defeats," had resorted to using CW against Halabja and Dojaila.

17 March 1988
Iran’s Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati implores the International Committee of the Red Cross to investigate Iraq’s CW attacks in Kurdistan. IRNA claims that Iraqi aircraft repeatedly bombed Halabja and Dojaila with CW as well as cluster bombs on 17 March, killing or wounding "scores of innocent Kurdish women, children, and aged people."

17 March 1988
IRNA reports the arrival this week in Sanandaj, Kurdistan (Iran) of close to 9,000 Kurdish refugees, all from the villages in Sulaimaniyah in northwestern Iraq. Abdullah Mohammad Ali, one of the Kurdish refugees tells IRNA that Saddam began launching a large attack against the towns in the region ten days ago due to the presence of Iranian troops and Iraqi Mojahedin. He states this attack included CW attacks on the villages of the region.

17 March 1988
At 1636 GMT, Khatam ol-Anbiya HQ communiqué reports the "liberation" of Halabja in the face of Iraqi "chemical bombs."

17-18 March 1988
IRNA reports that on 17 and 18 March, Iraqi planes attacked the towns of Nowsud and Marivan with mustard gas bombs, killing an unspecified number of civilians. IRNA claims that Iraqi planes attacked Kurdish villages near Marivan with CW on 16 and 17 March, killing an unspecified number of civilians.

18 March 1988
IRNA states that "the wounded are being evacuated to hospitals behind the frontlines by the liberating forces," while thousands more Kurdish refugees were fleeing across the border to Iran. While IRNA reports that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) captured the town, killing and wounding 8,000 Iraqi troops and capturing an additional 3,400 more, a Kurdish rebel group allied with Iran gave a different story. In a telephone call from

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Tehran, a Patriotic Union of Kurdistan spokesman states that Kurdish rebels had captured the town of Halabja on 15 March. He states that the Iraqis then attacked Halabja as well as neighboring towns on 16 March with napalm and CW, wounding and killing thousands.


18 March 1988
Tehran Radio reports that the Kurdish Democratic Party states that Iraq used phosphorous and cluster bombs in and around Halabja, killing and wounding a multitude of people.


20 March 1988
IRNA claims Iraq used cyanide, mustard, and unidentified nerve agents in the attacks on Kurdish population centers in northwestern Iraq "to prevent the people from joining Iranian combatants." IRNA goes on to quote Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati as informing the UN Secretary General that 5,000 Kurdish civilians were dead from the CW attack. He reportedly criticizes the UN for not stopping Iraq's use of CW earlier in the war. Iran states that it has airlifted 1,000 Kurds to hospitals in Tehran to receive medical treatment and as called upon the Red Cross and other similar organizations for humanitarian aid.


20 March 1988
An Iraqi military communiqué states that it successfully captured the mountain headquarters of Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which it accused of having helped Iran to capture Halabja and other villages in northwestern Iraq.


Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
21 March 1988

Iran’s permanent representative to the UN, Mohammad Jaafar Mahallati, informs a news conference that the Iraqi air force has been dropping cluster bombs, mustard gas, nerve gas, and cyanide on Kurdish towns in Northeastern Iraq since 17 March. He claims it is “the most extensive use of nerve gas on record,” with the hardest hit areas being the city of Halabja and the villages of Dojaila and Khorma. He states that the attacks are continuing and that they are a “turning point in the use of chemical warfare anywhere in the world. It is an act of genocide by the Iraqi regime against its own people. It is an act defined as a crime against humanity.” Mahallati demands the Security Council “immediately condemn Iraq’s use of chemical warfare, call for an immediate end to such practice, and immediately dispatch a mission to investigate.” He also asked that the Security Council convene a session solely on the topic of Iraq’s CW usage “independently from other war issues.” He claims that as many as 5,000 civilians killed and an equal number of people wounded.


21 March 1988

Iran puts wounded Iraqi civilians on display to reporters so they can document their CW-related injuries. News sources described the “peeling skin, raw pinkish blotches and labored breathing” and said that Iranian doctors attributed the injuries to mustard gas, and possibly phosgene and other chemicals as well. Ahmad Karim, a 58-year-old street vendor from Halabja states that "we saw the [Iraqi] planes come and use chemical bombs. I smelled something like insecticide." Dr. H. Sohrab Pour states that "Mustard gas certainly has been used, and also some agent causing long-term damage." He states that 159 injured people had been brought to his hospital since 18 March — with 67 of them still receiving treatment.


21 March 1988

Iran charges in a letter to the UN Secretary General that Iraq attacked three more Iranian villages with CW on 18 March. The letter reiterated Iran’s "urgent request" for a UN team to be sent to investigate the attacks.

— "UN Chief Appeals a New End to Gulf Hostilities," Xinhua General Overseas News Service (PRC), 22 March 1988, item number: 0322197.

21 March 1988

Iran boycotts the 17th conference of foreign ministers of member states of the Islamic Conference Organization that opened in Amman, Jordan today. Iran’s Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati refused to attend due to Jordan’s support for Iraq in the war. Velayati instead sent a message to the organization’s Secretary General outlining the recent Iraqi CW attacks on Halabja and Khurmal and expressing Iran’s displeasure with the organizations refusal to condemn the attacks.


Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
22 March 1988
IRNA reports that Iraqi aircraft bombarded three Iranian villages near the border towns of Marivan and Sardasht with CW this morning, killing and wounding numerous people. Iran's Interior Minister Ali Akbar Mohtashami sends a message to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees accusing Iraq of using CW in Kurdish areas of northeastern Iraq, causing thousands of people to seek shelter in Iran. He calls upon international organizations to break their silence and condemn the attacks.

22 March 1988
According to a different report, four villages in Marivan and two in Sardasht were attacked by CW.

22 March 1988
Tehran Radio reports that Iraqi planes attacks villages near Marivan with CW for two straight days last week. The Iranian foreign minister cabled the secretary general of the Islamic Conference Organization asking him to denounce "the extensive use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi regime."

22 March 1988
David Hirst reports that according to Iranian officials, Iraqi Mirage fighter planes dropped cyanide on the Kurdish people of Halabja. Dr. Sayyid Furutan says that "one bomb holds a hundred liters and on a cold day the vapor can quickly spread 500 meters. These people had no chance," he says as he pointed to what remained of a cyanide-carrying bomb. He goes on to state that in other areas of the town, planes dropped nerve gas along with mustard. "You can save the victims of nerve gas if you treat them quickly, and we saved many." However, the mustard gas injured many people. Hirst and other reporters visited a hospital in Bakhtaran where some of the victims less seriously injured are receiving treatment. More seriously injured victims have been transferred to Tehran where the Azadi stadium has been converted to allow treatment of the victims. All of the victims, numbering in the thousands, are reportedly Iraqi Kurdish civilians except for a handful of Iranian soldiers who did not don their gas masks in time. An Iranian journalist reported that he had observed the Kurdish townspeople of Halabja "hiding in the tobacco factory after we had entered the town without a shot being fired." He states that he had "wondered what they were all doing" until 6:30 pm when Iraqi Mirage fighter planes attacked the town with CW. [Note: There has been no confirmation that hydrogen cyanide or cyanogen chloride were used by either Iraq or Iran against targets in Kurdistan or elsewhere.]
23 March 1988

US State Department spokesman Charles Redman says with regard to the Iraqi use of CW on the Kurdish village of Halabja, "There are indications that Iran may also have used chemical artillery shells in this fighting." He did not provide any specific details about what the "indications" were. Redman did, however, mention that both Iran and Iraq were able to produce CW indigenously, and that both countries were trying to stockpile CW. Redman states that the United States "calls upon Iraq and Iran to desist immediately from any further use of chemical weapons, which are an offense to civilization and humanity." When asked to provide evidence of Iranian CW use, Redman responds that he was "not prepared to go into the kind of evidence we have." US officials state that both combatants can produce CW indigenously. An unnamed US official, however, claimed that the evidence of Iraqi CW use at Halabja was far more convincing than that of Iranian use there.


23 March 1988

The Special Security Office of the US Defense Intelligence Agency states, "Most of the casualties in Halabja were reportedly caused by cyanogen chlorine [chloride]. This agent has never been used by Iraq, but Iran has shown interest in it. Mustard gas casualties in the town were probably caused by Iraqi weapons because Iran has never been noted using that agent."


23 March 1988

The United States, Iran, and the Red Cross condemn Iraq for launching a CW attack against its Kurdish population last week. Iraq immediately denies attacking Kurdish villages with CW and instead blames Iran for the massacre. Meanwhile, Iran has escorted foreign media to the scene of the attacks. IRNA reports that Iraqi planes dropped CW munitions on "innocent and defenseless Kurdish inhabitants in Iranian liberated towns and villages in northeastern Iraq last week." IRNA reports the attacks killed 5,000 and wounded 5,000 more with the dead suffering "from burns on their eyes, faces, hands, feet and lungs, as well as disturbances in their nervous systems."


23 March 1988

At Iranian War Information Headquarters Minister, Kamal Kharrazi blames the UN Security Council for not stepping in earlier to prevent Iraqi use of CW. While addressing a press conference, Kharrazi states that the "indifferent attitude" of the Security Council would limit its chances of leading Gulf War peace efforts. He further warns that even though Iran has decided against using CW thus far, it would be forced to reconsider this self-imposed ban should the Security Council remain silent on the issue.


Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
23 March 1988
Kharrazi, in response to a question posed by a BBC correspondent about a possible Iranian retaliation using CW, states that "we have the capability to do this. However, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s use of chemical weapons depends on the reaction of the Security Council to this Iraqi action. We have not yet taken a definite decision in this respect but if no important step is taken to stop Iraq using chemical weapons, then we will be forced to defend ourselves."

23 March 1988
Kharrazi states, "We haven’t taken any decision yet" on using chemical weapons. "But as long as the international community refuses to condemn Iraq using chemical weapons against towns and villages we may be forced to do so....We think that some members of the Security Council may have been involved in the attacking of Iranian cities and may also have been involved in the planning of chemical warfare attacks against the captured Kurdish town in Iraq of Halabja. The Security Council is more worried that Iraq will be defeated than that its crimes will be punished."

23 March 1988
Iran states the cyanide that hit Halabja was delivered by 100-liter containers that vaporized the gas on impact. Doctors on the scene say that evidence clearly shows that cyanide was used along with mustard and nerve gas (although what this evidence was precisely is still unknown). Reporters taken to the scene of the attack were issued gas masks and medical kits as a precautionary measure by Iranian officials for fear of another Iraqi attack. Iran claims that the town was hit in three waves of gas attacks, beginning on 16 March in the afternoon and continuing into the next day. Iran states that cyanide was used over large portions of the city, while mustard and nerve gas were deployed in other districts. Iran states that most of its Revolutionary Guards and thousands of Halabja citizens had already left the town before the first bombing raid. However, up to half of the town's population appear to have still been in the town when the first bombs fell.
— "Iraqi Gas Leaves 'a Modern Pompeii'," Washington Times, 23 March 1988, p. 1A.

24 March 1988
Hashemi Rafsanjani warns that Iran will have no other choice but to retaliate with chemical weapons if Iraqi CW attacks continue. The Associated Press (AP) states that "the intensity of Tehran’s accusations against Iraq in recent days has heightened fears that the Iranians may be seeking to justify using chemical weapons of their own." The AP quotes Don Kerr of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London as stating that "it’s entirely likely that the Iranians could do so. They’ve had these weapons used against them for a long time." The AP notes that since 1984, Iran has accused Iraq of using CW against them on more than 100 occasions—primarily against Iranian troops. According to the AP, "Iran’s chief military spokesman, Kamal Kharrazi, has said this country is producing chemical weapons." The analysts and diplomatic sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that Iranian chemical weapons are believed to be mainly mustard and phosgene gases. Kerr noted, "These are relatively simple to manufacture from readily available industrial components, as is hydrogen cyanide. Only the more complex

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nerve gases are likely to pose a chemical challenge to the Iranians."

24 March 1988
Hashemi Rafsanjani states on Tehran Radio that "we asked the UN to send experts to the Halabja region to inspect the effects of the chemical weapons. If the international organizations refuse to take any step to punish Iraq, we shall not remain idle. We have the technology to produce chemical weapons, and although we have not exploited this yet, we will not remain idle forever."

24 March 1988
At a press conference, Rafsanjani states that "We are discontented with the UN Secretary General because he has not done his duty in preventing the Iraqis from using chemical weapons and attacking Iranian cities."
— "Iran to Send Envoy to Meet UN Chief," Xinhua General Overseas News Service (PRC), 24 March 1988, item number: 0324207.

24 March 1988
At a press conference, Rafsanjani states, "I want to thank the correspondents for having taken the trouble to go to Halabjah, and thus having started to reflect this calamity to the world. The events of the past two or three weeks are clearly unprecedented and worthy of serious consideration. Possibly the fact that the allegiance of the occupied cities' residents was entirely to the conquering forces and that they were very happy to see these forces enter cities is a rare or even unprecedented phenomenon. It is interesting to note that these cities were within the range of the Islamic Republic's artillery and that very recently Saddam [Husayn] had alleged that we were shelling them with our artillery. Had the residents of these cities been harmed by our artillery, they would not have displayed such sincere feelings towards us. Perhaps it is also unprecedented that the ruler of these cities so cruelly bombed his own people because they did not co-operate with his forces. The surprising thing is that the news media and world observers, and especially governments, do not consider these to be important points. History will judge the calamity of the chemical bombing of Halabjah and surrounding cities, and will put the military, political, and propaganda powers of today's world on trial. If Iraq had been punished last year when it used chemical weapons, as the UN also confirmed, this calamity would not have taken place. We asked the UN to send experts to inspect the calamity. But we see that in the UN and Security Council, the USA and France are preventing the dispatch of UN experts. By claiming that Iran may have also used chemical weapons, the Americans have cast the first shadow of doubt. However, the facts are so strong that whoever tries to raise doubts will have only disgraced himself."

Rafsanjani, in response to a question posed by a reporter on whether Iran would retaliate with CW if the international community remains silent on the issue, replies, "With the presence of correspondents in the operational theatre, we see, more or less, that the silence has been broken and that, fortunately, reports and reactions are accumulating. If this trend continues, it will be effective. But if appropriate organizations do not take steps, naturally we cannot sit idly by and witness the continuation of these crimes. We have stated previously that we do have the technology to manufacture chemicals and all the types of gases being used now. Fortunately,

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so far we have been able to restrain ourselves and not use them. But there is no guarantee that this restraint will continue forever."

A reporter further asks Rafsanjani to comment on the US condemnation of the Iraqi attack. Rafsanjani states, "I, too, read these reports today. We thank the USA for having condemned this. However, it has also committed an unpious act. While condemning this, they have said that it is alleged that Iran has also used chemical shells in the region. This is a lie. They should present facts. Also, they did not clearly refer to Iraq. They should explicitly condemn this crime by Iraq. Any weakness in condemnation will make Iraq bolder. I do not think there is the least doubt that this crime was carried out by Iraq intentionally and mischievously, and against its own people. We have a document proving that one of the Iraqi regional officers informed Baghdad that the region's people had been asked to take up arms and to fight the Iranians but that they refused to do so; thus, they should be punished. The answer from Baghdad was that they would soon be punished; and their punishment was what you, the correspondents, saw in the streets of Halabjah, in the hospitals and in the convalescent centers. This should be clearly, explicitly and decisively condemned. Meanwhile, it should be pointed out that condemnation so weak is not enough. Action should be taken against the aggressor; and this is what various countries are expected to do."

When asked about whether there is only a military solution to end the war, Rafsanjani states, "We intend to send someone to the UN for talks with the Secretary-General. But we have a recent bone to pick with the Secretary-General too, because he has not carried out the duty assigned to him by the UN to send an expert on chemical affairs to the region, even though we have heard that the USA and France have obstructed this. Moreover, the convention on massacres, which should be invoked now in view of the massacre of the Halabjah people, has not been invoked. The Secretary General should work on that. Also, he has not displayed the necessary decisiveness as far as the war of the cities is concerned and as a duty that he shoulders. At any rate, we will send someone to the UN."

Finally, an IRNA reporter asks, "Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani, despite the visit by my foreign colleagues to the fronts, as well as to Tehran hospitals, the Iraqi ambassador in London alleged last night that it was Iran that chemically bombed Halabjah. In your remarks, Your Excellency referred to a document on this. Is this a written document? Will you publish this document? Or was it heard from the POWs?" Rafsanjani replies, "We will study the document. If its publication is not contrary to military interests, we will publish it. As for the allegation by the Iraqis, this is extremely ridiculous and impudent. Now the Western correspondents are in our country. They have met the victims of the war, the victims of the chemical war in Halabjah. The interesting point is that we granted permission and told the Halabjah people that anyone who wants to go to Iraq can do so. But none of them [were] prepared to do so. Our proposal still applies. Any of the Iraqi people who have come recently to Iran from Halabjah and that region will be handed over to the International Red Cross if they want to return to Iraq. Our revolutionary guards, too, were poisoned by chemicals. Some of them were martyred, too, beside the Halabjah people. Let the correspondents and the experts see the films shot before the bombing. Iraq has made the same allegation before. UN experts came and stated that Iraq was lying. This time, too, Iraq is opposing their coming. Documents are so strong and clear that there can be no doubt. Well, Iraq is used to perpetrating crimes and refuting them, and it lacks the courage to take responsibility for its crimes. Unfortunately, it has the ear of its mentors, and this stems from the absence of conscience among these mentors. It is interesting and it should be interesting for you to know

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that we stopped the operations and our advance in order to save the oppressed people of the region. We deployed our hospital facilities, our helicopter transportation and other facilities, to save the people, and we were able to save several tens of thousands of people between 30,000 and 40,000 people from the region, bringing them into Iran. Ask Iraq what it has done to protect its own people."

24 March 1988

The Associated Press reports that IRNA claimed earlier this week that eight towns in northwestern Iran have been hit with Iraqi aerial CW attacks, causing numerous civilian casualties.

24 March 1988

In its lead article, The Guardian reports on a news conference given by the Iraqi ambassador to London and casts doubt on the claims he made that Iran, not Iraq, was the culprit in the Halabja CW massacre. The paper reports that "we are somewhat better placed than the ambassador to assess the likely origin and effects of the bombing because our own David Hirst was in a group of western reporters taken to Halabja this week by Iranians....Unfortunately for [the ambassador], the only participant in the Gulf War shown by repeated UN investigations to have used chemical weapons is Iraq. Iran did announce last December that it had begun to make 'sophisticated offensive chemical weapons.' But there is no evidence that it has yet done so....Even the Iranian leadership is not eccentric enough to liquidate its own supporters on its most promising front, where its ground-forces and their allies have the Iraqis on the defensive over a wide area."

24 March 1988

The Guardian reports that "there is little doubt that the Iranian and Kurdish versions of the tragedy are essentially correct....The attack on Halabja comes in the wake of persistent Kurdish claims that dozens of villages and towns have been attacked in this manner over recent years. Kurds on the Iranian side have not been spared; 100 people died and 2,000 were injured in an Iraqi attack on the Iranian border town of Sardasht on 28 June 1987, according to Iranian reports, and several nearby villages suffered further casualties in fresh attacks this week....Iran announced late in 1986 that it had developed its own chemical warfare technology, and was awaiting a political decision because Iran's war is ideological; I want to 'set an Islamic example' and win over fellow Moslems, especially those in Iraq. Iran's self-proclaimed principles are likely to be severely tested in the coming months, particularly if its troops make further inroads into Iraq."

24 March 1988

Reuters reports that during a tour of Halabja, its reporter notes that Iranian officials and local survivors claim that Iraqi forces repeatedly bombed the town with on 16 March, one day after Iranian forces took the town, and that the Iraqis also used CW against the towns inhabitants. Iranian doctors report that the wax-like appearance of some
of the dead indicates cyanide poisoning. [Note: This reported condition of corpses at Halabja seems to have formed the basis for the claims that cyanide was used. In fact, this condition is not pathognomonic evidence for cyanide intoxication.]

In the neighboring village of Anap, more bodies were strewn across the town, hanging out of cars and lying on the street. Some of the bodies had turned black. An Iranian Revolution Guard spokesman reports that “the Iraqis, using planes and artillery equipped with chemical weapons releasing mustard gas, cyanide and other types, caused 5,000 innocent people of Halabja and the area to die.” According to Reuters, “some survivors said a single warplane appeared from the west at 2 p.m. last Wednesday [16 March] and dropped one or more chemical bombs that dispersed a deadly yellow-and-white cloud. A middle-aged man, one of the handful of people still living on the outskirts of the town, told reporters, "The Iranians came here and we welcomed them. Then, about noon time, the [Iraqi] bombardment came. Everybody was killed. I saw a cloud. I saw gas." Iranian military officials told Western journalists that two Iraqi pilots, whose jets were shot down during the battle, had acknowledged Iraq was responsible for the chemical attack.


24 March 1988

Facts on File reports that Iran displays 3,000 captured Iraqi soldiers being held at a soccer stadium. Two Iraqi officers are presented at a news conference who claimed they witnessed the CW attack. Brig. Gen. Nather Hussein Mustafa claimed that he was three miles from the town when three Iraqi planes dropped CW bombs on the town. He states that following the attack, his Iranian captors gave him a gas mask and took him to see the town’s dead.


24 March 1988

Haj Ali Rasa, a 50-year-old Kurdish resident of Halabja claims, "the white clouds came from the Iraqi planes." The Globe and Mail states that Rasa’s account is confirmed by those of other survivors, and that all witness accounts generally corroborate the official Iranian line.


25 March 1988

The UN Secretary General confirmed that Iraq was to blame for the CW attacks on Kurdish villages in northeast Iraq last week, which caused "a high number of casualties including civilians in both countries." He states that his conclusion is based upon the "considerable and most serious evidence in the public domain," as well as on reports from the Red Cross. Iran's UN Ambassador again repeats Iran's demand for "the immediate dispatch" of a UN fact-finding team. If the UN failed to do so, he states that Iran would not attend any discussions aimed at ending the war.


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25 March 1988
The UN states that it is organizing a two-man team to investigate Iraq's use of CW in the Kurdish communities along the Iraq-Iran border. Iran's UN ambassador denounced the international body for slowly responding to the charges of massive CW attacks by the Iraqis. He states that unless the UN sends a team to investigate, Iran will unlikely participate in any UN efforts to end the war. "It means if the United Nations remains inactive regarding all aspects of the war, a political solution would be more and more difficult. We are losing time. Yet not all chances have died. We sincerely hope the United Nations would somehow rectify the inactiveness." In talks later in the day with the Secretary General, the ambassador states that a UN team will arrive in Iran on Monday. Meanwhile, a Kurdish leader reports that the villages of Seyo and Senan were bombed with CW on 24 March by Iraqi planes, killing at least 50 villagers and wounding numerous others. He appeals for urgent aid from the international community.

25 March 1988
At the Friday prayers at Tehran University, Chief Justice Ayatollah Musavi Ardebili states that Iranians are waiting to see how Iraq's allies on the UN Security Council respond to the Iranian capture of Halabja and the Iraqi CW attack that followed. "We are waiting to see what those who were supporting him in the UN Security Council, who used to say, 'Iraq is in favor of peace,' 'Iran is not accepting the resolution and Iran should be boycotted,' and 'Iraq be left free are going to do.' Can they wipe the shame off their faces? Will they say the same things after these chemical weapon attacks, after such extensive attacks against cities? We must also praise and thank the correspondents who have come and reported these events. However, unfortunately we have to ask them what they have done since they came and observed this. They say that they have sent photographs and reports, showed the bodies, gone to hospitals, you visited the wounded and heard their moans. You saw the area, you saw the greatest calamities and crimes and what did your governments say? 'We are sorry!' Another one said, 'We are concerned!' The one who has shown the strongest reaction said, 'I condemn this.' The biggest of the lot said, 'I strongly condemn this!' Is that all? Thousands of people were murdered, they burned thousands of people and you are sorry and concerned?"

25 March 1988
Iranian military communiqués report that Marivan has come under attack from CW bombs, injuring seven people.

26 March 1988
Doctors Without Borders confirms that Iraq has used cyanide and mustard gases in its recent attacks. One spokesman for the group states that the faces and the nails of some of the victims have turned blue and that "this confirms that they were killed by cyanide gas." He also states that many of the victims have the types of blisters associated with mustard. An Iranian doctor states that protective gear in the hands of the Iranian forces in the area

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protected them from most of the CW. Around 300 CW victims are receiving treatment in Tehran hospitals. A Belgium doctor declined to speculate on whether Iraq used nerve agent because it decomposed too quickly to be identified. Iraq states that it will use all available means to deter Iranian forces from advancing further.

26 March 1988

Tehran Home Service comments on the recent statement by the UN Secretary General that accused Iraq of carrying out the CW attack on Halabja. After reiterating the Secretary General’s belief that there is serious and considerable evidence proving that Iraq committed the atrocity, the report draws attention to diplomatic sources that "believe the UN Secretary General’s statement focuses on three important points. First, the Secretary General has raised the issue of the use of chemical weapons by the Zionist Iraqi regime for the first time as an independent issue....Second, for the first time the Secretary General names Iraq specifically and holds the regime ruling in Baghdad responsible for the use of chemicals weapons. Third, he has condemned the use of chemical weapons. Notwithstanding all this, the statement falls short of international expectations by a large margin, and the UN Secretary General's duty remains unchanged."

Iran's Ambassador to the UN states during a press conference that Iraq's recent CW attacks struck not only Halabja, but also towns and villages in Iran. He states that a failure to act on the part of the UN would not only result in the disappearance of the evidence that the crime ever took place, but also it would encourage the Iraqi regime to commit similar crimes in the future. After a meeting with the Secretary General, the ambassador states that Iran believes that the UN team's trip to investigate the attacks, and the report that follows, will certainly inform global opinion about the crime. Iran also hopes the trip and the report will have a practical impact in preventing future CW attacks.

Rafsanjani sends a message to parliaments around the world asking them to condemn the "massacre" at Halabja.

Chief Justice Musavi Ardebili sends a letter to the UN Secretary General stating, "The silence maintained by international circles and the irresponsible attitude of the UN Security Council has become a source of surprise to the freedom-lovers of the world and is an illogical position that contravenes legal precedents and international regulations." Although the Chief Justice thanks the Secretary General "for his action in condemning the Iraqi regime and the dispatch of a UN delegation to experts to review the dimensions of this calamity, [he demands] the legal punishment of the perpetrator of this crime and an arms embargo against the Iraqi regime in addition to a ban against the export of chemical and bacteriological weapons to Iraq or the production in a number of Iraqi cities."

27 March 1988

Iraqi newspapers state that "Iraq is determined to utilize all capabilities and means to decimate the invaders and..."
purge the land inch by inch" and that "we defend ourselves with all available means."

28-31 March 1988
A UN team visits Iran to investigate CW allegations at Halabja made by both Iraq and Iran. The team concludes that victims were exposed to mustard gas and something resembling a nerve agent. The UN makes no statement regarding the sources of exposure.

28 March 1988
A UN team lands in Tehran to investigate the CW attack on Kurdish villages in northeastern Iraq.

28 March 1988
Iraq sends an angry 15-page letter to the Secretary General condemning the UN decision to send a team to Tehran to investigate the CW attacks on Kurdish towns in northeastern Iraq and northwestern Iran. The letter also condemns the Secretary General and some members of the Security Council for believing Iran's claims, which resulted in a "biased and unbalanced" statement by the Secretary General on 25 March 1988. The letter did not confirm or deny Iraqi use of CW but states that "when each time Iran sends hundreds of thousands of people to attack and kill us, can you expect Iraq to stand by with folded hands when barbarians try to invade?" Finally, the letter states that Iran's of CW since the beginning of the war has been well documented, "but here there is no question or quick response by the Secretary General to investigate this or any aggression by Iran."

29 March 1988
Yaser Hashemi Rafsanjani, the 16-year-old son of the Majlis Speaker, and Amir Mohammadi Khomeiniha, son of Iran's Prosecutor General, were reportedly among the victims of a 25 March 1988 Iraqi CW attack along the northern front. The report states that Yaser Rafsanjani, now receiving hospital treatment, was a student volunteer stationed in Iraq's Sulaymaniyah Province when his unit came under Iraqi CW attack. A separate report indicates that 29 additional CW victims have been sent to Austria, West Germany, Switzerland, Britain, and the United States in order that they may receive medical treatment.

29 March 1988
Iraq reports that Iran has used chemical weapons during its latest offensive and threatens to attack Iranian cities with CW in retaliation.

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29 March 1988

Nuri Nayef, the head of the Iraqi News Agency’s Cairo office, says an Iraqi government spokesman informed him that the military "might choose a number of large Iranian cities to be the targets of chemical weapons as a deterrent and punitive measure." The unidentified spokesman had stated that Iran had deployed CW in Iraqi Kurdistan last week and that Iraq was deciding whether to respond in kind.


29 March 1988

Six CW victims arrive in Vienna to receive treatment for their injuries. Doctors attending to the victims state that their injuries lead them to believe they were exposed to mustard gas "in combination with a 'light' nerve gas, because they all have bad headaches, are dizzy, and (some) may have been unconscious."


29 March 1988

The Iraqi News Agency reports that "out of our desire to emphasize the facts and in reply to the campaign regarding Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, we would like to reiterate that Iran has used chemical weapons on the battlefronts several times. It has also used this weapon inside cities. At the beginning of the war, Iran also used CS gas against our forces in the city of Mohammerah [Khorramshahr] and on the southern and northern fronts."


30 March 1988

Iran shows a video at the Iranian UN mission to prove its claim that Iraq was behind the CW attack in Halabja. The video shows Iranian troops entering the city unopposed and touring the city. Then, in scenes filmed from a distance, it is possible to see explosions followed by large dispersals of white gas clouds as they cover huge sections of the city. The film concludes by showing another tour of the city, this time filled with dead bodies. Iran claims it films all of its battles and deposited this film with the UN as official evidence. In other news, reports suggest that Iran is unhappy with the composition of the team the UN sent to investigate the recent CW attacks. Consisting of just a political officer and a medical doctor, the team did not have any chemical weapons specialists.


31 March 1988

Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati tells the Conference on Disarmament, "I would like to reiterate here that the Islamic Republic of Iran has full capability of manufacturing chemical weapons, but based upon humanitarian criteria and our commitments to the valuable Geneva protocol of 1925, we do not intend to use these weapons as

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a deterrent."

31 March 1988

Velayati continues by stating that by attacking Halabja with CW more than 20 times on 17 March, the bombardment was the worst of its kind since the First World War. "Halabja was not the first city subject to Iraqi chemical bombardments, but with 5,000 martyrs and 7,000 injured, 75 percent of them women and children, it was the worst of it." He goes on to state that Iraq first began to use CW in January 1981 and later expanded its use in 1984. He accuses the US and other influential states of having a pro-Iraq policy that has prevented the UN from taking the strong measures necessary to deter Iraqi CW attacks.

31 March 1988

Velayati states at the Conference on Disarmament that "In Auschwitz, men and women were taken by force to gas baths but in Halabja, poison and gas were taken to the houses of people." He urges the delegates to travel to Zurich and Lausanne to visit the injured receiving treatment there and states that the attack on Halabja "must be recorded as a genocide and crime against humanity....Only, and I repeat only, by practical and unified action can we prevent the repetition of such crimes. No measures were (previously) taken by the Council and as a result Iraq, with open hands and with the hope that there would not be much international reaction, subjected Halabja to its chemical attacks."

31 March 1988

In a live television interview in Iran, Velayati updates viewers on recent diplomatic events at the Conference on Disarmament. He states that much of his speech concerned the Iraqi use of chemical weapons in Kurdistan. He informs viewers that he showed films and distributed brochures and pictures to the delegates attending the meeting. When asked what the response was to his speech, Velayati replies, "So far, Austria, the FRG, Great Britain, Switzerland, and the USA have agreed to take the victims of attacks by chemical weapons for treatment. Sweden, Norway, and Spain have expressed their willingness to accept the injured. Belgium has sent a team of physicians to Tehran. The Red Cross has sent a medical team and a planeload of pharmaceutical products. Other consignments of medicines and doctors have been sent. The world mass media, for example, French television, as well as the television networks of Switzerland, Germany [not further specified] Sweden, Australia, Austria, Great Britain and other countries have been presenting detailed coverage of issues pertaining to the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi regime. At the disarmament sessions during the past few days, Japan, on behalf of the Western countries, condemned the use of chemical weapons, while the GDR denounced Iraq's use of these weapons on behalf of the socialist countries. Sweden independently adopted a categorical and firm stance against the Iraqi regime for its use of chemical weapons. The Australian Foreign Minister declared a strong and firm stance against the Iraqi regime for its use of chemical weapons. For the first time in recent years, the Soviet

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representative condemned the use of chemical weapons against civilians, as did various other countries, some of which I have already mentioned. In general, it appears that despite attempts by the imperialist mass media to ignore this topic, this war crime, and to remain silent about it, the catastrophe was on such a large scale and our brothers in the Islamic Republic made such sincere efforts in this regard that this issue has generated an extensive reaction on the international level. The use of chemical weapons has left an unpleasant impression on people’s minds and led to a kind of loathing of the Iraqi regime on the part of people throughout the world. This loathing is now widespread. We can say that the people of the world are coming to the conclusion that the Islamic Republic was justified in saying that as long as the criminal regime remains in the region, the region will not know any peace."

31 March 1988
Six victims of recent CW attacks along the border of Iran and Iraq have arrived by Iranian Air Ambulance to New York.

31 March 1988
Iraqi aircraft bombarded two suburbs of the Iranian border city of Marivan with CW today, killing and wounding numerous people according to IRNA. The attack occurred just as the UN team investigating recent CW attacks left Tehran to travel to Halabja.

31 March 1988
A spokesman for the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan informs UPI that Iraqi planes bombarded the Kurdish city of Karadagh with CW on 26 and 27 March, killing 64 and wounding 210.

31 March 1988
In comments on Tehran Radio, Ayatollah Khomeini states, "the enemy has proved his brutal actions by firing chemical weapons on residential areas."

31 March 1988
In a later report, Tehran Radio claims that Iraqi planes dropped CW bombs on two villages near the border town of Marivan, but "only three people were martyred" and three injured thanks to Iranian measures already taken.

31 March 1988
Tehran citizens are warned for the first time that the radio will broadcast three beeps, a pause, and three more

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beeps to alert them that Iraq has attacked Tehran with CW. An official from the Iranian Guidance Ministry states that the Iraqis "would pay dearly if they dared to do it."


31 March 1988

Tehran Home Service reports on a statement made by an Iranian foreign ministry spokesman denouncing recent US allegations that Iran also used CW in Halabja: "The USA's officials, by linking the Islamic Republic of Iran with this false accusation, have sprung to Iraq's assistance so as to weaken and divert the world current [Persian: jarian], which has been built up against Saddam's regime. The foreign ministry spokesman added, "It is disgraceful for the US ruling circles in order to justify their incorrect policy of siding absolutely with Iraq, and now that the regime which they support, even according to the admissions of impartial medical missions and Western mass media, has committed the worst war crime of the present century to resort to such fabrications."

While strongly rejecting the USA's accusations, he added, "The US officials justify the crimes of Iraq in Halabjah, and this move on their part is a green light to that criminal regime to continue its extensive use of chemical weapons. In reality, American military experts are performing a task for Saddam which Goebbels performed for Hitler!...If the USA does not use its influence to compel the Iraqi regime not to repeat a tragedy such as that in Halabjah and not to use chemical weapons, there will be no doubts in the minds of the Iranian nation and all Muslims and freedom-seeking people of the world that the policy of using chemical weapons on the part of the Iraqi regime enjoys the full approval of the USA and that the White House and the war ministry [Defense Department] of the USA too are responsible for and are partners in this war crime as much as Saddam's regime is."


31 March 1988

Tehran Home Service, quoting an Iranian military communiqué, states that three people have died after two villages near Marivan were attacked with chemical weapons. In a separate report, it claims that Iraqi mustard gas and nerve gas killed 75 people in the region of Qaradagh in the villages of Susiyan and Dukan on 21-22 March, and Balakha, Jafaran, and Oliyan on 23 March.


April 1988

Iran produces its first gas masks and decontamination equipment.


April 1988

The gas masks are produced at the Yasa factories.

— Jean Pascal Zanders, "Iranian Use of Chemical Weapons: A Critical Analysis of Past Allegations," Talk at the
1 April 1988
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leader Jalal Talabani accuses Iraq of conducting a "war of genocide against the Kurdish people. They use chemical weapons against us all the time and raze our villages."

