This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

2008-2004

5 February 2008
In testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the Director of National Intelligence addresses the question of Iran's pursuit of WMD capabilities. On the issue of biological weapons Mr. McConnell says: "We assess that Iran has previously conducted offensive BW agent research and development. Iran continues to seek dual-use technologies that could be used for biological warfare."

27 February 2008
Testifying before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Lt. General Michael D. Maples states: "Tehran continues to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment and expertise which have legitimate uses, but also could enable ongoing biological warfare efforts."

3 March 2008
The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) releases its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2005. In the section addressing Iranian biological weapons programs the report states: "As of 2005, the status of its [Iran’s] biotechnology infrastructure indicated that at a minimum, Iran probably had the capability to produce at least small quantities of biological warfare (BW) agents for offensive purposes. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnology materials, equipment, and expertise that are consistent with its growing legitimate biotechnology industry but could benefit Tehran’s assessed probable BW program."
[This language essentially repeats that of the 2004 report.]
3 March 2008
The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) releases its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2006. In the section addressing Iranian biological warfare programs the report states: "Our assessment of Iran's biotechnology infrastructure indicates that Iran probably has the capability to produce large-quantities of some Biological Warfare (BW) agents for offensive purposes, if it made the decision to do so. Iran continues to seek dual-use biotechnology materials, equipment, and expertise consistent with its growing legitimate biotechnology industry but these components could also advance Tehran's BW capability." [This language differs from that of the 2005 report by introducing the assertion that Iran is capable of producing "large quantities" of BW agents as opposed to the "at least small quantities" of the previous report.]

6 July 2008
In the U.K. the Sunday Times runs a story describing ongoing Iranian imports of wild vervet monkeys from East Africa. The Iranian agency making the purchases reportedly indicated that these monkeys would be used to support vaccine production. However, the Sunday Times speculates that the monkeys may be used for research involving biological weapons. At the same time the report acknowledges that vervet monkeys are frequently used to test the effectiveness of vaccines.

11 January 2007
In testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. General Michael D. Maples, addresses the question of Iran's pursuit of WMD capabilities. On the issue of biological weapons General Maples says: "Iran has a growing biotechnology industry, significant pharmaceutical experience and the overall infrastructure that could be used to support a biological warfare program. DIA believes Iran is pursuing development of biological weapons."

20 August 2007
Addressing the Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of Experts in Geneva, Switzerland the Iranian representative notes the importance of a legally binding compliance mechanism. He states that "the Fifth and Sixth Review Conferences decided by consensus on the follow-up mechanism aiming at promotion of common understanding among the States Parties with the hope that real multilateralism would be revived and the negotiations on the Protocol on strengthening the Convention would be resumed in a foreseeable future. We strongly believe that the present follow-up mechanism which is of limited scope and nature, cannot be considered as a substitute to afore-mentioned negotiations."

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14 November 2007
Testifying before a hearing of the National Security and Foreign Affairs subcommittee of the House Oversight and Government Reform committee on the Regional And Global Consequences of U.S. Military Action in Iran Dr. Paul Pillar, former Deputy Director of the CIA Counterterrorism Center addresses the proposition that in the event of a US attack against Iranian nuclear facilities the Iranian government may choose to transfer chemical or biological weapons to terrorist groups for use against the US or its allies. In his testimony Dr. Pillar notes that in the past "Iran [has] not passed any of these unconventional weapons to clients or terrorist groups." "The reason is when you ask what would be the interest of such a regime to pass such weapons to another group where they would lose control, the interest simply isn't there. It's all disadvantage rather than advantage. They lose control and if they were ever used, a group that's known to be a client of Iran's -- say Lebanese Hezbollah -- would automatically be assumed by Washington and everyone else that they would be acting on Iran's behalf. So there's simply no advantage to it."

28 February 2006
In testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. General Michael D. Maples, addresses the question of Iran's pursuit of WMD capabilities. On the issue of biological weapons General Maples says: "we believe that Iran maintains offensive chemical and biological weapons capabilities in various stages of development."

May 2006
The US Central Intelligence Agency releases its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2004. In the section addressing Iranian biological programs the report states: "As of 2004, the status of Iran's biotechnology infrastructure indicated that at a minimum, Iran probably had the capability to produce at least small quantities of BW agents for offensive purposes. Iran continued to seek dual- use biotechnology materials, equipment, and expertise that is consistent with its growing legitimate biotechnology industry but could benefit Tehran's BW program."

22 September 2006
The United Kingdom's Department of Trade and Industry issues an updated list of Iranian entities that are considered to be of potential WMD concern. These entities are end-users of goods for which an export licence has been refused on end-use grounds related to suspected WMD programs. The updated list adds three entities: Amir Kabir University of Technology; M/S Iran Electromotor; and Oil Industries Engineering and Construction aka LG/OIEC/IOEC. There are now forty-nine entities on the DTI's list. The list is intended to help exporters judge which exports might potentially be of concern on end use grounds, based on previous licensing decisions. The presence of an entity on the list does not totally preclude the issuing of export licenses; fifteen entities on the list have had

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export licenses granted as well as refused.


28 - 30 September 2006
The United States Congress passes the Iran Freedom Support Act which is signed into law by President George W. Bush on September 30th. The law is an amended version of the 1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. In addition to authorizing assistance to support democracy in Iran the act attempts to prevent Iran from acquiring biological weapons and other WMD. It requires that "mandatory sanctions" be applied to any person who provides any "goods, services, technology, or other items" which could be used for biological weapons or weapon of mass destruction.


20 November 2006
Speaking at the Sixth Review Conference of the Convention on Biological Weapons (BWC) the United States Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation, Mr. John C. Rood says: "We [the United States] believe that the regime in Iran probably has an offensive biological weapons program in violation of the BWC." Rood did not provide evidence for his accusations. Speaking in reply, Iranian ambassador Alireza Moaiyeri, "categorically rejected" the accusation.


19 January 2005
Speaking in Paris at the Middle East, Peace, Stability, and the Role of Iran seminar Iranian nuclear spokesman Hossein Musavian says: "Tehran has fully respected its commitments to disarmament treaties but developed countries have not acted responsibly in the areas of nuclear, chemical, and biological cooperation for peaceful purposes as stipulated in international agreements." This statement continues the Iranian tradition of criticizing western export control regimes such as the Australia Group which it sees as being noncompliant with the requirements of the BWC.


21 January 2005
The Cuban and Iranian governments sign a memorandum of intent formalizing a number of decisions made on cooperation between the two governments. One of these decisions will result in the construction, in Iran, of a factory for the production of Hepatitis B vaccine. The facility is expected to commence operations by April 2005.


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11 February 2005
The Washington Post reports that the US government is undertaking a wide-ranging review of existing intelligence on Iran in the wake of reviews of intelligence performance on Iraq prior to the US invasion of 2003. One product of this review will be a memo focusing exclusively on Tehran's chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities - [which] will reflect an updated consensus within the intelligence community.

20 February 2005
The German Customs Office of Criminal Investigations (ZKA) believes that Iran is engaged in efforts to develop biological weapons. Biological weapons research and development efforts are reportedly being conducted "in small laboratories of universities, strictly guarded from the outside world." The ZKA also observes that "Iran has long-standing experience in the field of bio-technology so that is has the necessary know-how for operating biological combat agent programs."

9 March 2005
A nine member panel, made up of former senior government officials, completes a 14 month review of the United States foreign intelligence gathering capacity and found the intelligence on Iran deficient. The panel, created by President Bush, has expressed particular concern over the unreliable quality of intelligence on Iran's weapons of mass destruction which was unsatisfactory.

31 March 2005
The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction presents its final report to the President. The report notes that the Commission "reviewed the state of the Intelligence Community's knowledge about the unconventional weapons programs of several countries that pose current proliferation threats, including Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia. We cannot discuss many of our findings from these studies in our unclassified report, but we can say here that we found that we have only limited access to critical information about several of these high-priority intelligence targets."

27 January 2004
In Tokyo, officials from Japan and Iran meet for bilateral consultations on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. A summary posted on the website of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs states: "As for Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)/Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), both sides stressed the importance of conventions' universalization, which gains a momentum in the wake of Libyan accession to CWC, and of strengthening their national implementation by all member states. The Iranian side explained the current status of its bills to implement CWC/BWC. The Japanese side appreciated Iranian positive and constructive stance in the BWC enhancement process based upon the three-year 'work program', particularly in the Annual Meeting of the States Parties held in November 2003."

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19 - 30 July 2004
As part of the preparations for the Second Meeting of the States Parties to the BWC which is to be held in Geneva in December 2004 a Meeting of Experts is convened in Geneva. The Iranian delegation sets out its positions on a number of proposals before the meeting. In regard to the surveillance of infectious disease, the statement say: "although the BWC lacks a verification mechanism, we do believe that assigning security and politically oriented responsibilities, such as investigation of suspicious cases of use of biological weapons, to certain international organizations such as WHO, puts the humanitarian and fundamental objectives and mandate of these organizations in jeopardy." In regard to the issue of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons; "even though according to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the ‘Use’ is prohibited, but [...] regrettably some States Parties have still kept their reservations to that effect, that is keeping the right of retaliation for any case of use against them."

2 August 2004
In Tehran, the chairman of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council Foreign Policy Committee says that since the war with Iraq it has been the policy of Iran to take defensive measures against chemical, biological and nuclear attacks. In an interview with IRNA news agency, Seyyed Hoseyn Musavian says that the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics is responsible for enforcement of the policy.

22 September 2004
An officer in the Iranian Republic Guards appears on Iranian television to describe an ongoing military exercise, "Ashura-5." The officer claims that the exercise has demonstrated the ability of the Iranian armed forces to oppose invaders even if they are equipped with "the most destructive bacteriological and chemical weapons."

