

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF NEW START TREATY
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ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY TEXT

The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the “New START Treaty” or the “Treaty”) consists of the main Treaty text composed of sixteen articles, and a Protocol, which is an integral part of the Treaty and contains ten Parts and three Annexes.

Associated with the New START Treaty are three unilateral statements, which address missile defense and the Trident I SLBM. These statements are not integral parts of the Treaty, and they are not legally binding. The texts of these statements are included herein only for the information of the Senate, and they are discussed in this analysis.

The Treaty further reduces the limits on strategic offensive arms from the levels permitted under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991 (the “START Treaty”), which expired on December 5, 2009; and further reduces the limits on warheads from the levels permitted under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions of May 24, 2002 (the “Moscow Treaty”), which this Treaty will supersede upon entry into force.

As in the preceding START Treaty, the term "strategic offensive arms" is not defined in the New START Treaty. "Strategic" indicates that, in general, the forces covered are those of intercontinental range. "Offensive" is in contrast to defensive strategic arms, such as ballistic missile defense systems.

PREAMBLE

The Preamble serves as an introduction to the Treaty and sets forth the general context and goals of the Treaty. The Preamble draws on and develops the Joint Understanding signed in Moscow on July 6, 2009, by President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev, which conveyed the Presidents’ concept and further guidance for the negotiation of the New START Treaty. Initial Presidential

guidance for the Treaty was set forth in the London Joint Statement Regarding Negotiations on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms of April 1, 2009.

The second, third and fourth paragraphs of the preamble emphasize that new global challenges and threats require a new approach to strategic interaction between the United States and the Russian Federation than that which existed during the Cold War. This new relationship is being forged on the basis of mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation. The Parties acknowledge a mutual desire to reduce further the role and importance of nuclear weapons in their nuclear postures.

In the fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs, the Parties reiterate their commitment to fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which provides, in part, that the NPT Parties undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and they jointly express strong support for on-going efforts in non-proliferation. The seventh paragraph notes the Parties' intention to continue their efforts to reduce and limit nuclear arms while maintaining the safety and security of their nuclear arsenals, with a view to expanding this process in the future, to include a multilateral approach. In the U.S. view, follow-on negotiations with Russia should address non-strategic nuclear weapons and non-deployed nuclear weapon stockpiles.

Paragraphs eight through ten emphasize the shared view of the importance of predictability and strategic stability and the Treaty's contribution to those goals. The eighth paragraph states that the Parties are guided by the principle of indivisible security and expresses the shared view that the measures set forth in this Treaty will enhance predictability and stability, and thus the security, of both Parties. Paragraph nine recognizes the existence of an interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and notes that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties. Paragraph ten notes that the Parties are mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability.

Paragraphs eleven and twelve address the role of verification in the Treaty. The eleventh paragraph notes that verifiable and significant reductions in nuclear arsenals have had a positive effect on the world situation. The twelfth paragraph

sets forth the goal of the Parties to create a verification mechanism based on the positive record of the START Treaty that is adapted, simplified, and made less costly to implement, as the U.S. and Russian Presidents instructed in their July 6, 2009, Joint Understanding.

The final preambular paragraphs welcome the implementation of the START Treaty and the Moscow Treaty. The Parties acknowledge the role in the implementation of the START Treaty of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, along with the Russian Federation and the United States. They further express deep appreciation to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine for their contribution as non-nuclear weapon states to strengthening the NPT regime.

ARTICLE I

Article I sets forth the basic obligations of the Parties to reduce and limit their strategic offensive arms and to carry out the other obligations set forth in the Treaty and its Protocol.

This Article also establishes that definitions of terms used in the Treaty and its Protocol are provided in Part One of the Protocol. The Parties agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply all of the terms and definitions in Part One of the Protocol.

Although the Treaty does not define the term “strategic offensive arms,” it lists in Article III the specific types of systems to be limited by the Treaty and defines, in Part One of the Protocol, those systems so as to capture any modernized replacements.

ARTICLE II

Article II sets forth the central limits of the Treaty. It explicitly provides that each Party shall have the right to determine for itself the composition and structure (e.g., numbers and types) of its strategic offensive arms within the prescribed limits of the Treaty, consistent with the principle set forth in the Joint Understanding of July 6, 2009. This means that each Party has the freedom to determine for itself how it

will meet the central limits of the Treaty by the end of the seven-year reduction period.

Paragraph 1 provides that the Parties shall reduce and limit their intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and ICBM launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber nuclear armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter until its expiration, the aggregate numbers of these systems, as counted in accordance with the Treaty, do not exceed:

700, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;

1,550, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers; and

800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.

The July 6, 2009, Joint Understanding established that the Treaty would include two central limits, one for strategic delivery vehicles and the other for their associated warheads. The first and second central limits are intended to limit the deployed strategic forces of each Party. As the negotiations proceeded, the Parties agreed to pursue a third central limit for the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and for deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. This third central limit is intended to limit the ability of the Parties to “break out” of the Treaty limits by constraining the number of non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and non-deployed heavy bombers available for deployment. Each Party will have to operate within this aggregate limit as it considers whether to build and store new systems, and whether to eliminate, convert, or retain older systems.

“Deployed” and “non-deployed” are key concepts in the Treaty and are explained in Part One of the Protocol. A deployed ICBM or SLBM is an ICBM or SLBM that is contained in or on a deployed launcher of such missiles. Similarly, a deployed launcher of ICBMs is a launcher that contains an ICBM and is not an ICBM test launcher, an ICBM training launcher, or an ICBM launcher located at a space launch facility. A deployed launcher of SLBMs is an SLBM launcher

installed on a submarine that has been launched, that contains an SLBM, and is not intended for testing or training. Soft site launchers, when used for testing, training, or space launch, would not meet the definition of either deployed or non-deployed launchers. A deployed heavy bomber is any heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, other than a test heavy bomber or a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments located at a repair facility or production facility.

When ICBMs or SLBMs are removed from their launchers for any reason -- for example, for maintenance -- then both the missile and launcher become non-deployed for purposes of the Treaty and a notification of this change in status will be provided within five days of the change in status, leading to a corresponding adjustment in the New START Treaty's database, pursuant to subparagraph 3(e) of Section II of Part Four of the Protocol. Heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, by definition, become non-deployed when they are located at a repair facility or production facility, or if they meet the Treaty's definition of a test heavy bomber. Each such change in the deployed and non-deployed status of accountable systems will be notified in a timely manner to the other Party and recorded in the Treaty's database. This will help the Parties maintain an ongoing account of each side's deployed and non-deployed forces throughout the duration of the Treaty.

ARTICLE III

Article III provides the counting rules for the limits established in Article II of the Treaty. Paragraphs 1-3 establish the counting rules for each of the three central limits. Paragraph 1 establishes that deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers each count as one toward the aggregate limit of 700 deployed systems. Paragraph 2 makes it clear that, with respect to counting toward the warhead limit of 1,550, the number of warheads for ICBMs and SLBMs is the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs. Each such reentry vehicle, including conventionally-armed reentry vehicles, is counted as one warhead. It is important to note that the Treaty uses the defined term "warhead" to mean a unit of account used for counting toward the 1,550 aggregate limit as applied to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers. The term "reentry vehicle" is used to describe the part of the front section that can survive reentry through the dense layers of the Earth's atmosphere

and that is designed for delivering a weapon to a target or for testing such a delivery.

Previous practice under START was to use attribution rules to determine the number of warheads counted for each type of ICBM and SLBM. Under this practice, each deployed missile of a given type was counted as if it carried a particular number of warheads, even if the individual missile carried fewer reentry vehicles than its attributed number of warheads. Under the Moscow Treaty, each Party used its own methodology for counting which of its warheads it considered to be “deployed” and thus subject to the Treaty’s limits. Under the New START Treaty, one set of warhead counting rules will be used by both Parties and the warhead count will reflect the number of reentry vehicles actually emplaced on each ICBM and SLBM.

In accordance with the Eighth Agreed Statement in Part Nine of the Protocol, the Parties have agreed that non-nuclear objects on the front sections of ICBMs or SLBMs declared to carry at least one nuclear-armed reentry vehicle will not be counted as warheads. This statement is premised on the shared assumption that there is no military utility in carrying nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed reentry vehicles on the same ICBM or SLBM. In practice, this means that objects such as penetration aids and inert ballast objects that may be carried on an ICBM or SLBM will not count toward the Treaty’s warhead limits. Inspectors will have the opportunity to confirm that these objects are not nuclear through the use of radiation detection equipment during the re-entry vehicle portion of Type One inspections. Procedures for the use of radiation detection equipment are provided in the Annex on Inspection Activities.

Paragraph 2 provides that for purposes of counting toward the 1,550 limit, one nuclear warhead is counted for each deployed heavy bomber. Counting nuclear warheads for deployed heavy bombers is thus an attribution rule. This attribution approach was adopted because on a day-to-day basis, neither the United States nor the Russian Federation maintains any nuclear armaments loaded on board its deployed heavy bombers. If the counting approach adopted for deployed ballistic missiles had been applied to deployed heavy bombers, each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments would have been counted with zero nuclear warheads. The New START Treaty approach strikes a balance between the fact that neither side loads nuclear armaments on its bombers on a day-to-day basis and the fact that these bombers nonetheless have the capability to deliver

nuclear armaments stored on or near their air bases. The rationale for this “discounted” attribution of one weapon for each heavy bomber is based on the fact that bombers are not fast-flying, first-strike weapons, and are thus considered to be stabilizing systems.

Paragraph 3 establishes rules for counting deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers toward the aggregate limit of 800.

Paragraph 4 provides the counting rules for ICBMs, SLBMs and launch canisters. The rules reflect the fact that some missiles are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, others as assembled missiles without launch canisters, and others as assembled missiles in launch canisters. The counting rules are as follows:

For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch canister, is considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.

For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type is considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.

For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type is considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type. This rule applies to all U.S. “existing types.”

Each launch canister is considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an ICBM or SLBM is installed in it, until an ICBM or SLBM has been launched from it, or until an ICBM or SLBM has been removed from it for elimination. A launch canister is not considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM if it contains a training model of a missile or has been placed on static display. Launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a particular type are to be distinguishable from launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type.

Paragraph 5 sets out the rules regarding when newly constructed strategic offensive arms begin to be subject to the Treaty, meaning when they will begin to be subject to numerical restrictions and other relevant Treaty provisions. New ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile ICBM launchers become subject to the Treaty when they first leave a production facility. A new ICBM silo launcher becomes subject to the Treaty when the silo door is first installed and closed. A new SLBM launcher becomes subject to the Treaty when the submarine in which it is installed is first launched. A new heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments becomes subject to the Treaty when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which it was assembled. Notifications of newly constructed strategic offensive arms are provided in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol to the Treaty, including a notification 48 hours in advance of the exit of a solid-fueled ICBM or solid-fueled SLBM from a production facility. Such notifications help each side assess missile movements through national technical means of verification (e.g., overhead imagery satellites).

Paragraph 6 sets out the rules governing when ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers cease to be subject to the Treaty. Paragraph 6 distinguishes between rules governing when an individual item ceases to be subject to the Treaty (e.g., through conversion or elimination, and notification thereof, in accordance with Parts Three and Four of the Protocol to the Treaty), and rules governing when an entire type of ICBM or SLBM is no longer subject to the Treaty (when all launchers of that type of missile have been eliminated or converted in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol).

Paragraph 7 sets forth three important rules:

A missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth is not a ballistic missile to which the provisions of the Treaty apply. Thus, missiles for defense against ballistic missile attack or for air defense are not subject to the Treaty's limitations on ballistic missiles, provided that they are developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth. This provision parallels paragraph 3 of Article VII of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, with Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols, signed at

Washington on June 1, 1987 (the “INF Treaty”) and subparagraph 9(a) of Article III of the START Treaty.

Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments is to be distinguishable from a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The term “distinguishable” is defined in Part One of the Protocol. In this context, it means that, within the same type, heavy bombers not equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments must be different on the basis of the totality of functional and external differences that are observable by national technical means of verification, or, that are visible during inspection activities.

Heavy bombers of a given type cease to be subject to the limitations of the Treaty when the last heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments of that type is eliminated or converted in accordance with the procedures contained in Part Three of the Protocol. The First Agreed Statement adds specific verification and transparency measures associated with B-1B heavy bombers that apply once all B-1B heavy bombers have been converted to be equipped for non-nuclear armaments. This statement also establishes that these verification and transparency measures would apply in the event there is another type of heavy bomber for which all bombers of that type have been converted to non-nuclear heavy bombers. The United States expects to complete the conversion of all B-1B heavy bombers soon after the Treaty enters into force.

Paragraph 8 lists, for each Party, the existing types of ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers that are subject to the Treaty. The Parties agree that these lists are complete as of the date of Treaty signature. Because some silo launchers of Minuteman II and Peacekeeper ICBMs have not been eliminated, those missile types are considered to be existing types of ICBMs. Once all launchers for any existing type are converted or eliminated in accordance with the procedures specified in Part Three of the Protocol, that type will no longer be considered an existing type. New types of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, if developed by either Party, would also be subject to the Treaty. The Parties agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply the list of existing types in paragraph 8 of Article III.

ARTICLE IV

Article IV sets forth basing and locational restrictions for strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty. The concept of “basing” is used throughout the Treaty to convey the idea of a permanent facility that supports the long-term operations of a particular strategic offensive system on a permanent basis, as distinguishable from the idea of temporary stationing. In order for a deployed ICBM or deployed heavy bomber to be based at a facility, its routine day-to-day operations must be supported there. The term “based” is also used to assign a strategic offensive arm to a specific facility in the New START Treaty database. For example, deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers temporarily visiting locations other than their assigned base will continue to be specified as “based” at their assigned air base, but temporarily “located” at the facilities they are visiting. The Fourth Agreed Statement in Part Nine of the Protocol also specifies that the U.S. heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments undergoing conversion or awaiting elimination at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona will be considered deployed heavy bombers based at a declared air base, but located at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, until converted or eliminated.

Paragraph 1 establishes that deployed launchers of ICBMs, whether mobile launchers or silo launchers, shall be based only at ICBM bases. An ICBM base is defined as an area in which one or more basing areas and one associated maintenance facility are located (for mobile ICBM launchers), or an area in which one or more groups of silo launchers of ICBMs and one associated maintenance facility are located (for silo ICBM launchers). Maintenance facilities are an important component of the definition of an ICBM base because the operation of deployed ICBM launchers, including the ICBMs loaded on or in them, requires long-term support that can be provided only at or from a maintenance facility. Paragraph 1 also establishes that deployed heavy bombers, which, by Treaty definition, are equipped for nuclear armaments, shall be based only at air bases. This requirement is premised on the same rationale: that deployed heavy bombers require the long-term operational support provided only at an air base.

