

Argentina Missile Chronology

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Last update: May 2010

As of May 2010 this chronology is no longer being updated.
For current developments, please see the [Argentina Missile Overview](#).

2008-2006

16 May 2008

Argentine National Space Activities Commission (CONAE) conducts a second test of the Tronador I ballistic missile using liquid fuel.

—"Proyeto Tronador – I", Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales (CONAE), www.conae.gov.ar.

July 2008

Aware of the stigma of the Condor II, Argentine authorities want to maximize transparency and make sure the Tronador project adheres to international agreements. CONAE assures that the project started from scratch, but researchers told newspaper *Perfil* that VENG and the other participating institutions employ engineers that participated in the Condor project and have returned from the U.S just to be part of the Tronador project. José Astigueta, Tronador's project manager, told *Perfil* that Tronador II, ten times more powerful than its predecessor, is already being built and it is expected to fly its first mission in 2010. He also revealed plans for Tronador III, which will have a payload of 250 kg and will use solid fuel in some of its stages.

—"Construyen un nuevo cohete en la misma base del Cóndor II", *Perfil*, 27 July 2008, www.diarioperfil.com.ar

25 November 2008

Taking steps to restore its anti-aircraft defense capability, the Argentine Navy tests the surface-to-air missile Aspide aboard a MEKO 360 destroyer. The Aspide missile, originally developed by Italian company Selenia Elmag, with a range of 13 km and a 30kg warhead, was upgraded by the Argentine Armed Forces Scientific and Technical Research Institute (CITEFA).

—"Lanzamiento de MISIL ASPIDE desde un buque de la ARMADA ARGENTINA", CITEFA News, 25 November 2008, www.citefa.gov.ar. Juan Manuel Barragán, "Argentina develops rocket motor for Aspide missile", *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 10 November 2008.

July 2007

Argentina tests a new rocket as part of a plan to develop a satellite launcher for national use and commercial purposes. The new missile, Tronador, was launched in early July on a test range in Bahía Blanca. The successful

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launch opens the door to the second phase of the project, Tronador II, which is designed to use liquid fuel and carry a payload of more than 200 kg in a 400 km high orbit. VENG, a joint public-private venture controlled by the National Space Activities Commission (Conae) is in charge of the project. Also part of the project is the startup of a hydrazine concentrate pilot plant at Falda del Carmen to provide the base component of the liquid fuel that Tronador II will use.

—Daniel Gallo, "Probaron en secreto un cohete argentino", La Nación, 5 August 2007, www.lanacion.com.ar.

5 January 2006

Ali Magoudi, a confidant of Francois Mitterrand, claims in a book that Margaret Thatcher threatened to use nuclear weapons against Argentina during the Falklands/Malvinas war if France failed to provide details about the Exocet missiles it sold to Argentina.

—Ian Sparks and Matthew Hickley, "I'll nuke Argentina; Maggie 'issued the ultimate threat' to extract Exocet secrets from Mitterrand," Daily Mail, 5 January 2006, www.lexisnexis.com.

5 July 2006

Before going into an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council after North Korea's missile tests, Argentine ambassador to the United Nations, Cesar Mayoral told the Telam news agency that Argentina believed that North Korea's actions "put world peace and security in danger." He indicated, however, that Argentina does not favor imposing sanctions and hopes for a diplomatic solution.

—"Ambassador Says North Korean [Missile] Tests Jeopardize Peace," Telam, OSC document LAP20060705062004.

6 July 2006

Argentina, in a statement issued 6 July by the Foreign Ministry, expresses concern about the missile test conducted by North Korea and calls for that country to ratify the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and reconfirm the moratorium on missile testing.

—"Argentina voices "serious concern" over North Korean missile tests," Telam, BBC Monitoring Latin America, 7 July 2006, www.lexisnexis.com.

13 July 2006

Japan asks Argentina to support its draft resolution in the United Nations Security Council to pave the way for the imposition of sanctions against North Korea for conducting missile tests on 5 July.

—Natasha Niebieskikwiat, "Japón pidió apoyo a la Argentina en la ONU," Clarín, 13 July 2006, www.clarin.com.

15 July 2006

The United Nations Security Council adopts resolution 1695 condemning the launch of missiles by North Korea. The resolution, supported unanimously by all members, including Argentina, required all Member States to prevent the transfer of missile and missile-related items, materials, goods and technology to North Korea. Cesar Mayoral, Argentina's representative, said he was happy with the resolution and hoped that North Korea would come back to the negotiating table and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

—"Security Council Condemns Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Missile Launches, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1695 (2006)," United Nations Security Council SC 8778, 15 July 2006, www.un.org.

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9 October 2006

Argentina condemns North Korea's nuclear test, but Argentine ambassador to the United Nations, Cesar Mayoral, indicates that his country is against any "sanctions of military order."

—"La Argentina, contra el uso de la fuerza," La Nación, 10 October 2006, www.lanacion.com.ar.

14 October 2006

The United Nations Security Council adopts resolution 1718 imposing sanctions on North Korea for conducting a nuclear weapon test. The resolution was unanimously supported by all 15 members of the Council, including Argentina. Following the vote, Ambassador Cesar Mayoral indicated that his country had agreed to implement all the provisions of the resolution but did not intend to legislate the control of dual-use material.

—"Security Council Condemns Nuclear Test by Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1718 (2006)," United Nations Security Council SC 8853, 14 October 2006, www.un.org.

23 October 2006

Argentina prepares for modernization of its military equipment. Nilda Garré, Argentine Minister of Defense travels to Paris looking to acquire air-to-air and anti-ship missiles, including the Mica and Exocet MM40 Block I.

— Jose Higuera, "Argentina poised for military build-up," Jane's Defense Weekly, 22 November 2006, www.janes.com; "Garré visitó en Francia a fabricantes de misiles," La Nación, 24 October 2006, www.lanacion.com.ar.

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2005-2000

March 2005

In the course of discussions in Buenos Aires with Argentine Defense Minister Jose Pampuro, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld commented on the United States' concern over shoulder-fired missiles in Nicaragua. Rumsfeld discussed this issue, apparently, in order to garner greater support from Argentina on missile control measures.

—"Rumsfeld in Argentina to Discuss Haiti, Missiles", Agence France Presse, 22 March 2005, Lexis-Nexis.

May 2004

The Argentine Judiciary began an investigation of an alleged shipment of three surface-to-air missiles through northern Argentina (Pocitos area) into the Tri-Border area. These weapons, which could be used to attack U.S. aircraft, were reportedly trafficked in a third-party sale by a customs agent, a Bolivian general involved in arms trafficking, and some Arab citizens.

—"Argentina: Alleged Shipment of Missiles to Tri-Border Area Being Checked", BBC Monitoring International Reports, 26 May 2004, Lexis-Nexis.

December 2003

Delegates from Argentina and Russia met to discuss the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While both

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states called for a universal ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, they also stressed the need for a global regime for missile nonproliferation based on a legally binding accord. They also noted that the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation would be an important precursor to such a development.

—"Russia, Argentina Call for Diplomacy to Tackle International Crises", BBC Monitoring International Reports, 17 December 2003, Lexis-Nexis.

30 September 2001

A secret witness reported to be a former Iranian intelligence official gives testimony at the Argentine Embassy in Mexico. The official identified as "witness C" alleges that then President Carlos Menem accepted a \$10 million bribe from the Iranian government to state that there was no evidence of Iranian involvement in the AMIA bombing. "Witness C" further alleges that a member of Menem's inner circle visited Iran after the attack and urged Iran to "lower its public profile in Argentina while increasing commercial activity." [Note: In the four years following the attack, Argentine exports to Iran increase by almost 200%, while Argentina's exports to the rest of the world increased only 52%.]

—Miguel Bonasso, "Un silencio de diez millones: Las estremecedoras declaraciones del testigo secreto iraní," Pagina 12, 30 September 2001, www.pagina12.com.

14 May 2001

US and European intelligence sources report that Egypt is continuing efforts to in its missile program. The sources report that Egypt has obtained components from Germany via North Korea to develop the 450km Project T missile, the 900km Al Bader [Badr 2000], and the 1200km Vector missile.

—Steve Rodan, [no title], Middle East Newslite, 14 May 2001, www.menewslite.com.

July 2000

The Ministry of Defense and Lockheed Martin reach a second contract on A-4 refurbishment in Córdoba for the period July 2000-June 2005.

—Ministerio de Defensa, República Argentina, "Contrato 2 entre Ministerio de Defensa y Lockheed Martin Aircraft Argentina SA," undated, www.mindef.gov.ar; "Reflotan el contrato con la Lockheed," Clarín, 28 June 2000, www.clarin.com.

23 February 2000

Israeli and US intelligence sources reportedly believe that Egypt has transferred missile technology to North Korea, which Egypt originally acquired through the Cóndor missile program.

—Steve Rodan, "Israel, USA Claim Egyptian Missile Links with N. Korea," Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 February 2000.

17 February 2000

Varotto states that National Space Activities Commission (CONAE) has begun planning finance and engineering of the New Generation Space Vehicle (VENG).

—"Financian cohete para lanzar satélites," 17 February 2000, Nueva Era, www.nuevaera.com.ar.

16 February 2000

Michael Hardin, former CIA Senior Analyst on missile proliferation, identifies the Cóndor's termination as the

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foremost missile nonproliferation success to date, and offers a technical overview of the program. His public address before the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC, is reviewed and approved by the CIA's Publication Review Board, and presumably represents the Agency's best understanding that can be provided in an unclassified form. Hardin says, "the most successful and significant case study of missile nonproliferation is that of the C3D II SRBM (a.k.a. Vector and Badr 2000). This multi-billion dollar program was a direct derivative of the US Pershing 2, and was in development in Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq but had never reached the flight-test phase of development." Hardin notes that, "although the C3D II was designed with a solid-propellant first stage similar to that of the US Pershing 2, a liquid-propellant second-stage was designed based on an upper stage of an Ariane SLV engine. This original C3D II solid/liquid configuration had many of the same problems as the Indian Agni I MRBM and a solid-propellant second stage was also designed for the C3D II. The new solid-propellant second-stage approach significantly increased the overall system cost and development time as different staging and thrust termination technology had also to be designed or obtained and flight-tested—a phase never reached." Hardin also says, "the C3D II/Badr 2000 was designed as a mobile two-stage missile with a separating unitary or submunitions dispensing, re-entry vehicle that would have been more difficult to detect and intercept than the several SCUD variants actually used by Iraq. The C3D II was also the basis for even larger MRBM, ICBM and SLV designs. History shows that the most economical way to defend against a missile attack is to ensure that the offensive missile system never reaches the production/deployment phase." [Note: A source interviewed by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) refutes Hardin's assertion that the C3D II was a derivative of the Pershing 2, stating that the only similarities were "shared ideas on guidance and hardware."] —Michael Hardin, "Missile Defense and Missile Non-Proliferation: The Interactions," remarks before the Proliferation Roundtable at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 16 February 2000, www.ceip.org; CNS interview with missile engineer familiar with technical dimensions of Argentine missile program. Source wishes to remain anonymous.

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1999-1992

16 September 1999

Robert Walpole, who as an intelligence analyst in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State and subsequently Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense and Arms Control had closely followed the C3D II program, identifies its termination as a case where US nonproliferation efforts and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) "worked extremely well and put a stop to the program." Walpole contrasts the C3D II with contemporary North Korean ballistic missiles, stating that had the C3D been "completed to fruition, it would have made the No Dong and the Taepo Dong-I look like toys—it would have been a much better system." —Robert Walpole, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015," testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, www.fas.org.

1999

Decree 1330/99 approves *National Space Plan 1997-2008*, which commits National Space Activities Commission

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(CONAE) to "associated and priority" efforts with Brazil in examining the economic and technical prospects for developing a new generation vehicle for satellite launching (i.e., the VENG).

—Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales (CONAE), Plan Espacial Nacional "Argentina en el Espacio, 1995-2006," undated, www.conae.gov.ar.

17 December 1998

Britain relaxes its arms embargo on Argentina, which dates to the Falkland/Malvinas war in 1982. Sales of equipment that could put the disputed territory at risk are still banned.

—"Britain Eases Post-Falklands Arms Embargo Against Argentina," Reuters cited in New York Times, 18 December 1998, p. 11.

9 December 1998

Vice-Chancellor Cisneros and National Space Activities Commission (CONAE) President Varotto announce that Argentina plans to develop a space launch vehicle, the New Generation Space Vehicle (VENG), to be first launched in 2003. The VENG will place civilian communications and observation satellites in orbit and will be developed in conformity with Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines. Varotto estimates that \$60-70 million of government funds will be necessary to realize the project within four years, with the bulk of project financing to be raised through private capitalization of launch services.

—Daniel Santoro, "Con luz verde de los EEUU, el gobierno construirá un cohete," Clarín, 9 December 1998, www.clarin.com.ar.

31 November 1997

Commenting on Brazil's planned space launch vehicle (VLS) launch, former President Alfonsín publicly criticizes Menem's termination of the Cóndor program as a "useless, anti-Argentine, and unnecessary gesture" taken to satisfy US demands. In response, Vice-chancellor Andrés Cisneros declares, "the construction of the Cóndor was a clandestine operation initiated during the military government and continued by [Alfonsín], which was neither subject to control nor to international safeguards and which, in the name of sovereignty, situated the country among proliferant nations." He states that Brazil "today possesses its own launcher because, unlike the former Argentine government [of Alfonsín], it did things correctly" and in accord with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

—"Estalla polémica por el misil Cóndor," La Tercera, 31 October 1997, www.tercera.cl.

15 September 1997

Chancellor Di Tella inaugurates National Space Activities Commission's (CONAE) Ground Station Terrena Teófilo Tabanera at Falda del Carmen, which will receive high-resolution satellite images of Argentina. It is the third such facility in Latin America, and will enable Argentina to end its dependence on the Brazilian facility it has relied upon since the Air Force's facility in Mar Chiquita ceased functioning in the 1980s.

—Maximiliano Seitz and Germán Sopeña, "En Córdoba, una ventana al espacio," La Nación, 6 September 1997, www.lanacion.com.ar; "Inspeccionó Di Tella el montaje de aviones A-4," La Nación, 16 September 1997, www.lanacion.com.ar.

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27 June 1997

Domingo Cavallo's book recounting his experiences in the Menem administration provides a detailed exposé of governmental corruption in Argentina, including the allegation that Menem's 1988 campaign received funds in exchange for a promise to supply the C ndor II to Libya. This charge was initially made by the former treasurer of the Peronist Party's electoral campaign, Mario Rotundo, who supported Menem's successful campaign to win the party nomination in 1988.

—Domingo Cavallo, *El peso de la verdad: un impulso a la transparencia en la Argentina de los 90* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1997), pp. 19-21; Gabriel Pasquini, "Los costos de la democracia: el peso de la pol tica," *La Naci n*, 24 September 1997, www.lanacion.com.ar.

10 March 1997

National Space Activities Commission (CONAE) President Conrado Varotto announces that Argentina and Brazil are considering a joint project for a satellite launch vehicle. Such a "Mercosur rocket" would focus on regional needs for the launch of small- and medium-size satellites to low and medium orbits, and would be capable of launching a 1,000kg payload up to 1,000km. It would be coupled with a "Mercosur satellite" program designed to address environmental and agricultural needs unmet by Landsat or other existing systems.

—Daniel Arias, "Cohetes para el Mercosur," *Clar n*, 10 March 1997, www.clarin.com.ar.

1997

In accord with Decree 176/97, Argentina's revised *National Space Plan 1997-2008* identifies access to space and launching services as a principle objective.

—Conrado F. Varotto, "Argentina y Brasil en la Actividad Espacial," paper prepared for "Semin rio Brasil - Argentina," (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Pesquisa de Rela  es Internacionais, Minist rio das Rela  es Exteriores), 20-21 November 1997, p. 2.

4 November 1996

NASA launches the SAC-B satellite, the first of the Argentine SAC series, for research on solar physics and astrophysics. Although the satellite reaches orbit and functions as planned, a power failure in the third stage of NASA's Pegasus-XL launcher renders the satellite useless after only a few orbits.

—"Environment, Science, and Technology Section," U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, undated; "Informaci n sobre el SAC-B: Lanzamiento y final de la misi n," December 1996, www.conae.gov.ar.

29 August 1996

A Russian launcher places the Argentine micro-satellite uSAT-1 in orbit. The \$1.1 million photographic satellite was built at the C rdoba aeronautics institute by 20 engineers, most of whom were formerly involved in the C ndor program.

—Marcela Valente, "Argentina Launches Its First Satellite," *Inter Press Service*, 29 August 1996, www.lexis-nexis.com.

30 April 1996

President Menem announces that his government will declassify all decrees related to foreign arms exports signed

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since 1983.

—"Argentina: Secrecy Lifted on Decrees Related to Arms Sales," *Télam* (Buenos Aires), 30 April 1996, in FBIS-LAT-96-086, 30 April 1996.

9 April 1996

Argentine President Menem and Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso sign cooperation accords in Buenos Aires, which include agreement on peaceful uses of space science and technology. This "Framework Agreement on the Cooperation on Peaceful Applications of Space Science and Technology" is a product of the Argentine-Brazilian Joint Working Group on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The agreement identifies several areas for cooperation, including cooperation in space science and technology, evaluation and monitoring of the environment and ground resources for remote sensing and other space applications, the development of joint satellite missions, methods of access to space, and launching services.

—Maria Izabel Mallmann and Vera Seitenfus, "Cronologia do Mercosul 1985-1999," (Centro Brasileiro de Documentação e Estudos da Bacia do Prata, CEDEP/UFRGS), undated; Conrado F. Varotto, "Argentina y Brasil en la Actividad Espacial," paper prepared for "Seminário Brasil - Argentina," (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais, Ministério das Relações Exteriores), 20-21 November 1997.

1996

Decree 1662/96 places the National Space Activities Commission (CONAE) under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Exterior Relations and alters the space agency's organizational structure.

—Conrado F. Varotto, "Argentina y Brasil en la Actividad Espacial," paper prepared for "Seminário Brasil - Argentina," (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais, Ministério das Relações Exteriores), 20-21 November 1997.

18 July 1994

Terrorists bomb a Jewish community center, the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA), in downtown Buenos Aires, killing 86 people. Some Argentine officials and journalists subsequently believe that this attack may be retaliation for Argentina's failure to fulfill commitments to supply the Cándor II and nuclear reactor technologies to Iran, Iraq, Libya, and/or Syria.

