The States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Which Met in Geneva From 27 August To 21 September 1985 to Review the Operation of the Treaty Solemnly Declared:

• Their conviction that the Treaty is essential to international peace and security,
• Their continued support for the objectives of the Treaty, which are:
  • The prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
  • The cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and a Treaty on general and complete disarmament;
  • The promotion of co-operation between States Parties in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy,
• The reaffirmation of their firm commitment to the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty,
• Their determination to enhance the implementation of the Treaty and to further strengthen its authority.

Review of the Operation of the Treaty and Recommendations Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1–3

The Conference noted the concerns and convictions expressed in preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 and agreed that they remain valid. The States Party to the Treaty remain resolved in their belief in the need to avoid the devastation that a nuclear war would bring. The Conference remains convinced that any proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of a nuclear war.

The Conference agreed that the strict observance of the terms of Articles I and II remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing under any circumstances the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty’s vital contribution to peace and security, including to the peace and security of non-Parties.

The Conference acknowledged the declarations by nuclear-weapons States Party to the Treaty that they had fulfilled their obligations under Article I. The Conference further acknowledged the declarations that non-nuclear-weapons States Party to the Treaty had fulfilled their obligations under Article II. The Conference was of the view therefore that one of the primary objectives of the Treaty had been achieved in the period under review.

The Conference also expressed deep concern that the national nuclear programmes of some States non-Party to the Treaty may lead them to obtain a nuclear weapon capability. States Party to the Treaty stated that any further detonation of a nuclear explosive device by any non-nuclear-weapon State would constitute a most serious breach of the non-proliferation objective.

The Conference noted the great and serious concerns expressed about the nuclear capability of South Africa and Israel. The Conference further noted the calls on all States for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear facilities, resources or devices to South Africa and Israel and to stop all exploitation of Namibian uranium, natural or enriched, until the attainment of Namibian independence.

Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5

1. The Conference affirms its determination to strengthen further the barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices to additional States. The spread of nuclear explosive capabilities would add immeasurably to regional and international tensions and suspicions. It would increase the risk of nuclear war and lessen the security of all States. The Parties remain convinced that universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the best way to strengthen the barriers against proliferation and they urge all States not party to the Treaty to accede to it. The Treaty and the regime of non-proliferation it supports play a central role in promoting regional and international peace and security, inter alia, by helping to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives. The non-proliferation and safeguards commitments in the Treaty are essential also for peaceful nuclear commerce and co-operation.
2. The Conference expresses the conviction that IAEA safeguards provide assurance that States are complying with their undertakings and assist States in demonstrating this compliance. They thereby promote further confidence among States and, being a fundamental element of the Treaty, help to strengthen their collective security. IAEA safeguards play a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Unsafeguarded nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States pose serious proliferation dangers.

3. The Conference declares that the commitment to non-proliferation by nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty pursuant to Article I, by non-nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty pursuant to Article II, and by the acceptance of IAEA safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities within non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty pursuant to Article III is a major contribution by those States to regional and international security. The Conference notes with satisfaction that the commitments in Articles I–III have been met and have greatly helped prevent the spread of nuclear explosives.

4. The Conference therefore specifically urges all non-nuclear-weapon States not party to the Treaty to make an international legally-binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, both current and future, to verify that commitment. The Conference further urges all States in their international nuclear co-operation and in their nuclear export policies and, specifically as a necessary basis for the transfer of relevant nuclear supplies to non-nuclear-weapon States, to take effective steps towards achieving such a commitment to non-proliferation and acceptance of such safeguards by those States. The Conference expresses its view that accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the best way to achieve that objective.