There are no restrictions on where deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be located. These launchers may leave their basing areas for field deployments, similar to the deployments from their bases of ballistic missile submarines and heavy bombers. Because mobile ICBMs are considered survivable when deployed

in the field and therefore stabilizing, their unhampered operation while deployed in the field is permitted.

Paragraph 2 establishes that deployed launchers of SLBMs may be installed only on ballistic missile submarines. This requirement precludes installation of deployed SLBM launchers on surface ships or other platforms.

Paragraph 3 provides locational restrictions for non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs, non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and prototype ICBMs and SLBMs. There are no locational restrictions for non-deployed launchers of ICBMs within an ICBM base. There are no locational restrictions for non-deployed launchers of SLBMs.

Paragraph 4 provides that non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs, as well as non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs, may be in transit between declared facilities listed in the database established in accordance with Article VIII of the Treaty using the categories of data in Part Two of the Protocol to the Treaty. Paragraph 4 requires each Party to limit the duration of each such transit between facilities to no more than 30 days.

Paragraph 5 requires test launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs to be located only at test ranges.

Paragraph 6 requires that training launchers be located only at ICBM bases, training facilities, and test ranges. Paragraph 6 also provides that the number of silo training launchers located at each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs may not exceed one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

Paragraph 7 requires each Party to limit the number of its test heavy bombers to no more than ten. This limit is established because test heavy bombers are not subject to inspection.

Paragraph 8 provides that test heavy bombers, which are defined as non-deployed, may be based only at heavy bomber flight test centers and that non-deployed heavy bombers other than test heavy bombers may be located only at repair or production facilities for heavy bombers.

Paragraph 9 provides that each Party may not carry out at an air base joint basing of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties. Such an agreement, which allows for the joint basing of heavy bombers of the same type (e.g., B-1B, B-52H) where there is a mixture of those equipped for nuclear armaments and those converted to employ only non-nuclear armaments, is provided in the Third Agreed Statement in Part Nine of the Protocol. During the negotiations, the United States made clear to the Russian Federation that it planned to jointly base B-52H heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and B-52H heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at a selected air base during the life of the Treaty pursuant to this Agreed Statement.

Paragraph 10 provides that strategic offensive arms may not be located at eliminated facilities except during their movement through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers at such facilities. In accordance with the First Agreed Statement in Part Nine of the Protocol, this provision will have no effect on the basing of B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, and Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, following the elimination of these bases as declared facilities once all B-1B heavy bombers have been converted or eliminated in accordance with the Treaty. Procedures for inspection of converted B-1B heavy bombers at an eliminated facility are established in the First Agreed Statement in Part Nine of the Protocol and in Part Five of the Protocol.

Paragraph 11 establishes that strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty may not be based outside the national territory of each Party. This paragraph notes that the obligations provided for in this paragraph do not affect the Parties' rights in accordance with generally recognized principles and rules of international law relating to the passage of submarines or flights of aircraft or relating to visits of submarines to ports of third States. This paragraph also provides that heavy bombers subject to the Treaty may be temporarily located outside the national territory. In such a case, a Party is required to provide notification in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol to the Treaty.

ARTICLE V

Article V of the Treaty sets forth the Parties' understandings with respect to the modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms.

Paragraph 1 provides that, except as prohibited by the provisions of the Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out. This repeats the language of the July 6, 2009, Joint Understanding and is a further reflection in the Treaty of the flexibility concept first expressed in Article II that each Party has the right to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms within the Treaty's aggregate limits. Thus, within the overall limits of the Treaty, the Parties are permitted to deploy "new types" of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

Paragraph 2 addresses "new kinds" of strategic offensive arms. Whereas "new types" refers to new types of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments that meet the definitions of the Treaty, "new kinds" refers to new offensive arms of strategic range that do not meet the Treaty's definitions of these existing strategic offensive arms. This paragraph provides that when a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party has the right to raise the question of such an arm for consideration within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). The provisions regarding the BCC are contained in Article XII and Part Six of the Protocol and establish that either Party may place issues on the BCC agenda for consideration. This paragraph is thus included only for emphasis that either Party may place a concern about a new kind of strategic offensive arm on the BCC agenda for consideration.

The Parties understand that they may use the BCC to discuss whether new kinds of arms are subject to the Treaty. The United States stated during the negotiations its view that not all new kinds of weapon systems of strategic range would be "new kinds of strategic offensive arms" subject to the New START Treaty. Specifically, the United States stated that it would not consider future, strategic range non-nuclear systems that do not otherwise meet the definitions of this Treaty to be "new kinds of strategic offensive arms" for purposes of the Treaty. The Parties understand that, if one Party deploys a new kind of strategic range arm for delivering non-nuclear weapons that it asserts is not a "new kind of strategic offensive arm" subject to the Treaty, and the other Party challenges that assertion, the deploying Party would be obligated to attempt to resolve the issue within the

framework of the BCC. There is no requirement in the Treaty for the deploying Party to delay deployment of the new system pending such resolution.

The Parties agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply paragraph 2 of Article V.

Paragraph 3 states that each Party may not convert and may not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors therein. In addition, neither Party may convert or use launchers of missile defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs therein. The paragraph further states that the provision does not apply to former ICBM launchers that were converted prior to signature of this Treaty for placement of missile defense interceptors therein. This statement has the effect of ensuring that this prohibition does not apply to the five former ICBM launchers at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California that have been converted for missile defense purposes. These former ICBM launchers are not subject to the limits or obligations of the Treaty, except for the exhibitions required by the Seventh Agreed Statement of Part Nine of the Protocol. The Seventh Agreed Statement provides for an exhibition to confirm the conversion of all of these former ICBM silo launchers and a second exhibition to confirm they have not been reconverted.

ARTICLE VI

Article VI sets forth the requirement that conversion, elimination, or other means of removal from accountability of strategic offensive arms and facilities must be carried out in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol. The Parties agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply paragraph 1 of Article VI so that any conversion or elimination carried out between Treaty signature and entry into force will be done in accordance with the Treaty's procedures for conversion or elimination. There is no requirement in the provisional application period to convert or eliminate strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty. This merely establishes the requirement that, should a Party decide for itself to carry out conversion or elimination, it will do so in accordance with the agreed conversion or elimination procedures.

This Article also provides that notifications related to conversion, elimination, or other means of removal from accountability of strategic offensive arms and

facilities must be provided in accordance with Parts Three and Four of the Protocol.

Finally, this Article establishes that verification of the conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms and elimination of facilities, in accordance with the procedures set forth in Part Three of the Protocol, will be carried out by national technical means of verification in accordance with Article X of the Treaty, as well as through inspection activities, as provided for in Article XI of the Treaty.

ARTICLE VII

Paragraph 1 provides that a database pertaining to the obligations under the Treaty will be created in accordance with Parts Two and Four of the Protocol. It also stipulates that the categories of data that must be provided are those set forth in Part Two of the Protocol. Part Two of the Protocol provides that an initial exchange of site diagrams will occur within 45 days after signature of the Treaty, an initial exchange of data according to the categories of data will occur within 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty, and photographs will be provided within 45 days after entry into force for types of strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty for which no photographs were previously provided under the START Treaty.

The Parties must provide notifications provided for in Article VII in accordance with the provisions of Part Four of the Protocol and the Annex on Notifications. The data provided in the notification providing the initial exchange of data must be current as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

Paragraph 2 establishes the obligation that each Party must notify the other Party about changes in data and provide other notifications in a manner provided for in Part Four of the Protocol to the Treaty.

Paragraph 3 requires the Parties to use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) in order to provide and receive notifications, unless otherwise provided for in the Treaty. Examples of notifications that may be provided through diplomatic channels rather than the NRRC include: notice to the other Party that a facility is temporarily exempt from inspection activities in exceptional cases;

information a Party voluntarily provides to enhance confidence in the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty; and some communications pertaining to the BCC.

Paragraph 4 permits the Parties to provide additional notifications on a voluntary basis beyond those specified in Paragraph 2 of this Article if a Party deems this necessary to ensure confidence in the fulfillment of obligations assumed under the Treaty.

Paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 establish rules governing the public release of data.

Paragraph 5 provides that the Parties will hold consultations within the framework of the BCC on releasing to the public data and information obtained during the implementation of the Treaty. Paragraph 5 further makes it clear that the Parties have the right to release to the public such data and information only following agreement thereon within the framework of the BCC. Finally, this paragraph provides that each Party may, of course, release to the public data related to its own strategic offensive arms.

Paragraph 6 also makes it clear that geographic coordinates relating to data provided in Part Two of the Protocol to the Treaty, unique identifiers on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, site diagrams of facilities provided by the Parties pursuant to the Treaty, as well as coastlines and waters diagrams provided by the Parties pursuant to the Treaty may not be released to the public unless otherwise agreed by the Parties within the framework of the BCC.

Paragraph 7 establishes an important exception to the rules in Paragraph 5 governing release of information. Notwithstanding Paragraph 5, the aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; the aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers; and the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers, may be released to the public by the Parties.

The Parties agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply paragraphs 1-6 of Article VII. However, paragraph 2 is provisionally applied only to the

extent required to provide the notifications that the Parties agreed to provisionally apply.

ARTICLE VIII

Article VIII provides that, in those cases in which one of the Parties determines that its actions may lead to an ambiguous situation, that Party is to take measures to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty and to enhance confidence, openness, and predictability concerning the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. Such measures may include, among other things, providing information in advance on activities of that Party associated with deployment or increased readiness of strategic offensive arms to preclude the possibility of misinterpretation of its actions by the other Party. This information is to be provided through diplomatic or other channels.

The formulation “in those cases in which one of the Parties determines that its actions may lead to ambiguous situations” makes it clear that the obligation to “take measures to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty” is triggered only when that Party has determined that its own actions may lead to ambiguous situations. If the other Party has concerns regarding implementation of the Treaty, it has the independent right to raise such concerns in the BCC.

The Parties agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply Article VIII.

ARTICLE IX

Article IX provides that, by mutual agreement of the Parties, telemetric information on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs will be exchanged on a parity basis. Details of this exchange are provided in Part Seven of the Protocol and in the Annex on Telemetric Information. The phrase “parity basis” reflects the Parties’ agreement, in Part Seven of the Protocol, that the Parties will annually exchange telemetric information on an equal number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, up to a total of five launches per year. The number of launches for which telemetric information will be exchanged and issues associated with this exchange will be discussed on an annual basis within the framework of the BCC pursuant to Part Seven of the Protocol and the Annex on Telemetric Information.

ARTICLE X

Article X establishes obligations relating to the use of national technical means of verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. "National technical means" is a term used in a variety of arms control treaties; it refers to those systems, such as reconnaissance satellites, used to collect information useful in verifying compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

Paragraph 1 establishes that the Parties agree:

- (1) to use national technical means of verification at their disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law;
- (2) not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with this Article (e.g., a Party may not destroy, blind, jam, or otherwise interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party that are used in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law); and
- (3) not to use concealment measures that impede verification, by national technical means of verification, of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

Paragraph 2 clarifies that the obligation not to use concealment measures includes the obligation not to conceal ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, or the association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers at test ranges. However, the obligation not to use concealment measures does not apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases or to the use of environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms, since such prohibitions would disrupt normal operations.

The Parties agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply Article X.

ARTICLE XI

Article XI of the Treaty addresses inspection activities. This Article establishes the purposes and framework of inspections, the general inspection rights of the Parties,

and the purposes and framework of exhibitions. Additional details regarding the implementation of inspection activities are provided in Part Five and Part Nine of the Protocol and in the Annex on Inspection Activities.

Paragraph 1 establishes the right of the Parties to conduct inspection activities in accordance with the Treaty and the Protocol to the Treaty. The term “inspection activities” is defined in Part One of the Protocol and refers to both inspections and exhibitions. There are three types of inspection activities under the Treaty: Type One inspections, Type Two inspections, and exhibitions. The purpose of such inspection activities is to confirm the accuracy of declared data provided in accordance with the Treaty as part of the regime to verify compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

Paragraph 2 defines Type One inspections. Such inspections may be conducted at bases for ICBMs (both for silo-based and mobile launchers), for ballistic missile submarines, and for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments to confirm the accuracy of declared data. Confirming the accuracy of declared data at the inspection site includes confirming the number and types of deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty, the number of reentry vehicles located on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and the number of nuclear armaments located on deployed heavy bombers, if any, as well as confirming the absence of undeclared items at the inspection site. This inspection activity will contribute to the verification of compliance with the Treaty’s aggregate limits and related obligations. The Type One inspection of deployed and non-deployed strategic systems encompasses both the reentry vehicle inspection and aspects of the data update inspection, which were conducted at such bases under the START Treaty.

Paragraph 3 defines Type Two inspections. Such inspections may be conducted at a wide range of declared and formerly declared facilities. The purpose of a Type Two inspection at a declared facility is to confirm the accuracy of declared data regarding non-deployed strategic offensive arms located at such facilities, including confirming the absence of undeclared items, or to confirm the conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms.

Paragraph 3 also establishes the right to conduct Type Two inspections at formerly declared facilities in order to confirm that such facilities are not being used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. A “formerly declared facility” is a facility

that has been eliminated in accordance with Section VII of Part Three of the Protocol, including the removal from the facility of all strategic offensive arms specified for the facility and specified associated items.

Paragraph 4 addresses exhibitions, which are used to demonstrate features of new types of strategic offensive arms that distinguish them from existing types and to confirm the technical characteristics of such new types. Exhibitions are also used to demonstrate the results of the conversion of the first item of a given type of strategic offensive arm subject to the Treaty, including the distinguishing features for the converted system, which are intended to provide the basis for subsequent inspections to confirm the completion of conversion of such systems and that they have not been reconverted. Additional types of exhibitions are addressed in the Agreed Statements in Part Nine of the Protocol.

ARTICLE XII

Article XII establishes the BCC to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. The authority of and procedures for the BCC are set forth in Part Six of the Protocol.

The Parties agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply Article XII.

ARTICLE XIII

Article XIII provides that each Party may not assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with the Treaty's provisions. The phrase "obligations or undertakings" covers both formal written agreements and informal arrangements between governments.

Article XIII further provides that the Parties undertake not to transfer strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty to third parties. The Parties are to hold consultations within the framework of the BCC in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this regard. Article XIII makes it clear that this provision does not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of strategic offensive arms existing at the time of signature of the Treaty between a Party and a third State.