23 November 2004
The US Central Intelligence Agency submits its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions 1 July Through 31 December 2003 in accordance with S.721 of the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act. In respect to Iran, the report states that; "Even though Iran is part of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Tehran probably maintained an offensive BW program. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise that could be used in Tehran’s BW program. Iran probably has the capability to produce at least small quantities of BW agents." This statement, which repeats the statements issued on this matter by the CIA for a number of years now suggests an absence of new developments.

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2003-2002

7 April 2003
In response to an article appearing in the Madrid daily El Pais, the Iranian embassy in Madrid issues a statement denying that non-conventional arms such as chemical or biological weapons are part of the Iranian defense establishment.

10 April 2003
The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency submits its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2002. Regarding Iran, the report states: Even though Iran is part of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Tehran probably maintains an offensive BW program. Foreign dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise — primarily, but not exclusively, from Eastern Europe — continued to feature prominently in Iran's procurement efforts. While such materials do have legitimate uses, Iran's biological warfare (BW) program also could benefit from them. It is likely that Iran has capabilities to produce small quantities of BW agents, but has a limited ability to weaponize them."

15 May 2003
The National Council of Iranian Resistance, an Iranian opposition group, states that Iran is developing plague and cholera. The group also states that Iran has developed anthrax bacteria and now has the means to weaponize the agents.

16 May 2003
The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an Iranian opposition group, states that Iran is manufacturing biological weapons. Representatives of the NCRI make this claim in London at a session of the House of Commons. The representatives claim the Iran is currently producing anthrax smallpox and plague. They name individuals working on the weapons. Also the group states that program is run at a number of sites, including two universities and a hospital and Iran is trying to increase its biological scientists from 3,000 to 11,000 by sending academics abroad to learn Western biological and chemical skills. The group states that it received the information from another Iranian opposition group, the People's Mojahideen of Iran (PMOI).

16 May 2003
Iran denies the allegations of the National Council of Iranian Resistance that it is producing biological weapons. A senior Iranian government officials says that Iran "strongly deny that we have biological weapons because we do not need any banned weapons." The official also states that the opposition group is making such allegations because of US pressure on them.
— "Iran Says it has no Biological Weapons," Al-Bawaba, 16 May 2003.

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29 May 2003
The First Conference on [the] Campaign Against Bioterrorism is held in Tehran. The conference which is a joint project of the Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS) and the infectious diseases department of the Tehran Medical Science University examines the health risks posed by bioterrorism and attempts to develop an action plan for use by relief workers in the event of a bioterror event. Over 300 IRCS relief instructors attend the event along with IRCS managers and students from the university.

17 September 2003
Testifying before the US-Israeli Joint Parliamentary Committee which is conducting a hearing into Iranian WMD and Support of Terrorism, U.S. Assistant Secretary for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter says "Iran probably has produced some BW agents and may have some limited capability for biological weapons deployment. Iran continues to seek dual-use materials, equipment, and expertise to assist these programs. This program is embedded within Iran's extensive biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry so as to obscure its activities ... [I]n addition to its efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction, Iran continues its extensive efforts.

30 October 2003
In London, US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton delivers a speech to a meeting of the Bruges Group. Bolton makes several references to Iran's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and states that Iran "has robust BW, CW and missile programs." His speech includes a number of references to the adverse consequences for rogue states of continuing proliferation efforts.

4 November 2003
Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul says that Iran's conventional armament and its possible pursuit of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons continued to be a risk for the security of region.

10 November 2003
The US Central Intelligence Agency submits its Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, for 1 January Through 30 June 2003 in accordance with S.721 of the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act. In respect to Iran, the report states that until June 2003, "Iran continued to vigorously pursue indigenous programs to produce WMD ... manufactured. Even though Iran is part of the [BWC], Tehran probably maintained an offensive BW program. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise. While such materials had legitimate uses, Iran's biological warfare (BW) program also could have benefited from them. It is likely that Iran has capabilities to produce small quantities of BW agents, but has a limited ability to weaponize them."

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2 December 2003
Speaking at a conference organized by the Institute for Foreign Policy analysis and the Fletcher School's International Security Studies Program, US Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton issues a warning to Iran and a number of other states. Bolton says: “[r]ogue states such as Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya and Cuba, whose pursuit of weapons of mass destruction makes them hostile to US interests, will learn that their covert programs will not escape detection or consequences.” He goes on to highlight the U.S. actions in Iraq and indicates that the U.S. will interdict or seize shipments of items that it considers breach nonproliferation norms.

6 January 2002
Former Iranian President and current head of the influential Expediency Council, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, addresses a ceremony commemorating outstanding Iranian soldiers and proclaims, "Iran was not and would not try to acquire unconventional weapons." He added, "Iran never wanted to confront its opponents with nuclear or chemical bombs."

9 January 2002
Speaking to IRNA, former Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani is quoted as saying: "Although Iran today is one of the leading arms makers in the world, it has never been after non-conventional weapons and will never do so." Rafsanjani further states: "Iran has never thought of, and will never think of, using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against another nation."
Note: These statements of 6 and 9 January are likely a response to the latest CIA report released to the U.S. Congress this week titled "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001" (see above).

24 January 2002
The Bush administration imposes sanctions on several Chinese firms allegedly for selling CBW components to Iran. According to a U.S. State Department statement: "The penalties were imposed for the transfer to Iran since January 1, 1999 of sensitive equipment and technology controlled by the Australia Group." One unnamed U.S. intelligence official reportedly told the Washington Times that in April 2001, U.S. intelligence tracked one of the Chinese shipments of chemical-related goods as it made its way to Iran. The three firms penalized by the sanctions are Liyang Chemical Equipment, the China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Company, as well as Mr. Q.C. Chen. One of those firms produces glass-lined equipment; however, the reports did not mention if such equipment was transferred to Iran. The State Department statement goes on to say that "Q.C. Chen is already subject to U.S. sanctions....These sanctions currently remain in place." The statement continues by claiming that the activities of Q.C. Chen and other Chinese entities have been brought to the attention of the Chinese government on numerous occasions, and that the Chinese government was informed in advance of the decision to place further sanctions on Mr. Chen and others.

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29 January 2002
In his first State of the Union address, U.S. President George W. Bush calls Iran, Iraq, and North Korea an "axis of evil" and accuses them of supporting terrorism and seeking chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons that could threaten the United States.

30 January 2002
Iran rejects statements made by U.S. President Bush in his State of the Union address, denouncing them as "arrogant" and as a desire for hegemony. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi states, "We, besides rejecting American accusations, believe that the world will not tolerate US hegemonic ambitions and believe Mr. Bush would do better by presenting proof of his accusation....The Islamic Republic of Iran considers these remarks as interference in its internal affairs." Mr. Kharrazi believes that "Bush is intending to divert public opinion from the Middle East issues by raising up a new subject and thereby pave [sic] the ground for the United States to continue support for Israel in suppressing the Palestinian nation." Kharrazi added, "[t]he American president had better back up his assertions with evidence instead of repeating old and unfounded claims."

3 February 2002
Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, in a letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, rebuts allegations made by U.S. President Bush during his State of the Union Address. Kharrazi notes, "Iran does not seek weapons of mass destruction and, unlike the U.S. ally in this region, is a party to the NPT, CWC, and BWC and has signed the CTBT. As the only victim of weapons of mass destruction in the last generation, Iranian people have felt the horror of these weapons and are determined to ensure that no people will have to go through the same agony....It must be underlined that, unlike the United States, weapons of mass destruction have no place in Iran's defense doctrine. Iran is fully committed to observing all relevant international instruments on prohibition of such weapons, and its compliance has been repeatedly verified by the relevant international organizations. At the same time, Iran insists and vigorously pursues its inalienable right to develop its nuclear, chemical, and biological industries for peaceful purposes. This right is guaranteed in all relevant international instruments, and the deliberate campaign by the United States to arbitrarily deprive Iran of this right is a further violation of these regimes." Kharrazi further states that he believes that the Bush administration seeks to weaken these regimes, so that it remains "unhindered not only in developing and proliferating such weapons but more dangerously in leveling self-serving accusations against others."

12 February 2002
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, in testimony before the US Senate Budget Committee, tries to explain President Bush's "axis of evil" statement with regard to Iran. Secretary Powell states that although the United States is wary of Iran's continued efforts to develop WMD and the means to deliver them, "[w]e want the best for the people of Iran," and "we have offered the Iranians dialogue." Powell states further that the United States is looking for peace, not war, but "you don't find peace by sticking your head in the sand and ignoring evil where it

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16 February 2002
Iran successfully tests a new version of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the Muajar-4, which has the potential to deliver CBW. The test was attended by Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani.
— "Iran Presents New Military UAV," Middle East Newsline, 18 February 2002.

26 February 2002
U.S. Deputy Defense Undersecretary Lisa Bronson names Iran as one of several states that continue to pursue BW. She states: "Countries like Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, and Syria have consciously over the last seven to ten years gone ahead and been developing biological weapons. They have it, and we can't turn a blind eye to the fact that they have it." Bronson further charges that these states are rapidly developing indigenous biological warfare capabilities, taking advantage of acquired dual-use technology.

26 February 2002
U.S. Middle East analyst Michael Rubin urges the Bush administration to target Iran in its war on terrorism in order to counter its missile and WMD programs. Rubin, an adjunct fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, briefed the American Jewish Committee on the failure of the U.S. policy of engagement toward Iran, arguing for President Bush to take a much tougher line against the Islamic Republic. Rubin states: "The United States must be firmer in the face of hostile regimes. There will not be a significant anti-American backlash should the United States work actively to counter threats posed by terrorism and weapons proliferation."

