The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) entered into force in February. U.S. and Russian policymakers have indicated that they are preparing for talks on further reductions. At the same time, it is becoming more obvious that the list of issues to be discussed includes more than just strategic offensive arms.

In March 29 remarks prepared for a nuclear policy conference in Washington, U.S. national security adviser Tom Donilon said the next agreement “should include both non-deployed and nonstrategic nuclear weapons.” The New START resolution of advice and consent approved by the U.S. Senate includes a requirement that the administration seek to initiate negotiations with Russia on an agreement that “would address the disparity between the tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and of the United States and would secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner.”

Russian official statements have indicated a willingness to discuss tactical nuclear weapons, but only in conjunction with other issues. With regard to tactical weapons, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, “We are ready to discuss this very complex topic in the framework of a comprehensive approach to strategic stability.” He also called for “coordinated effort” on missile defense.

The ratification statement of the Russian State Duma says that questions concerning potential reductions and limitations of non-strategic nuclear arms must be considered in a complex of other problems of arms control, including deployment of a ballistic missile defense system, plans for creation and deployment of strategic delivery vehicles armed with non-nuclear weapons, [and] a risk of space militarization, as well as existing quantitative and qualitative disparity in conventional arms, on the basis of necessity to maintain strategic stability and strict observance of a principle of equal and indivisible security for all.

This article attempts to analyze the critical factors for making deeper bilateral, verifiable nuclear reductions possible, as well as the ways to resolve related problems. In the view of the authors, the most important issues are ballistic missile defenses, nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and conventional strategic arms.

Ballistic missile defenses are the key issue. On one hand, reducing the gap in the two sides’ attitudes toward missile defense would promote resolution of the two other issues. On the other hand, a lack of progress on missile defense will block dialogue on tactical weapons and conventional strategic arms as well as on further reductions of strategic nuclear arms.

Anatoly Diakov is director of the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, where Eugene Miasnikov is a senior research associate and Timur Kadyshev is a senior research scientist.

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Ballistic Missile Defense

The Russian expert community generally agrees that missile defenses affect strategic stability. Ballistic missile defenses undermine an adversary’s deterrent capability, giving the adversary incentives to build up offensive nuclear arsenals to compensate. Moreover, because missile defenses work much better against a limited attack, they create a dynamic in which a pre-emptive all-out strike would be an obvious choice for both sides in a crisis situation.

The Russian military is concerned about U.S. plans for the development of a global missile defense system. These concerns are based partly on the known capabilities of existing and planned deployments of U.S. missile defense elements, but even more on the perspective of the further development and augmentation of these elements. The Obama administration’s approach to the development of missile defenses provides for deployment by 2020 of a system capable of intercepting intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). U.S. sources admit that the new system will be more effective in countering individual long-range ballistic missiles. According to official Russian views, if such a system is developed, then enhancing it to the point that it would pose a threat to Russia’s deterrence capability would be just a matter of time.

This was the real reason for Russia’s insistence on keeping the statement on the existing interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms in the preamble to New START. Nevertheless, the two parties understand the text of the preamble differently. The Senate’s ratification resolution states that the preamble does not limit the U.S. missile defense deployment plans. In contrast, the Russian law on ratification of this treaty stresses the importance of the preamble and explicitly stipulates the right to withdraw from the treaty in the event of U.S. (or other countries’) deployment of missile defenses that are capable of significantly decreasing the effectiveness of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces.

Understanding that disagreement on missile defenses can not only block further reductions of nuclear arms, but also destroy New START, the Obama administration invited Russia to participate in the development of NATO’s missile defense system, which would be capable of defending all alliance members. During the November 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon, NATO countries reached an agreement to build such a system. Russia agreed to discuss possible cooperation.

What kind of cooperation is possible? Would it help remove Russia’s concerns about missile defenses, as the Obama administration seems to intend?

From Russia’s point of view, the goal of such cooperation must be to build a joint missile defense system, in which each party would have its own zone of responsibility. The parties would participate in the project on equal terms by jointly designing the architecture of the system, its configuration, and working principles. Each party would cover its own sector of responsibility—for Russia, its territory and neighboring states to the south, and for NATO, its southern flank—so that ground-based sensors are not directed toward the interior of the defended area. Therefore, each party would rely on the other in a matter of national security—a situation that requires trust and confidence between close allies rather than the kind of partnership currently existing between Russia and NATO.