For the United States, the only pattern of cooperation existing at the time of Treaty signature is the longstanding and continuing pattern of cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom, which the Russian side acknowledged during the New START Treaty negotiations. The Russian side understands this pattern to be as it was described during the START Treaty negotiations, as discussed below.

With respect to the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom, the phrase "pattern of cooperation," while not defined, is broader than any specific, currently existing sales or cooperation agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom. On July 29, 1991, in the final plenary meeting of the START negotiations, the United States made a formal statement with regard to the scope of its longstanding pattern of cooperation with the United Kingdom. The United States stated that it attaches great importance to the role played by the United Kingdom's independent nuclear deterrent in helping maintain world peace, and that the United States has, for many years, helped maintain and modernize that deterrent. The United States further stated that this is what it referred to as "the existing pattern of cooperation" between the United States and the United Kingdom, which then included agreement by the United States to sell the United Kingdom the Trident II weapon system. The United States has consistently maintained that, in this case, "pattern of cooperation" refers to maintaining an independent United Kingdom deterrent and not to any specific weapon system or any specific category of strategic offensive arms.

ARTICLE XIV

Article XIV provides the rules governing entry into force, duration, and withdrawal from the Treaty.

This Article establishes that the Treaty, including its Protocol, which is an integral part thereof, is subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty will enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

The Article further provides that the Treaty will remain in force for 10 years unless superseded by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic

offensive arms. If either Party raises the issue of extension of the Treaty, the Parties will jointly consider the matter. If the Parties decide to extend the Treaty, it will be extended for a period of no more than five years unless it is superseded before the expiration of that period by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. Such agreement to extend the Treaty would not be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.

On the subject of withdrawal, the Article provides that each Party has the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. A Party must give notice of such decision to the other Party. The notice must contain a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. The Treaty will terminate three months from the date of receipt by the other Party of the aforementioned notice, unless the notice specifies a later date.

Finally, the Article provides that, upon entry into force, the Treaty supersedes the Moscow Treaty.

ARTICLE XV

Article XV provides that each Party may propose amendments to the Treaty, which, if agreed, would enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of the Treaty.

This Article also permits the Parties to make changes in the Protocol to the Treaty that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty and to use the BCC to reach agreement on such changes. In such cases, the Parties need not resort to the procedure for making amendments in Paragraph 1.

ARTICLE XVI

Article XVI restates the obligation in the Charter of the United Nations to register the Treaty with the United Nations.

**ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS
OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS**

GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE PROTOCOL

The New START Treaty consists of the main Treaty text, and a Protocol with ten parts and three Annexes. The Protocol and its Annexes are integral parts of the Treaty; they will enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and will remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.

The ten Parts of the Protocol contain the definitions of terms that are used in the Treaty and the Protocol; the categories of data with respect to items subject to the Treaty; the procedures governing the conversion, elimination, or other means of removal from accountability of strategic offensive arms and facilities subject to the Treaty; the notifications provided for in the Treaty; the provisions governing the conduct of inspection activities; the provisions governing the operation of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC); the procedures associated with the fulfillment of obligations concerning the exchange of telemetric information; the agreement to provisionally apply certain provisions of the Treaty and the Protocol; the Agreed Statements regarding the Treaty and the Protocol; and the general provisions applicable to the Protocol.

The three Annexes to the Protocol provide the technical details for implementation of certain rights and obligations delineated in the Treaty and the Protocol. The Annexes address inspection activities, notifications, and telemetric information.

If it becomes necessary to make changes to the Protocol or the Annexes that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, Article XV of the Treaty provides that the Parties may use the BCC to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments to the Treaty.

PART ONE – TERMS AND THEIR DEFINITIONS

Part One consists of 90 numbered paragraphs, each of which sets forth a term and its definition. The Parties have agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply from the date of signature of the Treaty all of the terms and definitions found in this Part.

All of the defined terms are used in at least one place elsewhere in the Treaty documents. The number in parentheses following the paragraph number is the paragraph number of the equivalent term and definition in the Russian language text, because the terms are listed in their respective alphabetical orders in the English and Russian language texts. The numbers associated with the terms are not used elsewhere in the Treaty. The definitions are referenced by the use of the term itself.

Additional terms are defined or described in other Treaty documents, including the following terms (with the corresponding references): “environmentally-sealed heavy bomber” (paragraph 2, Fourth Agreed Statement of Part Nine of the Protocol); “Type One inspections” (paragraph 2, Article XI); “Type Two inspections” (paragraph 3, Article XI); “Item of inspection” (paragraph 10, Section V, Part Five of the Protocol and paragraph 2, Part Nine of the Annex on Inspection Activities); “providing Party” (paragraph 1, Part One of the Annex on Telemetric Information); “receiving Party” (paragraph 2, Part One of the Annex on Telemetric Information); “trainee team” (paragraph 3, Part One of the Annex on Telemetric Information); “site diagrams of facilities” (paragraph 1, Part Four of the Annex on Inspection Activities); “agree with” for satellite system receivers (paragraphs 5 and 6, Section V, Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities); “navigation system” (paragraph 7, Section V, Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities); “measurement” (paragraph 1, Section VI, Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities); “inspected object” (subparagraph 15(a), Section VI Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities); “hard cover” (subparagraph 11(a), Section II, Part Six of the Annex on Inspection Activities); “soft cover” (subparagraph 11(b), Section II, Part Six of the Annex on Inspection Activities); “combined cover” (subparagraph 11(c), Section II, Part Six of the Annex on Inspection Activities); and “large enough to be an item of inspection” or “large enough to contain an item of inspection” (paragraph 4, Part Nine of the Annex on Inspection Activities).

For the convenience of readers, numbers have been provided below that correspond with the numbers given to the English-language order in Part One of the Protocol.

1. The term “air base” means a facility at which deployed heavy bombers are based and their operation is supported. The term does not include production facilities for heavy bombers, repair facilities for heavy bombers, or heavy bomber flight test centers. “Based” is not further defined but the term is used in the Treaty in the sense of a permanent facility that supports long-term operations on a permanent basis rather than temporary stationing.
2. The term “aircraft” means any manned machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from interaction with the air other than the interaction of the air with the Earth's surface.
3. The term “aircrew member” means an individual who performs duties, associated with inspection activities on the territory of the inspected Party related to the operation of an inspection airplane of the inspecting Party, and who is included on the inspecting Party’s list of aircrew members. The number of individuals on the list of aircrew members is not limited, but the number of aircrew members for each inspection airplane shall not exceed ten (or no more than 15 with permission of the inspected Party). Aircrew members are accorded privileges and immunities while in the territory of the inspected Party, as provided for in paragraph 7, Section II, Part Five of the Protocol. The term applies only to aircrew members on inspection airplanes. It does not apply to any aircrew on commercial or Open Skies aircraft that might be used for the transportation of inspectors.
4. The term “air-launched cruise missile” or “ALCM” means an air-to-surface cruise missile of a type, at least one missile of which has been flight-tested from an aircraft or deployed on a bomber after December 31, 1986. The definition of the term includes a date chosen to exclude, as an ALCM, the Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) that was flight-tested from an aircraft before December 31, 1986. This term does not specify the range of an ALCM. The term “long-range ALCM” specifies an ALCM with a range in excess of 600 kilometers. The term “long-range nuclear ALCM” specifies an ALCM of a range in excess of 600 kilometers that is nuclear-armed.

5. The term “airplane” means a power-driven, heavier-than-air aircraft that derives its lift in flight chiefly from aerodynamic reactions on surfaces that remain fixed under given conditions of flight. This term is a central element of the definition of “bomber” and, by extension, “heavy bomber” and “deployed heavy bomber.”

6. The term “ballistic missile” means a missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. This term includes, within its definition, the defined term, “weapon-delivery vehicle,” which means, for ballistic missiles, “a missile of a type, any one of which has been launched or flight-tested, or deployed to carry or be used as a weapon, that is, as any mechanism or any device that, when directed against any target, is designed to damage or destroy it.” Not all ballistic missiles are subject to the Treaty. For example, subparagraph 7(a) of Article III of the Treaty provides that a “missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to which the provisions of this Treaty apply.”

7. The term "basing area" means an area within an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs, in which deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs are based and in which fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs are located. This term is used in the definition of the term “ICBM base” for mobile launchers of ICBMs and is used in the inspection procedures for ICBM bases.

8. The term “bomber” means an airplane of a type, any one of which was initially constructed or later converted to be equipped for bombs or air-to-surface missiles. The term is also used in the definition of the term “heavy bomber.”

9. The term “conversion or elimination facility” is used to describe specified facilities for the elimination of ICBMs or SLBMs, and launch canisters of ICBMs; for the conversion or elimination of mobile launchers of ICBMs; for the conversion or elimination of SLBM launchers; and for the conversion or elimination of heavy bombers. There is, however, no requirement to carry out conversion or elimination procedures at a conversion or elimination facility. Conversion or elimination may be carried out at any declared facility. Conversion of mobile launchers of ICBMs, silo launchers of ICBMs, SLBM launchers and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments is permitted. There are no provisions in the Treaty for conversion of ballistic missiles. Conversion or

elimination facilities will be listed in the database established using the categories of data in Part Two of the Protocol.

10. The term “cruise missile” means a missile that is an unmanned, self-propelled weapon-delivery vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. This definition distinguishes cruise missiles from ballistic missiles and remotely piloted airplanes. This term is used in the definition of the term “air-launched cruise missile,” which is a component of the term “long-range nuclear ALCM.” The term is relevant to the definition of “heavy bomber” and also to inspections to confirm the accuracy of data on the number of nuclear armaments on deployed heavy bombers.

11. The term “declared data” means data provided by a Party, the accuracy of which is confirmed during inspection activities. It consists of: (1) data with respect to items subject to the Treaty, specified according to categories of data contained in Part Two of the Protocol — that is, the contents of the database; (2) data included in notifications provided in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol that update the contents of the database; (3) information on technical characteristics of new types of strategic offensive arms included in notifications provided in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol that update the contents of the database, and that have been confirmed during exhibitions; and, (4) information that the inspected Party provides to inspection teams during pre-inspection procedures. This term was needed to clarify that inspection teams have the right to confirm the accuracy of all such declared data during inspection activities regardless of whether that data came from notifications, pre-inspection briefings, or other information in the database.

12. The term “deployed heavy bomber” means a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, other than a test heavy bomber or a heavy bomber located at a repair facility or at a production facility. This term is used with respect to the aggregate limits in Article II of the Treaty of 700 for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers; 1,550 for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers; and 800 for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers. In accordance with Article III of the Treaty, each deployed heavy bomber counts as one toward each of these limits.

13. The term “deployed ICBM” means an ICBM that is contained in or on a deployed launcher of ICBMs. This term is used with respect to the aggregate limits in Article II of the Treaty of 700 for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; and 1,550 for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers. Deployed ICBMs for silo launchers are considered to be contained “in” their launchers, while deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers are considered to be contained “on” their launchers. In accordance with Article III, each deployed ICBM counts as one toward the aggregate limit of 700.

14. The term “deployed launcher of ICBMs” means an ICBM launcher that contains an ICBM and is not an ICBM test launcher, an ICBM training launcher, or an ICBM launcher located at a space launch facility. This term is understood to be synonymous with the term “deployed ICBM launcher,” which is used with respect to the aggregate limit in subparagraph 1(c) of Article II of the Treaty of 800 for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers. In accordance with Article III, each deployed launcher of ICBMs counts as one toward the aggregate limit of 800.

15. The term “deployed launcher of SLBMs” means an SLBM launcher installed on a submarine that has been launched, that contains an SLBM, and is not intended for testing or training. This term is understood to be synonymous with the term “deployed SLBM launcher,” which is used with respect to the aggregate limit in subparagraph 1(c) of Article II of the Treaty of 800 for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers. In accordance with Article III, each deployed launcher of SLBMs counts as one toward the aggregate limit of 800.

16. The term “deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs” means a mobile launcher of ICBMs that contains an ICBM and is not a mobile test launcher or a mobile launcher of ICBMs located at a space launch facility. This term describes a category of data in Part Two of the Protocol and is used in the procedures for Type One inspections at an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs. In accordance with Article III, each deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs, which is a subcategory of deployed launcher of ICBMs, counts as one toward the aggregate limit in subparagraph 1(c) of Article II of the Treaty of 800 for deployed and non-deployed

ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.

17. The term “deployed SLBM” means an SLBM that is contained in a deployed launcher of SLBMs. This term is used with respect to the aggregate limits in Article II of the Treaty of 700 for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers; and 1,550 for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers. In accordance with Article III, each deployed SLBM counts as one toward the aggregate limit of 700.

18. The term “distinguishable” means different on the basis of the totality of functional and external differences that are observable by national technical means of verification, or, when such observations may be inconclusive in the opinion of the inspecting Party, that are visible during inspection activities. The term is used in the Treaty with respect to: (1) variants of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers; (2) differences between heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments; (3) launch canisters for ICBMs and SLBMs of different types; and (4) differences between the chassis of existing mobile launchers and eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs so that they can be distinguished from mobile launchers of ICBMs. A Party is required to make certain that items required to be distinguishable have sufficient differences so that the totality of their differences allows the other Party to “distinguish” between them. In practice, such functional differences may not, in all cases, be external to the item. In such cases, the Party possessing the item must also provide an external difference. Although external differences may be observable by national technical means of verification, there is no requirement that the Party possessing the item ensure that such features are observable by the other Party's national technical means. Further, there is no obligation inherent in this definition for the distinguishable item to be displayed to the national technical means of verification of the other Party. Such external differences must, in all cases, be observable during inspections. More importantly, in all these cases in which the observing Party is unable to determine distinguishability by national technical means of verification, it would have the opportunity during inspections to observe the totality of functional differences and external differences that make the items distinguishable. Distinguishing features are demonstrated during exhibitions. If a Party is not satisfied with the distinguishing features demonstrated, it may raise the issue within the framework of the BCC.

19. The term “each year” means during a period of 12 months commencing on the date of entry into force of the Treaty or on an anniversary of that date. The term is used primarily in relation to quotas on inspections, and is designed to facilitate implementation of Treaty rights and obligations. The “treaty year” approach was also used in the INF and START Treaties. Where the Parties intend to use calendar year, the word “calendar” is inserted.