9 March 2002
A classified US DOD report detailing the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review is leaked to the press. The report, presented to Congress on 8 January 2002, allegedly calls for the military to prepare contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against a potential target list of seven states, including Iran. The weapons would ostensibly be deployed in retaliation for a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack emanating from one of the aforementioned countries. While the US government is criticized for placing such a high importance on nuclear weapons in its strategic doctrine, the Bush administration counters that the new nuclear posture seeks to limit the chances of nuclear weapon use by enhancing and reinforcing the US nuclear deterrent.

10 March 2002
Iran condemns the leaked DOD nuclear posture report immediately. Former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani claims that the United States is hoping to intimidate other states. He states, "[t]he intimidating atmosphere created by the United States influences countries' security. In this atmosphere adventurers will be encouraged to create planned insecurity in the countries."
19 March 2002
In testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl Ford states that Iran has "continued to seek considerable dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise from abroad—primarily from entities in Russia and Western Europe—ostensibly for civilian uses. We believe that this equipment and know-how could be applied to Iran's BW program. Iran probably began its offensive BW program during the Iran-Iraq war, and likely has evolved beyond agent research and development to the capability to produce small quantities of agent. Iran may have some limited capability to weaponize BW."

16 April 2002
US Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Issues John Wolf states that Iran is developing its WMD and missile programs with help from North Korea, China, and Russia. He also reports that the United States is working to prevent Russian scientists assisting in the research and development efforts of CBW programs in countries like Iran.

17 April 2002
An Israeli report asserts that the United States claims that Iran has begun an effort to sell missiles and equipment necessary for producing CBW to its allies throughout the Middle East and North Africa.
— "Missile Rogues Seek to Become WMD Exporters," Middle East Newsline, 17 April 2002.
Note: It appears that the information is attributed to the briefing given by US Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf to members of the media on 16 April 2002. However, Wolf did not refer to Iran, or any other country, marketing CBW components or other material to third countries. The Middle East Newsline only cites "US officials" as the source of the information. However, because the article devotes a significant amount of time to the briefing given by Wolf, the reader is led to believe the information came from Wolf.

6 May 2002
In an address before the Heritage Foundation, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton states that Iran has a BW program that "began during the Iran-Iraq war and accelerated after Tehran learned how far along Saddam Hussein had progressed in his own program. The Iranians have all of the necessary pharmaceutical expertise, as well as the commercial infrastructure needed to produce—and hide—a biological warfare program. The United States believes Iran probably has produced and weaponized BW agents in violation of the Convention." Bolton continues by charging that Cuba "has provided dual-use biotechnology to other rogue states." Although he does not explicitly say Iran is one of those states, he does mention a visit to Iran by Castro in 2001. Bolton then refers to a statement he attributes to Castro, while he was speaking at Tehran University: "Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its knees."

10 May 2002
In a response to the accusations made by Under Secretary of State Bolton, Cuban President Fidel Castro challenges the United States to "produce even the tiniest piece of evidence" to support its claims. Castro says that "if a Cuban scientist from any of our biotechnology institutes had been cooperating with any country in the development of

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biological weapons, or if he or she had tried to create them on his or her initiative, he or she would be immediately presented in a court of justice as we would consider it an act of treason to the country." Castro continues by referring to Cuba’s Law against Terrorist Acts, which prohibits anyone from having anything to do with CBW. Those who do will face a minimum of 10 years in jail or a maximum of capital punishment. Castro denies ever saying anything remotely close to the statement Bolton attributes to him. He maintains that he has “all the tapes and the transcription” of the speeches he made while in Iran, and that he can prove he never made that statement. Castro also defends Iran by saying that “not one of the many leaders I talked to said anything to me about biological weapons or any other kind of weapon.”

[Note: Whether or not Castro made the statement is in doubt. On 10 May 2001, Agence France Presse (AFP) quoted Castro as saying, "Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its knees. The US regime is very weak, and we are witnessing this weakness from close up." This is the only source quoting Castro as making that statement. In a FBIS translated text of the Spanish-version AFP, the Iranian Ayatollah Khamenei states, "The United States is more vulnerable than ever, so that is why cooperation between the two countries can contribute to sink that oppressing country." Later, Castro comments, "The US government is weak and we can see it up close. I can assure you all that we are not afraid of that country." Castro then added, "The people and governments of Cuba and Iran can send the United States to its knees." In a FBIS translated text of the IRNA press digest for 10 May 2001, IRNA cites a Kayhan International headline titled, "Cuba, Iran could bring US to its knees."

The Iran Press Service stated on 10 May 2001 that "the decision to bring down and defeat the United States was taken during a meeting, Wednesday, in Tehran, between the 74-year-old Lider Maximo of Communist Cuba and the 76-year-old leader of the Islamic Republic Ayatollah Ali Khamenehi. He (Castro) once again agreed with Ayatollah Khamenehi on the point that Iran and Cuba can hand in hand defeat America, the official Iranian news agency IRNA quoted the Cuban leader, after he was assured by his host that Iran and Cuba can achieve the goal, 'hand in hand'."

Nelson P. Valdes, the director of the University of New Mexico’s Program of Academic Research on Cuba, asserts that Castro never made a statement remotely close to the one attributed to him by Mr. Bolton: "I have secured all the transcripts of all the public statements made by the Cuban leader while visiting Iran, and there is nothing that mildly resembles that alleged quote." Valdes states that with the exception of AFP, "none of the wire services represented in Iran at the time carried such a statement from Fidel Castro. Although I have contacted AFP they have not provided evidence that the quote was accurate, nor do we know yet the identity of the person who wrote the story."


13 May 2002

Unnamed Western diplomatic sources claim that some US officials are holding secret talks with the Iranians, but that the Bush administration is divided over its Iran policy. Some cabinet-level officials desire to see improved relations with Iran and cite as evidence of Iran’s potential its recent intelligence assistance to the United States since 11 September. However, other officials state that Iran’s "strategic weapons programs" are cause for concern.

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and have priority as far as US policy is concerned.  

13 May 2002
The European Union's General Affairs Council states on 13 May 2002: "The Council noted that broad agreement existed on the substance and objectives of the overall approach for developing relations with Iran, as well as commercial matters these should include a serious dialogue on questions such as terrorism, proliferation, and regional stability. It accordingly instructed the Permanent Representatives Committee to examine all the relevant elements put forward in the debate so that the General Affairs Council is in a position to take a decision at its June session."

14 May 2002
It is reported that the European Union (EU) delayed acting on the Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Iran yesterday, "amid disagreements within the EU over how to confront Iran's missile and weapons of mass destruction programs."
— "Iranian WMD Expected to be Marginal in Summit," Middle East Newsline, 14 May 2002.

15 May 2002
An Israeli report states, "Cuba has been marketing biological weapons components and technology to Middle East clients." Unnamed US officials are cited as the source of information that US intelligence is monitoring ongoing discussions between Libya, Iran, and Cuba for the exchange or transfer of biotechnology for their BW programs. The officials claim Cuba is violating the BW公约 by offering Iran and Libya dual-use BW-related knowledge and equipment. One US intelligence source is quoted as saying, "it's not clear what Cuba has gotten out of this relationship [with Iran]. It is clear that Iran has obtained a considerable amount of weapons technology. In many cases, Russia has used Cuba as a front for technology that Moscow cannot transfer."
— "Cuba Markets WMD Technology to Iran, Libya," Middle East Newsline, 15 May 2002.

15 May 2002
In an interview with the Boston Globe, José de la Fuente, the former Director of Research and Development at Cuba's Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology, states that Cuba sold biotechnology that could be used to create BW to Iran in the late 1990s. De la Fuente particularly emphasized that the sale of recombinant materials used to make a hepatitis vaccine could instead be used for BW: "Once the technologies are transferred, the country that bought the technology could do with them that what they want."

16 May 2002
The Federal Register announces today that two Armenian, two Moldovan, and eight Chinese entities have been sanctioned under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2002, for transferring equipment and/or technology controlled by multilateral export control regimes. The companies sanctioned are Lizen Open Joint Stock Company and Armen Sargsian of Armenia; Liyang Chemical Equipment Company; Zibo Chemical Equipment Plant; China National Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Company; Wha Cheong Tai Company; China Shipbuilding Trading Company; China Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation; China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation; Mr. Q.C. Chen of China; and Cuanta SA and Mikhail Pavlovich Vladov of Moldova. Liyang
Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
17 June 2002
The General Affairs Council (GAC) of the European Union announces today that it will move forward with a Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Iran. There were suggestions in May that the decision had been delayed due to concerns over Iran's WMD programs. However, today's statement by the GAC only mildly mentioned WMD by stating: "Regarding non-proliferation, the EU encourages Iran to sign, ratify, and fully implement relevant international instruments."

18 June 2002
During a question-and-answer session today at the US State Department's Noon Briefing, spokesman Richard Boucher answers a question regarding the US stance on the EU's decision to further ties with Iran: "We have maintained an ongoing discussion and dialogue with the European Union about policy towards Iran. This is a subject of frequent discussion. We have also made quite clear in this discussion our concerns, our grave concerns about Iranian behavior. That includes Iran's support for international terrorism, Iran's opposition to the Middle East peace process, its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them through ballistic missile development, and Iran's human rights record."

6 July 2002
A US State Department official speaking today in Yerevan, Armenia, says that two years ago, the company Lysine sold Iran biological fermenting tanks that could aid Iran in producing BW.

19 July 2002
US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says that ten entities will be sanctioned under the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 and/or the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991."

19 July 2002
Eight of the companies are Chinese state-owned firms, according to US State Department officials speaking to the Washington Times on conditions of anonymity. The officials say that some companies have sold Iran advanced conventional weaponry while others have sold CBW equipment.