The goal of Russia’s offer to build a sectoral missile defense system is to avoid deployment in Europe of missile defenses capable of neutralizing Russia’s strategic capability. It also expresses Russia’s readiness to make a commitment to building a working system capable of defending against intermediate- and long-range missiles. At the same time, the most that Russia can offer now and in foreseeable future for such a system is ground-based early-warning radars; detection, tracking, and identification systems; and relevant technologies. This is clearly not sufficient for building its part of sectoral missile defenses.

Because the United States and NATO intend to build a system of their own based on a phased approach and offer to Russia only the option of jointly investigating the possibility of linking existing and planned systems, their response was quite predictable: Russia’s offer goes beyond what they are ready to accept. Judging by statements of U.S. officials, the planned NATO missile defense system apparently will represent the U.S. system supplemented and extended by missile defense elements of European NATO member states. A similar role evidently is intended for Russia. By “cooperation,” the United States apparently means integration of Russian elements (existing and prospective ones) into the U.S. system. However, the phased approach pursued by the Obama administration is still under development, while the joint NATO system is even further from deployment. As for the Russian role in joint missile defense, the United States and its NATO allies have not reached a common understanding so
far. In any case, the parties agreed that the issue will be studied by technical experts, who will prepare a comprehensive joint analysis of the future framework for missile defense cooperation. The progress of this analysis will be assessed at the June 2011 meeting of Russian and NATO defense ministers in Brussels.9

If a NATO missile defense system is created, equipment for missile launch detection, tracking, and interception will be deployed in Europe. At the same time, taking into account the growing gap between Russian and U.S. capabilities in high-tech weapons, a realistic scenario to consider would be that Russian participation in such a system is limited to sensors. This system, designed to cope with individual missile launches, would not be capable of affecting Russia’s strategic deterrence capability. However, the Russian military is concerned that the U.S.-NATO missile defense system will be improved significantly and that the improvement, combined with the reduction in Russian nuclear forces, will significantly weaken Russia’s nuclear deterrent capability.9

Thus, the approaches of the parties to the missile defense problem are radically different, making the problem difficult to solve in the near future. However, it is possible and essential to undertake steps that would help to reduce the acuteness of the problem gradually.

First of all, it is necessary to renew the confidence-building measures and efforts to develop cooperation in missile defenses that were declared several times during the last 10 years. An important step in this direction would be the joint work on assessment of capabilities of third countries in the area of missile defenses in order to develop a common understanding of emerging threats. In particular, implementation of the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) for the exchange of data from early-warning systems and notifications of missile launches agreed in 2000 or even of two centers (in Moscow and Brussels), as was proposed by President Vladimir Putin during his meeting with President George W. Bush in 2007, would facilitate that. Using these centers, the parties could exchange data on missile launches by third countries. In the future, JDECs and detection and analyzes elements linked with them could form the basis of a common information subsystem of the joint missile defense systems that also would include independent command and control and interception systems.

Certain steps already are being taken. The United States proposed possible cooperation with Moscow that could include exchanging launch information, setting up a joint data-fusion center, allowing greater transparency with respect to NATO’s missile defense plans and exercises, and conducting a joint analysis to determine areas of future cooperation.10

The joint data-fusion center would allow Russian and NATO officers to have simultaneous access to missile launch data from sensors in NATO countries and Russia, giving both sides a full, real-time picture of potential threats. These centers would combine data from fixed and mobile radar sites, as well as from satellites.11

These steps, if implemented, could alleviate Russian concerns about U.S.-NATO missile defenses in Europe, help develop a common view on potential threats, and serve as a basis for further, closer cooperation on missile defenses and possibly other areas.

Russian military experts also propose the following possible areas of cooperation in missile defenses:

- Renewal of joint computer tests of theater missile defenses, expanding their scope beyond theater missile defense to practical tests of real missile defense systems at test ranges
- Use of Russian test ranges and related infrastructure, as well as experience in the design of target detection and identification systems (and in some other areas) for development of interception systems
- Use of Russian space-launch capabilities, including converted ICBMs, for putting in orbit U.S. space tracking and surveillance system satellites12

Along with military cooperation, the parties should undertake joint diplomatic efforts on the limitation and elimination of missile threats within the framework of international regimes, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, and by working directly with countries that could pose a threat.