20. The term “facility” means an ICBM base, submarine base, air base, maintenance facility of an ICBM base, basing area of a mobile ICBM base, silo launcher group, ICBM loading facility, SLBM loading facility, production facility, repair facility, storage facility, training facility, conversion or elimination facility, test range, heavy bomber flight test center, or space launch facility. When the adjective “specified” is added in front of the word facility, it indicates that a facility is captured by the definition only if the Party declares it to be such a facility in the database required by Article VII of the Treaty. The rest of the definition for such a specified facility serves merely as a guideline and is not obligatory. If the word “specified” is not used in the definition of any particular facility, then any facility that meets the definition is captured. For example, the definition of a “production facility” is not limited to “specified facilities” and therefore a facility that meets the definition of a production facility must be declared as such in the database. However, the definition of a “repair facility” is for specified facilities. This means that a Party may choose to declare a facility as a repair facility that also performs other functions, and may declare a facility that performs repair as another category of facility. If a Party chooses not to declare a facility as any type of facility subject to the Treaty, then Treaty-limited items are not permitted to be located at the facility. This approach was taken to avoid a requirement to declare a facility more than once or to inadvertently capture facilities capable of performing functions such as repair, but that are not used for purposes related to the Treaty.

21. The term “fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs” means a unique structure, within a basing area, designed to contain mobile launchers of ICBMs. The term is used in the definition of a “basing area” and in Part Five of the Protocol in the description of the procedures for Type One inspections at an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

22. The term “front section” means that portion of the payload of the final stage that contains the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles and may, depending on design,

include a platform for a reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles, penetration aids, and a shroud. The term is used in specifying the length of assembled ICBMs and SLBMs with or without front section in the database provided for in Part Two of the Protocol. It is also used in Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol regarding Type One inspections of deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs. These inspections are for the purpose of ascertaining that the front section of such a missile contains the number of reentry vehicles equal to the number of warheads declared for the deployed ICBM or deployed SLBM. The term is also used in the Eighth Agreed Statement of Part Nine of the Protocol regarding non-nuclear objects located on the front section of an ICBM or SLBM.

23. The term “heavy bomber” means a bomber of a type, any one of which satisfies either of the following criteria: (a) its range is greater than 8,000 kilometers, or (b) it is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. If a bomber meets neither criterion (a) nor (b), or if otherwise agreed by the Parties, a bomber will not be considered to be a heavy bomber. The term is used as an important element of defining which types of bombers are subject to the Treaty (existing types of heavy bombers are listed in subparagraph 8(c) of Article III of the Treaty). “Bomber” is a defined term meaning an airplane of a type, any one of which was initially constructed or later converted to be equipped for bombs or air-to-surface missiles. Aircraft other than airplanes (for example, airships or helicopters) do not meet the definition of a bomber and thus cannot be “heavy bombers” for the purposes of the Treaty. “Range” is also a defined term that means, for an aircraft, the unrefueled range with a 7,500 kilogram ordnance load and a specific flight profile.

24. The term “heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments” means a heavy bomber that is not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, nuclear air-to-surface missiles, or nuclear bombs. Heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments are neither deployed nor non-deployed heavy bombers, and therefore do not count towards the aggregate limits in Article II of the Treaty. Additionally, only the special procedures of the First Agreed Statement of Part Nine of the Protocol apply to heavy bombers of a type for which all heavy bombers have been converted to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments.

25. The term “heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments” means a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, nuclear air-to-surface missiles, or nuclear bombs. Only heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, in either deployed or non-deployed status, are subject to the Treaty’s limits.

26. The term “heavy bomber flight test center” means a facility, other than a production facility for heavy bombers, at which test heavy bombers are based and their operation is supported. Such facilities are not air bases and they are not subject to inspection.

27. The term “ICBM base” is defined as, for mobile launchers of ICBMs, an area in which one or more basing areas and one associated maintenance facility are located; or, for silo launchers of ICBMs, an area in which one or more groups of silo launchers of ICBMs and one associated maintenance facility are located. The Treaty does not establish outer boundaries for ICBM bases.

28. The term “ICBM launcher” means a device intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an ICBM. It includes both silo launchers of ICBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs.

29. The term “ICBM loading facility” means a facility, outside an ICBM base and outside a test range, where ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs are loaded onto or unloaded from mobile launchers of ICBMs. Neither Party had such facilities at the time of signature, but this definition allows for the possibility that such facilities may exist at a later date.

30. The term “in-country escort” means a group of individuals designated by the inspected Party to accompany and assist inspectors and aircrew members throughout the in-country period. The in-country escort meets the inspection team and aircrew members at the point of entry (POE), and expedites their entry and the entry of their baggage, equipment and supplies into the territory of the inspected Party. The in-country escort also examines equipment and supplies brought into the territory of the inspected Party in accordance with Paragraph 4, Section IV of Part Five of the Protocol and Section I of Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities, to ascertain that the equipment and supplies cannot perform functions unconnected with the requirements of inspection activities. The in-country escort then accompanies the inspection team and assists it in exercising its functions throughout the in-country period. Inspectors, in discharging their functions, communicate with personnel of the inspected Party only through the in-country escort. Representatives of the inspected facility must be included among the in-country escort at the inspection site.

31. The term “in-country period” means the period of time from the arrival of the inspection team or aircrew members at the point of entry of the inspected Party until their departure from the country through the point of entry.

32. The term “inspection activities” means inspections and exhibitions.

33. The term “inspection activity site” means a location at which inspections or exhibitions may be conducted in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty and Part Five of the Protocol. The inspection activity sites associated with the points of entry in each Party’s territory will be listed in the database in accordance with the category of data in paragraph 3 of Section IX of Part Two of the Protocol.

34. The term “inspection site” means a location at which Type One or Type Two inspections may be conducted in accordance with Part Five of the Protocol. Paragraph 4 of Section V of Part Five of the Protocol stipulates that the boundaries of the inspection site are the boundaries of the facility specified on the inspection site diagram.

35. The term “inspection team” means the group of inspectors assigned by the inspecting Party to conduct a particular inspection activity. The number of inspectors on an inspection team is limited to no more than ten pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section V of Part Five of the Protocol.

36. The term “inspector” means an individual specified by one of the Parties to conduct inspection activities and included on that Party's list of inspectors. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Section II of Part Five of the Protocol, the number of individuals on the list of inspectors may not exceed 300 individuals at any one time, and all inspectors shall be citizens of the inspecting Party. Procedures for proposing and rejecting inspectors, as well as provisions outlining their privileges and immunities, are contained in Section II of Part Five of the Protocol.

37. The term “intercontinental ballistic missile” or “ICBM” means a land-based ballistic missile with a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers. As in START, the selection of the threshold range of 5,500 kilometers in the definition makes the threshold range limitation align with the INF Treaty (which bans land-based ballistic missiles of the United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers). The distance of 5,500

kilometers is based on the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental United States and the northwestern border of the Russian Federation.

38. The term “launch” means the initial motion and subsequent flight of an ICBM or SLBM. The term “launch” as used in this Treaty has the same meaning that the term “flight test” had in START. Despite the change in terminology, the Parties’ understanding of their Treaty obligations will remain the same as in START. The term “launch” does not require flight for a minimum distance or period of time. Neither does the term imply launch from a specific area, such as a test range.

39. The term “launch canister” means a container, directly associated with an ICBM or SLBM, that can be or has been used for transporting and storing an assembled ICBM or SLBM, with or without its front section, and from which an ICBM or SLBM can be or has been launched. In accordance with subparagraph 4(d) of Article III of the Treaty, each launch canister shall be considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an ICBM or SLBM is installed in it, until an ICBM or SLBM has been launched from it or until an ICBM or SLBM has been removed from it for elimination. The Peacekeeper ICBM is not considered to be “canisterized” because the “liner,” in which it is installed in the silo launcher, is associated with the launcher. The missile is not maintained, stored, or transported in the “liner” outside the launcher.

40. The term “launcher of missile defense interceptors” means a device intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch missile defense interceptors. This term is used in paragraph 3 of Article V of the Treaty.

41. The term “long-range ALCM” means an ALCM with a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

42. The term “long-range nuclear ALCM” means a long-range ALCM that is nuclear-armed.

43. The term “maintenance facility” means a facility that is part of an ICBM base and at which ICBMs and ICBM launchers are maintained and their operation is supported.

44. The term “missile defense interceptor” means a missile that was developed, tested, and deployed in order to intercept ICBMs, SLBMs, or their reentry vehicles. This term is used in paragraph 3 of Article V of the Treaty.

45. The term “mobile launcher of ICBMs” means an erector-launcher mechanism for launching ICBMs and the self-propelled device on which it is mounted.

46. The term "new type" means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a type of ICBM or a type of SLBM, the technical characteristics of which differ from the technical characteristics of an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of each type declared previously in at least one of the following respects: number of stages; type of propellant of any stage; length of either the assembled missile without front section or of the first stage, by more than three percent; and, diameter of the first stage, by more than three percent. The threshold of more than three percent was selected to align with the tolerance for measurements taken during exhibitions and inspections. If the measurement of an item of inspection is within three percent of the declared dimensions in the database, the item is considered to be confirmed as declared.

47. The term “non-deployed heavy bomber” means a test heavy bomber or a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments located at a repair facility or at a production facility. This is different from the START Treaty, which considered all nuclear-equipped heavy bombers except test heavy bombers as deployed. This term is used with respect to the aggregate limit of 800 for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers in Article II of the Treaty.

48. The term “non-deployed ICBM” means an ICBM not contained in a deployed launcher of ICBMs or on a deployed launcher of ICBMs. In accordance with subparagraph 3(b) of Article IV of the Treaty, non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs may be located only at, as appropriate, submarine bases, ICBM or SLBM loading facilities, maintenance facilities, repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, test ranges, space launch facilities, and production facilities.

49. The term “non-deployed launcher of ICBMs” means an ICBM test launcher, an ICBM training launcher, an ICBM launcher located at a space launch facility, or

an ICBM launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, that does not contain a deployed ICBM. This is different from the approach under the START Treaty, which considered each deployed ICBM launcher to contain a deployed ICBM regardless of whether or not it actually contained an ICBM. In accordance with subparagraph 3(a) of Article IV of the Treaty, non-deployed launchers of ICBMs may be located only at ICBM bases, production facilities, ICBM loading facilities, repair facilities, storage facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, training facilities, test ranges, and space launch facilities. This term is synonymous with the term “non-deployed ICBM launcher,” which is used with respect to the aggregate limit in Article II of the Treaty of 800 for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.

50. The term “non-deployed launcher of SLBMs” means an SLBM launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, that is intended for testing or training, or an SLBM launcher that does not contain a deployed SLBM. This is different from the approach under the START Treaty, which considered each deployed SLBM launcher to contain a deployed SLBM regardless of whether or not it actually contained an SLBM. This term is synonymous with the term “non-deployed SLBM launcher,” which is used with respect to the aggregate limit in Article II of the Treaty of 800 for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.

51. The term “non-deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs” means a mobile launcher of ICBMs that does not contain an ICBM, or a mobile test launcher of ICBMs, or a mobile launcher of ICBMs located at a space launch facility, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.

52. The term “non-deployed SLBM” means an SLBM not contained in a deployed launcher of SLBMs.

53. The term “nuclear armaments” means, for heavy bombers, long-range nuclear ALCMs, nuclear air-to-surface missiles, or nuclear bombs.

54. The term “Open Skies airplane” means an airplane performing an observation flight in accordance with the Open Skies Treaty of March 24, 1992, that is simultaneously used for transporting an inspection team to or from a point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party.

55. The term “period of inspection activities” means, for an inspection or exhibition, the period of time from the completion of pre-inspection procedures until the commencement of post-inspection procedures. The period of the activity is determined in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section V of Part Five of the Protocol.

56. The term “produce” means build, construct, or manufacture in any quantity, and includes serial production as well as one-of-a-kind manufacturing. “Produce” includes production of prototypes, since it includes one-of-a-kind manufacturing.

57. The term “production facility” is defined for ICBMs or SLBMs as a facility at which: ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in their launch canisters are assembled, including the joining of all stages of such missiles and the loading of such missiles into launch canisters; ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters are assembled, including the joining of two or more stages; and, first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages are assembled. “Production facility” is defined for ballistic missile submarines as a facility at which construction of ballistic missile submarines is performed; for mobile launchers of ICBMs as a facility at which the erector-launcher mechanism of a mobile launcher of ICBMs is mounted on the self-propelled device; and, for heavy bombers as a facility at which assembly of a complete heavy bomber airframe is performed.

58. The term “prototype” means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, an ICBM or SLBM of a new type, no more than 20 missiles of which have been launched, and no launchers of missiles of which have been deployed. The reason for this term was the Parties' intent to prevent a new type of ICBM or SLBM from counting toward the Treaty's central limits until certain developmental milestones have been achieved. This gives the Parties the flexibility to alter or cancel a program before the missile becomes accountable under Article II of the Treaty. However, prototype ICBMs or SLBMs are considered to be non-deployed missiles (for which there is no central limit) and are subject to relevant provisions of the Treaty such as notifications and, as stated in paragraph 5 of Section I of Part Two of the Protocol, providing unique identifiers. In accordance with subparagraph 3(b) of Article IV of the Treaty, prototype ICBMs and SLBMs may not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases or at submarine bases. In accordance with subparagraph 3(a) of Article IV of the Treaty, mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs may not be

located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases. At Treaty signature there were no prototype ICBMs or SLBMs for either Party. In subparagraph 8(a)(ii) of Article III of the Treaty, the Russian Federation declared the RS-24 ICBM, which had been a prototype ICBM under the provisions of the START Treaty, as an existing type under the New START Treaty.

59. The term “range” means: for an ALCM, the maximum distance that can be flown by an ALCM of that type in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact; for a ballistic missile, the maximum distance determined by projecting the flight trajectory onto the Earth's sphere from the launch point of a missile of that type to the point of impact of a reentry vehicle; and, for an aircraft, the maximum distance that can be flown, without refueling, by an aircraft of that type when carrying an ordnance load of 7,500 kilograms, with a full fuel load in the internal and external fuel tanks and a flight profile optimized to ensure minimum fuel consumption per kilometer, taking into account the distance covered during climb and descent. With respect to aircraft, the fuel remaining in the fuel tanks after landing shall be no more than five percent of the maximum capacity of the fuel tanks. The range of systems is used to determine which systems are or are not limited by the Treaty.

60. The term “reentry vehicle” means that part of the front section that can survive reentry through the dense layers of the Earth's atmosphere and that is designed for delivering a weapon to a target or for testing such a delivery. Under this definition the weapon delivered need not be nuclear, which means that reentry vehicles on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs are always accountable toward the 1,550 aggregate limit on warheads in Article II of the Treaty, regardless of whether or not they are nuclear-armed.

61. The term “repair facility” means: for ICBMs or SLBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base or a submarine base, for the repair or maintenance of ICBMs or SLBMs; for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base, for the repair or maintenance of mobile launchers of ICBMs; and, for heavy bombers, a specified facility, outside an air base, for the repair or maintenance of heavy bombers.