—Arnoldo Lamisovsky, Guillermo Francos, and Franco Caviglia, *Projecto de Resolución, Expediente 1656-D-00*, (Buenos Aires: Cámara de Diputados de la Nación – República Argentina, 2000), www.ardiputados.gov.ar; Norberto Bermúdez and Carlos Torrenco, "Lo que no se investigó sobre los atentados (Parte I);" "Lo que no se investigó sobre los atentados (Parte II);" Julio Rajneri, "Río Negro va más lejos con la pista siria;" "Los acuerdos y compromisos secretos de Menem y los árabes;" and "El dominicano Nemen Nader habla desde Madrid: 'Menem recibió 40 millones de los países árabes en 1988';" *Río Negro*, 11-13 January 2000, www.rionegro.com.ar.

July 1994

The Ministry of Defense and Lockheed Martin reach a contract to refurbish A-4 aircraft at the Fábrica Militar in Córdoba, for the period July 1994-June 2000.

—Ministerio de Defensa, República Argentina, "Contrato 2 entre Ministerio de Defensa y Lockheed Martin Aircraft Argentina SA," undated.

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1994

Argentina's *National Space Plan 1995-2006* and Decree 2076/94 declare that space development activities are a national scientific-technical priority.

—Conrado F. Varotto, "Argentina y Brasil en la Actividad Espacial," paper prepared for "Seminário Brasil - Argentina," (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais, Ministério das Relações Exteriores), 20-21 November 1997.

November 1993

Argentina becomes a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

—Deborah A. Ozga, "A Chronology of the Missile Technology Control Regime," *Nonproliferation Review*, Winter 1994, p. 86.

16 November 1993

The *New York Times* reports that by terminating Argentina's Cónдор and "nuclear weapons program" and by supporting the Gulf War Coalition, President Carlos Menem has "made Argentina the closest ally in South America to the United States."

—Nathaniel C. Nash, "Argentine President Clears Hurdle to Second Term," *New York Times*, 16 November 1993, p. A8, www.lexis-nexis.com.

27 September 1993

Argentine officials send another shipment of important Cónдор components to Spain, including those related to guidance.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cónдор II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 88.

25 September 1993

Authorities allow journalists to visit the 45 buildings—many of them underground—that comprise the Falda del Carmen complex, which had been built during 1981-1985 at an expense of \$300 million. Falda del Carmen may be used in a project to construct the first scientific satellite to be built in Latin America, in collaboration with NASA.

—"Possible Use of Condor-2 Facilities to Develop Scientific Satellite," *Noticias Argentinas*, 25 September 1993; in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 27 September 1993, www.lexis-nexis.com.

Mid-September 1993

The Argentine government finally acquires parts and components held by recalcitrant Air Force officers and ships them to Spain. These include two electronic guidance systems, three computers, launching equipment, and a tower. However, a sophisticated X-ray machine, a solid-fuel grinder, and a mixer still remain at Falda del Carmen, awaiting an assessment whether they can be converted for civilian use. *La Nación* reports that the fuel mixers at Falda del Carmen are of US manufacture. US officials insist these items must also be relinquished, but Defense Minister Camilión asserts that Cónдор dismantlement is "all finished."

—William R. Long, "Argentina Abolishes Missile Program with Iraq," *Los Angeles Times*, 26 September 1993, p. 15, www.lexis-nexis.com.

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13 September 1993

Camilión declares that archives of the Cóndor II program will be made public, saying, "The Argentine public has the right to know what happened, what was done, who took part in it, and whether there was foreign aid."

—"Defense Minister Says Details of 'Condor-2' Project Will Soon Be Made Public," Noticias Argentinas, 14 September 1993; in BBS Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 September 1993, www.lexis-nexis.com.

2 September 1993

The final shipment of Cóndor components, including launcher vehicles and guidance systems, are shipped to Spain for destruction.

—"Last' Condor-2 Missile Parts to Go to Spain in October," EFE (Madrid), 2 September 1993; in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 September 1993, www.lexis-nexis.com.

August 1993

Inspectors of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) discover three plants in Iraq that are identical to those at Falda del Carmen. They conclude that the Iraqi Badr-2000 ballistic missile program is a "technical derivation" of the Cóndor II, and find two rocket motors with serial numbers identical to those produced at Falda del Carmen. The Argentine Defense Ministry confirms that UN weapons inspectors discovered two Cóndor II missile engines, which had been produced at the Falda del Carmen factory, in Iraq, and that Argentina delivered Cóndor "elements" to Iraq via Egypt prior to the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War. The ministry also confirms that similar factories in Iraq and Egypt were identical twins of the Falda del Carmen plant that produced the engines found in Iraq. Defense Minister Oscar Camilión denies Argentine involvement in these plants, however, stating, "There has not been any transfer of Argentine technology to Iraq, as the technology in question was fundamentally German." Camilión also rejects reports of contractual agreements of expert collaboration between Argentina and Iraq, but confirms that German technicians had worked on the Cóndor II project. Egyptian technicians also worked with the Argentine experts on the Cóndor II project, but there is no confirmation that Iraqi technicians participated directly with the Argentines.

—Sergio Persoglia, "Proyecto Cóndor II: entre Falda del Carmen y Bagdad," Clarín, 28 February 1998; "UN Discovers More Evidence of Iraqi Links to Cóndor Missile Project," International Defense Review, November 1993, p. 842; "Government Admits War Technology May Have Reached Iraq," Inter Press Service, 30 August 1993, www.lexis-nexis.com.

22 June 1993

Camilión reportedly reassures Radical Civic Union (UCR) legislators in a closed session of the Chamber of Deputies defense committee that Falda del Carmen will not be destroyed, but rather employed for alternative purposes that will sustain employment of civilian and military personnel formerly involved in the Cóndor II program.

—"Argentine Says Missile Program Will Not Be Completely Destroyed," AFP, 23 June 1993, www.lexis-nexis.com.

12 March 1993

Radical Civic Union (UCR) deputies formally urge the Menem Administration to refuse alleged US demands to destroy the "solid fuel blending" and other equipment at Falda del Carmen. In a public communiqué, the opposition legislators declare, "The Argentine government must secure recognition of its right—stemming from its

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position as a sovereign nation—to the possession of a manufacturing plant for solid-fuel components, under international controls and safeguards guaranteeing that these will not be used for military purposes." While supporting Argentine entry into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the deputies insist that, "entry must be achieved without accepting the precondition of destroying our country's ability to possess components, and without requiring limitations which are incompatible with our country's sovereignty and add nothing to matters of international security."

—"UCR Want Condor Plant Saved," Noticias Argentinas, 10 March 1993, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 March 1993, www.lexis-nexis.com.

4 March 1993

Defense Minister Antonio Erman Gonzales states that "No one should be surprised by the non-existence of a 'smart' warhead, because one never existed....A 'smart' warhead was never discussed because such technology was never achieved [in Argentina]." The minister claimed to be "unaware" of any missile or missile components being sold following President Menem's decision to discontinue research. He added, "We actually preserved all those components that might technologically or scientifically be used for peaceful purposes." Gonzales states that missile parts shipped to Spain were sent to analyze "whether they can be used for scientific and peaceful purposes," but could not confirm whether any parts had been reshipped to the United States, as Spanish publications have claimed. Gonzales said that the entire Cóndor II shipment had been "duly controlled by Spanish experts" present at the time of loading.

—"Reportage on Existence of Cóndor II Warhead," Télam (Buenos Aires), 4 March 1993, cited in Proliferation Issues, 22 March 1993, p. 19.

3 March 1993

The United States supports Argentina's application to become a full member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

—Deborah A. Ozga, "A Chronology of the Missile Technology Control Regime," Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1994, p. 86.

1 March 1993

US Ambassador to Argentina Todman holds a private, closed door meeting with Air Force Chief Jose Juliá. Todman inquires about "missing parts" for the Cóndor II missiles. Todman proclaims that everything requested to date is in the United States, with the exception of the "intelligent warhead" that was never sent to Spain. The ambassador outlines possibilities for destruction of the Falda del Carmen facility, which still includes sufficient infrastructure to restart the Cóndor program. Juliá claims that the project is now out of his jurisdiction, and that the Cóndor II never had a computerized guidance system. However, a high-ranking Air Force official states the Cóndor I was complete and President Menem himself activated it to test it. The official says the Cóndor II was never concluded because of lack of funds and that the "Cóndor project was a great fraud."

—"Air Force Chief, U.S. Envoy View Issue," La Prensa (Buenos Aires), 6 March 1993, p. 4, cited in FBIS-LAT-93-044, 9 March 1993, p. 15.

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13 February 1993

The United States signs a memorandum of understanding to allow Argentina to purchase advanced computer equipment, nuclear technology, and aeronautical guidance systems from the United States. A US official who asked not to be identified states, "Basically it shows that we think this country is reliable and responsible in handling the use of potentially dangerous technology." Argentina in turn agrees to controls over technology it purchases from the United States or develops indigenously.

—Nathaniel C. Nash, "Argentina Signs Technology Pact," *New York Times*, 13 February 1993, p. 4.

February 1993

US Ambassador Todman unofficially gives Argentine officials a "non-paper" requesting the disposal of guidance computers and associated software for the C ndor. Subsequently, two different copies of the "non-paper" begin circulating—one with two paragraphs deleted by the Foreign Ministry. The omitted text includes "gratitude for everything done to dismantle the C ndor missile to this date [with] the firm purpose [of] concealing the bad handling of diplomatic relations with the United States."

—"Otro reclamo de EE.UU. por el C ndor enfrenta a la Canciller a con Defensa," *Clar n*, 28 February 1993, p. 2; "Air Force Chief, U.S. Envoy View Issue," *La Prensa* (Buenos Aires), 6 March 1993, p. 4, cited in FBIS-LAT-93-044, 9 March 1993, p. 15.

29 January 1993

An Argentine ship arrives in Rota, Spain, with 14 missile engines, 17 airframes, 2 scale models, and other C ndor II missile components. The parts are to be reshipped to an unidentified US port, and be destroyed in the United States.

—"Menem: Missile Parts Shipment to USA 'Planned'," *EFE*, 10 March 1993; in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 March 1993, www.lexis-nexis.com; Nathaniel C. Nash, "Argentina Gives Missile Parts to U.S. for Disposal," *New York Times*, 7 March 1993, p. 9, www.lexis-nexis.com; "Otro reclamo de EE.UU. por el C ndor enfrenta a la Canciller a con Defensa," *Clar n*, 28 February 1993, p. 2.

10 January 1993

Argentina ships 41 containers of missile parts to Rota, Spain. These include 14 engines and 30 C ndor II airframes that had been stored briefly at the Puerto Belgrano naval base in Bah a Blanca, Argentina.

—J. Olmo y Losada, "C ndor II to Be Shipped to Spain for Dismantling," *ABC* (Madrid), 7 January 1993, p. 24, cited in *Proliferation Issues*, 15 January 1993, p. 13; Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso C ndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edici n CERIR, 1999), p. 88.

1993

Decree 1903/93 authorizes export of specific parts of the C ndor II to Spain. Argentine officials invite Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) member states to send representatives to examine shipment contents.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso C ndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edici n CERIR, 1999), p. 87.

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1992-1993

Chancellery officials Fernando Petrela and Andrés Cisneros conduct negotiation with Spain regarding Cónдор disposition.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cónдор II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 87.

29 November 1992

The United States invites Argentina to attend an Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) meeting in Interlaken, Switzerland.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cónдор II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 93.

12-20 November 1992

Presidents Bush and Menem meet, and for the first time in their encounters the Cónдор II is *not* on the agenda. This milestone is the result of Menem's policy shift on the missile project.

—Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cónдор II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 59.

4-7 November 1992

The Chancellery presents a note to the US Department of State reiterating its decision to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cónдор II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 93.

November 1992

Nine former SNIA-BPD employees are cleared of all charges of illegally transferring missile technology to the Cónдор II project. Charges are dropped on the grounds that defendants' activities occurred before the Italian government implemented legislation on arms and military technology exports.

—Deborah A. Ozga, "A Chronology of the Missile Technology Control Regime," *Nonproliferation Review*, Winter 1994, p. 85; who cites a letter to Ozga from unidentified Italian government official, 2 June 1993.

November 1992

President George Bush sends missile experts to Falda del Carmen installations to confirm Argentina's intentions to dismantle the Cónдор program.

—César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cónдор II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 52.

November 1992

General Colin Powell travels to Argentina for meetings on Southern Cone defense issues.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cónдор II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 103.

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November 1992

President Bush sends President Menem a note stating his confidence that a quick solution for destruction of the Cónдор will be found.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cónдор II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 87.

13 October 1992

US Ambassador Todman visits Foreign Minister Di Tella and requests that Argentina accelerate logistical aspects of dismantling the Cónдор project.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cónдор II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 87.

September 1992

Spanish technicians reportedly visit the Cónдор II missile trials and construction installation in Falda del Carmen to acquire technology for the Spanish space program. Spain is reportedly interested in using Cónдор II solid-fuel and steerable nozzle systems in its National Institute of Aerospace Technology's (INTA) Capricornio launcher program.

—"Cónдор II Revival in Support of Spanish Space Program," *International Defense Review*, November 1992, 1062.

August 1992

The solid-fueled first stage of 14 Cónдор missiles remain in storage at Falda del Carmen, and a lesser number of missile guidance systems supplied by French firms remain unaccounted for. US officials speculate that the guidance systems may have been shipped to Iraq, or are hidden by Air Force advocates of the missile system. At this point, the Menem Administration has not developed a plan for their destruction and faces serious domestic political obstacles to doing so. Government officials are wary of exploding the missiles on site at Falda del Carmen. Given its proximity to Córdoba, such explosions would be heard by the city's one million residents, a political bastion of the opposition Radical Civic Union (UCR) party.

—Nathaniel C. Nash, "Argentina Lagging on Missile Pledge," *New York Times*, 19 August 1992, p. 7, www.lexis-nexis.com.

24 July 1992

The French Embassy in Buenos Aires notifies the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) members approved of Argentine Decree 603/92 and subsequent measures taken by the Argentine government. The MTCR expresses a desire to continue dialogue with Argentina.

—Government of Argentina, Bureau of International Security, "Argentina's Non-Proliferation Policy," 1992.

July 1992

Argentine Defense Ministry sources say that Spain and Argentina may begin joint activities to reuse facilities at Falda del Carmen. They expect conclusion of a cooperation accord between Argentina's National Space Activities Commission (CONAE) and Spain's National Institute of Aerospace Technology (INTA) during Defense Minister González' upcoming visit to Madrid on 30 July 1992, when he will meet with Spanish Defense Minister Julian Garcia Vargas.

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—"Pact with Spain May Include Cóndor Missile Base," *Noticias Argentinas* (Buenos Aires), 28 July 1992, in *Proliferation Issues*, 20 August 1992, p. 8.

8 June 1992

An Argentine newsweekly reveals details from Barcelona and Villalonga's forthcoming book on the Cóndor program. They allege that two Cóndor II missiles were virtually completed, and are ready for launch and held by the Argentine Air Force in a secret arsenal. The revelation prompts a denial by the Defense Ministry, but the Foreign Ministry confirms that two Cóndor missiles are still armed and that it was not possible to dismantle them. —"Content of New Book on Cóndor II Viewed," *Somos* (Buenos Aires), 8 June 1992, pp. 18-21, cited in *Proliferation Issues*, 10 July 1992, pp. 7-9.

June 1992

The Chancellery receives a delegation of scientists from the National Institute of Aerospace Technology (INTA), of Spain. They seek an agreement for disposal of missile parts from Falda del Carmen.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 86; "Cóndor II Missile Technology to Be 'Recycled'," *Clarín* (Buenos Aires), 2 June 1992, 4; in *FBIS-LAT-92-107*, 3 June 1992, pp. 22-23.

1 May 1992

Juliá announces the purchase of 40 Skyhawk A4M aircraft from the United States.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 105.

9 April 1992

Decree 603/92 establishes a regime to control exports of sensitive materials.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 93; "Argentina Introduces Tough Curbs on Technology Exports," *Financial Times*, 29 April 1992.

April 1992

A Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) mission travels to Argentina to assess its export control measures. The mission submits a report to the MTCR plenary in Oslo, but the plenary body does not extend membership at this time.

—Government of Argentina, "Argentina's Non Proliferation Policy, Report delivered by the Bureau of International Security, Nuclear, and Space Affairs, 1992," *Arms Control Reporter*, March 1993, 706.B.111.

April 1992

Argentina begins discussions with Spain regarding disposition of Cóndor program assets. Argentine negotiators include González and Juan Ferreira Pinho of the Defense Ministry, Andrés Cisneros of the Chancellery, and Sahade, President of the National Space Activities Commission (CONAE).

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 86.

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17 March 1992

Terrorists bomb the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29 people. Some Argentine officials and journalists subsequently believe this attack may be retaliation for Argentina's failure to fulfill commitments to supply the C300 and nuclear reactor technologies to Iran, Iraq, Libya, and/or Syria.

—Arnoldo Lamisovsky, Guillermo Francos, and Franco Caviglia, Proyecto de Resolución, Expediente 1656-D-00, (Buenos Aires: Cámara de Diputados de la Nación – República Argentina, 2000), www.ardiputados.gov.ar; Norberto Bermúdez and Carlos Torrenco, "Lo que no se investigó sobre los atentados (Parte I)"; "Lo que no se investigó sobre los atentados (Parte II)"; Julio Rajneri, "Río Negro va más lejos con la pista siria"; "Los acuerdos y compromisos secretos de Menem y los árabes"; and "El dominicano Nemen Nader habla desde Madrid: 'Menem recibió 40 millones de los países árabes en 1988'"; Río Negro, 11-13 January 2000, www.rionegro.com.ar.

20 February 1992

US Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney presses for an end to the C300 during his visit to Buenos Aires, on a tour of five Latin American countries.

—Anabella Busso, Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso C300 (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 102; John Barham, "Cheney Urges Halt to Condor Missiles," Financial Times, 21 February 1992, www.lexis-nexis.com.

11 February 1992

Defense Minister González formally transfers Falda del Carmen to the National Space Activities Commission (CONAE) in a secret ceremony.

—Martin Granovsky, Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 332.

7 February 1992

Defense Minister González states that the C300 missile program will be inventoried before transfer to the National Space Activities Commission (CONAE). He denies a report that dismantling of the missile project will take place on 10 February 1992 under supervision of US inspectors, saying "there are no plans for destroying the C300 missile now." González declares the plan is to transfer the project on 11 February 1992 to the CONAE, which will hire technical personnel and researchers to pursue "peaceful objectives."

—"Minister Denies Reports on Dismantling C300," Télam (Buenos Aires), 7 February 1992, cited in Proliferation Issues, 21 February 1992, p. 6.

Late 1991-Early 1992

The Air Force impedes an inventory of missile assets, while the Defense Ministry insists on complying with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

—Anabella Busso, Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso C300 (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 85.