Confidence-building measures in missile defense could include the search for points of common understanding, which is being conducted within the NATO-Russia Council and in Russian-U.S. dialogue. Work on missile defense projects that may not be ambitious but are mutually profitable, such as the examples listed above, could reduce existing ten-
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons
One may find different definitions in the literature describing the class of nonstrategic nuclear weapons—tactical, sub strategic, or short-range nuclear weapons. In this paper, the term “nonstrategic nuclear weapons” refers to U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons associated with delivery systems that are not covered by New START.

Although nonstrategic weapons are not covered by arms control agreements, the unilateral and reciprocal initiatives adopted by Presidents George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991, known as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, led to a significant reduction of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic stockpiles. Because these initiatives are not legally binding, however, each party carried out the reductions on a voluntary basis, without applying bilateral transparency and verification measures.

The United States and Russia have never declared their holdings of nonstrategic weapons. According to estimates of nongovernmental experts, the United States currently has about 500 such weapons in its active arsenal, of which about 200 are deployed on the territories of U.S. allies in Europe. During the Cold War, the principle mission of U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in Europe was providing nuclear assurance for European allies and extended nuclear deterrence against the threat from the superior conventional forces of the Soviet Union and its allies. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, this mission of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe has lost its significance. As a result, a number of European countries (Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway) attempted to raise the issue of withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. However, this initiative has not received adequate support; in accordance with the new Strategic Concept approved by NATO at its Lisbon summit, the alliance remains nuclear, and U.S. nuclear weapons continue to be stationed in Europe.

According to Russian officials, the number of Russian nonstrategic weapons currently is less than 25 percent of what it was in 1991. Unofficial estimates of Russia’s nonstrategic arsenal vary from 2,000 to 5,000, but the most reliable sources agree that Russia currently has about 2,000 such weapons in its active stockpile. According to official information, all Russian nonstrategic weapons were removed from their delivery vehicles and placed at central storage facilities located within Russian national territory so that adequate measures to ensure their safety and security are implemented.

The principal U.S. interest in negotiations on nonstrategic weapons is linked to Russia’s numerical superiority in this area. Such a disparity is also worrisome for U.S. allies in Europe. In view of this disparity, even before the conclusion of New START, several official U.S. documents stated that the United States needs to pursue significant numerical reductions of Russian nonstrategic weapons. Some nongovernmental experts and official representatives of certain states expressed concerns with regard to the safety of these weapons and tried to exploit such concerns by referring to the possibility that nonstrategic weapons will be stolen and will fall into terrorists’ hands. This scenario is used to strengthen the argument for adding these weapons to the agenda for negotiations, but such allegations are groundless.

Although the new Russian military doctrine, adopted on February 5, 2010, does not provide any specific information on missions and roles for nonstrategic weapons, many Russian experts believe that Russia has increased its reliance on nuclear weapons, especially nonstrategic ones, because of its geostrategic and economic situation. Russia has to take into account that its territory is within the range of nuclear weapons of other nuclear-weapon states located along its perimeter. The expansion of NATO, the approach of its military structure toward Russian borders, and the technological and numerical superiority of the alliance in conventional forces also are noted.

In this context, the Russian political and military leadership is inclined to consider nonstrategic weapons as a means to compensate for the weakness of Russian conventional forces, a tool that plays a vital role in ensuring national security.

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in the world, including the nuclear weapons capabilities of other states.

Third, Moscow reasonably believes that Washington is unlikely to abandon the principle of parity in possible future negotiations on these types of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the U.S. side will likely insist on equal numbers of nonstrategic weapons for the two sides.

Given these factors, and the recent NATO decision to preserve U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, Moscow has no motivation to start negotiations on nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

There is a belief in the nongovernmental community that including nondeployed strategic weapons on the agenda of negotiations could induce Russia to enter negotiations on nonstrategic weapons. The United States has more than 2,000 nondeployed strategic weapons, many more than Russia has. In the past, the inventory of U.S. nondeployed weapons was regarded by Russian experts as giving the United States the capability for a rapid buildup of its strategic forces and thus a significant advantage. However, bringing nondeployed strategic weapons into negotiations may not be attractive enough for Russia to agree to negotiations on nonstrategic nuclear weapons for political and technical reasons. Among the political reasons, the most important are NATO’s unwillingness to discuss the Russian proposal for creating a new security system in Europe and the alliance’s recent decision to continue basing U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.