3 April 1988
Iran’s deputy foreign minister states during a press conference that Iran will be adding new conditions that will need to be fulfilled if it is to accept a cease-fire proposal: namely, that the Iraqi regime be held accountable and punished for its attacks on civilians and its use of chemical weapons. "I think the war of the cities and the use of chemical weapons is not justified at anytime...it is a war crime." He states that the UN needs to strongly condemn these actions and take punitive measures against Iraq such as employing an embargo on shipments to Iraq of chemical weapons precursors. He states that Iraq supports a global ban on the use, storage, and production of chemical weapons; although he does not state that Iran will never use chemical weapons. In response to the US accusations that Iran used chemical weapons against Halabja, he states that the United States is "very naïve" and that the accusations were nothing more than an attempt to "justify American support for Iraq."

4 April 1988
A European ambassador in Teheran calls Iraq's use of chemical weapons at Halabja "a warning they are ready to use chemical warheads." According to Newsweek, Iranian leaders threaten to use their own chemical weapons in retaliation. Newsweek sources in Teheran believe Iran is producing chemical weapons with the aid of West German technology.

4 April 1988
Western journalists in Halabja find no evidence on the ground to support Iraq's claim that Teheran is responsible for the gas attack on Halabja. US News & World Report claims that Iran has acquired enough raw materials to produce four tons of poison gas a month despite export bans. The same source claims that Iran possesses poison gas and is threatening to use it unless the United Nations punishes Iraq for employing chemical weapons.

4 April 1988
Iraq formally requests the UN Secretary General to send a team to investigate Iranian use of CW in its recent attacks in Iraq. In a letter to the UN Chief, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz states, "Your excellency, I have the honor to inform you that it has been ascertained that the criminal Iranian regime's armed forces bombarded the Iraqi forces in the Halabja sector on 30 and 31 March 1988 with chemical weapons. The Iranian regime did this with artillery and aircraft. As a result of this barbarous bombardment, 88 military personnel were seriously
wounded and are now in hospital in Baghdad....The Iraqi government requests Your Excellency to dispatch a mission to Baghdad immediately to visit the wounded and to learn the details of the aggression."

4 April 1988
Iran accuses Iraqi forces of wounding at least 18 Kurdish tribesmen with CW attacks on Iranian-held cities in northeastern Iraq over the weekend.

4 April 1988
Five CW victims sent by the Iranian government arrive in Japan to receive treatment for their injuries.

4 April 1988
Tehran Radio reports that Iraqi aircraft have dropped CW bombs on two villages in the Paveh area of Iran's Bakhtaran Province.

5 April 1988
Iran furiously rejects Iraqi allegations of its use of CW. A spokesman for Iran's War Information Headquarters states that the Iraqi allegations were made "in a bid to counteract international condemnation of Iraq's use of chemical substances against the Kurds of Iraq" and Iranian forces. A different Iranian spokesman states that Iraq more than likely "mistakenly used chemical weapons against its own forces who were stationed" near Iranian soldiers. Iran's prime minister states that the nations of the world "should adopt a severe stance against the Iraqi regime's crime which threatens not only Iran but also the whole world."

5 April 1988
An Iranian soldier receiving treatment in Vienna for chemical weapons-related injuries dies today. He was brought to Vienna on 29 March.

6 April 1988
The UN states that it is preparing to send a two-man team to Baghdad to investigate Iraqi claims of Iranian CW attacks. The team will consist of the same investigators recently investigating Iranian claims of Iraqi CW attacks in Kurdistan. Meanwhile, reports state that the Iranian Ambassador to the Vatican has sent the Pope a video showing Iranian evidence of the Iraqi attack on Halabja. In a letter accompanying the video, the ambassador states that,
"The Iraqi regime has used chemical bombs of various kinds, including mustard gas, nerve gas, and above all cyanide, against the helpless civilian populations." Furthermore, Iran's Foreign Minister sends a letter to the UN Secretary General stating, "it is imperative to dispatch a chemical weapons specialist as well as a military specialist to the Islamic Republic to complete the work of the previous team."

6 April 1988
Reporters are shown Iraqi soldiers injured by what Iraqi official claim to be Iranian chemical weapons. Around 80 soldiers and 10 military officers claim that Iranian chemical bombs and shells fell on Halabja on 31 March. An Iraqi doctor states, "Tests have proved they were all hit by mustard gas which caused severe injuries and inflammation of their eyes, skin, and sensitive parts of their bodies." An Iraqi lieutenant states, "A white smoke billowed over the area and oil spots appeared on the ground. About seven minutes later I felt bubbles growing on my skin, which was burning and which turned black and dark red." [Note: This could be due to white phosphorous incendiary or smoke munitions.]

6 April 1988
IRNA reports, "Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati categorically rejected Baghdad's baseless claims that Iran had used chemical weapons against Iraqi forces. In a letter to the United Nations Secretary General, Velayati expressed surprise that Javier Perez de Cuellar has responded positively to the untenable Iraqi request for dispatch of a UN team to Iraq within 24 hours, while it took more than two weeks for the Secretary General to respond to serious and repeated request by Iran regarding a far graver situation. [The] Iraqi regime, in a vain attempt to divert the international public opinion from Iraqi genocide in the city of Halabjah and in the Qara Dagh region, where Iraqi civilians were targets of chemical warfare by the Iraqi war criminals, has called on the UN to send a team to Iraq. In addition to conducting on-sight investigation of the extent of this latest Iraqi war crime, the team can indeed provide the urgently needed, and till now unavailable, emergency medical warfare in the Qara Dagh region."

Velayati concluded the letter by saying, "in view of the repeated use of chemical weapons in increasingly alarming proportions by Iraq, it is necessary that this investigative endeavour of the Secretary-General lead to a binding and enforceable decision on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. It is imperative that the parties commit themselves to accept and abide by such a binding decision."

10 April 1988
US military experts and government officials discuss the growing military challenges in the Middle East. These experts cite the growing use of chemical weapons by both Iran and Iraq—even against civilians. The experts reveal that US intelligence sources first detected Iraqi use of chemical weapons in 1982. That release backfired when poor deployment caused the chemical weapons to drift back over the Iraqi forces. After that experiment, Iraqis used chemical weapons in Kurdistan in 1983, and along the southern front in 1984-85. They state that Iraq has focused

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its efforts on persistent weapons such as mustard gas rather than non-persistent weapons such as cyanide. This is because the Iraqi military is often on the defensive and wants chemical weapons that will stay in the environment for a long time in order to hold off Iranian attacks for greater periods of time. On the other hand, because Iranian troops are often on the offensive, they have concentrated on non-persistent weapons that will dissipate quickly in front of advancing forces. These weapons include cyanide and chlorine. Pentagon sources state that there are "strong indications" that Iran also used chemical weapons in Halabja. "There is ample reason to believe both had a hand in it. It wasn’t a one-way show," the official says.

— David Ottaway, "Middle East Perils: The Introduction of Medium-Ranged Missiles, Chemical Weapons and Ballistic-Missiles Warfare into the Volatile Region has Created a Situation that could Spell Doom in a New War Erupts between Arabs and Israel," Toronto Star, 10 April 1988, p. H3.

10 April 1988
Tehran Radio reports that a village near Marivan has been bombed with chemical weapons this morning by Iraqi forces. Anti-chemical units are reported to have rushed to the scene.


10 April 1988
An Iraqi military spokesman denies that Iraqi forces attacked Marivan with chemical weapons and claims that Iran is spreading false accusations to divert attention from its own use of chemical weapons.


11 April 1988
Dr. Hamid Sohrapour of Labafi Nejad Hospital in Tehran reports that the gas used in Halabja was probably VX or tabun: "We know that Iraq has stocks of both kinds of gas."


11 April 1988
Tehran residents are buying plastic overalls, rubber tires, and powdered coal to protect themselves in the event of an Iraqi CW attack on their city. The Iranian government suggests that the fumes of burning tires offer some protection from chemical weapons. Government television instructs people to cover exposed skin with plastic, cover their mouths with a wet cloth soaked in powdered coal, and to move to higher ground in the event of a CW attack.


11 April 1988
Iran’s UN Representative states at a press conference that the Security Council should create an embargo against Iraq on chemical weapons precursors.

11 April 1988
Iraq flies 15 of its soldiers to England, West Germany, and Austria to receive treatment for injuries it says were caused by Iranian chemical weapons late last month. An Iraqi embassy spokesman says, "We bring the proof now that our soldiers have been hit" with chemical weapons.

12 April 1988
IRNA states that Iraqi forces deployed chemical weapons in Iraqi Kurdistan. Iranian troops are reported to have "immediately used protective devices though many are injured." IRNA quotes an Iraqi Kurd radio station as reporting a CW attack on Kurdish villages on 10 April that killed "hundreds of civilians and [wounded] many others."

12 April 1988
A Christian Science Monitor report quotes Iran's War Information Headquarters head Kamal Kharrazi as saying, "We have absolutely refrained from the use of chemical weapons in spite of the fact that we have the capability to produce and deploy them....You have to know our patience has limits. We are now waiting for international bodies to do something to prevent the continued use of chemical weapons by our enemy. At this stage it doesn't mean we aren't going to use chemical weapons." The article also reports on the capture of an Iraqi pilot, Maj. Ahmad Shaker of Iraq's 44th Squadron, who states that he was surprised that Iraqi Kurds had been injured and killed in the Halabja attacks. He was captured on 17 March and states that Iraqi pilots had thought the Kurds had vacated the town after it fell to the Iranians. He guesses that 20-25 Iraqi planes, each carrying 3-4 "special bombs," attacked the Halabja area in mid-March. He denies that he dropped any chemical weapons on Halabja, but admits to dropping chemical bombs near Basra in 1983.

12 April 1988
The Christian Science Monitor reports an interview with Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister that took place sometime last week. In the report, the official states that although the treatment of Iranian soldiers in US hospitals is a positive sign for the troubled relations between the two countries, the recent allegations made by the US State Department about Iranian use of chemical weapons were less positive. In referring to the allegations, the deputy foreign minister states, "They are very negative things. [This is] very open help for a criminal aggressor, which doesn't enjoy any international reputation or credibility. The hostility of American policy toward our revolution is mainly leading the administration to take these kind of positions." The reporter then asks him to comment on a statement made by Iran's foreign minister that although Iran has the capability to use chemical weapons, it has not and will never use chemical weapons. The reporter asks if this can be construed as a formal pledge not to use chemical weapons. He responds, "It is true. This is our position. But there is a main question: what kind of deterrent should we use to prevent Iraqis from using chemical warfare? There are only two, political and military....Unfortunately, the Security Council is showing deaf ears to all the calls, showing inconceivable ignorance...so we are entitled to think of deterrent measures because the political deterrent activities are not
enough. But what Dr. Velayati said, it is our constant policy. It is like a country who has the nuclear capability but he wants not to use it at all: as a deterrent measure maybe they have the capability but they are not going to use it."


13 April 1988
A high-ranking US official states, "It looks like Iran used its chemical weapons against military targets, while Iraq used them against troops and civilians" in the battle around Halabja last month. US officials state that they have solid intelligence that points to Iranian targeting of Iraqi troops through cyanide-filled artillery shells at about the same time as the gas attack on Halabja. This disclosure is weakening the Iranian propaganda campaign the officials say. US officials have also learned that West German technology and supplies are important to both Iranian and Iraqi chemical weapons arsenals. One example is ammunition-making technology supplied by Fritz Werner, a German tool-making company. US intelligence believes this equipment, supplied to both Iran and Iraq in 1986, has been used in chemical weapons programs.


13 April 1988
Hashemi Rafsanjani states, "We hope our defense will be so strong that we will not be forced to use chemical arms." If Iran was forced to use chemical weapons in response to repeated Iraqi chemical attacks, Rafsanjani states that Iran cannot be held responsible. He disputes claims that Iran has already used chemical weapons, claiming that Iran would be brave enough to admit their use if it ever came to that. He then criticizes the major world powers for maintaining chemical weapons stockpiles and contributing to Iraq's chemical weapons program. He states that although the superpowers are hypocrites for condemning the Iraqi attacks, there words are meaningless and they are simply telling lies.


14 April 1988
Three alleged Iranian victims of chemical weapons returned to Iran after receiving medical treatment for minor injuries. They were part of a group of five sent to Japan on 4 April. The other two are in serious condition. Doctors have not determined if their injuries are a result of chemical weapons.


15 April 1988
The Director General of Political Affairs of the Iranian Foreign Ministry meets with his Dutch counterpart in The Hague for discussions on trade and agriculture. In addition to those main topics, the Iranians also brought up the topic of Iraq's use of chemical weapons in Halabja. After the meeting, the Iranian official relates, "we emphasized the need for international organizations and community to ban the use of chemical weapons [and] we declared that we don't have any intention to use chemical weapons for humanitarian reasons....International bodies should take appropriate measures to punish Iraq for using chemical weapons."

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15 April 1988
Special trucks and equipment designed to neutralize the effects of chemical weapons have been stationed throughout Tehran, as there is growing speculation that the Iranian capital may come under Iraqi chemical weapons attack. Hospitals are stockpiling medicine and supplies to respond to a chemical weapons attack while the government is engaging in a large-scale advertising/public service campaign to teach the public what to do in the event of a chemical attack.

16 April 1988
A Tehran Home Service report calls the US claim from two weeks ago about Iran’s use of chemical weapons a "baseless lie" and says its sole intent is to exonerate the Iraqi regime “from the horrifying crime of Halabja.”

17 April 1988
Tehran Radio reports that Iraqis have resorted to using chemical weapons in fighting on the Fao Peninsula. IRNA reports that the Iraqis began using mustard, cyanide, and nerve agents in the fighting since 1:30 a.m. GMT.

17 April 1988
Tehran officials conduct drills to train their citizens on steps to take should the city come under large-scale chemical weapons attack. Smoke grenades were thrown, the chemical weapons attack siren sounded, first responders and decontamination units arrived on the scene, and the (fictitious) wounded were transported to area hospitals.

17-18 April 1988
According to General Wafiq Al-Sammarai, former head of Iraqi Military Intelligence, Iraq uses VX against Iran in the battle of Fao in Southern Iraq.

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18 April 1988
Kamal Kharrazi, director of the Iranian office of war information, denies that Iran has ever used chemical weapons. Still, he adds, "there are limits to our patience."
— "A Battered City Under Siege," Maclean's, 18 April 1988, p. 34.

18 April 1988
According to US News & World Report, the Iranians ask the French government to allow shipments of chemicals and fertilizers that the Iranians could easily turn into poison gas. In return, Iran may influence Hezbollah to free French hostages in Lebanon.

18 April 1988
IRNA reports that Iraqi chemical weapons attacks on the Fao peninsula have been so severe that they have adversely affected parts of Abadan.

Mid-April 1988
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Supreme Defence Council spokesman, states in Rome "that where and when necessary, the Islamic Republic of Iran will be capable of equipping all its forces with chemical weapons."

21 April 1988
Iran's Ambassador to India claims in a news conference at the Iranian Embassy that the United States is assisting Iraq in its use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces. Similar news conferences occur in Iranian Embassies in Japan and Belgium. The Iranian Ambassador to India claims that US troops are fighting alongside their Iraqi allies on the Fao Peninsula. He states, "the conspirators have descended now to open and direct military intervention, and worse of all to the use of chemical weapons."

22 April 1988
Tehran Radio reports that Iraq attacked it with chemical weapons in two bombing raids on Howejneh and Dar-Khoweyn (south of Ahwaz) in the southern sector, "wounding tens of our Arab-speaking compatriots....Chemical, bacteriological, and radiological defense units rapidly arrived on the scene" and began decontamination.

22 April 1988
IRNA reports that Iraqi forces shelled residential areas of Abadan with chemical weapons. IRNA also reports that the villages of Karhenu and Shamriyeh near Susangerd were bombed with chemical weapons.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
23 April 1988
Iran accuses Iraq of unleashing chemical weapons attacks on four of its southern border villages today, killing a number of people.

23 April 1988
An anti-chemical weapons brigade has been formed in Tehran to protect the city and the central province against Iraqi chemical weapons attacks. The evening newspaper Ettela'at reports that several districts within Tehran have undergone chemical weapons training during the past month. The paper further reports that many of the city's residents are nervous of attack and that many have made gauze masks filled with [baking] soda.
— "Iran Sets up Brigade against Chemical Weapons," Xinhua General Overseas News Service (PRC), 23 April 1988, item number: 0423012.

23 April 1988
Iran's UN Envoy sent a formal request to the United Nations in response to its reports of Iraq's use of chemical weapons in recent days. The request was issued "in connection with the renewed use of such weapons against our country's non-military areas. We request the renewed and immediate dispatch of an UN expert delegation in order to investigate the resumed use of chemical weapons by Iraq, and we hope that this time the secretary general will act without delay or hesitation. We must at the same time reiterate that Iraq's increasing use of chemical weapons and the colorless and ineffective reaction of the UN has created yet another worthless round to the advantage of Iraq and against the international community which has lasted since 1984, that is since the time of the dispatch of the first UN expert delegation to the Islamic Republic of Iran."

He continues to state that the Security Council's silence on the topic of Iraq's use of chemical weapons has encouraged further Iraqi use of the weapons. He states, "for quite some time, the Islamic Republic of Iran has predicted the worldwide dangers of the quantitative and qualitative expansion of war crimes and of Iraq's violation of international regulations and it has given the necessary warnings to the UN Secretary General. But unfortunately, the inaction of that organization has consistently left the path open to Iraq." He adds that Iran hopes the next delegation will comprise enough experts to carry out a comprehensive investigation.

23 April 1988
IRNA states that Iraqi planes caused heavy casualties when they dropped chemical bombs on two villages near Howeyzah and on the villages of Shamriyeh and Safheh near Ahvaz.
24 April 1988
Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani states during an interview in Rome with La Stampa that if and when it was deemed necessary, Iran could equip all of its forces with chemical weapons. He adds that he hopes that will never be necessary.

24 April 1988
Iran's Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati states, "the people of the world have realized that the aggressive Iraqi regime has used chemical weapons against our people, the Iraqi nation, and the Kurdish population. Recently the Arab-populated border villages of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Susangerd and Hoveyzeh were chemically bombed by Iraq. This issue should be pursued seriously at international forums, especially at the Geneva disarmament talks. Many countries and international organizations have already condemned this action." Dr. Velayati is in Damascus conveying a message to the Syrian President from the Iranian President regarding Iraq's use of chemical weapons.

25 April 1988
Israeli intelligence reports the delivery of Soviet-made SS-21 missiles that are capable of delivering chemical warfare agents.

25 April 1988
Diplomatic sources in Tehran contacted by the Associated Press state there is no reason to believe Iran has used chemical weapons yet in the war with Iraq.

25 April 1988
Rafsanjani answers a question posed by La Stampa about whether Iran could mass-produce chemical weapons. He responds, "We are capable of mass production. However, we do not wish to fill our stores with these materials, which we hope never to use. As yet we have not felt the need for mass production, but we are sufficiently prepared to be able to produce quickly whatever quantities of such dangerous materials we need."

26 April 1988
A Tehran resident advised a Xinhua reporter to make a gas mask using gauze, sodium bicarbonate (baking soda), and activated carbon. The man states, "it can help you escape the first attack. You should then climb to a rooftop or a point over nine meters in height to save yourself from the deadly gas."

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26 April 1988

The UN reports that its investigations last month into chemical weapons use in Iran and Iraq found that chemical weapons have been used in both countries "in an even more intensive scale than before." Although the UN states that there is more chemical weapons evidence in Iran than Iraq, it does not state which party was to blame.


26 April 1988

Xinhua News Service reports that the UN investigation reveals that both countries used chemical weapons. One of the investigators, Dr. Manuel Dominquez, finds after examining 66 patients in Iran that 62 of them "showed clear signs of having been exposed to Yperite. [sulfur mustard]." All of the 39 patients he examined in Iraq were also exposed to Yperite. An acetylcholine esterase-inhibiting substance (i.e., nerve agent) has also been used, according to Dr. Dominquez.


26 April 1988

The Associated Press states that even though the UN report did not lay blame on any particular country for the chemical attacks, Iraqi officials seemed pleased. The Counselor to the Iraqi Mission at the UN states that "it definitely bears out our contention that Iran used chemical weapons.... We have stated over and over that we will use any means to defend our sovereignty. It's a matter of survival for us. We are not confirming or denying it—but definitely we are not denying it." Iranian officials refused to comment on the report. The team did not visit Halabja, nor did it gather weapons fragments. However, the team was shown shrapnel from bombs dropped on an Iranian village that bore Cyrillic markings.


26 April 1988

Western observers in southern Iraq discredit Iranian claims that chemical weapons had been used in the recent fighting. One observer states, "They had no need for that, and there seems to be no evidence of it either."


27 April 1988

Iran's UN Envoy Mahallati issues Iran's first formal response to the UN regarding the report that was issued two days ago from the chemical weapons fact-finding mission. It is "very disappointing to note" that the report "fails to address the crime in a clear and unambiguous tone." The mission "did not have the scientific or practical expertise to determine the source of responsibility." Because of this, Iran asks the UN to dispatch "a complete team capable of determining responsibility for the crime." He further requests that the UN "establish a permanent team in Tehran and Baghdad to investigate the extent of and responsibility for future uses of chemical weapons. It is long
overdue, with unforgivable consequences, for the Security Council to take effective measures to compel the war criminals in Baghdad to respect internationally recognized rules of warfare." He then urges the Security Council to "condemn Iraq for its continued and persistent use of chemical weapons" and to "impose an embargo on the export of the material and technology for production of chemical weapons to Iraq."


27 April 1988
During an interview later that day with the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic, Mahallati declares the UN report to be defective and criticized its delay. He states, "the unjustified delay of the UN Secretariat in releasing this report gave the Iraqi regime a chance to use chemical weapons again after its deployment of such weapon in Halabja....In spite of the clear admission by the fact-finding mission stressing that chemical weapons have been used more extensively and more seriously, the stances of the UN Secretary General in its connection appears to be insufficient....The least the UN can do is to condemn the Iraqi regime for the deployment of chemical weapons, ban any export of chemical materials to Iraq which can be used to manufacture chemical weapons and establish a permanent supervisory mission on the deployment of chemical weapons in the region."


28 April 1988
The production of gas masks for fighting chemical weapons has begun at Iran’s National Industries Organization’s Yasa factory. The director of the Yasa factory states, "Anti-chemical gas masks for war are a strategic product produced in a limited number of countries. Because they are a strategic product, their production is extremely difficult. However, a long time ago the IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps] brothers assigned Iran Yasa the duty of testing and producing this mask. Fortunately these efforts proved fruitful and these masks are now being produced in limited numbers. In addition to ending our dependence, we will also be saving large amounts of foreign currency. The final price of the masks is one-eighth the cost of imported masks."


29 April 1988
During the Friday prayers at Tehran University, Rafsanjani states that, "What the UN did recently was very strange. During the Halabja incident, the majority of the world media, the majority of international correspondents, and the majority of doctors who became involved and all the experts who came, all explicitly expressed the view that Halabja was a crime committed by Saddam and that Saddam had resorted to genocide there. The most responsible authority associated with the UN sent an expert. Then after a delay of 40 days, during which the case was somewhat stalled, it said in a weak statement that, yes, in Halabja, chemical substance had been used and that individuals from Iran and Iraq had been hurt....That is how impotent they are in front of this revolution and this Islam that they whitewash an obvious fact, which all the world can see."

— "Rafsanjani Sees Conspiracy against Iran by 'the East, the West, Israel, and Reaction,'" Tehran Home Service, 29
30 April 1988
The Iranian newspaper *Islamic Republic* reports that Hashemi Rafsanjani has threatened to use chemical weapons to retaliate against Iraq. In a closed religious meeting he states that Iran's retaliation to Iraq "must be so powerful as to force Iraq to give up its missile and chemical weapon attacks." The newspaper states that while Iran has already succeeded in acquiring mustard and nerve gas, Khomeini forbids their use.

— "Iran Threatens to use Chemical Weapons against Iraq," Xinhua General Overseas News Service (PRC), 1 May 1988, item number: 0501087.

30 April 1988
Iran's deputy foreign minister criticizes the UN decision not to send a complete team to investigate the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. This decision, which he claims appears to have been a plot from the very beginning, led to the filing of an incomplete report that failed to name Iraq as the perpetrator of the chemical weapons attack. He states that the attack on Halabja was an "unprecedented massacre" and that if punishment for the crime was not effectively meted out, the use of chemical weapons will become commonplace throughout the world. He states that Iran would prefer that the major powers would exercise their power and compel Iraq to cease its use of chemical weapons. If they do not, Iran will be forced to consider compelling Iraq through military means.


2 May 1988
The *Christian Science Monitor* reports that although the threat of an Iranian chemical weapons attack on Baghdad is regarded as "highly unlikely," five western embassies have issued chemical weapons gear and gas masks to their employees.


5 May 1988
The Soviet Union denies supplying either Iraq or Iran with chemical weapons.


5 May 1988
During a program called the "Political Round Table" aired on the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the moderator of the program poses a question: At the beginning of this week on Saturday, Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani talked about preventing Iraq from continuing the war of the cities and chemical attacks. He said that a good deterrent would be more extensive retaliatory operations, at an even greater level than the Iraqi attacks....Is this change in policy due to the UN expert's report, which was extremely tepid and did not condemn Iraq as it should have, or is it due to Iraq's increasing use chemical attacks at the front, such as in Halabja?" In response to this question, Iranian Deputy Prime Minister Ali Reza Mo'ayyeri states, "Of course, we have had the capability to

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produce chemical weapons and use them for years, but we have not done so....International organizations, and the UN in particular, have unfortunately not adopted a strong and firm stance to prevent the use of these weapons....With its dispatch of a very inadequate two-member team, who were not even experts in chemical weapons, a vague report was prepared and then presented to the UN Security Council....As regards the retaliatory tit-for-tat operations, we have never used chemical weapons, despite our capability to do so. We will endeavor to maintain our restraint in this regard, but restrain and patience have a time limit, too. If the aggression continues, we shall use our resources."

The moderator then asks the acting chief of the IRGC GHQ, Abbas Mohtaj, "What role do chemical weapons play on the fronts and in operations?" He responds, "The use of chemical weapons depends on the readiness of our forces, and their effectiveness depends on the quantity used. The difference between chemical and conventional weapons is this if a mortar explodes in a battalion, some will be wounded, some martyred; with chemical weapons, a great number will be affected and hurt....But I must add that chemical weapons can never be the deciding factor in any war. They can only serve to slow down or halt movements at various stages."


9 May 1988
The UN Security Council passes a resolution condemning the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War and called on both parties in the conflict to cease their usage of chemical weapons. The US Ambassador to the UN states that the US has evidence that both Iran and Iraq are using chemical weapons. Iraq does not deny its use of chemical weapons but also accuses Iran of using chemical weapons.


9 May 1988
US Permanent Representative to the UN, Vernon A. Walters, states, "The United States fully supports this strong action by the Security Council. We condemn without reservation illegal use of chemical weapons by both sides in the gulf conflict. The report submitted April 25 by the Secretary General notes a recent alarming escalation in such use....We are also troubled by evidence that both Iraq and Iran are continuing to enhance their chemical weapons capability through acquisition of precursors for chemical weapons production. We continue to urge those states that have not already done so to adopt strict controls on the export of chemical weapons precursors to both parties...We reiterate our appeal to both sides to cease use of chemical weapons and to abide by the terms of customary and conventional international law, including the Geneva Protocol to which they both subscribe."


The text of Resolution 612, adopted by a unanimous vote, is as follows: The Security Council, having considered the report of 25 April 1988 (S/19823) of the Mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, dismayed by the Mission’s conclusions that chemical weapons continue to be used in the conflict and that their use has been on an even more intensive scale than before:

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Affirms the urgent necessity of strict observance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925;

Condemns vigorously the continued use of chemical weapons in the conflict between Iran and Iraq contrary to the obligations under the Geneva Protocol;

Expects both sides to refrain from the future use of chemical weapons in accordance with the obligations under the Geneva Protocol;

Calls upon all States to continue to apply or to establish strict control of the export to the parties to the conflict of chemical products serving for the production of chemical weapons;

Decides to remain seized of the matter and expresses its determination to review the implementation of this resolution.


10 May 1988
A Tehran Home Service commentary criticizes the UN Security Council stating that its "ineffective and imperfect stance, more than 50 days after the chemical bombing of Halabjah by the Iraqi criminal regime, showed that the Security Council has so far failed to act in accordance with the UN Charter, based on the Geneva Protocol of 1925, to halt the proliferation and deployment of chemical weapons by Iraq. The Council's long silence in the face of this horrific crime, which was condemned by many countries and personalities including the UN Secretary General, emboldened that regime to repeat its crime and deploy chemical weapons in residential areas of southern regions of the Islamic Republic of Iran [IRI]....It seems that from now on the deployment of chemical weapons will become a normal option and will from this date be added to the war capabilities of many countries....The current resolution of the Security Council on a general condemnation of chemical weapons deployment in the Iran-Iraq War has justified Iraq's action in its inhumane crime at Halabjah, which is unprecedented since the First World War, and has tried to follow the policies of the USA and other Western supporters of Saddam by classifying both countries [Iran and Iraq] in the same category. The objective of this sinister plot of Western imperialism, led by America, is to cover up the Iraqi regime's deployment of chemical weapons so as to realize the plan for imposing an arms embargo against the IRI. This is taking place at a time when the Iraqi regime, in the war against Iran, is constantly armed and equipped by these countries and Arab reaction. At present the release of the Security Council's ineffective resolution on the deployment of chemical weapons, which took place as the result of some Council members' measures of support for the Iraqi regime, has overshadowed [or undermined; Persian: tahtoshshoa] the Secretary General's just stance in condemning this regime and the deployment of chemical weapons....The biased and critical measures of the UN regarding the developments of the Iran-Iraq War, [measures] which are always undertaken in order to encourage the Iraqi regime to continue its atrocities with the co-operation of the USA and Arab reaction, will further familiarize the international community with the bitter taste of the hegemonist powers' desire to serve their own interests....The expansion of these crimes will naturally
engulf other countries of the region and the world with its horrific consequences."
— "Tehran Radio Comments on UN Security Council's 'Equivocal and Pointless' Resolution on Chemical Weapons,"

15 May 1988
IRNA reports that at least 100 civilians killed and many more wounded in Iraq's Kurdish province of Arbil when Iraqi aircraft bombed several villages with chemical weapons. The villages are identified as Kuk-Tappeh, Assgar-Sutkeh, Mayeleh, Farchenar, Sheikhan, Kalleh-Shir as well as others in Hamran and Zehzi. Those attacks took place yesterday [14th May]. IRNA reports eight Iraqi warplanes hit the same villages with chemical weapons in addition to many other Kurdish villages in Arbil province.

16 May 1988
Iran apparently accuses Iraq of dropping chemical weapons on seven villages on 3 May 1988.

17 May 1988
IRNA reports that Iraqi planes dropped chemical bombs at 9:15 GMT on three villages near Sardasht, injuring more than 60 civilians.

18 May 1988
IRNA reports that 200 civilians have died from the Iraqi chemical weapons attack on 17 March in the area around Sardasht. IRNA adds that this afternoon, Iraqi planes bombed a village near Marivan with chemical weapons, killing three civilians and wounding eight more.

19 May 1988
Iran's UN Delegation petitioned the UN Secretariat to assign a full delegation of experts to study the extent of Iraq's recent use of chemical weapons, including their use in the past two days against the villages of Mulla Shaykh and Buzaylah near Sardasht, and Neyl near Marivan. The petition calls on the Secretary General to investigate Iraq's use of chemical weapons under Article V of UN Security Council Resolution 612 and to take immediate punitive and deterrent actions against Iraq.
— "Iran and Iraq in Brief; Iran's UN Delegation Submits Note on Iraqi Chemical Warfare," Tehran Home Service, 20

19 May 1988
Iranian military communiqués report that the death toll from yesterday’s chemical weapons attack by Iraq on a village near Marivan has risen to 12, all of whom are civilians.

19 May 1988
In a statement before the Subcommittee on Technology and the Law of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism L. Paul Bremer, III, states, "chemical weapons are known to be in hands of states such as Iran and Iraq which have practiced terrorism. The world community has shown little outrage at the recent use of chemical weapons by both Iran and Iraq in their war. Perhaps a psychological barrier has already been broken for terrorists to use them."

21 May 1988
Iraq rejects Iranian accusations that it killed 230 people with chemical weapons attacks inside Iran this week. "The Iranian accusations are false," according to an Iraqi military spokesman in Baghdad. Iraq claims its bombers targeted Iranian troops near Paveh on Friday, but denied using chemical weapons.

23 May 1988
Iran claims 88 civilians have been killed and 790 wounded as of 22 April 1988 by Iraqi attacks, three of which were attacks with chemical weapons.

23 May 1988
Iran’s UN Envoy meets with the President of the UN Security Council to strongly demand that the Council take action, under the auspices of Resolution 612, to condemn the Iraqi use of chemical weapons. He also states that Iran is prepared to welcome a new UN investigation team.

24 May 1988
Iran claims Iraqi forces have used chemical weapons in the Sumar region on the western front.
24 May 1988
Iran reports 12 people were killed and 95 wounded when Iraqi planes bombed Ney last weekend.

Summer 1988
A *Foreign Affairs* publication states that since 1983-84, "Iran has come up with effective countermeasures [to Iraqi chemical weapons], and in 1987 Iran also apparently started using chemical weapons on the battlefront, specifically mustard gas and phosgene." The author cites the UN Secretary General's report to the UN Security Council (S/18852, 8 May 1987) as evidence for this statement even though the report does not state Iran used chemical weapons. The article continues, "The Soviets have chemical warheads for their Scuds. It would be surprising if the Iraqis have neglected to develop or obtain similar warheads for their own missiles, and it would be nearly as surprising if the Iranians have been followed suit."

Summer 1988
The Pentagon considers selling Iraq one million units of an US-made nerve agent antidote in an autoinjector. The Reagan administration blocks the deal in the fall after Iraq employs chemical weapons against Kurdish villages. A Dutch licensee of a Maryland firm, Survival Technology, Inc., sells the $4 anti-nerve gas injector to both Iran and Iraq. (The device contains an antidote, atropine, packaged in a syringe that is automatically injected when jabbed against the leg.)

1 June 1988
Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati addresses the Third Extraordinary Session of the United Nation General Assembly's Disarmament Conference and uses nearly all of his allotted 30 minutes to discuss Iraq's use of chemical weapons and the UN's failure to stop it. Velayati states, "Certainly the most important issue that merits serious international attention is proliferation of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against the people of Iran and Iraq."
He claims Iraq has used chemical weapons 253 times since the beginning of the war and that the worst attack of all—Halabja—was the result of the international community's "indifference and irresponsible attitude." He proposes the establishment of a permanent team of UN chemical weapons specialists in the region, stating that their presence would be an important deterrence against future attacks. He also states that the UN should send chemical weapons specialists to investigate Iraq's chemical weapons production facilities.

1 June 1988
In addition to addressing the Disarmament Conference, Velayati also meets individually with the Secretary General. During this meeting, Velayati criticizes the weakness of the UN for not adopting a harder line with Iraq regarding its inhumane chemical weapons attacks. He reportedly asks the Secretary General to ask "the Security Council on our behalf 'why it has not adopted a decisive stance towards Iraq's...use of chemical weapons'.”

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
1 June 1988

A Tehran Home Service commentary states that "[the imperialists]...shamelessly close their eyes to the facts and ignore the inhumane crimes of the Iraqi regime. The chemical bombing of Halabja is the greatest act of genocide since the atomic bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. But the imperialists were not prepared to make an official mention of Iraq in their resolution, even if merely to placate the people."


2 June 1988

Tehran Home Service reports that Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati has described the indifference of the UN to the chemical bombing of Sardasht as the cause of the heinous atrocity subsequently perpetrated by the Iraqi regime in Halabja. He warned the people of the world that the latest Security Council stance on this crime will soon result in the extensive use of chemical weapons for the annihilation of humanity in all parts of the world.

According to the central news unit, Mr. Velayati, who was speaking at the special UN disarmament conference session in New York, gave details of the outcome of the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi regime in Iranian residential areas. He said that the banning of chemical weapons was the most important obligation of the disarmament conference, and called on the session to take a stand against this dangerous international phenomenon, pointing out that the UN is the most appropriate and suitable organization to do so. He called on the Security Council to carry out the necessary study for the implementation of Resolution 612 and to take a firm stance against the Iraqi regime's indifference to the contents of this resolution and its repeated use of chemical weapons [only] 10 days after the approval of this resolution. He asked the Council to refrain from mere slogans and abandon its inertia.

Regarding the silence of the UN on the crimes of the Ba'thist Iraqi regime, Velayati said, "With immense audacity, Iraq continues its use of chemical weapons as part of its proclaimed policy in the imposed war....it is hoped that, in view of Iraq's insistence on using such weapons, and its acknowledgement of their purchase and use, the UN Security Council will condemn Iraq directly and vehemently and take immediate, decisive and drastic steps to ban the sale of materials for producing chemical weapons and to inspect chemical installations in Iraq."


Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
3 June 1988
Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati meets the West German foreign minister this afternoon and discusses the Iran-Iraq War, efforts by the secretary general to negotiate a cease fire, the UN's opposition to the use of chemical weapons, and the situation in Afghanistan.

4 June 1988
According to the Washington Post, Kurdish leaders meeting in Damascus debate whether they should maintain their tactical alliance with Iran, in light of the fact that the alliance thus far has only resulted in massive Iraqi chemical weapons attacks against their people.

9 June 1988
The chairman of Bulgaria's Council of Ministers meets his Iranian counterpart, Mr. Mir Hoseyn Musavi, in Tehran. The two issue a statement calling for chemical and nuclear weapons free zones be established in the Balkan Peninsula as well as the region around the Persian Gulf.

10 June 1988
Iran's UN Envoy criticizes the UN Security Council for their inaction regarding "Iraq's use of chemical weapons." He states that Iran is indignant to what he termed "the football game between the Secretary General and the Security Council" in responding to Iraq's use of chemical weapons. He repeats Iran's viewpoint that the Iraqi use of banned substances such as chemical weapons should be considered "independent of any other elements in the conflict" and urged the Security Council to not only strongly condemn Iraq for their use of chemical weapons, but to also force them to stop using chemical weapons in the future.
— "Iran Criticizes UN Inaction on Chemical Weapons," Xinhua General Overseas News Service (PRC), 10 June 1988, item number: 0610008.

12 June 1988
IRNA reports that Iraqi planes attacked the Beyt ol-Moqaddas 7 sector.

12 June 1988
Iran's President Khamene'i opened the First International Congress to Investigate Chemical Weapons this morning at Razi Hall at the Mashhad University Medical School. He states that the Congress has been convened to due to a sense of responsibility about a pressing issue facing Iran that will face other nations around the world in the future. He states, "Bearing in mind the need to observe the Geneva Convention prohibiting the production and

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deployment of chemical weapons, Iran condemns any use of such weapons. It considers that the immediate closure of all chemical weapons factories is in the interest of mankind and [is] an urgent and undeniable duty....If the international organizations continue their silence in the face of the crimes and atrocities of the Iraqi regime, which is tantamount to collaborating with it, the adverse, unknown and escalating consequences of the widespread use of chemical weapons will affect mankind all over the world, and few societies will be safe from them. To perform their international duty, governments should not only refrain from selling any material which could be used for this purpose or placing it at the disposal of others, but they should supervise the operation of companies and factories which prepare and supply raw materials which could be processed into chemical weapons, so that the profiteering and power-seeking ambitions of individuals or regimes which disregard humanitarian commitments, would not encourage them to produce and use materials deadly to mankind..."  

13 June 1988
According to Newsweek, Iran sends teams of high-level officials to scour London, Madrid, and other European capitals for arms. Mideast sources say Tehran is shopping for "hundreds of thousands of gas masks and heavy-artillery munitions."

13 June 1988
Middle East sources claim that Iran is on a massive quest to procure "hundreds of thousands of gas masks and heavy artillery munitions."

13 June 1988
The Associated Press (AP) states that IRNA claims that Iraqi planes dropped chemical bombs on Iranian forces and that decontamination teams neutralized their effects to keep casualties low. However, it is not clear if the AP is referring to an attack today, or if it is referring to attacks around Basra last month.

13 June 1988
Tehran Radio reports that Iraq has used chemical weapons in the Shalamcheh sector on the southern front. Decontamination units rushed to the scene to limit the affects of the chemical weapons.

14 June 1988
IRNA reports that Iraq has continued its use of chemical weapons in the Shalamcheh sector and that a chemical weapons air raid on a village near Baneh at 4:30 a.m. GMT has killed two and wounded 10.

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19 June 1988
IRNA reports that "a large number of Iranian Moslem combatants were martyred and injured when Iraqi warplanes chemically bombed the Changuleh region east of Mehran....Earlier in the day, Iraqi warplanes had chemically bombed the town of Mehran...[special units were sent to] neutralize the chemical weapons using special techniques." Iraq denies the attack was with chemical weapons and states the Iranian claims, according to Iraq's Culture and Information Minister, are "nothing more than a pretext to explain away a new military setback." The Iraqi Minister claims "the attack...was mounted by forces of the National Liberation Army of Mujahedeen Khalq, which have no chemical weapons in their possession."

19 June 1988
Iran claims Iraq has used chemical weapons on a large scale during a six-pronged attack on Iranian territory.

19 June 1988
A commentary on Tehran Radio states, "At that time the authorities of the Islamic Republic reminded the UN that a failure to confront decisively in international forums these inhuman acts by the Iraqi regime would embolden that regime in the use of chemical weapons. Thus, before long the correctness of the predictions of the Islamic Republic was proved. The Iraqi regime then extended the domain of its chemical attacks to the towns and in so doing it brought about a calamity such as that in the town of Halabja martyring 5,000 residents, mainly women and children, using chemical agents. After the Halabja calamity, the UN was forced to approve Resolution 612 in an independent form for the purpose of prohibiting the use of chemical weapons in the imposed war. Yet, despite the approval of this resolution, so far no efforts have been made to implement it."

20 June 1988
IRNA says Britain's condemnation of Iraq's use of chemical weapons is a "positive" sign. It quotes the Iranian Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mahdi Karrubi as stating that this condemnation "can influence the outlook of the Islamic Republic officials and people towards Britain." Karrubi made the comment while speaking with four British lawmakers who are in Iran hoping to help win the release of British hostages in Lebanon.

21 June 1988
Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister for Euro-American Affairs Mohammad Javad Larijani states that he appreciates Britain's condemnation of Iraq's use of chemical weapons. Another senior Iranian official states that relations between Iran and Britain could return to previous levels and expressed hope that Britain's future policies towards

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the Iran-Iraq War, the use of chemical weapons, and the Persian Gulf would completely remove obstacles blocking an improvement in relations.


22 June 1988

Iraq denies using chemical weapons in an attack against Mehran on 19 June. It claims Iranian National Liberation Army attacked Mehran and thus "the issue is an Iranian one and Iraq has nothing to do with it."


22 June 1988

The first corps of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) ground forces division is establishes the 15th Imam Hasan Majtaba Urban Brigade for Chemical Defence.


24 June 1988

The US Senate votes 91-0 for a resolution condemning Iraq for using chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. Sen. George Mitchell, D-Maine, reports that Iraq used chemical weapons on 16 March against the Iranian-occupied city of Halabja, killing up to 2,000 civilians. (No mention is made of Iranian chemical weapons in the Senate resolution).


24 June 1988

The Iraqi Mission to the UN releases a statement saying, "On Tuesday, 21 June 1988, the spokesman for the secretary general announced that the secretary general, after his meeting with the Iranian permanent representative, had decided to send a mission to investigate Iranian allegations on the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. Upon the announcement of this decision, we expressed our surprise at this hasty decision, which was based on an arbitrary interpretation of the informal consultations of the Security Council on this subject. After the decision to dispatch the team was made, the permanent representative of Iran notified the secretariat that his government was not ready to receive the mission. This development confirms beyond any doubt that the Iranian authorities do not have the evidence to back up their allegations and fabrications, which coincided with Iran's military defeats on the battlefield in recent months. It also confirms beyond any doubt that the secretariat was once again hasty in responding to unsubstantiated Iranian allegations and lies."


24 June 1988

Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, in a question-and-answer period during his current European tour, is asked about the recently announced UN mission to Iran to investigate recent allegations of Iraqi chemical weapons...
use. Velayati responds, "This invitation was issued a few weeks ago. On a number of occasions after the ratification
of Resolution 612 in connection with Iraq's use of chemical weapons, the Iraqi regime repeatedly used chemical
weapons against us. We repeatedly reported this to the UN and requested that, in accordance with the Security
Council's approval, the Secretary General should dispatch missions to inspect the locations and investigate the
effects of the weapons used immediately upon receiving reports of the contravention of an agreement such as the
use of chemical weapons here which is an overt contravention of the recent Security Council resolution.
Unfortunately, a few weeks passed and the Security Council delayed sending a delegation; therefore, most of the
traces of the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi regime have been destroyed. This procrastination and delay
definitely have political reasons; that is, Iraq's protectors have influenced the [UN] Security Council....But, in any
case, the sending of missions to investigate the use of chemical weapons by Iraq could have positive results.
— "Iran: Velayati Comments on European Tour, UN Mission on Chemical Weapons," Tehran Home Service, 24 June

25 June 1988
IRNA claims Iraqi troops launched a new offensive this morning against Iranian-held Majnnoon Island. IRNA claims
Iraq has used chemical weapons in the attack.
— "Iran Reports Iraqi Offensive on Majnnoon Island," Xinhua General Overseas News Service (PRC), 25 June 1988,
item number: 0625169.

25 June 1988
IRNA reports that the Badr Corps of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq, the force defending
Majnnoon Island from Iraqi attack, "put up heroic resistance but were forced to retreat to new positions because of
the enemy's heavy poison gas attacks."

26 June 1988
Iran claims more than 60 Iranians have been killed and another 4,000 wounded in Iraqi chemical weapons attacks
near Ahvaz.
— "Iran Says 60 Killed by Iraqi Chemical Attack," Xinhua General Overseas News Service (PRC), 26 June 1988, item
number: 0626144.

26 June 1988
The attack reportedly came yesterday after Iraq took control of Majnoon Island. IRNA cites Red Crescent Officials
as stating that Iraq used mustard, nerve, and cyanide agents near the Iranian city of Ahvaz.
— "Iran Alleges Iraqi Chemical Attack against Ahvaz; Velayati's Letter to UN," Islamic Republic News Agency, 26
June 1988, reported in British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 June 1988, Part 4,

26 June 1988
The Iraqi News Agency cites an "authorized Iraqi source" as denying the Iranian allegations.

26 June 1988
According to a report on Tehran Radio, Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati has written a letter to the UN Secretary General "referring to the crimes committed by the regime ruling Baghdad...including...deploying chemical weapons and poison gases." Velayati warns that if international organizations continued to procrastinate in defending victims of Iraqi chemical weapons, "Iran would consider it her right to take appropriate measures to defend herself."

26 June 1988
IRNA reports that fighting has occurred in the areas of Hoseyniyeh, Tala’iyeh, and Majnoon Islands on 25 June. The report states that Iraq dropped chemical weapons several times on these areas, in addition to a chemical bombing of the Jofeyr region (3:33 a.m. GMT).

27 June 1988
IRNA claims Iraq used mustard, nerve, and cyanide gas during its attacks on Majnoon Island and the areas around Ahvaz. "The enemy chemical attack came after it gained control over the Majnoon Islands Saturday following extensive use of chemical weapons." An Iraqi military official responds that, "the Iranian claims are mere lies...and Iran resorts to lies every time it receives a military blow."

28 June 1988
A three-member UN fact-finding team will depart for Iran this week to investigate Iran’s recent allegations that Iraq has deployed chemical weapons. According to a UN spokesman, the team "is scheduled to depart from Europe on June 30 and will spend a few days in Iran." The spokesman states that Iran requested the team be sent "over last weekend." Amir Zamaninia, press officer from the Iranian mission to the UN states that Iran requested the mission "in order to document for the international community another case of Iraqi use of chemical weapons. The Secretary General is obliged to investigate and verify that use of chemical weapons as soon as possible before the evidence of use of chemical weapons has disappeared." The counsellor of Iraq’s UN Mission believes the Secretary General took a "hasty action," and states that the UN mission is nothing more than a trap laid by the Iranians. When the UN team finds no evidence of Iraqi chemical weapons usage, the Iranians "would blame the United Nations for delay of sending the mission."

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
28 June 1988
The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps General Staff reports that Iraq has used chemical weapons as part of an attack attempting to capture Iranian positions in the Darbandikhan area and the Shakh-Shemiran heights in Iraqi Kurdistan.

1 July 1988
Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, while on a three-day visit to Bonn, states that Iraq has used chemical weapons to fight off hundreds of thousands of "fanatical" invaders—but only in retaliation to Iranian use of chemical weapons. "Sometimes they were used by both sides in the conflict....Iran used them first at the beginning of the conflict. They have used them since the beginning....[Iraq believes] every nation has the right to protect itself against an invader although the means might be controversial."

1 July 1988
Aziz also states, "When we want peace, we have to respect all conventions. But you cannot say I'm going to respect all these conventions and give the other side the liberty not to respect them." Referring to the 25 April UN Report, Aziz states, "The UN report says both sides have used [chemical weapons]. Iran started its use. We were victims many times, since the early beginning of the conflict." When asked if it was true that both sides have used chemical weapons, Aziz replies, "Both sides."

1-5 July 1988
A UN team visits Iran to investigate allegations of CW use, including nerve agents and mustard.

4 July 1988
While meeting with the UN chemical weapons investigation team currently in Iran, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for International Affairs Mohammad Hoseyn Lavasani criticizes previous efforts made by the UN in regard to Iraqi chemical weapons use. He states, "The Islamic Republic expects you to mirror the facts you have seen in your visit to chemical victims of Iraqi toxic attacks, to the Security Council and Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar. We expect the UN to keep these facts in mind and accordingly take serious preventive measures against the Iraqi regime, instead of trying to change a humanitarian issue in a political one." One of the UN team members replies that his team has come to investigate Iraq’s chemical weapons attacks and that it will immediately submit its report to the Secretary General.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
6 July 1988
A UN spokeswoman states that it is possible for the UN to send a team to Baghdad to investigate Iraqi claims that Iran has used chemical weapons. The Iraqi request for the team came in a letter from Ismat Kittani, Iraq's Permanent Representative to the UN, to the UN secretary general. Kittani accuses Iran of injuring many soldiers by using chemical weapons in an operational sector on 1 July. He states that this followed a similar attack on 20 June. Kittani states that Iraqi troops discovered an Iranian chemical weapons depot in one of the sectors from which the Iranians were forced to withdraw.
— "UN Likely to Probe Alleged Iranian Use of Chemical Arms," Xinhua General Overseas News Service (PRC), 6 July 1988, item number: 0706016.

6 July 1988
The West German foreign minister sends a message to the foreign ministers of those countries parties to the Conference on Disarmament urging them to complete their work on a chemical weapons prohibition. He states that on 9 May, the Security Council passed a resolution calling on both Iran and Iraq to cease using chemical weapons. However, he says, this has not happened. Because of this, he states there is a danger of continued development of chemical weapons.

6 July 1988
The Iranian News Agency states that a military spokesman "denied the use of chemical weapons. He said that the Iranian claims are ridiculous and are being repeated by the Iranians every time they sustain a military defeat."

8 July 1988
Iran accuses Iraq of dropping chemical bombs on Khoramshahr, Abadan, and Khosrow-Abad at the same time they were under Iraqi artillery fire. Iraq denies the claim.

9-12 July 1988
In response to Iraqi claims that Iran committed two CW attacks at Sulaymaniyah and Basra, the same UN team investigates this allegation. By examining wounded Iraqi soldiers, the team concludes that they were exposed to mustard, but it is unknown if these were caused by Iranian or Iraqi chemical weapons.

10 July 1988
Iran accuses Iraq of bombing a war refugee camp near Baneh with chemical weapons this morning at 8:30 am local time. The attack reportedly wounded 12 people. Iranian decontamination teams are said to have rushed to the scene.
— "Iran Accuses Iraq of Dropping Chemical Bombs," Xinhua General Overseas News Service (PRC), 10 July 1988 item number 0710148.

10 July 1988
Tehran Radio reports that Iraq used chemical weapons against two villages near Marivan in addition to the attack on the refugee camp in Baneh. At Baneh, one person was killed and 150 wounded.

12 July 1988
Iran accuses Iraq of using chemical weapons this morning in the Sharhani region along the southern front, killing 25 Iranian soldiers and wounding an additional 3,600.

13 July 1988
Most families in Tehran keep Iranian-made gas masks in their homes—but they do not appear to take them with them on the street.

13 July 1988
Foreign reporters are allowed to visit with Iranian chemical weapons victims. The victims report that when the chemical attack began, there was no fighting occurring between the two sides. Two wounded soldiers state, "At first, we did not realize the Iraqi chemical attack. When we felt a bad smell, we began to wear gas masks. But it is too late." A doctor treating the soldiers reports, "they were apparently wounded by mustard gas." More than 150 Iranian soldiers are currently receiving treatment for chemical weapons-related injuries.

13 July 1988
Iranian military communiqués claim that Iraq has bombed the Chenaneh, Fakkeh, and Sharhani sectors of the southern front with chemical weapons.

13 July 1988
IRNA reports that Iraqi planes bombed a village near Marivan with chemical weapons today. This is in addition to two other villages near Marivan that were hit with chemical weapons today.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
14 July 1988
US Vice President George Bush criticizes Iran and Iraq for using chemical weapons. "No country should think it could use chemical weapons with impunity," says Bush.

18 July 1988
The Guardian writes, "Together with the 'war of the cities' on the home front, nothing has dealt such a sudden shock to morale as chemical weapons on the battlefields. The Iraqis, explained a revolutionary guard, saturate the frontlines with quick-acting poisons such as nerve gas and the rear with a slow-acting one, mustard gas. It appears to be a formidable combination, its effects all the more extraordinary in that it is the revolutionary guards who, if not actually running away, are abandoning desperately and expensively won positions with barely a fight...each Iraqi success seems to have an incremental effect; just how low morale has sunk became clear last week when rumors sweeping the capital had it that, under a colossal chemical bombardment killing tens of thousands of people, Khorramshahr had fallen to the Iraqis—the same Khorramshahr which was renamed Kuninshahr, 'City of Blood,' as the prime symbol of heroic, popular resistance to the original Iraqi onslaught."

20 July 1988
The UN releases a report describing its July investigations of Iraqi and Iranian CW use. The team concludes that the Iraqis used both mustard and an acetylcholine esterase inhibiting substance (nerve agent) against Iran in late June (approximately 25-30 June). As indicated above, Iraqi exposure to CW is also documented, but the source of the exposure is not known. (There is no definitive evidence of Iranian CW use noted).

20 July 1988
An IRNA commentary states, "Even more dismal is the UN record on Baghdad's use of chemical weapons, which were first deployed by Iraq as early as in the winter of 1980 and against solely civilian targets from August 1983. UN teams from 1984 have repeatedly evidenced Baghdad's use of poison gases culminating in the massacre of over 5,000 Kurds at Halabja in March this year, but save a presidential statement, the Security Council has yet to condemn the Iraqi regime for its persistent violations. The present resolution does little more than 'deplore' the invitation of the conflict, the attacks of shipping and civilian targets and the use of chemical weapons, but gives the Security Council an opportunity to redeem itself from its ignoble past. If and when implemented to the letter, the Security Council Resolution 598 on [the] Iraq-Iran War seems capable of paving the way for peaceful settlement of the conflict."
22 July 1988
Iraq has reportedly launched another chemical weapons attack on Iranian troops.

22 July 1988
An Iranian military communiqué claims that Iraqi troops have made extensive use of chemical weapons—the result of which was a forced retreat by Iranian troops in the south and west of Iran.
— "Iran Claims 5,000 Iraqi Casualties," Xinhua General Overseas News Service (PRC), 22 July 1988 item number 0722232.

22 July 1988
IRNA reports that dozens of civilians were wounded by Iraqi chemical bombs that fell on the border towns of Karand and Sarepol Zahab.

22 July 1988
The Iranian Ambassador to the UN tells reporters that Iraq has "extensively used chemical warfare in three regions" of Iran in the past few hours, killing 80 and wounding more than 600.
— Lei Lili, "Iran Not to Accept Preconditions from Iraq, Says Ambassador," Xinhua General Overseas News Service (PRC), 22 July 1988 item number 0722022.

22 July 1988
Iranian military communiqués report, "since dawn today, fresh units of the Third Army Corps of the Iraqi aggressors...continued their advance inside Iranian territory in an unmanly manner by extensive use of chemical weapons."

22 July 1988
IRNA reports the chemical bombing of Sar-e Pol-e Zahab, Khosrawi, and Qasr-e Shrin at 8:15 GMT and the chemical bombing of Zarneh and Sarmil villages near Kerend and Sar-e Pol-e Zahab at 8:40 GMT.

23 July 1988
According to The Economist, Iraqis admit that they made the first use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War to counterbalance Iran's superiority in numbers.

23 July 1988
Iran claims Iraqi forces have moved across large sections of Iran and bombed the villages of Sar-e Pol Zahab and

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Gilan-e Gharb with chemical weapons. The chemical attacks are said to have injured "a large number of villagers." Gilan-e Gharb, 20 miles inside Iran, fell under the weight of a chemical attack. "The aggressors also captured Sar-e Pol Zahab garrison using the same dastardly tactic."


23 July 1988
IRNA reports the Iraqi occupation of Gilan-e Gharb at 16:08 GMT after the extensive use of chemical weapons. At 16:53 GMT, Iraqi forces capture Sar-e Pol-e Zahab garrison by using chemical weapons.

26 July 1988
Sadegh Tabatabai, a member of Iran's Supreme Defense Council, tells the German periodical Stern that Iran has dropped its preconditions that Iraq be named as the aggressor during the war and agreed to begin cease-fire negotiations under UN Resolution 598 which passed 20 July 1987. Tabatabai explains that the main reason Iran gave up its precondition was due to Iraq's use of chemical weapons. "We did not want to counter the massive use of chemical weapons with a similar action. Therefore, we decided to do the responsible thing and accept something dreadful so that something still more dreadful would not happen."

26 July 1988
Iran claims Iraqi planes dropped chemical weapons on Iranian forces east of the Ahvaz-Khorramshahr highway while other planes bombed a village in northern Kurdistan province.

26 July 1988
Tehran Radio reports that, according to a Central News Unit report, sources close to the Security Council state that Council members are angered over Iraq's use of chemical weapons. According to the report, some members of the Council have warned that further silence by the UN will leave a bad historical precedent. Tehran Radio goes on to state that the British envoy to the UN states that all members of the Security Council agree that the use of chemical weapons has been the most terrible aspect of the Iran-Iraq War. UN sources, according to Tehran Radio, "have stressed that the 15 members of the Security Council have been really scared by reading the report [written by the team investigating chemical weapons use by Iraq], not yet published, concerning the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi regime." UN diplomats have stated that now there is now doubt amongst members of the Security Council that Iraq has clearly violated the 1925 Geneva Convention.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
27 July 1988
IRNA reports that Iraqi planes have dropped chemical weapons in a residential area of the Chahar Zebar district in western Iran today, near the provincial capital of Bakhtaran, wounding several people.

27 July 1988
According to IRNA, residential areas near Bakhtaran were bombed with chemical weapons at 16:08 GMT

29 July 1988
IRNA reports that 10 people were wounded when Iraq used chemical weapons during a bombardment of Bilo, a village on the outskirts of Marivan.

1 August 1988
Two UN Security Council investigators publish a report that the Iraqis have been using chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War. From their examination of Iranian victims, weapons fragments and soil samples, and from seven previous UN reports, the authors conclude that the Iraqis have been using chemical weapons (including mustard gas, two types of nerve gas, and cyanide gas) with increasing intensity and frequency against Iranian troops and civilian targets since 1984. This report neither condemns nor clears Iran on charges of also having used chemical weapons. Iraqi produced nine gassed soldiers and grenades captured from Iranian soldiers to prove Iran’s use of chemical weapons, but the report’s wording leaves open the possibility that the grenades were Iraqi and the soldiers were injured when handling their own side’s weapons.

1 August 1988
Excerpts of the United Nations report issued on this day:
"We deeply regret to say that, on the basis of evidence gathered during the present mission, and in spite of repeated appeals by the United Nations, chemical weapons continue to be used on an intensive scale against Iranian forces. As highlighted...by previous missions to Iran, the continued use of such weapons in the present conflict increases the risk of their use in future conflicts."

"The use of yperite (mustard gas) was again confirmed, both medically and by chemical analysis....The use of nerve gas or cyanide was not confirmed by chemical analysis in the field, no doubt owing to their rapid disappearance....According to patients as well as reports of doctors,...2,000 people had been affected on the Majnoon Islands....The chief of the medical service of the region further said that, on June 25... there had been a massive attack by Iraqi forces which had begun with artillery fire using chemical ammunition and lasted for approximately two hours."

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
"From the examination of weapon fragments it can be concluded that bombs similar [to those] in 1984, 1986 and 1987 have again been used against Iranian forces on Iranian territory, indicating their repeated utilization by Iraqi forces."

"On July 11, the team visited the camp outside Baghdad. After donning protective equipment supplied by the military authorities, as some grenades in the stockpile were leaking and were in bad condition, we went into a bunker containing 81mm mortar grenades. The number of grenades was stated to be 141, and they were claimed to be chemical munitions captured from Iranian forces in Salamcha, east of Basra....Unopened grenades still in wooden crates were tested....A positive response was obtained, suggestive of the presence of a blister agent."

"It has been possible to determine without any doubt that, between the end of June and the beginning of July, nine Iraqi soldiers were affected by yperite [mustard gas], four of them in a military position named 'Peak 660' near As Sulaymaniyah, and the other five in the military sector of Basra. All of them had at least one of the following types of injury typical to exposure to yperite: erythema, darkening of the skin, conjunctivitis, blisters and injuries common to those found in second-degree burns."


1 August 1988
Javier Perez de Cuellar informs the Security Council that "chemical weapons continue to be used on an intensive scale against Iranian forces." De Cuellar calls the findings of a recent UN investigation in Iran "particularly disturbing." The investigation included clinical examinations of victims and chemical analysis of soil samples and weapon fragments. The investigation determined that Yperite and an acetylcholine esterase inhibiting substance (i.e., nerve agent) were used in Iran, but owing to time and resources constraints, the mission has not been able "to make a precise determination of the extent of the use of chemical warfare agents."

After visiting Iran, the UN team visited Iraq between 9-11 July to inquire into its charges that Iran used chemical weapons on 20 June 20 and 1 July. The team visited nine Iraqi soldiers and determined that "their injuries had been produced by yperite." They also determined that the mortar grenade fragments in question "were confirmed to contain yperite [i.e., sulfur mustard]." However, the mission was only able to say that these grenades were "alleged" to have been fired by the Iranians and said that, "the number of casualties and the extent of their injuries seemed less extensive than in previous investigations."

Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Mahallati tells reporters that he thought the findings of the report were "positive." He states that after the adoption of Resolution 612, Iraq has attacked Iran with chemical weapons on three occasions. He believes that the international community should take effective punitive and preventive measures to cope with the situation and to apply pressure and leverage on Iraq for its acceptance of a cease-fire, he noted.

— "UN Chief Anxious about Use of Chemical Weapons against Iran," Xinhua General Overseas News Service (PRC), 1 August 1988 item number 0801176.

1 August 1988
The Secretary General also states, "It is with deep concern and anxiety that the secretary general must once again
inform the Security Council that chemical weapons continue to be used in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq...From the examination of weapon fragments it can be concluded that bombs similar to those used in 1984, 1986, and 1987 had again been used against Iranian forces on Iranian territory, indicating their repeated utilization by Iraqi forces."


1 August 1988
Although nowhere in the report was Iran said to have used chemical weapons, ITAR-TASS states that the secretary general "was particularly anxious about the fact that chemical weapons [were] used by Iran and Iraq only several weeks after the UN Security Council had passed Resolution 612." ITAR-TASS continues to write that, "the Secretary General said that the reports presented to the United Nations provided a clear-cut proof that Iran and Iraq were acting in violation of that resolution."


2 August 1988
IRNA reports that Iraqi airplanes dropped chemical weapon on four locations in Oshnavieh district south of Orumiyeh in western Azerbaijan province this morning.


2 August 1988
IRNA states that at least 1,031 people have been injured from the attack, mostly with minor injuries. Meanwhile, during an interview on Iranian television, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati calls for a ban on the export of chemical weapon precursors. He points to Iraq's massive use of chemical weapons as evidence that such a ban should be enacted.


3 August 1988
Velayati sends a formal protest to the UN stating that Iraq has dropped eight chemical bombs on eight locations yesterday, killing 1,000 civilians. Because of this "heinous Iraqi act of aggression," Velayati requests the UN dispatch another chemical weapons investigation team.


4 August 1988
Iraq dismisses Iran's latest charges that it has used chemical weapons as nothing more than "baseless allegations." He states that Iran's goal, through putting forth such allegations, is to find "groundless pretexts to avoid entering into direct negotiations to end the war."


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4 August 1988
In a statement, Velayati states that the attack occurred at 2:45 a.m., "when the innocent and unsuspecting inhabitants of Oshnaviyeh were asleep." He states that the eight bombs dropped on Oshnaviyeh contained mustard gas. The injury tally has now risen to 1,700.

6 August 1988
Iran states that Iraq has been carrying out chemical weapons attacks over the past two days against Kurds in northeastern Iraq. More than 63 wounded people managed to cross the border into Iran to receive treatment for chemical weapons injuries. Iran claims the villages Kani-Rash, Zavar, and Serou were attacked.

6 August 1988
The Economist believes Iran has clearly won in the public relations campaign, even if its forces are not winning on the battlefield. The article states that while the recent UN report vilifies Iraq for using chemical weapons, no solid evidence is offered to prove Iran has used chemical weapons. The article reports that "the Iraqis produced nine gassed soldiers and some grenades which they said they had captured from the Iranians, but the report's careful wording leaves open the possibility that the grenades were Iraqi and the soldiers were injured when handling their own side's weapons. The US State Department has, in the past, said that the Iranians are also guilty—but that they use gas less frequently and general in retaliation for Iraqi attacks. The Americans have not produced evidence."

6 August 1988
Iran claims 2,700 people were injured by the 2 August Iraqi chemical weapons attack.

10 August 1988
Iran's Permanent Representative to the United Nations reports that a new UN investigation team will arrive in Iran tomorrow to investigate allegations of new Iraqi chemical weapons use. The UN has not issued a statement confirming the dispatch of the team.
— "UN Chemical Investigation Team to Arrive in Iran Tomorrow," Xinhua General Overseas News Service (PRC), 10 August 1988 item number 0810059.

10 August 1988
At the closing session of the International Conference on Aggression and Defense in Tehran today, Rafsanjani states, "You know that for the past few years the Iraqis have been using chemical weapons. You know that they hit our cities. You know that two or three days earlier even as the Security Council had issued its verdicts they dropped chemical bombs on Oshnaviyeh, poisoning some 2,000 people. They do the same inside Iraq as well. And you know, if all the people may not know that the production of chemical weapons and laying one's hands on
chemical materials is not a difficult job for a country like Iran. With its great pharmaceutical factories and very high-level chemical experts, Iran would not find it difficult to do this....Why did we not manufacture chemical weapons? Well, the world must make a judgment here. The world must distinguish the aggressor from the defender...In this visit [referring to the latest visit in July by the UN team],...the Iraqis resorted to staging shows by inflicting chemical materials on some of their soldiers or showing those who were poisoned in battle, or showing some stock, saying that these were chemical weapons which they had captured from Iran....If Iraq could have shown any such thing [Iran's use of chemicals] it would have certainly done so to prove it if it had any way of doing so. Now I must tell you that the Islamic Republic has the power to manufacture all sorts of chemical materials which are customary in the armies of the world. The Islamic Republic has the power of mass production. But it did not use it against the Iraqi nation. This stems from being committed to principles."


10 August 1988

Rafsanjani also reportedly states, "The Iraqis had violated every accepted principle of warfare including using chemical weapons. But Iran had managed to stave off aggression without compromising Islamic principles. Had it occurred to the people of the world to ask why Iran had not used chemical weapons? It certainly was not because it could not manufacture them. Why did we not use chemical weapons?" He states that Iran fought the war with "one hand tied behind its back" in adherence to its principles. Despite this, the world has supported Iraq. Had the superpowers had "even a little conscience," they would not have behaved the way they did.


12-14 August 1988

A UN team visits Iran to investigate CW allegations. The team concludes that Iraq bombed the Sheikh Othman district in Oshnaviyah with mustard. Iranian authorities claim that 2,680 casualties resulted from the attack, of which 910 were hospitalized. Additionally, the UN team visits the attack site, and laboratory tests determine that mustard had contaminated 500 square meters.


15 August 1988

In a letter to the US Senate, Massoud Barzani of the Kurdish Democratic Party claims that Iraq initiated chemical warfare against the Kurds in northern Iraq in April 1987. He cites 14 attacks in 1987 striking numerous villages in Iraqi Kurdistan. He cites 11 attacks thus far in 1988, and lays the blame for Halabja squarely on the Iraqis. Nowhere in his letter does he blame Iran for chemical weapons attacks on the Iraqi Kurds.


20 August 1988

Anthony Cordesman states, "Iran was beginning to produce significant mustard gas and nerve gas by the time of the August, 1988 [20 August 1988] cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War, but never succeeded in using poison gas effectively during the war."

[Note: Cordesman does not offer evidence or a citation to back up this claim. It

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remains unclear where he has received this information.]

**23 August 1988**
A UN team has determined that "chemical weapons have been used against Iranian civilians in an area adjacent to an urban center lacking any protection against that kind of attack....It is with deep concern that we have reached the conclusion, on the basis of the evidence obtained during this mission, that in spite of repeated appeals by the United Nations, chemical weapons have been used against Iranian civilians....Their utilization against civilians is particularly offensive to the human conscience and should be strongly rejected." Iraq was not directly named as the culprit.

**23 August 1988**
Patients injured in the chemical weapons attack told the team that a propeller-powered plane dropped four of the bombs on a field near town, and four other bombs in the mountains adjacent to the town.

**26 August 1988**
The UN Security Council unanimously votes which "condemns resolutely the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between Iran and Iraq." The Council agrees to consider "appropriate and effective measures" to deal with any future use of chemical weapons.

**26 August 1988**
The Security Council resolution was sponsored by Great Britain and did not explicitly mention Iraq as the state who used chemical weapons.

**1 September 1988**
Iran’s foreign minister takes a break from Iran-Iraq peace talks to address the Conference on Disarmament on the topic of chemical weapons. He states, "it is sad to see that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 has been violated with impunity so intensely and indiscriminately....This is a very dangerous trend, that weapons of mass destruction such as chemical weapons are gradually being treated conventionally....International reaction to reports of their repeated use of substantiated by various UN inspection teams has been somehow acquiescent." He calls on the Conference to finally complete 10 years of debate on a comprehensive treaty banning chemical weapons.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org).
7 September 1988
An official Iraqi letter to the UN secretary general claims that Iran seeks a peace agreement solely so it has the chance to rebuild its armed forces and equip them with advanced weaponry including chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. The letter states that Iran continues to manufacture "weapons of comprehensive destruction, including chemical weapons." The letter states that in an interview on Tehran Radio on 2 September 1988, Iranian Revolution Guards Minister Rafiqdust speaks about Iran's chemical, biological, and nuclear industries. The Iraqi letter states that Rafiqdust "also revealed a biological industry, ignoring the fact that Iran is a signatory to the international agreement preventing the development, productions, and storing of bacteriological and toxic weapons and stipulating for the destruction of those weapons an agreement that became effective in 1975. Thus, the Iranian regime once again has proved through one of its officials its non-respect for international agreements and charters. It also proves that what it really seeks through its talk about peace is a truce to rebuild its forces and equip them with all kinds of weapons, including chemical, biological, and even nuclear weapons to wage a new armed aggression against Iraq." [Note: A Lexis-Nexis search for this interview on Tehran Radio found the interview in question; however, no mention of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons were found in the body of the text.] — "Iraqi Letter to the UN Says Iran Intends to Develop Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Weapons," Iraqi News Agency, 7 September 1988, reported in British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 September 1988, Part 4, p. A1.

9 September 1988
The US Senate votes to enact tough new sanctions against Iraq for its use of chemical weapons against the Kurds. The sanctions would eliminate $800 Million in US credits and credit guarantees and would halt the transfer of sensitive US equipment to Iraq. Persian Gulf officials call this the toughest US measure against Iraq that they could recall.

9 September 1988
Tehran Television, while commenting on the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) conference in Cypress, notes that the NAM "has not yet officially and directly announced Iraq's aggression against Islamic Iran. Despite world condemnation of the Ba'thist regime for its use of chemical weapons against the revolutionary Iranian nation and the oppressed Iraqi Kurds, this movement has not only failed to act in a similar way, but by keeping silent, it has shown that it does not pay the necessary attention to its duties and principles."

13 September 1988
The United States and its key allies call upon the United Nations to send a team to investigate Iraq's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds. Great Britain, West Germany, and Japan join the United States to request that the UN send a team to northern Iraq and Turkey to verify Kurdish claims. [Note: This is the first time the US has requested a UN team to investigate chemical weapons violations by Iraq.]

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13 September 1988
UN Secretary General de Cuellar, under pressure from the United States and nine other countries, formally asks Iraq to allow a UN investigation team into Iraqi Kurdistan. [Note: The secretary general has never formally asked Iraq before to allow UN inspectors, always insisting that the UN must be invited.]