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1991

31 December 1991

Investigative journalists Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga report that neither the Argentine public nor government officials knows for certain what has happened to the C3D missiles that were produced. They assert that National Space Activities Commission (CONAE) authorities have not traveled to examine the installation where the C3D was fabricated.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil C3D* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 219.

End of December 1991

The National Space Activities Commission (CONAE) completes its investigation of the C3D project. Ambassador to the United States Guido Di Tella reports on its findings to President Menem, noting that the Air Force is unwilling to comply with dismantlement.

—Martin Granovsky, *Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 332.

14 November 1991

Menem meets with Bush in Washington, DC. The US president commends his counterpart's decision "to halt missile proliferation [and thus] create a safer hemisphere, a safer world."

—US Department of State, "Argentine President Carlos Menem Visits Washington, DC," Department of State Dispatch, 18 November 1991, www.lexis-nexis.com.

4 November 1991

The Chancellery sends a letter to a meeting of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) representatives explaining decisions made in aerospace technology matters, stating that the Argentine National Space Activities Commission (CONAE) provides an export control regime on equipment and space technology in accordance with nonproliferation parameters.

—Daniel Santoro, *Operación C3D II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 99.

Late 1991

In his first visit to the United States as Chancellor, Domingo Cavallo meets with US Secretary of State James Baker, who presses his Argentine counterpart to terminate the C3D II. Baker reads a memo prepared by US intelligence agencies, which constitutes Di Tella's first briefing about the missile program. Ambassador to the United States Guido Di Tella and Under-Secretary for Latin American Relations José Luis Fernández Valoni, also attend this meeting.

—Domingo Cavallo, *El peso de la verdad: un impulso a la transparencia en la Argentina de los 90* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1997), p. 18.

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28 August 1991

Argentina announces adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines and principles, and formally requests to become a member.

—Cancillería Argentina, "Report on Non-Proliferation Policy by the Argentine Republic," unofficial (English) translation, Buenos Aires, 1993, p. 5.

28 August 1991

By executive decree 995/91, President Menem dissolves the National Space Research Commission (CNIE) and establishes that all Cóndor II missile elements, parts, and components be disarmed, dismantled, recycled, or rendered unusable, and that the project be cancelled. Scientific staff, facilities, and materials are transferred to the National Space Activities Commission (CONAE), which reports directly to the President of the Republic.

—Conrado F. Varotto, "Argentina y Brasil en la Actividad Espacial," paper prepared for "Seminário Brasil - Argentina," (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais, Ministério das Relações Exteriores), 20-21 November 1997.

26 August 1991

Pentagon officials assert that Argentina is still developing the Cóndor II.

—"Missile Proliferation Chronology," Arms Control Reporter, September 1991, p. 706.

23 August 1991

National Space Research Commission (CNIE) offices are transferred to National Space Activities Commission (CONAE).

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 27.

23 August 1991

National Space Activities Commission (CONAE) President Sahade announces that Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico will begin technical studies to develop a satellite launch vehicle. In regards to the Cóndor II, he says, "For the time being, the only thing I can say is that no one has talked about destroying anything. On the contrary, rather we are thinking about how we can construct space technology."

—"Space Commission to Build Rocket for Satellites," Noticias Argentinas (Buenos Aires), 23 August 1991, cited in Proliferation Issues, 12 September 1991, p. 3.

August 1991

National Space Activities Commission (CONAE) and NASA sign a general agreement on cooperation for peaceful use of space, and a specific accord to develop the first Argentine satellite.

—Cancillería Argentina, "Report on Non-Proliferation Policy by the Argentine Republic," unofficial (English) translation, Buenos Aires, 1993, p. 5.

7 July 1991

Air Force Commander Juliá orders that Falda de Carmen be abandoned.

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—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 213.

4 June 1991

Lawrence Eagleburger meets Foreign Minister Di Tella to congratulate President Menem for his decision on the Cóndor.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 212.

4 June 1991

Clarín reports that astronomer Jorge Sahade will be appointed president of National Space Activities Commission (CONAE) and will be charged with dismantling the Cóndor project, and that Argentina has 30 days to complete an inventory of the National Space Research Commission (CNIE).

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 209.

31 May 1991

The Chilean Army unveils its 40km-range Rayo ("lightning") multiple launch rocket system two days after Argentina announces its decision to dismantle the Cóndor II project. Chile is developing the system with assistance from British Royal Ordnance.

—"On Chile's 'Lightning' Rocket," *Noticias Argentinas* (Buenos Aires), 31 May 1991; cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 24 June 1991, p. 14; Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 208.

28 May 1991

Defense Minister Antonio Erman González announces to the nation the Executive Decision to dismantle, recycle and/or not utilize all of the elements, parts, and components of the Cóndor II, for application to only peaceful ends. He announces that all of National Space Research Commission (CNIE) will become National Commission on Space Activities (CONAE), headed by the president. He announces Argentina's decision to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). He concludes by declaring that far from protecting Argentina's national security, the Cóndor made Argentina more vulnerable, increased instability in other parts of the world, and compromised the nation's prestige.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 198-199; Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 82; Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 88.

28 May 1991

Menem signs National Decree 995/91 to deactivate National Space Research Commission (CNIE) and replace it with the National Commission on Space Activities (Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales; CONAE). The

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decree places the new agency under the "direct and exclusive" jurisdiction of the President of the Nation, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs presiding over an 11-member CONAE directorate, seconded by the Chancellery's Secretary of Foreign Relations and Latin American Affairs. According to the terms of the decree, Argentina "preserves its right to technological and scientific development for peaceful ends...(but) rejects any offensive military utilization of space activities." Article 4 of 955/91 mandates development of a national export control regime for sensitive technology, in conformity with nonproliferation criteria. Article 7 orders the Ministry of Defense to produce within 30 days a complete inventory of all resources located at CNIE headquarters in Buenos Aires, the industrial plant at Falda del Carmen, and the Space Investigations laboratory in San Miguel. All these resources are to be transferred to CONAE, which will also receive and maintain such rights and obligations contracted by CNIE with the firms D.E.A., I.A.S.A., IFAT Corporation, Consultec, Desintec, and Consen that are compatible with the purposes of CONAE. Article 8 specifies that "all elements, parts, and components of the C3 Condor II missile, in all of its versions and stages of development, which exist to date, will be deactivated, dismantled, reconverted and/or unused according to their possibilities for use in pacific applications and ends, in such a manner as to effectuate in incontrovertible and definitive form the complete and irreversible cancellation of the respective project, transferring the scientific personnel, installations, and materials involved to the new National Space Activities Commission (CONAE)."

—Carlos Menem, Erman González, Guido Di Tella, and Domingo Cavallo, "Decreto Nacional 995/91: Creación de la Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales," Boletín Oficial, 3 June 1991, www.medioambiente.gov.ar.

21-23 May 1991

Raúl Matera, Secretary of Science and Technology, negotiates a memorandum of understanding with NASA representatives, by which the US space agency will participate in an Argentine satellite project, the SAC-B, in Buenos Aires in 1994.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil C3 Condor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 207.

17 May 1991

US Ambassador Todman meets with Defense Minister González in the Ministry of Defense, and expresses US preference for destruction of Falda del Carmen. González is opposed to this, but assures that Argentina will adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil C3 Condor II*. Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992, 187.

14 May 1991

Air Force Commander Juliá sanctions Brigadier General Crespo to 30 days house arrest for his statements regarding the C3 Condor.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil C3 Condor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 194; "Cavallo on Background to C3 Condor-2 Project; Gonzalez on Armed Forces," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 May 1991, www.lexis-nexis.com.

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13 May 1991

Defense Ministry spokesperson Faustino Altamirano denies a report that Argentina has or could easily assemble up to 30 Cónдор II missiles, saying "It is impossible. The missile was in the experimental stage. They had been building the prototypes, so it would be impossible to have 30 missiles ready."

—Daniel Drosdoff, "Argentina Pressured to Destroy Missile Capability," UPI, 13 May 1991, www.lexis-nexis.com; Nathaniel C. Nash, "Argentina's President Battles His Own Air Force on Missile," *New York Times*, 13 May 1991, p. 1, www.lexis-nexis.com.

10 May 1991

Brigadier General Crespo declares that if Argentina abandons the Cónдор project, the country will become a "banana republic." Crespo is the only military officer to publicly rebuke the president for his decision. In reaction, Menem orders Air Force Commander Juliá to sanction Crespo. Shortly thereafter, Crespo and Economy Minister Cavallo engage in a heated discussion with Cavallo denouncing the military's association with Iraq.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cónдор II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 81, who cites *La Nación* and *Clarín*, pp. 14, 17, 18 May 1991; Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cónдор II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 193-194.

9 May 1991

Defense Minister González announces on Argentine television the deactivation of the Cónдор II missile project.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cónдор II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 191, 193.

7 May 1991

In a press conference on the Persian Gulf War, journalists question Defense Minister González about the Cónдор.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cónдор II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 81, citing *Clarín* (Buenos Aires), 9 May 1991, p. 9.

6 May 1991

The Defense Ministry issues an official statement that contrary to "published versions today regarding the status of the Cónдор II, the Ministry of Defense has yet to decide whether or not the project will be deactivated." The Ministry spokesman, who reads the statement to reporters over the phone, asserts that during the 4 May meeting, only hypothetical plans were discussed and no definite decisions were made.

—"Deactivation of Cónдор-2 Denied," *Buenos Aires Herald*, 6 May 1991, p. 7, in FBIS-LAT-91-088, 7 May 1991, p. 22.

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—"Deactivation of Cóndor-2 Denied," Buenos Aires Herald, 6 May 1991, p. 7, in FBIS-LAT-91-088, 7 May 1991, p. 22.

6 May 1991

At a public dedication ceremony in Buenos Aires, President Menem remarks that the Cóndor II missile has been totally deactivated, denying the existence of any pressure by the United States or Europe. Menem also rejects reports that there is tension within the Armed Forces over the suspension of the project.

—"Menem: Cóndor-2 Project 'Totally Deactivated'," Telám, 6 May 1991, in FBIS-LAT-91-088, 7 May 1991, p. 22.

5 May 1991

Defense Minister González reports that Argentina is studying the possibility of joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) saying, "This is the healthiest attitude that Argentina can adopt in order to show that we are not engaged in an arms race."

—"Signing of Missile Control Agreement Considered," La Prensa (Buenos Aires), 5 May 1991, pp. 1, 4, in FBIS-LAT-91-088, 7 May 1991, p. 22.

5 May 1991

Defense Minister González offers a public account of this meeting, reporting that no determination has been made and that the work plan is in dispute. He concludes by stating that Menem must resolve the question.

—Daniel Santoro, Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 87.

4 May 1991

Cavallo calls a meeting with Defense Minister González, Foreign Minister Di Tella, Economy Minister Cavallo, and Bauzá to discuss destruction of Falda del Carmen and a "concrete plan" to deactivate the Cóndor II. The ministers agree to cancel the program in time for González's upcoming visit to the United States.

—Anabella Busso, Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 80; Daniel Santoro, Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 86.

Early May 1991

Economy Minister Cavallo, Foreign Minister Di Tella, and Defense Minister González meet again in the Government Palace. Bauzá decides to mediate between Cavallo and González, and calls upon Menem to intervene in a meeting on 4 May.

—Daniel Santoro, Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 85.

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May 1991

Economy Minister Cavallo reportedly demands to know the nature of the project to develop the Cóndor II and charges that an apparent commitment had been made to export the technology without Foreign Ministry or Economy Ministry participation. Cavallo tells former Air Force Commander Brigadier General Ernesto Crespo that this was illegal. Cavallo also states that he did not find a document signed by either former Foreign Minister Dante Caputo, the former Foreign Ministry Undersecretary, or former Economic Coordination Undersecretary, Adolfo Canitrot, authorizing transfer of Cóndor fuel technology.

—"Minister Demands 'Truth on Cóndor II Missile Project'," *Télam* (Buenos Aires), 17 May 1991; cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 24 June 1991, p. 13.

May 1991

Argentine generals prevent a team of US observers from inspecting Falda del Carmen despite President Menem's approval of the visit.

—William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, *Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 478.

16 April 1991

President Menem holds a second meeting on the Cóndor in the Olive Room on Economy Minister Cavallo's request. The president, Cavallo, Foreign Minister Di Tella, Defense Minister González and presidential arbitrator Eduardo Bauzá attend, and begin a bitter interministerial confrontation that continues for 43 days (16 April-28 May 1991). The final result of this clash is a second decision to end the Cóndor project.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 76; Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 125, 179.

5 March 1991

Argentine Defense Minister González denies that his country built the Cóndor II ballistic missile in partnership with Egypt and Iraq, but confirms that Argentina developed Cóndor II technology. González declares that "Argentina has officially decided to totally abandon any such research or development of technology for war purposes....Argentina's missile program is restricted to the development of technology, meteorology atmosphere studies, and medical research."

—"Gonzales Says Cóndor II Prototype 'Never Built'," *EFE*, (Madrid), 5 March 1991; cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 19 March 1991, p. 14.

14 February 1991

Foreign Minister Di Tella announces in a Buenos Aires news conference that US Secretary of State James Baker has agreed to consider an Argentine proposal to recycle Cóndor technology in a joint US-Argentine space project.

—Anne H. Harrison, "Argentina Offers to Work with US on Space Project," *UPI*, 14 February 1991, www.lexis-nexis.com.

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11 February 1991

The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is investigating firms suspected of having exported arms illegally to Iraq. A preliminary report serves as a response to sources of allegations of German involvement: a list compiled by US Senator Jesse Helms naming 62 German arms suppliers to Iraq, and a report by the Simon Wiesenthal Center entitled "The Poison Gas Connection." The following firms are subjects in the on-going investigations: Anlager Bau Contor/Beaujean Consulting Engineers (which produced high-capacity propulsion for rockets); Dango and Dienenthal Maschinbeau GmbH (regarding equipment to work smeltable materials); Havert Handelgesellschaft GmbH (for technical improvement of Scud missiles); H&H Metalform GmbH (rocket bodies and ultra-centrifuges required for rocket casings [*sic*; in fact, centrifuges are not used for casings]); Integral/Saverinformatic/ICME (missile-related computer programs); Inwako (technical improvement of Scud-B missiles). MBB-Transtecnica is also under investigation in connection with criminal proceedings against the Consen subsidiary PBG for exporting calibration instruments used in rocket research. Criminal proceedings have been initiated against Gildemeister Projecta GmbH for serving as a general contractor in Iraqi missile programs, and PBG Project Betreungs GmbH-Bohlen Industrie GmbH for delivering rocket technology. The status of the several cases of alleged illegal missile-related transactions remains unclear at this time: Eltro GmbH (rocket guidance systems); Mauserwerke Oberndorf GmbH (equipment for rocket research); Nickel GmbH (rocket factory air-conditioning technology); Promex Explorations GmbH (rocket technology); Feldix GmbH (rocket technology); Waldrich Siegen Werkzeugmaschinen GmbH (rocket factory machine tools).

—"Report on Firms Involved with Iraqi Arms," *Die Welt* (Bonn), 11 February 1991, p. 6; cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 19 March 1991, pp. 33-39.

February 1991

US Ambassador Todman sends a letter to Defense Minister González asking for something more concrete than the announcement of the missile's deactivation, which Humberto Romero had already made.

—Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 83.

February 1991

Retired Brigadier General and former Argentine Air Force Chief Ernesto Crespo reportedly states that the "Córdoba II project was never sold to Iraq." He cites as evidence the fact that the Argentine-Egyptian project used solid fuel for the missile, while the Iraqi project used liquid fuel, and criticized former Foreign Minister Domingo Cavallo for "giving credence to ill-intentioned magazine reports and for not producing serious evidence."

—"Ex-Air Force Chief Denies Iraqi Missile Deal," *Noticias* (Buenos Aires), 8 February 1991; cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 25 February 1991, p. 16.

February 1991

Foreign Minister Di Tella travels to Washington, DC, where he meets with William Price, an advisor to Brent Scowcroft. Di Tella advises the US officials that the Air Force did not inform him regarding changes in the Córdoba project. He also meets with James Baker, Secretary of State, and agrees to find a means by which Argentina and the United States can apply the Córdoba technology in a cooperative endeavor.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Córdoba II* (Buenos Aires: Edición

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CERIR, 1999), p. 75; Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 143, and *La Nación*, 12 February 1991.

25 January 1991

Minister of Economy Cavallo sends a letter to Juanarena asserting that the *Cóndor* was not as an autonomous Argentine development, but rather a deal by which Argentina received payment in the form of foreign technology in exchange for allowing foreigners to use her territory to conduct business with Iraq.

—César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 51; Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 117; "Crece la polémica en torno del misil *Cóndor II*," *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), 26 January 1991, p. 4; "Texto de la carta que distribuyó la Cancillería," *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), 26 January 1991, p. 4.

25 January 1991

La Nación reports on the differing opinions of Argentine Air Force officials who claim that no work has been done on the *Cóndor* in almost a year and Menem's declarations that decommissioning of the program is almost complete.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 116.

22 January 1991

Minister of Economy Cavallo states that *Cóndor II* development was approved by the Radical Civic Union (UCR) government and received financing from Iraq.

—"Chronology 1991," *Arms Control Reporter*, March 1991.

16 January-28 February 1991

The United States implements Operation Desert Storm.

—US Department of Defense, "The Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Timeline," undated, www.defenselink.mil.

January 1991

German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) makes an official declaration detailing some of its activities related to the *Cóndor* project, stating that it terminated its involvement with the *Cóndor II* in 1986.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 154.

January 1991

Gente interviews Ernesto Crespo, Commander in Chief of the Argentine Air Force, in his home, and asks critically whether the *Cóndor II* was not really more *his* project than that of the Argentine Air Force. Crespo responds that he made the *Cóndor* happen.

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—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 132.

January 1991

The Swiss-based Consen group of companies reportedly has been almost totally liquidated. Switzerland's Consen of Zug has gone into liquidation and IFAT, another key Swiss firm, is proceeding likewise. In Salzburg, Austria, Consen affiliates Delta Consult and Delta System are being "wound down," with one to be liquidated and the other reduced to a token existence. Another related firm, Tema, located in France, is close to being dissolved.

—"Take-Off Delayed," Middle East, January 1991, p. 16.

January 1991

Minister of Economy Cavallo goes on a public offensive against the Cóndor and Radical Civic Union (UCR) officials, and Juanarena seeks to rebut this criticism. Cavallo insinuates that President Alfonsín and his ministers signed secret contracts regarding the Cóndor II, and that bribes were paid to maintain secrecy and facilitate illicit transactions.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 73; "Suborno iraquiano acelerou projeto de míssil argentino," *O Estado De São Paulo*, 7 March 1991, p. 11.