62. The term “rocket motor case” means the case that remains after the solid propellant is removed from the solid rocket motor.

63. The term “self-contained dispensing mechanism” means a device that separates from the final stage of a missile together with the front section and that independently targets and releases the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles and penetration aids. For those missile types that have a self-contained dispensing mechanism, the front section is attached to the self-contained dispensing mechanism. Although self-contained dispensing mechanisms are normally associated with ballistic missiles with more than one reentry vehicle, this is not required; the Russian SS-25 ICBM, for example, has a self-contained dispensing mechanism, but only one reentry vehicle. Self-contained dispensing mechanisms are commonly referred to in the United States as post-boost vehicles.

64. The term “sequential inspection” means an inspection, conducted at facilities associated with the same point of entry, by an inspection team that has not departed the territory of the inspected Party following the completion of the previous inspection.

65. The term “silo launcher of ICBMs” means an ICBM launcher in a silo structure located in the ground. A “silo launcher of ICBMs” is an “ICBM launcher,” which is defined as a device intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an ICBM.

66. The term “silo training launcher” means a full-scale silo launcher of ICBMs specified for training purposes. Paragraph 6 of Article IV of the Treaty establishes numerical and locational constraints on silo training launchers. Models of silos that are less than full depth, sometimes called stub or shallow training silos, are not considered to be silo training launchers, and are not subject to provisions of the Treaty, except that such silos located in inspectable areas are subject to inspection. The four ICBM training silos located at the three U.S. ICBM bases and the three engineering models of silos at Hill AFB, Utah, do not meet the definition of an “ICBM launcher” since they are not intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an ICBM. Since these ICBM training silos and engineering models of silos do not meet the definition of an “ICBM launcher,” they therefore cannot be considered “silo launchers of ICBMs” or “silo training launchers.” Although these ICBM training silos and engineering models of silos were counted as silo training launchers under the START Treaty, they will not be considered as such under this Treaty.

67. The term “SLBM launcher” means a device intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an SLBM. The word “intended” allows launchers to be considered as such prior to actually containing an SLBM, i.e., on a newly constructed ballistic missile submarine following the launch of the submarine.

68. The term “SLBM loading facility” means a shore-based facility, outside a submarine base, where SLBMs are loaded onto or unloaded from ballistic missile submarines. This term is needed only to reflect Russian practices; U.S. SLBMs are loaded at submarine bases.

69. The term “soft-site launcher” means any land-based fixed launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs other than a silo launcher. Soft-site launchers are considered to be neither deployed nor non-deployed launchers and do not count against the 800 aggregate limit specified in subparagraph 1(c) of Article II of the Treaty.

70. The term “solid-fueled ICBM” means an ICBM for which all stages are equipped with solid rocket motors.

71. The term “solid-fueled SLBM” means an SLBM for which all stages are equipped with solid rocket motors.

72. The term “solid rocket motor” means that part of the stage that consists of the case filled with solid propellant.

73. The term “space launch facility” means a specified facility from which objects are delivered into the upper atmosphere or space using ICBMs or SLBMs. Such facilities are listed in the database in accordance with the category of data in Section VI of Part Two of the Protocol.

74. The term “stage” means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a section of a missile that is equipped with a propulsion unit, with the exception of the self-contained dispensing mechanism.

75. The term “storage facility” means: for ICBMs or SLBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base, a submarine base, a test range, or a space launch facility for the storage of ICBMs or SLBMs; for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base, a test range, or a space launch facility for the

storage of mobile launchers of ICBMs; and, for heavy bombers, a specified facility, outside an air base, for the storage of heavy bombers.

76. The term “submarine base” means a facility at which ballistic missile submarines, as well as submarines that had been previously equipped with SLBM launchers but after conversion are incapable of launching SLBMs, are based, and at which shore-based support for such submarines, which may include the assembly, loading, maintenance, and storage of SLBMs, is provided.

77. The term “submarine-launched ballistic missile” or “SLBM” means a ballistic missile with a range in excess of 600 kilometers of a type, any one of which has been contained in, or launched from, a submarine. The range of 600 kilometers was selected to avoid limitations on tactical naval systems.

78. The term “telemetric information” means information that originates on board a missile during its initial motion and subsequent flight and that is broadcast. All data meeting this definition, regardless of content, are considered to be “telemetric information.” As noted for the term “launch,” which also uses the phrase “during its initial motion and subsequent flight,” no change is required for the Parties’ understanding of their Treaty obligations through the use of this term. The term “telemetric information” is used in Article IX of the Treaty and throughout Part Seven of the Protocol and the Annex on Telemetric Information to the Protocol.

79. The term “test heavy bomber” means a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments designated exclusively for testing and based at a heavy bomber flight test center. Each Party is limited to no more than ten test heavy bombers in accordance with paragraph 7 of Article IV of the Treaty.

80. The term “test launcher” means an ICBM launcher or an SLBM launcher located within a test range. Since a “test launcher” is an “ICBM launcher” or “SLBM launcher,” the term refers to launchers within a test range that are intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an ICBM or SLBM. The number of test launchers is not specifically limited by the Treaty; however, test launchers are considered non-deployed launchers and count under the 800 aggregate limit specified in subparagraph 1(c) of Article II of the Treaty.

81. The term “test range” means a designated land area, other than an ICBM base, from which launches of ICBMs or SLBMs are conducted. Water areas, such as the

waters off the coast of Cape Canaveral, Florida, are not considered to be test ranges. Thus, launches from ballistic missile submarines in those waters are not considered launches from test ranges. For the purposes of this Treaty, the Leninsk Test Range in Kazakhstan will be considered a test range even though it will not be listed in the database established using the categories of data in Part Two of the Protocol. The Russian Federation is required to provide a notification when it transits ICBMs to or from the Leninsk Test Range. The Russian Federation's long-term lease arrangement for the use of this test range is explained in the analysis of paragraph 2 of Section III of Part Four of the Protocol.

82. The term "training facility" means a specified facility, outside an ICBM base or submarine base, at which personnel are trained to use, operate, or maintain ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers. Although for ICBMs and SLBMs this definition is very general, note that such facilities are "specified." That is, the Parties are free to designate only the facilities they choose that meet this definition. There is no category of training facilities for heavy bombers as the Parties agreed that there was no need for it, since there were no training heavy bombers.

83. The term "training launcher" means a silo training launcher or a mobile training launcher. In accordance with paragraph 6 of Article IV of the Treaty, training launchers may be located only at ICBM bases, training facilities, and test ranges. The number of silo training launchers located at each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs may not exceed one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base. Although a silo training launcher is a defined term, there is no separate definition for a mobile training launcher because Russia stated that it did not possess any.

84. The term "training model of a missile" means a full-scale, inert model of an ICBM or SLBM that is not capable of being launched and that differs from an ICBM or SLBM on the basis of external and functional differences that are visible during inspection activities.

85. The term "transit" means the one-way movement from one facility to another facility of: a non-deployed ICBM; a non-deployed SLBM; or a non-deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs. In accordance with paragraph 4 of Article IV of the Treaty, the duration of each transit is limited to 30 days. Transits must be notified in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section II of Part Four of the Protocol.

86. The term “unique identifier” or “UID” means a non-repeating alpha-numeric number that has been applied by the inspected Party to an ICBM, SLBM, or heavy bomber. Paragraph 5 of Section I of Part Two of the Protocol requires each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber to have a unique identifier and such unique identifiers are required in certain notifications as agreed in the Annex on Notifications to the Protocol. Provisions for reading and recording unique identifiers during inspection activities are provided for in Part Five of the Protocol. Additional procedures relating to unique identifiers are provided in Part Two of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol.

87. The term “variant” means: for heavy bombers, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, of airplanes of one type and one category that are distinguishable from other airplanes of the same type and the same category; and, for ICBMs and SLBMs, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, of ICBMs of one type or SLBMs of one type that are distinguishable from other ICBMs or SLBMs of the same type. The term “variant” should be considered along with “new type;” a Party may choose to declare a variant for an item that does not differ sufficiently to meet the threshold for declaring a new type.

88. The term “version” means, for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a type, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, based on external or functional differences from other such items. The Russian delegation during the negotiations made clear that all such versions of mobile launchers will have visible distinguishing features, which could be either external or functional according to this definition.

89. The term “warhead” means a unit of account, not a physical item, used for counting toward the 1,550 aggregate limit contained in subparagraph 1(b) of Article II of the Treaty. The term represents the declared number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs, and the one nuclear warhead attributed to each deployed heavy bomber. The term “warhead” is distinct from the terms “reentry vehicle” or “nuclear armament” which are the physical items declared by the inspected Party during pre-inspection briefings and confirmed by observation during Type One inspections.

90. The term “weapon-delivery vehicle” means, for ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, a missile of a type, any one of which has been launched or flight-tested, or deployed to carry or be used as a weapon, that is, as any mechanism or any

device that, when directed against any target, is designed to damage or destroy it. This term is used only in the definition of “ballistic missile” and “cruise missile” and is based on similar provisions in the INF and START Treaties.

PART TWO – CATEGORIES OF DATA PERTAINING TO STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Structure and Overview

Part Two of the Protocol consists of nine sections. The sequence of the categories of data in this Part resembles that used in START, but changes in overall structure and organization were made to reflect different data requirements under the terms of the Treaty.

This Part establishes the categories of data that will be exchanged between the Parties and sets forth instructions as to how specific data will be provided. The categories of data identified in Part Two include the types of ICBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBMs, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and their related facilities. Part Two also lists the categories for technical characteristics for ballistic missile systems as well as categories for distinguishing features for heavy bombers.

The initial data, which will be exchanged by the Parties 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty pursuant to paragraph 1 of Section II of Part Four of the Protocol, will be organized according to the prescribed categories. The timing of the initial data exchange allows for time to prepare the data in the new categories prior to exchange. Inclusion of data in the initial exchange does not constitute agreement on such data by the other Party.

Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section II of Part Four of the Protocol, after the initial exchange of data, the database will be updated no later than 30 days after the expiration of each six-month period following the entry into force of the Treaty, and, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section II of Part Four of the Protocol, no later than 5 days after an event that results in a change of data according to agreed categories of data. The exchange of aggregate warhead data is an exception to the notification requirements of paragraph 3 of Section II of Part Four of the Protocol. The Parties are only required to provide warhead data in the notifications at each six-month period. The aggregate numbers included during the six-month

exchanges of data in accordance with Section II of Part Two of the Protocol will be available for release to the public.

Exhibitions of weapons systems not previously exhibited under START, and exhibitions of future systems will be conducted pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI of the Treaty. These exhibitions will enable the Parties to check, by on-site observation and measurement, technical information contained in the database or provided through notification of new types of ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile launchers of ICBMs, and distinguishing features for heavy bombers. Some of the technical data obtained during such exhibitions can be reconfirmed during subsequent inspections. This data will also be used during Type One and Type Two inspections of facilities listed in the database, which can be conducted up to ten and eight times per year, respectively, to confirm that items of inspection are the items they are declared to be.

Throughout Part Two the mark “- -” is used to signify that a Party currently does not have a particular item or facility or that the category of data is not applicable to the Party; the use of the mark “* * *” in the database signifies that the particular entry or category of data exists, and that a Party agrees to provide it when it becomes available.

Section I - General Provisions

Paragraph 1 outlines the basic requirement that data exchanged during the life of the Treaty will use the categories of data in Part Two of the Protocol. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article XV of the Treaty, should the Parties determine a requirement for a new category of data that does not affect the substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty it may be created by the BCC. The Parties have agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply this paragraph from the date of signature of the Treaty.

Paragraph 2 requires the Parties to exchange, no later than 45 days after Treaty signature, site diagrams of facilities and, as appropriate, coastlines and waters diagrams for all facilities at which inspection activities may be carried out. Diagrams are not required for facilities that are not subject to inspection activities. The Parties have agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply this paragraph from the date of signature of the Treaty.

Paragraph 3 requires the Parties to carry out an initial exchange of data as well as photographs, no later than 45 days after the Treaty enters into force. The parameters for the specific photographs that must be exchanged are contained in Part Five of the Annex to the Protocol on Inspection Activities. Photographs are not required if they were previously provided under the START Treaty.

Paragraph 4 explains the symbols used in this Part that will also be used in exchanges of data to show that certain data is not applicable, or that certain data will be provided when available. The Parties have agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply this paragraph from the date of signature of the Treaty.

Paragraph 5 states the requirement that each ICBM, each SLBM, and each heavy bomber shall have a unique identifier.

Paragraph 6 explains the requirements for recording geographic coordinates in data exchanges. The Parties have agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply this paragraph from the date of signature of the Treaty.

Paragraph 7 allows each Party to use the system of coordinates commonly employed by it. The Parties have agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply this paragraph from the date of signature of the Treaty.

Paragraph 8 specifies the requirement to express to the nearest minute the geographic coordinates for silo launchers of ICBMs located in a silo launcher group at an ICBM base and test launchers.

Section II - Aggregate Numbers

Section II sets forth the categories of data for aggregate numbers of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers; and deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers that are limited by the Treaty in subparagraphs 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c) of Article II of the Treaty. This data represents the aggregate of the data required by Sections III, IV, V, and VI of Part Two of the Protocol.

Section III - ICBMs, ICBM Launchers, and
Warheads on Deployed ICBMs

Section III sets forth the categories of data for the numbers of deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed ICBMs, non-deployed ICBMs, deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, and ICBM test launchers, as well as data on related facilities, by base and location. As with Sections IV, V, and VI, the beginning of this Section contains aggregate data, which will be the basis for the aggregate numbers in Section II. Section III, along with all other Sections of Part Two of the Protocol, establishes some categories of data for items or facilities that neither Party had at the time of signature, but may exist at a later date.

By definition, the number of deployed ICBMs and deployed launchers of ICBMs will always be equal.

Section IV - SLBMs, SLBM Launchers, and
Warheads on Deployed SLBMs

Section IV sets forth the categories of data for the numbers of deployed SLBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, non-deployed SLBMs, deployed and non-deployed launchers of SLBMs, SLBM test launchers, as well as data on related facilities, by base and location. Ballistic missile submarines will also be listed according to the submarine base where they are based.

Ballistic missile submarines in conversion or overhaul will be listed at the submarine base at which they are permanently based. This was done to avoid inspections of shipyards under the Treaty. Since sensitive equipment and technology could not be adequately protected during inspections at shipyards, and since submarines generally can be monitored through national technical means of verification, this approach was judged acceptable to both Parties. A similar approach was taken with respect to the START Treaty.

By definition, the number of deployed SLBMs will always equal the number of deployed launchers of SLBMs.

