



ORGANISATION FOR THE
PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Working together for a world free of chemical weapons


The OPCW Verification Regime

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CWC in a nutshell

- Entered into force on **29 April 1997**
- Is a multilateral, non-discriminatory, comprehensive treaty embedding measures on destruction, non-proliferation, protection and international cooperation.
- Aims to eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under strict international verification and to prevent re-emergence of chemical weapons





CWC in a nutshell

- **Broad adherence:**
 - **192 States** have ratified or acceded, covering over **98 %** of the worldwide chemical industry
 - **1** signatory State, **3** non-signatory States
 - **8** SPs declared possession of Chemical Weapons
 - **14** SPs declared former Chemical Weapons Production Facilities



CWC routine verification regime

- Verification of the elimination of chemical weapons
 - Article IV: destruction of chemical weapons
 - Article V: destruction (or conversion) of chemical weapons production facilities.
- Preventing re-emergence of chemical weapons
 - Article VI (Activities non prohibited): monitoring of some chemical industry activities and trade of some chemicals



Article II: What is a Chemical Weapon?



- **Toxic chemicals and their precursors**, except where intended for **purposes** not prohibited under this Convention as long as the **types and quantities** are consistent with such purposes



General purpose criterion:

“Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. **This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production**, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.”



Schedules of chemicals

- The Schedules of Chemicals do not define what a chemical weapon is
- Define which industrial facilities and chemicals are subject to declaration and verification by the OPCW
 - Thresholds for declarations and inspections
- Chemicals have been classified in three schedules on the basis of their degree of toxicity, history of use in chemical warfare and extent of commercial use.



Basic verification framework

Declarations



Verification

- Declarations of data on a regular basis
- Compilation, analysis and cross-checking of declared data and/or other information
- Verification of declared information, through remote and/or on-site continuous monitoring and/or on-site inspections
- Clarification mechanisms in case of technical difficulties or ambiguities
- Fact-finding missions or challenge inspections



On-site inspection at CWDF: Systematic Verification Procedures

- **Physical presence at the facility (24/7) by direct observation, perimeter walks and/or random short-notice visits.**
- **Monitoring with on-site instruments:**
 - Continuous real-time access to views provided by facility and CCTV cameras installed at agreed locations.
 - Reviewing time-indexed and recorded views provided by these CCTV cameras.
 - Real-time read-only access to relevant process parameters (including historical trends of key process parameters) on advisory screens.
- **Applying OPCW seals on CCTV cameras, junction boxes, tanks, valves, etc.**
 - During period of inactivity, additional seals may be applied to disable the process, as deemed necessary.
- **Reviewing all relevant and up-to date documentation.**



Practicalities

- Support structure for inspections
 - 24/7 Operations Centre
 - Equipment Store and logisticians
 - OPCW Laboratory and analytical chemists
 - Travel and visa units
- Escort Team in Inspected State Party
- Cooperation from inspected facility



Dealing with issues from inspections

- Issues requiring further attention (IRFA) and uncertainties:
 - bilateral resolution: between TS and inspected State Party
 - about 10-20 IRFAs per year; very few uncertainties
- Summarised for all States Parties in the annual classified Verification Implementation Report
- Minor issues: States Parties amend declarations



Addressing compliance concerns

- Article IX provides provisions for:
 - Bilateral or multilateral clarification mechanisms
 - Challenge inspection to clarify and resolve concerns about possible non-compliance
- Article X gives SPs the right to request assistance, including IAU, if attacked or threatened with CW
- Assistance to UNSG in investigating alleged use in a State not Party





The OPCW and Syria: 5 major missions

1. UN mission – March - September 2013
2. OPCW-UN Joint Mission - October 2013 – August 2014
3. Fact Finding Mission – April 2014 →
4. OPCW mission in Syria – September 2014 →
5. OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism – August 2015 →



Three major work streams

1. Destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons programme (warfare agents and infrastructure)
2. Clarification of Syria's initial declaration
3. Investigations into alleged use of chemical weapons



Destruction of the chemical weapons programme

- Removal and destruction of chemical agents
 - 1300 metric tonnes declared
 - Over 1000 metric tonnes of Category 1 chemicals
 - All Category 1 chemicals destroyed by August 2014
 - Unprecedented international effort
 - 99% now destroyed – remaining Category 2 chemicals by end 2015



Destruction of the Syrian CW programme

- Destruction of infrastructure
 - 27 chemical weapons production facilities declared
 - Underground structures, mobile units and aircraft hangars
 - 26 now verified as destroyed
 - One aircraft hangar remains to be destroyed





Destruction of the Syrian CW programme

- Verification measures required
 - Entrances to underground structures plugged and filled
 - Fibre optic monitors provide real-time notification of tampering or power loss
- All work carried out under difficult security conditions





Clarification of Syria's initial declaration

- Declarations are the basis of the CWC's verification regime
- Initial declarations for possessor States are key
- Declaration Assessment Team
 - Now undertaking its 12th visit to Syria
 - A number of unresolved issues remain
 - DAT will report again to OPCW Executive Council in March



Investigations of alleged use of CW

- Fact-finding mission established in April 2014
- Initial reporting late 2014
- Further incidents in 2015 – reporting in October
- One instance of use of sulfur mustard, indications of chlorine
- Reports will go to JIM





Joint Investigative Mechanism

- Established by UNSCR 2235 (7 August 2015)
- Independent body, headed by Virginia Gamba
- 3-person panel
- Political/legal and investigative units
- Operational November 2015 – first reporting after 90 days





JIM Mandate

“...to identify to the greatest extent feasible individuals, entities, groups, or governments who were perpetrators, organisers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, in the Syrian Arab Republic...”



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