January 1991

By presidential direction and under duress, the Argentine Air Force escorts a dozen US officials on a tour of facilities related to the Cóndor, including sites in San Miguel, Falda del Carmen, Chamental, Fábrica Militar de Aviones de Córdoba, and launch stations in Punta Rasa, Chubut, and Mar Chiquita. At Falda del Carmen, they reportedly viewed mobile missile launchers as well as solid-fuel production facilities. The US officials are not convinced that Cóndor termination has been implemented, and provide a secret written report to US Ambassador Todman, who forwards this information to the Chancellery and the Air Force. Todman and Juanarena meet in the foyer of the Casa Rosada, where Juanarena accuses Todman of sending CIA agents rather than technicians.

—Martin Granovsky, *Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 201-202; Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 74; Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II*. (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 104-105.

1991

The Conversion Plan for the Argentine economy and announcement of the dismantling of the Cóndor project improve US-Argentine economic relations.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 89.

1991

Di Tella meets William Price in Washington and relates that the Argentine government does not know what is

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happening with the Cóndor project and cannot guarantee that missile parts are being destroyed. He also meets with James Baker. After these interviews, US pressure mounts against Argentina.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 143-144.

1991

Cavallo becomes Minister of Economy, and quickly concludes that without terminating the Cóndor, Argentina cannot achieve good relations with the United States or receive debt assistance from the World Bank.

—César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 52.

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1990

10 December 1990

US Ambassador Todman sends a letter to the Economics Minister Erman González (as well as a copy to Chancellor Cavallo), stating that Argentine public officials had demanded substantial payment for the import of machinery from the US firm Swift-Armour.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 72, who cites Página 12 as reporting the allegation.

5 December 1990

Despite a violent military uprising of the *carapintada* ("painted faces," referring to camouflage adopted by the disaffected junior Army officers) just days earlier, George Bush visits Buenos Aires in part to show support for Menem and for democratic rule in Argentina. In a joint press conference, an Argentine journalist asks Bush and Menem what the United States will do for Argentina, in light of its contribution of two naval vessels to the US-led Gulf War coalition. Menem states the Argentine contribution was to world order and international law, not for any reward. He declares, "We have a friendship with the United States which is really unprecedented. But it was not in that framework that we acted. We do not seek any retribution or any reward. That would be undignified. And if there is anything that the Argentines are known for, it is their sense of dignity. We don't want any help or aid. We want to work with the United States and other countries to preserve peace, which is tantamount to saying to preserve life. We do not seek any counterpart or anything in return. And in fact, were it offered, we would not accept it."

—"Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Buenos Aires, Argentina," *Public Papers of the President*, (College Station, TX: George Bush Presidential Library, 5 December 1990), <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu>.

3 December 1990

Fourth and final *carapintada* ("painted faces," referring to camouflage adopted by the disaffected junior Army officers) military uprising takes place. Menem orders loyal troops to crush the rebellion and the uprising ends in less than 24 hours resulting in 13 deaths. President Menem's firm handling of the situation draws praise from

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President Bush, who visits two days later.

—Deborah L. Norden, *Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), p. 149; Luigi Manzetti, *Institutions, Parties, and Coalitions in Argentine Politics* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), pp. 195-196.

December 1990

The US-based (Minneapolis) firm Honeywell begins an internal investigation of its involvement in development of fuel-air explosives for Egyptian and Iraqi ballistic missiles. Honeywell appoints an outside law firm to investigate its involvement.

—"Honeywell Implicated in FAE Work," *Flight International*, 12 December 1990, www.lexis-nexis.com; "A Bigger Blast," *Middle East*, January 1991, p. 15-16.

December 1990

Menem appoints Cavallo as Minister of Economy, Di Tella as Chancellor, and González as Minister of Defense.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 73.

22 November 1990

Cavallo divulges even more clandestine aspects of the Cóndor II project, revealing President Alfonsín's authorization of the project by secret decree. He emphasizes the necessity for complete transparency regarding the program.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 114.

November 1990

The Consen firms, including Consen itself, IFAT, Delta Consult, Delta System, and Tema, are being liquidated. Former German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm's (MBB) missile specialists have retired, as a result of adverse publicity, government pressures, and threats to their physical safety.

—Alan George, "Condor Missile Firms on Verge of Collapse," *Independent*, 13 November 1990, www.lexis-nexis.com.

1 October 1990

Meeting at the White House, President Menem tells President Bush that the Cóndor program has been "completely deactivated." In a subsequent press conference, US Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson says that US officials believe Menem is sincere in his commitment to terminate the Cóndor, and describes this as "a major achievement in reducing the threat of missile proliferation." Aronson notes that Iraq and Libya had been potential customers for the missile and associated technologies.

—Bernard Aronson, "Transcript of Briefing," *Federal News Service*, 1 October 1990.

October 1990

Following Menem's meeting with President Bush, Chancellery and Ministry of Defense officials consider political and legal aspects of dismantling or recycling Cóndor components for civilian use. Justice Minister León Carlos

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Arslanian provides a memo finding that the destruction of such components would not constitute a crime of treason, as Air Force officers argue on the basis of the Code of Military Justice.

—Martin Granovsky, *Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman*, (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 331.

October 1990

An unattributed report asserts that Project *Betreuungs GmbH* (PBG) of Germany assisted in arming Iraq. Senior Public Prosecutor Friedrich Bethke states that PBG conveyed sensitive technologies to Iraq via Argentina and Egypt. PBG allegedly delivered German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm's (MBB) blueprints for fuel-air bombs to Iraq through Egypt, as well as parts of MBB's *Cóndor* missile system through Buenos Aires to Iraq. The German government could not confirm whether PBG had helped establish an R&D center for missile construction in Iraq. —"Firm Probed for Sending Arms Technology to Iraq," *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), 22 October 1990, p. 15; cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 15 November 1990, p. 25.

October 1990

Defense Minister Humberto Romero and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces José Juliá conclude that the proposed visit by US technicians to *Cóndor* facilities cannot be avoided.

—Martin Granovsky, *Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 201.

19 September 1990

Clarín publishes a statement by Juanarena, who asserts that Iraq was never involved in any way in the *Cóndor* project.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 42.

18 September 1990

Chancellor Cavallo and Defence Minister Romero appear before the Argentine Congress to inform legislators of the decision to send troops to the Persian Gulf. Cavallo also informs Deputy Conrado Storani (UCR) that Iraq had participated in development of the *Cóndor*. To prove this allegation, he shows Storani Secret Decree 1315 that Alfonsín signed in 1987. Cavallo thus begins his political campaign against the *Cóndor II*.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 42; Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 113.

Mid to late September 1990

Following Commodore Miguel Guerrero's meeting with US officials on 12 September, President Menem publicly announces the halting of the *Cóndor* program, and secretly orders the Air Force to desist from developing the missile.

—Martin Granovsky, *Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman*, (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 196-201.

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12 September 1990

Comodore Miguel Guerrero, president of the National Space Research Commission (CNIE), chairs a meeting of US and Argentine officials regarding the Cóndor program. The encounter includes the executive secretary of the Space Activities Program of the Ministry of Science and Technology, Jorge Ferrante; Chancellery official Gustavo Zlauvinen; the Science Counselor in the US Embassy, Paul Maxwell; and US embassy officials Douglas Shaffer and Stephen Geis. The US officials press Guerrero to clarify questions regarding the Cóndor, and Maxwell reportedly states that he "has instructions from my government to definitively clarify the Cóndor issue as an unavoidable condition for proceeding with bilateral space cooperation. If we do not clarify it, there will be no launch of a joint satellite." The US officials request that a group of US technicians be permitted to visit Falda del Carmen.

—Martin Granovsky, *Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 199-200; Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), pp. 70-71.

6 September 1990

Todman submits an unsigned "nonpaper" to the Argentine chancellor, minister of defense, and chief of the General Staff of the Air Force, requesting information regarding the Cóndor program.

—Martin Granovsky, *Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman*, (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 199.

September 1990

The United States reportedly steps up pressure on German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB), through a coded telex to the German Foreign Ministry stating that MBB's "alleged deliveries" for a "fuel-air explosive" project is "particularly critical." Iraq is the first third world country to possess this MBB product.

—"MBB Said Main Supplier of Weapons to Iraq," *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), 24 September 1990, pp. 32-34; cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 16 October 1990, pp. 10-11.

September 1990

Foreign Minister Cavallo reaches a verbal agreement with Lawrence Eagleburger regarding the Cóndor project. Argentina agrees that it will not export the missile technology, that its missile development activities will be transparent, that the two countries will cooperate on missile issues, and that Argentine and US diplomats will plan meetings to discuss nuclear issues.

—Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 55.

22 August 1990

Foreign Minister Cavallo announces that Argentina will eliminate all possible shipments of aerospace technology to Iraq.

—"Aerospace Technology Shipments to Iraq Eliminated," *Buenos Aires Domestic Service*, 22 August 1990, cited in *FBIS-LAT-90-164*, 23 August 1990.

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7 August 1990

Responding to UN Security Council economic and military sanctions imposed against Iraq, Defense Minister Humberto Romero declares that Argentina has never sold weapons to Iraq.

—"Defense Minister Denies Sale of Weapons to Iraq," Buenos Aires DYN, 7 August 1990, cited in FBIS-LAT-90-153, 8 August 1990.

2 August 1990

Iraq invades Kuwait. Coalition forces attack Iraq and Iraqi forces in Kuwait on 16 January 1991, and Iraq accepts a cease-fire agreement on 6 April.

—US Department of Defense, "The Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Timeline," undated, www.defenselink.mil.

20 July 1990

President Menem signs Secret Decree 1373, which dissolves the INTESA consortium and rescinds its contracts to develop and export missile technology, and also places Falda del Carmen under the jurisdiction of the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. The decree orders the technical staff of the C3D effort to transfer all elements of the program to the National Space Research Commission (CNIE).

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso C3D II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), pp. 34, 72; Martin Granovsky, *Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 200-201; César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el C3D II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 52.

July 1990

The last C3D test is conducted at the Chacabuco Airbase in La Rioja Province, in which a stage of the missile travels over 160km.

—"Defense Minister Denies Missile Pact With Iraq," DYN (Buenos Aires), 21 April 1990; cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 7 May 1990, pp. 29-30.

30 June 1990

The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assesses Iraq's ballistic missile programmatic efforts, including those based on the C3D program. At this time, Iraq is developing five distinct missile programs. Although the more ambitious C3D II will take longer to develop than the Iraqi-produced Al-Husayn and Al-Abbas missiles, it will be "easier to handle, require less preparation time before launch, offer more payload options, and provide better accuracy and range." The CIA estimates that the solid-fueled C3D II missile system will have a range of 750-1,000km, carry a payload of approximately 500kg, and employ a submunition warhead design. When Iraq begins to produce the system, it will likely modify the warhead submunition design to enable it to deliver chemical and/or biological weapon agents.

Judging that it will be "difficult, if not impossible, to stop" Iraqi ballistic missile projects, the CIA estimates that with continued foreign assistance, Iraq will commence production of the C3D II by the early 1990s; however, halting external aid could delay production to the mid-to-late 1990s. Iraq will likely face technical challenges in "guidance

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and control, second-stage configuration, and flight-testing," which could be surmounted through external assistance. Through its work on the Cóndor, Iraq may gain experience applicable to its other missile programs, e.g., in such areas as stage separation. Regardless of the status of the Argentine and Egyptian Cóndor II projects, the CIA anticipates that Iraq will continue to seek technical assistance from both countries with its Cóndor project. While Egypt had been Iraq's main contact in the past, the CIA expects closer ties with Argentina in the future. The agency reports, "Our growing concern is that Argentina and Egypt—despite claims of withdrawing from the program—will continue development of the Cóndor II through Iraq. Argentine and Egyptian engineers may train at Iraqi production facilities, which are similar to these in Argentina and almost identical to ones in Egypt. Argentina and Egypt could begin indigenous production with little or no notice shortly after its [*sic*] engineers return from Iraq. We believe Iraq will be the first of the three to produce the Cóndor II."

This CIA assessment is based on information available as of 29 May 1990, and is largely based on analysis of Iraqi foreign procurement efforts. The CIA also declares, "Although we have not identified a formal, coordinated nuclear weapons program, we believe Iraq's activities, especially its covert nuclear procurement, strongly suggest a weapons program exists."

—US Central Intelligence Agency, *Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments: An Intelligence Assessment* (Washington, DC: Directorate of Intelligence, 30 June 1990), classified "Top Secret," declassified excerpts released 5 March 1998, www.foia.ucia.gov, pp. 4-6, 10, 12, 20-21, 29.

June 1990

Juliá meets with Welsh again in Washington, DC and reaffirms that the Argentine government has decided to suspend the Cóndor project.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 69.

14 May 1990

Juliá meets in Washington, DC, with US State Department official Reginald Bartholomew, who presses for an end to the Cóndor project. In response, Juliá declares "But the project no longer exists. It died." To which Bartholomew responds, "Yes, the project has died many times, but still it continues dying."

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 69.

25 April 1990

President Menem announces that construction of the Cóndor II was halted "some time ago" for lack of resources. He also admits that the decision was made to avoid a confrontation with the United States and other countries. The Argentine government expects that freezing the project will help Argentina gain access to the US aeronautics market. In a subsequent statement, Air Force Chief of Staff Juliá rules out the possibility that the Cóndor II could have upset the balance of power saying, "I am amused by everything said abroad about the project because it is incredible for anyone to think that the 'Condor II' project could endanger peace in the Middle East or that it could upset the balance of power."

—"Menem Says Missile Scrapped Over US Concern," *Clarín*, 25 April 1990, p. 8, cited in FBIS-LAT-90-081, 26 April

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1990, p. 20; "Air Force Chief's Statement," *Telam* (Buenos Aires), 27 April 1990, cited in FBIS JPRS-TND-90-009, 15 May 1990, p. 10.

21 April 1990

After eight months of political pressure, Argentine Defense Minister Humberto Romero announces that although the *Cóndor* "in no way signified a risk or danger to anyone," the project has been "halted. It is not going ahead because of a political decision and lack of funds. The project is frozen." This is the first official announcement of the halting of the project.

—"Condor Missile Project Halted," AP, 22 April 1990, www.lexis-nexis.com; "Defense Minister Says Condor II Project Halted," *Clarín*, 27 April 1990, p. 3, cited in FBIS-LAT-90-082, 27 April 1990, 12; Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 67; Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 67; Martin Granovsky, *Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman*, (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 195.

1 April 1990

According to a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Intelligence Assessment, "[a]ll the solid propellant missile production projects in Egypt, Argentina, and Iraq are highly dependent on the influx of Western technology obtained from the Consen Group. Similarly these Consen companies need these overseas markets to keep afloat financially. Because of the creation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in April 1987, covert cooperation took on added importance."

—US Defense Intelligence Agency, "The Grey Arms Market: Methods of Maintaining Covert Business Relationships," Intelligence Assessment declassified and partially released, available through the Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com>.

April 1990

Argentina reportedly has produced five prototypes of the *Cóndor II* at Falda del Carmen. Project head Colonel Louis Guerrero (name as reported in original) says that there is an international campaign against Argentine production of the *Cóndor II*, "because the United States never forgave us for transferring technology to Iraq that permitted that country to build its own missiles in a much shorter time."

—"Motivation Discussed," EFE (Madrid), 28 April 1990; cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 15 May 1990, pp. 9-10.

March 1990

Jonathan Moyle, a reporter for *Defence Helicopter World*, is found hanging in a hotel room in Santiago, Chile. Chilean police initially rule the death a suicide. A Chilean judge later reopens the case and it is found that Moyle had been drugged, suffocated with a pillow, and injected in the heel with a lethal substance, with his body left to appear as if he committed suicide. It is theorized that Moyle is killed in response to his investigation of arms trafficking between Iraq and Chile, particularly his investigation of Carlos Cardoen, a Chilean arms manufacturer with links to Saddam Hussein.

—AFP, "Misterioso asesinato," *Clarín*, 28 February 1998, www.clarin.com.ar; Colin Baraclough, "Who Killed

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Jonathan Moyle? A British Journalist and the Iraqgate Factor," Columbia Journalism Review, July/Aug 1993, www.cjr.org.

March 1990

The Iraqi ambassador to Rome, Muhammad Sa'id al-Sahhaf, reportedly denies that the Iraqi Cóndor Project received financing from Italy. He also denies that Iraq is cooperating with Argentina on the Cóndor.

—"Italian Role In Missile Project Denied," Ansa (Rome), 31 March 1990; cited in Nuclear Developments, 31 March 1990, p. 16.

March 1990

General Larry Welsh, US Air Force Chief of Staff, presses Brigadier General Juliá regarding the Cóndor.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II. Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992, p. 69.

26 February 1990

Argentina and Britain formally reestablish diplomatic relations, which had been severed with the 1982 conflict over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands.

—"Flags Fly again as Links with Argentina Resume," Daily Telegraph, 27 February 1990, www.lexis-nexis.com.

25 January 1990

Foreign Minister Cavallo sends a private letter to Juanarena accusing him of making grave political errors, specifically of allowing missile technology to be shipped from Argentina.

—Daniel Santoro, Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 68.

1990

The United States increases pressure on the Argentine Air Force to terminate the Cóndor.

—Anabella Busso, Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 69.

1990

By this time, the third developmental phase of the Cóndor was to be completed.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 26.

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1989

21 December 1989

The US Joint Chiefs send a report to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) regarding Argentine press accounts of the development of the Cóndor missile. The report concludes saying, "[passage deleted] – is the project dead or

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not? President Menem had ordered the project dropped in October, yet November and December were full of indications that the missile was anything but dropped. Source immediately tightened up and became more controlled in his conversation."

—US Department of Defense, "IIR [Excised] Cóndor II Missile," Intelligence report declassified and partially released, available through the Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com>.

December 1989

Experts report that the al-Abid, Iraq's three-stage, 48-ton satellite launch missile, is not (as had been previously alleged) a Cóndor II missile. According to experts who viewed a videotape of the 7 December 1989 launch of the al-Abid, the faint smoke plume emanating from the rocket was indicative of a liquid-fueled motor, while the Cóndor II has a solid-fuel engine. Further, the Cóndor has only two stages, whereas three stages can be seen on the tape of the al-Abid launch. According to Gary Milhollin of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, five motors can be seen in the first stage, which he suggests are either Scuds or elongated Scuds welded together. This would suggest that the al-Abid is not wholly indigenously produced, but rather an adaptation of Soviet missiles similar to the al-Abbas and al-Hussein missiles. Argentine and Egyptian engineers are reportedly present for the launch.