Technical reasons are linked to the fact that establishing control over nonstrategic nuclear weapons as well as nondeployed strategic weapons means application of transparency and verification measures over nuclear warheads themselves. However, the United States and Russia have no experience yet in warhead monitoring. Moreover, the development and use of an inspection mechanism for nuclear warheads is prevented by the fact that their design, manufacturing, and maintenance are among the most tightly guarded secrets in any nuclear-weapon state. In addition, asymmetries in the Russian and U.S. nuclear weapons production infrastructures and the sensitivity of questions regarding transportation and storage of nuclear weapons should be taken into account. For these reasons, development and implementation of control and verification measures with regard to nuclear warheads is an extremely difficult task from a technical point of view. Its solution will require significant efforts of experts in both countries and can be achieved only if a sufficient level of mutual confidence between the states is established.

Therefore, taking the foregoing into consideration, attempts to include nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Russian-U.S./NATO negotiations do not look promising. Under such circumstances, coordinated unilateral initiatives with regard to nuclear weapons seem preferable, although such initiatives would not be legally binding. First of all, such unilateral initiatives could be aimed at the introduction and development of transparency measures in Russia, the United States, and NATO.

Transparency measures could be implemented in two phases. First, arsenals of U.S. and Russian nondeployed nuclear weapons could be divided into two categories. The first category would include nuclear weapons assigned to deployed delivery systems but placed at storage sites as a hedge (active arsenal). The second category would include nuclear weapons...
with expired lifetimes and slated for disassembly and disposal.

In the first stage of implementing transparency measures, Russia, the United States, and NATO could voluntarily

• share information about the total number of nondeployed nuclear weapons eliminated since 1992;

• share information about the number of nuclear weapons associated with different types of delivery systems that were completely eliminated in accordance with the unilateral commitments in 1991 (e.g., land mines and artillery shells);

• share information annually on the total number of nuclear weapons in the first category (active arsenal) and on the locations at which the weapons are stored, with each side undertaking commitments that weapons of this category will stay only in declared storage sites; and

• declare that they have no plans to transfer weapons from the second (to-be-eliminated) category to the first category.

This exchange of information could be implemented confidentially, in accordance with the national legislation of each side.

Another initiative that could greatly facilitate progress on establishing a verification regime over nonstrategic nuclear weapons would be unilateral commitments by Russia and the United States not to research, develop, and manufacture new types of such weapons.

In the second stage, the sides could

• exchange information on the number of nondeployed nuclear weapons associated with each type of delivery system;

• permit visits to the facilities where weapons of the first category are stored, the purpose being to confirm that the number of weapons stored does not exceed the declared number;

• provide evidence of elimination of weapons of the second category; and

• permit visits to weapons storage facilities of the second category on completion of weapons elimination procedures.

The implementation of the second phase will require an agreement on the protection of sensitive information provided by the sides, for example, location of storage facilities.

In parallel with the implementation of the above initiatives, Russian and U.S. experts jointly could develop technical means and procedures for nuclear weapons verification. It should be noted that Russian and U.S. specialists already have carried out a joint effort in the mid-1990s aimed at developing verification methods for monitoring nuclear warhead inventories and eliminating them while protecting sensitive information. It had been assumed that the sides would have verification means and procedures at their disposal if Russia and the United States could agree to negotiate monitoring of nondeployed nuclear weapons.

**Strategic Conventional Arms**

Over the last several years, the Russian side has suggested more than once that further steps in U.S. and Russian nuclear arms reductions cannot be made without taking into account existing U.S. programs to develop strategic systems armed with non-nuclear weapons. Russian officials also emphasized the existence of a strong link between the Pentagon’s prompt global-strike concept, which serves as a framework for development of strategic non-nuclear arms, and ballistic missile defense programs. Linked together, these developments are seen in Russia as a threat to the survivability of its future strategic forces.

Over the last few years, these types of risks have been accentuated in documents reflecting views of the Russian military-political leadership. Both “The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation Until 2020” and “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” adopted in 2009 and 2010, respectively, list deployment of strategic conventional precision-guided weapons systems as one of the main risks for Russia, along with the development and deployment of strategic missile defense and the militarization of space.

The views on the U.S. side regarding strategic conventional arms fundamentally differ from the Russian views. The U.S. side gives a high priority to development of conventional systems with strategic range as well as ballistic missile defenses, while objecting to any limitation in these areas.