22 July 2002
It is reported that unnamed US officials stated that eight of the companies to be sanctioned are Chinese state-owned entities. The officials allegedly claimed that the companies involved were helping Iran weaponize chemical warheads, but there was no mention of BW.

22 July 2002
John Bolton writes a letter to US Congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart, expanding on his charges that Cuba has a covert BW program and aides to other states, including Iran, in BW production. Mr. Bolton states in the letter that he
cannot prove the accusations beyond doubt, but that the charges are based on US intelligence sources and reports from Cuban expatriates.

23 July 2002
In an opinion editorial to the Washington Times, US Congressmen Christopher Cox and Lincoln Diaz-Balart charge that Cuba is working with Ayatollah Khamenei of Iran to "undermine America." They then accuse Cuba of having an offensive BW program and of selling biotechnology to "rogue states."

24 July 2002
The US government imposes sanctions on eight Chinese companies, one Chinese individual, and one Indian individual for allegedly helping Iran and Iraq purchase advanced conventional weapons and to develop WMD programs, specifically CW. No mention was made specifically of BW. The companies and individuals sanctioned under both the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 and the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Control Act of 1979 as amended by the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 are, Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology Import and Export Corporation; China Machinery and Equipment Import Export Corporation; China National Machinery and Equipment Import Export Corporation; CMEC Machinery and Electric Equipment Import Export Company; CMEC Machinery and Electrical Import Export Company; China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import Export Company; and Wha Cheong Tai Company. The Chinese individual sanctioned is Q.C. Chen, who has been repeatedly sanctioned since 1997. The entities sanctioned only under the Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act of 1992 include China Shipbuilding Trading Company and Indian national Hans Raj Shiv.

25 July 2002
Reportedly all but two of the companies sanctioned yesterday were caught selling advanced conventional goods to Iran, such as high-speed catamaran missile boats and anti-ship cruise missiles, and not CBW components. The other two cases allegedly involved BW-related goods.

29 July 2002
In a press conference with the Iranian Foreign Minister, EU Foreign Policy chief Javier Solana states that, even with the recent decision by the EU to widen trade and cooperation with Iran, "EU-Iran relations can never reach their full potential if we do not eliminate problems that hamper such a positive development....One [of these problems] is nonproliferation/acquisition of weapons of mass destruction."

29 July 2002
In testimony before Congress today, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Marshall Billingslea states that "both Iran and Syria themselves have robust chemical warfare programs and both are exploring biological weapons. Both countries can deliver these weapons by a variety of means, via short-range missile systems such as Scuds or by artillery shells, and Iran is making strides in developing the Shahab-3 medium-range missile and longer-range systems." Billingslea also comments that Iran is able to violate its "obligations under treaties such as the Biological

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Weapons Convention with relative impunity."
— "Hearing of the International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate

November 2002
CBS News reports that it has uncovered documents that show that Wouter Basson had been in contact with Iran.
Basson had previously headed South Africa’s germ warfare program called "Project Coast" during the 1980s.
— "US Doctor Linked to S. Africa Biological and Chemical Weapons Program: CBS," Agence France Presse, 4
November 2002.

12 November 2002
Talks on strengthening the global ban on biological weapons falter due to objections from the non-aligned group,
which includes Iran. The group reportedly is upset because they feel the United States is dictating to them what
they are going to do, instead of negotiating.

2001-1998
January 2001
The US DOD reports that "Iran is believed to be pursuing offensive biological warfare capabilities and its effort may
have evolved beyond agent research and development to the capability to produce small quantities of agent."
— US Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January
2001, p. 36.

1 January-30 June 2001
In its unclassified, semi-annual report to the US Congress, the CIA charges that Iran is attempting to develop
biological weapons and their delivery systems. The CIA says that Iran continues to seek dual-use biotech
equipment from Russia and Western Europe and that the equipment could be used to enhance Iran’s BW program.
The CIA believes Iran began its BW program during the Iran-Iraq War, and that it "may have some limited capability
for BW deployment." In addition, the report states, "Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to
acquire WMD...technology from abroad. In doing so, Tehran is attempting to develop a domestic capability to
produce various types of weapons—chemical, biological, and nuclear—and their delivery systems." The report
alleges that Iran received additional assistance in its efforts from entities in North Korea and Western Europe.
— Central Intelligence Agency, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," 1 January through 30 June 2001,
www.cia.gov

7 March 2001
Unconfirmed reports claim that Iran is working to make its 1,300km-range Shehab-3 missile capable of delivering
chemical and biological weapons.
29 March 2001
Former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn, in a speech before the National Press Club, says that Iranian intelligence officers have been "making recruiting trips to Russia, offering biological weapons scientists many times their pay to move to Iran."

31 March 2001
Cuban Vice President and Head of Biotechnology Affairs, Dr. Mose Myar, says Cuba is ready to increase its cooperation with Iran in the field of biotechnology. Strengthening cooperation with Iran is viewed by Fidel Castro as being important. Cooperation in the field of manufacturing medicines, technology transfer, and vaccine production began six years ago.

1 April 2001
According to Michael Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute in Washington, DC, Iran has a BW program that possibly includes B. anthracis and botulinum toxin.
— A. Venter, "Iran's Increasingly Unconventional Arsenal, Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst, 1 April 2001.

5 April 2001
India and Iran are about to sign a new trade deal that aims to increase Indian exports to Iran, and one of the areas India will reportedly concentrate on is biotechnology. Biotechnology is a "major interest" according to Dr. Amit Mitra, Secretary-General of the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

7 May 2001
An editorial in the Iran News notes that, "Havana (Cuba) is currently participating in the construction of a vaccine factory near Tehran." This report coincides with the official state visit to Iran of Cuban President Fidel Castro, from 8-11 May 2001. During the visit, the two countries solidify the joint Iranian-Cuban project on biotechnology. Further information reports that Cuba is assisting Iran in the production of hepatitis B vaccine in the town of Karaj. The factory is slated to go online at the end of 2001.

8 May 2001
Iran joins China and seven other countries in calling for the international community to scrap an agreement that seeks tighter control on exports of BW-related technology. The Australia Group (AG), the 32-member state organization created to control the export of technology that could be used in the production of chemical and biological weapons, seeks to enforce stringent verification measures. Iran, a target of past technology transfer restrictions, claims that the AG's policies are discriminatory and politically motivated.

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31 July 2001

Iran Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hamid-Reza Asefi disputes claims by White House Spokesman Ari Fleischer that Iran is trying to produce or gain access to biological weapons. Mr. Asefi states that the claims are "desperate and unfounded," and that the United States is making the allegations to justify its refusal to sign the protocol to the BWC. Furthermore, Asefi says that his country has supported the 1972 BWC in both word and deed.


31 July 2001

Two Iranian MPs deny US allegations that Iran is producing biological weapons, calling the allegations "baseless": "Iran is opposed to such moves, and all its nuclear research and activities are in line with upgrading its technological information, not for developing biological or nuclear weapons to use against any country." Iran stands by its signature to the BWC, the MPs say.


5 September 2001

An unnamed US administration official states that Russian companies continue to help Iran develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. He asks not to be named and does not elaborate.


October 2001

José de la Fuente, former Director of Research and Development at the Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (CIGB) in Cuba, states that CIGB sold Iran the "production technology for three of the CIGB’s most significant accomplishments: a recombinant hepatitis B vaccine, IFN-αIIb, and streptokinase." De la Fuente called this technology sale "profoundly disturbing to many of us who gave so much time and effort to the development of an economically viable but essentially altruistic biotechnology for our country. The strengthening of Cuban-Iranian cooperation began with Cuban aid shortly after the Iranian earthquake of 1990...It has culminated in Iran buying outright the prized fruits of the CIGB, namely recombinant protein production technologies in yeast and Esherichia coli, as well as the large-scale production protocols for both soluble and insoluble proteins synthesized in or excreted by them. There is no one who truly believes that Iran is interested in these technologies for the purpose of protecting all the children in the Middle East from hepatitis, or treating their people with cheap streptokinase when they suffer sudden cardiac arrest."


19 November 2001

John R. Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, accuses Iran of having an offensive BW program in violation of the BWC in his address to the Fifth Review Conference of the BWC at the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland. In his words: "We are also quite concerned about Iran, which the United States believes probably has produced and weaponized BW agents in violation of the convention."


Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
December 2001
A report states that Iran "is seeking" nuclear weapons, "likely" has biological weapons, and "has had" chemical weapons.

2001-2002
Jane's reiterates the claim in its 1998-1999, 1999-2000, and 2000-2001 reports from Mohammad Mohaddessin of the National Council of Resistance of Iran that biological weapons research is being carried out at the Razi Serum and Vaccine Production facility northwest of Karaj on the Qazvin-Hessarak highway.

2001-1998

2000-2001
Jane's reiterates its 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 report that Mohammad Mohaddessin of the National Council of Resistance of Iran believes that biological weapons research is being carried out at the Razi Serum and Vaccine Production facility northwest of Karaj on the Qazvin-Hessarak highway.

January-June 2000
According to a report by the Director of Central Intelligence, during the first half of 2000, "...Tehran expanded its efforts to seek considerable dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise from abroad—primarily from entities in Russia and Western Europe—ostensibly for civilian uses. We judge that this equipment and know-how could be applied to Iran's biological warfare (BW) program."

4 February 2000
Boris Labusov, chief of the Press Center for the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, denies allegations made by the CIA that Russia is continuing exports of chemical, biological, and ballistic missile production technologies to Iran. According to Labusov, the United States does not support these statements with verifiable evidence.
— "SVR Denies CIA Director's Allegations of Continuing Exports of Rocket Technologies from Russia to Iran" Interfax, 4 February 2000.