—"Iraq Heavy Missile Launch Definitely Not Cóndor II," *Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly*, January 1990-4 February 1990, p. 1; US Department of Defense, "IIR [Excised] Cóndor II Missile," Intelligence report declassified and partially released, available through the Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com>.

27 November 1989

Juliá says that further testing of the Cóndor II is unnecessary, and politically inadvisable, as it would be "misinterpreted" by countries seeking to poison Argentine-US relations.

—"Argentina Air Force Exhibits Technical Developments; COS on Cóndor 2 Project and Pampa Aircraft," *Noticias Argentinas*, 1 December 1989, www.lexis-nexis.com.

22 November 1989

The US Congress rescinds the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment, which had banned arms sales to Argentina since 1977.

—Carlos Saul Menem, *Estados Unidos, Argentina y Carlos Menem*, (San Isidro: Editorial CEYNE, 1990), p. 202.

November 1989

Swedish arms export control authorities are investigating the alleged involvement of the defense firm Bofors in the Cóndor program.

—John Burton, "Swedish Government Investigates Bofors Over Missile Claims," *Financial Times*, 8 November 1989, www.lexis-nexis.com.

29 October 1989

Bush and Menem meet in Costa Rica, where Bush urges his Argentine counterpart not to transfer any dangerous missile technology to Saddam Hussein.

—Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 73.

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October 1989

Five US senators formally request that the US Secretary of Defense investigate whether the German firm MBB provided fuel-air explosive (FAE) technology to Iraq in the course of its participation in the Egyptian-Iraqi Cónдор II project. In addition, they express concern that FAE technology may have been transferred to Iraq illegally from the United States.

—"FAEs for Iraq," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 20 October 1990, p. 739.

October 1989

Juliá reportedly states that the Cónдор II project will continue despite US objections conveyed to President Menem. Juliá says that criticism is superficial, and that concern was expressed only at low levels during the president's recent trip to the United States. He declares that the Cónдор project was planned in 1977-78 with the objective of creating a launch vehicle that could place satellites into orbit. By adjusting trajectory and load the missile could conceivably "carry anything," even a nuclear warhead, and would thereby act as a deterrent. Juliá claims that the United States is in fact *not* worried that Argentina might export this technology to counties that could cause an imbalance of power in certain regions, nor that Argentina would master this missile technology. —"Cónдор II Project To Continue," *DYN* (Buenos Aires), 5 October 1989, cited in *Proliferation Issues*, 26 October 1989, p. 21.

October 1989

The Argentine Air Force tests the FAS-320 Tabano, or "Horsefly," tactical rocket. The Tabano is an upgraded version of the Alacrán, and a precursor of the proposed Cónдор II satellite launch vehicle. The Tabano is 6.3m in length, can carry a 500kg warhead, and is designed to carry a cluster bomb device capable of destroying an area of four hectare at a range of 100km.

—"Argentina Trial-Launches New Weapons," *Defence*, October 1989, p. 749.

27 September 1989

Menem and Cavallo meet with US President George Bush for 45 minutes, and Bush urges them to suspend development of the Cónдор. Cavallo concludes that the missile project is jeopardizing US-Argentine economic relations. Brigadier General José Antonio Juliá also meets with officials in the Pentagon and with senior members of Congress to discuss the Cónдор II. He informs them that at this time, Argentina has developed only a solid-fuel engine and the missile airframe, but has not developed a guidance system. In fact, guidance development has been halted for several months due to lack of funding. Juliá attempts to strike a deal when the conversation changes to a brief discussion of the Pampa. Juliá next meets with Nancy Doran, Under Secretary of Defense, who tells him clearly that the program must end or Argentina will receive no credits or assistance from the United States. Finally, Juliá meets with Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary of State for Nuclear Affairs and Disarmament, who grills him on the Cónдор II and on Argentine nuclear capabilities, Juliá realizes that these vexing issues are former Brigadier General Crespo's legacies for him. In a subsequent press conference at the headquarters of the Organization of American States (OAS), Menem states that he will continue the Cónдор project despite US opposition, saying "We are not developing it for war, we can develop it for peace. These are the arguments used by the great powers. Argentina can use them, too."

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y*

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destrucción del misil Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 54-55; "Menem Tours Washington, Announces IMF Accord," Inter Press Service, 27 September 1987.

19 September 1989

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) issues an assessment on the smuggling activities of Abdelkader Helmy to the US Attorney for the Eastern District of California. It notes that "[w]ithout the activities of Dr. Helmy, and his co-conspirators, in procuring restricted technology, completion of the Cóndor missile program is doubtful."

—US Defense Intelligence Agency, "Assessment on the Activities of Abdel Kader Helmy, et al. and the Egyptian/Iraqi Cóndor Missile Program," 19 September 1989, cited in *United States v Abdelkader Helmy, et al.*, S 88 201 RAR (1989).

19 September 1989

Assistant Secretary of State John H. Kelly tells a US House of Representatives panel that Egypt has terminated its cooperation with Iraq on the Cóndor II, but does not comment on why Egypt withdrew from the project.

—David B. Ottaway, "Egypt Drops Out of Missile Project; State Department Official Offers No Details on Iraqi Program," *Washington Post*, 20 September 1989, p. A32.

16 September 1989

US Undersecretary of State for military affairs Robert Decain urges opposition to the Cóndor in discussions with Argentine Vice Chancellor Mario Campora and Minister of Defense Italo Luder. In London, US Vice President Dan Quayle makes a public statement saying the United States will continue to put pressure on countries (principally Germany and Italy) involved with the Cóndor II project.

—Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 50.

14 September 1989

An editorial in the *Tehran Times*, in reference to the Cóndor II project, warns that the Argentine president should think carefully about the dangers of setting off an arms race in the Middle East.

—"Iraqi Effort to Get Nuclear Missiles Viewed," *Tehran Times*, 14 September 1989, p. 2, cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 26 October 1989, p. 2.

7 September 1989

The Iraqi Embassy states that there is no plan to develop Cóndor missiles with Argentina or with any other state. The Embassy notes that while Iraq now possesses the capability of manufacturing medium-range missiles indigenously, Argentina does not.

—"Embassy Comments on Report," *Ina* (Baghdad), 7 September 1989, cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 6 October 1989, p. 20.

September 1989

Menem discusses the Cóndor with Libyan President Moammar Khaddafi while both are in Belgrade for meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Khaddafi reportedly argues that only with military power can one gain

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advantage against the Americans, and that this motivates his keen interest in the C3D missile. According to meeting participant and Menem cabinet minister Domingo Cavallo, Khaddafi "makes it clear that he had supported Menem's electoral campaign in exchange for a promise to begin negotiations on exporting the missile to Libya." Menem responds evasively, arguing the missile is ineffectual and lacks a guidance system, but Khaddafi replies that what matters is the Americans' belief that it is a potent system, and that for Libya, even an unguided missile would serve as long as it arouses great concern among the Americans. After the meeting, Menem remarks to Cavallo that his advisors have irresponsibly sold the C3D to Khaddafi for electoral contributions, and that this realization reinforces his determination to halt the program as soon as possible.

—Domingo Cavallo, *El peso de la verdad: un impulso a la transparencia en la Argentina de los 90* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1997), pp. 19-21; "Cavallo destapa nuevos esc3ndalos," *La Naci3n*, 27 June 1997, www.lanacion.com.ar; "Los acuerdos y compromisos secretos de Menem y los 3rabes," *R3o Negro*, 11 January 2000, www.rionegro.com.ar.

September 1989

The Egyptian government terminates the Badr-2000 missile project and ends its involvement with the C3D.

—Daniel Santoro, *Operaci3n C3D II: la historia secreta del misil que desmantel3 Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 42.

23 August 1989

In his first trip abroad as President, Carlos Menem issues a joint declaration on missile technology with his Brazilian counterpart, Fernando Collor de Mello. The two presidents sign the Argentine-Brazilian Joint Declaration on Bilateral Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. This declaration forms the Argentine-Brazilian Joint Working Group on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which meets annually and includes representatives from the Chancelleries and space agencies of both countries. The Working Group coordinates activities of the two countries on international laws related to space, and gives rise to Joint Technical Meetings held periodically with representatives from the respective space agencies of Argentina and Brazil, CONAE and the Instituto Nacional de Pesquisa Espaciales (INPE).

—Conrado F. Varotto, "Argentina y Brasil en la Actividad Espacial," paper prepared for "Semin3rio Brasil - Argentina," (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Pesquisa de Rela33es Internacionais, Minist3rio das Rela33es Exteriores), 20-21 November 1997; Maria Izabel Mallmann and Vera Seitenfus, "Cronologia do Mercosul 1985-1999," (Centro Brasileiro de Documenta33o e Estudos da Bacia do Prata, CEDEP/UFRGS, undated).

14 August 1989

The Italian government brings charges against nine former employees of the National Industrial Applications Company (SNIA), BPD (Defense Division), for the sale of medium-range ballistic missile components to Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq. Other individuals are charged as a result of the investigation, but not taken into custody.

—"Charges Filed In Missile Parts Sales To Argentina," *L'Unita* (Milan), 30 June 1989, p. 6; cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 14 August 1989, p. 41.

30 July 1989

Giorgio Santacroce, an Italian prosecutor, accuses Consen and INTESA directors of illegal sales of military arms

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components.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 101.

29 July 1989

Italian police detain nine former National Industrial Applications Company (SNIA) technicians on charges of illicit arms trade and collaboration in the Cóndor II missile project. They are Riccardo Cechetti, president of Conser (Rome); Eugenio Renzulli, former president of Intes (Rome) and director of Conser; Silvano Lustrati, president of Intea (Rome); Sandro Fagioli, president of Intes; Mario del Papa, managing director of Meg and Rata (Aprilia); Roberto Coculo, an employee of Conser and Intes; Vittorio Baglioni, former technical manager of Rata and current manager of Camma (Aprilia); Alberto Loy, former director of Intes; and Pietro Spadetta, managing director of Conser. Twenty Swiss, German, Austrian, and Argentine "front" companies are also implicated. Authorities search SNIA headquarters and warehouses of both SNIA and Rata seizing missile parts and nozzle components.

Authorities also search the offices of Microtecnica in Turin and the Institute for Advanced Technology (IFAT) in Zurich.

—Antonio Cipriani, "Italian 'Córdors' to Argentina: Missile Trafficking Discovered," *L'Unita* (Milan), 30 July 1989, p. 6; in "Charges Filed in Missile Parts Sales to Argentina," FBIS-WEU-89-151, 8 August 1989, p. 6.

19 July 1989

Brigadier General José Antonio Juliá becomes head of the Argentine Air Force.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 37.

8 July 1989

Carlos Menem assumes the presidency. Shortly before taking power, President Menem states in *La Nación* that Argentina does not have the political capacity nor the international standing to sustain a missile project such as the Cóndor. He takes office facing economic crisis, with inflation running at 150% per month, and the country \$4 billion in arrears in payments on its \$64 billion foreign debt.

—César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), pp. 50-51; Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 37; Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 3rd ed. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 110.

5 July 1989

Air Force officials conduct the third and final test-launch of the Alacrán missile at Chamental, with president-elect Carlos Menem reportedly in attendance.

—Vann Van Diepen, ["intelligence document"], secret, date not known but circa 1992; translated and published in Martin Granovsky, *Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman*, (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 343.

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July 1989

Nine former employees of SNIA-BPD, which is controlled by the Italian firm Fiat, are under investigation by Italian judicial and intelligence officials for illegal activities connected with the C3ndor II program. Fiat denies involvement with the C3ndor II, but acknowledges that SNIA-BPD collaborated with the German firm Messerschmitt-B3olkow-Blohm (MBB) in developing the C3ndor I.

—John Wyles, "Fiat Link Suspected in C3ndor Missile Probe," *Financial Times*, 31 July 1989, www.lexis-nexis.com

July 1989

International pressures, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and technical difficulties bring the C3ndor II program virtually to a halt in Argentina and Egypt. In particular, technical setbacks in guidance and control have prevented Argentina from conducting an initial flight test of the missile.

—US Central Intelligence Agency, *Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments: An Intelligence Assessment* (Washington, DC: Directorate of Intelligence, 30 June 1990), classified "Top Secret," declassified excerpts released 5 March 1998, www.foia.ucia.gov, p. 9; Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcci3n y destrucci3n del misil C3ndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 130.

30 June 1989

Consen files for bankruptcy in Switzerland.

—Kenneth Timmerman, *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), p. 151.

11 June 1989

At a party given by the Argentine Air Force, US Ambassador to Argentina Terence Todman attempts to discuss the C3ndor project with Commander in Chief of the Argentine Air Force Ernesto Crespo. Crespo tells Todman that he will only discuss the matter with Larry Welsh, head of the US Air Force, or Todman's superiors at the US State Department.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcci3n y destrucci3n del misil C3ndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 15-16.

May 1989

Hyperinflation and economic contraction provoke food riots in Argentine cities, a traumatic national experience for a country accustomed to agricultural abundance and worldwide recognition as a leading agro-exporter.

Contemporaneous electoral defeat by Peronist candidate Carlos Saul Menem leads President Alfons3n to announce that he will resign from office six months before his term is to expire.

—Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 3rd ed., (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 109.

15 April 1989

President Mubarak of Egypt removes his Minister of Defense Ghazala.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcci3n y destrucci3n del misil C3ndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 89, 190.

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14 April 1989

Speaking in San Rafael de Mendoza, President-elect Carlos Menem makes statements in favor of continuing with the Cóndor, describing it as a peaceful project.

—Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 57; Rogelio Garcia Lupo, Newton Carlos, and Juan Jorge Faundes, *El Arsenal Sudamericano de Saddam Hussein*, (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editorial Zeta S.A., 1991), p. 100.

April 1989

West German Minister of Defense Rupert Scholz complies with the request of Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens to investigate the participation of German firms in the Cóndor II project. William Waldgrave, British Vice Minister of the Foreign Office, expresses concern on a special BBC report that the Argentines could use the Cóndor to target the Malvinas. US Vice President Dan Quayle states in an interview that the United States pressured Bonn to curtail German commercial activities in the Cóndor project.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 24.

10 April 1989

In a BBC documentary entitled "The Cóndor Conspiracy," the Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces, Major General Ehud Barak, charges that the German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) is "responsible for the overall planning of the [Cóndor] project and for the systems in it." West German Customs officials had raided MBB offices just days earlier. In response, West German Defense Minister Rupert Scholz tells Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens that although his government currently "lacks sufficient information," it will conduct a through investigation of MBB's alleged involvement. An unidentified source in the West German Foreign Ministry says that some officials in Bonn must already know about MBB's connection with the Cóndor, as the leading firm has very close ties with the government. MBB issues a statement admitting the company carried out a feasibility study for the Cóndor II as late as 1987. Sources inside MBB also admit they are still supplying parts for a missile research laboratory in Iraq (Saad 16). The documentary concludes with the prediction, "Thanks to European engineers, the Cóndor-2 prototype will fly in the next year. Then it will be for sale, and the West cannot control who will buy it."

—David Horovitz, "Bonn Helping Arabs Develop Nuclear Missile," *Jerusalem Post*, 11 April 1989, www.lexis-nexis.com; Menachem Shalev, "Bonn Doesn't Know 'Enough' about Cóndor Missile," *Jerusalem Post*, 12 April 1989, www.lexis-nexis.com "The Cóndor Conspiracy," *BBC Panorama*, 10 April 1989.

April 1989

The Brazilian newspaper *O Estado De São Paulo* subsequently reports that the Argentine Air Force successfully tests the Cóndor II at Falda del Carmen at this time. However, Busso later quotes an unidentified high-ranking Air Force official, who insists that the Cóndor II was never test flown.

—"Iraqi Bribes in Cóndor II Missile Project Viewed," *O Estado De São Paulo*, 7 March 1991; cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 28 March 1991, p. 11; Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 39; "Suborno iraquiano acelerou projeto de míssil argentino," *O Estado De São Paulo*, 7 March 1991, p. 11.

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3 March 1989

Página 12 reports that the Cóndor missile is scheduled for testing in Patagonia over a 504km range.

— "Argentine Newspaper Says Condor Project with Egypt Cancelled for Sake of Israeli Deal," *Noticias Argentinas*, 4 April 1989; in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 April 1989, www.lexis-nexis.com.

25 January 1989

US Senator Jeff Bingaman (Democrat, New Mexico) sends a letter to Secretary of State James Baker expressing concerns about an export license that the US firm LTV has requested to export rocket technology to SNIA-BPD. Bingaman believes that no license should be granted because of SNIA's involvement with the Cóndor II project. Baker replies that Bingaman's concerns will be taken into account when a final decision is made.

— Jeff Bingaman, Letter to James A. Baker, 25 January 1989, declassified and released, available through the Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com>; James A. Baker, Draft reply to Senator Jeff Bingaman, [date unclear], declassified and released, available through the Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com>.

17 January 1989

Wilhelm Vullride is appointed director of Consen.

— "Profil Views Involvement In Iraq Arms Plant," *Profil* (Vienna), 24 April 1989, pp. 38-42; cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 5 May 1989, pp. 34-36.

1989

The DOT missile production complex near Baghdad undergoes its first operational test.

— "Further Transfers Of Military Technology Reported," *Profil* (Vienna), 8 May 1989, pp. 29-31; cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 23 May 1989, pp. 39-42.

1989

The German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) admits to BBC Panorama that it was involved in the Cóndor project, but says it withdrew in 1985 after determining that the program was oriented toward military purposes. German Minister of State Erich Riedl supports this claim, saying "nothing illegal has taken place." However, according to a company source, an MBB subsidiary, Transtechnica, continued work on warhead development. MBB also admits that it carried out a feasibility study for the Cóndor II as late as 1987. It also acknowledges that it continued to supply parts for Sa'ad 16, near Mosul in Iraq, and was due to begin working there in the summer of 1989. Adolf Hammer, former MBB head of military research, continues to work in Argentina after the company's withdrawal, and now directs Switzerland's Institute for Advanced Technology's (IFAT) in Salzburg.

— "The Cóndor Conspiracy," BBC Panorama, 10 April 1989.

1989

Terence Todman becomes US ambassador to Argentina.

— US State Department, "Chiefs of Mission," www.state.gov.

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1988-1986

21 December 1988

Air Force officials conduct the second flight-test of the Alacrán missile at Chamental, reportedly to test a sub-munition warhead.

—Vann Van Diepen, ["intelligence document"], secret, date not known but circa 1992; translated and published in Martin Granovsky, *Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 343.

End of 1988

Italian production of fins for the Cóndor remains stymied. Albino Bertolina, who oversees the production of the fins and airframes, decides instead to produce both at Falda de Carmen.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 130, 139.

