

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Arab position regarding issues before the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Working paper on disarmament submitted by the Lebanese Republic on behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States

1. The continued possession and development of nuclear weapons are a threat to international peace and security and contrary to the objective of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The continuation of security and defence policies based on the possession of nuclear weapons and the use of such weapons as a deterrent against non-nuclear-weapon States undermines the credibility and legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime.
2. The Arab States welcome all proposals and initiatives that aim to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, and call on the 2010 Review Conference to translate those initiatives into practical measures, including a precise and binding timetable for nuclear-weapon States to disarm in accordance with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty and with the practical measures set forth in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.
3. The Arab States call on the 2010 Review Conference to adopt a decision on the prohibition of development and production of new nuclear weapons as a preliminary step towards a world free of nuclear weapons.
4. The Treaty is the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. States parties are called on to achieve its universality forthwith and make progress towards nuclear disarmament as that would directly strengthen efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons.
5. States parties should comply fully with all their obligations under the Treaty. The rights of States parties under the Treaty should be consolidated and any attempt to reinterpret the Treaty's provisions should be rejected.
6. The inalienable right of States parties to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes must be affirmed and attempts to curtail that right under any pretext must be rejected.



7. Consolidation of the Treaty requires fulfilment of existing commitments, in particular those relating to nuclear disarmament, within the framework of the Treaty and those undertaken at previous Review Conferences, and the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East, which was adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Such consolidation should take place before consideration of any new commitments on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

8. The Arab States call on the 2010 Review Conference to develop a plan of work aimed at achieving the universality of the Treaty through the immediate and unconditional accession of States not parties to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. Those States should place all of their nuclear facilities and programmes under the comprehensive safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

9. The Arab States call on the 2010 Review Conference to issue a decision on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty and to develop effective international arrangements for granting unconditional security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of nuclear weapons.

10. The Arab States stress that IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements are legally binding under the Treaty, whereas the Model Protocol Additional to such agreements is optional. The conclusion of an additional protocol should not be obligatory nor should it be used as a standard for determining whether States should be allowed to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful uses.

11. The Arab States affirm the sovereign right of States to withdraw from the Treaty and reject any attempt to amend or reinterpret the provisions of article X or to restrict their application through new measures.

12. Implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East:

(a) It should be recalled that, at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the States parties emphasized the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty in the Middle East and ensuring that all nuclear facilities and programmes in the region are subject to comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference calls for the resolution on the Middle East to be considered part of the review process until the resolution has been implemented.

(b) In order to consolidate the credibility of the Treaty, the Arab States call on States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States that sponsored the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, to affirm their complete commitment to the aims of that resolution, which is an integral part of the agreement reached at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference to extend the Treaty indefinitely.

(c) The 2010 Review Conference, in accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, should call on Israel to accede unconditionally to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, inasmuch as those steps are essential to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

(d) The Arab States emphasize that the success of the 2010 Review Conference depends on making progress in the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

(e) The Arab States call on the 2010 Review Conference to explore and adopt practical means to implement the resolution on the Middle East and to adopt the practical measures set forth in the working paper submitted by the Arab States.

(f) The Arab States call on the United Nations to convene a conference that will make a sincere effort to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East within a specific time frame, in implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions, including the General Assembly resolution entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East”. They also call on IAEA to prepare the necessary terms of reference on the basis of its experience in preparing for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world.

(g) The Arab States call for the establishment of a standing committee comprising the members of the Bureau of the 2010 Review Conference, with a mandate to follow up implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, which called on Israel to accede to the Treaty forthwith and place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Committee should also follow up implementation of the outcome of the 2010 Review Conference, and submit a comprehensive report thereon to the 2015 Review Conference and the sessions of the Preparatory Committee, in order to inform them of the progress made.

(h) Nuclear-weapon-States should affirm their full commitment to implement the provisions of article I of the Treaty. They should further undertake not to provide Israel with any form of direct or indirect assistance that would enable it to increase its capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons or explosive nuclear devices, or to acquire or gain control thereof, in any way, shape or form. The provision of such assistance to Israel would threaten regional and international peace and security, and gravely endanger the non-proliferation regime.

(i) The Arab States call on the Director General of IAEA to follow up on implementation of resolution GC(53)/RES/17 of September 2009, entitled “Israeli nuclear capabilities”, and provide the Board of Governors with progress reports in that regard.

(j) The Arab States call on the Agency to halt the technical programmes provided to Israel. Cooperation with Israel on nuclear issues should be suspended until it accedes to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and places all its nuclear facilities under a comprehensive safeguards agreement. Those steps are a necessary precondition in order to promote the universality, credibility and effectiveness of the Treaty.

(k) The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would help build confidence and contribute to achieving peace in the region. Until such a zone has been established, the Arab States stress that no State in the Middle East should possess nuclear weapons or explosive nuclear devices, or allow such devices to be placed in its territory or in territory under its jurisdiction or control. All States must refrain from taking any action that goes against the letter and spirit of the Treaty or contradicts any of the international resolutions and documents concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.