7 February 2000
According to Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, most estimates indicate that Iran has between 6 and 12 Scud-B launchers, and as many as 200 Scud-B ballistic missiles, with a range of 230-310km. Other sources, including the Israel government, indicate that the number could be as high as 300 Scud-BS with 15 launchers. US analysts reportedly say that Iran can domestically produce nearly all components of the Scud-B, except for the most sophisticated components of the guidance system and motors. Iran may also have between 5 and 10 Scud-C launchers, each with several missiles. This number probably includes four Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs) that Iran received from North Korea in 1995. The North Korean Scud-C has a range of...
500km and can carry a 700kg warhead. Iran has reportedly tested the new missiles from mobile launchers near Qom, to a target area about 500km south of Shahroud. Iran may be working with Syria on developing chemical or biological warheads for the Scud-C. In addition, North Korea may have sold such technology to Iran as part of the Scud-C sale.

10 February 2000
In an article written by US Defense Secretary William Cohen and translated for and published in the German paper *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, Cohen states that Iran (as well as Iraq and North Korea) are trying to manufacture nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. In addition, Cohen claims that Iran is building missiles capable of carrying these weapons.

22 March 2000
CIA Director George Tenet says that Iranian technological advances have made it difficult for the CIA to monitor Iran's BW program. Tenet says that "Iran, for example, driven in part by stringent international export controls, is acquiring the ability to domestically produce raw materials and the equipment to support indigenous biological agent production."

22 March 2000
US President Bill Clinton signs the Iran Nonproliferation Act, which allows the United States to impose immediate sanctions on any country that supplies Iran with equipment or technology that can be used to develop or deliver nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

June 2000
Iran "made the most active attempts to hire biologists from the FSU (Former Soviet Union) states. The Iranian representatives proposed cooperation to the leadership of some Russian organizations. The Council of Resistance demonstrates that some Russian scientists have signed the contracts and work now for the Iranian defense industry or in the Pasteur Institute." [Note: this appears to be completely drawn from the NCR allegations made on 26 January 1999.]

1 July-31 December 2000
The CIA reiterates past reports that Iran continues to seek dual-use biological equipment, expertise, and materials from abroad. "Iran probably began its offensive BW program during the Iran-Iraq War, and it may have some limited capability for BW deployment."

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19 July 2000
Turkish intelligence suggests that production of biological weapons is carried out at front companies and other institutions in nine locations in Iran’s north and western regions. The work is allegedly being done with the help of Chinese, Indian, and North Korean assistance.

20 July 2000
The Iranian Embassy in Ankara denies allegations that Iran has the necessary equipment to produce biological weapons.

29 August 2000
Iran is seeking to build cooperation in the biotechnology field with foreign institutions in order to offset the challenges posed by insufficient budgets, lack of skilled workers, and unclear Iranian government policies. "Our country’s scientific and university centers can compensate for the domestic scientific weaknesses and educational vacuums with the aid of foreign researchers and experts."

21 September 2000
In Senate testimony, the CIA reiterates most of the information it related on 10 May 1996. Instead of the statement, "Currently, the program is mostly in the research and development stages," the CIA now says "the program is in the late stages of research and development."

5 October 2000
John A. Lauder, Director of the DCI Nonproliferation Center, reports to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Iran is pursuing both civilian biotech activities and a biological warfare (BW) program...The program is in the late stages of research and development, but we believe Iran already holds some stocks of BW agents and weapons."

5 October 2000
Robert J. Einhorn, Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, reiterates what is said by John A. Lauder.

6 October 2000
Cuban Vice President Carlos Lage tours an Iranian-Cuban vaccine and biotechnological medicine factory in Iran. The facility is expected to be ready in late 2001 for the production of hepatitis B vaccine, streptokinase, interferon, and erythropoietin.

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15 October 2000
The head of the Razi Research Institute, Ali-Akbar Mohammadi, claims the Institute produces more than $100 million worth of vaccines every year. He claims the Institute meets 100 percent of Iran’s livestock vaccine needs every year, 80 percent of its poultry vaccine needs, and 85 percent of its human vaccine needs. The annual production is 2.7 billion vaccine doses per year. Mohammadi claims the Institute exports to 21 countries, and that some 30 percent of the Institute’s vaccines were given away last year free of charge to Afghanistan, Kenya, Albania, Azerbaijan, and Tanzania. He adds that although the Institute is allocated $5 million every year, the institute spends considerably less than that.


1999-2000
Jane's reiterates its 1998-1999 report that Mohammad Mohaddessin of the National Council of Resistance of Iran believes that biological weapons research is being carried out at the Razi Serum and Vaccine Production facility northwest of Karaj on the Qazvin-Hessarak highway.


19 January 1999
The Russian biologist Dr. Valery Bakayev denies having worked in any offensive biological warfare program for the Soviet Union or Iran.


20 January 1999
It is reported that the Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai allegedly provided secret documents to the United States stating that at least 10,000 Russian scientists are helping Iran develop missiles and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The report claims that the Russian scientists are helping Iran develop its Shehab-3 and Shehab-4 missiles (capable of deploying chemical and biological weapons), as well as a 3,600 km range S.S.-400. Israel believes the missiles will be completed in 2002, and that they will be capable of carrying nuclear warheads by 2007. Iran claims that the Shehab-3 was designed based on indigenous technology.


24 January 1999
Dr. Valeriy Bakayev, Doctor of Biological Sciences at the Pasteur Institute in Tehran's Iranian Science Center for Biotechnology and Molecular Biology, responds to accusations made in the New York Times last month. A reporter covering Bakayev's press conference states that Bakayev says the article "juggled the facts in such a way that the article made out that Russian biological scientists are working in Iran on creating biological weapons....This claim does not conform to reality and discredits the honest name of a scientist and citizen of Russia." The reporter says that Bakayev "intends to look into the possibility of bringing an action against the New York Times for libel." Bakayev states, 'I correctly understand the term 'freedom of the press,' and I believe that it should bear juridical and financial responsibility for gross distortion of and juggling with the facts....Neither I nor any other Russian biological scientists working in Iran are participating in any military programs of the Islamic Republic, and [the

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Russian scientists] know nothing about any such efforts by the Iranians in this direction."

26 January 1999
The National Council of Resistance (NCR) of Iran, an Iranian opposition group, charges today that the Iranian "regime's BW and chemical weapons program has been intensified since Mohammad Khatami took office as president....Khatami created a group of advisors, called the Science and Technology Group, which oversees the regime's plans and projects in the area of biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons. The Science and Technology Group is affiliated with the Office of the President. The group's head is Taqi Ebtekar; Dr. Bahari-Pour is its secretary. The group's office is located in Tehran. In the Ministry of Defense, Dr. Dowlatshahi is the expert responsible for the development of biological weapons."

The opposition group alleges that there are four primary institutions responsible for producing biological weapons in Iran. The Special Industries Organization (SIO) of the Defense Ministry, headed by Dr. Abbas-Pour, is under the supervision of the Science and Technology Group. The organization, headquartered in Tehran, is made up of five branches and employs about 4,000 people. The Biological Research Center is located in the Shaheed Maysami Complex and is where the SIO conducts its BW research. The leaders and key personnel in this center are from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp, and the National Council of Resistance claims that 25 Iranian experts are currently working on "germ weapons." The NCR claims that the SIO has a fermenter project headed by Dr. Gholamhossein Riazi. In conjunction with the Razi Institute, he has managed to produce a fermenter with the help of a man by the name of Shalashi with a capacity over 100 liters.

The second organization alleged to be helping in the BW production effort is the Research and Engineering Center of the Construction Crusade. This center, headed by an engineer named Fazlollah Vakili-Fard, manufactures an advanced fermenter.

A third group that the NCR alleges is working on BW in Iran is the Revolutionary Guards Corps. This research is conducted at Imam Hossein University in Tehran and has developed a 40-50 liter fermenter.

The fourth organization named by the NCR is the Bio-Technology Research Center, which works under the supervision of the Organization for Scientific Industrial Research. Five biotechnology groups work in this center, one of which is developing biotech equipment such as fermenters.

The group also claims that six different organizations concentrate on "germ warfare research and production." The Vira Laboratory, located in Tehran with 250 employees, is headed by Dr. Riazzi and works under the supervision of the Defense Ministry. The NCR claims Vira is currently working on "agents that contaminate soil...Vira is now in the protection and containment stage for these agents."

A second organization, the Construction Crusade's War Engineering Research Center, is alleged to focus on research and production of VX (which the NCR apparently believes is a biological agent).

The third organization named by the NCR is the Pasteur Institute of Tehran, where the NCR claims the Defense Ministry maintains "a secret experimental lab...where the toxicity of mold and biological poisons is studied. This center is supervised by a man named Massoumi from the Defense Ministry. In this institute, research is conducted on extremely poisonous chemicals, especially the class of mold which produce aflatoxin."

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The fourth organization named is the Razi Serum Institute, located in Hessarak, Karaj, 25 miles west of Tehran. "This center is capable of producing at least three microbes, useful for germ and biological warfare."

The fifth and sixth organizations working on germ warfare are the previously mentioned Revolutionary Guards Corps Imam Hossein University and the Special Industry Organization's Biological Research Center.

The group claims that Brigadier General Mohammad Fa'eqi of the Special Industry Training Center is in charge of "handling the affairs of foreign researchers." Dr. Moboudi, under the Office of the President, coordinates the project. The NCR claims that 14 Russian, Chinese, and Korean experts currently work for the SIO. The NCR claims Iran uses Beheshti, Amir Kabir, and Tarbiat Universities as covers for purchasing dual-use biotech equipment from Switzerland, the Netherlands, France, Italy, and Denmark.


28 January 1999
Another scientist denies the US allegations that Russian scientists are assisting Iran in developing biological weapons: "Mortez Azartush, head of the Pasteur Institute, denied reports of the US press about cooperation with Russian scientists to start the production of chemical and biological weapons in Iran."