Section V - Heavy Bombers and Nuclear Warheads Counted for Deployed Heavy Bombers

Section V sets forth the categories of data for the numbers of deployed heavy bombers, nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers, test heavy bombers and other non-deployed heavy bombers, and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, as well as data on related facilities, by base and location.

Each facility listed under this Section includes a category that will list those heavy bombers that are based, or assigned, at that specific facility, and a category that lists those heavy bombers that are located at that specific facility. Accordingly, the same heavy bomber could be listed twice as both based and located at a specific facility, or listed under two different facilities. This approach provides a realistic picture of both Parties' heavy bomber forces.

When counting toward the aggregate limits, both for heavy bombers and for nuclear warheads, only those heavy bombers listed under the "based" category will be used. Likewise, to calculate the number of nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers at each air base, only the number of deployed heavy bombers based at each air base will be counted for this calculation.

Section VI - Space Launch Facilities

Section VI sets forth the categories of data for the numbers of non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs at space launch facilities and the locations of such space launch facilities.

It is important to note that, for the United States, only soft-site launchers are located at existing space launch facilities. Therefore, there will be no non-deployed launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs counted for the United States in this Section, as soft-site launchers are excluded by the definitions of non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and do not count toward the limit of subparagraph 1(c) of Article II of the Treaty.

Section VII - ICBM and SLBM Technical Data

Section VII sets forth the categories of data for technical characteristics of ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs, as well as size criteria to be used

during inspections. The technical characteristics of items that existed under START will be carried over into the new database. The technical characteristics for ICBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, and SLBMs not exhibited under START will be confirmed during exhibitions of such items no later than the date that inspection activities begin, which is 60 days after entry into force of the Treaty. Technical characteristics for all future items will be confirmed during subsequent exhibitions as required. The Annex on Inspection Activities sets forth the criteria related to how measurements will be taken during such exhibitions.

Section VIII - Heavy Bomber Distinguishing Features

Section VIII sets forth the distinguishing characteristics of heavy bombers, to include distinguishing features between variants of a type and category of heavy bomber. Under some circumstances, a Party may not be required to declare distinguishing features for all categories of data listed in this Section, nor, in some circumstances, would a Party be required to list any distinguishing features for a heavy bomber if there are no variants of that type of heavy bomber. Accordingly, distinguishing features for the B-52G and B-52H will be listed, but not for the B-2A.

For the B-1B equipped for nuclear armaments, distinguishing features are not required to be listed under subparagraph 1(a) for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Rather, in accordance with subparagraph 7(b) of Article III of the Treaty, distinguishing features of the B-1B equipped for non-nuclear armaments will be recorded in subparagraph 1(b) for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments.

Accordingly, a footnote provides the explanation that the distinguishing features for the B-1B equipped for non-nuclear armaments will be recorded in the database after the exhibition is completed pursuant to the First Agreed Statement of Part Nine of the Protocol.

Section IX - Other Data Required by the Treaty

Section IX is organized to capture a variety of data related to Treaty implementation.

Paragraph 1 provides for a list of the names and locations of facilities where static testing or static firing is conducted. Notwithstanding subparagraph 3(b) of Article IV of the Treaty, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM may be located at the locations provided for in this paragraph where static testing or static firing is conducted. Such first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs will continue to be listed in the database as based at the facility at which such first stages of ICBMs and SLBMs were located prior to their movement to the locations provided for in this paragraph.

Paragraph 2 provides for a list of ICBMs, SLBMs, submarines, heavy bombers, and inspection airplanes, and, where applicable, their variants. Paragraph 2 of Section III of Part Five of the Protocol provides that the inspecting Party has the right to use agreed inspection airplanes. Agreement will be considered to have been reached when a Party does not object to the notification of intent to use an inspection airplane within ten days of such notification.

Paragraph 3 provides for a list of the facilities by name, location, and coordinates that are subject to inspection activities with their corresponding points of entry. The Parties have agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply this paragraph from the date of signature of the Treaty.

Paragraph 4 provides for a list by name, location, and coordinates, of facilities that are not subject to inspection.

Paragraph 5 provides for a list of the points of entry and their associated airports.

Paragraph 6 provides for a list of the routes for flights of inspection airplanes to and from the points of entry for each Party.

Paragraph 7 provides for a list of those facilities formerly declared in the database that, in accordance with Section VII of Part Three of the Protocol, are considered eliminated for the purposes of the Treaty. By definition, no such data will exist upon the initial data exchange after entry into force.

Paragraph 8 provides for a list of changes to inspection site boundaries when portions of existing boundaries have been excluded in accordance with the Annex on Inspection Activities. By definition, no such data will exist upon the initial data exchange after entry into force.

PART THREE – CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION PROCEDURES

Structure and Overview

Part Three sets forth procedures for the conversion, elimination, and other means for removal from accountability of strategic offensive arms and facilities subject to the Treaty, as specified in Article VI of the Treaty. The Parties have agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply Part Three of the Protocol from the date of signature of the Treaty, but only to the extent required for the implementation of other provisionally applied portions of the Treaty. Provisional application of this Part does not require either Party to provide notifications on conversion or elimination or to make eliminated items visible to national technical means of verification. While neither Party is obligated to convert or eliminate items subject to the Treaty during the period of provisional application, should either Party choose to do so, they will use the conversion or elimination procedures provided for in this Part.

Procedures for inspections to confirm the conversion or elimination of items subject to the Treaty are contained in Part Five of the Protocol. The requirements for notifications regarding conversion or elimination are contained in Sections II and V of Part Four of the Protocol.

Some conversion or elimination procedures are not confirmed by inspection; in some of those cases, national technical means of verification is identified in this Part of the Protocol as the means to confirm such conversions or eliminations.

Part Three consists of seven sections, described below.

Section I - General Provisions

Section I sets forth general provisions regarding conversion or elimination.

Paragraph 1 provides that items subject to the Treaty shall be converted or eliminated at facilities declared in Part Two of the Protocol or *in situ*. Both Parties intend to use the conversion or elimination facilities declared in accordance with Part Two of the Protocol; however, the fact that conversion or elimination may be

carried out at any declared facility provides flexibility to the Parties and obviates the need to spend excessive time and money to move items to conversion or elimination facilities in certain cases. All notification and verification measures are applicable regardless of where the conversion or elimination is completed

Paragraph 2 makes clear that a strategic offensive arm that is eliminated is no longer subject to the Treaty because it has been rendered inoperable such that it can no longer be used as a strategic offensive arm.

Paragraph 3 makes clear that an ICBM launcher, SLBM launcher, or heavy bomber may be converted so that it will no longer be subject to the aggregate limits provided for in Article II of the Treaty by rendering it incapable of employing ICBMs, SLBMs, or nuclear armaments for heavy bombers. The procedures used for conversion must be such that the other Party can confirm the results of the conversion. The Treaty gives both Parties considerable flexibility in converting ICBM launchers or SLBM launchers or heavy bombers. Upon completion of the conversion procedures and confirmation of the completion of conversion, these converted items may be used for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty. An ICBM launcher or SLBM launcher also may be converted to an ICBM launcher or SLBM launcher of another type.

Paragraph 4 provides for using new procedures, which the possessing Party has developed independently, for conversion or elimination. Part Three of the Protocol contains flexibility to use other procedures that the possessing Party develops. This flexibility provides for future planning and for the use of new technologies that may be developed during the lifetime of the Treaty. The use of new procedures is permitted for certain items specified in Sections III (Conversion or Elimination of ICBMs), IV (Conversion or Elimination of SLBM launchers) and V (Conversion or Elimination of Heavy Bombers) of Part Three. The new procedures must be included in a notification no fewer than 5 days after the initiation of the conversion or elimination process; they may be notified earlier if the Party chooses. If the other Party has a question about the new procedures, the question will be discussed in the framework of the BCC. The demonstration provided for in this paragraph may be conducted in the framework of the BCC and may include descriptions, diagrams, drawings, and photographs as needed, or it may be conducted on-site if so agreed. The new procedures will then be recorded in the framework of the BCC, and the procedures may thereafter be used when converting or eliminating an item of that type. While the new procedures must be

discussed and demonstrated within the framework of the BCC, if requested by the other Party, the possessing Party would not be obligated to delay the use of the new procedures.

Paragraph 5 sets forth the requirement to conduct a one-time on-site exhibition when the first item of a type of strategic offensive arm is converted, in order to demonstrate the conversion procedures used. Whether a Party uses established conversion procedures, as listed in the applicable Section of this Part of the Protocol, or new procedures it develops, such an exhibition is required. The exhibition will provide the distinguishing features of the converted item and will facilitate subsequent confirmation of the completion of conversion for items of that type. If a Party uses new conversion procedures it developed, this on-site exhibition will be in addition to the demonstration described in paragraph 4 above.

Paragraph 6 states that the results of the completion of conversion or elimination procedures may be confirmed either by the use of national technical means of verification in accordance with Article X of the Treaty, or by inspection pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty, or both, as specified in the subsequent sections.

Section II - Procedures for Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs

Section II sets forth the process for elimination of all types of ICBMs and SLBMs.

Paragraph 1 permits each Party to determine its own procedures for elimination of its liquid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs. This is similar to the START Treaty, which did not contain specific procedures for elimination of ICBMs for silo launchers or elimination of SLBMs. Such elimination procedures must comply with the requirements of paragraph 2 of Section I, and the notification of initiation of the elimination, provided in accordance with subparagraph 1(b) of Section V of Part Four of the Protocol, must specify the elimination procedures used.

Paragraph 2 lists the procedures to be used for elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs, which are defined in Part One of the Protocol as ICBMs and SLBMs for which all stages are equipped with solid rocket motors. Each Party has the right to use any of the procedures in paragraph 2 to eliminate its missiles. There is no provision in this paragraph for the use of other procedures developed by the possessing Party to eliminate solid-fueled ICBMs or SLBMs. Therefore, one of

the agreed procedures must be used for such elimination. The notification of the initiation of elimination, provided in accordance with subparagraph 1(b) of Section V of Part Four of the Protocol, must specify the elimination procedure used.

If the missile is eliminated by explosion of its first stage rocket motor in accordance with subparagraph 2(a), no further measures are required, and a notification of completion of the elimination is provided to the other Party in accordance with Section V of Part Four of the Protocol.

If the missile is eliminated by burning out the solid propellant from the first stage rocket motor in accordance with subparagraph 2(b), the resulting first stage rocket motor case must be subjected to the additional destructive actions of either (1) cutting or punching into the case a hole of at least one meter in diameter or (2) cutting the case into two pieces of approximately equal size.

If the missile is eliminated by washing out the propellant from the first stage rocket motor in accordance with subparagraph 2(c), additional destructive steps must be taken with respect to the resulting first stage rocket motor case, which must be crushed, flattened, or cut into two parts of approximately equal size.

Paragraph 3 specifies the additional verification measures required for solid-fueled ICBM and SLBM first stage rocket motor cases when the propellant has been removed using a procedure that leaves the rocket motor case intact (subparagraphs 2(b) and 2(c)). Eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs are subject to inspection during the 30-day period following the notification of the completion of elimination procedures provided in accordance with Section V of Part Four of the Protocol. Special provisions are contained in this paragraph and in Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol regarding inspection of accumulations of eliminated first stage rocket motor cases of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs. If not part of an accumulation, each eliminated rocket motor case or its pieces must be placed in the open and remain visible to national technical means of verification for 60 days following the notification of the completion of elimination procedures and that motor case or its pieces also are subject to on-site inspection for 30 days. If the eliminated first stage rocket motor case is part of an accumulation, it is subject to national technical means of verification for 30 days, concurrent with its availability for inspection.

Launch canisters are considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM in accordance with subparagraph 4(d) of Article III of the Treaty. Paragraph 4 of Section II provides for the elimination of launch canisters when their associated missiles are eliminated. After it is separated into two parts, a launch canister must be placed in the open and visible to national technical means of verification for 60 days; this display can take place wherever the launch canister is eliminated, for instance at a test range after a test launch. Paragraph 5 specifies that, following the 60-day display period, the pieces of the launch canister may be used for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty, with the additional restriction that the pieces of the launch canister may not be exported to a third party.

Section III - Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of ICBM Launchers

Section III sets forth procedures for elimination of ICBM launchers and for conversion of ICBM launchers, both silo and mobile launchers.

Paragraph 1 requires that silo launchers must remain visible to national technical means of verification during their elimination process and for 60 days following completion of the elimination procedures.

Paragraph 2 lists the procedures to be used for elimination of silo launchers of ICBMs. Each Party has the right to use the specified procedures contained in subparagraph (a) or (b) to eliminate silo launchers, or may develop new procedures in accordance with subparagraph (c) and paragraph 4 of Section I. The notification of initiation of elimination, provided in accordance with subparagraph 1(b) of Section V of Part Four of the Protocol, must specify the elimination procedure used.

Paragraph 3 provides the right to confirm by inspection the elimination of a silo launcher during a 30-day window following notification of the completion of elimination procedures in accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of Section V of Part Four of the Protocol. Procedures for inspection of an eliminated silo launcher are provided in Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol. The area of an eliminated silo launcher may not be graded over until the 60-day period for verification by national technical means of verification specified in paragraph 1 of this Section has expired or upon completion of the inspection.

Paragraph 4 contains the procedures to be used for elimination of mobile launchers of ICBMs. The entire set of elimination procedures must be completed in all cases to eliminate a mobile launcher of ICBMs. There is no provision in this paragraph for the use of other procedures developed by the possessing Party to eliminate mobile launchers of ICBMs.

Paragraph 5 requires that eliminated mobile launchers be distinguishable from deployed mobile launchers if they are located at declared facilities. The paint scheme on such vehicles must be distinguishable by national technical means of verification.

Paragraph 6 specifies the verification measures required for mobile launchers of ICBMs following completion of the elimination procedures. Each Party has the right to inspect to confirm the elimination of a mobile launcher during a 30-day window following the notification of the completion of elimination procedures in accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of Section V of Part Four of the Protocol. Special provisions are contained in this paragraph and in Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol regarding inspection of accumulations of eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs. Eliminated mobile launchers that are accumulated must be placed in the open and visible to national technical means of verification for 30 days or until completion of the inspection. If not accumulated, each eliminated mobile launcher must be visible to national technical means of verification for 60 days or until completion of an inspection.

Paragraph 7 permits the chassis of the eliminated mobile launcher of ICBMs to be used in any way not inconsistent with the Treaty.

Paragraph 8 applies to conversion of either a silo launcher or mobile launcher of ICBMs from one type to another type (i.e., converting the ICBM launcher to launch another type of ICBM). The Treaty gives each Party the flexibility to decide for itself what types of ICBMs to deploy in its ICBM launchers, but the change of type must be notified in accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of Section V of Part Four of the Protocol. In addition, the notification of initiation of conversion, provided in accordance with subparagraph 1(b) of Section V of Part Four of the Protocol, must specify the conversion procedure used. After the first conversion of a type of ICBM launcher, the exhibition specified in paragraph 5 of Section I must be conducted.