14 September 1988
US State Department spokesman Charles Redman states that the use of chemical weapons by both Iran and Iraq has set a "dangerous precedent" for the Middle East.

15 September 1988
US State Department spokesman Charles Redman states that the Australia Group, while turning its attention currently on Libya, has primarily focused on Iran and Iraq because they "had been seen to be using chemical weapons" during their war. The statement, carried in Japan Economic Newswire, was made while Redman was explaining new cooperation between the members of the Australia Group to investigate Libya’s program. The report concludes by stating: "The US, Soviet Union, France, and Iraq are said to have such chemical weapons, and Iran, Israel, North and South Korea are believed to be among the countries either possessing such weapons or in the process of producing them."

15 September 1988
Iranian President Ali Khamene’i, while at Friday prayers at Tehran University, states, "One of the important issues of the day is the great tragedy of the chemical bombardment of Iraqi Kurds, which is truly a huge incident and an international incident; it is by no means a domestic incident. The Iraqi authorities, in the face of international pressure and pressure from the UN, which wants to go and investigate, protest that, gentlemen, this is a domestic issue. How strange! Someone, a regime, chemically bombards several villages and launches an onslaught against a huge population consisting of tens of thousands,...all sorts of people are driven away from their houses and lives, from their cities and regions....You are massacring all those people and you say it is a domestic issue. The world’s conscience has been truly affronted by that act....A regime cannot be allowed to use chemical weapons despite international sanctions and expect that the world should just stand and watch....The world must enter [the field] with decisiveness. It must put pressure on the Iraqi regime. That is a warning. I express my sincere sense of fellow-feeling with all Kurdish brothers and all those who have suffered in such incidents and I convey my own and the Iranian government’s and the nation’s deepest regrets over what has happened to those innocent and defenseless Muslims."

21 September 1988
A commentary on Tehran Radio states, "The Iraqi Kurds, who have fallen victim to the Iraqi regime’s genocidal use
of chemical weapons that has caused widespread deaths and homelessness, are still awaiting resolute action by the international community to put an end to this genocide. The American Foreign Ministry [as heard], meanwhile, has claimed that the Iraqi regime has stopped using chemical weapons in domestic and international conflicts. The American Foreign Ministry, while considering Tariq Aziz’s remarks last Saturday [17 September] as positive, stated that Aziz had stressed that Iraq respects all the clauses and provisions of international laws, such as the Geneva Protocol of 1925, in connection with the prohibition of use of chemical weapons, and that it is in agreement with this protocol....The new stance of the American administration has been adopted at a time when, due to the repeated use of chemical weapons by Iraq which has reached its peak against the Kurds of that country, the worry has surfaced that the international ban on the use of these weapons may be ignored in wars between different countries. This reaction, which may be justified within the framework of the preservation of America interests and the wheeling and dealing that usually takes place between the superpowers, has come at a time when Tariq Aziz has clearly admitted his country's use of chemical weapons during its war against Iran....The fact that the Reagan administration interprets the Iraqi Foreign Minister’s remarks as meaning that the Baghdad regime will stop its use of chemical weapons in domestic and international conflicts, reveals that the periodic condemnation of Iraq by the American government and its Western allies for its use of chemical weapons and the simultaneous propaganda which has taken place in this respect, was merely an attempt to exonerate themselves from the charge that they have been indifferent about the use of chemical weapons....the White House dwellers prefer the preservation of their strategic interests in the Middle East and Iraq to the recommendations of the Senate. While the American Senate sought the imposition of sanctions against the Iraqi regime, the Reagan administration refused to implement these sanctions."


22 September 1988

IRNA states, "In its analysis of Baghdad's extensive arsenal of poison gases, the New Scientist suggested that the nerve gas tabun, rather than hydrogen cyanide, was used in the most horrifying instance at Halabja that killed 6,000 Kurdish civilians in March this year. Evidence of hydrogen cyanide being used, it believed, could have been because the gas is produced when impurities in tabun reacted with ground water, and in any event tabun left no marks on bodies as had been found to be the case at Halabja. The magazine understood that Iraq was producing some four tonnes of tabun every month as well as 60 tonnes of sulphur and nitrogen mustard and 4 tonnes of the more deadly nerve gas sarin. From Baghdad's purchases of chemicals, it further suggested the regime was planning to produce nerve gas VX, which is several times more toxic than sarin and much less degradable."


23 September 1988

Hashemi Rafsanjani, while giving a sermon at the Friday Prayers at Tehran University states, "Now when the war is coming to an end, see what a hue and cry is raised by America about the chemical bombings in northern Iraq. See
what a noise they are making, as though this has just happened [for the first time]. Did not Iraq turn Halabja into a hell five or six months ago? Did not Iraq kill five or six thousand people there with the same chemical weapons? Was not the Qara Dagh region totally destroyed two months earlier by Iraq with chemical weapons? Did not Iraq put all the people of the central area...north of Sulaymaniyah to flight with chemical bombs either killing them there or making them flee to Iran? At that time the Americans were not saying anything....Our hospitals were filled with people who had been torn apart by chemical weapons and by poisonous bombs....Their reporters came, they witnessed, they shot film and they went, but all their film was lost to history. However, the Americans are searching all the mountains in Turkey to find [proof of] chemical weapons to raise the issue in the world....Their problem was the issue of the Islamic Revolution. Their problem was the issue of Islam. All of them closed their eyes to the war crimes of the use of chemical weapons or the bombings of cities. For how many years did the Iraqis bomb and flatten our cities?...These are not crimes which mankind can tolerate. Yet they had closed their eyes completely to those crimes."


25 September 1988
The Guardian reports that between 1983-1987, chemical weapons were used tactically primarily by Iraqi forces. "True, there were reports that the Iranian Army had fired a few gas shells during its Karbala IV offensive. But the intensity of the Iraqi fire in return was apparently so great that no equilibrium was possible."


26 September 1988
The secretary general of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) of Iran asserts, "Iran used chemical weapons twice against the Iranian Kurds, and we have evidence of this. The first time was in 1982 and the second on 13 August 1987—the KDP foundation anniversary."


1 October 1988
A Tehran Radio commentary applauds the recent "more prominent stance" the British have taken on Iraqi use of chemical weapons. The commentary states however, that "although a positive step, [the stance] is not considered adequate."


3 October 1988
In an address to the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly, Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati denounces the UN's track record on Iraq's use of chemical weapons. He states, "While the Security Council dealt in two different resolutions, 612 and 620, with the Iraqi use of chemical weapons, the mild nature of the resolutions in fact encouraged Iraq to continue on a massive scale its horrifying use of chemical weapons." He complains that the

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resolutions did not even name the perpetrator of the crime, instead simply criticizing the use of chemical weapons "against Iranians." According to Velayati, Iraq, after these weak resolutions, "used on a large scale chemical weapons against its own Kurds in the northern part of the country."

18 October 1988
Tehran Radio quotes Hashemi Rafsanjani as stating that Iran has a new and powerful "device" in its arsenal to deter Iraq from resuming attacks on its cities. He did not elaborate.

19 October 1988
Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, then speaker of the Iranian parliament, says in a speech to military officers, "[c]hemical and biological weapons are poor man's atomic bombs and can easily be produced. We should at least consider them for our defense. Although the use of such weapons is inhuman, the war taught us that international laws are only scraps of paper."

19 October 1988
Iranian Speaker of the Parliament Hashemi Rafsanjani states, "...We should fully equip ourselves in the defensive and offensive use of chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons."

19 October 1988
Rafsanjani states, "During the war, chemical weapons were used against our forces, and no one made any objections. But now, considering the current political atmosphere, the use of chemical weapons is condemned. In light of this, we must at least equip our forces with equipment for defense against these destructive weapons."

19 October 1988
Tehran Television reports that the British government described the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iranian forces as barbarous. It describes the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds as a cause of much concern.
— "Iran in Brief; British Government Statement on Iraq's Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons Reported," Tehran

24 October 1988
US Special Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Max L. Friedersdorf, claims as many as 20 countries now possess chemical weapons. He states that Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Israel, and Ethiopia are believed to have chemical weapons, while Iran is fast on its way to joining the club. Professor Aubin Heyndrickx of the Toxicology Laboratory of the State University of Ghent is "absolutely sure, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that chemical weapons were a significant factor in ending the Gulf War. The Iranians had an almost religious horror of Iraqi chemical weapons. That's one reason they almost totally evacuated Tehran during the War of the Cities this spring." Most experts agree that if Iran has used chemical weapons in retaliation against Iraq, their attacks have been limited in scope.

The article goes on to outline the capabilities of each of the Middle East states believed to have a chemical weapons program.

25 October 1988
According to the Associated Press, CIA director William Webster, in a speech to the World Affairs Council, 
"...stressed the growing dangers of chemical weapons used by Iran and Iraq in their eight-year war." [Note: It is not clear whether Webster actually states Iran used chemical weapons. He speaks about Syria and Libya possessing chemical weapons capabilities, but does not mention Iran — at least in the text provided by the report. It could be that this is merely inference by the author.]

7 November 1988
The Tehran Times states that one of the reasons for the normalization of relations between Iran and Britain is because of Britain’s stance on Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. Iran, the newspaper states, considers this to be a favorable step.
— "Iran to Normalize Relations with Britain," Xinhua General Overseas News Service (PRC), 7 November 1988 item number 1107192.

22 November 1988
Anthony Cordesman says Iran and Iraq are rushing into a chemical weapons arms race. He states that both countries are working to assemble larger and deadlier chemical weapons stockpiles. "Behind the scenes, there is an absolutely massive effort in chemical weapons. Both sides are arming for war." He estimates Iran has a stockpile of several hundred tonnes of mustard gas. He states that Iraq has a three-year head start in chemical weapons tactics, expertise, and research. Meanwhile, according to the article, Gulf-based Western diplomats reportedly believe "the Iran-Iraq chemical arms race points to a continuing lack of trust between the Gulf neighbors....These diplomats see chemical weapons proliferation as a powerful, long-term ingredient in the age-old Iran-Iraq rivalry. They say that Iran is now forced to work toward chemical weapons parity with Iraq to create a credible deterrent.

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against any future Iraqi decision to use chemical weapons against Iranian forces or civilians. 'Possession of chemical weapons is political clout,' says one diplomat. 'The Iraqis want many options and chemical weapons is [sic] one of those options. Whether they use them or not is unimportant but just that they have them.' He adds, 'The same is true for Iran.' There is evidence that both Iraq and Iran used chemical weapons during the Gulf war. Iraq appears to have resorted to chemical weapons attacks more often and on a wider scale than Iran, in many cases to push back advancing Iranian forces....Many Gulf War analysts say that the most dangerous precedent to emerge from the eight years of fighting in the Gulf War was the suggestion that cheap and effective chemical weapons can help turn a war effort around. Even more compelling is the suggestion that Iran risked losing the war because Iran's Revolutionary Guards were not efficient enough to bolster Iran's own chemical weapons arsenal to match that of Iraq's on the battlefield."


1 December 1988

US authorities are investigating an agreement by an US company to transfer thiodiglycol to Iran, circumventing US export control laws. The company, Alcolac of Baltimore, MD, began shipping the chemical in February 1987 for Colimex, a West German company now named Chemco GmbH. The February shipment made first went to Norfolk, VA, where customs officials intercepted the shipment and replaced the drums of thiodiglycol with drums of water. The agents then tracked the shipment to Singapore, where it was then transshipped to Karachi, Pakistan. In Pakistan, the shipment was again transferred, this time to an Iranian ship called the SS Iran Ekram. From Karachi, the shipment was sent to Bandar Abbas, Iran, where it was off-loaded. From there, it made its way to a company in Tehran. [Note: Referenced earlier in 1987 chronology.]


1 December 1988

Peter Walascheck, a West German national accused of illegally trying to ship thiodiglycol to Iran (from Alcolac, a company in Baltimore), sacrifices his $350,000 bond and flees the United States. According to the report, Walascheck was ordered to stay at a halfway house, but he never returned from his volunteer job. His hearing had been scheduled for 20 December.


13 December 1988

In an article about chemical weapons proliferation, the Christian Science Monitor states, "There were also persistent reports, some buttressed by US intelligence, that Iran used chemical weapons as well [during the war with Iraq]. This caused some countries to refrain from criticizing Iraq. But some European diplomats dispute the claim that Iran used chemicals, saying it's based on a reading of the evidence that is prejudiced against Iran." The article also reports that, "Western analysts agree that Iran is one of the two or three key countries to watch now for a chemical weapons buildup. It already has a limited production capability, according to US intelligence, and it has reportedly supplied Libya with some chemical warfare materials. 'It's safe to assume,' a well-placed US official says, 'that Iran will now set about eliminating the gap in chemical warfare capability that was so plain during the war with Iraq'."

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The article concludes by stating, "'We don't deny the capability' to produce chemical weapons, says Hassan Mashadi, an Iranian representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. 'We deny that during the course of the war we have used them.' But, he adds, 'when the very existence of people is jeopardized, and no one cares, people will buy arms. They will cut out bread and butter if they have to, but they will do it. In this kind of a situation,' he concludes, 'talking about disarmament is meaningless'."


13 December 1988
The Christian Science Monitor reports that according to US intelligence, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Libya all have the means to produce chemical weapons. Western intelligence analysts conclude that, "Iran also has a limited chemical warfare capability."


Late 1988
Anthony Cordesman states, "Debates took place in the Iranian parliament or Majlis in late 1988 over the safety of Pasdaran gas plants located near Iranian towns..." [Note: Cordesman offers no citation to back up his claim that these debates took place. After an extensive open source search, CNS is unable to corroborate this claim.]


1987

1987
Iran is able to deliver limited quantities of blister (mustard) and blood (cyanide) agents.

1987
Anthony Cordesman states that "the Director of the CIA and informed observers in the Gulf have indicated that Iran could produce mustard gas and blood agents like hydrogen cyanide, phosgene gas, and/or chlorine gas by 1987." [Note: Cordesman cites the 9 February 1989 Senate testimony by CIA Director William Webster as evidence for this statement. However, Webster’s testimony simply states that "Iran produces the blister agent mustard, blood agents, and nerve agents..." Nowhere does he mention that this occurred "by 1987," nor does he state that the agents where "hydrogen cyanide, phosgene gas, and/or chlorine gas" as Cordesman claims. It is not clear, therefore, where Cordesman received this information—perhaps it is from the unidentified "informed observers in
the Gulf" that Cordesman refers to.

1987
The Alavi Foundation (also known as the Moztasafan Foundation of New York until 1992)—a New York-based non-profit charitable organization that a classified 1994 FBI report says is "entirely controlled by the government of Iran"—starts distributing more than $400,000 to a variety of state-run organizations in Iran. US government investigators believe that some of this money is used to purchase gas chromatography and other equipment in the United States for Iran's chemical weapons programs. The recipient organizations include Sharif University, the University of Tehran, Islamic Azad University of Karaj, and a number of medical colleges.

1987
According to *Foreign Affairs*, Iran starts using chemical weapons, specifically mustard gas and phosgene, on the battlefront.

1987-1988
Iran begins to employ indigenously produced CW.

Early 1987
Iran reportedly uses CW near Basra and Mehran.

First Half of 1987
Iran purchases some 90 tons of thiodiglycol, a precursor for mustard gas, from a US company, Alcolac International, in Maryland.

1987
American businessmen Harold Greenburg and Nick Defino made a deal with Alcolac International to broker hundreds of tons (or $1 million worth) of thiodiglycol (a key ingredient in mustard gas) for export to Iran and Iraq. Greenburg and Defino would stand to make 1 cent a pound in profit. Charles Tanaka, an export-import agent in Japan, initiated the deal. Dennis Bass, a special agent for the US Customs Service, intercepts 120 tons of poison gas chemical precursors on their way to Iran from Alcolac International in Baltimore. Bass and his men emptied the chemical drums and filled them with water before sending them on their original intended route to Iran.
1987
Iran allegedly supplies Libya with chemical agents in exchange for naval mines. Libya employs the agents against Chadian troops.

1987
Prime Minister Mir Hussein Musavi declares that Iran has produced CW, but that it will not employ such weapons unless forced to in defense against Iraqi chemical attacks.

1987
Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, reportedly consents to "the acquisition and use of chemical agents."

1987
According to Anthony Cordesman, "Iran is able to weaponize limited quantities of blister (sulfur mustard) and blood (cyanide) agents beginning in 1987, and had some capability to weaponize phosgene gas, and/or chlorine gas. These chemical agents were produced in small batches, and evidently under laboratory scale conditions, which enabled Iran to load small numbers of weapons before any of its new major production plants went into full operation. These gas agents were loaded into bombs and artillery shells, and were used sporadically against Iraq in 1987 and 1988."

1 January 1987
Iran states that 400 of its soldiers were wounded by Iraqi mustard gas on the western front. They were transported to a hospital in Bakhtaran for treatment. Iran claims that this is the second time in a week its forces have been hit with CW.

4 January 1987
Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, today calls on the UN Secretary General to send a team of experts to Iran to investigate Iraqi use of CW. He goes on to say that if the United Nations does not prevent Iraq from using CW in the future, Iran will use any means necessary to prevent further CW use by Iraq. In addition to this message, Iranian officials allow foreign journalists to visit a group of soldiers injured by Iraqi CW near Abadan in late December. One of the wounded Iranians tells reporters that Iraq used CW from 8 a.m. until 3 p.m. on 25 December. Iran claims that although Iraq only used CW against forward positions in the past, it is now beginning to target rear areas as well.

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5 January 1987
Iran says that five of its soldiers have died in a Tehran hospital due to CW-related injuries from recent Iraqi attacks on its front lines.

7 January 1987
IRNA reports that Iran shells an Iraqi CW depot on the western bank of the Shatt al-Arab today, injuring and killing hundreds of Iraqis. Around 20 Iranians are also injured from the ensuing gas cloud after it made its way across to the Iranian lines on the east side of the river. IRNA also quoted an unidentified Iranian official as stating that Iran now has the capability to produce chemical weapons.

9 January 1987
Iraqi forces possibly bombed their own troops with chemical weapons today, according to Radio Tehran. The mistake was said to have taken place near Umm al-Rasas, contaminating a "large area."

10 January 1987
Iranians claim that Iraq has again used chemical weapons against their troops in the Gulf War, and that Iranian artillery has exploded an Iraqi chemical shell dump. None of the supposed victims were seen by an independent physician.
— "Nasty, Cheap, and Hard to Stop," The Economist, p. 42.

11 January 1987
During the course of a five-week investigation by the New York Times, Paul S. Cutter, a former employee of the US Information Agency who is currently serving a five-year sentence for selling TOW missiles to Iran, reveals that retired Col. Ralph Mark Broman took part in the sale to Iran of 120,000 CW-resistant military uniforms.

15 January 1987
Tehran Radio charges that Iraq dropped CW bombs on Iranian troops during a counterattack today against Iran's Karbala-5 offensive.

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15 January 1987
John Reed of Las Vegas, Nevada, convicted in 1985 for attempting to sell 400,000 CW-resistant suits to Iran, has had his sentence reduced due to questions regarding US policies towards selling arms to Iran.

23 February 1987
Iran accuses Iraq of using CW as a means to beat-back an Iranian offensive. The tactic failed, according to Iran, because of the intervention of Iranian anti-CW units that neutralized the effects of the weapons.

24 February 1987
Tehran Radio reports that Iraqi forces used CW shells to bombard Iranian positions to slow progress being made by Iranian forces along the front.

1 March 1987
Xinhua General Overseas News Service (PRC) reports on the end of Iran’s Karbala-5 offensive, and cites Iranian sources as claiming that Iraq used CW to slow the offensive. The offensive took place near Basra, Iraq, and lasted from 9 January to 26 February.

8 March 1987
IRNA reports that Iraq lobbed shells filled with CW at Iranian troops near Basra today. Iranian anti-CW units neutralized the effects of the weapons. IRNA reports only 3 Iranian soldiers are wounded.

23 March 1987
The United States claims that there is no evidence that Iran has employed CW against Iraq. US Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Barker states in a Senate hearing: "Certainly in the Iraq-Iran conflict there is very definite evidence of the use of chemical weapons...[j]ust by Iraq."

April 1987
Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati categorically denies Iraqi charges that Iran employed CW.

9 April 1987
IRNA accuses Iraq of using helicopters to drop CW bombs on Iranian positions in an attempt to slow Iranian troops advancing towards Basra. Anti-CW units neutralized the CW.

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9 April 1987
Iran’s Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati urged the Conference on Disarmament to strengthen the current ban on CW by expanding it to cover the stockpiling, transfer, and development of CW. Velayati states that "The unprecedented level of the use of chemical warfare in recent years has proved beyond doubt that the effective implementation of [an] international convention on the production, use, stockpiling, transfer, and development of chemical weapons is an urgent imperative." He also states that the strengthened ban should include some form of punishment for those who violate the ban.

11 April 1987
IRNA states that Iraq has attacked Iranian troops participating in the Karbala-8 offensive the cities of Abadan, Khorramshahr, and several villages in Khuzestan with mustard gas delivered in artillery rounds today. Anti-CW units have neutralized the weapons. Iran states the death toll reached 200 and the number of wounded climbed over 3,000.

13 April 1987
Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati requests the UN to send a team to Iran to investigate Iraq’s recent use of CW. Velayati states that the failure of international bodies, including the United Nations, to employ effective pressure to force the Iraqis to halt their use of CW has, in fact, encouraged Iraq to increase the number of its CW attacks, as well as develop more effective CW for use against Iran. He urges the creation of a CW-related embargo against Iraq.

17 April 1987
A spokesman for the Iranian War Information Headquarters denies Iraq’s claims that Iran has been using chemical weapons, Tehran radio (IRNA) reports. Iraqi claims that Iran had been using chemical warfare were "aimed at covering up Iraq's extensive chemical attacks on Iranian forces in the southern and western fronts recently." The spokesman also goes on to say that although Iran "is quite able to retaliate [against] these enemy measures, its response would not be what the Iraqi regime has claimed." Iraqi chemical casualties could be explained by climactic changes in air currents that worked against the Iraqis in using their chemical weapons, according to the spokesman.

18 April 1987
IRNA reports that Iraq has used CW against Iraqi Kurds allied with Iranian forces in Northern Iraq. One hundred sixty Kurdish fighters are affected.

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20 April 1987
Iraq has recently sent two letters to United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar protesting Iranian use of phosgene and mustard gas. Iraq is allowing, for the first time, a UN team to investigate on Iraqi soil the use of CW. Iraq states that it has not allowed UN investigators in the past because doing so would "divert attention from ending the war." However, Iraq now wants its evidence of Iranian CW use "brought to the world community."

20 April 1987
Iranian UN Representative, Rajaie-Khorassani, voiced his government's displeasure with what it perceives to be a double standard in the UN sending a team to investigate Iraq's claims against Iran without the UN receiving a formal request from the Iraqi government. "Why should we make so many requests on various occasions without any positive response on behalf of the Secretariat and an offer to be made to the Iraqis without any request?" asks Rajaie-Khorassani. He went on to repeat the Iranian position that it does not use CW.

21 April 1987
Iran's War Information Headquarters states that it will use any means necessary to prevent Iraq from continuing to use CW, unless the UN acts on the issue. A spokesman states on Tehran Radio that "if the United Nations takes no practical steps to prevent the Iraqi regime from using chemical weapons, the Islamic Republic of Iran will consider it as its natural right to use all its means decisively to confront" the problem. He states that Iraqi assertions that Iran has used CW are "mere propaganda to enable it to deploy chemical weapons on a larger scale." Furthermore, he claims that "the weather conditions in the region and also the proximity of the frontline positions in some sectors cause the phosgene gas used by Iraq to seep to the Iraqi positions, and consequently poison and injure the Iraqis themselves." He believes that UN investigators should take this into account and not simply list Iraqi soldiers as "being injured and poisoned by Iran."

22 April 1987
Rajai'e Khorassani, Iran's representative to the United Nations, comments in an interview on the recent decision by the United Nations to send an investigative team of chemical weapons experts to the region after more than 10 previous requests on his part. Khorassani notes no such requests by the Iraqi representative despite his accusations of Iranian use of phosgene (an unstable chemical that dissolves after being released in the air and leaves no trace) in what Khorassani calls a "false report" to the United Nations. Khorassani states that, "Iraq can never prove her claim because thus far Iran has not used chemical weapons." He also alleges that, "A number of Iraqi POWs who have been involved in the use of chemical weapons have announced that the Iraqi regime has repeatedly bombed the positions of her own troops; because of the proximity of the front lines, sometimes some of their forces in front of us have been bombed and injured." As for Iranian military policy with regard to chemical weapons, Kohrassani claims: "Although we possess very strong proof about Iraqi use of chemical weapons against the forces of Islam, and although the Iraqi regime does not possess any proof of its claim, one cannot yet foresee what the result of sending these teams would be. However, we once again announce: If the international organization does not take any steps in putting an end to the crimes of the Iraqi regime, we will retaliate in kind,

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and in that case we will certainly announce it."

23 April 1987
Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati meets with a four-member UN team, sent to investigate Iranian claims that Iraq has again used CW, and demands that the UN do more to stop Iraq from using CW. Velayati complains that Iraq continues to use CW, even though the UN confirmed their use by Iraq twice before. The UN team visits Tehran hospitals to visit those wounded by CW.

27 April 1987
IRNA charges that Iraqi troops have fired CW against Iranian positions in northeast Iraq on one or more occasions today. Iran has launched a new attack against Iraq in retaliation for what it claims is Iraq's use of CW against the Kurds.

2 May 1987
Iraqi Kurds are seeking medical treatment for injuries sustained after Iraqi forces dropped unidentified CW agents on more than 20 Kurdish villages last month. The attacks allegedly occurred on 14 April and reportedly injured 450 Kurds, all but 50 of which were civilians.

9 May 1987
Iran accused Iraq of dropping CW on civilian targets in the Bolhassan neighborhood of Baneh province.

11 May 1987
An Iranian doctor, Ali Rezer Albabi, treating Kurdish victims of mustard gas in the Iranian border town of Baneh, tells a reporter that he, like many other Iranian doctors, is treating victims of the Iran-Iraq War. He explains that all doctors in Iran began receiving training for treating mustard gas casualties once Iraq first deployed CW against Iran two years ago.

13 May 1987
A UN report released today on what it called "one of the gravest infringements of international norms," states that Iraq continues to use CW against Iran, and that Iraqi troops have also been wounded by CW. The report does not clarify whether the Iraqi injuries stem from Iraqi CW blown back across the front lines to their own positions, or whether they stem from Iranian use of CW. The report finds that Iraq attacked the Iranian town of Khorramshahr at least twice on 10 April. One of the attacks targeted a water installation with nerve-gas-filled rockets while the other attack bombarded a housing development with mustard gas. According to the report, "From the examination of weapon fragments found in the Khorramshahr area, chemical bombs similar to those used in 1984
and 1986 have again been used against Iranian forces, indicating their continued deployment by Iraqi forces...in addition, it is most likely that chemical rockets have also been used in this area." The report states that 35 people died in the two attacks. In Iraq, the teams examined three corpses and eight CW survivors and found that they had been exposed to both mustard and phosgene. The team found that the soil samples they took around Basra contained mustard gas. However, the team was unable to find any bomb fragments or craters containing evidence of CW.

Upon the issuing of the report, the Secretary-General states that "The specialists' findings [were] that chemical weapons were again used against Iranian forces by Iraqi forces, also causing injuries to civilians in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and that now also Iraqi forces have sustained injuries from chemical weapons must add new urgency to the grave concerns of the international community." The Secretary General goes on to state that the team found no evidence to prove Iraq's claims that Iran had used CW. The UN team that issued the report visited Iranian territory from 22-29 April and Iraqi territory from 29 April-3 May.


14 May 1987
The Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Larijani blames the UN Security Council for failing to act on a UN report issued yesterday that found Iraq has continued to use CW against Iranian soldiers and civilians. He tells a press conference that "it was surprising that the UN Security Council was still silent on this grave issue." He goes on to say that Iran, unlike the Security Council, cannot afford to be silent on the issue and simply sit at the negotiating table while CW is used against it. Iran is compiling a list of foreign companies and countries that have assisted Iraq in building up its CW capabilities and would release that list to relevant international organization shortly. Larijani further warns that "as long as the Security Council did not condemn the Iraqi attack on Iran, there would be no possibility for Iran to cooperate with the Council."


16 May 1987
The Iranian Foreign Ministry today expresses regret over what it describes as a weak UN Security Council resolution on Iraqi use of CW. According to the Foreign Ministry, although the UN team was unanimous in its findings that Iraq has continued its use of CW, the Security Council is content to issue a resolution completely lacking of "executive teeth" to punish Iraq. The Iranian government denounced the Iraqi attacks as "crimes against humanity."


21 May 1987
Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Velayati sends a missive to the Secretary General of the United Nations, iterating

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that "all countries and related international organization must be asked to mount a coordinated effort aimed at requiring the Iraqi regime to declare its commitment not to repeat the use of chemical weapons." It concludes by saying "the Islamic republic of Iran reserves to the right to change its policy of non-utilization of its legitimate right to retaliate in kind, and cannot endure vast human and material damages as a permanent policy."
— "Velayati Urges UN To Act on Chemical Weapons Use," Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 21 May 1987, translated in FBIS-SAS-87-099, 22 May 87, p. 11.

29 May 1987
Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Velayati states in a letter to UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar that the UN should ask all countries to refrain from exporting CW precursor chemicals.

3 June 1987
An Iraqi military spokesman today denies recent Iranian allegations that Iraq used CW in the Biran Shahr region of Iran.

Mid-1987
Iran reportedly has a significant capacity to produce mustard, cyanide, and nerve agents.

6 June 1987
A New York Times reporter visiting Iraqi soldiers near the front notes that the few soldiers he saw near the front all carried gas masks.

27 June 1987
Iran charges Iraqi warplanes have dropped CW bombs on its troops in an effort to halt the latest Iranian offensive. Decontamination units are reported to have rushed to the scene, limiting the effect of the CW agents.

28 June 1987
Iran claims that Iraqi planes dropped mustard gas bombs on the Iranian border town of Sardasht, killing 10 civilians and injuring 650 more. The attacks targeted four residential areas on two separate bombing runs.

July 1987
A UN official who was involved in all of the investigations in Iran and Iraq regarding CW use states, "There is no

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evidence that Iran has used them."
— Andrew Alexander, "Iraq Continues Chemical War against Iran; UN Looks Other Way," Atlanta Constitution, 9 July 1987, p. 22.

2 July 1987
Iran suggests that Iraq may have used biological weapons as well as mustard gas during the 28 June attack on Sardasht that killed 12 and wounded 650. This is believed to be the first Iranian accusation of BW usage by Iraq. IRNA claimed the suggestion came from a doctor who treated some of the victims from the attacks. He cited worsening infections and abnormal symptoms as reason for his speculation. He stated that specialists would be needed to examine the bomb remnants. [Note: Gas gangrene, a common battlefield injury complication, was common among casualties throughout the Iran-Iraq War. There is no evidence found to date that Iraq or Iran utilized Clostridium perfringens as a form of shrapnel contaminant, although Iraq did research the bacterium for use in weaponry during the 1980s and probably 1990s.]

3 July 1987
Iranian UN officials charge that Iraq's "inhuman" CW attack on Sardasht killed 12 people and left 2,000 people wounded—650 severely. If confirmed, the attack will be the worst thus far in the war.

5 July 1987
The death toll from the 28 June CW attack on Sardasht has climbed to 35, according to an official from Azarbaijan province.
— "Iran Says, 35 People Killed by Iraqi Chemical Bomb," Xinhua General Overseas News Service (PRC), 5 July 1987, item number: 0705004.

12 July 1987
The Iranian evening newspaper Keyhan reports that a drill in the port city of Bandar Abbas, involving Revolutionary Guards, federal and local police, the air force, the Ministry of Health, the Red Crescent, the city government, and volunteers, trained participants in rescue techniques, fire fighting, and neutralizing the effects of CW. The drill was code named "Defending Hormuz Strait."

21 July 1987
US Secretary of State George Schultz states that the latest Security Council resolution on an Iran-Iraq War ceasefire was designed with Iranian interests in mind. He stated that the resolution's denunciation of chemical warfare and the creation of an impartial panel to investigate who began the war were efforts by the Security Council to reach out to Iran. Iran boycotted the session and has not commented on the resolution.

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24 July 1987
Rear Adm. Harold Bernsen, commander of the US Navy's Middle East force, states that US naval vessels escorting ships through the Persian Gulf would have to man battle stations and wear steel helmets, deflated life-vests, and anti-CW gas masks to protect themselves from Iranian attacks.

31 July 1987
The Reagan administration today announces it will tighten export controls on 13 new CW-related substances. Five of those substances would require a license to be shipped anywhere in the world, while the other eight would be banned only for Iran, Iraq, and Syria. US State Department spokesman Charles Redman explains that the reason for the ban for those three countries is because "We believe that Iran, Iraq, and Syria are seeking these eight chemicals from Western countries for use in their chemical weapons programs.... The purpose of these new export controls is threefold:

To curb the supply of chemicals now being sought by Iran, Iraq, and Syria for their respective chemical weapons programs;

To ensure that American chemicals do not contribute to the manufacture of chemical weapons which are subsequently used in the Iran-Iraq war; and

In the case of the worldwide licensing requirements for five chemicals, to harmonize US export controls with those of other Western industrialized nations which are cooperating to curb the supply of chemical weapons precursors to gulf war belligerents."

However, unnamed administration officials speaking on condition of anonymity state that there has been no independent confirmation that Iran has used CW.

4 August 1987
US State Department spokesman Charles Redman states that the eight new nerve gas precursors banned to Iran, Iraq, and Syria are in addition to eight other precursors already banned to those countries. The new chemicals are N, N-diisopropylaminoethane-2-thiol; N, N-diisopropylaminoethyl-2-chloride (the latter two being VX nerve agent precursors); dimethyl phosphate (DMP) (nerve agent precursor); 3 hydroxy-1- methylpiperidine (psychoincapacitant precursor); phosphorus trichloride (nerve gas precursor); 3-quinuclidinol (BZ psychoincapacitant precursor); thionyl chloride (nerve agent precursor); trimethyl phosphate (TMP) (nerve agent precursor). Four of the chemicals already banned include demethyl methylphosphonate (DMMP); methylphosphonyl dichloride (DC); methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF); phosphorous oxychloride, all nerve agent precursors. [Note: The United States had singled out psychoincapacitant precursors here, given the lack of open-source reports that Iraq had been using such CW agents during this period.]
— "US Expands Ban on Chemical Sales," Journal of Commerce, 4 August 1987, p. 6A.

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11 August 1987
Iran delivered its formal response to the 20 July UN Security Council Resolution 598 calling for a cease fire in the Iran-Iraq War. In the response to UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, Iran outlines several areas where it is willing to work with the United Nations. These include naming Iraq as the aggressor in the conflict, preventing the use of CW, and halting the bombardment of civilian areas.

12 August 1987
Iran today reacted negatively to the 20 July UN Security Council Resolution 598 calling for a cease fire in the Iran-Iraq War, saying that it was not "a balanced, impartial, comprehensive and practical resolution." However, it pledged to work with the UN Secretary General to enable the Security Council to create a more just resolution in the future. Iran called the Secretary General's eight-point plan from 1985 as the only "practical plan thus far." That plan called for an end to the use of CW as well as a halt to targeting non-military assets.
— "Iran's Position on the UN Resolution," Xinhua General Overseas News Service (PRC), 12 August 1987, item number: 0812057.

26 August 1987
Iranian Prime Minister Hussein Musavi today criticizes UN Security Council Resolution 598 calling for a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War, saying that it did not take "a clear stand on [the] crime" of Iraq using CW.

September 1987
Iran reportedly begins supplying Libya and Syria with CW stocks. One report (ABC News) alleges that Iran is supplying Libya with CW in exchange for Soviet-made "sophisticated mines." Libya denies the charges.

September 1987
A somewhat different report out of the United Kingdom alleges that Iran was supplying Libya with newly developed CW in exchange for missiles: "Iran has agreed to supply Libya with Iranian-produced chemical weapons in exchange for advanced Soviet Scud-B missiles, according to informed sources in Tehran and Tripoli....The sources said Iran had developed three new types of chemical mortar shells and rockets for use against ships, tanks and troop concentrations."

September 1987
Iran denies the above report.

10 September 1987
According to a senior US administration official, the United States sends a message through the Soviet Union to Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
Libya stressing its concern over reports of Libyan attempts to procure CW from Iran in exchange for the Soviet-made mines.

— David B. Ottaway, "In a Rare Joint Effort, Superpowers Press Libya; Gadhafi Cautioned on Arms Deal with Iran," Washington Post, 11 September 1987, p. A33.