End of 1988

The Iranian Ambassador is brought to Falda del Carmen to prove that the Scud missiles that Iraq is launching at Iran are from the Soviet Union, and have different characteristics than those of the Cóndor II.

—Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 28.

End of 1988

A bomb explodes in front of a truck that was to transport German and Italian technicians to the Egyptian missile production plant, Factory 17.

—Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 28.

December 1988

Colonel Mohamed Alí Seineldín leads the third *carapintada* uprising ("painted faces," referring to camouflage adopted by the disaffected junior Army officers), of Villa Martelli. Seineldín has taken over for Rico, who is in jail. He demands a further reorganization of the army high command, a bigger defense budget, a public vindication of the "dirty war," and amnesty for all those who mutinied. The uprising ends after eight days. Although the Argentine government publicly denies any concessions publicly, military salaries are increased and the military budget is expanded.

—Deborah L. Norden, *Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 131-132; Uigi Manzetti, *Institutions, Parties, and Coalitions in Argentine Politics* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), pp. 192-193.

Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.



November 1988

Ekkehard Schrotz leaves Switzerland's Institute for Advanced Technology's (IFAT) board of directors.

—"Profil Views Involvement In Iraq Arms Plant," *Profil* (Vienna), 24 April 1989, pp. 38-42; cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 5 May 1989, pp. 34-36.

November 1988

Frank Carlucci, US Secretary of Defense, expresses concern regarding the Cónдор to Argentine Secretary of Defense José Horacio Juanarena.

—Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cónдор II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 31.

October 1988

US officials block the export of vertical mixers for solid-fuel production to Iraq, which were to be fabricated by APV Chemical Machinery, a US subsidiary of the British food-processing firm APV.

—"Iraqi Bid to Buy Condor Kit Stopped," *MidEast Markets*, 16 October 1989, www.lexis-nexis.com.

October 1988

Argentine officials believe that the Chilean government is gathering intelligence on the Cónдор II. Mendoza police arrest a Chilean national, Wolf Guerrero, for allegedly spying for Chile's Central Nacional de Inteligencia.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cónдор II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 108-109.

October 1988

Dante Caputo, Minister of External Relations, meets in New York with US Secretary of State George Shultz, who expresses concern regarding the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Latin America nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty.

—Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cónдор II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 32.

Last trimester of 1988

The Cónдор II missile project is paralyzed because of difficulty in programming the interface between the guidance and control systems. Brigadier General Petrich, who directs research and development, uses his knowledge of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to try to resolve the interface problems.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cónдор II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 135, 177.

23 September 1988

The US Embassy in Italy sends a cable to the US Secretary of State indicating that the embassy will respond with "no comment" to inquiries about Fiat transfers of US technology to the Cónдор missile program alleged in Alan Friedman's book *Agnelli and the Network of Italian Power*.

—United States Embassy, Italy, "Friedman Book on Fiat: Tech Transfer to Condor Project," Confidential Cable declassified and released, available through the Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com>.

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20 September 1988

A "military source" says that Air Force technicians are working on the Cóndor II project to produce a medium-range rocket for launching satellites into orbit, and denies that Argentina plans to sell the weapons abroad. Although the Cóndor missile under development at Falda del Carmen facility is theoretically capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, the source affirmed that this is not the intention of the Argentine government.

—"Military Source Says Condor II Project Intended for Peaceful Purposes," *Télam*, 20 September 1988; in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 22 September 1988, www.lexis-nexis.com.

8-9 September 1988

At the first Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Plenary Group meeting in Rome, representatives of the seven member-states identify the Cóndor II as a particular "project of concern," and prioritize efforts to block it through export controls and diplomatic initiatives.

—Dan Oberdorfer, "U.S. Seeks to Curb Argentine Missile Project," *Washington Post*, 19 September 1988, p. 6.

September 1988

During debt rescheduling negotiations due to conclude this month, the Reagan administration is apparently disinclined to press Argentina regarding the Cóndor.

—Mark Tran, "Argentina Missile Raises US and British Fears," *Guardian*, 21 September 1988, www.lexis-nexis.com

24 August 1988

Adolf Karl Hammer registers in Zug as director of Switzerland's Institute for Advanced Technology (IFAT). At this time Ekkehard Schrotz, a former employee of the German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) and co-director of Delta Systems, also serve on IFAT's board of directors.

—"Profil Views Involvement In Iraq Arms Plant," *Profil* (Vienna), 24 April 1989, pp. 38-42; cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 5 May 1989, pp. 34-36.

August 1988

In Cabo Raso, 130km south of Rawson, Argentina, Brigadier General Crespo prepares to conduct a public test-launch of the Cóndor II and the Alacrán. In conjunction with the Minister of Defense, he invites President Alfonsín and the US Ambassador Theodore Gildred to attend the test-launch. However, because of pressure from the United States and the Argentine Chancellery, the launch is cancelled.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 39; Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 38.

20 July 1988

An Argentine Ministry of Defense spokesperson, responding to a recent *U.S. News and World Report* article, denies that Argentina is supplying Iraq with any "aerospace technology...for fabrication of missiles." The spokesperson admits that Argentina and Egypt have had an agreement for two years to cooperate on satellite launch vehicles for meteorological and communication satellites, but denies any agreements with Iraq.

—"Defensa desmintió la venta de misiles a Irak y Egipto," *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), 20 July 1988, p. 19.

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July 1988

U.S. News & World Report reports that Argentina is a primary supplier of ballistic missiles to Iraq and Egypt. A US intelligence source states that the ultimate objective of the Cóndor project is to provide Egypt and Iraq each with 200 Cóndor II missiles and to enable the two countries to produce such missiles indigenously. The two-stage Cóndor II is to incorporate an advanced, French-built, inertial guidance system.

—Mel Elfin, "Behind the Condor Carbon-Carbon Smuggling Scam," *U.S. News and World Report*, 25 July 1988, p. 38.

July 1988

La Nación quotes the Israeli newspaper *Davar* as reporting that Argentina intends to produce 1,000km-range Cóndor missiles in Egypt. The project will receive funds from Iraq and technology from Europe, particularly West Germany.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 41; "La Argentina produciría un misil de alcance medio con Egipto," *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), 4 July 1988, p. 5.

June 1988

An unknown intruder breaks into Consen's office in Zug, and hastily searches through files containing lists of the group's missile production affiliate.

—"Further Transfers Of Military Technology Reported," *Profil* (Vienna), 8 May 1989, pp. 29-31; cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 23 May 1989, pp. 39-42.

27 May 1988

A car bomb destroys the Peugeot of Consen director Ekkehard Schrotz, and his secretary receives a message that he has been killed. The bombing is apparently an effort to disrupt the Cóndor project, allegedly by Israeli Mossad agents, although an obscure pro-Iranian group called the Guardians of Islam claim credit. [Note: It is unclear whether the explosion is an assassination attempt or meant solely as a warning.]

—Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), pp. 28, 40; Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 50; "Further Transfers Of Military Technology Reported," *Profil* (Vienna), 8 May 1989, pp. 29-31; cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 23 May 1989, pp. 39-42; "The Cóndor Conspiracy," *BBC Panorama*, 10 April 1989.

25 May 1988

Consen director Ekkehard Schrotz meets with a "high ranking" Argentine Air Force official.

—Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 28.

24 May 1988

Dante Caputo, Minister of External Relations, accuses the British of fabricating stories that Argentina had signed a contract with China for missile construction.

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—Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), pp. 32-33.

22 May 1988

The Times of London, quoting diplomatic sources in Peking, reports that China has made a secret deal with Argentina to supply technology for the production of anti-ship and medium-range missiles capable of hitting the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.

—Louise Branson, "Secret Argentina Missile Deal; China," *The Times*, 22 May 1988, www.lexis-nexis.com.

May 1988

Brigadier General Crespo and Ekkehard Schrotz, head of Consen, reportedly have a conversation in the Cóndor Building about working with Saddam Hussein, and give specifics on training and funding figures for such involvement.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 146.

April 1988

Italy addresses US concerns regarding SNIA's technology sales to Argentina. The United States resumes exporting technology to SNIA-BPD. [Note: A deciding factor in the resumption of technology exports is reportedly the discovery of China's sale of CSS-2 missiles to Saudi Arabia.]

—ANSA (Rome), 24 September 1988, in FBIS-WEU-88-156, 26 September 1988, p. 13; Alan Friedman, *Agnelli: Fiat and the Network of Italian Power* (New York: New American Library, 1989), p. 265.

4 February 1988

US Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci meets with Italian Prime Minister Gorla in Rome. Gorla urges that the two countries put aside past differences over SNIA-BPD's missile exports to the Cóndor program.

—US Department of Defense, "Secretary Carlucci's Meeting With Italian Prime Minister Gorla in Rome," 4 February 1988, "Secret cable declassified and partially released, available through the Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com>.

February 1988

The Atlanta, Georgia branch of the Italian Banco Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) begins financing Iraqi orders of \$600 million-to-\$1 billion for machine tools, computers, and composite materials manufacturing equipment to be used in the Cóndor II (Badr-2000) and other Iraqi military development programs. These funds are provided as direct loans to the Iraqi central bank, some of which were provided to Techcorp, the Iraqi firm that contracted with Consen to produce the Cóndor II.

—Alan Friedman and Victor Mallet, "Iraq 'Used Unauthorized BNL Credits' for Military Purchases," *Financial Times*, 20 September 1989, www.lexis-nexis.com; Alan Friedman, "Flight of the Condor," *Financial Times*, 21 November 1989, www.lexis-nexis.com

25 January 1988

The US State Department requests clearance to brief Italian government officials on the Cóndor missile program

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using information drawn from the National Security Agency. [Note: The recipients of the memo are blacked out in the released version, as are all of the talking points outlined in the memo.]

—US State Department, "Talking Points on the Argentine Ballistic Missile Program; for Use With Officials of the Government of Italy," Secret memo declassified and partially released, 25 January 1988, available through the Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com>.

16 January 1988

Air Force planes fly over positions taken by rebelling Army officers, during the second *carapintada* uprising ("painted faces," referring to camouflage adopted by the disaffected junior Army officers) led by Aldo Rico in Monte Caseros. [Note: The Air Force's overt support of the Radical Civic Union (UCR) government may indicate a quid pro quo for the Alfonsín government's support of the Cóndor program.]

—Martin Granovsky, *Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 205; Luigi Manzetti, *Institutions, Parties, and Coalitions in Argentine Politics* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), p. 193.

Early 1988

Technicians successfully conduct a secret test of the first prototypes of the Cóndor II motor. Miguel Guerrero, a graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), is among the technicians.

—Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 37.

Beginning of 1988

Ekkehard Schrotz, head of Consen, begins to channel missile technology through Consen's second office in the loosely regulated state of Monaco.

—"The Cóndor Conspiracy," BBC Panorama, 10 April 1989.

Beginning of 1988

Italy begins talks with Commander in Chief of the Argentine Air Force Ernesto Crespo and Ekkehard Schrotz, head of Consen. Italian officials discover four stabilizer fins for the Cóndor, which the Italian government orders destroyed under US pressure.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 97.

1988

Presidential candidate Carlos Menem travels to Syria on a personal visit, but meets with senior Syrian political and intelligence officials, including Rifat El Assad, brother of the Syrian president, and Syrian Vice-President Abdul Halim Haddam. In these meetings, Menem allegedly promises to supply the Cóndor II missile and nuclear reactor technologies to Syria in exchange for contributions to his electoral campaign. These funds allegedly exceed \$40 million and come from the governments of Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), as well as businesses in these countries. The monies are provided via "Mathaba," a lobby backing electoral campaigns for candidates of Arab origin in Latin American countries; the group is pivotal in

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enabling a candidate from a poor province with limited national exposure to win the Peronist nomination and subsequently the presidency.

—Arnoldo Lamisovsky, Guillermo Francos, and Franco Caviglia, Proyecto de Resolución, Expediente 1656-D-00 (Buenos Aires: Cámara de Diputados de la Nación – República Argentina, 2000), www.ardiputados.gov.ar;
Norberto Bermúdez and Carlos Torrenco, "Lo que no se investigó sobre los atentados (Parte I)"; and "Lo que no se investigó sobre los atentados (Parte II)"; Julio Rajneri, "Río Negro va más lejos con la pista siria"; "Los acuerdos y compromisos secretos de Menem y los árabes"; and "El dominicano Nemen Nader habla desde Madrid: 'Menem recibió 40 millones de los países árabes en 1988'"; Río Negro, 11-13 January 2000, www.rionegro.com.ar.

1988

The Italian government accuses technicians associated with SNIA-BPD of illegally selling arms components.

—Anabella Busso, Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 24.

1988

Investigations accelerate after US officials reveal an Egyptian espionage network, and Alan Friedman publishes his book *Agnelli and the Network of Italian Power*, which describes the connection between FIAT and the Argentine missile program.

—Anabella Busso, Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 23; Wyn Q. Bowen, *The Politics of Ballistic Missile Proliferation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 2000), pp. 44-45.

1988

Egypt and Consen cut ties with the Cóndor effort. Egypt no longer has the funding and Consen discontinues providing technical information.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 51.

1988

Egypt threatens to cut funding after Consen falls behind in project development.

—Anabella Busso, Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 40.

1988

The United States increases pressure on the Radical Civic Union (UCR) government to dismantle the Cóndor project.

—Anabella Busso, Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 29.

1 December 1987

A US State Department internal paper describes the Italian firm SNIA-BPD as a "leading high-tech firm in rocket propulsion systems, solid and liquid, both for armaments and space research." The report continues saying "SNIA-

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BPD is responsible for all of the Ariane rocket's solid propulsion and, in a joint venture with the French company SEP, is the prime contractor for the development of Ariane V's 170-ton solid-rocket boosters. It also produces rockets and attitude systems for several ESA and Italian scientific satellites....Since 1980, the company has probably acquired and is seeking considerable rocket propulsion technology from the United States through the IRIS program....SNIA-BPD, along with other divisions of the FIAT Group, is actively seeking SDI contracts." [Note: SNIA-BPD employees are later investigated for selling missile components to Argentina for the C3D project.] —US State Department, "SNIA-BPD: Italy's Aggressive Competitor in Rocket Boosters; for Missiles and Space Launches," Secret internal paper declassified and released, 1 December 1987, available through the Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com>.

Late 1987

In response to rising international pressure, Commander in Chief of the Argentine Air Force Ernesto Crespo invites President Alfonsín to Falda del Carmen. Impressed by what he sees there, the president reportedly remarks, "it looks like we are in a developed country."

—Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 20.

Late 1987

The National Space Research Commission (CNIE) formulates an initial Argentine space plan, ARES Plan 2002.

—César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 10.

Late 1987

According to British journalist Alan Friedman, the US CIA discovers that US companies are collaborating with SNIA, a subsidiary of Italy's Fiat.

—Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 30.

Late 1987

The United States increases political pressure on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to stem missile development. With this in mind, the Argentine Air Force renegotiates its deal with Egypt.

—Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 41.

Fall 1987

American and British officials say that the defense division of SNIA-BPD, a subsidiary of Italy's Fiat, is supplying technology for the C3D project, in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

—John Wyles, "Fiat Link Suspected in Condor Missile Probe," *Financial Times*, 31 July 1989, p. 2.

Post August 1987

Following INTESA's creation, there is discussion of whether an Argentine or German will manage Falda del Carmen. Gutekendorf, a German citizen, runs the plant until 1990.

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—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 34.

13 August 1987

President Alfonsín signs Secret Decree 1315, by which he permits the Cóndor project to continue and accepts relocation of missile industrial activity from abroad to Argentina. Decree 1315, citing authorization granted by Resolution 388, formally approves the new state-supported corporation, INTESA.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 33; César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 46; Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), pp. 26, 41; Martin Granovsky, *Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 194.

Mid-July 1987

Iraq contracts with Cóndor Projekt Ag (CPAG; later renamed Projekte Conchem Ag) for designs, drawings, and specifications for Cóndor II and possibly for other missile production facilities, under the supervision of Project 395 (a.k.a. Project DOT).

—US Central Intelligence Agency, *Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments: An Intelligence Assessment* (Washington, DC: Directorate of Intelligence, 30 June 1990), classified "Top Secret," declassified excerpts released 5 March 1998, www.foia.ucia.gov, p. 24.

June 1987

An internal Consen document identifies key firms collaborating in the Cóndor program. Based on Western intelligence and other sources, journalist Alan Friedman summarizes these as follows: "Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm of West Germany was to supply guidance systems and general missile know-how; SNIA-BPD, a subsidiary of Italy's Fiat, the rocket motors and solid fuels; MAN of West Germany the transporter erector launchers (TELs) that helped make Cóndor a mobile missile; and Sagem of France, the inertial navigation systems. Also listed as Consen/Cóndor contractors are Bofors, the Swedish arms maker, and Wegmann, a German producer of multiple-launch rocket systems." Some of these firms were subcontractors on the US Pershing 2 missile program, upon which elements of the Cóndor II are based.

—Alan Friedman, "Flight of the Condor," *Financial Times*, 21 November 1989, <<http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>>; John Burton, "Swedish Government Investigates Bofors Over Missile Claims," *Financial Times*, 8 November 1989, www.lexis-nexis.com.

May 1987

The Argentine Congress approves the Due Obedience Law dropping charges against all officers below the rank of colonel for participation in the "dirty war."

—Luigi Manzetti, *Institutions, Parties, and Coalitions in Argentine Politics* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), p. 193.

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Mid-1987

Iraq begins construction of its own Cóndor II production facilities.

—US Central Intelligence Agency, *Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments: An Intelligence Assessment* (Washington, DC: Directorate of Intelligence, 30 June 1990), classified "Top Secret," declassified excerpts released 5 March 1998, www.foia.ucia.gov, p. 9.

16 April 1987

Canada, France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States, and West Germany reach agreement on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

—César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 35; Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 30; Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 49.

April-June 1987

Argentine Secretary of Defense Juanarena and US Ambassador Theodore Gildred meet sometime during this period at the Jockey Club in San Isidro and discuss the Cóndor II missile project.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 44-45.

15 April 1987

Colonel Aldo Rico leads the first military rebellion of the *carapintada* ("painted faces," referring to camouflage adopted by the disaffected junior Army officers) in the Campo de Mayo military base outside Buenos Aires. The uprising is in response the trials of several junior officers for their roles in the "dirty war." President Alfonsín originally intends the trials for only high-ranking officers who gave orders. But after the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (CSFA) dismisses many of the most serious charges facing members of the military junta, the Federal Appeals Court re-indicts many of the officers, including junior officers.

—Deborah L. Norden, *Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 128-129; Uigi Manzetti, *Institutions, Parties, and Coalitions in Argentine Politics* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), pp. 188-192.