February 1999
Iran's opposition in exile accuses Tehran of researching and developing VX, toxic molds, and soil-contaminating agents: "The Iranian regime....is now capable of producing at least three types of biological munitions, usable for germ warfare. Teheran is concentrating on increasing production to mass production levels, and safeguarding these biological weapons," says Mitra Bagheri, the Italian representative of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. According to the Iranian opposition group, four different organizations/facilities are now engaged in producing biological weapons: Special Industries Organization of Iran's Ministry of Defense; Research Center of the Construction Crusade; Revolutionary Guards Corps research concentrated in the Imam Hossein University; and the Biotechnology Research Center. These sources have also supposedly identified an additional six unnamed BW research and production centers.

10 February 1999
The CIA claims Chinese business groups have exported chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Syria, and India in the past six months, despite a ban on such exports from the Chinese government.

13 February 1999
The MKO reports that Iran has accelerated its chemical and biological weapons production program since President Khatami came to office: "Under the supervision of around 25 of their Russian counterparts, Iranian

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scientists have hastened their efforts to develop chemical and biological weapons...." According to MKO sources, Iran is awaiting sophisticated computers to accelerate its chemical and biological weapons production and has already managed to produce the nerve agent VX, as well as $B. \text{anthracis}$ and aflatoxin. In addition to Russian scientists who are assisting Iran's program, the MKO claimed that Chinese and North Korean scientists are also "helping to further Iran's WMD capabilities...."


17 February 1999
British Foreign Office Minister Tony Lloyd claims that Britain has not been able to verify Israeli claims that there are thousands of Russians working on developing Iran's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs.

12 April 1999
During a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Israeli Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon offers to increase military technology cooperation with Russia in exchange for tightened control of technology transfer to Iran. At the same time, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens states to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, "We know today that Russian technological information regarding nuclear capability and ballistic missiles has for months been passed from Russia to Iran. I believe that we must do what we can, in addition to the efforts by the US, to prevent this transfer of technology to Iran." According to a senior defense official, Iran is set on developing long-range surface-to-surface missiles, as well as acquiring biological and chemical weapons and achieving a nuclear capability. He said that Iran would be unable to achieve these goals without Russian assistance, and that there are no indications that this aid is stopping.
— "Further on Sharon's Russia Talks, Iranian Procurement," Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 13 April 1999; FBIS, Document FTS19990413001053, 13 April 1999.

13 April 1999
Israeli Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon offers additional military technology cooperation to Russia on the condition that it ceases its weapons technology exports to Iran. A senior intelligence officer states that Iran is developing a long-range surface-to-surface missile equipped with biological and chemical warheads, and that Iran is set on developing nuclear weapons. He adds that Russian assistance is imperative to these endeavors.

28 April 1999
In an interview with Jane's Defence Weekly, Dr. Ken Alibek states that "between five and ten" of the best biological warfare scientists have been hired by Iran for long-term, top secret projects. Iran is allegedly paying them between $3,000 and $5,000 per month.

29 April 1999
During congressional testimony, John A. Lauder, Director of the DCI Nonproliferation Center, states, "Teheran also continues to seek dual-use biotechnological equipment from Russia and other countries—ostensibly for civilian uses."

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17 June 1999
The Mojahedin-e Khalq claims that Iran has spent "huge sums...in recent years on developing chemical, germ warfare, and nuclear weapons in Iran."

July-December 1999
In its bi-annual report to congress, the CIA states that, "Teheran expanded its efforts to seek biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise from abroad—primarily from entities in Russia and Western Europe—ostensibly for civilian uses."
— Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July through 31 December 1999.

10 August 1999
A Washington DC news report claims that Iran is suspected of trying to produce the smallpox virus; that it is "among the nations that have hidden quantities of Variola for possible weapons production."

21 August 1999
Iran's Armed Forces reject US reports that Iran is producing weapons of mass destruction. It responds that it was a victim of such weapons and has consistently supported all international efforts to ban such weapons.

22 September 1999
A report by the Air Force National Air Intelligence Center claims that Iran is building a missile that is expected to carry nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. According to the report, most of the new medium- and intermediate-range missiles built by Iran, China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan "will be armed with non-conventional warheads."

23 September 1999
It is reported that the Organization for Defense Industries has begun operation of the production line for uniforms resistant to biological agents (protective suits).

10 November 1999
Iran's new Zulfiqar main battle tank features a nuclear, biological, and chemical defense system.

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1998
Gerald Steinberg writes that China is alleged to have supplied Iran's Razi Serum and Vaccine Production Center with biological weapons technical assistance.

1998-1999
Mohammad Mohaddessin of the National Council of Resistance of Iran believes that biological weapons research is being carried out at the Razi Serum and Vaccine Production facility northwest of Karaj on the Qazvin-Hessarak highway.

1 January-30 June 1998
The CIA reports that Iran "is seeking to develop an indigenous capability to produce various types of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems...Tehran continued to pursue purchasing dual-use biotechnical equipment from Russia and other countries, ostensibly for civilian uses. Its biological warfare program began during the Iran-Iraq War, and Iran may have some limited capability for BW deployment."

1 March 1998
Seth Carus reports that "there is no information about the extent to which the Iranians have solved all the problems associated with production and dissemination of biological agents. Without such knowledge, it is impossible to assess the true threat posed by Iran's biological weapons."

19 June 1988
Nachum Manbar, an Israeli businessman, is convicted for selling biological and chemical weapons parts and know-how to Iran for $16 million.

15 October 1998
Iran's Foreign Ministry's Director-General for International and Political Affairs, while addressing the Conference on Disarmament, reiterates Iran's commitment to the nuclear, chemical, and biological arms control treaties that it has signed.

6 November 1998
The Federation of American Scientists reports that "Iran's biological warfare program is now believed to generally be in the advanced research and development phase. Iran has qualified, highly trained scientists and considerable expertise with pharmaceuticals. It also possesses the commercial and military infrastructure needed to produce basic biological warfare agents and may have produced pilot quantities of usable agent. Iran is judged to be able to

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support an independent BW program with little foreign assistance (although some...BW expertise, especially from Russia, is flowing to Iran). It is reported that the country has located a BW lab near its CW production facilities at Damghan....Iran also can make some of the hardware needed to manufacture agents. Iran has most likely investigated both toxins and live organisms as BW agents, produced some agents and probably weaponized a small quantity of its production. It is possible that Iran has developed a small BW arsenal that could be delivered by a variety of systems."

8 December 1998
According to Russian scientists and American officials, Iran has allegedly succeeded in recruiting at least five scientists from the former Soviet Union "who once worked in laboratories tied to Moscow's vast germ warfare program."

10 December 1998
In a statement, the Iranian Embassy denies the 8 December 1998 New York Times report that the Iranian government actively recruited five germ warfare Russian scientists to develop a BW program. An Iranian scientist, Mehdi Rezayat, who was identified as a key figure in an Iranian purchasing network, also denies that he tried to recruit Russian biologists to develop Iran's germ warfare program: "...he said yesterday that his approaches were entirely peaceful, and that he was only trying to acquire the talent and technology to make diagnostic kits for hepatitis and AIDS, and antibiotics and other medicines."
Hamid-Reza Asefi, the spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, states the 8 December accusations by the United States Department of State as well as the New York Times are nothing more than a "provocation against technological progress in our country, particularly in the field of microbiology." Asefi states that "scientific cooperation with Russia is utterly transparent and is aimed at solving peaceful problems."

20 December 1998
The Razi Vaccine and Serum Research Institute hosts a mock biological weapons inspection for the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the BWC. The mock inspection, referred to as a "national trial visit," is conducted in order to evaluate the procedures for random visits and to prepare for the effective implementation of the provisions of the Protocol. The four-person inspection team consists of a microbiologist, pharmacologist, legal expert, and general manufacturing practice engineer.
According to a report on the national trial visit, the Razi facility was notified of the visit and the composition of the team 24 hours before the visit. At that time, "...the mandate and notification were submitted to the team for its consideration and review. The mandate was to examine the accuracy of declaration provided by the facility." During the visit, the inspection team inspected equipment and was briefed on the activities of the facility, its organizational chart, complex layout, and production process. The inspection team inspected vaccine production lines, fermentation areas, QC laboratories, BL-3 areas, and other key equipment. "In a limited number of cases, managed access techniques were practiced by the facility. For instance, the visiting team requested access to some parts of the facility where access was denied for the CPI [confidential proprietary information and property] reason, with the arguments that these parts are unrelated to the visit mandate. But as an alternative, the home team (a team with a similar make-up from the Razi Institute) made an effort to find other means of satisfying the
visiting team to fulfill its mandate."

22 December 1998

Jane's reports that "Iran held a combined arms exercise in the Gulf earlier this month [that] tested its defences against nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare and the use of domestically developed electronic countermeasures."

1997-1990

January 1997
An analysis of the article notes, "Commenting on the Bild story, Klaus Rose, chairman of the German Parliamentary Defence Committee, said that the reports may be true. 'It is a genuine threat,' Rose told Saar radio. 'The reports are credible.' Rose adds that the Iranian missile could carry a conventional High Explosive warhead as well as chemical and biological warheads. He also suggested that key technologies for the programme were being obtained from North Korea and Russia."

1 February 1997

Jane's suggests that Iran and other countries are opening up trade offices in Moscow so that they may recruit former Soviet scientists and weapons experts to work on their weapons of mass destruction programs. Jane's cites the US Defense Department's publication Proliferation Threat and Response, April 1996 as evidence of the existence of Iran's WMD program.