5. The Conference expresses its satisfaction that four of the five nuclear-weapon States have voluntarily concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA, covering all or part of their peaceful nuclear activities. The Conference regards those agreements as further strengthening the non-proliferation regime and increasing the authority of IAEA and the effectiveness of its safeguards system. The Conference calls on the nuclear-weapon States to continue to co-operate fully with the IAEA in the implementation of these agreements and calls on IAEA to take full advantage of this co-operation. The Conference urges the People’s Republic of China similarly to conclude a safeguards agreement with IAEA. The Conference recommends the continued pursuit of the principle of universal application of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in all States. To this end, the Conference recognizes the value of voluntary offers and recommends further evaluation of the economic and practical possibility of extending application of safeguards to additional civil facilities in the nuclear-weapon States as and when IAEA resources permit and consideration of separation of the civil and military facilities in the nuclear-weapon States. Such an extending of safeguards will enable the further development and application of an effective regime in both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

6. The Conference also affirms the great value to the non-proliferation regime of commitments by the nuclear-weapon States that nuclear supplies provided for peaceful use will not be used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive purposes. Safeguards in nuclear-weapon States pursuant to their safeguards agreements with IAEA can verify observance of those commitments.

7. The Conference notes with satisfaction the adherence of further Parties to the Treaty and the conclusion of further safeguards agreements in compliance with the undertaking of the Treaty and recommends that:

   (a) The non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty that have not concluded the agreements required under Article III (4) conclude such agreements with IAEA as soon as possible;
   (b) The Director-General of IAEA intensify his initiative of submitting to States concerned draft agreements to facilitate the conclusion of corresponding safeguards agreements, and that Parties to the Treaty, in particular Depositary Parties, should actively support these initiatives;
   (c) All States Party to the Treaty make strenuous individual and collective efforts to make the Treaty truly universal.

8. The Conference notes with satisfaction that IAEA in carrying out its safeguards activities has not detected any diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded material to the production of nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices or to purposes unknown.

9. The Conference notes that IAEA safeguards activities have not hampered the economic, scientific or technological development of the Parties to the Treaty or international co-operation in peaceful nuclear activities and it urges that this situation be maintained.

10. The Conference commends IAEA on its implementation of safeguards pursuant to this Treaty and urges it to continue to ensure the maximum technical and cost effectiveness and efficiency of its operations, while maintaining consistency with the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities.
11. The Conference notes with satisfaction the improvements of IAEA safeguards which has enabled it to continue to apply safeguards effectively during a period of rapid growth in the number of safeguarded facilities. It also notes that IAEA safeguards approaches are capable of adequately dealing with facilities under safeguards. In this regard, the recent conclusion of the project to design a safeguards regime for centrifuge enrichment plants and its implementation is welcomed. This project allows the application of an effective regime to all plants of this type in the territories both of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty.

12. The Conference emphasizes the importance of continued improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards, for example, but not limited to:
(a) Uniform and non-discriminatory implementation of safeguards;
(b) The expeditious implementation of new instruments and techniques;
(c) The further development of methods for evaluation of safeguards effectiveness in combination with safeguards information;
(d) Continued increases in the efficiency of the use of human and financial resources and of equipment.

13. The Conference believes that further improvement of the list of materials and equipment which, in accordance with Article III (2) of the Treaty, calls for the application of IAEA safeguards should take account of advances in technology.

14. The Conference recommends that IAEA establish an internationally agreed effective system of international plutonium storage in accordance with Article XII (A) 5 of its statute.

15. The Conference welcomes the significant contributions made by States Parties in facilitating the application of IAEA safeguards and in supporting research, development and other supports to further the application of effective and efficient safeguards. The Conference urges that such co-operation and support be continued and that other States Parties provide similar support.

16. The Conference calls upon all States to take IAEA safeguards requirements fully into account while planning, designing and constructing new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and while modifying existing nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

17. The Conference also calls on States Parties to the Treaty to assist the IAEA in applying its safeguards, inter alia, through the efficient operation of State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, and including compliance with all notification requirements in accordance with safeguards agreements.

18. The Conference welcomes the Agency’s endeavour to recruit and train staff of the highest professional standards for safeguards implementation with regard to the widest possible geographical distribution, in accordance with Article VII D of the IAEA Statute. It calls upon States to exercise their right regarding proposals of designation of IAEA inspectors in such a way as to facilitate the most effective use of safeguards manpower.