11 September 1987
The United States today communicates through the Soviet Union a request to Libya that it not send Soviet-made sea mines to Iran in return for Iranian CW. State Department spokesman Charles Redman does not offer proof that Iran in fact had CW or that it transferred any to Libya, but states that the reports corroborate claims made by Chad that Libya was now using CW in their ongoing border war. According to the Associated Press, Iran has used CW during its war with Iraq — however, it does not offer proof for making that statement. Unidentified US intelligence agents reported observing Libyan and Iranian cargo planes unloading in Tehran and Tripoli, respectively, but could not identify the cargo the planes carried. One official states that "We don't have confirmation that it did take place. We think it might have, but we don't have 100 percent proof." Some unidentified administration officials expressed doubt over the accuracy of the intelligence reports regarding the Iranian transfer of CW to Libya, perhaps indicating why no formal protest had been made to Iran. The Libyans, in a letter to the UN Secretary-General, denied any transfer had taken place.


12 September 1987
During a call-in radio broadcast, Iranian officials answer questions asked by listeners. One Iranian engineer responds to a question by stating that Iran is now making a variety of war-related products, including CW protective gear. A military official in Washington, DC confirmed the statement but said the quality of the items Iran now produces is quite low.


24 September 1987
The United States has sent 2,000 gas masks to Chad after State Department officials claim they have irrefutable evidence that the Libyan/Iranian mines-for-CW transfer took place. The officials state that according to shaky intelligence, there is a possibility another similar transfer may be in the works.


25 September 1987
The Iranian opposition group the Moujahedeen claims to have evidence that the Iranian government has recently built a pipeline designed to transport CW to the southern front. Ali Safavi, the group's spokesman, charges that the Iranian government was also in the process of stockpiling CW near the southern front for use in its next offensive.

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They offer no proof for their allegations, which appear in any case to be highly suspect.

5 October 1987
The United States is preparing to send stinger missiles [manportable surface-to-air missiles MANPADS] to Chad in an effort to bolster that country's defenses against Libya after Libya allegedly acquired CW from Iran. The stingers are intended to counter the CW threat now posed by Libyan planes.

10 October 1987
Iraq states Iranian claims that Iraq used bombers to launch a CW attack against Iran on 8 October are "a sheer lie." The spokesman continues to state that Iraq does not use any CW.

11 October 1987
IRNA states that an Iranian missile strike against Baghdad was in reaction to an Iraqi CW attack that killed 100 Iranian soldiers and injured dozens more. The soldiers were encamped last week in the Sumar basin, about 80 miles northeast of Baghdad.

13 October 1987
Iranian officials claim that Iraq used a new class of CW in its attack on Iranian forces in the Sumar basin last week. An Iranian colonel reports that the new weapon is more powerful than previous weapons and that "everyone will die if he takes a breath of the poisonous gas." An Iranian report stated that 100 soldiers died and 300 were wounded. Two of the dead soldiers were shown to reporters. They were badly burned and their faces had turned black. The colonel states that "This shows that the Iraqis have used a new kind of chemical bomb which is filled with a very poisonous green liquid." According to the colonel, all soldiers stationed in the basin have now been issued gas masks.

18 October 1987
US Secretary of State George Schultz states that both Iraq and Iran have used CW, "[i]n the first reported reversal of official US opinion."
— Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation
29 October 1987
Iran and Iraq trade allegations at a UN conference on CW disarmament, accusing each other of using CW during their seven-year war. Hassan Masahadi of Iran claims that Iraq has used CW against Iran 17 times this year alone.

November 1987
Anthony Cordesman claims that "Iran seems to have completed completion of a major poison gas plant at Qazvin, about 150 kilometers west of Tehran. This plant is reported to have been completed between November 1987 and January 1988. While supposedly a pesticide plant, the facility's true purpose seems to have been poison gas production using organophosphorous compounds. It is impossible to trace all the sources of the major components and technology Iran used in its chemical weapons program during this period. Mujahideen sources claim Iran also set up a chemical bomb and warhead plant operated by the Zakaria Al-Razi chemical company near Mahshar in southern Iran, but it is unclear whether these reports are true."

16 November 1987
Unnamed US officials state that intelligence reports suggest that Iran has some capacity to make CW such as nerve agent and mustard gas.

17 November 1987
The Iraqi News Agency reports that dozens of planes have attacked an Iranian facility in the port city of Bushehr believed to be producing and storing Iranian CW. The news agency reports that the attack "reduced the facility to rubble." Other reports from Iraqi military communiqués put the scene of the attack 37 miles away from Bushehr. Iran reports that Iraq struck its nuclear facility in Bushehr instead.

18 November 1987
When asked to comment on the Iranian report that Iraq had bombed its nuclear facility, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz responds that Iraq actually bombed a CW facility. He adds that Iraq would bomb Iranian CW facilities in the future as well, and that this particular facility was "the biggest industrial complex for chemical products at Iran's Bushehr port." In an Iraqi military communiqué, Iraq did not mention the nuclear facility when it reported it hit a chemical plant 37 miles away from the nuclear plant.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.

25 November 1987
The Iranian evening newspaper Keyhan quotes the Iranian minister of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Mohsen Rafiqdust, as stating that Iran will use CW against Iraq if Iraq continues to use CW against Iran. — "Iran Threatens to Deploy New Type of Ground-to-Ground Missile," Xinhua General Overseas News Service (PRC), 25 November 1987, item number: 1125003.

3 December 1987
US government officials state that Iran traded chemical weaponry to Libya in return for sophisticated naval mines. According to the officials, the CW was probably a mixture of mustard gas and nerve agents. — "US Officials Say Iran, Libya Secretly Trading Arms," St. Petersburg Times (Florida), 4 December 1987, p. A10; "The World; Iran-Libya Arms Deal Told," Los Angeles Times, 4 December 1987, p. 2.

27 December 1987
Iranian Prime Minister Husayn Mousavi states that Iran is producing CW. In "presenting the annual budget to parliament, [Mousavi] listed the toxic arms in a long list of weapons that he said Iran's defense ministry was producing."

27 December 1987
Prime Minister Mousavi specifies that Iran is producing "sophisticated offensive chemical weapons" and has deployed long-range missiles along its front with Iraq.

27 December 1987
Mousavi was quoted as saying that Iran would not use CW "as long as it was not forced to and will respect international conventions."

27 December 1987
Furthermore, Mousavi claims that Iran is producing copies of the US-made TOW anti-tank missile as well as remote-controlled pilotless aircraft (i.e., unmanned aerial vehicles or UAVs), and that it will soon start producing fighter planes.
27 December 1987
In reporting the speech, IRNA reports that "The long list of domestic productions in defense industry also includes sophisticated offensive chemical weapons" and that a "special section" within the defense industry had been established for their production.

29 December 1987
Mussavi modifies his statement of 27 December in front of the Majlis to claim that Iran only has a CW capability: "The Islamic Republic is capable of manufacturing chemical weapons and possesses the technology. But we will produce them only when Islam allows us and when we are compelled to do so."

30 December 1987
The London daily Independent writes that "[p]ro-government Iranian sources claim Ayatollah Khomeini has vetoed [chemical weapons] use on moral grounds but say he is under pressure from sectors of the government and military to lift the ban before the winter offensive." The newspaper goes on to state that unidentified sources in Tehran and Tripoli, Libya have stated that Iran has developed three new types of chemical mortars designed to attack naval forces, troops, and tanks. The report states that Libya would like the shells to use against Chad and that it is prepared to trade 12 Scud-B missiles for them.

1986
1986
A deputy in the Iranian parliament reportedly says that products such as mustard gas "...are on the production line."

1986-1987
Iran has the capability to produce enough lethal agents to load its own weapons. [Note: The citation Cordesman offers to back up this claim does not exist.]
1986-1988

*Jane's Intelligence Review* reports that evidence exists that between 1986 and 1988, Iran received help from North Korea to design and manufacture chemical warheads. The possibility also exists that North Korea directly transferred chemical warheads to Iran.

— "Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme Special Report, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 1 April, 1994, p. 192.

**Early 1986**

A second UN mission visits Iran to investigate CW attacks.


**12 January 1986**

Tehran's Mayor Mohammad Nabi Habibi led an Iranian delegation to a conference in Sheffield, UK dealing with nuclear disarmament, peace issues, and the elimination of chemical and biological weapons.


**26 January 1986**

An Iranian military communiqué on 27 January reports that Iraq fired chemical weapons in the Ayn Khush sector of the front at 12:15 and again at 18:15 local time. An Iraqi military communiqué dated 27 January denied the Iranian claims that the Ayn Khush sector had been hit with chemical weapons.


**30 January 1986**

An Iranian military communiqué on 31 January reports that five Iranian soldiers in the Khorramshahr (Abadan) sector were wounded by an Iraqi chemical at 1:30 a.m. on 30 January. A 1 February military communiqué reported an additional chemical attack of five chemical shells on 30 January in the Chilat Sector. Those shells failed to produce any damage due to inclement weather.


**February 1986**

IRNA cites Prime Minister Hussein Musavi as saying that, "...Iran has not yet deployed chemical weapons although it is capable of doing so."


*Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.*
12 February 1986
IRNA radio reported military communiqués stating that Iranian troops came under chemical weapons attack while defending Iranian-held territory surrounding the Umm Qasr naval base on Iraq's Fao peninsula. Chemical weapons decontamination units were at the scene trying to neutralize the agents. The chemical weapons consisted of "'chemical bullets' as well as missiles, each of which carried 40 liters [approximately 10 gallons] of chemical solution."

13 February 1986
An Iranian military communiqué reports that "the cowardly enemy once again resorted to chemical weapons, but the chemical weapons defense unit took action immediately to neutralize the chemical reagents and evacuate the injured behind the front. This morning also the enemy by mistake subjected the positions of Iraqi forces, which were close to the defensive lines of Islam's combatants, to chemical bombardment and serious casualties were no doubt inflicted on Iraq's Presidential Guards division....Latest reports from Wa al-Fajr operational theater indicate that the Iraqi regime in the past two days has been continuously shelling the area and attacking it with chemical weapons consisting of mustard and nerve gases and also cyanide derivatives. [Note: These cyanide derivatives may be a reference to tabun, which contains cyanide in its molecular structure and is an active leaving group in the nerve agent, cyanogen chloride, or hydrocyanic acid (HCN). Again, no confirmation exists that Iraq used HCN in combat against Iranian troops.] The attacks have been carried out mainly over palm groves in the liberated port city of Fao and on the Fao-Basra road as well as the western bank of Arvand river [Shatt al-Arab]. Those afflicted are suffering from respiratory malfunctioning, sore eyes, and skin burns. A number of them have been transferred to Ahvaz hospital and several others to Tehran."

13 February 1986
An Iranian military spokesman from the War Information Headquarters claimed that at least 10 Iranian soldiers have been killed and many others injured by Iraqi chemical weapons attacks over the past two days. He went on to say that Iran has asked the UN Secretary General to send a team to Iran to investigate the attack.

13 February 1986
Iraqi Information Minister Latif Nsayef Jassem rejected the Iranian accusations and instead charged Iran was the one using chemical weapons—specifically late at night on 12 February and early in the morning on 13 February.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
13 February 1986
Dr. Hamid Sorabpour, a director of a hospital in Tehran, reports that his hospital has already admitted 85 victims of nerve and mustard gas intoxication, and that they expected 70 more to be admitted shortly.

13 February 1986
Iran's Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati chastises the UN and Secretary General Perez de Cuellar for their "inaction vis-à-vis the deployment of chemical weapons by Iraq." Lying blame on the United Nations for the continuing Iraqi chemical weapons use, Mr. Velayati went on to say, "I regret that I have to announce that with the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in the past two days, the Islamic Republic of Iran is left with no recourse but to resort to a new course of action in order to make Iraq refrain from its chemical attacks, unless, with the next few days, an effective international solution is proposed an firmly implemented to halt these attacks by the UN, and Your Excellency in particular."

13 February 1986
Iran's UN Ambassador, Said Rajaie Khorassani, accuses Iraqi planes of attacking the Iranian city of Abadan with chemical weapons. Although he gives no direct figures on the numbers of killed by CW in Abadan, Khorassani claims 2,500 Iranians have been injured and 20 killed by mustard, nerve, and blood agents in the past few days. He goes on to accuse the UN Security Council of "callousness and irresponsibility" in not condemning Iraq's CW use and other violations of international law. Khorassani says he officially asked Secretary General Perez de Cuellar to send a team to investigate the attacks. In response to the Iraqi claims that Iran had used CW against Iraq, Khorassani responded that it was a "big lie" and that "when we use it, we will say it." He warns that "if Iraq uses [CW] one more time, we have to use these weapons if they continue.

13 February 1986
When asked about the conflicting claims of CW use, US State Department spokesman Charles Redman responds that although the United States government could not confirm the accusations at this time, there has been some recent evidence that Iran is developing a CW capacity.

14 February 1986
Tehran Radio claims that 17 Iranians have been killed from Iraqi CW and that another 1,500 have been injured. The Martyrs' Foundation in a statement on Tehran Radio condemns Iraq's "inhuman" use of CW and said it plans to send some of the CW victims abroad for medical treatment.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
15 February 1986
Iranian Prime Minister Hussein Musavi warns that Iran will take serious and adequate steps to prevent Iraq from using CW, unless the international community intervenes to stop Iraq. This message is contained in correspondence sent to the leaders of 20 other countries. Earlier, foreign diplomats and reporters were also shown CW victims from the Fao Peninsula in a hospital in Tehran.

15 February 1986
A commentary on Tehran Radio criticized the recent meeting of the Arab League's Committee on the Gulf War for not denouncing Iraq's use of chemical weapons. The committee was meeting in Baghdad.

15 February 1986
Gholam Reza Hadidi, the Charge d'Affaires for the Iranian embassy in Paris, France, reports during a press conference that Iraq has used CW against Iranian troops three times in the past three weeks. He claims those attacks took place on 27 January, 30 January, and yesterday, 14 February, in an attack on the border city of Abadan.

15 February 1986
Iraqi Information Minister Latif Nessayif Jassim dismissed the Iranian allegation that Iraq had used CW against the city of Abadan. Jassim states that Iraqi forces do not need to use CW against civilian targets because they are in full control of all areas of the front. He states that Iran is simply using the CW allegations as a tool to cover up its own CW use against Iraqi forces.

15 February 1986
An Iranian military communiqué claims Iraq again used CW against Iranian troops, and that Iranian medical and anti-chemical units attempted to neutralize the effects of the chemical weapons.

15 February 1986
In a Iranian-Libyan joint statement issued today, both sides condemned Iraq for using CW during its fighting with Iran. The statement was issued at the end of a visit to Iran by a Libyan delegation led by Abu Zayd Umar Durdah,
Secretary for Agrarian Reform and member of the Revolutionary Command Council.

16 February 1986
Iraq charges that Iran used CW against Iraqi troops, but gave no further details about how many troops are affected, or where the incident took place. Iran countered that Iraq dropped CW bombs from planes and shelled the front with "mustard and nerve gasses and also cyanide derivatives."

16 February 1986
Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, West Germany, and Sweden have been asked by Iran to care for some of its victims of CW.

16 February 1986
Iranian Health Minister Marandi has called upon the World Health Organization to use its influence to stop Iraq from using CW.

17 February 1986
Iran sent 38 soldiers to European hospitals to be treated for CW intoxication. Prof. Gerhard Freilinger, a doctor who has treated Iranian CW victims twice in the past, states that "the extent of the burns is much greater than before. These people are all much more seriously injured than the ones I saw earlier....I am certain mustard gas was also involved because respiratory organs...were most seriously damaged." Freilinger went on to say that they would be lucky if four of the eight soldiers taken to Vienna would survive. The Iranian embassy in Sweden reported that the five soldiers airlifted there had been injured by CW dropped by Iraqi warplanes.

18 February 1986
The Iranian representative to the UN will boycott the special Security Council meeting on the Gulf War in protest of the Council's failure to condemn Iraq's invasion of Iran at the beginning of the war, and its failure to condemn Iraqi use of CW. In related news, Tehran Radio reports that 60 CW victims are being treated in Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, Sweden, Switzerland, and West Germany. The radio station went on to blame London media outlets for not providing enough media coverage to the plight of the Iranian CW victims.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
18 February 1986
Doctors at the University of Lausanne reported that the three Iranian soldiers being treated there appear to be suffering from wounds caused by mustard gas.

18 February 1986
The Iranian Charge d'Affaires in London, Seyed Jalal Sadatian, held a press conference to release information detailing more than 50 Iraqi CW attacks between 1980 and 1984. He states that while Iran is not currently considering using these weapons, it would have to reconsider should the attacks continue.

19 February 1986
The US State Department condemned Iraq's use of CW. According to the written statement, the State Department claimed that the use of CW "threatens the effort of many decades to ban this kind of warfare." The statement went on to blame Iran for the continuation of the war.

19 February 1986
The Iraqi ambassador to the United Nations, Riyadh al Qaysi, dismissed Iran's accusations that Iraq had used CW weapons.

19 February 1986
The US State Department says that "information available to us strongly suggests that Iraq has used chemical weapons in the latest round of fighting. We condemn this, as we have consistently in the past." The statement did not mention Iraq's allegations of Iranian CW use. Iran claimed that Iraq has recently used a "new type of poisonous gas" against Iranian troops.

19 February 1986
The head of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corp Medical Center announces that 8,500 troops have been injured by Iraqi mustard, nerve, and cyanide weapons. Two thousand of these troops are receiving hospital treatment either in Iran, or overseas.

20 February 1986
One of the eight Iranian soldiers transported to Vienna for treatment has died from the effects of mustard gas, a doctor there says today. Another soldier was dead on arrival. The others are in danger of succumbing to the same fate, he says. Laboratory tests have confirmed the presence of mustard gas. The Iranian Embassy in Belgium said that one of the nine soldiers airlifted there has died. Of the 400 soldiers brought to the Labbanfinejad hospital in
Tehran for CW-related treatment, 200 have been released, 7 have died, and over 30 have been sent on to Europe.

20 February 1986
IRNA claims that Iraqi planes mistakenly attacked their own forces on the Fao Peninsula today.

20 February 1986
Forty-two additional injured Iranian soldiers were sent to Europe for treatment of CW wounds, one of whom died en route. The Iranian Charge d'Affaires in London, Seyed Jalal Sadatian, greeted the group of soldiers airlifted to Great Britain and stated: "This is not the first time Iraq has used chemical weapons and still the rest of the world remains silent and refuses to condemn them." An official of the Iranian embassy in Vienna who greeted soldiers claimed that these were just a small fraction of the more than 8,000 Iranians wounded during the 13 February CW attack. One-quarter of that figure suffered what he deemed "serious injuries."

21 February 1986
Iraqi Deputy Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Hisham Sabah al-Fakhri claims the Iranian accusations of CW use on the part of the Iraqi forces are "categorically untrue."

22 February 1986
Maj. Gen. Maher Abdel-Rashid, commander of Iraq's Third Army Corps, claims that Iranian forces launched a CW mortar counterattack against his troops today. He states that the Iranians used "mustard gas and a similar kind of gas." When asked about the effect of the gas on his soldiers, he responded that "we are not used to complaining about casualties." This is the second time during this offensive that Iraq has charged Iran with using CW.

22 February 1986
A note handed to Great Britain's Foreign Office by the Iranian Charge d'Affaires in London, states that "the silence of the British government and the international organizations vis-à-vis the Iraqi use of chemical weapons is encouraging the Baghdad regime to continue its war crimes." He said that since Britain claims there is not sufficient evidence to officially condemn Iraq for the atrocities, the British officials should visit the Iranian CW victims undergoing treatment for their injuries in London. He went on to say that Iran hopes to receive an official response to an Iranian enquiry regarding the British sale of chemical weapons-related materials to Iraq. In an apparent response to this last question, a British Foreign Office official informed IRNA that Britain has tightened its export regulations after it apparently sent Iraq fertilizer materials that could also be used in the production of CW.
— "Iran Has Called on Britain to 'Clarify its Stance',' British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
23 February 1986

The Iranian Embassy in London announces that one of the 11 Iranian soldiers receiving treatment there for CW intoxication has died. He "had external burns, internal bleeding, his kidneys didn't function and his throat was blocked." [Note: The latter type of injury—pseudomembrane formation in the upper airways—is typical of grave respiratory exposure to mustard gas, and is often the cause of death in such cases.]


23 February 1986

IRNA cited Iranian Military communiqués as stating that "confused Iraqis" launched CW attacks against their own troops on the Fao Peninsula.


23 February 1986

IRNA quotes Iranian Prime Minister Hussein Musavi as saying that although "the worldwide protests against Iraq's frequent use of chemical weapons has forced the Baghdad regime to attribute such criminal acts to Iran, in a bid to rid herself of the accusation...Iran has not yet deployed chemical weapons in the war fronts." However, he warned, "Iran is capable of doing so. If the Iraqi aggression continued, Iran would give a proper answer to it."


24 February 1986

The UN Security Council voted unanimously to call for a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War. The resolution "deplores the use of chemical weapons contrary to the obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol." Iran had boycotted the deliberations leading up to the resolution, and immediately condemned it for not naming Iraq explicitly for beginning the war or using CW. Iranian ambassador to the United Nations Said Rajaie Khorassani, ruefully exclaimed before the vote: "Let them pass their nasty resolution." A few hours after the resolution passed, Iran's speaker of the Parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani proclaimed the unleashing of a new offensive in northern Iraq to protest what he call an "ineffective and shallow" resolution.

25 February 1986
UN Spokesman Francois Giuliani announces that a team of four specialists has been dispatched to Iran and will arrive in Tehran this evening. They will report back to the UN next week on Iranian charges that Iraq has used CW. The team will not be visiting Iraq because that government has not invited them.

26 February 1986
During a trip to the Shatt al-Arab front, Guardian reporter Ian Black notes that all Iranian soldiers "wear light protective suits against chemical attack and carry their gasmasks everywhere."

26 February 1986
The New York Times states that "although [Iraq and Iran] have accused each other of using chemical weapons, there has never been any evidence that Iran has used them in the five-and-a-half year war, according to US and United Nations officials." [Note: The Times did not mention the names of the officials to which they are referring.]

27 February 1986
A five-man United Nations inspection team landed in Tehran to investigate Iranian accusations of Iraqi CW attacks. They will visit a hospital in Tehran before traveling to the border cities of Ahvaz and Abadan in southwestern Iran. Iran repeated its charges that Iraq has used CW in the battle for control of the Fao Peninsula, and claims over 8,500 Iranians have been wounded or killed. According to the Iranian government, about 90 soldiers (five or whom have died) have been sent to Europe to receive treatment. Iran also repeated its accusation that Iraqi planes mistakenly bombed their own troops with CW. In a related matter, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati addressed the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and called for a war crimes tribunal to be established to prosecute the Iraqis responsible for authorizing use of CW. "We want these criminals punished as were those who appeared before the Nuremburg court," Velayati said.

27 February 1986
The UN team travels to the Labbafi-Nejad Medical Center in Tehran and meets its director, Dr. H. Sohrabpur. He reports that since the beginning of the Val-Fajr 8 offensive on 9 February 1986, over 400 soldiers wounded by chemical weapons had received treatment at his center. Of these, 11 had died, 31 had been sent abroad, and 33 had been transferred to intensive care units at other Tehran hospitals. The UN team visited some of the patients. According to Dr. Peter Dunn, "Most of the patients we saw and spoke with showed classic symptoms of mustard gas poisoning." He states, "we were taken to several wards to examine and interview nine Iraqi casualties from a group of 15 who were being treated for mustard gas injuries sustained in the Al-Faw area several days before. Speaking out without prompting or duress, Iraqi prisoners all claimed they had been injured by chemical bombs dropped by their own aircraft, either after they had been captured by — or had surrendered to — Iranian forces, or when they were in no-man's land between the opposing forces."

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28 February 1986
The UN team visits Ahvaz and arrives in time to see "about 50 chemical casualties being loaded into a medi-vac aircraft for transport to Tehran." According to a team member, "the mission’s chemical work was made difficult by two unexpected factors. First, there was a delay of about two weeks between the dates of the attacks and the arrival of the mission in Iran. Second, unusually heavy rains pelted southwest Iran in February, flooding many areas. The first area inspected was a building site in a suburb 2km northeast of the center of Abadan. Although chemical bombs fell 15 days before and that area had been decontaminated, we were able to detect residual mustard gas in bomb craters....The second area was flat, water-soaked terrain several hundred meters off the main road running from Abadan to Qofas. We examined three bomb craters...[mustard gas] vapor concentrations of 0.2-2.5mg/meters cubed were measured at the bottom of the craters even though the area had been decontaminated and excessive water — resulting in the hydrolysis of agents — was present. From the second area we traveled south towards Qofas along the main road....After crossing the Barmanshir River by pontoon bridge, we passed through a plantation of date palms on our way to the Hadhrat Fatima Field Hospital, about 40km from Abadan. We were told that mustard gas bombs has fallen in the groves....The hospital area had been attack the previous day. Of 12 bombs dropped, four had fallen very close to the hospital buildings. Casualties from this attack were those we had examined at Ahvaz Airport earlier that day. One bomb had fallen 15m from the entrance to the hospital...." The team collected soil samples from a non-decontaminated crater about 50m from the hospital. [Note: These soil samples, after analysis in Sweden and Switzerland, "were shown to contain between 0.1 and 0.2 percent by weight of mustard gas..."] The team noted that it was interesting that unlike the mission in 1984, there were no unexploded mustard gas bombs. They were told later by a captured Iraqi pilot that impact fuses are now being used, rather than timed fuses that were used previously. He also told the team that Iraq had changed its tactics so that chemical bombs were now dropped from high, rather than low altitude. Later in the evening, the team interviewed an Iraqi pilot at the Shaheed Baghai Hospital. He informed them that he had participated in two "special missions" during which he dropped bombs that matched the description of unexploded chemical bombs examined in 1984.

Late February 1986
Iraq responds to Iranian battlefront successes near the Iraqi-Kuwait border with poison gas attacks on infantry troops. Eighty-three Iranian soldiers are evacuated to hospitals in Belgium and Austria. After examining soldiers in Vienna, Dr. Gerhard Freilinger reports, "It is highly likely that not only mustard gas, but also cyanide and a nerve gas known as tabun were used."

March 1986
At a State Department briefing, the "spokesman added that Syria may have assisted Iranian chemical warfare production."

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**Early March 1986**
A third UN mission visits Iran to investigate CW attacks and presents a report to the Secretary General concluding that mustard gas, and occasionally nerve gas, were used by Iraqi forces against Iran.

**2 March 1986**
The UN mission investigating chemical weapons in Iran visits the Val-Fajr Infirmary located in Azadi Stadium in Tehran. There they meet the director, Dr. Khatemi, who informs them that all of the chemical casualties transported to Tehran from the front are first brought here for initial diagnosis. Around 15 percent are then transferred on to other Tehran hospitals should they need more intensive treatment. He claims that since early February 1986, around 2,000 chemical casualties have been treated in Ahvaz hospitals, and some 10,000 at the Val-Fajr Infirmary. At a reception with a senior officer for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the evening, the team receives a request to postpone their departure so they may investigate a new chemical attack in northwestern Iran. The official claims the attack occurred within the last 24 hours and victims had been taken to the town of Baneh. The team, due to time constraints, could not postpone their departure to investigate.

**3 March 1986**
The UN team investigating Iran’s CW accusations left Tehran upon completing its investigation.

**7 March 1986**
Unnamed Reagan administration "experts" report that unspecified intelligence reports indicate Iraq has recently used mustard gas. They say that, contrary to Iraqi reports, there is no evidence that Iran has used CW recently.

**12 March 1986**
The UN mission sent to investigate Iraqi chemical weapons attacks in Iran conclude that, "Based on evidence gathered during this second visit to Iran, the UN mission unanimously concluded that chemical weapons have been used in the Abadan area against Iranian positions by Iraqi forces. Medical examinations and testimony of Iranian and Iraqi casualties evacuated from the Al-Faw area further confirmed the use of chemical weapons in that war zone by Iraqi forces. Delivery weapons were identified as aerial bombs filled with mustard gas. The mission also concluded that the sheer number of casualties [over 70] seen in Tehran and Ahvaz would indicate an escalation in the use of chemical weapons in 1986 compared to 1984...we unanimously conclude that: (a) On many occasions, Iraqi forces have used chemical weapons against Iranian forces; (b) The agent used has mainly been mustard gas.

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although on some occasions nerve gas was also employed."

14 March 1986
UN-sponsored report on the Iran-Iraq War charges Iraq with using chemical weapons "on many occasions" against Iran. UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar condemns Iraq for violating 1925 Geneva Protocol banning chemical weapons. The report accuses Iraq of mostly using mustard gas, with nerve gas used "on some occasions." Although this is the third UN report on CW usage in the Iran-Iraq War since 1984, it is the first that directly names Iraq as the culprit. Neither US State Department nor UN officials believe there is any evidence suggesting Iran used CW against Iraq. Four UN experts collected evidence from 26 February until 3 March and came to the conclusion that "the use of chemical weapons appears to be more extensive than in 1984." They visited over 700 casualties in Tehran and Ahwaz, and found chemical weapons residue in bomb craters in three places in the Iranian city of Abadan, as well as on Iranian-held positions on the Fao Peninsula. Iran's deputy delegate to the UN, Fereidoun Damavandi Kamali, praised the report.

14 March 1986
IRNA charges that Britain has delivered 10 cylinders of chemicals weighing 780kg to Iraq, and links this distribution to past instances where Britain has delivered chemical weapons to Iraq.

16 March 1986
A radio commentary claims that "the UN organization, the UN Secretary General...and international and regional organizations are responsible for defending [international laws banning the use of CW] and obstructing their violation. However, the initiative of the UN Secretary General and the stance adopted in the past by the UN organization, the UN Security Council in particular, lack the determination required for stopping a regime that violates international law." The commentary goes on to blame the Secretary General for not openly criticizing the Iraqi regime and argues that simply disclosing that the Geneva Protocol was violated will not deter Iraq from using CW again in the future.

17 March 1986
A two-day seminar on chemical and biological warfare, and ways to limit their affects, began at Shiraz University in Shiraz, Iran today. The opening statement read at the conference blamed Iraq for using CW and demanded that a

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severe punishment should be brought to bear against anyone using those kinds of weapons. The statement went on to say that, although Iran has the capability of manufacturing CW, it was not doing so due to its respect of international norms and regulations. Iran is hosting the conference as a way to better enable it to counteract the effects of these weapons.


20 March 1986
US Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Donald Lowitz, announces that the UN report issued earlier in the week regarding Iraq's use of CW against Iran is "in accord with the United States findings....My country deplores Iraq's use of chemical weapons in this conflict."


22 March 1986
Iran's foreign minister demands a formal resolution from the UN Security Council condemn Iraqi use of CW. He states that Iraq began using CW three years ago and the UN has done nothing to stop it. He claims that more needs to be done than simply issuing a statement condemning Iraq's actions.


23 March 1986
Mohsen Rafiq-Dust, Minister of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), spoke about the extensive use of CW that Iraq employed as a means of disrupting Iran's logistical support lines. He claimed Iraq's use of over 1,000 bombs and 6,000 artillery shells (8,000+ liters of chemical weapons) would have been more than enough to thoroughly contaminate an area twice the size as the one currently occupied by Iran. He said that Iran was able to mitigate the effects of the weapons through protective gear and decontamination equipment.


24 March 1986
Iranian military communiqués claim that Iraq resumed its use of CW yesterday and and reported CW being used on Abadan at 12:30 a.m. GMT.


25 March 1986
Iran's foreign ministry charges that, despite the UN's condemnation last week of Iraq's use of CW, Iraq has continued using CW over the past 2 days, poisoning a number of Iranian soldiers. The attacks took place along the Fao-Basra Highway, beginning yesterday. The foreign ministry urges the Security Council and other international organizations "to take a decisive measure to halt such war criminal acts...The various countries of the world should

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boycott or put pressure on the Baghdad government to force it to respect international conventions."

25 March 1986
An unidentified "knowledgeable US source" states that Syria has begun producing CW. When asked if the Syrians were providing CW to Iran, the source said, "I think I'd better not answer that question." The disclosure came at a briefing for reporters at the State Department on the current status of arms control talks.

31 March 1986
The commander of Iraq's Third Corps, Gen. Mahir Abdal Rashid, says that he would not hesitate to use any weapon, including CW, at his disposal to fight Iran.

17 April 1986
An Iranian doctor from the Shiraz University medical institute announces that he has developed a new ointment effective in treating burns caused by CW blister agents. The ointment comprises 25 chemical compounds, and samples have been sent to the front.

20 April 1986
An Iranian delegation to a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Coordinating Bureau meeting, led by Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, walked out of the meeting in protest after the Bureau failed to condemn Iraq for using CW against Iran. Iran had expected the NAM meeting to name Iraq as an aggressor in the conflict and a violator of international norms and laws.

21 April 1986
Iran claims that Iraq has again used CW, beginning yesterday afternoon as well as this morning on a northern portion of the Fao Peninsula. An Iraqi spokesman responded to this charge by stating that the claims were "ridiculous" and that "Iraq did not use chemical weapons, nor is it in need of using them." Iran did not mention how many troops were injured in the CW attacks.

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27 April 1986
The Minister of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Mr. Rafiq-Dust, announces that the Corps has made considerable progress in the missile, aircraft, chemical, and nuclear fields.

29 April 1986
Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hoseyn Musavi visited the Parchin group of chemical facilities today. The facilities belong to the Defense Industries Organization (DIO). The Defense Minister, the head of DIO, explained to the Prime Minister that despite the DIO's inability to secure the original architectural plans for the plants, installation, operation, and expansion of the plants had taken place as plan, thanks to intensive efforts from Iranian specialists.

May 1986
Iran's Consul General in Hong Kong, Said Zare, denies claims of illegal trafficking of restricted materials, including a failed gas mask sale, to Iran via Hong Kong: "There is definitely no trade [between Hong Kong and Iran] in this type of material." However, re-export statistics from the Hong Kong government, statements from several locally-based businessmen and US intelligence sources, and proof from a US District Court in Atlanta contradict his statement.

12 May 1986
Upon concluding a meeting in Geneva, the Iranian Foreign Ministry's Director General of International Affairs and the UN Executive Secretary for Planning and Environment, released a statement condemning Iraq's use of chemical weapons. The text states that "UN experts have stressed that chemical gases have been used by Iraq in the war against Iran. Not only is this action in contravention of international regulations, but endangers the health of mankind. The environment section of the UN is in unison with all efforts directed at preventing the use of chemical and bacteriological gases in any part of the world. It is prepared to utilize all its facilities in this respect."

18 May 1986
Factories in Iran are now producing a military uniform offering protection against chemical weapons.

25 May 1986
Iran claims that Iraq used chemical weapons in Mehran and Saleh-Abad at 6:45 a.m. in western Iran. IRNA reports that casualties are low because troops in those regions are equipped with gas masks.

27 May 1986
Unidentified US arms control officials claim that Libya and Iran are attempting to develop a CW capability, and point out that any nation with a modern chemical industry can easily develop CW from fertilizers and pesticides.

27 May 1986
Foreign journalists brought by Iranian officials to the Labbafinejad Hospital in Tehran are shown Iranian soldiers injured in last Sunday's alleged CW attack near the city of Mahran. Doctors inform the journalists that six of the 38 Iranian soldiers brought to the hospital following the attack are in critical condition due to mustard gas intoxication.

5 June 1986
The US State Department maintains that Iran has been attempting to develop a CW capability, but that it has been unable to deploy them. Bernard Kalb, spokesman for the State Department states that "We have known for several years that both Iran and Iraq have had active, ongoing programs to develop chemical weapons. Our imposition of chemical export controls two years ago was designed to impede the supply of chemical weapons precursors to these two countries. Unidentified intelligence reports note that Syria has begun the production of CW and has entered into talks with Iran on cooperating in that field. Mr. Kalb announces that "the United States is concerned that Syria may have a chemical weapons capability and has assisted Iran in the Iranian war effort." However, he notes, "Iran has not used chemical weapons, but their continued use by Iraq and the potential for Iranian use is a cause of concern." Kalb goes on to add that the US has no proof that Syria has given CW to Iran.

5 June 1986
Reports about Iran's alleged CW program arise out of Iranian government budget debates. According to the Iranian resistance newspaper, Iran Liberation, a budget bill was introduced to establish an organization called Jahad-e Daneshgahi (University Crusade) to gather young Iranian scientists for CW research. The details released during the debate said the University Crusade would have "200 graduates with at least a first degree...carrying out various experiments on such products as mustard gas and military equipment." The deputy who gave these details went on to say that "these products are now on the production line."

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
15 July 1986
Timothy Renton, Minister of State for the British Foreign Office, speaking at the Conference on Disarmament, states that Iraq can produce hundreds of tons of mustard and nerve agents, and that "Iran may in turn be taking steps to acquire its own chemical weapons." The New York Times states that Renton said that Iran and other Middle East countries appear to be developing CW.