Section IV - Procedures for Conversion
or Elimination of SLBM Launchers

Section IV sets forth separate procedures for elimination of SLBM launchers and for conversion of SLBM launchers.

Paragraph 1 contains the procedures to be used for elimination of SLBM launchers. A Party does not have the right to decide for itself to use new procedures.

Paragraph 2 makes clear that completion of the elimination procedures in paragraph 1 and provision of notification thereof is sufficient to cause the SLBM launchers to cease to be subject to the Treaty.

In accordance with paragraph 3, the submarine on which the SLBM launchers were eliminated must be visible to national technical means of verification for 60 days following notification of the completion of elimination procedures, provided in accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of Section V of Part Four of the Protocol.

Paragraph 4 requires notification if a submarine on which eliminated SLBM launchers were installed is moved to another facility for the purpose of scrapping. It also requires notification when the scrapping of the submarine is complete. Both notifications will be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section II of Part Four of the Protocol.

Paragraph 5 applies to conversion of an SLBM launcher from one type to another type (i.e., converting the SLBM launcher to launch another type of SLBM). The Treaty gives each Party the flexibility to decide for itself what types of SLBMs to deploy in its SLBM launchers, but the change of type of SLBM must be notified. In addition, the notification of initiation of conversion, provided in accordance with subparagraph 1(b) of Section V of Part Four of the Protocol, must specify the conversion procedure used, as developed by the Party carrying out the conversion. After the first conversion of a type of SLBM launcher, the exhibition specified in paragraph 5 of Section I must be conducted.

Paragraph 6 lists the procedures to be used for conversion of individual SLBM launchers or all SLBM launchers on a submarine. Each Party has the right to use the specified procedures contained in subparagraph (a) or (b) to convert SLBM

launchers, or may develop new procedures in accordance with subparagraph (c) and paragraph 4 of Section I. The conversion procedures must render the converted SLBM launchers incapable of launching an SLBM. The notification of initiation of conversion, provided in accordance with subparagraph 1(b) of Section V of Part Four of the Protocol, must specify the conversion procedure used.

Paragraph 7 specifies the verification measures required following completion of conversion procedures for SLBM launchers. When the conversion procedures are completed and notification is provided in accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of Section V of Part Four of the Protocol, the submarine on which one or more converted SLBM launchers are installed must be made available for inspection at a submarine base for a 30-day period. The procedures for inspections to confirm the results of such a conversion are provided in Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol. In addition, after the first conversion of a type of SLBM launcher, the exhibition specified in paragraph 5 of Section I must be conducted.

Section V - Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of Heavy Bombers

Section V sets forth separate procedures for elimination and conversion of heavy bombers.

Paragraph 1 provides the procedures to be used for the elimination of a heavy bomber. Each Party has the right to eliminate a heavy bomber by removing or destroying one of the basic elements of flight. This may be done by cutting off a wing, cutting off the tail section, or cutting the fuselage in two. In all cases, the cuts must be made at a location obviously not an assembly joint. The notification of initiation of the elimination, provided in accordance with subparagraph 1(b) of Section V of Part Four of the Protocol, must specify the elimination procedure used.

Paragraph 2 specifies that the results of elimination can be confirmed using national technical means of verification and that therefore, the pieces of the eliminated heavy bomber must remain visible to national technical means of verification for 60 days following completion of the selected elimination procedure.

Paragraph 3 provides the procedures to be used for conversion of a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Each Party has the right to use the specified procedures contained in subparagraph (a) or (b) to convert heavy bombers or may develop new procedures in accordance with subparagraph (c) and paragraph 4 of Section I. Subparagraph 3(a) references “external attachments” rather than the word “external attachment joints” as used previously under START. The use of the broader term “external attachments” is meant to convey that other aspects of the external attachments for pylons may be modified rather than having to exclusively modify the physical attachment joint where the pylon is fitted to the airplane. The conversion procedures must render the heavy bomber incapable of employing nuclear armaments. The notification of initiation of conversion, provided in accordance with subparagraph 1(b) of Section V of Part Four of the Protocol, must specify the conversion procedure used.

Paragraph 4 specifies the verification measures required following completion of conversion procedures for heavy bombers. When the conversion procedures are completed and notification is provided in accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of Section V of Part Four of the Protocol, the heavy bomber may not be flown and must be moved to a viewing site and made available for inspection for a 30-day period. The procedures for inspections to confirm the results of conversion are provided in Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol. In addition, after the first conversion of a type of heavy bomber, the exhibition specified in paragraph 5 of Section I must be conducted.

Section VI - Other Means for Removal from Accountability

Section VI sets forth other ways in which strategic offensive arms may cease to be subject to the Treaty. A strategic offensive arm that is lost as a result of an accident or is disabled beyond repair meets the requirement for elimination specified in paragraph 2 of Section I. Disablement beyond repair includes considerable financial costs that make recovery or repair impractical. Prior to placing a strategic offensive arm on static display or using it as a non-flyable ground trainer, paragraph 2 requires it to be rendered inoperable to meet the requirement for elimination specified in paragraph 2 of Section I.

The launch of an ICBM or SLBM eliminates the missile from accountability. Static testing or static firing of an ICBM or SLBM also eliminates the missile. Static testing or static firing need only pertain to the first stage of the missile. Notification of the elimination of an ICBM or SLBM by launch, static testing, or static firing must be provided in accordance with subparagraph 3(a) of Section II of Part Four of the Protocol.

Section VII - Procedures for Elimination of Facilities

Section VII sets forth procedures for elimination of facilities from Treaty accountability.

Paragraph 1 specifies that any facility as defined in Part One of the Protocol and listed in the database shall be considered eliminated for purposes of the Treaty when all the items listed in this paragraph have been eliminated or removed from the facility.

Paragraph 2 sets forth specific procedures for elimination of fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, which are defined in Part One of the Protocol and listed in the database. After the superstructure of the fixed structures have been disassembled, the foundations of such structures must remain visible to national technical means of verification so the Parties can confirm that they are not used thereafter to support mobile launchers of ICBMs.

Eliminated facilities continue to be listed in the database as formerly declared facilities and continue to be subject to inspection under the quota for Type Two inspections. The provisions for inspections of formerly declared facilities are contained in Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol.

Facilities eliminated in accordance with the Section may be used for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 10 of Article IV of the Treaty, strategic offensive arms may not be located at eliminated facilities except during their movement through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers at such facilities.

PART FOUR – NOTIFICATIONS

Structure and Overview

Part Four consists of seven Sections. Pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty, Part Four sets forth the requirements for notifications of certain activities involving strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty and their related facilities. The Parties' Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) are responsible for the transmission and receipt of these notifications, unless otherwise provided for in the Treaty.

Section I provides general rules for notifications. Section II specifies the requirements for notifications concerning data with respect to the database specified in paragraph 1 of Article VII of the Treaty. This section also specifies notifications concerning prototypes, new types, and new kinds of strategic offensive arms. Section III specifies the requirements for notifications concerning movement of strategic offensive arms. Section IV specifies the requirements for notifications concerning launches of ICBMs and SLBMs and the exchange of telemetric information and supports Part Seven of the Protocol and the Annex on Telemetric Information to the Protocol. Section V specifies the requirements for notifications concerning the conversion or elimination of items and facilities subject to the Treaty and supports Part Three of the Protocol. Section VI specifies the requirements for notifications concerning inspection activities and supports Part Five of the Protocol and the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol. Section VII specifies the requirements for notifications concerning activities of the BCC and additional messages and supports Part Six of the Protocol.

Section I - General Provisions

Paragraph 1 establishes that notifications will be provided in accordance with Article VII of the Treaty, Part Four of the Protocol, and the Annex on Notifications to the Protocol. The Parties have agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply this paragraph from the date of signature of the Treaty.

Paragraph 2 sets forth the time and date when a notification will become effective. It also notes that Greenwich Mean Time will be used in all notifications. The Parties have agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply this paragraph from the date of signature of the Treaty.

Section II - Notifications Concerning Data
Pertaining to Strategic Offensive Arms

Section II contains six paragraphs that set forth the obligation of each Party to provide to the other Party notifications concerning data with respect to items for which categories of data are contained in Part Two of the Protocol and in any other agreed categories of data.

Paragraph 1 requires that each Party provide its data current as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty for each category of data contained in Part Two of the Protocol, and each Party must provide that data no later than 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty. This is the initial exchange of data and this notification is therefore provided only once. It will constitute the database for the Treaty and will subsequently be updated in its entirety every six months.

Paragraph 2 requires that each Party provide its updated data for each category of data contained in Part Two of the Protocol no later than 30 days after the expiration of each six-month period following entry into force. The first of these six-month periods begins the first day of the calendar month following the month of entry into force of the Treaty. Data accurate as of the end of the preceding six-month period must be provided. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article VII of the Treaty, the updates will be transmitted through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers.

Paragraph 3 requires that notification of an event be provided no later than five days after the occurrence of the event if such an event results in a change in data in the database or in other agreed categories of data, except for changes in data on warheads. The information provided in these notifications must be sufficient for the receiving Party to make all the requisite changes in the relevant categories of data established in Part Two of the Protocol and other agreed categories of data. The information that must be provided in the notification of the event includes the change in data, by number, and, as applicable, type, category, variant, and version of the items; the location of the items; the date on which such a change occurred; and the unique identifier, if applicable. In addition, the geographic coordinates must be specified for the location that relates to the occurrence of the event. Subparagraphs (a) through (e) provide an illustrative list of situations in which use of this notification would be required if not provided in accordance with other provisions of Part Four. Other illustrative situations where this notification would

be used are: construction of a new silo-launcher of ICBMs, notification of a change in the number of non-deployed items at a facility due to the transit of an item to or from that facility, data concerning the technical characteristics of new types and variants of strategic offensive arms to be exhibited, and changes in technical data or heavy bomber distinguishing features.

Paragraph 4 is the notification of the arrival at a declared facility of the first prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM of a new type. Prototype ICBMs and SLBMs will be subject to the Treaty as non-deployed missiles. Information must be provided in the notification to assist the other Party in differentiating the prototype from existing types.

Paragraph 5 is the notification that a prototype ICBM or SLBM has reached a critical stage in its development (that is, after the twentieth flight test or 30 days before its deployment) and will be considered a new type. This notification can also be provided if the notifying Party decides to declare a new type of ICBM or SLBM before the twentieth flight test. At that point, any launchers for the new type will become subject to the limit in subparagraph 1(c) of Article II of the Treaty. Missiles of the new type will be counted under the limits in subparagraphs 1(a) and (b) of Article II as soon as they are deployed under the Treaty's definition. In accordance with Section VII of Part Two of the Protocol, the notifying Party must provide a certain amount of information about the new type of missile including, number of stages, weight, length, diameter, and launch canister technical characteristics. The location and date for the required exhibition(s) will be provided pursuant to the notification specified in paragraph 12 of Section VI of Part Four of the Protocol.

Paragraph 6 is the notification of the cessation of development of a new type of a prototype missile and of the intention not to deploy such a missile. The information that must be provided includes the type of the prototypes and the date of the decision to curtail its development. Any prototype missiles will remain subject to the Treaty as non-deployed missiles until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures in Part Three of the Protocol.

Paragraph 7 requires notification of the transfer of SLBMs to or from a third State in accordance with an established pattern of cooperation existing at the time of signature of the Treaty, as referred to in Article XIII of the Treaty. The number, type, date, unique identifier, and location of the transferred SLBM must be

provided. This notification will be used with respect to the longstanding pattern of cooperation that existed at the time of signature of the Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom. There is a separate notification, provided under paragraph 2 of Section III of Part Four of the Protocol that the Russian Federation will use to notify the transit of Russian ICBMs to and from the Leninsk Test Range in Kazakhstan for the purpose of conducting flight test launches from the Leninsk Test Range. Under its long-term lease arrangement with Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation maintains ownership and control over all ICBMs transported to and from the Leninsk Test Range.

Paragraph 8 provides a means for the Parties to raise or respond to questions about new kinds of strategic offensive arms. This notification relates to paragraph 2 of Article V of the Treaty and subparagraph (d) of Section I of Part Six of the Protocol, which provides for questions relating to the applicability of provisions of the Treaty to new kinds of strategic offensive arms to be resolved in the BCC.

Section III - Notifications Concerning Movement of Strategic Offensive Arms

Section III consists of six paragraphs on notifications of certain movements of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.

Paragraph 1 requires that a Party be notified no less than 48 hours in advance of the exit of any solid-fueled ICBM or SLBM from a production facility specified in Part Two of the Protocol. The type of ICBM or SLBM, the number of items, the unique identifier(s), and the name and coordinates of the production facility will be provided. This notification will be given in advance of the departure of the solid-fueled missile from the production facility to give the other Party the opportunity to use national technical means of verification to confirm the exit.

Paragraph 2 requires that a notification be provided no later than five days after an ICBM has moved to or from a test range located outside a Party's national territory, which a Party has used for conducting launches of ICBMs between December 5, 1994 and December 4, 2009. The practical effect of this notification is to require the Russian Federation to notify the movement of ICBMs to or from the Leninsk Test Range in Kazakhstan for the purpose of conducting test launches. Leninsk is not a declared facility under the Treaty. A missile that has made a transit to

Leninsk for testing will remain listed in the database as “based” at the facility from which it departed for Kazakhstan.

The Russian Federation has a long-term lease agreement to use the ICBM test range in Leninsk, Kazakhstan to test-launch ICBMs. This arrangement is a legacy of the Former Soviet Union when Kazakhstan was part of the national territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. During the New START Treaty negotiations, the United States acknowledged this long-standing lease agreement, and, as discussed above, the Treaty requires the Russian Federation to provide notification to the United States when it transits missiles to and from the Leninsk test range. The Russian side consistently stated that, with respect to this arrangement, the Russian Federation maintains ownership and control over all strategic assets moved to the Leninsk test range. While the Russian side indicated at times during the negotiations that this long-term lease agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan was not a pattern of cooperation for purposes of Article XIII of the Treaty, the Russian side referred to this arrangement as a pattern of cooperation in its closing plenary statement. The Russian Federation made clear throughout the negotiations, however, that this arrangement does not include the transfer of strategic offensive arms to Kazakhstan. The United States does not have a test range outside its national territory and therefore will not make use of this particular notification.

Paragraph 3 requires a notification when the visit of a heavy bomber of a type subject to the Treaty to certain locations or regions exceeds 24 hours in duration. This is a change to the approach under START where visit notifications were only required for visits to other declared facilities inside national territory. The notification is required for visits to a specific location inside the national territory or to a geographic region outside of the national territory of the possessing Party when the visit exceeds 24 hours in duration.