19. The Conference also commends to all States Parties the merits of establishment of international fuel cycle facilities, including multination participation, as a positive contribution to reassurance of the peaceful use and non-diversion of nuclear materials. While primarily a national responsibility, the Conference sees advantages in international co-operation concerning spent fuel storage and nuclear waste storage.

20. The Conference calls upon States Parties to continue their political, technical and financial support of the IAEA safeguards system.

21. The Conference underlines the need for IAEA to be provided with the necessary financial and human resources to ensure that the Agency is able to continue to meet effectively its safeguards responsibilities.

22. The Conference urges all States that have not done so to adhere to the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material at the earliest possible date.

**Article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7**

1. The Conference affirms that the NPT fosters the world-wide peaceful use of nuclear energy and reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of any Party to the Treaty to develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II.

2. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking by all Parties to the Treaty, in accordance with Article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right of all Parties to the Treaty to participate in such exchange. In this context, the Conference recognizes the importance of services. This can contribute to progress in general and to the elimination of technological and economic gaps between the developed and developing countries.

3. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking of the Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to cooperate in contributing, alone or together with other
States or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. In this context the Conference recognizes the particular needs of the least developed countries.

4. The Conference requests that States Parties consider possible bilateral co-operation measures to further improve the implementation of Article IV. To this end, States Parties are requested to give in written form their experiences in this area in the form of national contributions to be presented in a report to the next Review Conference.

5. The Conference recognizes the need for more predictable long-term supply assurances with effective assurances of non-proliferation.

6. The Conference commends the recent progress which the IAEA’s Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) has made towards agreeing a set of principles related to this matter, and expresses the hope that the Committee will complete this work soon. The Conference further notes with satisfaction the measures which CAS has recommended to the IAEA Board of Governors for alleviating technical and administrative problems in international shipments of nuclear items, emergency and back-up mechanisms, and mechanisms for the revision of international nuclear co-operation agreements and calls for the early completion of the work of CAS and the implementation of its recommendations.

7. The Conference reaffirms that in accordance with international law and applicable treaty obligations, States should fulfill their obligations under agreements in the nuclear field, and any modification of such agreements, if required, should be made only by mutual consent of the parties concerned.

8. The Conference confirms that each country’s choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies. International co-operation in this area, including international transfer and subsequent operations should be governed by effective assurances of non-proliferation and predictable long-term supply assurances. The issuance of related licences and authorization involved should take place in a timely fashion.

9. While recognizing that the operation and management of the back-end of the fuel cycle including nuclear waste storage are primarily a national responsibility, the Conference acknowledges the importance for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy of international and multinational collaboration for arrangements in this area.

10. The Conference expresses its profound concern about the Israeli military attack on Iraq’s safeguarded nuclear reactor on 7 June 1981. The Conference recalls Security Council Resolution 487 of 1981, strongly condemning the military attack by Israel which was unanimously adopted by the Council and which considered that the said attack constituted a serious threat to the entire IAEA safeguards regime which is the foundation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Conference also takes note of the decisions and resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the International Atomic Energy Agency on this attack, including Resolution 425 of 1984 adopted by the General Conference of the IAEA.

11. The Conference recognizes that an armed attack on a safeguarded nuclear facility, or threat of attack, would create a situation in which the Security Council would have to act immediately in accordance with provisions of the United Nations Charter. The Conference further emphasizes the responsibilities of the Depositaries of NPT in their capacity as permanent members of the Security Council to endeavour, in consultation with other members of the Security Council, to give full consideration to all appropriate measures to be undertaken by the Security Council to deal with the situation, including measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

12. The Conference encourages Parties to be ready to provide immediate peaceful assistance in accordance with international law to any Party to the NPT, if it so requests, whose safeguarded nuclear facilities have been subject to an armed attack, and calls upon all States to abide by any decisions taken by the Security Council in accordance with the United Nations Charter in relation to the attacking State.