5 February 1997

The Iran Brief reports that some of Iran's "major universities and research organizations may be linked to its biological warfare program. Hints of the Iranian program have emerged in bits and pieces in recent years, as mysterious explosions have occurred in Switzerland and Germany at warehouses where biological fermenters were being prepared for shipment to Iran. The main alleged supplier was a subsidiary of Bayer in Germany....On July 8, 1996, the Commerce Department announced that it had fined one US supplier, Sigma Chemical Company of St. Louis, Missouri, $480,000 for having made 48 shipments of biotoxins to various destinations since 1991. Many of those shipments went to Iran. On two occasions, the company applied for licenses to ship biological materials and enzymes to Iran in 1990 and 1991, but was refused. Sigma's client on those occasions were the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and the Biochemistry Institute of Tehran."
— Iran Brief, 5 February 1997, p. 10.

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11 February 1997
In answering questions posed by the US Senate, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright states that Iran possesses chemical weapons, that it is likely Iran possesses biological weapons, and that those weapons pose a threat to US military personnel in the Gulf. According to her responses, the State Department has no knowledge that the China National Chemical Import-Export Corporation (Sinochem), or its affiliates, has transferred chemical or biological weapons technology to Iran. The State Department refuses to name, at an unclassified level, any companies that may have transferred chemical or biological weapons technology to Iran. The State Department also has no evidence that Poly Group or Polytechnologies, or the Chinese Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (or any of their affiliates) have transferred chemical or biological weapons technology to Iran. The State Department would not respond at the unclassified level as to whether the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is involved in producing biological weapons in Iran. The State Department also has no evidence to suggest that Iran has transferred biological weapons to terrorist groups.

April 1997
Paula DeSutter writes that "Iran is aggressively pursuing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, ballistic missiles and other means of delivery and its use of its NBC weapons will be particularly difficult to deter...The IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] has the lead in Iran for the production and employment of NBC weapons and is well organized, coherent, and virulent in their hatred of the United States...The United States believes that Iran has some weaponized biological weapons and a large chemical weapons stockpile, some of which are deployed on Abu Musa Island in the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz...Iran, and the Iranian Navy in particular, has exercised its BW and CW capabilities in tactical maneuvers that explicitly train the IRGC's 'Shin-mim-re' or 'chemical, biological, and radiological' units. Most of these exercises involve offensive assaults on fixed enemy positions. Thus, they are not strictly defensive..."

May 1997
Seth Carus states that Iran has a growing chemical and biological weapons arsenal.

August 1997
The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reports that the "Iranian BW program has been embedded within Iran’s extensive biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries so as to obscure its activities. The Iranian military has used medical, education, and scientific research organizations for many aspects of BW agent procurement, research, and production. Iran has also failed to submit the data declarations called for in the CBMs. The United States reiterates its previous finding that Iran probably has produced BW agents and apparently has weaponized a small quantity of those agents.

30 September 1997
According to the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, Iran is developing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The Mossad states, "Massive Russian assistance and close cooperation with Iran are enabling the Iranian regime to

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develop independent capabilities to produce medium-range ballistic missile systems within a very short time."
Technical and HUMINT sources reveal that the Shehab-3 and -4 missiles have ranges up to 1,240 miles. The US DIA confirmed the Mossad's information.

12 November 1997
Jane's reports that, "Over the last few years, Iran has embarked on what the CIA calls an 'unrelenting' program to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technology. The US intelligence community is watching closely to determine Iranian acquisition methods, which range from outright purchases on the world market to developing technology programs domestically."

3 December 1997
United States Secretary of Defense William Cohen states that the United States "is now concerned Iran may have produced up to 200 tons of VX nerve agent and 6,000 gallons of anthrax."

1996
According to press reports, Iran has developed a BW aerosol for terrorist use, which the Iranian leaders have allegedly deployed to assassinate three opponents of the regime.

April 1996
The United States Department of Defense states that "Iran began its biological warfare program in the early 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War...The Iranians are conducting research on toxins and organisms with biological warfare applications...With their biotechnical support structure, the Iranians are capable of producing many different biological warfare agents. Iran has evolved from piecemeal acquisition of bioprocessing equipment and is now pursuing complete biological production plants that could be converted to producing biological warfare agents. Some of its major universities and research organizations may be linked to its biological warfare program."

6 May 1996
In a written response to questions posed by the United States Senate, the Defense Intelligence Agency states that, "Iran has maintained an offensive BW program since the mid-1980s, with the intent of developing BW weapons.

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Iran has the requisite scientific and technical infrastructure needed to develop and field BW weapons. Like other proliferants in the region and elsewhere, Iran has been successful in acquiring necessary dual-use equipment for biological agent R&D and production. Efforts are underway to conceal the location(s), pace, and direction of the offensive program. Iran's BW program has the momentum to mature into a weapons capability and to pose a regional threat during the next decade. The report goes on to say that while there is a danger of state sponsors of terrorist groups "provid[ing] such weapons to terrorists if they wish...we have no conclusive information that any sponsor has the intention to provide these weapons to terrorists.”


10 May 1996
In a written response to questions posed by the United States Senate, the CIA states that, "Iran has had a biological warfare program since the early 1980s. Currently, the program is mostly in the research and development stages, but we believe Iran holds some stocks of BW agents and weapons. For BW dissemination, Iran could use many of the same delivery systems—such as artillery and aerial bombs—that it has in its CW inventory. We are concerned that in the future, Iran may develop a biological warhead for its ballistic missiles, but we would not expect this to occur before the end of the century. Tehran most likely has investigated both toxins and live organisms as BW agents. Iran has the technical infrastructure to support a significant BW program and needs little foreign assistance. It conducts top-notch legitimate biomedical research at various institutes, which we suspect provide support to the BW program. Because of the dual-use nature of biomedical technology, Iran's ability to produce a number of both human and veterinary vaccines also gives it the capability for large-scale BW agent production." The report goes on to say that while there is a danger of countries such as Iran, Libya, and Syria aiding terrorists in creating chemical or biological weapons, the CIA currently has "no evidence of state sponsors providing chemical or biological weapons, or the technologies to produce them, to terrorist groups..."


11 August 1996
*The Sunday Times* cites an Israeli analysis that states that Iran has a stockpile of *Bacillus anthracis* and botulinum toxin in the northwest city of Tabriz. The newspaper says that "both the CIA and the Israelis believe that military scientists working for the Islamic regime in Tehran have developed a deadly BW aerosol that can be carried by a terrorist." The newspaper continues to say that Israel believes that while Iran will not be able to deliver biological weapons via long-range ballistic missiles before the turn of the century, they can deliver such weapons with Scud missiles. It also states that they can deploy them from Sukhoi aircraft. The article adds that Israel's defense ministry warned the CIA last week that if Iran were attacked by the United States, "it will respond with a terrible escalation of terror, including the poisoning of water resources in Western Europe and America with a biological pollutant." [Note: When reviewing the original text of the CIA and DIA responses, there does not appear to be any mention of "military scientists having developed a deadly BW aerosol that can be carried by a terrorist." Therefore, it is not clear where this information is coming from, unless it is from the Israeli report.]


4-10 November 1996
For the past two years, Cypriot officials have been attempting to clamp-down on the practice of transshipping

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nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons materials to states such as Iran and Syria. Western diplomats claim that Russia is the largest supplier of these materials.

**December 1996**
A report in the German newspaper *Bild* claims that Iran is developing a 3,500km-range ballistic missile that could carry a 700kg chemical or biological warhead.

**1995**
The US DOD believes that Iran probably accelerated its biological weapons development efforts after the 1995 revelations about the scale of Iraq's BW program prior to the Gulf War.

**1995**
The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency states in its 1995 Annual Report to Congress that, "The Iranian BW program has been embedded within Iran's extensive biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries so as to obscure its activities. The Iranian military has used medical, education and scientific research organizations for many aspects of BW agent procurement, research, and production. Iran has also failed to submit the data declarations called for in the CBM's." The report's finding is that, "The United States reiterates its previous finding that Iran probably has produced biological warfare agents and apparently has weaponized a small quantity of those agents."

**January 1995**
*Jane's* states that while Iran is classified as a nation with a biological weapons development and delivery capability, "there is no firm indication that it currently holds stocks of such weapons." However, *Jane's* cautions, "it must be assumed that [Iran] has either acquired or will seek to acquire the technology to place [biological weapons] in production in the event of a major CBW threat." The report continues by stating that, "We believe that research work into the means of biological warfare has been in progress since 1990 and that an initial program of development and the associated procurements is in place. This work is believed to be taking place at a research establishment in Damghan. It may be that this work has already led to the creation of small stocks of biological agents. We are aware of attempts to acquire the means of producing mycotoxins."

**February 1995**
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Shahamat-73, in the Persian Gulf. The exercise involves "defense operations against chemical and microbiological attacks."

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1 June 1995

*Jane's* reports that Iran "already has chemical and probably biological weapons and the strategic means to deliver them... and is believed to have a biological weapons capability, but the details are sketchy. A chemical and biological production facility is located at Damghan." *Jane's* also states that, "Iran unquestionably has chemical weapons and strategic delivery systems. It is alleged to be working on biological and nuclear warfare capabilities." Later in the report, *Jane's* states that Iran is "pursuing research into biological weapons." *Jane's* believes that Iran "initially regarded chemical and biological weapons as 'the poor man's atomic bomb' but [that Iranian leadership] may now have modified their views and downgraded their perception of the strategic effectiveness of these weapons." Later, the article states that, "There is evidence that Iran has pursued an offensive biological warfare program, but little hard information has been verified. According to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Iran does not have an offensive BW capability, but has a 'military-applied biological program.' The regime appears to see these weapons in the same light as chemical weapons, namely as deterrents to Iraq's possible use of such weapons. Since 1982, there have been rumors of Iranian efforts to 'weaponize' mycotoxins. During the 1980s, there were reports that Iran had carried out research on anthrax and biotoxins. In 1989, it emerged that Iran had previously purchased from Germany growth cultures suitable for the production of mycotoxins. In 1993, reports suggested that Iran had obtained bio-weapons technology from companies in Switzerland and Germany, but these remain unconfirmed. Reports indicate that the plant at Damghan conducts biological as well as chemical weapon research. Work may also be conducted at a pesticide plant near Tehran." *Jane's* states that an area "of concern for Iran's neighbors is the prospect of mounting chemical or biological warheads onto its missiles. There is no hard evidence concerning this question, but it seems likely that Iran has the capability." [Note: Of interest in this special report is that despite alleging that Iran conducts biological weapons research at a facility in Damghan, the section of the report dedicated to Damghan makes no mention of biological weapons—only chemical weapons.]