Although the Russian military industry was given the task of developing precision-guided munitions, the relevant
budget allocations are not comparable to those assigned to U.S. development programs. Therefore, the existing gap between the United States and Russia will only widen in the future. For this reason, development of strategic conventional arms likely will be one of the major obstacles on the way to deep reductions of nuclear weapons.

The Russian side insisted that the issue of strategic conventional arms become a topic of the New START negotiations. The treaty contains the following measures:

- Numerical limits on ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), ICBM and SLBM launchers, and deployed warheads on conventional ICBMs and SLBMs

- Transparency measures with respect to strategic delivery systems equipped for conventional armaments if similar systems equipped for nuclear armaments exist (ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines, heavy bombers)

- Limited transparency measures with respect to strategic delivery systems equipped for conventional armaments if similar systems equipped for nuclear armaments have been eliminated or converted to systems equipped for conventional armaments (cruise-missile submarines, heavy bombers)

One should underscore that New START limits strategic conventional arms to a much lesser extent than did the original START, which expired in 2009. Moreover, the new treaty does not prohibit development of some types of strategic arms that were banned by the previous treaty.

In spite of the agreement reached, the problem of strategic conventional arms may become a sticking point even for implementation of New START. When the Obama administration submitted New START to Congress, it made clear that it does not contain any constraints on testing, development, and deployment of current or planned prompt global-strike systems. Perhaps to reinforce this argument, the Department of Defense has decided not to develop systems for conventional prompt global-strike missions based on traditional ballistic missiles and instead to explore boost-glide concepts that have a nonballistic flight trajectory. According to the article-by-article analysis of New START by the U.S. Department of State, it is the view of the U.S. side that not all new kinds of weapons systems of strategic range would be new kinds of strategic offensive arms subject to New START. Specifically, the Obama administration stated that it would not consider future strategic-range non-nuclear systems that do not otherwise meet the definitions of the treaty to be new kinds of strategic offensive arms for purposes of the treaty. A similar understanding was expressed in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s and full Senate’s resolutions of advice and consent to ratification.

The Russian side adheres to an entirely different interpretation. The federal law on New START ratification states that all strategic offensive arms, including new types of offensive arms with strategic range, are subject to the treaty provisions.

The question of applicability of the provisions of New START to any new kind of strategic-range offensive arms should be resolved within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission prior to the deployment of such new kinds of arms. Existing differences could be resolved, provided that the sides demonstrate openness and a readiness to build mutual confidence. In particular, transparency in the U.S. programs for development of strategic non-nuclear arms and restraint in the deployment of these weapons would help to alleviate Russian concerns.

Negotiations on limiting strategic non-nuclear arms, which seem possible only within the framework of a wider bilateral dialogue on further nuclear arms reductions, could be an additional mechanism for overcoming disagreements. Although the current U.S. administration’s hands

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marine deployment areas and preventing collisions of nuclear submarines.

Because such problems can only be solved in a context of a broader bilateral dialogue on further nuclear reductions, progress in this direction also depends on Russia’s readiness to discuss the issues of most interest to the United States, in particular, the issue of nonstrategic nuclear arms reduction.

Conclusion

U.S.-Russian cooperation on the search for complex solutions to the problems identified above can be possible only if each side takes into account the other’s security concerns. If such concerns are taken into consideration and the two sides succeed in resolving the issues discussed above, one may be able to speak about the development of more confident relations between the United States and Russia and about the appearance of conditions for further reduction of their nuclear arsenals. The suggested approach also could help to move the two countries away from relations tramed by a model of mutual assured destruction, which continues to prevail in the U.S.-Russian dialogue in spite of frequently repeated declarations that the Cold War has ended and the sides have reset their relations.

ENDNOTES

1. Donilon said, “A priority will be to address Russian tactical nuclear weapons. We will work with our NATO allies to shape an approach to reduce the role and number of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, as Russia takes reciprocal measures to reduce its nonstrategic forces and relocates its nonstrategic forces away from NATO’s borders.” With regard to verification of nondeployed and tactical warheads, he said, “We are ready to begin discussions soon with Russia on transparency and confidence-building measures that could provide the basis for creative verification measures in the next round of U.S.-Russia nuclear arms reductions.” Tom Donilon, “The Prague Agenda: The Road Ahead,” Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Washington, D.C., March 29, 2011.


8. NATO-Russia Council, Joint statement at the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council, Lisbon, November 20, 2010.