13. The Conference considers that such attacks could involve grave dangers due to the release of radioactivity and that such attacks or threats of attack jeopardize the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Conference also acknowledges that the matter is under consideration by the Conference on Disarmament and urges co-operation of all States for its speedy conclusion.

14. The Conference acknowledges the importance of the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the principal agent for technology transfer amongst the international organizations referred to in Article IV(2) and welcomes the successful operation of the Agency’s technical assistance and co-operation programmes. The Conference records with appreciation that projects supported from these programmes covered a wide spectrum of applications, related both to power and non-power uses of nuclear energy notably in agriculture, medicine, industry and
The Conference notes that the Agency’s assistance to the developing States Party to the Treaty has been chiefly in the non-power uses of nuclear energy.

15. The Conference welcomes the establishment by the IAEA, following a recommendation of the First Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, of a mechanism to permit the channelling of extra-budgetary funds to projects additional to those financed from the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund. The Conference notes that this channel has been used to make additional resources available for a wide variety of projects in developing States Party to the Treaty.

16. In this context, the Conference proposes the following measures for consideration by the IAEA:

(i) IAEA assistance to developing countries in siting, construction, operation and safety of nuclear power projects and the associated trained manpower provision to be strengthened.

(ii) To provide, upon request, assistance in securing financing from outside sources of nuclear power projects in developing countries, and in particular the least developed countries.

(iii) IAEA assistance in nuclear planning systems for developing countries to be strengthened in order to help such countries draw up their own nuclear development plans.

(iv) IAEA assistance on country-specific nuclear development strategies to be further developed, with a view to identifying the application of nuclear technology that can be expected to contribute most to the development both of individual sectors and developing economies as a whole.

(v) Greater support for regional co-operative agreements, promoting regional projects based on regionally agreed priorities and using inputs from regional countries.

(vi) Exploration of the scope for multi-year, multi-donor projects financed from the extra-budgetary resources of the IAEA.

(vii) The IAEA’s technical co-operation evaluation activity to be further developed, so as to enhance the Agency’s effectiveness in providing technical assistance.

17. The Conference underlines the need for the provision to the IAEA of the necessary financial and human resources to ensure that the Agency is able to continue to meet effectively its responsibilities.

18. The Conference notes the appreciable level of bilateral co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and urges that States in a position to do so should continue and where possible increase the level of their co-operation in these fields.

19. The Conference urges that preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty in access to or transfer of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking particularly into account needs of developing countries.

20. Great and serious concerns were expressed at the Conference about the nuclear capability of South Africa and Israel and the development of such a capability by South Africa and Israel would undermine the credibility and stability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. The Conference noted the demands made on all States to suspend any co-operation which would contribute to the nuclear programme of South Africa and Israel. The Conference further noted the demands made on South Africa and Israel to accede to the NPT, to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear facilities and to pledge themselves not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

21. The Conference recognizes the growing nuclear energy needs of the developing countries as well as the difficulties which the developing countries face in this regard, particularly with respect to financing their nuclear power programmes. The Conference calls upon States Party to the Treaty to promote the establishment of favourable conditions in national, regional and international financing institutions for financing of nuclear energy projects including nuclear power programmes in developing countries. Furthermore, the Conference calls upon the IAEA to initiate and the Parties to the Treaty to support the work of an expert group study on mechanisms to assist developing countries in the promotion of their nuclear power programmes, including the establishment of a Financial Assistance Fund.

22. The Conference recognizes that further IAEA assistance in the preparation of feasibility studies and infrastructure development might enhance the prospects for developing countries for obtaining finance, and recommends such countries as are members of the Agency to apply for such help under the Agency’s technical assistance and co-operation programmes. The Conference also acknowledges that further support for the IAEA’s Small and Medium Power Reactor (SMPR) Study could help the development of nuclear reactors more suited to the needs of some of the developing countries.