17 July 1986
The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) urged Japanese industry to avoid exporting to Iran and Iraq 40 kinds of chemicals that could be used to make CW.

14 August 1986
Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati claims that Iraq has used CW on five occasions since March, and called on the Conference on Disarmament to open an investigation on which countries supplied Iraq with its chemical weapons capabilities, renew its condemnation of all use of CW, ban the export of CW-related chemicals and equipment, and immediately send CW investigating teams to Iran when Iran requests them. He complains that although many European countries have export controls, there is no thorough administration to force export compliance. If Iraq could procure and produce CW, he states, any country could do so. He urged Iraq to officially renounce further use of CW. If it did not, and if it continues to use CW, Iran, Velayati states, reserves the right to defend itself.

23 August 1986
A commentary on Tehran radio expresses the view that Iran would like the Non-Aligned Movement to condemn Iraq because it is the aggressor in the war and for its use of CW.

25 August 1986
The New York Times cites unidentified intelligence reports as claiming that Iran has a program to develop CW, although it is smaller than the Syrian program. The reports suggest that Syria may be helping Iran on its CW program. Unidentified American officials state that there is no evidence that Iran has used CW, although Iran may
have fired back at Iraqi forces some unexploded CW shells that Iraq had fired at its forces.

**28 August 1986**
In an interview with Iranian radio and television, Hashemi-Rafsanjani is asked: "As you are aware, in this war Iraq made use of chemical weapons over and over again....The question is: does the Islamic Republic of Iran have the facilities to retaliate in kind or not, and if it has, why did we retaliate in kind in the past in the sense that when they hit us with missiles we also hit them with missiles and when they came with their aircraft we did the same why have we not, in this particular case, retaliated in kind up to now? Does the potential exist or not?" Rafsanjani replies that, "In those early days they claimed that they had certain facilities which we did not have. But since we did have the technology for this, we took certain measures and we can retaliate in kind to the same level as Iraq." He denies that Iran bought the CW from Israel.

**4 September 1986**
Iran charges that Iraq lobbed two shells filled with CW on Iranian soldiers stationed in the Hajj Omran sector of northeastern Iraq where Iran began its Karbala 2 offensive last week, killing one soldier and wounding seven more.

**5 September 1986**
The Iranian War Information Headquarters calls upon international organizations, particularly the Non-Aligned Movement, to "break their silence and condemn the Iraqi regime" for using CW.

**8 September 1986**
The Isfahan Reconstruction Crusade has now begun mass production of a device designed to neutralize chemical weapons. The device was previously produced only in limited quantities. According to the designer of the device, it was originally produced "four years ago but many changes have taken place since. The first apparatus built was controlled from the outside and its spraying range was less than 360 degrees. Now...we are proud to have manufactured something that is much better than similar products manufactured abroad. For example, our machine has a firing range of more than 100 meters in contrast to the 22-meter range of foreign ones....The machine is operated from the inside unlike the American one. The crew members do not have to wear special clothing to shield them from chemical weapons. Oxygen is fed into the crew's compartment so that they can easily breathe even in the most contaminated areas....An additional feature this year is a digital wind sensor...that shows which way the wind is blowing and the exact speed of the wind in kilometers."

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
8 September 1986

The Iranian News Agency reports that "Iraqi troops attacked Bamo and Sheykh Saleh regions, in west Iran, with chemical bombs [this] afternoon. The area is still under chemical bombardment. So far 125 Muslim combatants have been hospitalized and the number of injured is expected to rise."


9 September 1986

IRNA claims that that Iraqi forces again dropped CW agents on Sheykh Saleh on Tuesday, in addition to the first raids on that town and the town of Bamo on Monday.


9 September 1986

In a statement issued by the War Information Headquarters, Iran threatens to "heavily bombard" Iraqi industrial areas "in retaliation for the Baghdad regime's use of chemical weapons...and its raids on Iranian industrial and residential points."


10 September 1986

IRNA states that Foreign Minister Velayati has sent an official note to the UN Secretary General protesting Iraq's recent CW attacks and the bombing raid on the city of Tabriz. Velayati states that Iran "will no longer tolerate these Iraqi atrocities and will take deterrent measures against repeated Iraqi violations of international regulations." He demands the UN take appropriate measures to prevent Iraq from continuing these types of attacks in the future.


12 September 1986

Iran fires missiles into Baghdad in retaliation for Iraq's recent CW attacks in northwestern Iran. An Iranian military communiqué states that "the experience of the past six years has proved this fact, that the Islamic Republic of Iran should individually take measures against the violations of the Iraqi regime of international laws."


25 September 1986

An Iraqi military communiqué states that Iraqi planes bombed a military-run chemical facility in Isfahan today.


Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
30 September 1986
Due to an Iraqi raid on an Iranian chemical fertilizer facility in Isfahan, Voice of the Liberation of Iran reports that the Swedish engineers who had been in charge of the facility have been asked to "permanently" leave Iran. Quoting the "Lloyd's insurance company of London," this report alleges that the Isfahan facility was devoted to the production of chemical weapons and is now out of action because of the bombing.

Late September 1986
According to Chemical Week, official reports from Iran and Iraq claim that Iraqi jets bombed chemical process industries plants deep inside Iran. Iraq claims its planes hit a petrochemical plant at Isfahan and an aluminum complex and agricultural machinery plant at Arak.
— "Bombing and Building in Iran," Chemical Week, 8 October 1986, p. 15.

2 October 1986
Platt's Petrochemical Report states that the Isfahan chemical facility struck by Iraqi planes last week was a petrochemical facility. Although Iran has given no indication as to the type of petrochemical facility it was, Platt's notes that an aromatics facility was due to begin operations there in 1989, and was set to produce 80,000 tones/year benzene and 40,000 tones/year of toluene and paraxylene, among other products. [Note: Such chemical products have little or no relevance to CW agent production.]

4 October 1986
More than 100 of the CW neutralizing devices manufactured by the Isfahan Construction Jihad Ministry (see 8 September 1986 entry) have been sent to the front lines for use in the war against Iraq. Mr. Khameneh'I, Chairman of the Supreme Defense Council and Reconstruction Jihad Minister Zanganeh were in attendance at the ceremony.

5 October 1986
Tehran Radio reports that 150 of the CW neutralizing devices (see 8 September 1986 and 4 October 1986 entries) have been sent to the front.

5 October 1986
An Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, speaking on the topic of the current UN Security Council session on the Iran-Iraq War, states that "As we have witnessed, the Secretary General’s efforts in connection with war crimes and the use of chemical weapons by Iraq have to some extent clarified the facts although, unfortunately, no decisive action has been taken to deter this violator of international laws and the party responsible for such war.

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damage. At present the bombing of civilian areas and the use of chemical weapons continues in spite of condemnation by the Security Council and the UN Secretary General. The Secretary General is well aware that the Islamic Republic of Iran, in spite of its capability, has refused to make use of chemical weapons."

9 October 1986
Iran rejects the latest UN Security Council resolution on the Iran-Iraq War and criticized the Security Council for not denouncing Iraq for employing CW against Iranian forces.

12 October 1986
Iraq announces that it has destroyed "warfare, chemicals, and ammunition plant" during a raid at 10:30 GMT on the Iranian city of Isfahan.

29 October 1986
[Note: Anthony Cordesman cites a Washington Times article that supposedly has something to do with Iran's lack of a chemical weapons ability at the time Iraq launched its first CW attacks. The article also states that 1985 and possibly 1984, Iran used chemical mortars and artillery shells captured from Iraq. Finally, the article also states that Iran began domestic production of chemical weapons in 1986-1987. This article is the backbone of Cordesman's evidence on Iran's chemical weapons program in the 1980s. Unfortunately, it does not appear to exist.]

November 1986
Iran claims to have become self-sufficient in chemical defensive gear.

November 1986
Shimon Peres, Israeli foreign minister, claims that Syria has assisted Iran in obtaining CW to counter Iraq.

November 1986
One Israeli report claims that "chemical weapons, apparently including nerve and mustard gas, [had] recently been confirmed by Western intelligence sources."

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
10 November 1986
Mohsen Rafiqdoust, Minister of the Revolutionary Guards, says that Iran has become self-sufficient in producing equipment necessary to counter chemical and biological warfare.
— Scheherezade Faramarzi, "Iran Says France Fixing its Mistakes in Middle East," Associated Press, 10 November 1986.

10 November 1986
The BBC, reporting on the claim above, gives a transcript of a statement presumably made by Rafiqdoust. All bracketed text and parentheses are those of the BBC. "This is the 55th convoy of such equipment which is being sent to the fronts, including chemical baths [presumably decontamination baths or showers]; divisions, brigades and battalions; filters for the trenches and fortifications of our beloved ones. We plan to equip all the fortifications with these filters so that the enemy may lose hope from that point of view too [presumably of using chemical weapons] and may realize that it has to submit to the will of our nation. There is comprehensive equipment against chemical attacks which caters for all stages, from the stage prior to the enemy's use of chemical weapons up to the state of their use and the fight against them; namely, filters for the trenches to keep them secure against them [chemical weapons]. If the enemy uses them we have baths, individual packs, group capsules, and equipment. We have prepared ourselves completely against these hostilities, and these are being sent to the fronts.

23 November 1986
Simon O'Dwyer-Russell, defense correspondent for the Sunday Telegraph of London, reports that unidentified Western intelligence officials believe that Iran and Syria have acquired nerve gas warheads from the Soviet Union via Libya. These sources say that the warheads can be attached to Scud-B missiles. It is not clear when Libya may have received the warheads, but British intelligence is reported to have "traced the source of the nerve agent back to the Soviet Union." The warheads can reportedly kill everyone within a 25-square mile area, although such an impact is clearly being overstated.

23 November 1986
Zev Eitan, a military affairs expert at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, admits that Israel has known Iran and Syria are attempting to acquire the capability to fit long-range ballistic missiles with chemical warheads. However, he remains doubtful of the report in the Sunday Telegraph that Libya has supplied the countries with Soviet-made nerve gas warheads. "I am not definitely convinced this information is correct," he says.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
23 November 1986
According to US officials, Iran has received Soviet chemical warfare equipment via Czechoslovakia. Anthony Cordesman and Gary Sick are experts interviewed for this story.

26 November 1986
Beginning today, as part of "Mobilization Week," Khandaq exercises are being held all over Iran to practice techniques in, among other things, neutralizing the effects of chemical weapons.

1 December 1986
During a meeting with Iranian Charge d'Affaires to Rome, Mohammed Reza Entezari, an Italian foreign ministry spokesman, alleges that a handful of Italian firms were responsible for sending "chemical weapons" to Iraq. The official claims that the firms were unaware of the Italian export controls on weapons to Iraq. Entezari is surprised by the revelations that Italy was involved in sending "chemical weapons" to Iraq via the Netherlands, and responds that he finds these explanations as "unsatisfactory." He states that had these transactions never taken place, the region would have been peaceful long ago.

2 December 1986
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister of International and Economic Affairs, Mohammed Javad Larijani, comments on the International Committee of the Red Cross being allowed to resume activities in Iran. He states that the main task for the Red Cross would be to take a firm stance against the use of chemical weapons, attacks on residential areas, investigating soldiers reported to be missing in action, and investigating Iraq's treatment of Iranian prisoners of war.

11 December 1986
A seminar run by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps' Anti-Chemical, Bacteriological, and Radioactive Divisions is held in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province. This is the second seminar of its kind and will last for a total of two days, during which time practical maneuvers and exercises to countering the effects of CW will be practiced.

12 December 1986
The Guardian(London) reports that unidentified Western sources believe Syria may have offered chemical
weapons expertise to Iran.

15 December 1986
Unidentified "informed sources" claim that the CIA has been providing intelligence to the Iraqi military to aid them in their war against Iran. The sources claim that as early as 1984, the United States has engaged in assisting Iraq in its intelligence gathering. The claim that Iraq used this information to orchestrate CW attacks against Iranian troops. Regular sharing of intelligence from US satellites reportedly began in 1985.

26 December 1986
IRNA claims that Iraq has used CW shells against Iranian positions on the east bank of the Shatt al Arab.

27 December 1986
Maj. Gen. Talea Ruhaaim al-Douri, deputy commander of Iraq's Third Army Corps, rejects Iran's claims that Iraqi forces used CW yesterday. "We simply didn't need them," he says.

27 December 1986
Iran urges the UN to take "more serious effective measures" against Iraq to prevent them from using CW. Iran claims several of its soldiers were wounded from recent Iraqi CW attacks on the east bank of Shatt al Arab.

After 1985
[According to Anthony H. Cordesman], Iran begins to stockpile cyanogen chloride, phosgene, and mustard gas.

1986
A deputy in the Iranian parliament reportedly says that products such as mustard gas "...are on the production line."
1986-1987
Iran has the capability to produce enough lethal agents to load its own weapons. [Note: The citation Cordesman offers to back up this claim does not exist.]

1986-1988
*Jane's Intelligence Review* reports that evidence exists that between 1986 and 1988, Iran received help from North Korea to design and manufacture chemical warheads. The possibility also exists that North Korea directly transferred chemical warheads to Iran.
— "Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme Special Report, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 1 April, 1994, p. 192.

Early 1986
A second UN mission visits Iran to investigate CW attacks.

12 January 1986
Tehran’s Mayor Mohammad Nabi Habibi led an Iranian delegation to a conference in Sheffield, UK dealing with nuclear disarmament, peace issues, and the elimination of chemical and biological weapons.

26 January 1986
An Iranian military communiqué on 27 January reports that Iraq fired chemical weapons in the Ayn Khush sector of the front at 12:15 and again at 18:15 local time. An Iraqi military communiqué dated 27 January denied the Iranian claims that the Ayn Khush sector had been hit with chemical weapons.

30 January 1986
An Iranian military communiqué on 31 January reports that five Iranian soldiers in the Khorramshahr (Abadan) sector were wounded by an Iraqi chemical at 1:30 a.m. on 30 January. A 1 February military communiqué reported an additional chemical attack of five chemical shells on 30 January in the Chilat Sector. Those shells failed to produce any damage due to inclement weather.
February 1986
IRNA cites Prime Minister Hussein Musavi as saying that, "...Iran has not yet deployed chemical weapons although it is capable of doing so."

12 February 1986
IRNA radio reported military communiqués stating that Iranian troops came under chemical weapons attack while defending Iranian-held territory surrounding the Umm Qasr naval base on Iraq's Fao peninsula. Chemical weapons decontamination units were at the scene trying to neutralize the agents. The chemical weapons consisted of "'chemical bullets' as well as missiles, each of which carried 40 liters [approximately 10 gallons] of chemical solution."

13 February 1986
An Iranian military communiqué reports that "the cowardly enemy once again resorted to chemical weapons, but the chemical weapons defense unit took action immediately to neutralize the chemical reagents and evacuate the injured behind the front. This morning also the enemy by mistake subjected the positions of Iraqi forces, which were close to the defensive lines of Islam's combatants, to chemical bombardment and serious casualties were no doubt inflicted on Iraq's Presidential Guards division....Latest reports from Wa al-Fajr operational theater indicate that the Iraqi regime in the past two days has been continuously shelling the area and attacking it with chemical weapons consisting of mustard and nerve gases and also cyanide derivatives. [Note: These cyanide derivatives may be a reference to tabun, which contains cyanide in its molecular structure and is an active leaving group in the nerve agent, cyanogen chloride, or hydrocyanic acid (HCN). Again, no confirmation exists that Iraq used HCN in combat against Iranian troops.] The attacks have been carried out mainly over palm groves in the liberated port city of Fao and on the Fao-Basra road as well as the western bank of Arvand river [Shatt al-Arab]. Those afflicted are suffering from respiratory malfunctioning, sore eyes, and skin burns. A number of them have been transferred to Ahvaz hospital and several others to Tehran."

13 February 1986
An Iranian military spokesman from the War Information Headquarters claimed that at least 10 Iranian soldiers have been killed and many others injured by Iraqi chemical weapons attacks over the past two days. He went on to say that Iran has asked the UN Secretary General to send a team to Iran to investigate the attack.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
13 February 1986

Iraqi Information Minister Latif Nsayef Jassem rejected the Iranian accusations and instead charged Iran was the one using chemical weapons—specifically late at night on 12 February and early in the morning on 13 February.

13 February 1986

Dr. Hamid Sorabpour, a director of a hospital in Tehran, reports that his hospital has already admitted 85 victims of nerve and mustard gas intoxication, and that they expected 70 more to be admitted shortly.

13 February 1986

Iran’s Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati chastises the UN and Secretary General Perez de Cuellar for their "inaction vis-à-vis the deployment of chemical weapons by Iraq." Laying blame on the United Nations for the continuing Iraqi chemical weapons use, Mr. Velayati went on to say, "I regret that I have to announce that with the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in the past two days, the Islamic Republic of Iran is left with no recourse but to resort to a new course of action in order to make Iraq refrain from its chemical attacks, unless, with the next few days, an effective international solution is proposed and firmly implemented to halt these attacks by the UN, and Your Excellency in particular."

13 February 1986

Iran’s UN Ambassador, Said Rajaie Khorassani, accuses Iraqi planes of attacking the Iranian city of Abadan with chemical weapons. Although he gives no direct figures on the numbers of killed by CW in Abadan, Khorassani claims 2,500 Iranians have been injured and 20 killed by mustard, nerve, and blood agents in the past few days. He goes on to accuse the UN Security Council of "callousness and irresponsibility" in not condemning Iraq's CW use and other violations of international law. Khorassani says he officially asked Secretary General Perez de Cuellar to send a team to investigate the attacks. In response to the Iraqi claims that Iran had used CW against Iraq, Khorassani responded that it was a "big lie" and that "when we use it, we will say it." He warns that "if Iraq uses [CW] one more time, we have to use these weapons if they continue.

13 February 1986

When asked about the conflicting claims of CW use, US State Department spokesman Charles Redman responds that although the United States government could not confirm the accusations at this time, there has been some recent evidence that Iran is developing a CW capacity.

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14 February 1986
Tehran Radio claims that 17 Iranians have been killed from Iraqi CW and that another 1,500 have been injured. The Martyrs' Foundation in a statement on Tehran Radio condemns Iraq's "inhuman" use of CW and said it plans to send some of the CW victims abroad for medical treatment.

15 February 1986
Iranian Prime Minister Hussein Musavi warns that Iran will take serious and adequate steps to prevent Iraq from using CW, unless the international community intervenes to stop Iraq. This message is contained in correspondence sent to the leaders of 20 other countries. Earlier, foreign diplomats and reporters were also shown CW victims from the Fao Peninsula in a hospital in Tehran.

15 February 1986
A commentary on Tehran Radio criticized the recent meeting of the Arab League's Committee on the Gulf War for not denouncing Iraq's use of chemical weapons. The committee was meeting in Baghdad.

15 February 1986
Gholam Reza Hadidi, the Charge d'Affaires for the Iranian embassy in Paris, France, reports during a press conference that Iraq has used CW against Iranian troops three times in the past three weeks. He claims those attacks took place on 27 January, 30 January, and yesterday, 14 February, in an attack on the border city of Abadan.

15 February 1986
Iraqi Information Minister Latif Nessayif Jassim dismissed the Iranian allegation that Iraq had used CW against the city of Abadan. Jassim states that Iraqi forces do not need to use CW against civilian targets because they are in full control of all areas of the front. He states that Iran is simply using the CW allegations as a tool to cover up its own CW use against Iraqi forces.

15 February 1986
An Iranian military communiqué claims Iraq again used CW against Iranian troops, and that Iranian medical and

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anti-chemical units attempted to neutralize the effects of the chemical weapons.

15 February 1986
In a Iranian-Libyan joint statement issued today, both sides condemned Iraq for using CW during its fighting with Iran. The statement was issued at the end of a visit to Iran by a Libyan delegation led by Abu Zayd Umar Durdah, Secretary for Agrarian Reform and member of the Revolutionary Command Council.

16 February 1986
Iraq charges that Iran used CW against Iraqi troops, but gave no further details about how many troops are affected, or where the incident took place. Iran countered that Iraq dropped CW bombs from planes and shelled the front with "mustard and nerve gasses and also cyanide derivatives."

16 February 1986
Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, West Germany, and Sweden have been asked by Iran to care for some of its victims of CW.

16 February 1986
Iranian Health Minister Marandi has called upon the World Health Organization to use its influence to stop Iraq from using CW.

17 February 1986
Iran sent 38 soldiers to European hospitals to be treated for CW intoxication. Prof. Gerhard Freilinger, a doctor who has treated Iranian CW victims twice in the past, states that "the extent of the burns is much greater than before. These people are all much more seriously injured than the ones I saw earlier....I am certain mustard gas was also involved because respiratory organs...were most seriously damaged." Freilinger went on to say that they would be lucky if four of the eight soldiers taken to Vienna would survive. The Iranian embassy in Sweden reported that the five soldiers airlifted there had been injured by CW dropped by Iraqi warplanes.

18 February 1986
The Iranian representative to the UN will boycott the special Security Council meeting on the Gulf War in protest of
the Council's failure to condemn Iraq's invasion of Iran at the beginning of the war, and its failure to condemn Iraqi use of CW. In related news, Tehran Radio reports that 60 CW victims are being treated in Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, Sweden, Switzerland, and West Germany. The radio station went on to blame London media outlets for not providing enough media coverage to the plight of the Iranian CW victims.


18 February 1986
Doctors at the University of Lausanne reported that the three Iranian soldiers being treated there appear to be suffering from wounds caused by mustard gas.


18 February 1986
The Iranian Charge d'Affaires in London, Seyed Jalal Sadatian, held a press conference to release information detailing more than 50 Iraqi CW attacks between 1980 and 1984. He states that while Iran is not currently considering using these weapons, it would have to reconsider should the attacks continue.


19 February 1986
The US State Department condemned Iraq's use of CW. According to the written statement, the State Department claimed that the use of CW "threatens the effort of many decades to ban this kind of warfare." The statement went on to blame Iran for the continuation of the war.


19 February 1986
The Iraqi ambassador to the United Nations, Riyadh al Qaysi, dismissed Iran's accusations that Iraq had used CW weapons.


19 February 1986
The US State Department says that "information available to us strongly suggests that Iraq has used chemical weapons in the latest round of fighting. We condemn this, as we have consistently in the past." The statement did not mention Iraq's allegations of Iranian CW use. Iran claimed that Iraq has recently used a "new type of poisonous gas" against Iranian troops.


19 February 1986
The head of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corp Medical Center announces that 8,500 troops have been injured by Iraqi mustard, nerve, and cyanide weapons. Two thousand of these troops are receiving hospital treatment either in Iran, or overseas.
20 February 1986
One of the eight Iranian soldiers transported to Vienna for treatment has died from the effects of mustard gas, a doctor there says today. Another soldier was dead on arrival. The others are in danger of succumbing to the same fate, he says. Laboratory tests have confirmed the presence of mustard gas. The Iranian Embassy in Belgium said that one of the nine soldiers airlifted there has died. Of the 400 soldiers brought to the Labbanfinejad hospital in Tehran for CW-related treatment, 200 have been released, 7 have died, and over 30 have been sent on to Europe.


20 February 1986
IRNA claims that Iraqi planes mistakenly attacked their own forces on the Fao Peninsula today.

20 February 1986
Forty-two additional injured Iranian soldiers were sent to Europe for treatment of CW wounds, one of whom died en route. The Iranian Charge d'Affaires in London, Seyed Jalal Sadatian, greeted the group of soldiers airlifted to Great Britain and stated: "This is not the first time Iraq has used chemical weapons and still the rest of the world remains silent and refuses to condemn them." An official of the Iranian embassy in Vienna who greeted soldiers claimed that these were just a small fraction of the more than 8,000 Iranians wounded during the 13 February CW attack. One-quarter of that figure suffered what he deemed "serious injuries."

21 February 1986
Iraqi Deputy Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Hisham Sabah al-Fakhri claims the Iranian accusations of CW use on the part of the Iraqi forces are "categorically untrue."

22 February 1986
Maj. Gen. Maher Abdel-Rashid, commander of Iraq's Third Army Corps, claims that Iranian forces launched a CW mortar counterattack against his troops today. He states that the Iranians used "mustard gas and a similar kind of gas." When asked about the effect of the gas on his soldiers, he responded that "we are not used to complaining about casualties." This is the second time during this offensive that Iraq has charged Iran with using CW.

22 February 1986
A note handed to Great Britain's Foreign Office by the Iranian Charge d'Affaires in London, states that "the silence of the British government and the international organizations vis-à-vis the Iraqi use of chemical weapons is
encouraging the Baghdad regime to continue its war crimes." He said that since Britain claims there is not sufficient evidence to officially condemn Iraq for the atrocities, the British officials should visit the Iranian CW victims undergoing treatment for their injuries in London. He went on to say that Iran hopes to receive an official response to an Iranian enquiry regarding the British sale of chemical weapons-related materials to Iraq. In an apparent response to this last question, a British Foreign Office official informed IRNA that Britain has tightened its export regulations after it apparently sent Iraq fertilizer materials that could also be used in the production of CW. — "Iran Has Called on Britain to 'Clarify its Stance',' British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 February 1986, Part 4, p. A1; "Iran Calls on Britain to Clarify Stance," IRNA, 22 February 1986, reported in British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 February 1986, Part 4, p. A1.

23 February 1986
The Iranian Embassy in London announces that one of the 11 Iranian soldiers receiving treatment there for CW intoxication has died. He "had external burns, internal bleeding, his kidneys didn't function and his throat was blocked." [Note: The latter type of injury—pseudomembrane formation in the upper airways—is typical of grave respiratory exposure to mustard gas, and is often the cause of death in such cases.]

23 February 1986
IRNA cited Iranian Military communiqués as stating that "confused Iraqis" launched CW attacks against their own troops on the Fao Peninsula.

23 February 1986
IRNA quotes Iranian Prime Minister Hussein Musavi as saying that although "the worldwide protests against Iraq's frequent use of chemical weapons has forced the Baghdad regime to attribute such criminal acts to Iran, in a bid to rid herself of the accusation...Iran has not yet deployed chemical weapons in the war fronts." However, he warned, "Iran is capable of doing so. If the Iraqi aggression continued, Iran would give a proper answer to it."

24 February 1986
The UN Security Council voted unanimously to call for a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War. The resolution "deplores the use of chemical weapons contrary to the obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol." Iran had boycotted the deliberations leading up to the resolution, and immediately condemned it for not naming Iraq explicitly for beginning the war or using CW. Iranian ambassador to the United Nations Said Rajaie Khorassani, ruefully exclaimed before the vote: "Let them pass their nasty resolution." A few hours after the resolution passed, Iran's speaker of the Parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani proclaimed the unleashing of a new offensive in northern Iraq to
protest what he call an "ineffective and shallow" resolution.

25 February 1986
UN Spokesman Francois Giuliani announces that a team of four specialists has been dispatched to Iran and will arrive in Tehran this evening. They will report back to the UN next week on Iranian charges that Iraq has used CW. The team will not be visiting Iraq because that government has not invited them.

26 February 1986
During a trip to the Shatt al-Arab front, Guardian reporter Ian Black notes that all Iranian soldiers "wear light protective suits against chemical attack and carry their gasmasks everywhere."

26 February 1986
The New York Times states that "although [Iraq and Iran] have accused each other of using chemical weapons, there has never been any evidence that Iran has used them in the five-and-a-half year war, according to US and United Nations officials." (Note: The Times did not mention the names of the officials to which they are referring.)

27 February 1986
A five-man United Nations inspection team landed in Tehran to investigate Iranian accusations of Iraqi CW attacks. They will visit a hospital in Tehran before traveling to the border cities of Ahvaz and Abadan in southwestern Iran. Iran repeated its charges that Iraq has used CW in the battle for control of the Fao Peninsula, and claims over 8,500 Iranians have been wounded or killed. According to the Iranian government, about 90 soldiers (five or whom have died) have been sent to Europe to receive treatment. Iran also repeated its accusation that Iraqi planes mistakenly bombed their own troops with CW. In a related matter, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati addressed the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and called for a war crimes tribunal to be established to prosecute the Iraqis responsible for authorizing use of CW. "We want these criminals punished as were those who appeared before the Nuremburg court," Velayati said.

27 February 1986
The UN team travels to the Labbafi-Nejad Medical Center in Tehran and meets its director, Dr. H. Sohrabpur. He reports that since the beginning of the Val-Fajr 8 offensive on 9 February 1986, over 400 soldiers wounded by
chemical weapons had received treatment at his center. Of these, 11 had died, 31 had been sent abroad, and 33 had been transferred to intensive care units at other Tehran hospitals. The UN team visited some of the patients. According to Dr. Peter Dunn, "Most of the patients we saw and spoke with showed classic symptoms of mustard gas poisoning." He states, "we were taken to several wards to examine and interview nine Iraqi casualties from a group of 15 who were being treated for mustard gas injuries sustained in the Al-Faw area several days before. Speaking out without prompting or duress, Iraqi prisoners all claimed they had been injured by chemical bombs dropped by their own aircraft, either after they had been captured by — or had surrendered to — Iranian forces, or when they were in no-man's land between the opposing forces."


28 February 1986

The UN team visits Ahvaz and arrives in time to see "about 50 chemical casualties being loaded into a medi-vac aircraft for transport to Tehran." According to a team member, "the mission's chemical work was made difficult by two unexpected factors. First, there was a delay of about two weeks between the dates of the attacks and the arrival of the mission in Iran. Second, unusually heavy rains pelted southwest Iran in February, flooding many areas. The first area inspected was a building site in a suburb 2km northeast of the center of Abadan. Although chemical bombs fell 15 days before and the area had been decontaminated, we were able to detect residual mustard gas in bomb craters....The second area was flat, water-soaked terrain several hundred meters off the main road running from Abadan to Qofas. We examined three bomb craters...[mustard gas] vapor concentrations of 0-2.5mg/meters cubed were measured at the bottom of the craters even though the area had been decontaminated and excessive water — resulting in the hydrolysis of agents — was present. From the second area we traveled south towards Qofas along the main road....After crossing the Barmanshir River by pontoon bridge, we passed through a plantation of date palms on our way to the Hadhrat Fatima Field Hospital, about 40km from Abadan. We were told that mustard gas bombs has fallen in the groves....The hospital area had been attack the previous day. Of 12 bombs dropped, four had fallen very close to the hospital buildings. Casualties from this attack were those we had examined at Ahvaz Airport earlier that day. One bomb had fallen 15m from the entrance to the hospital..." The team collected soil samples from a non-decontaminated crater about 50m from the hospital. [Note: These soil samples, after analysis in Sweden and Switzerland, "were shown to contain between 0.1 and 0.2 percent by weight of mustard gas..."] The team noted that it was interesting that unlike the mission in 1984, there were no unexploded mustard gas bombs. They were told later by a captured Iraqi pilot that impact fuses are now being used, rather than timed fuses that were used previously. He also told the team that Iraq had changed its tactics so that chemical bombs were now dropped from high, rather than low altitude. Later in the evening, the team interviewed an Iraqi pilot at the Shaheed Baghai Hospital. He informed them that he had participated in two "special missions" during which he dropped bombs that matched the description of unexploded chemical bombs examined in 1984.


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Late February 1986
Iraq responds to Iranian battlefront successes near the Iraqi-Kuwait border with poison gas attacks on infantry troops. Eighty-three Iranian soldiers are evacuated to hospitals in Belgium and Austria. After examining soldiers in Vienna, Dr. Gerhard Freilinger reports, "It is highly likely that not only mustard gas, but also cyanide and a nerve gas known as tabun were used."

March 1986
At a State Department briefing, the "spokesman added that Syria may have assisted Iranian chemical warfare production."

Early March 1986
A third UN mission visits Iran to investigate CW attacks and presents a report to the Secretary General concluding that mustard gas, and occasionally nerve gas, were used by Iraqi forces against Iran.

2 March 1986
The UN mission investigating chemical weapons in Iran visits the Val-Fajr Infirmary located in Azadi Stadium in Tehran. There they meet the director, Dr. Khatemi, who informs them that all of the chemical casualties transported to Tehran from the front are first brought here for initial diagnosis. Around 15 percent are then transferred on to other Tehran hospitals should they need more intensive treatment. He claims that since early February 1986, around 2,000 chemical casualties have been treated in Ahvaz hospitals, and some 10,000 at the Val-Fajr Infirmary. At a reception with a senior officer for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the evening, the team receives a request to postpone their departure so they may investigate a new chemical attack in northwestern Iran. The official claims the attack occurred within the last 24 hours and victims had been taken to the town of Baneh. The team, due to time constraints, could not postpone their departure to investigate.

3 March 1986
The UN team investigating Iran's CW accusations left Tehran upon completing its investigation.

7 March 1986
Unnamed Reagan administration "experts" report that unspecified intelligence reports indicate Iraq has recently used mustard gas. They say that, contrary to Iraqi reports, there is no evidence that Iran has used CW recently.
12 March 1986
The UN mission sent to investigate Iraqi chemical weapons attacks in Iran conclude that, "Based on evidence gathered during this second visit to Iran, the UN mission unanimously concluded that chemical weapons have been used in the Abadan area against Iranian positions by Iraqi forces. Medical examinations and testimony of Iranian and Iraqi casualties evacuated from the Al-Faw area further confirmed the use of chemical weapons in that war zone by Iraqi forces. Delivery weapons were identified as aerial bombs filled with mustard gas. The mission also concluded that the sheer number of casualties [over 70] seen in Tehran and Ahvaz would indicate an escalation in the use of chemical weapons in 1986 compared to 1984...we unanimously conclude that: (a) On many occasions, Iraqi forces have used chemical weapons against Iranian forces; (b) The agent used has mainly been mustard gas although on some occasions nerve gas was also employed."

14 March 1986
UN-sponsored report on the Iran-Iraq War charges Iraq with using chemical weapons "on many occasions" against Iran. UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar condemns Iraq for violating 1925 Geneva Protocol banning chemical weapons. The report accuses Iraq of mostly using mustard gas, with nerve gas used "on some occasions." Although this is the third UN report on CW usage in the Iran-Iraq War since 1984, it is the first that directly names Iraq as the culprit. Neither US State Department nor UN officials believe there is any evidence suggesting Iran used CW against Iraq. Four UN experts collected evidence from 26 February until 3 March and came to the conclusion that "the use of chemical weapons appears to be more extensive than in 1984." They visited over 700 casualties in Tehran and Ahwaz, and found chemical weapons residue in bomb craters in three places in the Iranian city of Abadan, as well as on Iranian-held positions on the Fao Peninsula. Iran's deputy delegate to the UN, Fereidoun Damavandi Kamali, praised the report.

14 March 1986
IRNA charges that Britain has delivered 10 cylinders of chemicals weighing 780kg to Iraq, and links this distribution to past instances where Britain has delivered chemical weapons to Iraq.

16 March 1986
A radio commentary claims that "the UN organization, the UN Secretary General...and international and regional organizations are responsible for defending [international laws banning the use of CW] and obstructing their violation. However, the initiative of the UN Secretary General and the stance adopted in the past by the UN organization, the UN Security Council in particular, lack the determination required for stopping a regime that violates international law." The commentary goes on to blame the Secretary General for not openly criticizing the
Iraqi regime and argues that simply disclosing that the Geneva Protocol was violated will not deter Iraq from using CW again in the future.


17 March 1986
A two-day seminar on chemical and biological warfare, and ways to limit their affects, began at Shiraz University in Shiraz, Iran today. The opening statement read at the conference blamed Iraq for using CW and demanded that a severe punishment should be brought to bear against anyone using those kinds of weapons. The statement went on to say that, although Iran has the capability of manufacturing CW, it was not doing so due to its respect of international norms and regulations. Iran is hosting the conference as a way to better enable it to counteract the effects of these weapons.


20 March 1986
US Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Donald Lowitz, announces that the UN report issued earlier in the week regarding Iraq's use of CW against Iran is "in accord with the United States findings....My country deplores Iraq's use of chemical weapons in this conflict."


22 March 1986
Iran’s foreign minister demands a formal resolution from the UN Security Council condemn Iraqi use of CW. He states that Iraq began using CW three years ago and the UN has done nothing to stop it. He claims that more needs to be done than simply issuing a statement condemning Iraq’s actions.


23 March 1986
Mohsen Rafiq-Dust, Minister of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), spoke about the extensive use of CW that Iraq employed as a means of disrupting Iran's logistical support lines. He claimed Iraq’s use of over 1,000 bombs and 6,000 artillery shells (8,000+ liters of chemical weapons) would have been more than enough to thoroughly contaminate an area twice the size as the one currently occupied by Iran. He said that Iran was able to mitigate the effects of the weapons through protective gear and decontamination equipment.


24 March 1986
Iranian military communiqués claim that Iraq resumed its use of CW yesterday and and reported CW being used on
Abadan at 12:30 a.m. GMT.