3 June 1995

*Jane's* cites a recently available CIA report to Congress, which concludes that Iran has a biological weapons research and development program.


July 1995

Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Piruzi-6, at the Northern Persian Gulf. The exercise involves "dealing with injuries from chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks." IRGC helicopters equipped with spray tanks overfly Iranian naval vessels in the military exercise, "evidently simulating a chemical or biological attack against ships at sea."


13 July 1995

It is reported that Iran, along with Pakistan, India, and China, is obstructing the establishment of a verification mechanism for the BWC.


9 November 1995

During testimony before the US House of Representatives International Relations Committee, Michael Eisenstadt
states that Iran is "developing biological weapons. It probably is researching such standard agents as anthrax and botulin toxin and it has shown interest in acquiring materials which could be used to produce ricin and mycotoxins. At this time, Iran can probably deploy biological weapons, and disseminate them via insect vectors, terrorist saboteurs, or spray tanks on aircraft or ships, although more advanced means of dissemination—by unmanned aircraft or missiles for instance—may currently be beyond its means."

1 April 1994
Jane's reports that "Iran's biological weapons capability is also quite substantial...but little accurate knowledge of this capability of the Iranian armed forces is available."
— Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Iran's National Strategy Striving for Regional Parity or Supremacy?", Jane's International Defense Review, 1 April 1994, p. 28.

July 1994
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Fajr-7, in the Northern Persian Gulf. Participating forces in the exercise include "chemical, biological, and radiological units."

1 July 1994
Jane's reports that "biological weapons production is also reportedly under way" in Iran.

Fall 1994
International Review states that an official with Germany's Economic Ministry recently warned a meeting of Frankfurt industrialists that Iran was trying to buy chemical products for chemical weapons under the guise of benign-sounding company names. He further warned the group that Iran could do the same thing in the biological field by purchasing antibiotics.

January 1993
US President George Bush, in his last arms control compliance report to Congress, states that Iran probably has produced a small amount of biological weapons. CIA Director James Woolsey states that Iran's BW ability "could be operational now."

15 January 1993
Title XVI of the US Department of Defense Authorization Act places Iran under the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (PL 101-513). Under this act, the United States opposes, and seeks that other states oppose, transfers of goods or technology to Iran that would contribute to its acquisition of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, or destabilizing numbers of advanced conventional weapons.

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April 1993
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Piruzi-4, at the Northern Persian Gulf. The exercise involves "chemical, biological, and radiological operations."

Spring 1993
Reports suggest that Iran has succeeded in obtaining advanced technology that can be applied to BW from companies in Switzerland, as well as containment equipment and technology from Germany.

1 April 1993
Michael Eisenstadt, writing for Jane's Intelligence Review, states that Syria and Iran have developed a relationship in the field of military cooperation and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). He states that the cooperation may include work in the nuclear arena (where Iran enjoys a technological lead) and perhaps the development of chemical and biological warheads (where Syria enjoys a technological lead). [Note: Eisenstadt, as the excerpt above shows, emphasizes "may" and "perhaps," and offers no concrete examples to back up his speculation.]

20 May 1993
The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service reports that "it is possible to speak confidently of a military-applied biological program" in Iran. It states that military-applied biological research has been conducted for about three years and that there is an "initial program of research, development, and purchases in the sphere of biological weapons." The report continues by stating that "it cannot be ruled out that small stocks of biological agents have already been created. Western countries have recorded attempts by Iranian representatives to purchase unofficially equipment and biological material suitable for the production of biological weapons, mycotoxins particularly."
[Note: The three year time period and the reference to Western countries might refer to the attempts to purchase the two strains of fusaria from Canada and the Netherlands in 1988/1989.]

November 1993
Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Wa al-Fajr-1, in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Participating forces in the exercise include "chemical, biological, and radiological units."

21 December 1992
According to US, French, and German officials, Germany is enjoying an export "bonanza" to Iran. Germany's Federal Export Agency reports an 80 percent approval rate for licenses to ship dual-use equipment on the C-list of controlled technology to Iran. Critics of Germany's export control policy complain that much of the equipment on

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the C-list can be used for nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile applications.

**Early 1990s**

*Iran reportedly acquires 120 tons of castor beans, used in the production of the toxin ricin.*


**Early 1990s**

The *Washington Times* states that mysterious explosions at factories in Germany and Switzerland that destroyed biological fermentation equipment destined for Iran are reported to have adversely impacted Iran's BW program. The program is reported to be hidden in Iran's biotech and pharmaceutical industries.


**1990s**

According to former US Senator Sam Nunn, "...Iranian intelligence officers began making recruiting trips to Russia, offering biological weapons scientists many times their pay to move to Iran."


**1990s**

Iran allegedly conducts covert operations linked to BW research and development in Germany and Switzerland.


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**1989-1929**

**1989**

Reports emerge that Iran had previously purchased growth media suitable for producing mycotoxins from Germany.


**1989**

US intelligence sources report that Iran is trying to buy two new strains of fungi from Canada and the Netherlands that can be used to produce mycotoxins. The Imam Reza Medical Center at Mashhad Medical Sciences University and the Iranian Research Organization for Science and Technology are identified as the end users for this purchasing effort, "but it is likely that that the true end user was an Iranian government agency specializing in biological warfare."


Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iranian Chemical and Biological Weapons," CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment, 30
July 1997, p. 32; Michael Eisenstadt, *The Deterrence Series: Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence, Case Study 4: Iran*, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998, p. 2.

21 February 1989
Iran attempts to buy toxigenic fungi in the Netherlands. The Iranian Research Organization for Science and Technology in Tehran orders 11 types of fungi that can be used to produce mycotoxins from the Netherlands' Central Bureau for Fungus Cultures. The Dutch reject the order. This is Iran's second try in one year to procure fungi.

18 October 1988
Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, then Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, says in a speech to military officers, "[c]hemical and biological weapons are poor man's atomic bombs and can easily be produced. We should at least consider them for our defense. Although the use of such weapons is inhuman, the war taught us that international laws are only scraps of paper."

18 October 1988
Iranian Speaker of the Parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani states, "...[w]e should fully equip ourselves in the defensive and offensive use of chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons."

December 1988
An Iranian national allegedly attempts to buy toxigenic strains of fungi from Canada. An Iranian man identified in intelligence reports as a Mr. Moallem reportedly issues a request to a Canadian scientist, Dr. H. Bruno Schiefer, Director of the Toxicology Research Center at the University of Saskatchewan, to send him two strains of fungi. After consulting the Canadian government, Schiefer refuses.

December 1988
Dr. Schiefer, in a 20 November 2001 interview, recalls that the request was "definitely" suspicious. Because of this, he contacted the Canadian Foreign Affairs Department and followed its advice to turn down the request. Western intelligence sources believe that the letter to Dr. Schiefer was one of several attempts made on behalf of Iran to purchase mycotoxin-producing fungi from Canada and the Netherlands. The two samples of fungi requested were *Fusarium* spp.

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2 July 1987
The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reports that Iraq may have used biological weapons during a bombing raid on Sardasht, a mountain town in northwest Iran. The information came on 28 June from a doctor who examined victims from the raid. IRNA quotes him as stating that "the worsening infections of some of the wounded, along with other symptoms...indicated that biological bombs were used." The doctor states that medical specialists will be needed to examine the bomb remnants. The raid killed 12 and wounded 650.
— Samir F. Ghattas, "Revolutionary Guards Reinforce Naval Bases against U.S.,” Associated Press.

As Early as 1982
As a result of the Iran-Iraq War and the Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iranians, Iran allegedly begins to develop biological weapons by working on the "production of mycotoxins." Middle East analyst Anthony Cordesman acknowledges, however, that "there are insufficient unclassified data to characterize the scale of Iran's biological warfare programs, their focus....It is clear, however, that Iran has such programs and it has good reasons for expanding them...."

[Note: According to Cordesman, the 1982 SIPRI Yearbook is the source that reports about Iranian BW activity, beginning for the first time in 1982 and then sporadically through the 1988 edition. However, CNS could not find any statement about an Iranian BW capability nor any Iranian research in mycotoxins in the 1982 Yearbook.]

Mid-1980s
Mana International Investments, a company registered in Poland and controlled by Israeli businessman Nachum Manbar, supplies Iran with nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protective suits.
— "CW Deliveries from China," Iran Brief, 6 July 1995.

1980s
An Iranian scientist reportedly makes repeated efforts to acquire different strains of a fungus that produces mycotoxins from Canadian and later Dutch facilities.

Early to Mid-1980s
According to the US Department of Defense (DOD), Iran begins its offensive biological warfare program.

22 August 1973
Iran ratifies the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).

1960-1972
There is no information available in open sources regarding a potential BW program.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
Between 1955 and 1960
Eleven Iranian officials attend US Army chemical and biological weapons training courses.

1929-1955
There is no information available in open sources regarding a potential biological warfare (BW) program.

4 July 1929
Iran accedes to the Geneva Protocol.

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