23. The Conference expresses its satisfaction at the progress in the preparations for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPIPCUNE) and its conviction that UNCPIPCUNE will fully realize its goals in accordance with the objectives of resolution 32/50 and relevant subsequent resolutions of the General
Assembly for the development of national programmes of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries.

24. The Conference considers that all proposals related to the promotion and strengthening of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which have been produced by the Third Review Conference of the NPT, be transmitted to the Preparatory Committee of the UNCIPICPUNE.

**Article V**

1. The Conference reaffirms the obligation of Parties to the Treaty to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions are made available to non-nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty in full accordance with the provisions of Article V and other applicable international obligations, that such services should be provided to non-nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.

2. The Conference confirms that the IAEA would be the appropriate international body through which any potential benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions could be made available to non-nuclear weapon States under the terms of Article V of the Treaty.

3. The Conference notes that the potential benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions have not been demonstrated and that no requests for services related to the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions have been received by the IAEA since the Second NPT Review Conference.

**Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8-12**

A. 1. The Conference recalled that under the provisions of Article VI all Parties have undertaken to pursue negotiations in good faith:

- On effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date;
- On effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament;
- On a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

2. The Conference undertook an evaluation of the achievements in respect of each aspect of the Article in the period under review, and paragraphs 8 to 12 of the preamble, and in particular with regard to the goals set out in preambular paragraph 10 which recalls the determination expressed by the Parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty to:

- continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.

3. The Conference recalled the declared intention of the Parties to the Treaty to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament and their urging made to all States Parties to co-operate in the attainment of this objective. The Conference also recalled the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions on nuclear weapons for all time and the desire to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

4. The Conference notes that the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations concluded, in paragraph 50 of its Final Document, that the achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiations of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes;

(c) A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-tables whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

5. The Conference also recalled that in the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference, the Parties expressed the view that the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests was one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race and expressed the hope that the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty would take the lead in reaching an early solution of the technical and political difficulties of this issue.

6. The Conference examined developments relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race in the period under review and noted in particular that the destructive potentials of the nuclear arsenals of nuclear-weapon States parties were undergoing continuing development, including a growing research and development component in military
have declared that they are abiding by the provisions of Article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. The Conference recalled that a stage of negotiations on the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II) had been concluded in 1979, by the signing of the Treaty which had remained unratified. The Conference noted that both the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have declared that they are abiding by the provisions of SALT II.

11. The Conference recalled that the bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America which were held between 1981 and 1983 were discontinued without any concrete results.

12. The Conference noted that bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America had been held in 1985 to consider questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in the interrelationship. No agreement has emerged so far. These negotiations are continuing.

13. The Conference evaluated the progress made in multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations in the period of the Review.

14. The Conference recalled that the trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty, begun in 1977 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, had not continued after 1980, that the Committee on Disarmament and later the Conference on Disarmament had been called upon by the General Assembly of the United Nations in successive years to begin negotiations on such a Treaty, and noted that such negotiations had not been initiated, despite the submission of draft treaties and different proposals to the Conference on Disarmament in this regard.

15. The Conference noted the lack of progress on relevant items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular those relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war including all related matters and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

16. The Conference noted that two Review Conferences had taken place since 1980, one on the Seabed Treaty and one on the Environmental Modification Treaty and three General Conferences of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. In 1982, a Special United Nations General Assembly Session on Disarmament took place without any results in matters directly linked to nuclear disarmament.

17. The Conference also noted the last five years had thus not given any results concerning negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament.

B. 1. The Conference concluded that, since no agreements had been reached in the period under review on effective measures relating to the cessation of an arms race at an early date, on nuclear disarmament and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the aspirations contained in preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 had still not been met, and the objectives under Article VI had not yet been achieved.

2. The Conference reiterated that the implementation of Article VI is essential to the maintenance and strengthening of the Treaty, reaffirmed the commitment of all States Parties to the implementation of this Article and called upon the States Parties to intensify their efforts to achieve fully the objectives of the Article. The Conference addressed a call to the nuclear-weapon States Parties in particular to demonstrate this commitment.