25 March 1986
Iran's foreign ministry charges that, despite the UN's condemnation last week of Iraq's use of CW, Iraq has continued using CW over the past two days, poisoning a number of Iranian soldiers. The attacks took place along the Fao-Basra Highway, beginning yesterday. The foreign ministry urges the Security Council and other international organizations "to take a decisive measure to halt such war criminal acts...The various countries of the world should boycott or put pressure on the Baghdad government to force it to respect international conventions."

25 March 1986
An unidentified "knowledgeable US source" states that Syria has begun producing CW. When asked if the Syrians were providing CW to Iran, the source said, "I think I'd better not answer that question." The disclosure came at a briefing for reporters at the State Department on the current status of arms control talks.

31 March 1986
The commander of Iraq's Third Corps, Gen. Mahir Abdul Rashid, says that he would not hesitate to use any weapon, including CW, at his disposal to fight Iran.

17 April 1986
An Iranian doctor from the Shiraz University medical institute announces that he has developed a new ointment effective in treating burns caused by CW blister agents. The ointment comprises 25 chemical compounds, and samples have been sent to the front.

20 April 1986
An Iranian delegation to a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Coordinating Bureau meeting, led by Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, walked out of the meeting in protest after the Bureau failed to condemn Iraq for using CW against Iran. Iran had expected the NAM meeting to name Iraq as an aggressor in the conflict and a violator of international norms and laws.
21 April 1986
Iran claims that Iraq has again used CW, beginning yesterday afternoon as well as this morning on a northern portion of the Fao Peninsula. An Iraqi spokesman responded to this charge by stating that the claims were "ridiculous" and that "Iraq did not use chemical weapons, nor is it in need of using them." Iran did not mention how many troops were injured in the CW attacks.

27 April 1986
The Minister of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Mr. Rafiq-Dust, announces that the Corps has made considerable progress in the missile, aircraft, chemical, and nuclear fields.

29 April 1986
Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hoseyn Musavi visited the Parchin group of chemical facilities today. The facilities belong to the Defense Industries Organization (DIO). The Defense Minister, the head of DIO, explained to the Prime Minister that despite the DIO's inability to secure the original architectural plans for the plants, installation, operation, and expansion of the plants had taken place as plan, thanks to intensive efforts from Iranian specialists.

May 1986
Iran's Consul General in Hong Kong, Said Zare, denies claims of illegal trafficking of restricted materials, including a failed gas mask sale, to Iran via Hong Kong: "There is definitely no trade [between Hong Kong and Iran] in this type of material." However, re-export statistics from the Hong Kong government, statements from several locally-based businessmen and US intelligence sources, and proof from a US District Court in Atlanta contradict his statement.

12 May 1986
Upon concluding a meeting in Geneva, the Iranian Foreign Ministry's Director General of International Affairs and the UN Executive Secretary for Planning and Environment, released a statement condemning Iraq's use of chemical weapons. The text states that "UN experts have stressed that chemical gases have been used by Iraq in the war against Iran. Not only is this action in contravention of international regulations, but endangers the health of mankind. The environment section of the UN is in unison with all efforts directed at preventing the use of chemical and bacteriological gases in any part of the world. It is prepared to utilize all its facilities in this respect."

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18 May 1986
Factories in Iran are now producing a military uniform offering protection against chemical weapons.

25 May 1986
Iran claims that Iraq used chemical weapons in Mehran and Saleh-Abad at 6:45 a.m. in western Iran. IRNA reports that casualties are low because troops in those regions are equipped with gas masks.

27 May 1986
Unidentified US arms control officials claim that Libya and Iran are attempting to develop a CW capability, and point out that any nation with a modern chemical industry can easily develop CW from fertilizers and pesticides.

27 May 1986
Foreign journalists brought by Iranian officials to the Labbafinejad Hospital in Tehran are shown Iranian soldiers injured in last Sunday’s alleged CW attack near the city of Mahran. Doctors inform the journalists that six of the 38 Iranian soldiers brought to the hospital following the attack are in critical condition due to mustard gas intoxication.

5 June 1986
The US State Department maintains that Iran has been attempting to develop a CW capability, but that it has been unable to deploy them. Bernard Kalb, spokesman for the State Department states that "We have known for several years that both Iran and Iraq have had active, ongoing programs to develop chemical weapons. Our imposition of chemical export controls two years ago was designed to impede the supply of chemical weapons precursors to these two countries. Unidentified intelligence reports note that Syria has begun the production of CW and has entered into talks with Iran on cooperating in that field. Mr. Kalb announces that "the United States is concerned that Syria may have a chemical weapons capability and has assisted Iran in the Iranian war effort." However, he notes, "Iran has not used chemical weapons, but their continued use by Iraq and the potential for Iranian use is a cause of concern." Kalb goes on to add that the US has no proof that Syria has given CW to Iran.
5 June 1986
Reports about Iran's alleged CW program arise out of Iranian government budget debates. According to the Iranian resistance newspaper, *Iran Liberation*, a budget bill was introduced to establish an organization called Jahad-e Daneshgahi (University Crusade) to gather young Iranian scientists for CW research. The details released during the debate said the University Crusade would have "200 graduates with at least a first degree...carrying out various experiments on such products as mustard gas and military equipment." The deputy who gave these details went on to say that "these products are now on the production line."

15 July 1986
Timothy Renton, Minister of State for the British Foreign Office, speaking at the Conference on Disarmament, states that Iraq can produce hundreds of tons of mustard and nerve agents, and that "Iran may in turn be taking steps to acquire its own chemical weapons." The *New York Times* states that Renton said that Iran and other Middle East countries appear to be developing CW.

17 July 1986
The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) urged Japanese industry to avoid exporting to Iran and Iraq 40 kinds of chemicals that could be used to make CW.

14 August 1986
Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati claims that Iraq has used CW on five occasions since March, and called on the Conference on Disarmament to open an investigation on which countries supplied Iraq with its chemical weapons capabilities, renew its condemnation of all use of CW, ban the export of CW-related chemicals and equipment, and immediately send CW investigating teams to Iran when Iran requests them. He complains that although many European countries have export controls, there is no thorough administration to force export compliance. If Iraq could procure and produce CW, he states, any country could do so. He urged Iraq to officially renounce further use of CW. If it did not, and if it continues to use CW, Iran, Velayati states, reserves the right to defend itself.

23 August 1986
A commentary on Tehran radio expresses the view that Iran would like the Non-Aligned Movement to condemn Iraq because it is the aggressor in the war and for its use of CW.

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25 August 1986

The New York Times cites unidentified intelligence reports as claiming that Iran has a program to develop CW, although it is smaller than the Syrian program. The reports suggest that Syria may be helping Iran on its CW program. Unidentified American officials state that there is no evidence that Iran has used CW, although Iran may have fired back at Iraqi forces some unexploded CW shells that Iraq had fired at its forces.


28 August 1986

In an interview with Iranian radio and television, Hashemi-Rafsanjani is asked: "As you are aware, in this war Iraq made use of chemical weapons over and over again....The question is: does the Islamic Republic of Iran have the facilities to retaliate in kind or not, and if it has, why did we retaliate in kind in the past in the sense that when they hit us with missiles we also hit them with missiles and when they came with their aircraft we did the same why have we not, in this particular case, retaliated in kind up to now? Does the potential exist or not?" Rafsanjani replies that, "In those early days they claimed that they had certain facilities which we did not have. But since we did have the technology for this, we took certain measures and we can retaliate in kind to the same level as Iraq." He denies that Iran bought the CW from Israel.


4 September 1986

Iran charges that Iraq lobbed two shells filled with CW on Iranian soldiers stationed in the Hajj Omran sector of northeastern Iraq where Iran began its Karbala 2 offensive last week, killing one soldier and wounding seven more.


5 September 1986

The Iranian War Information Headquarters calls upon international organizations, particularly the Non-Aligned Movement, to "break their silence and condemn the Iraqi regime" for using CW.


8 September 1986

The Isfahan Reconstruction Crusade has now begun mass production of a device designed to neutralize chemical weapons. The device was previously produced only in limited quantities. According to the designer of the device, it

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was originally produced "four years ago but many changes have taken place since. The first apparatus built was controlled from the outside and its spraying range was less than 360 degrees. Now...we are proud to have manufactured something that is much better than similar products manufactured abroad. For example, our machine has a firing range of more than 100 meters in contrast to the 22-meter range of foreign ones....The machine is operated from the inside unlike the American one. The crew members do not have to wear special clothing to shield them from chemical weapons. Oxygen is fed into the crew's compartment so that they can easily breathe even in the most contaminated areas....An additional feature this year is a digital wind sensor...that shows which way the wind is blowing and the exact speed of the wind in kilometers."


8 September 1986
The Iranian News Agency reports that "Iraqi troops attacked Bamo and Sheykh Saleh regions, in west Iran, with chemical bombs [this] afternoon. The area is still under chemical bombardment. So far 125 Muslim combatants have been hospitalized and the number of injured is expected to rise."


9 September 1986
IRNA claims that that Iraqi forces again dropped CW agents on Sheykh Saleh on Tuesday, in addition to the first raids on that town and the town of Bamo on Monday.


9 September 1986
In a statement issued by the War Information Headquarters, Iran threatens to "heavily bombard" Iraqi industrial areas "in retaliation for the Baghdad regime's use of chemical weapons...and its raids on Iranian industrial and residential points."


10 September 1986
IRNA states that Foreign Minister Velayati has sent an official note to the UN Secretary General protesting Iraq's recent CW attacks and the bombing raid on the city of Tabriz. Velayati states that Iran "will no longer tolerate these Iraqi atrocities and will take deterrent measures against repeated Iraqi violations of international regulations." He demands the UN take appropriate measures to prevent Iraq from continuing these types of attacks in the future.

12 September 1986
Iran fires missiles into Baghdad in retaliation for Iraq's recent CW attacks in northwestern Iran. An Iranian military communiqué states that "the experience of the past six years has proved this fact, that the Islamic Republic of Iran should individually take measures against the violations of the Iraqi regime of international laws."

25 September 1986
An Iraqi military communiqué states that Iraqi planes bombed a military-run chemical facility in Isfahan today.

30 September 1986
Due to an Iraqi raid on an Iranian chemical fertilizer facility in Isfahan, Voice of the Liberation of Iran reports that the Swedish engineers who had been in charge of the facility have been asked to "permanently" leave Iran. Quoting the "Lloyd's insurance company of London," this report alleges that the Isfahan facility was devoted to the production of chemical weapons and is now out of action because of the bombing.

Late September 1986
According to Chemical Week, official reports from Iran and Iraq claim that Iraqi jets bombed chemical process industries plants deep inside Iran. Iraq claims its planes hit a petrochemical plant at Isfahan and an aluminum complex and agricultural machinery plant at Arak.
— "Bombing and Building in Iran," Chemical Week, 8 October 1986, p. 15.

2 October 1986
Platt's Petrochemical Report states that the Isfahan chemical facility struck by Iraqi planes last week was a petrochemical facility. Although Iran has given no indication as to the type of petrochemical facility it was, Platt's notes that an aromatics facility was due to begin operations there in 1989, and was set to produce 80,000 tones/year benzene and 40,000 tones/year of toluene and paraxylene, among other products. [Note: Such chemical products have little or no relevance to CW agent production.]

4 October 1986
More than 100 of the CW neutralizing devices manufactured by the Isfahan Construction Jihad Ministry (see 8 September 1986 entry) have been sent to the front lines for use in the war against Iraq. Mr. Khameneh'I, Chairman of the Supreme Defense Council and Reconstruction Jihad Minister Zanganeh were in attendance at the ceremony.

5 October 1986
Tehran Radio reports that 150 of the CW neutralizing devices (see 8 September 1986 and 4 October 1986 entries)
have been sent to the front.

5 October 1986
An Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, speaking on the topic of the current UN Security Council session on the Iran-Iraq War, states that "As we have witnessed, the Secretary General’s efforts in connection with war crimes and the use of chemical weapons by Iraq have to some extent clarified the facts although, unfortunately, no decisive action has been taken to deter this violator of international laws and the party responsible for such war damage. At present the bombing of civilian areas and the use of chemical weapons continues in spite of condemnation by the Security Council and the UN Secretary General. The Secretary General is well aware that the Islamic Republic of Iran, in spite of its capability, has refused to make use of chemical weapons."

9 October 1986
Iran rejects the latest UN Security Council resolution on the Iran-Iraq War and criticized the Security Council for not denouncing Iraq for employing CW against Iranian forces.

12 October 1986
Iraq announces that it has destroyed "warfare, chemicals, and ammunition plant" during a raid at 10:30 GMT on the Iranian city of Isfahan.

29 October 1986
[Note: Anthony Cordesman cites a Washington Times article that supposedly has something to do with Iran’s lack of a chemical weapons ability at the time Iraq launched its first CW attacks. The article also states that 1985 and possibly 1984, Iran used chemical mortars and artillery shells captured from Iraq. Finally, the article also states that Iran began domestic production of chemical weapons in 1986-1987. This article is the backbone of Cordesman’s evidence on Iran's chemical weapons program in the 1980s. Unfortunately, it does not appear to exist.]

November 1986
Iran claims to have become self sufficient in chemical defensive gear.

November 1986
Shimon Peres, Israeli foreign minister, claims that Syria has assisted Iran in obtaining CW to counter Iraq.

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November 1986
One Israeli report claims that "chemical weapons, apparently including nerve and mustard gas, [had] recently been confirmed by Western intelligence sources."

10 November 1986
Mohsen Rafiqdoust, Minister of the Revolutionary Guards, says that Iran has become self-sufficient in producing equipment necessary to counter chemical and biological warfare.
— Scheherezade Faramarzi, "Iran Says France Fixing its Mistakes in Middle East," Associated Press, 10 November 1986.

10 November 1986
The BBC, reporting on the claim above, gives a transcript of a statement presumably made by Rafiqdoust. All bracketed text and parentheses are those of the BBC. "This is the 55th convoy of such equipment which is being sent to the fronts, including chemical baths [presumably decontamination baths or showers]; divisions, brigades and battalions; filters for the trenches and fortifications of our beloved ones. We plan to equip all the fortifications with these filters so that the enemy may lose hope from that point of view too [presumably of using chemical weapons] and may realize that it has to submit to the will of our nation. There is comprehensive equipment against chemical attacks which caters for all stages, from the stage prior to the enemy's use of chemical weapons up to the state of their use and the fight against them; namely, filters for the trenches to keep them secure against them [chemical weapons]. If the enemy uses them we have baths, individual packs, group capsules, and equipment. We have prepared ourselves completely against these hostilities, and these are being sent to the fronts.

23 November 1986
Simon O'Dwyer-Russell, defense correspondent for the Sunday Telegraph of London, reports that unidentified Western intelligence officials believe that Iran and Syria have acquired nerve gas warheads from the Soviet Union via Libya. These sources say that the warheads can be attached to Scud-B missiles. It is not clear when Libya may have received the warheads, but British intelligence is reported to have "traced the source of the nerve agent back to the Soviet Union." The warheads can reportedly kill everyone within a 25-square mile area, although such an impact is clearly being overstated.

23 November 1986
Zev Eitan, a military affairs expert at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, admits that Israel
has known Iran and Syria are attempting to acquire the capability to fit long-range ballistic missiles with chemical warheads. However, he remains doubtful of the report in the Sunday Telegraph that Libya has supplied the countries with Soviet-made nerve gas warheads. "I am not definitely convinced this information is correct," he says.


23 November 1986
According to US officials, Iran has received Soviet chemical warfare equipment via Czechoslovakia. Anthony Cordesman and Gary Sick are experts interviewed for this story.


26 November 1986
Beginning today, as part of "Mobilization Week," Khandaq exercises are being held all over Iran to practice techniques in, among other things, neutralizing the effects of chemical weapons.


1 December 1986
During a meeting with Iranian Charge d'Affaires to Rome, Mohammed Reza Entezari, an Italian foreign ministry spokesman, alleges that a handful of Italian firms were responsible for sending "chemical weapons" to Iraq. The official claims that the firms were unaware of the Italian export controls on weapons to Iraq. Entezari is surprised by the revelations that Italy was involved in sending "chemical weapons" to Iraq via the Netherlands, and responds that he finds these explanations as "unsatisfactory." He states that had these transactions never taken place, the region would have been peaceful long ago.


2 December 1986
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister of International and Economic Affairs, Mohammed Javad Larijani, comments on the International Committee of the Red Cross being allowed to resume activities in Iran. He states that the main task for the Red Cross would be to take a firm stance against the use of chemical weapons, attacks on residential areas, investigating soldiers reported to be missing in action, and investigating Iraq's treatment of Iranian prisoners of war.


11 December 1986
A seminar run by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps' Anti-Chemical, Bacteriological, and Radioactive Divisions is held in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province. This is the second seminar of its kind and will last for a total of two days, during
which time practical maneuvers and exercises to countering the effects of CW will be practiced.

12 December 1986
*The Guardian* (London) reports that unidentified Western sources believe Syria may have offered chemical weapons expertise to Iran.

15 December 1986
Unidentified "informed sources" claim that the CIA has been providing intelligence to the Iraqi military to aid them in their war against Iran. The sources claim that as early as 1984, the United States has engaged in assisting Iraq in its intelligence gathering. The claim that Iraq used this information to orchestrate CW attacks against Iranian troops. Regular sharing of intelligence from US satellites reportedly began in 1985.

26 December 1986
IRNA claims that Iraq has used CW shells against Iranian positions on the east bank of the Shatt al Arab.

27 December 1986
Maj. Gen. Talea Ruhaaim al-Douri, deputy commander of Iraq's Third Army Corps, rejects Iran's claims that Iraqi forces used CW yesterday. "We simply didn't need them," he says.

27 December 1986
Iran urges the UN to take "more serious effective measures" against Iraq to prevent them from using CW. Iran claims several of its soldiers were wounded from recent Iraqi CW attacks on the east bank of Shatt al-Arab.

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1985

**Mid-1980s**
Mana International Investments, a company registered in Poland and controlled by Israeli businessman Nachum Manbar, supplies Iran with nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protective suits.


**1984-1985**
Iran begins to use lethal CW that was captured from Iraqi unexploded ordinances and in artillery rounds. Analysts have pointed out that it is possible that the Iranian troops were not aware that they were firing chemical munitions, since Iraq did not mark chemical rounds in any special way.


**1985**
Syria reportedly agrees to supply Iran with CW, but later backs away from the offer.


**1985**
Iran begins to use CW offensively. It initially uses chemical artillery rounds, which were either acquired from Syria or captured Iraqi stocks.


**March 1985**
An Iranian opposition group in Italy reportedly claims that a chemical fertilizer plant in Marv Dasht, Iran, was converted over a three-year period with supervision from West German and Italian companies and experts, "with the aim of making chemical weapons."


**March 1985**
During a trip to the Persian Gulf by UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar and Giandomenico Pico, the latter reports that during a discussion between Perez de Cuellar, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, and Iranian Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani, Rafsanjani states that CW has terrified Iranian troops. He then states that, "We possess more advanced facilities to produce chemical weapons, but we do not use them. We would not ever do so if Iraq continued to use them." Velayati interrupts Rafsanjani and states that Iran does not even want to produce...
CW, but Rafsanjani simply repeats that Iran does not want to use CW, leaving the possibility that Iran might produce them.


**March 1985**

Iran accuses Iraq of responding to its first major infantry offensive into southern Iraq in 13 months with poison gas attacks.


**11-17 March 1985**

Iraq allegedly uses mustard gas to turn back Iranian forces launching an assault to cross the Tigris River and cut the highway linking Baghdad with Basra. Tests on 13 Iranian casualties flown to European hospitals from Iran showed that they were victims of mustard gas exposure.


**Mid-March to Mid-April 1985**

33 Iranian soldiers suffering from chemical burns are flown to Europe for treatment.

— "Gulf War; Fooling the People," *The Economist*, 13 April 1985, p. 49.

**13 March 1985**

In a letter to the UN, Iran accuses Iraq of "deploying chemical weapons" in the marshes near Basra. Iran's Deputy Foreign states that Iran formally asked Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar to prevent Iraq from using CW. He states that if the UN fails to prevent Iraq, Iran will feel free to respond in kind.


**14 March 1985**

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister tells a news conference that Iraq fired CW-filled artillery shells at Iranian forces. He states that, "We think the lack of a stand by the international community against Iraq's use of chemical weapons indeed authorizes us to use chemical weapons against Iraq, but we still hope the international community will be able to stop Iraq."


**14 March 1985**

Tehran Radio reports that 180 Iranians had been affected in the 13 March CW attack.


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15 March 1985
The reports that news services claim that Iraq has deployed CW three times against Iran during the most recent offensive.

15 March 1985
Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati makes a formal request to the UN to "take necessary steps to immediately stop this antihuman action." He suggests the UN establish a permanent mission in Tehran to investigate CW war crimes.

15 March 1985
Iranian President Ali Khamenei states that Iraq has resumed its use of cyanide and nerve gas in five sectors of the southern front. "We declare here and now that we are capable of retaliation against every action. If Iraq uses chemical weapons, we will give a firmer reply and be sure that we will do it." Khamenei goes on to state that Iran will "answer every fist with a harder fist."

16 March 1985
Iran's Majlis speaker Rafsanjani states during today's Majlis session that any bombing of an Iranian city would be "responded by bombardment of Baghdad," and that any attacks on ships in the Gulf would be "responded by bombardment of Basra." He states that "employment of chemical weapons in battlefields will receive a more severe response."

19 March 1985
Iran's UN delegate accuses Iraq of using CW twice last week.

20 March 1985
Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister says that 20 Iranian soldiers injured by Iraqi CW will be sent to Vienna, Bonn, Munich, and London shortly. He states that Iraq used mustard gas and smaller amounts of cyanide and phosphorous on seven occasions in the marshland fighting near Basra. According to him, the first occasion was before 14 March, while the other six were between 14 March and 16 March. He stated that the CW were dispersed by "shells fired from cannons," and that 200 Iranian soldiers had been hospitalized due to CW-induced "blisters on their bodies, skin and eye irritations and lung irritations."
20 March 1985
Iraqi commanders paraded foreign reporters in front of a cache of captured Iranian equipment, some of which were Iranian gas masks. The reporters asked the Iraqi commander if Iraq had used CW in the attack, and he replied that "we did not use any because we do not have any. If we had some, we would use it."

21 March 1985
A number of Iranian CW victims will be flown to London to receive medical treatment at a private hospital, the Iranian embassy reports today.

22 March 1985
According to medical specialists in West Germany, tests prove that the 13 Iranian soldiers flown to West Germany to receive treatment were exposed to mustard gas.

22 March 1985
Iran says it has sent 33 soldiers wounded by CW to Britain, West Germany, Austria, and Belgium to receive medical treatment.

23 March 1985
Dr. Gernot Pauser, an Austrian physician treating eight wounded Iranians, states that his team of doctors is positive the soldiers were exposed to mustard gas and one other unidentified substance.

24 March 1985
One of the eight Iranian soldiers flown to Vienna has died of his injuries.

25 March 1985
US intelligence analysts confirm that Iraq recently used CW against Iran along its southern front. According to Reagan administration officials, a preliminary examination concludes that Iraq used mustard gas in its attacks.

Unnamed State Department officials on hand for a meeting between US Secretary of State George Schultz and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz said they had no doubt that Iraq had used CW again. The Los Angeles Times reports that State Department officials said that Schultz "bluntly put Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz on notice that the administration expects Iraq to stop engaging in chemical warfare. However, when asked after the meeting if he discussed CW with Schultz, Aziz said he did not recall any discussion about CW during the meeting. A separate State Department official refused to confirm that Schultz brought up the topic of CW with Aziz, but said that Schultz had done so "on repeated occasions and that Aziz left the meeting 'well aware of our concern on this

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27 March 1985
An Iranian soldier undergoing treatment for CW-related injuries in London dies today.
— "Baghdad Threatens to Extend War to all Parts of Iran / Possible Gulf War Escalation," The Guardian (London), 27 March 1985.

27 March 1985
Iraq's UN ambassador denies that his government was using CW against Iran.

28 March 1985
The Iranian Foreign Ministry issues a statement welcoming UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar's 26 March statement that expressed regret and concern over the use of CW in the Gulf War. Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati sends a letter to Sharifuddin Pirzado, Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and requests that he do all that he can to limit the further use of CW by Iraq.

28 March 1985
IRNA states that unless Iraq stops "attacking residential areas of Iranian cities, targeting their fire on commercial shipping and using chemical weapons," it would "immediately lead to retaliation in kind."

28 March 1985
The Iranian War Information Headquarters claims that 200 Iranian soldiers have been injured by mustard gas in recent fighting in the Huwaizah Marshes.

28 March 1985
Fifteen additional wounded Iranian soldiers are flown to Europe to receive treatment for CW injuries. Three are taken to Paris, two to London and Geneva, and 10 to Frankfurt. According to airport workers, the soldiers showed no visible wounds.

April 1985
Unnamed US officials claim that the United States has picked up "a certain amount of information from radio interceptions of discussions by Iranian and Iraqi commanders about their ability to use chemicals."

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April 1985
In addition, US "intelligence sources" report that Iran may be acquiring CW munitions, as well as Scud missiles, from Libya. Iran denies this report.

1 April 1985
Iraq used CW at least five times against Iran during the month of March, according to a newly released US government report.

7 April 1985
During a meeting with the UN Secretary General, Majlis speaker Rafsanjani told Perez de Cuellar that Iran did not trust the various mediators trying to bring about an end to the war with Iraq because none of them adopted what Iran considered to be a fair, just, and humanitarian stance to the war. Rafsanjani said that Perez de Cuellar's stance was the first positive step he had seen, but complained that the Security Council had chose to deal with the problem "in a sly manner."

8 April 1985
United Nations officials in New York reported that Iraq used mustard gas during its victorious Tigris River battle in mid-March.

8 April 1985
Iran's official news agency reports that Iraq used artillery shells filled with mustard and nerve agents in four places in southern Iraq yesterday, including in Huwaizeh.
— Mohammed Salam, "Iraqis Bomb Cities as UN Chief Arrives in Baghdad," Associated Press, 8 April 1985.

9 April 1985
UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, in Tehran for talks before flying to Baghdad later in the day, states that he will call for an end to attacks on civilian areas, commercial shipping and aviation, and the use of chemical weapons. Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati calls the secretary general's comments "relatively fair" while Iran's president said they were "praiseworthy."
— "UN Chief’s Iran Visit Ends," Xinhua General Overseas News Service (PRC), 9 April 1985, item number: 040935.

9 April 1985
UN officials credited the Security Council's March resolution that supported Iran's charges that Iraq was using CW as a reason for the cordial atmosphere between the Secretary General and Iranian leaders when he visited them in Iran earlier this week.

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9 April 1985
IRNA reports that Iran asked Perez de Cuellar to open a new investigation into Iraq's CW attack on Monday that killed 11 and wounded "many others."

10 April 1985
Iran issues a formal statement that Iraq has shelled 12 separate locations with CW munitions in the past two days. The statement urged the Secretary General to take immediate action to investigate the attacks.
— Patrick Keatley, "Gulf War Gap 'as Wide as Ever': UN Secretary-General de Cuellar Ends Peace Mission to Iran and Iraq," The Guardian, 10 April 1985.

10 April 1985
While speaking at the Razi vaccine factory in Karaj, Hashemi Rafsanjani states that Iran "will show its power" should Iraq continue launching CW attacks against it. Iran has "limited patience," according to Rafsanjani, when it comes to Iraq's immoral use of CW. He said that thus far, Iran has attempted numerous times to convince the Iraqi regime not to resort to CW. He states, "But if the Iraqis will not change their mind and continue their mischief, we will show them our power."

11 April 1985
Iraq threatens to use "new, highly developed" weapons to halt Iranian forces while Iran claims that Iraq has employed CW rockets and artillery shells against its forces for three consecutive days, killing 11 soldiers.

11 April 1985
The Christian Science Monitor reports that Secretary General Perez de Cuellar succeeded in getting both Iran and Iraq to agree to a ban on CW as well as a ban on targeting civilian areas during his meeting with leaders from those two countries. However, that agreement has been broken by the recent fighting and charges by Iran of Iraqi CW use. Perez de Cuellar is expected to send a new UN team to investigate the Iranian claims.

13 April 1985
An Iranian military communiqué reports that Iraq attacked Iranian forces on the southern front with CW on 10 and 12 April, wounding numerous Iranian soldiers.

16 April 1985
Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati tells the Conference on Disarmament that 4,600 Iranians have been killed or injured in CW attacks since 3 March. Recently, while at the UN, he stated that, "The use of inhuman

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chemical weapons is becoming a normal act at the international level for the trampling of the rights of peoples due to the consecutive deployment of this weapon by the Iraqi regime. A fortnight ago, exactly at a time when the UN Secretary General was in Baghdad to pursue his efforts to persuade the Iraqi regime to abide by international conventions and regulations, the Islamic Republic of Iran was once again the victim of an extensive chemical attack. Could you, as the most informed individuals conducting the multilateral disarmament negotiations in this conference come to terms with your conscience to justify the catastrophic and conspiratorial indifference of international bodies vis-à-vis this crime of genocide through lack of appropriate international means to prevent the use of chemical weapons? The Iraqi regime has in fact declared to the UN and the person of the secretary general that it is determined not only to continue the deployment of chemical weapons, but to absolutely disregard the world public opinion and all international conventions and regulations. Does this tragic state of affairs not persuade all fair-minded people to suspect that the Iraqi regime dares ridicule all universal values of humanity on the strength of certain behind-the-scene backings, and escape any criticism by the Security Council and other practical international measures? Could the Security Council deny that its silence has not persuaded and encouraged Iraq to continue to deploy these weapons? The Islamic Republic of Iran once again openly declares that in spite of its ability to retaliate in all such cases, if it would like not to violate international laws and regulations, and would do so only when there is no other option. Nevertheless, unfortunately, the repeated violations of the international laws by the Iraqi regime have led us to the conclusion that under the present circumstances, priority must be accorded to the discussions, negotiations, and efforts which have to be made in order to establish a practical guarantee system for the international regulations. Such discussions must take place before all others, otherwise, in view of the precedent that Iraq has set; it is feared that the major international laws and regulations which are the fruit of the great pains of mankind and the universal human values might be subjected to total elimination.

Velayati also states that while the Secretary General was in Baghdad, Iraq began using aircraft to spray a Tabun/Cyanide compound on Iranian troops while at the same time attacking them with mustard gas. He reiterated that Iran has requested the UN establish a permanent mission in Tehran to investigate Iraq CW abuse. [Note: It is possible that the “Tabun/Cyanide” compound may in fact be simply the nerve agent tabun along with cyanide, the latter being a contaminant from the tabun molecule in sample analysis].


17 April 1985
Around 45 Iranian soldiers suffering from apparent CW-related injuries arrive in Vienna and are dispersed throughout Europe to receive treatment for their injuries.


18 April 1985
An Iranian soldier transported to Munich to receive treatment less than 24 hours ago has already died to from mustard gas-related injuries. Around 20 other Iranian soldiers are currently in West Germany receiving treatment.

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for CW injuries.

20 April 1985
After examining Iranian soldiers in London and Ghent, Dr. Manuel Dominguez, a UN chemical weapons expert, determines that Iranian troops were exposed to Yperite [sulfur mustard], and possibly hydrocyanic acid. [Note: Iraqi use of hydrocyanic acid has not yet been confirmed, at least according to open sources.]

20 April 1985
US intelligence reports now that Iran also appears to be using CW, although the reports state that the United States cannot determine if Iran made the weapons itself, or if it received them from Libya.

24 April 1985
The US State Department spokesman states that Iran "has been seeking to develop a chemical weapons capability and may now be in a position to use such a weapon."

24 April 1985
A senior State Department official who has closely followed the development of CW in the Gulf says, "I think this is a very dangerous situation." He reports that Iran is very upset by the weak UN response. Administration officials state that Iran is preparing for another offensive and that it may use CW this time. US intelligence bases its claims by closing monitoring the sales of CW precursors and by intercepting Iraqi and Iranian military communication.

25 April 1985
In response to the US claims, an IRNA report commenting on a recent address by Rafsanjani to the intelligence and operations unit of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, states "The USA suddenly claims that Iran has transferred its immeasurable capabilities to the fronts. This claim has two sides to it. One is their aim today, whereby Iraq thinks that the only weapons it has is the chemical one and therein makes a mistake and will later understand that it has made a mistake, as in everything else. The other is that they wish to exonerate the Iraqi regime with such talk." Referring to the fact that the USA raises the issue of our use of chemical substances in order to minimize the crimes and heinous deeds perpetrated by Saddam, Hashemi-Rafsanjani then said, "Of course they will be beset with difficulties in this matter since the Iraqi soldier is not like the Iranian soldier who goes to the fronts seeking martyrdom. The moment they sense the smell of chemical substances they will most certainly not remain at the front. This contradiction has come about in the moves by our enemy." Rafsanjani goes on to lament how the French government is silencing French physicians treating Iranian CW victims and refusing them to state the cause of their injuries.
— "Rafsanjani's Speech to Iranian Revolution Guards Intelligence Unit," Islamic Republic News Agency, 25 April

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25 April 1985
Iran’s Prime Minister states that recent US allegations about Iran’s CW program and its possible use of CW against Iraq is nothing but a ploy to influence the UN Security Council and force it "to issue a watered-down resolution in condemnation of chemical weapons use in general, which might also include a call for an end to the war."

25 April 1985
An Iranian military communiqué accused Iraq again of firing "several chemical shells," at 8 p.m., 24 April, along the northern front in the Marivan sector of Kordestan.

26 April 1985
Iran’s Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani states that the recent UN Security Council statement condemning CW is "a positive move." However, it contains "an unacceptable weakness" by not explicitly naming Iraq as the state using CW. "Now that you are condemning this act, and you know Iraq is responsible, why do you act like a coward and conservative? Speak clearly." The statement said that the Council is "appalled that chemical weapons have been used against Iranian soldiers during the month of March 1985." Rafsanjani says that Iran "would start talks on the war with the UN if the organization names Iraq as the aggressor and violator of various international laws in war."

29 April 1985
US intelligence officials claim Iran is prepared to use poison gas, a new weapon, in an upcoming attack against the southern Iraqi city of Basra. Iran has positioned a 100,000-man assault force for this second and larger attack on Basra. After Iraq began using mustard gas and nerve gas in the war, Iran warned that it would retaliate with its own chemical arsenal, although there has been no evidence of Iranian CW activity until now. An American official claimed that now, "there is reason to believe both sides are ready to gas each other."

10 May 1985
An Iranian soldier being treated for sulfur mustard injuries dies today in London.

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7 June 1985
Mohammed Ali Hadi, a member of Iran's Parliamentary Defense Commission, states that Iran will begin using CW unless Iraq stops using them.

19 June 1985
Hashemi Rafsanjani meets with diplomatic envoys from various countries to appeal to them to help Iran rid the region of Saddam Hussein. During the appeal, he condemns Iraqi violations of international laws such as attacking merchant ships and deploying CW.

24 June 1985
Teheran IRNA reports that "a sum of 3.5 billion rials (about 35 million dollars) has been allocated for constructing five large chemical plants, the deputy minister of industries in charge of chemical sector, Mr. Bakshi said Monday [24 June]....On the domestic need for raw materials, he said that the imported materials were of 1,700 kinds, of which the government has agreed in principle to import 200. More than 1,000 industrial units have received operating permits so far, of which 300 units are to produce chemical and mineral materials. These units will save the government a sum of 400 million dollars in foreign exchange form its total yearly expenditure currently standing at 2 billion dollars in chemical purchases from abroad."

1 July 1985
Hashemi Rafsanjani supports Japan's three-point plan for ending the Iran-Iraq War. Japan's proposal was first released last year during a UN General Assembly session and calls for ensuring the safe passage of commercial shipping through the Gulf, the safety of ports, and the banning of CW. During a five-day official visit to Japan, Rafsanjani reportedly states that Iran has no objections with the Japanese proposal.

2 July 1985
During a meeting with Japan's Foreign Minister, Rafsanjani states that although his country is capable of attacking commercial ships in the Persian Gulf—as well as deploying CW—Iran has refused to do so on humanitarian and moral grounds.

4 August 1985
A Los Angeles Times investigation has uncovered an Iranian attempt to procure 400,000 CW protection suits and associated decontamination units from a Connecticut firm named Cofish International. The deal, for a reported

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$96 million, was brokered through a Swiss man named Rene Schuler currently living in Brazil. A Cofish executive became suspicious when Schuler stipulated that the suits could not be manufactured by any Jews and that the suits would be destined for a "Mideast country we can't talk about on the telephone." The executive then contacted the US Customs Service office in New Haven, Connecticut, who set up a dummy office in the company's export division. According to an investigator familiar with the case, the Iranians "didn't bat an eye when they heard the price for the suits was going to be $96 million." The executive reports that part of the scheme was to manufacture a phony export license stating that the final destination for the suits would be Rome. The Customs agent was able to arrange for Schuler to come to the United States to inspect the decontamination equipment. During their meeting at an East Hartford Connecticut hotel, Shuler stated: "You know where [the shipment] is going? It's going to Iran."