29 October 1986

Britain bans foreign fishing vessels in a 150km exclusion zone around the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. Argentina intensifies air force and naval patrols, and organizes military maneuvers in Patagonia.

—David Rock, *Argentina, 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), p. 401.

16 October 1986

Theodore Gildred is appointed US ambassador to Argentina.

—US State Department, www.state.gov.

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14 October 1986

Argentine officials conduct the first test-launch an Alacrán missile at the airbase Chamental in La Rioja province. The Alacrán missile is reported to be about 6.2m long with a body diameter of 0.56m. The missile has four clipped-tip, moving delta control fins at the base, for aerodynamic control within the atmosphere. The Alacrán has an estimated launch weight of 1,620kg and a single conventional HE warhead of 400kg. The missile has inertial guidance. A report indicates that two alternative submunition payloads have been developed for Alacrán: either 1,020 CAM-1 submunitions, or 176 MOR-1 anti-tank and anti-personnel grenades. Alacrán has a single-stage solid-propellant motor, a range of about 150km, and contains parts interchangeable with those of the Cóndor I. [Note: A knowledgeable technical source interviewed by Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) states that these specifications for Alacrán are unrealistic and would mean a completely different production line, for which Argentina did not have the capacity.]

—Vann Van Diepen, ["intelligence document"], secret, date not known but circa 1992; translated and published in Martin Granovsky, *Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 343; *Jane's Strategic Weapons* 36, "Offensive Weapons, Argentina – Alacran," 12 July 2001, <http://online.janes.com>; CNS interview with missile engineer familiar with technical dimensions of Argentine missile program. Source wishes to remain anonymous.

29 July 1986

Argentine President Raúl Alfonsín and Brazilian President José Sarney sign the Argentine-Brazilian Integration Act, which envisions reciprocal preferential treatment with respect to third markets. Protocols on aeronautical and nuclear cooperation are among the 12 signed in the first stage of the integration project.

—Maria Izabel Mallmann and Vera Seitenfus, "Cronologia do Mercosul 1985-1999," (Centro Brasileiro de Documentação e Estudos da Bacia do Prata, CEDEP/UFRGS, undated).

July 1986

José Horacio Juanarena becomes Minister of Defense.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 34-35.

Mid-1986

Transtecnica ceases delivery to the Cóndor II project. The German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) and Consen get involved in a project to develop a missile with 120-mile range for Egypt.

—"Profil Views Involvement In Iraq Arms Plant," *Profil* (Vienna), 24 April 1989, pp. 38-42; cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 5 May 1989, pp. 34-36.

Early 1986

Dante Caputo, Minister of External Relations, and Raúl Tomás, a former Ministry of Defense official, meet with King Hassan II of Morocco. Hassan agrees with Caputo and Tomás that Morocco could be the gateway to the Middle East and Iraq for Argentina. Caputo and Tomás are accompanied from Madrid to Rabat by the brother-in-law of Adnan Kashoggi, a Saudi businessman implicated in the Iran-Contra scandal.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y*

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destrucción del misil Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 65; "El Condor Esta Vivito y Coleando," Somos, 8 June 1992, pp. 18-20.

Early 1986

The Argentine Air Force begins development of propulsion for the Cóndor II.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 34.

Early 1986

Construction of Falda del Carmen is complete, and 150 scientists from Germany, France, and Italy arrive to work at the facility.

—"The Cóndor Conspiracy," BBC Panorama, 10 April 1989.

30 April 1986

By Resolution 388, the Ministry of Defense proposes creation of Interadora Aeroespacial SA (INTESA), which is to participate in the Cóndor project. [Note: The resolution apparently is not formally authorized until signed by President Alfonsín on 13 August 1987.]

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 170.

1986

First test-launch of Cóndor I.

—Jane's Strategic Offensive Weapons, "Argentina – Alacran," 23 January 2001, <http://online.janes.com>.

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1985-1978

1985

By this time, the Secreto Militar Italian (SISMI) reportedly has information regarding the participation of SNIA-BPD in the Cóndor project.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 23.

Late 1985

Program personnel are not able to fulfill their goal of a test launch of the Cóndor by the end of the year.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 26.

December 1985

An article in *Asuntos Militares* details technical specifications and timeline for the Cóndor project, declaring that Argentina would join the "ballistic missile club" by 1990. *Asuntos Militares* interviews Edgardo Sthal, who details

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the impact of the Malvinas War on Argentina's reliance on the purchase missiles. It prompts the decision to invest in development of its own missile program, which would allow greater strategic flexibility during military operations. Sthal provides a detailed description of Falda del Carmen. This same year, Sthal is promoted to Brigadier General, and is placed in charge of development efforts.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 22, 24-27.

End of 1985

Installations for propulsion system fabrication are completed.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 26.

12 October 1985

Iranian Vice-Chancellor Mansouri holds a press conference at Iran's embassy in Buenos Aires to explain the results of a weeklong visit by Vice-Chancellor Jorge Sábato. Mansouri asserts that Latin America's external debt is just another instrument that the United States has adopted to exercise control in the Middle East.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 43.

October 1985

After President Alfonsín meets with a group of Arab businessmen in Texas, Saudi representatives state that they are ready to make "large investments" in Argentina if it ceases selling grain to Iran and instead begins selling to Iraq.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 65; "El Condor Esta Vivito y Coleando," *Somos*, 8 June 1992, pp. 18-20.

August 1985

Italy's SNIA engages RATA to provide guidance and control equipment. [Note: This date is inferred from the initial story and may be inaccurate.]

—"Iraq's Involvement In Cóndor II Project Viewed," *Somos* (Buenos Aires), 28 January 1991, pp. 1-4; cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 25 February 1991, p. 13.

August 1985

Officials at the Military Aircraft Factory (Fábrica Militar de Aviones-FMA) acknowledge that the Cóndor has potential military applications.

—"Flight of the Condor," *International Defense Review*, August 1985, p. 1357.

11 June 1985

Argentine Brigadier General Edgardo Stahl, a military engineer of German descent in charge of the Córdoba materiel area, meets with the German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm's (MBB) director Karl Adolf Hammer in Europe. Hammer informs Stahl that due to domestic and foreign political pressure, MBB cannot continue with the

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Cóndor II project. Hammer offers to relocate the project abroad, with a group of MBB experts to work in the client country.

—Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), pp. 40-41.

June 1985

The Argentine Air Force displays a rocket less ambitious than the Cóndor II, which is called the Cóndor I-A III [also written as "C1 A3"], at the International Air and Space Exposition in Le Bourget, France. A brochure describes the rocket as "a state of the art, high-performance multi-purpose vehicle." The literature also notes that rocket research came from the German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm's (MBB) Astronautics Division. [Note: This rocket may have been the Alacrán, a solid-fueled missile of up to 120km range and 450kg payload missile.]

— Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 24; César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 41; "Argentina Develops Condor Solid-Propellant Rocket," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 17 June 1985, p. 61; "The Cóndor Conspiracy," *BBC Panorama*, 10 April 1989; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, *Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 467.

25 May 1985

Defense Minister Borrás dies, and Germán Lopez stands in until José Horacio Juanarena assumes the post.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 34.

9 April 1985

President Alfonsín signs Secret Decree 604 to conclude the deal with Egypt, and officially authorize the contracts signed on 14 December 1984. Juan Sourrouille, Minister of Economy, Dante Caputo, Minister of External Relations, and Raúl Borrás, Minister of Defense, also sign the decree. By this agreement, Argentina agrees to deliver 44 motors plus four "test motors" to Egypt. The decree approves both the Cóndor I and Cóndor II as part of the Air Force's "Satellite Plan."

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 33; Mario Baizan, "Iraq's Involvement in Condor II Project Viewed," *Somos*, 28 January 1991, pp. 1-4, cited in FBIS JPRS-TND-91-003, 25 February 1991, pp. 13-15; Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 24; Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 28; Martin Granovsky, *Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 194.

15 March 1985

Teodoro Waldner becomes Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 32.

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March 1985

Brigadier General Crespo becomes Commander in Chief of the Argentine Air Force. On taking his new post, he decides to continue both the Cóndor missile and Pampa aircraft projects.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 31; Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 32.

1985-1988

During this period, Argentina ships 12 solid-fuel rocket motors to Egypt.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 119.

Mid-1980s

Cóndor II rocket engines are tested at testing facilities near Azul, 500km south of Buenos Aires. Transtechnica analyzes the test results.

—"Waffengeschaeft – Geheim-projekt Condor," *Stern*, 25 August 1988, translated by US Defense Intelligence Agency, 15 September 1988, available through the Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com>.

14 December 1984

The Argentine Air Force, Tecnologia Aeroespacial SA, Switzerland's Institute for Advanced Technology (IFAT), DESINTEC AG, and Consen SA, sign agreements on cooperation and export of technology and materials, all of which are to be overseen by the Argentine Ministry of Defense.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 33; Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 25.

December 1984

Honeywell delivers a 141-page study to Switzerland's Institute for Advanced Technology (IFAT) entitled *FAE Warhead Analysis Final Report*. [Note: Burrows and Windrem later mention a 300-page FAE report sold to Ken Smith. It is unclear whether this is the same report but sanitized for classified material, a pre-existing report, or a typographical error.]

—William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, *Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 201, 473.

October 1984

An Egyptian delegation representing Iraq signs an agreement in Buenos Aires to begin development of the \$3.2 billion Cóndor II project. Iraq funds much of the project, which it and Egypt term Badr-2000. The German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) is the most prominent supplier for the project and provides design and planning assistance as well as laboratory simulation and missile-control equipment. Egypt and Iraq are each to receive 200 missiles, as well as missile production facilities to produce additional units. Cairo's interest is

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reportedly spurred by Israel's deployment of the Jericho-II ballistic missile, which has a range of at least 750km.
—Mel Elfin, "Behind the Condor Carbon-Carbon Smuggling Scam," *US News & World Report*, 25 July 1988, p. 38, www.lexis-nexis.com; Tony Walker, Andrew Gowers, and David Buchan, "Egypt and Argentina in Long-Range Missile Plan," *Financial Times*, 21 December 1987, p. 28, www.lexis-nexis.com.

July 1984

Air Force officials take Defense Minister Raúl Borrás to visit Falda del Carmen.

—Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 19.

4 April 1984

A Honeywell internal memo outlines the company's discussion with Kevin Smith, a consultant to Switzerland's Institute for Advanced Technology (IFAT) and Honeywell Control Systems, to obtain a fuel-air explosives' (FAE) study for Egypt. The memo notes that "[t]he Egyptians are developing a ballistic missile with the technical efforts being funded by the Saudi Arabians. The Saudis have provided, according to Smith, \$1 billion to IFAT. Smith remarked that this money is "currently being deposited in Swiss banks." According to the memo, the missile, "to have an accuracy of 0.1% of its range, was intended to attack high value, fixed targets such as cities, ports, oil refineries, and air bases...[T]he missile would probably never be fired in anger." Smith assures Honeywell that by the time the report is passed from IFAT to the Egyptians, all Honeywell logos and corporate symbols would be removed.

—"A Bigger Blast," *Middle East*, January 1991, pp. 15-16.

March 1984

Honeywell's UK subsidiary, Honeywell Control Systems, signs a \$200,000 contract (Burrows and Windrem report a \$100,000 contract) with Switzerland's Institute for Advanced Technology (IFAT) to conduct a study of fuel-air explosives (FAE) for Egypt's Ministry of Defense. Ken Smith, a British aerospace consultant to both IFAT and Honeywell Control, negotiates the FAE deal and supplies specifications to Honeywell on 9 October 1985 and 4 November 1984. These state that the weapon should weigh 400kg, and have a volume of 0.5 cubic meters. Egypt originally tries to obtain FAEs from the US State Department under the guise of using such munitions to clear mines in the Egyptian desert, but the request is rejected.

—"A Bigger Blast," *Middle East*, January 1991, pp. 15-16; "Honeywell Implicated in FAE Work," *Flight International*, 12 December 1990, www.lexis-nexis.com; *United States v Abdelkader Helmy, et al.*, S 88 201 RAR (1989), p. 4; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, *Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 200.

15 February 1984

The Egyptian Ministry of Defense signs a contract with Switzerland's Institute for Advanced Technology (IFAT) for the planning and delivery of a projection plant for the manufacture of rocket engines, as well as the design and development of a conventional missile system.

—*United States v Abdelkader Helmy, et al.*, S 88 201 RAR (1989), p. 4; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem,

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Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 468.

1984-1988

International Signal and Control, a defense firm located in Pennsylvania, ships US missile technology and military equipment to South Africa, which is in violation of US export law but apparently with the acquiescence of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The technologies include photo-imaging equipment for missile testing; telemetry tracking equipment; and gyroscopes for missile guidance. Some equipment reportedly is later employed in the Cóndor II project in Iraq.

—Alan Friedman, "CIA 'Knew' of Illegal US Missile Deal," Financial Times, 24 May 1991, www.lexis-nexis.com.

1984

At this point, the Argentine Air Force has four ambitious projects: computerization of all weapons systems, development of the IA-63 Pampa aircraft, plans to obtain technology to create an AWACS early warning aircraft, and the Cóndor project. According to Brigadier General Waldner, Air Force Chief of General Staff, the Cóndor project reaches its zenith during Alfonsín's term. Waldner views the IA-63 Pampa aircraft—a more visible project—as a higher priority than the Cóndor, and he is running out of funds for the Cóndor effort.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 31, 40-41.

1984

US Ambassador Robert Bushnell investigates an arms shipment from Argentina to Iran. According to Raúl Tomás, a former Ministry of Defense official, Bushnell sought to ensure that Argentina did not sell arms to Iran, but never expressed concern regarding the Cóndor.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 63-64.

1984

The first public account of the Cóndor is reported in the *Sunday Times* of London, which cites British government sources.

—Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 32.

1984

British, Israeli, and US intelligence agencies are aware of the Cóndor II project. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher begins pressing her West German counterpart, Helmut Kohl, to stop cooperating with Argentina in the Cóndor project.

—Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 17.

1984

The United Kingdom monitors offensive weapons developed by Argentina with the capacity to reach the

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Malvinas/Falklands Islands.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 40-41.

1984

The British defense firm Hunting Engineering conducts work for the Zug-based firm Desintec to predict the performance of the Cóndor I.

—"US Aid Money Financed Condor," *MidEast Markets*, 11 December 1989, www.lexis-nexis.com.

1984

Many German engineers working on the Cóndor II project are also jointly working on the German KOLAS missile, which is a short-range missile similar in design the Pershing 2. The US firm Martin Marietta, the original Pershing 2 manufacturer, collaborates with the German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) on KOLAS. [Note: This collaboration leads to assertion that the Cóndor II was built using Pershing technology.]

—William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, *Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 470-471.

1984

Iraq agrees to enter the Cóndor project, provided that the resulting product has a range at least five times that of the Cóndor I's 150km range (i.e., capable of reaching Tehran or Tel Aviv). Guerrero calculates that the Cóndor I can be transformed into the second stage of a larger rocket with a liquid-fuel booster to extend the range, but that doing so will require technology that will attract the attention of the United States and Great Britain. To avoid scrutiny, the Iraqis suggest using Egypt as a go-between. Iraq agrees to provide funding via Egypt for the Argentine Cóndor II program, probably in exchange for some portion of Argentine missile production and to gain its own missile production capability. Saudi Arabia, while appearing to be ambivalent about the project, secretly deposits \$1 billion into Swiss banks for its support. The Saudis are eager to support a missile that can be fired on Israel and/or "revivalists" in Iran. The German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) in turn makes lavish expenditures using the Arab money, giving its employees extravagant bonuses and paying well above market value for missile elements. [Note: Although some characterize spending on the project as excessive, employees of Consen may have paid well above market price for many items in order to maintain good relations with their former companies who supplied them with missile parts. This was especially true of MBB, which allegedly allowed Consen to operate out of its offices for weeks at a time.]

—Kenneth Timmerman, *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), pp. 154-155; US Central Intelligence Agency, *Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments: An Intelligence Assessment* (Washington, DC: Directorate of Intelligence, 30 June 1990), classified "Top Secret," declassified excerpts released 5 March 1998, www.foia.ucia.gov, p. 9; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, *Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 469-470; "Waffengeschaefte – Geheim-projekt Condor," *Stern*, 25 August 1988, translated by US Defense Intelligence Agency, 15 September 1988.

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Beginning of 1984

The Argentine Air Force is now under civilian control, and keeping the Cóndor project secret within a select group of military specialists is no longer possible. The head of the Argentine Air Force, Teodoro Waldner, informs Raúl Alfonsín, the newly elected President, and several other high-ranking civilian officials of this situation.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 28; Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), pp. 18-19.

23 December 1983

Argentina and Iran continue having problems in their bilateral relations. In Madrid, Spanish customs agents seize a shipment of small arms sent from Argentina bound for Tehran. According to Iranian Chancellor Alí Akbar Vellevati, Iran presents a brief document to the Spanish officials who detained the shipment.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 63.

December 1983

Brigadier General Teodoro Waldner becomes Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 32.

13 December 1983

Raúl Alfonsín of the Radical Civic Union (UCR) Party assumes the presidency, after winning an upset electoral victory against the Peronist (Justicialista) Party. This marks the transition from authoritarian military to civilian democratic rule in Argentina.

—Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 3rd ed. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 108.

5 August 1983

The Institute for Advanced Technology (IFAT) is founded in Zug.

—William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, *Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 467.

June 1983

The first multilateral meeting between the original seven members of the future Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) takes place.

—Deborah A. Ozga, "A Chronology of the Missile Technology Control Regime," *Nonproliferation Review*, Winter 1994, p. 68.

1983-1989

The German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) works with Argentina in development and financing of the Cóndor through its affiliate company, Consulting Engineers, SA (Consen).

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—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 19.

1983

The Italian firm SNIA-Viscosa legally sells three vertical mixers for propellant production, which had been fabricated in the United States, to the Argentine Cóndor program.

—Vann Van Diepen, ["intelligence document"], secret, date not known but circa 1992; translated and published in Martin Granovsky, *Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 343.

1983

The Argentine military recognizes that it may encounter increasing economic and political difficulties in the Cóndor project once the country returns to civilian control.

—César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 46.

1983

Canada, France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States, and West Germany begin negotiations that will lead to establishment of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

—César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 35.

1983

Program personnel conduct a static test of the Cóndor I motor.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 26.

1983

The Falda del Carmen facility is completed in Córdoba.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 16.