3. The Conference welcomes the fact that the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are conducting bilateral negotiations on a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms — both strategic and intermediate-range — with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. It hopes that these negotiations

Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies
will lead to early and effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. Such agreements will complement and ensure the positive outcome of multilateral negotiations on disarmament, and would lead to the reduction of international tensions and the promotion of international peace and security. The Conference recalls that the two sides believe that ultimately the bilateral negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

4. The Conference urges the Conference on Disarmament, as appropriate, to proceed to early multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament in pursuance of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament.

5. The Conference reaffirms the determination expressed in the preamble of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, confirmed in Article I (b) of the said Treaty and reiterated in preambular paragraph 10 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.

6. The Conference also recalls that in the Final Document of the First Review Conference, the Parties expressed the view that the conclusion of a Treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests was one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race. The Conference stresses the important contribution that such a treaty would make toward strengthening and extending the international barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons; it further stresses that adherence to such a treaty by all States would contribute substantially to the full achievement of the non-proliferation objective.

7. The Conference also took note of the appeals contained in five successive United Nations General Assembly resolutions since 1981 for a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, and of similar calls made at this Conference. It also took note of the measure announced by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions from 6 August 1985 until 1 January 1986, which would continue beyond that date if the United States of America, for its part, refrained from carrying out nuclear explosions. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics suggested that this would provide an example, for other nuclear-weapon States and would create favourable conditions for the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty and the promotion of the fuller implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

8. The Conference took note of the unconditional invitation extended by the United States of America to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to send observers, who may bring any equipment they deem necessary, to measure a United States of America nuclear test in order to begin a process which in the view of the United States of America would help to ensure effective verification of limitations on underground nuclear testing.

9. The Conference also took note of the appeals contained in five United Nations General Assembly resolutions since 1982 for a freeze on all nuclear weapons in quantitative and qualitative terms, which should be taken by all nuclear-weapon States or, in the first instance and simultaneously, by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the understanding that the other nuclear-weapon States would follow their example, and of similar calls made at this Conference.

10. The Conference took note of proposals by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America for the reduction of nuclear weapons.

11. The Conference took note of proposals submitted by States Parties on a number of related issues relevant to achieving the purposes of Article VI and set out in Annex I to this document and in the statements made in the General Debate of the Conference.

12. The Conference reiterated its conviction that the objectives of Article VI remained unfulfilled and concluded that the nuclear-weapon States should make greater efforts to ensure effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, for nuclear disarmament and for a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The Conference expressed the hope for rapid progress in the United States–USSR bilateral negotiations. The Conference, except for certain States whose views are reflected in the following subparagraph, deeply regretted that a comprehensive multilateral Nuclear Test Ban Treaty banning all nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time had not been concluded so far and, therefore, called on the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985 and called on all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of such a Treaty as a matter of the highest priority in the Conference on Disarmament.

At the same time, the Conference noted that certain States Party to the Treaty, while committed to the goal of an effectively verifiable comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, considered deep and verifiable reductions in existing arsenals of nuclear weapons as the highest priority in the process of pursuing the objectives.
of Article VI. The Conference also noted the statement of the USSR, as one of the nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty, recalling its repeatedly expressed readiness to proceed forthwith to negotiations, trilateral and multilateral, with the aim of concluding a comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the submission by it of a draft Treaty proposal to this end.

**Article VII and the Security of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States**

1. The Conference observes the growing interest in utilizing the provisions of Article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

2. The Conference considers that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure and therefore the process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account.

3. The Conference emphasizes the importance of concluding nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements in harmony with internationally recognized principles, as stated in the Final Document of the First Special Session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament.

4. The Conference holds the view that, under appropriate conditions, progress towards the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones will create conditions more conducive to the establishment of zones of peace in certain regions of the world.