9 September 1985
The Washington Post reports that late last month, an US official knowledgeable about US intelligence on Iran stated that "Iran has the capability" to use CW. However, the few CW attacks attributed to Iran in the past appear to be shelling Iraqi troops with captured Iraqi CW munitions.


2 December 1985
Western intelligence sources confirm that Iraq has once again used poison gas against Iranian troops in the Gulf War. This month Iran protested at the United Nations that Iraq had shelled Iranian troops with "chemical cannonballs," severely injuring eight people. Although the United States has twice condemned Baghdad's use of mustard gas, US officials note that Iran has also developed a chemical arsenal—but with mixed results. There is no evidence Iran has used it at the front. "It seems they have succeeded [only] in gassing themselves," says one official.


2 December 1985
Unidentified Reagan administration officials state that Iran is likely to be developing the capability to produce CW. They state that Iran currently has "some capability" to deploy CW through the use of Iraqi mustard and nerve gas munitions captured during battles earlier this year and during 1984. When asked if Iran has chemical weapons, an anonymous source replies that "the answer is yes." Another source states that "we believe [the Iranians] have some [chemical warfare] capability and we believe they have an intent to develop a production capability. We believe they are working toward the development of a production capability." The source declines to elaborate on what evidence the United States has to substantiate these statements. Although others have suggested in the past that Iran had captured Iraqi CW munitions, this is believed to be the first suggestion that Iran is building an indigenous CW production capacity. Kenneth L. Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, declines to state whether Iran or any other countries possess CW.

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21 December 1985
Frederick W. Axelgard, a Middle East expert with Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, states that Iraq is in for a challenging two or three months due to Iran's buildup along the border and reports that Iran has "been seeking and perhaps acquiring chemical weapons capability."

1984
Mid-1980s
According to Jane's Intelligence Review, Iran began producing sulfur mustard and phosgene in the mid-1980s—using these weapons in the later stages of the Iran-Iraq War.
— Dr. Andrew Rathmell, "Iran's Rearmament — How Much a Threat?" Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 July 1994, p. 317.

Mid-1980s
According to Anthony Cordesman, Iran began purchasing large amounts of CW defensive gear in the mid-1980s.

1984
Iran commences production of limited batches of chemical agents.

1984
According to Anthony Cordesman, Iran did not have the ability to produce CW by the time Iraq began using the weapons against it. However, Cordesman states that Iran "seems to have made limited use of chemical mortar and artillery rounds as early as 1985—and possibly as early as 1984—these rounds were almost certainly captured from Iraq. [Note: The source Cordesman cites to back up these claims, a Washington Times article from 29 October 1986, does not exist. Therefore, it remains unclear where Cordesman received this information. It is possible that it was obtained while being member of Senator John McCain's staff.]"

1984
The US District Court finds that an Atlanta businessman named Pat Stevens has been illegally shipping restricted material to Iran via Hong Kong with the help of Hong-Kong based confederates operating under the names

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Aviation Enterprises and Centurion Aviation. In 1984, Stevens forwards a sample gas mask to Tehran in anticipation of a $60,000 for the sale that was never completed.

1984
South Korea supplies Iran with copies of the Finnish Kemira respirators. However, the gas masks did not fit properly, and their filters only lasted for 15 minutes.

1984
Iran purchases atropine antidote injectors from a Dutch company (probably Solvay Duphar).

1984
According to an unconfirmed report, an explosion occurs at the Marvdasht complex in Iran. About a dozen technicians involved in CBW experiments are killed.

1984
Iran's representative to the UN, Ambassador Rajai Khorasani, states in a news conference, "We are capable of manufacturing chemical weapons. If the Iraqis repeat their crime, we may consider using them. But we think that to resort to retaliation can only be justified when all other means of preventing Iraq are exhausted and still Iraq repeats its crime."
— Michael Eisenstadt, The Deterrence Series: Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence, Case Study 4: Iran, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998, p. 9.

18 February 1984
An explosion occurs at the Iranian Petro-Chemical Center in Khrobasht.

27 February 1984
The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), the official Iranian news agency, reports that Iraq has been dropping "chemical bombs" in air raids since the preceding night in the northern flank of the 730-mile battle front. The agency reports that the bombs, releasing nerve gas and nitrogen mustard, have killed or wounded more than 400

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Iranians in the last 24 hours. [Note: The report of "nitrogen" mustard versus sulfur mustard is unclear, and probably erroneous. It is likely that at this point in the war, Iraq was using sulfur mustard.]

27 February 1984
According to a joint war communiqué of the Army and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iraq uses chemical bombs in the fighting south of the Majnoon Islands and northeast of the Nashwa region, as well as in the al-Ozair region of Iraq, killing or wounding about 400 Iranians.

28 February 1984
W. Andrew Terrill Jr. states that by this time, Iranian troops seem to have been better prepared to counteract Iraqi chemical weapons. He states that "protective masks, atropine injectors and very limited amounts of protective clothing were found among the effects of dead Iranian troops..."

29 February 1984
An Iranian statement invites representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit Iranian soldiers who have been wounded by chemical bombs dropped by Iraqi planes.

Early March 1984
Iran sends 30 chemical casualties to hospitals in Vienna, London, Stockholm, and Tokyo. The medical evidence supports Iran's claim of Iraqi CW use.

Early March 1984
Bengt Koerlof, assistant professor at the Karolinska Hospital burns unit in Vienna, says he "will not rule out" the possibility that three Iranians he treated were burned by chemical weapons. The worst case involved burns over 75 percent of the body, and the other two were burned over 50 percent and 25 percent of their bodies, respectively. An unidentified Austrian doctor said to be involved in the treatment of ten Iranian soldiers flown to Vienna speculates the burns could have been caused by chemical weapons.

Early March 1984
Professor Aubin Heyndrickx from Belgium's University of Ghent claims Iranian soldiers were struck down by mustard gas and yellow rain [trichothecene mycotoxins] after examining their wounds at Vienna's General Hospital. Although both Iran and Iraq are said to have stockpiles of nerve-gas antidotes, there is no conclusive evidence that either country makes or uses nerve gas. A western photographer claims to have seen three unused hypodermic needles containing a nerve-gas antidote among the possession of Iranian soldiers at Ghuzil.

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**4 March 1984**
The Islamic Republic News Agency accuses Britain of providing Iraq with the chemical weapons that resulted in the death of 400 Iranians and the injury of some 1,100 others in the fighting since 27 February. Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaker of the Iranian Parliament and a spokesman of the Tehran regime, says that the chemical attacks occurred in fighting east of the southern Iraqi port city of Basra and called them an "unforgivable crime." The British Foreign Office in London denies both that it has chemical weapons and that it sold them to Iraq. Iran asks the United Nations to investigate the gas bomb attacks. Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati says the disarmament conference in Geneva should be assigned to the probe.

**4 March 1984**
Tehran Radio claims in an Arabic language broadcast that "Britain has been providing aid and signing agreements with the Ba'athist rulers of Iraq for billions of dollars under which various weapons were provided...Internationally banned chemical weapons were the most recent genocidal weapons Britain supplied." A spokesman from the British Foreign Office says, "no weapons, chemical or otherwise, has been supplied to either side" by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's government since the conflict erupted in September 1980.

**4 March 1984**
Hisham Sabah Fakhry, Iraq's commander of operations east of the Tigris River, denies to a group of reporters that any troops under his command have used mustard gas or other chemical weapons in past fighting, but he defends Iraq's right to take all necessary measures, saying, "We never welcome an enemy with flowers. Therefore, we will use all possible means to defend our country." He states that he has never used CW and would only use "the usual means" of warfare. But he avoids direct answer to questions on whether poison gas has been used in other areas. He says he does not know whether chemical weapons are available in his command.
In a side note, UPI reports that doctors in Vienna and Stockholm are treating 15 Iranian soldiers who have burn wounds consistent with those of CW. Iran accuses Iraq of wounding more than 1,000 of its troops with CW.

**5 March 1984**
The United States formally condemns and censures Iraq for using CW.

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5 March 1984
State Department spokesman John Hughes says US officials concluded from "available evidence" such as independent news reports and "non-Iranian" sources that Iraq had used the weapons.

5 March 1984
The New York Times quotes a Reagan administration official as stating that the United States has known for at least a year that Iraq was contemplating the use of CW. He states that the United States decided to go public with the charges only after backdoor channel appeals failed to alter Iraq's behavior.

5 March 1984
One of five Iranian soldiers being treated in Sweden for injuries dies, and doctors say they believe he has been "exposed to chemical weapons." Neither Sweden nor Austria says they can confirm Iranian charges that Iraq has been using gas bombs in the Iran-Iraq War.

5 March 1984
Meanwhile, doctors in Vienna confirm that the 10 soldiers being treated there were wounded "by chemical causes." However, they could not confirm that Iraq had used CW. "Eight of the patients are suffering from superficial acid burns of the skin. Two others are under intensive care with lesions of inner organs as well, including a drop in white blood corpuscles." [Note: Lowered white blood cells is indicative of mustard intoxication.]

5 March 1984
In Tehran, nearly 65 foreign diplomats tour a hospital to observe patients Iran claims have been injured by Iraqi CW. According to IRNA, Iran has "sufficient documents" to prove that the UK supplied the CW Iraq recently used against it. At the UN, Iranian Ambassador Said Rajaie-Khorassani reports that he will make a formal request for a UN investigation of the CW attacks by Iraq.

5 March 1984
During a meeting with the Swedish Ambassador in Iran, Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaker of the Iranian Parliament, asked that "the British government, which has close, friendly relations with you, should be told to stop delivering chemical bombs to Iraq so that this war can be ended more quickly." The Swedish ambassador then asked if Iran would accept the verdict of a court if a trial on Iraq's use of chemical weapons was convened. Rafsanjani responds that "this, is, of course my personal point of view and other officials have not yet made any decision in this respect. Of course, we will express our view about this trial, the elements forming the court, and the location of the trial. But if the court is held in accordance with our conditions, then any verdict passed about Saddam's punishment would be acceptable to us." In Sweden, reports state that one of the Iranian soldiers flown there for treatment has died.

**6 March 1984**

A Red Cross team treats 160 wounded Iranian combatants who exhibit symptoms of an Iraqi chemical attack. ICRC doctors find "extensive superficial burns," "serious respiratory problems," and "keratoconjunctivitis...[which] leads to the presumption of the recent use of substances prohibited by international law."

— "Iran-Iraq War: Chemical Weapons-ICRC Appeal," United States Department of State, 10 March 1984, Record Number 57965.

**6 March 1984**

Tehran Radio denounces a report by the BBC that denies British transfer of CW to Iraq, and states that "the lying BBC" was simply trying to "clean up decrepit British imperialism." The radio reports that Iran has "irrefutable documents and evidence" that the UK has delivered CW to Iraq.


**6 March 1984**

An Iraqi spokesman denies claims by Iran that his country has used CW.


**7 March 1984**

UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar states that he "strongly condemns the use of chemical weapons wherever and whenever this may occur." However, he does not indicate whether he would authorize a UN investigation of the Iranian charges against Iraq. Iran states that the CW were deployed in the marshland east of Basra and that they killed more than 400 troops and injured more than 1,100. Hashemi Rafsanjani calls for a trial of Saddam Hussein, the commander of the Iraqi armed forces, and leaders of Iraq’s ruling Baath Party "for the crime of resorting to the use of chemical weapons." Rafsanjani goes on to belittle the US denunciation of Iraq’s use of CW as nothing more than "a sweet reproach from a father to a son...[and that it] is a mere trick to fool the people, and to pretend that they are not indifferent towards the issue. When Iraq uses these [chemical weapons] and the world centers close their eyes to it, then what could be done tomorrow if a terrorist throws a poisonous capsule in a large crowd in any country..." He also states that it is the duty of the international press to strongly condemn the Iraqi actions in order to discourage their use by other countries or even terrorist organizations in the future.


**7 March 1984**

IRNA reports that nearly 1,100 Iranian soldiers have been wounded by Iraqi chemical bombs and nerve gases in "an

*Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.*
According to official reports published here, even since the war started in September 1980, the Iraqi regime has used various types of chemical weapons by means of artillery shells, mortars, and aerial bombs, against Iran’s forces and civilian populations. Only before the recent operations (Wa al-Fajr 5, Wa al-Fajr 6, and Kheybar) started in February, Iraq has used lethal chemical bombs in different western and southwestern regions of Iran, 48 times. During the first few days of the Kheybar operations some 400 Iranians had been wounded or martyred in Iraq’s chemical bombing of the Kheybar operational region. The figure, however, rose gradually to 700 and then 1,100, as the Baghdad regime increased its application of the internationally banned chemicals. The injured Iranian combatants were transferred to various hospitals in Khuzestan and later to Tehran and several other cities for initial treatment. Some of the wounded Iranians who had been contaminated with toxic agents released by the Iraqi bombs on Majnoon Islands suffered mostly from facial burns and eye injuries, also having intense nausea, inflamed, tear-flowing eyes, giddiness, loss of equilibrium and intense coughing. The type of the chemicals used were nerve gas, nitrogen mustard [sic], vesicant (blistering), and irritant.

According to the injured, upon explosion, the bombs emitted a yellow gas that quickly spread over the area and the troops within a radius of one kilometer. The fragments of a bomb later collected from the point of explosion were of a green color according to the wounded combatants. Iranian doctors treating the patients have said that the Iraqis have most likely used other types of toxic chemicals such as chlorine in their bombs, and possibly arsenic and phosgene compounds. The doctors said some of the patients (about 30 percent) had received minor injuries, most of whom were released from hospitals within a short period of time and returned to the battlefront. Despite the repeated appeals of Iran to various international organizations, so far, silence has been the only response given by these organizations to Baghdad’s repeated violation of human rights in its war against Iran. During the recent disarmament conference in Geneva, the Iranian delegates (headed by Foreign Minister Velayati) distributed pictorial leaflets among the foreign dignitaries attending the conference containing a summary report on Iraqi deployment of chemical weapons. Iran has also launched other universal efforts in a bid to convince the international organizations that this Iraqi crime, like the regime’s other violations of human rights, should be condemned. To this end, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati of the Islamic Republic on Sunday [4th March] cabled a message to the United Nations, urging the dispatch of a special delegation here to study the Iraqi use of chemical weapons. Iran’s permanent envoy to the UN, Sa’id Raja’i-Khorasani has also called on UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, to open an investigation into the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi regime against Iran. According to Resolution No. 37/98 passed at the UN in 1982, the United Nations Organization, upon learning about application of chemical bombs in a country, is duty bound to dispatch a team of experts to the said country immediately and inform all the UN members of the results of its investigations. This responsibility is independent from the organization’s duty vis-a-vis the very issue of the war and therefore under no pretext could the UN refrain from investigating the case.

Meanwhile, Iran’s foreign ministry sent a letter to the representative committee of the International Red Cross (IRC) in Tehran, inviting the IRC representative to visit victims of the Iraqi chemical bombardment. On Monday, 5 March, foreign ambassadors, charge d'affaires, and military attaches were invited to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, where they listened to reports on Iraqi regime’s deployment of chemical weapons. Also, the same day, some 65
foreign diplomats in Tehran visited convalescing victims of the chemical weapons, at Labafi Nezhad hospital. The Islamic Republic of Iran, based on some of the available evidence, has accused the British government of supplying chemical weapons to the Iraqi regime. Iranian officials have deplored the act and have asked Britain to stop the shipment of these weapons. Majlis Speaker Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, in a meeting with the Swedish Ambassador to Tehran Monday, asked the Swedish government to discourage Britain from sending more chemical weapons to Iraq. He said this British measure was in contradiction with its claims that it wanted to see an end to the Iraq-Iran war. Meanwhile, a British parliamentarian Tuesday [6th March] conceded that the British government was involved in chemical warfare in the Persian Gulf because, he said, "British firms have sold protective suits and gas masks to Iraq and several other Arab countries. We trust that in the world today, no human conscience could overlook such a naked crime and no heart could stay unmoved in the face of so much pain and suffering ruthlessly inflicted on human beings. We also hope that the international for realizing their grave responsibility towards humanity at large and world peace, would be instrumental in relaying the voice of these victims to the world, and denouncing these criminal acts."

7 March 1984
A Washington Post article states that mustard gas is being produced at an Iraqi facility in the town of Samawa. According to the Post's diplomatic sources, Iraq first used CW in July of 1983 along the central section of the front and that it used CW for a second time in the Penjwin hills along the northern front. However, those attacks were limited in size and scope in comparison to the large scale attacks now being used against Iran's human wave offensives.

9 March 1984
Iran leveled new charges against Iraq for using CW in a bid to retake the Majnoon Islands. The allegations claim that "dozens" of Iranian soldiers were wounded by the CW. According to the Associated Press, the US State Department reported on 6 March that the US has known since last year that Iraq was using CW against Iran.

10 March 1984
A Washington Post article shows a picture of an Iranian soldier wearing a gas mask.

12 March 1984
Baghdad radio boasts that Iraqi troops used "insecticide" on Iranian attackers in the southern front in the past weeks. US intelligence analysts suspect that the Iraqis may have been using mustard gas. Officially, Iraq denies using "banned weapons," but it says it has a right to employ them if necessary.

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12 March 1984
An Iranian soldier in Sweden reported seeing a "big orange-colored cloud of gas" emanate from an Iraqi bomb dropped from a plane that landed 20 feet from him. His eyes started to sting and he went blind — 14 hours later his skin began to swell and it felt like his whole body was burning. [Note: These symptoms are consistent with exposure to mustard agent.]

March 1984
Dr. Herbert Mandl, an Austrian physician, reports that tests conducted at the Toxicological Institute in Ghent, Belgium confirm "with certain proof" that the Iranian soldiers were suffering from injuries caused by not only mustard gas, but also by mycotoxins, or "yellow rain." As for three of the patients who have died in Vienna, and an additional soldier who died in Stockholm, "the cause of death was definitely mustard gas and yellow rain; we have established that now without a doubt." [The toxicological study performed at Ghent was done by Hendryckx, and has since been called into question with regard to the presence of tricothecene mycotoxins.]

13-19 March 1984
The first team of UN specialists visits Iran to investigate alleged Iraqi CW attacks. Its report, submitted on 21 March, confirms that, "chemical weapons in the form of aerial bombs have been used in the areas inspected in Iran by the specialists...." The chemical agents used reportedly included mustard gas and tabun nerve agent.

13 March 1984
Six of the 15 Iranian CW victims flown to Europe to receive medical treatment have died. An additional 13 have recently been sent to Britain, France, Switzerland, and Japan. Meanwhile, a UN team has arrived in Tehran to investigate Iranian claims surrounding Iraq's alleged use of CW against Iranian troops.

15 March 1984
A Belgian scientist [Hendryckx] says his examinations of Iranian CW victims in Vienna show evidence that the soldiers were exposed to mustard gas and mycotoxins.

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15 March 1984
Iraq's Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs is in Washington, DC dismissed Iran's claim that his country was deploying CW. He suggested that Iran was simply trying to divert attention from its inability to defeat Iraq on the battlefield. He cast doubt on statements made by European doctors that the Iranian soldiers were victims of CW and said that even if they were injured by chemicals, they could have been injured by Iranian chemicals.

19 March 1984
Iran sends 15 more alleged CW victims to Europe today to receive treatment as the UN team investigating Iran's allegations concluded its work and returned to Geneva to document their findings. Yesterday they were in the southwestern Iranian city of Ahwaz to conduct tests. Iran claims that Iraq used CW again on 17 March during heavy fighting in the borderland marsh regions. Iran claims CW bombs dropped from planes wounded 460 Iranian soldiers. Meanwhile, the Iranian charge d'affaires in London repeats claims that Britain supplied CW to Iran. He states that, "We will reveal our evidence when the time is right."

23 March 1984
Speaker of the Majlis Rafsanjani states the following during prayers at Tehran University: "At present, we are committed not to resort to chemical bombs. However, I do not know how long this will remain so. At present, we are determined not to use them, but can one be patient forever if they continue their course of action?...Iran is the strongest country in the entire Middle East with regard to its chemical works. Our pharmaceutical works and our chemists and the scientists we have at our disposal are the best throughout the Middle East."

23 March 1984
In a slightly different and extended translation, Iran claims it will retaliate with CW if Iraq continues to attack its troops with chemical weapons. IRNA quoted Parliament Speaker Rafsanjani as stating that with Iran’s "advanced pharmaceutical and chemical technology, [it] can manufacture chemical weapons and use them any time it should deem it advisable....We now believe that we should not employ chemical weapons, but we do not know how long we will maintain such an outlook. We are determined not to venture into doing this. But can we wait for a lifetime? We now manufacture 155mm artillery shells capable of hitting a range of 28 kilometers. Instead of filling them with explosives, we can even now fill them with poisonous elements. If forced to try our hand in this task, we are certainly more capable and more resourceful than any other nation in the region." He adds that if the UN did not denounce the Iraqi actions, it would be a crime against humanity.

23 March 1984
Iraq claims that some Iranians sent abroad for medical treatment for burns were the victims of an explosion at the Iranian Petro-Chemical Center in Khrobasht, which took place on 18 February 1984.

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23 March 1984
The French newspaper the France-Soir said the explosion took place at a French-built facility in Marc-Dachtn on 19 February and that 35 Iranians and 10 foreign technicians were killed, with another 50 wounded. Some of those wounded were later sent to France, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK with the story that they had been injured by Iraqi attacks. An Iranian opposition figure with ties to the former Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar confirmed the report as accurate.

23 March 1984
W. Andrew Terrill Jr. states that this French report reflected the stance of the French government at this time. Terrill states that Iraq was one of France's largest clients for weaponry at the time, and that Iraq bought more military equipment from France than from any other country. The French, Terrill states, seemed unconcerned by Iraqi use of chemical weapons and maintained official silence on the issue while continuing their arms trade with Iraq. He states the French "seemed not disposed to criticize the use of CW by their client." This is reflected in the reports from France-Soir and how the paper, along with Le Monde "indulged in speculations" that Iranians were injured not by chemical weapons, but by an industrial accident.

23 March 1984
An Iranian CW victim in London claimed he was injured when an artillery shell filled with CW struck his bunker on 13 March. Another Iranian victim said he had been attacked on 28 February when Iraqi planes attacked a concentration of 400 Iranian soldiers.

26 March 1984
The UN releases the report of its first investigation of possible CW use in the Iran-Iraq War. The team's unanimous decision is that chemical weapons were used in the areas of Iran visited by the UN team. The CW were mustard gas and Tabun delivered by aerial bombs. No statement was offered as to which party is responsible for the CW attacks, although contained in the report are statements by Iranian soldiers who observed three Iraqi aircraft dropping CW bombs over their positions in the Shatt-e-Ali marshlands. The inspectors also observed unexploded aerial bombs in the desert region of Hoor-ul-Huwaizeh the day after an Iraqi attack there.

30 March 1984
After revelations by in the UN report regarding CW use, the United States bans the export of certain chemicals to
Iraq and Iran.

30 March 1984
The UN Security Council today issues a presidential statement, the Council's weakest form of a statement, condemning the use of CW without labeling Iraq as a country that uses CW. Instead, it will only encourage both Iran and Iraq to adhere to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Iran's Ambassador to the UN said that if the Council did not specifically condemn Iraq for its actions, it would show that "the Council is a joke." A New York Times article quotes US intelligence officials as saying that they have irrefutable evidence to prove Iraq used nerve gas against Iran and that Iraq, with help from West German firms, was close to being able to mass-produce CW.

Spring 1984
W. Andrew Terrill Jr. states that Great Britain "took the lead in the move for a UN Security Council denunciation of Iraq for CW use. Yet, this initiative, supported also by the Netherlands, failed against the opposition of France, and to some extent, the United States."

1 April 1984
Iran's Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani sends a message to fellow parliament speakers of countries around the world asking them to condemn Iraq for its use of CW. In the message, Rafsanjani repeats the theme of his 7 March address by stating that "despite the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran has greater facilities than the Iraqi enemy, both technically and scientifically, for the manufacture and use of such weapons, taking cognizance of its adherence to Islamic morality and its respect for mankind and international mores, it has refused to make use of banned weapons; and it has not resorted to retaliation in kind, which is an accepted right. The Islamic Republic of Iran is still displaying patience, despite the fact that there are nearly 3,000 wounded and disabled and more than 40 martyrs as a result of chemical bombings." He goes on to state that reports indicate that Iraq intends to make greater use of CW in the future and calls upon all countries to "condemn this crime and thwart the promotion of this sinister precedent."

2 April 1984
At a news conference in London, Iran's delegate to the UN, Rajai Khorassani, asserts that Iran is "capable of manufacturing chemical weapons. If the Iraqis repeat their crime, we may consider using them. But we think that to resort to retaliation can only be justified when all other means of preventing Iraq are exhausted and still Iraq repeats its crime."
4 April 1984
The *Christian Science Monitor* reports that Iran is using the findings of the UN report to ask members of the Non-Aligned Movement as well as the Islamic Conference to condemn Iraq. Iranian diplomats in Europe are also trying to obtain a declaration from the European Economic Community on CW. However, one European diplomat confides that "I trust the United States State Department when it says Iraq is using chemical weapons, but on a purely legal point of view, I don't have any evidence that the gas-loaded bombs examined by United Nations experts had effectively been dropped by Iraqi aircrafts."

9 April 1984
Washington believes the Iraqis used nerve gas in battle for the first time last month to repel an Iranian attack.

9 April 1984
US Departments of State and Commerce ban exports of the following five chemicals to Iran and Iraq: potassium fluoride, dimethyl methylphosphonate, methylphosphonyl difluoride, phosphorous oxychloride (the latter four compounds being nerve agent precursors), and thiglycol (mustard agent precursor). US officials concede they have no evidence implicating the Iranians in chemical warfare.

10-11 April 1984
The United States, Britain, France, Japan, and Australia ban exports of certain chemicals to Iraq and Iran.

12 April 1984
Britain today followed the US in banning the export of eight CW precursor chemicals to Iran and Iraq, and encouraged the EEC to do the same.

May 1984
An East German company supplies Iran with 5,000 "respirators," which turn out to be ordinary industrial half-masks with goggles, unsuitable for chemical defense. Iran reportedly selected the company because of the extremely low price of $12 each.

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Early July 1984
The Iranian deputy foreign minister says in Tehran that, "the Islamic Republic of Iran has not and will not use chemical weapons."

6 July 1984
UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellor appeals to Iran and Iraq to make "a solemn commitment not to use chemical weapons of any kind for any reason. UN spokesman Francois Giuliani said that although Iraq has not responded to the appeal, he was "confident that the other answer will be coming."

7 July 1984
Iran pledges at the UN not to use CW in its war with Iraq, even though the Iraqis continued to use them.

31 October 1984
A report for The Guardian gathered from the Iranian front lines reports that the Ministry for Revolutionary Guards issues ampules and syringes in plastic boxes to its soldiers to protect them from Iraqi nerve gas.

16 December 1984
A New York Times reporter visiting Iran is instructed on how to defend himself against CW attack before he was allowed to visit the front. He quotes an Iranian captain as stating "there is nerve gas, choking gas, lung gas, and gas for the blood. These are elements which the Iraqis have bought in great quantities." The captain goes on to explain what to do if his skin started to turn red, if his muscles began to spasm, if his stomach began to hurt, if he could not breathe, or if his eyes began to foam. The captain demonstrated how to put on gas masks, to use syringes for shots every 10 minutes if the reporter stopped breathing. He also gave out amyl nitrite to break into the gas masks. [Note: Amyl nitrite is an antidote for cyanide poisoning.]

1983-1929
1983
Iran begins its offensive chemical warfare program and a crash effort to acquire chemical defense gear, in response to Iraqi CW use against Iranian forces. The IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps), with support from the Iranian Ministry of Defense, is placed in charge of the program.

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1983-1984
A Western analyst reports that, "Iran only seems to have begun a crash effort to create a domestic chemical weapons production capability in 1983-1984. It sought aid from European firms like Lurgi to produce [sic] large 'pesticide' plants and began to try to obtain the needed feedstock from a wide range of sources, relying heavily on its Embassy in Bonn manage the necessary deals." While Lurgi did not provide the pesticide plant Iran sought, Iran did obtain substantial support from other European firms and feedstocks from a wide range of Western sources. [Note: Cordesman does not offer any citations or other evidence to substantiate his claims. His one footnote for all of this information pertains to a deal in 1987 to ship thiodiglycol to Iran from the Baltimore-based company Alcolac. More information on that case is given below.]

9 August 1983
More than 50 Iranian soldiers are severely wounded by Iraqi chemical bombs dropped in northwestern Iran. The victims complain of painful burning and irritation in the eyes and on the body. (These symptoms are consistent with exposure to mustard agent.) The bombs were dropped six kilometers west of the Piranshahr-Ravanduz road in Kordestan province. W. Andrew Terrill Jr. states that these attacks took place near Piranshahr.

22 October 1983
Iraqi forces fire "at least 20 chemical artillery shells" in order to stop advancing Iranian troops in the Sarbish and Hani Baranah regions, north of the Iraqi town of Panjvin.

25 October 1983
The Iranian agency accuses Iraq of dropping "chemical bombs" on a village near Baneh, killing 13 and wounding 40.

25 October 1983
The Armed Forces Joint Staff issues Communiqué No. 1513 reporting Iraqi use of "chemical bombs" in the area around Baneh, killing 13 Iranians and wounding 48.

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28 October 1983
First Lieutenant Abbas Kangarani and another conscripted combatant named Esma'il Mohammadian, both under treatment at a Tehran hospital for skin injuries caused by toxic bombs and other chemical explosives, claim they witnessed Iraqi aircraft dropping chemical bombs in the Khavazi-II battlefront several days ago. Lt. Kangarani says that seconds after seeing the Iraqi aircraft drop the bomb an entire area was darkened by a mist and he immediately developed nausea and vertigo surface scars on the exposed parts of his body. Mohammadian says that doctors have told him that he is suffering from the effects of phosphorous bombs. The two say that the chemical bombs polluted a vast area in the Wa al-Fajr 4 theater. [Note: The rapid onset of symptoms caused by the reported injurious substances are consistent with the use of white phosphorous, and perhaps other toxic off gases from conventional explosives.]

26 October 1983
More than 100 people are injured as Iraqi planes drop chemical bombs on the villages of Bayan-Darreh and Bayanjan near the Kurdish inhabited town of Banah.

3 November 1983
Iran formally submits its first allegation of Iraqi CW use to the United Nations and requests that the Secretary-General commence an investigation.

7 November 1983
Iraqi war planes drop chemical bombs on the Sheikh-Lar region in the northwestern battlefront at 1600 hours. Twenty wounded Islamic combatants suffering from burn and eye irritation are transferred to hospitals in Maragheh, East Azarbayjan Province.

7 November 1983
A Western analyst states that Iraqi chemical attacks in late October and early November took place at Panjivin.

24 November 1983
The International Medical Seminar in Tehran issues a final statement recommending that Iran make required arrangements for the establishment of a permanent commission to survey the damages caused by chemical and biological bombardment of Iranian cities and military zones in close cooperation with international institutes concerned. It also called on the United Nations and the International Red Cross organization to dispatch fact-
finding committees to Iran in order to investigate the results of Iraqi chemical attacks and make the world know about their findings.


Early December 1983
According to Kurdish sources, Khomeyni’s regime repeatedly uses napalm bombs and chemical weapons to murder villagers in Kordestan during recent clashes.


10 December 1983
Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, criticizes a resolution passed by the political committee of the Islamic Conference on the Iran-Iraq War: "The resolution passed by the political committee...attempts to cover up the crimes committed by this [Iraqi] regime including attacks on residential areas, the killing of innocent civilians, the use of chemical bombs....In our view, it is worthless and does not affect our decision to continue our just and legitimate fight on the battlefield against the aggressor."


21 June 1982
Raids on 11 Mojahedin-e Khalq (MKO) safehouses in Tehran by Iranian security forces yielded the seizure of several arms, documents and cyanide tablets.

— "Iran: In Brief; Clashes with Mojahedin-e Khalq," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 June 1982.

19 June 1982
Iran signs a trade protocol with Bulgaria, authorizing the sale of chemical fertilizers and other agricultural products to Iran in exchange for oil and industrial products. Arrangements were also made for Bulgaria to aid in the production of vaccines and other various veterinary drugs.

— "In Brief; Bulgarian-Iranian Agreements," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 June 1982; "Iran: Agreement on Trade," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 July 1982.

July 1982
Iranian troops are attacked by Iraq with riot control agents (CS or other tear gas).


July 1982
A US source reports Iraqis use of riot control agents (CS or other tear gas) on unmasked Iranian troops, causing panic and retreat due to a lack of detection equipment. Commentary states that "US officials are confident that the Iraqis do not possess any deadly chemical weapons." According to a Western analyst, this is the first use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War.

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25 October 1982
Saleh Ali Fatah, an Iraqi diplomat stationed in Denmark, asserts in a television interview that Iraq has a "deadly sophisticated weapon prepared for use against Iran that could kill 60,000, 70,000 and even 100,000 people at one time." The diplomat reportedly denied that it was nuclear or chemical or anything else illegal under international treaties. Supposedly he also denied that it was a biological weapon off camera.

28 October 1982
A $10 million contract with the Bulgarian Termoelektro electrical engineering company ensures Iran's acquisition of new "devices for the chemical treatment of water at a thermal power station near Tabriz," with plans to commence construction in the Spring of 1983. If this were a legitimate enterprise for civilian uses, the chemical treatment here probably would have involved the use of chlorine.

December 1982
Western analysis states that "credible accounts of lethal CW use by Iraq began to emerge in December" 1982. [Note: It is not clear which attacks or accounts of the attacks Terrill is referring to. Terrill cites a 26 January 1984 Los Angeles Times article.]

9 January 1981
SIPRI reports in 1985 that on this day Iraq began using CW against Iranian troops. Tehran Radio claimed that "Iraqis used napalm and "chemical warfare bombs" in their attacks on Ahvaz, Southwestern Iran.

9 January 1981
SIPRI reported that on this day Iraq began using CW against Iranian troops.

13 January 1981
According to the official Iranian tabulation of its war with Iraq, published in 1988, this is the day that Iraq first used CW against Iranian troops at Halaleh and Neykhazar.

21 July 1981
Iraqi sources deny Iranian claims of chemical weapon use at this stage of the Iran/Iraq conflict, citing Iranian motives to generate international sympathy for their cause.

13 August 1981
Iran reports an Iraqi chemical weapons attack in an unnamed mountain pass along the Northern Iran/Iraq border. Iraq dismisses the claims as part of Iran's ongoing "campaign of lies."

September 1980
According to Defense and Foreign Affairs, Iran uses Hong Kong as a conduit for unspecified strategic materials to Iran imported mainly from the United States. Over the next six years, the source documents that the clandestine traffic includes aircraft parts and an attempted sale to Iran of protective masks.

1 October 1980
An Iraqi fighter jet drops three bombs on the Iran Chemical Development Co. (ICDC), still under construction in Bandar Khomeini, southern Iran. The bombs damaged a chemical tank yard, Aroma plant area, and Olef plant area of the Japan-Iran joint petrochemical complex. All 800 employees were safely evacuated to a remote site.

16 November 1980
Iran publishes its first allegation of an Iraqi CW attack. [Note: As shown directly below, there are varying reports as to when exactly Iraq began using CW against Iranian troops in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).]

16 November 1980
The Iranian Chief of Staff Office alleges that the Iraqis used "chemical weapons that caused blisters" and "spread germs" during a battle in the Southwestern city of Susangerd that left many civilian and military casualties. While the chemical substance was never specified, journalists speculated about the use of napalm.

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16 November 1980
A Western-based analyst believes charges made by Iran about Iraqi use of chemical weapons are "almost certainly without foundation." He believes the charges were part propaganda and part fear that Iraq would soon use chemical weapons. He states that unlike Iraq, which followed USSR military doctrine emphasizing the role of chemical weapons, Iran did not have a chemical weapons doctrine. At this time, Iran's "forces seldom carried protective equipment and received little, if any formal training in CW countermeasures."

Between 1960 and 1980
There is no information available concerning Iranian CW activities.

Between 1955 and 1960
Eleven Iranian officials attend US Army chemical and biological weapons (CBW) training courses.

Between 1929 and 1955
There is no information available concerning Iranian CW activities during this period.

5 November 1929
Iran accedes to the Geneva Protocol for the "Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare." Significantly, Iran does not place any reservations on its participation in and adherence to the protocol (i.e., right of in-kind retaliation, etc.). [Note: This becomes an important factor during Iran's war with Iraq (1980-1988), in which Iran resorts to CW acquisition, development, and use in retaliation for Iraq's chemical attacks.]
— For date confirmation, see SIPRI, "High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Protocol," projects.sipri.se.

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