Mid-1982

Some 50 Air Force veterans of the Falklands/Malvinas War gather in the Air War College (Escuela de Guerra Aérea) immediately after the conflict. Over 70 days of discussions, these self-named "pariahs" led by Ernesto Crespo, José Juliá, Teodoro Waldner, Tomás Rodríguez, Carlos Corino, and Roberto Petrich become the core of a new effort within the Air Force. Like fellow officers in their service, they do not accept Argentine defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas War, and view the conflict as having demonstrated not only their military competence but also their centrality to future national defense. Stung by Argentina's technological dependence on France for Exocet anti-ship missiles, they develop the "Air Force Development Plan" for the next 10 years, which envisions four ambitious projects, including the Cóndor II.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y*

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destrucción del misil Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 23, 39-40, 62; Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), pp. 13, 15.

14 June 1982

Argentine armed forces surrender to the British in Port Stanley, and both the Army and Navy are humiliated by their poor performance during the brief South Atlantic conflict. However, Air Force pilots win national respect for the courage and competence in inflicting significant damage on the British fleet.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 19; Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 3rd ed. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 106-107; David Rock, *Argentina, 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 381-382.

2 April 1982

Following the largest anti-government demonstrations since the military "Proceso" took power in March 1976, the Argentine armed forces invade the Falklands/Malvinas Islands and quickly subdue the British garrison. Argentina has long claimed the islands, despite their physical control by Britain since its forcible occupation and expulsion of Spanish-speaking colonists in 1833. Through the invasion, the Argentine junta sought to incite public outrage over Britain's illegitimate occupation and catalyze a nationalist "rally 'round the flag," thus distracting attention from mounting public disaffection with the regime. The gambit backfires, however, as unforeseen military defeat utterly discredits to the Proceso government.

—Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 3rd ed. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 105-106; David Rock, *Argentina, 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 380-382; Jack S. Levy and Lili Vakili, "Diversionary Action by Authoritarian Regimes: Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas Case," Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *The Internationalization of Communal Strife* (New York: Harper Collins, 1992).

1982

US President Ronald Reagan authorizes National Security Directive 70, which warns of the dangers of missile technology proliferation in the developing world.

—César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 35.

1982

At Chile's request, the United States investigates the sale by Israel of 54 Skyhawks used by Argentina during the Falklands/Malvinas War. Concern originates with the Israeli Labor Party officials, who are concerned the United States has not authorized such a sale. However, Ariel Sharon, a Likud party candidate, objects to consulting the United States and the request is channeled through Chile. The report determines that Israel sold 30 Skyhawks to the Argentine Air Force and 24 to the Navy.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 41.

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3 April 1981

French engineers and technicians calibrating Exocet missiles leave Buenos Aires. With little technical expertise in such matters, the Argentine military manages to calibrate three Exocets and to launch one of those from Puerto Argentino. [Note: The difficulty in obtaining additional Exocets motivates acceleration of the Cóndor missile project.]

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 62.

12 March 1981

National Law 22.426 moves the National Registry of Contracts, Licenses, and Technology Transfer to the jurisdiction of the National Institute of Industrial Technology (INTI).

—Emanuel Adler, *The Power of Ideology: The Quest for Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil*, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of Berkeley Press, 1987), pp. 110-111, 117.

1981

Comisión Nacional de Investigaciones Espaciales (CNIE) moves its offices to Calle Dorrego after parts of the Air Force headquarters, called the Cóndor building, collapse.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 27.

1981

The Argentine Navy buys the Super Etendart aircraft system from France, which includes aircraft and Exocet AM-39 air-to-ground missiles.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 62.

11 April 1980

Argentina recalls all diplomatic personnel from its embassy in Iran.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 57, who cite *Noticias Argentinas* and Cable 24 of New York.

Early 1980s

The German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) begins work on an upgraded version of the US Pershing 2 missile. When officials in Washington become aware of MBB's role in the Cóndor II project, they warn MBB about possible technology transfers and advise that they disengage from the Cóndor project. MBB responds by furloughing over 30 senior managers and engineers to create a special firm specifically for the Cóndor. [Note: A knowledgeable source interviewed by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) claims that MBB never worked on the Pershing 2.]

—William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, *Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting*

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World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 467; CNS interview with missile engineer familiar with technical dimensions of Argentine missile program. Source wishes to remain anonymous.

Early 1980s

APV Chemical Machinery, a US subsidiary of the British food-processing firm APV, sells several mixers for solid-fuel production to the Italian aerospace firm SNIA-BPD. Some are then transferred to the Argentina Air Force for use in the Cónдор program.

—"Iraqi Bid to Buy Condor Kit Stopped," *MidEast Markets*, 16 October 1989, www.lexis-nexis.com.

1980

European involvement in the Cónдор project increases, with Bolhen Industries providing technology. Later, the principal European actors are related to the Consen Group, which includes Consen SA, IFAT (Institute for Advanced Technology) Corporation, Ltd., and Desintec AG (an IFAT subsidiary). Consen is headquartered in Zug, Switzerland, and is at the center of a network of firms based in Argentina, Austria, Germany, New Jersey, Monaco, and the United Kingdom. Helmut Reiser, a German engineer, is one of the important figures involved in reaching deals on the Cónдор project. Many Consen personnel working on the Cónдор were involved in earlier collaborative European projects that dates back to the 1960s, and which culminated in the Ariane system. [Note: A knowledgeable source interviewed by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) states that Consen personnel did not work on the Ariane missile system but may have worked on the space launch vehicle.]

—Simon Henderson, "West Blocks Advance of Condor II Missile," *Financial Times*, 31 August 1989, www.lexis-nexis.com; "The Cónдор Conspiracy," *BBC Panorama*, 10 April 1989; CNS interview with missile engineer familiar with technical dimensions of Argentine missile program. Source wishes to remain anonymous.

1980

The Argentine government contracts Consen to act as technical advisor in development of the Cónдор I. Consen is a nominally independent firm that uses office space of the German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) and other facilities and hires over 10 senior missile experts from MBB. An MBB subsidiary, Transtechnica, is also to assist.

—"Profil Views Involvement In Iraq Arms Plant," *Profil* (Vienna), 24 April 1989; pp. 38-42, cited in *Nuclear Developments*, 5 May 1989, pp. 34-36; "The Cónдор Conspiracy," *BBC Panorama*, 10 April 1989; Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) interview with missile engineer familiar with technical dimensions of Argentine missile program. Source wishes to remain anonymous.

1979

The German-Austrian company BOWAS begins construction on the Falda del Carmen plant for production of solid-fuel propellant for the Cónдор program. The facility is located in a pueblo of 100 people, 10km from Alta Gracia, outside the city of Córdoba.

—Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cónдор II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 16; Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cónдор II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 20; Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cónдор II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 19.

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10 August 1979

Air Force Head Omar Rubens Graffigna signs the secret "Satellite Development Plan," the first step in the Cóndor initiative. The "Satellite Development Plan" becomes the plan for the Cóndor project. Soon after, the Air Force develops Plan 2000 to develop new projects, which include the Cóndor program.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 20; Anabella Busso, *Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), pp. 13, 16.

Summer 1979

Air Force Commander José García is authorized to negotiate a military industrial project in Argentina with Dornier, a subsidiary of the German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB), in Munich.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 20.

1979-1981

Air Force Chief Brigadier General Omar Rubens Graffigna appoints a small, "super-secret" commission of scientists and technicians to conduct a theoretical study of the possibility of constructing a nuclear warhead suitable for a medium-range missile. An Air Force commodore heads the group, which after two years concludes that the Air Force cannot gain access to highly enriched uranium (HEU) or weapons-grade plutonium necessary to produce a nuclear warhead. In its research, the group reportedly does not make contact with either the National Atomic Energy Commission (Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica; CNEA), nor the military service most closely tied to the CNEA, the Navy. [Note: In 1978, the CNEA launched a top-secret gaseous-diffusion uranium enrichment plant at Pilcaniyeu, which is not publicly revealed until 1983.] The Air Force subsequently directs developmental efforts toward conventional warheads, without forgetting that the nuclear option existed, at least in principle.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 220-222.

1979

Comisión Nacional de Investigaciones Espaciales (CNIE) assigns a group of technicians to the Vicecomodoro Marambio launch base on the northeastern tip of Antarctica. Vicecomodoro Marambio is one of three Argentine bases capable of launching rockets.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 35.

1978

Chile and Argentina reach the brink of war stemming from their dispute over demarcation of the South Beagle Channel.

—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 20.

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Late 1970s-1989

The German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) collaborates with Argentina in development of the Cóndor missile. MBB is partially under federal ownership and supervision until 1989, and is a profitable enterprise for the West German government. Initially, MBB works on a "weather research rocket" under the code name Condor 1. The project, however, is allegedly only a cover to allow missile technicians to enter the country without raising suspicion.

—César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 41; Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, *Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 158; "Waffengeschaefte – Geheimprojekt Condor," *Stern*, 25 August 1988, translated by US Defense Intelligence Agency, 15 September 1988.

Late 1970s

The German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) designs the "Techniks" missile based on the design of the US-built Pershing 1. The Condor II design bears a striking resemblance to the German missile. According to former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, Dr. Stephen Bryen, the Techniks is designed by MBB purely for export. [Note: A knowledgeable source contacted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) refutes this claim and states that Techniks was a "forerunner" and a modification of the Pershing 2 first stage with terminal guidance.] The principal markets for the missile are believed to be Argentina and Egypt.

—"UN Inspectors Destroy Condor II Equipment," *Middle East Defense News*, 30 March 1992, www.lexis-nexis.com; CNS interview with missile engineer familiar with technical dimensions of Argentine missile program. Source wishes to remain anonymous.

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1977-1947

1970s

Argentina builds Castor sounding rockets used in a cooperative program with Germany. Castor is a two-stage solid-propellant rocket utilizing the design of the Canopus II. The booster is a cluster of four Canopus and the second stage is a Canopus II.

—Arthur F. Manfredi et al., *Ballistic Missile Proliferation Potential in the Third World* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1986), p. 16; Miguel Sanchez, "Sounding Rockets in Argentina," in *Space Research in Argentina* (Buenos Aires: National Commission on Space Research, 1969), p. 8.

1977-1978

As military attaché in the Argentine embassy in Spain, Air Force officer Ernesto Crespo travels eight times to Egypt, Lebanon, and Libya as part of the ambassadorial entourage. Crespo maintains, however, that he does so solely on behalf of the ambassador and that he makes no contacts regarding the Cóndor program being launched at this time. [Note: Crespo becomes one of the most important officials in the Cóndor program, especially as chief of the

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Air Force in the mid-1980s.]

—"El brigadier Crespo admitió que hizo ocho viajes al Líbano," Clarín, 6 June 1998, www.clarin.com.ar.

August 1977

National Law 21.617 places the National Registry of Contracts, Licenses, and Technology Transfer under the jurisdiction of a subsecretary of the Industry Ministry.

—Emanuel Adler, *The Power of Ideology: The Quest for Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of Berkeley Press, 1987), pp. 110-111, 118.

February 1977

Captain Miguel Guerrero completes his master's thesis in electronics engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). [Note: Guerrero later directs the Falda del Carmen facility and eventually becomes president of the National Space Research Commission (CNIE).]

—Miguel Vicente Guerrero, "Drift Performance vs. Operating Temperature in a Low-Cost Strapdown Gyroscope" (Master's thesis, MIT, 1977).

1977-1978

The Chief Commandant of the Argentine Air Force, Brigadier General Omar Graffigna, initiates the Cóndor effort and Argentina converts the Cóndor I sounding rocket into a tactical missile. This missile does not have a sophisticated control and guidance system. The program was developed in response to foreign reticence to supply Argentina with arms after the 1976 military coup. Argentine missile development may also have been motivated by the possibility of conflict with Chile over the Beagle Islands.

—Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation and its Control, Center for International Security and Arms Control (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, June 1991), pp. 39-72; Daniel Santoro, *Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 15.

1977

The Tauro project is launched to survey natural resources using aerial photography. A two-stage Castor rocket is used for the project equipped with a high-resolution camera, an attitude control system, and equipment for recovery.

—César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), pp. 14-15.

March 1976

Armed forces take power in Argentina. Initially led by General Jorge Rafael Videla, the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional, or "Proceso" regime, governs for the next six years. The armed forces wage a *guerra sucia* ("dirty war") against leftist revolutionaries and other Argentines suspected of being "subversives." Leftist uprisings and military repression cripple higher education, with university student enrollment plummeting by nearly one-third in just three years. International condemnation makes the country an international pariah state during this period, as was Chile and South Africa.

—Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 3rd ed. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University

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Press, 1992), pp. 103-104; Emanuel Adler, *The Power of Ideology: The Quest for Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of Berkeley Press, 1987), p. 123.

1973

Active-duty military officers displace civilian specialists in the National Space Research Commission (CNIE) to "protect" the agency from Peronist influence and in rejection of civilian emphasis on strictly pacific developmental efforts. This displacement and subsequent secrecy precludes the participation of many of Argentina's best civilian specialists in the CNIE, forestalling prospects for sustained, autonomous scientific progress in this field.

—César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), pp. 17-18.

1970s

The National Space Research Commission (CNIE) and the Institute of Aeronautics and Space Investigations (IIAE) lack sufficient resources to develop advanced missile technology. Hence, the Cóndor can be developed only after an influx of foreign technology.

—César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 43.

Winter 1969

The Canopus II is launched for the first time. Canopus II is a single-stage, solid-propellant rocket capable of carrying a 50kg payload to an altitude of 100km.

—Miguel Sanchez, "Sounding Rockets in Argentina," in *Space Research in Argentina* (Buenos Aires: National Commission on Space Research, 1969), p. 8.

1969

The Institute of Scientific Research and Technology of the Armed Forces (CITEFA) and the Argentine Navy begin research on a radio-guided missile, the Martín Pescador.

—César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 25.

1969

Construction begins on the Laboratory and Pilot Plant for Propellants (Laboratorio y Planta Piloto de Propulsantes), of the Department of Meteorological Investigation (Departamento de Investigación Meteorológica; DIM).

—César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 16.

1969

Argentina launches two Nike Cajun rockets, a Nike Apache rocket, and a Rigel rocket from Chamental. The rockets carry payloads constructed by the Institute of Aeronautics and Space Investigations (IIAE).

—César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), pp. 10-11.

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December 1967

The first flight of the Rigel launch vehicle takes place at Chamental. The rocket reaches an altitude of 300km with a 29kg payload. Rigel is a two-stage composite solid-propellant rocket. The first stage is an Orion II rocket with slight modification.

—Miguel Sanchez, "Sounding Rockets in Argentina," in *Space Research in Argentina* (Buenos Aires: National Commission on Space Research, 1969), pp. 7-8.

13 August 1966

Argentina launches the first Orion II rocket, a single-stage, solid-propellant rocket capable of carrying a 20kg payload to an altitude of 100km.

—Miguel Sanchez, "Sounding Rockets in Argentina," in *Space Research in Argentina* (Buenos Aires: National Commission on Space Research, 1969), p. 7.

July 1966

The military government of General Juan Carlos Onganía violently purges national universities of faculty and students, in what is later called the "night of the long clubs." This prompts large-scale massive brain drain from higher education and research, hampering national scientific and technological development in many areas.

—David Rock, *Argentina, 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 346-347; Emanuel Adler, *The Power of Ideology: The Quest for Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of Berkeley Press, 1987), pp. 122-123, 135.

1965

Under National Space Research Commission (CNIE) sponsorship, several laboratories develop payloads for measuring X-rays, primary cosmic rays, and electron and proton precipitation. Gamma-Centauro, Orion II, and American Arcas are the main rockets used.

—Miguel Sanchez, "Sounding Rockets in Argentina," in *Space Research in Argentina* (Buenos Aires: National Commission on Space Research, 1969), p. 5.

1964

Argentina begins cooperation with NASA on a project to measure characteristics of the ionosphere. As part of the program, Argentine personnel from the University of Buenos Aires work at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center. The Nike Cajun and Nike Apache are the primary launch vehicles used.

—César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 10; Miguel Sanchez, "Sounding Rockets in Argentina," in *Space Research in Argentina* (Buenos Aires: National Commission on Space Research, 1969), p. 5.

1963-1975

During this period, the National Space Research Commission (CNIE) and the Institute of Aeronautics and Space Investigations (IAIE), develop the rockets Centauro (also referred to as Centaure) Alpha, Beta, and Gamma, Orion II, Castor, Canopus I and II, Rigel, and Clag I and II.

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—César Docampo, Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 13; Miguel Sanchez, "Sounding Rockets in Argentina," in Space Research in Argentina (Buenos Aires: National Commission on Space Research, 1969), p. 5.

1963-1967

Argentina develops a mixture of ammonium chlorate and polyvinyl chloride for use in solid-fuel rocket motors.
—César Docampo, Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 16.

1962-1967

NASA coordinates a project with Argentina and France to measure wind direction and intensity and to study atmospheric dynamics. The multilateral collaboration succeeds in launching 16 French Centaure rockets from Argentina to an altitude of 180km, each with a 30kg payload.

—César Docampo, Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 10-11; Miguel Sanchez, "Sounding Rockets in Argentina," in Space Research in Argentina (Buenos Aires: National Commission on Space Research, 1969), p. 5.

1962

The Center for Experimentation and Launching of Self-Propelled Projectiles (Centro de Experimentación y Lanzamiento de proyectiles Autopropulsados; CELPA) begins operation. Rockets launched by CELPA at Chical, in the province of La Rioja, eventually include some with a range of up to 200km.

—César Docampo, Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), 10; Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 35.

14 June 1961

The National Space Research Commission (CNIE) signs a memorandum with the US National Aeronautical and Space Agency (NASA) for cooperation on sounding rockets for space research.

—Eugene M. Emme, comp., "Aeronautical and Astronautical Events of 1961," Report of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to the Committee on Science and Astronautics, US House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 14-30, www.hq.nasa.gov.

1960

National Executive Order 1164/60 authorizes creation of the National Commission for Space Investigations (Comisión Nacional de Investigaciones Espaciales; CNIE).

—César Docampo, Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 8.

1954

Argentina begins work to develop solid-propellant rocket engines.

—Miguel Sanchez, "Sounding Rockets in Argentina," in Space Research in Argentina (Buenos Aires: National Commission on Space Research, 1969), p. 7.

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1954

Secret Decree 44 mandates replacement of the Directorate of Investigation and Development of the General Directorate of Military Production by the Institute of Scientific and Technical Investigations of the Armed Forces (Instituto de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas de las Fuerzas Armadas; CITEFA).

—César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), pp. 19-20; Emanuel Adler, *The Power of Ideology: The Quest for Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of Berkeley Press, 1987), p. 106.

1947

Argentina begins development of small tactical rockets with liquid-propellant motors at the Instituto Aerotécnico.

—César Docampo, *Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II* (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 12; Miguel Sanchez, "Sounding Rockets in Argentina," in *Space Research in Argentina* (Buenos Aires: National Commission on Space Research, 1969), p. 4.

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