5. The Conference expresses its belief that concrete measures of nuclear disarmament would significantly contribute to creating favourable conditions for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

6. The Conference expresses its satisfaction at the continued successful operation of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). It reaffirms the repeated exhortations of the General Assembly to France, which is already a signatory of Additional Protocol I, to ratify it, and calls upon the Latin American States that are eligible to become parties to the treaty to do so. The Conference welcomes the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II to this Treaty by all nuclear-weapon States.

7. The Conference also notes the continued existence of the Antarctic Treaty.

8. The Conference notes the endorsement of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty by the South Pacific Forum on 6 August 1985 at Rarotonga and welcomes this achievement as consistent with Article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Conference also takes note of the draft Protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and further notes the agreement at the South Pacific Forum that consultations on the Protocols should be held between members of the Forum and the nuclear-weapon States eligible to sign them.

9. The Conference takes note of the existing proposals and the ongoing regional efforts to achieve nuclear-weapon-free zones in different areas of the world.

10. The Conference recognizes that for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty arrangements for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone the cooperation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary. In this connection, the nuclear-weapon States are invited to assist the efforts of States to create nuclear-weapon-free zones, and to enter into binding undertakings to respect strictly the status of such a zone and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

11. The Conference welcomes the consensus reached by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security, and urges all Parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

12. The Conference also invites the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to the letter and spirit of United Nations General Assembly resolution 39/54.

13. The Conference considers that acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and acceptance of IAEA safeguards by all States in the region of the Middle East will greatly facilitate the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region and will enhance the credibility of the Treaty.

14. The Conference considers that the development of a nuclear weapon capability by South Africa at any time frustrates the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and that collaboration with South Africa in this area would
undermine the credibility and the stability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. South Africa is called upon to submit all its nuclear installations and facilities to IAEA safeguards and to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. All States Parties directly concerned are urged to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. The nuclear weapon States are invited to assist the efforts of States to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, and to enter into binding undertakings to respect strictly the status of such a zone and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

15. The Conference considers that the most effective guarantee against the possible use of nuclear weapons and the danger of nuclear war is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of this goal on a universal basis and recognizing the need for all States to ensure their independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, the Conference reaffirms the particular importance of assuring and strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Conference recognizes that different approaches may be required to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty.

16. The Conference underlines again the importance of adherence to the Treaty by non-nuclear-weapon States as the best means of reassuring one another of their renunciation of nuclear weapons and as one of the effective means of strengthening their mutual security.

17. The Conference takes note of the continued determination of the Depositary States to honour their statements, which were welcomed by the United Nations Security Council resolution 255 (1968), that, to ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty which is a victim of any act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

18. The Conference reiterates its conviction that, in the interest of promoting the objectives of the Treaty, including the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, all States, both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, should refrain, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or the use of force in relations between States, involving either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons.

19. The Conference recalls that the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly in paragraph 59 of the Final Document took note of the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States regarding the assurance of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of threat of use of nuclear weapons and urged them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

20. Being aware of the consultations and negotiations on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which have been under way in the Conference on Disarmament for several years, the Conference regrets that the search for a common approach which would be included in an international legally binding instrument, has been unsuccessful. The Conference takes note of the repeatedly expressed intention of the Conference on Disarmament to continue to explore ways and means to overcome the difficulties encountered in its work and to carry out negotiations on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this connection, the Conference calls upon all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to continue the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament devoted to the search for a common approach acceptable to all, which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character.

Article VIII

The States Party to the Treaty participating in the Conference propose to the Depositary Governments that a fourth Conference to review the operation of the Treaty be convened in 1990.

The Conference accordingly invites States Party to the Treaty which are Members of the United Nations to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the forty-third session of the General Assembly:

Implementation of the conclusions of the third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a Preparatory Committee for the fourth Conference.
Article IX

The Conference, having expressed great satisfaction that the overwhelming majority of States have acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and having recognized the urgent need for further ensuring the universality of the Treaty, appeals to all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and other States advanced in nuclear technology, which have not yet done so, to adhere to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.