Paragraph 4 requires a notification indicating the conclusion of the visit of a heavy bomber of a type subject to the Treaty notified pursuant to paragraph 3.

Paragraph 5 requires that a notification be provided in accordance with the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises of September 23, 1989, 14 days in advance, of one major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers each calendar

year should one or more occur. This does not, however, place any limitation on the number of major strategic exercises involving heavy bombers that a Party may conduct each calendar year. The Parties have agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply this paragraph from the date of signature of the Treaty.

Paragraph 6 requires that a notification be provided no later than 48 hours after the completion of a major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers. The Parties have agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply this paragraph from the date of signature of the Treaty.

Section IV - Notifications Concerning Launches of ICBMs or SLBMs and the Exchange of Telemetric Data

Section IV consists of six paragraphs. One paragraph covers launches of ICBMs and SLBMs while the remaining five paragraphs cover the exchange of telemetric information conducted in accordance with Part Seven of the Protocol and the Annex on Telemetric Information to the Protocol.

Paragraph 1 provides for the advance notification of any launch of an ICBM or SLBM in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988 (the Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement). Data regarding telemetry broadcast frequencies and modulation types must be provided for those launches for which telemetric information may be provided to the other Party in accordance with Part Two of the Annex on Telemetric Information. While launches of ICBMs or SLBMs that are not subject to the Treaty, such as of Trident I SLBMs, are not subject to this provision, they remain subject to notification pursuant to the Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement itself. The Parties have agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply this paragraph from the date of signature of the Treaty. Telemetric broadcast information will not be included in notifications provided prior to entry into force of the Treaty because, in accordance with the Annex on Telemetric Information, telemetric information will only be exchanged for launches conducted after entry into force of the Treaty.

Paragraph 2 provides for the receiving Party to notify the providing Party if the recording media, telemetric information on said media, or the interpretive data for

the telemetric information provided in accordance with Part Three of the Annex on Telemetric Information is incomplete or of insufficient quality. Such notification must be provided within 180 days of receipt of the specified materials.

Paragraph 3 requires the providing Party to respond within 60 days to the notification provided for in paragraph 2 of this Section.

Paragraph 4 provides for the advance notification of the providing Party to the receiving Party regarding the proposed date and place where the demonstration of telemetric recording media and playback equipment will be conducted in accordance with Part Four of the Annex on Telemetric Information. The Annex on Telemetric Information requires a demonstration of applicable recording media and telemetric information playback equipment in order to make it possible for the other Party to play back provided recordings of the telemetric information.

Paragraph 5 merges two notification provisions. The first notification contains a request from the receiving Party to the providing Party to acquire telemetric information playback equipment and spare parts for said equipment in accordance with Part Five of the Annex on Telemetric Information. The second notification is the response of the providing Party to the request, which must be provided within 30 days of receipt of the request.

Paragraph 6 also merges two notification provisions. The first notification contains a request from the receiving Party to the providing Party for maintenance or for training in the operation and maintenance of telemetry playback equipment in accordance with Part Six of the Annex on Telemetric Information. The second notification is the response of the providing Party to the request, which must be provided within 45 days of receipt of the request.

Section V - Notifications Concerning Conversion or Elimination

Section V contains notification requirements concerning the elimination of ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM and SLBM launch canisters, and facilities; and conversion or elimination of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers.

Paragraph 1 covers three distinct points in the conversion or elimination process. All three notifications must be provided for each item or facility converted or

eliminated with the date specified for each, although several items may be notified in a single message.

Subparagraph (a) is a notification of the intent to convert or eliminate strategic offensive arms in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol and must be transmitted no less than 30 days in advance of the initiation of conversion or elimination procedures.

Subparagraph (b) is a notification of the initiation of a conversion or elimination procedure in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol and must be transmitted no later than five days after the initiation.

Subparagraph (c) is a notification of the completion of a conversion or elimination procedure in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol and must be transmitted no later than five days after the completion.

Paragraph 2 requires each Party to provide, no later than 20 days after the beginning of each calendar year, the numbers and types of strategic offensive arms scheduled for conversion or elimination during that year.

Section VI - Notifications Concerning Inspection Activities

This section consists of fourteen paragraphs dealing exclusively with inspection activities. There are notifications that are integrated with the sequence of events associated with inspections and exhibitions (paragraph 14, subparagraphs (a) through (d)) and there are notifications dealing exclusively with the administrative aspects of inspection activities (paragraphs 1 through 13).

Paragraph 1 sets the times for providing and updating the diplomatic clearance numbers for inspection airplanes.

Paragraph 2 provides for the notification of the flight plan of an inspection airplane prior to departure to the inspected Party's territory.

Paragraph 3 provides for the notification acknowledging and approving the flight plan of an inspection airplane in response to a paragraph 2 notification. As stated in paragraph 4 of Part One of the Annex on Inspection Activities, the inspected

Party is required to approve the flight plan of the inspection airplane no less than three hours before its planned time of departure from the last airfield prior to entry into the inspected Party's airspace, so that the inspection team may arrive at the point of entry by its estimated time of arrival.

Paragraph 4 requires a 30 day advance notification when the flight route of an inspection airplane is to be changed.

Paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 8 address the lists of inspectors and aircrew members. Pursuant to paragraph 5, the initial lists of inspectors and aircrew members will be exchanged no later than 25 days after entry into force of the Treaty. Paragraph 6 provides for updates no more than once every 45 days to the initial lists of inspectors and aircrew members provided for in paragraph 5. The notification in Paragraph 7 conveys two pieces of information: 1) the agreement with or objection to inspectors or aircrew members proposed in the lists provided in accordance with paragraphs 5 and 6, and 2) an objection to an inspector or aircrew member already on the lists of inspectors and aircrew members any time during the life of the Treaty. Paragraph 8 requires the Parties to update the inspector list bi-annually to coincide with the required six-month database update.

Paragraph 9 provides an advance notification that indicates when an inspection team will arrive at the point of entry to conduct an inspection. This notification must be provided during normal working hours, no less than 32 hours before the arrival of the team.

Paragraph 10 requires the inspected Party to provide notification of the determination of agreed geographic coordinates of reference points to be used at a point of entry. The initial transmittal of geographic coordinates does not constitute agreement between the Parties until additional procedures, outlined in Section V of Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities, have been completed. Additionally, the notification allows each Party to provide changes, if applicable, to the agreed geographic coordinates.

Paragraph 11 is the notification of a change to site diagrams of facilities and coastlines and waters diagrams. Provisions regarding such changes are contained in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of Part Four of the Annex on Inspection Activities.

Paragraphs 12 and 13 are the notifications concerning the intent to conduct an exhibition of strategic offensive arms and the intent to participate in such an exhibition.

Paragraph 14 covers information that is provided by the in-country inspection team to the inspected Party. This information will not be transmitted through the respective Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, but rather is provided in person by the inspection team leader to the in-country escort. Paragraph 14 is divided into four subparagraphs:

Subparagraph 14(a) conveys information on the type of inspection and the inspection site. Under most circumstances, this notification is provided within four hours of the arrival of the team at the point of entry. If the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential inspection without returning to the point of entry, the notification of the sequential inspection site is provided no later than the completion of the post-inspection procedures of the previous inspection.

Subparagraph 14(b) is the notification of the intent to conduct a sequential inspection. Notifications provided in accordance with subparagraphs 14(a) and 14(b) are delivered on a single notification format provided by the inspection team leader.

Subparagraph 14(c) is the notification used if the inspecting Party cancels an inspection under certain conditions as described in part Five of the Protocol.

Subparagraph 14(d) is used during certain inspections to designate an item intended for inspection and is to be provided at the inspection site after completion of pre-inspection procedures.

Section VII - Notifications Concerning Activities of the BCC and Additional Messages

Section VII consists of six paragraphs that set forth the obligation of each Party to provide notifications concerning the BCC as well as any additional Treaty messages. The Parties have agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply this Section from the date of signature of the Treaty.

Paragraphs 1 and 2 concern a request to convene a session of the BCC and the response to such a request. According to paragraph 1 of Section III of Part Six of the Protocol, the response must be provided no later than 15 days after receiving such a request.

Paragraph 3 allows the Parties to provide additional messages related to activities of the BCC.

Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 are general notifications related to a request for clarification of a previous notification; a correction, clarification, or modification of a previous notification; and an additional message concerning any topic related to the Treaty.

PART FIVE – INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

Structure and Overview

Part Five of the Protocol consists of ten Sections. Section I addresses general provisions related to inspection activities. Section II addresses the legal status of inspectors and aircrew members while on the territory of the inspected Party. Section III addresses the arrangements for air transportation of inspection teams to and from the territory of the inspected Party. Section IV addresses the activities beginning with the arrival of an inspection team at the point of entry. Section V addresses general rules for the conduct of inspection activities. Section VI addresses the conduct of Type One Inspections. Section VII addresses the conduct of Type Two Inspections. Section VIII addresses the conduct of exhibitions. Section IX addresses the cancellation of inspection activities. Section X addresses inspection activity reports.

Pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty, Part Five of the Protocol provides detailed descriptions of the purposes, rights and procedures associated with conducting the Type One and Type Two inspections and exhibitions called for in Article XI. The Annex on Inspection Activities provides further details regarding the procedures for conducting inspections and exhibitions. The procedures in Part Five of the Protocol and the Annex on Inspection Activities will also be used for any inspection activities associated with the Agreed Statements in Part Nine of the Protocol. These inspection activities, in conjunction with the use of national technical means of verification in accordance with Article X of the Treaty and

information exchanges and notifications provided for in Article VII of the Treaty, provide the foundation for verifying compliance with the New START Treaty.

Part Five of the Protocol addresses the full range of procedures needed to perform inspection activities, including the provision of a notification that an inspection or exhibition will occur, arrangements and time lines for transporting inspectors whose names appear on agreed lists and their associated inspection equipment to the inspection sites, the legal status of inspectors and aircrew members during inspections, the inspection activities that are to be performed depending on the types of facilities and the type of inspection being performed, the time lines associated with the inspection activities at the site, and the procedures for reporting the results and concluding the inspection activities.

Paragraph 2 of Article XI of the Treaty provides the right to conduct Type One inspections at ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases. Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol addresses such Type One inspections.

As specified in Article XI of the Treaty and Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol, the purpose of Type One inspections at ICBM bases, submarine bases and airbases is to confirm the accuracy of the data declared for such bases, on the number and types of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, deployed heavy bombers, deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs or launchers of SLBMs, non-deployed ICBMs or non-deployed SLBMs, on the number of warheads located on deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs, and the number of nuclear armaments located on deployed heavy bombers. In addition, at submarine bases, Type One inspections can be used to confirm, as provided for in the Second and Ninth Agreed Statements of Part Nine of this Protocol, that launchers declared as converted launchers have not undergone reconversion and remain incapable of launching SLBMs. At certain airbases, Type One inspections can also confirm, in accordance with the First Agreed Statement of Part Nine of this Protocol, that converted heavy bombers have not undergone reconversion and remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments.

Paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty provides the right to conduct Type Two inspections at facilities listed in Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol. Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol provides the right to conduct eight such Type Two inspections each year.

As specified in Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol, the purpose of Type Two inspections at ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; storage facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, and heavy bombers; repair facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile launchers of ICBMs; test ranges; and training facilities is to confirm the accuracy of declared technical characteristics and data specified for such facilities, on the number and types of non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs, non-deployed first stages of ICBMs and SLBMs, non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs, and deployed heavy bombers stored at a storage facility for heavy bombers.

The purpose of Type Two inspections at formerly declared facilities, as specified in Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol, is to confirm that these facilities are not being used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. If heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments are based at formerly declared facilities, then inspections can be conducted in accordance with the First Agreed Statement in Part Nine of the Protocol, to confirm that such heavy bombers remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments.

The purpose of Type Two inspections at ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs, as specified in Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol, is to confirm the results of elimination of silo launchers of ICBMs. During such inspections, no other items or portions of such ICBM bases are subject to inspection.

The purpose of Type Two inspections at submarine bases, as specified in Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol, is to confirm the results of the conversion of launchers of SLBMs installed on ballistic missile submarines. During such inspections, no other items or portions of such submarine bases are subject to inspection.

The purpose of Type Two inspections at conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMS, or mobile launchers of ICBMs, as specified in Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol, is to confirm that elimination procedures have been completed on solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs.

The purpose of Type Two inspections at storage facilities for heavy bombers, as specified in Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol, is to confirm the accuracy of declared data specified for such facilities on the numbers and types of deployed

and non-deployed heavy bombers located there and to confirm the number of nuclear armaments located on such heavy bombers, if any. In accordance with the Fourth Agreed Statement in Part Nine of the Protocol, inspections conducted at the storage facility for heavy bombers at the Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, AZ, include inspections of environmentally-sealed heavy bombers, which are considered to be deployed for purposes of the Treaty.

The purpose of Type Two inspections at conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers, as specified in Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol, is to confirm the results of the conversion of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments.

Paragraph 4 of Article XI of the Treaty provides for the conduct of exhibitions. As specified in Article XI of the Treaty and Section VIII of Part Five of the Protocol, the purpose of such exhibitions is to demonstrate distinguishing features and to confirm technical characteristics of each new type, variant, or version of an ICBM, SLBM, heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, or ICBM launcher. Exhibitions are also conducted to demonstrate the results of the conversion of the first item of each type of ICBM launcher, SLBM launcher, or heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, including identifying the distinguishing features associated with the converted system. Inspectors use these distinguishing features to confirm the conversion of other converted systems and, subsequently, to confirm that converted systems have not been reconverted back to strategic offensive arms without proper notification of such reconversion to an existing or new type of strategic offensive arm.

Section I - General Provisions

Section I establishes the principle that each Party shall facilitate the conduct of inspection activities by the other Party.

Paragraph 1 provides the obligation to facilitate the conduct of inspection activities.

Paragraph 2 establishes the right to begin inspection activities 60 days after entry into force of the Treaty and to conduct them thereafter for the duration of the Treaty.

Paragraph 3 states that notifications relating to inspection activities are to be provided as specified in Part Four of the Protocol.

Paragraph 4 limits each Party to no more than one inspection on the territory of the inspected Party at any one time. This limitation applies to the conduct of both Type One and Type Two inspections but does not prohibit the conduct of an inspection during the conduct of one or more exhibitions.

Paragraph 5 provides for the temporary exemption of facilities from Type One or Type Two inspections under exceptional circumstances. The Parties agreed that this provision was necessary in order to preclude inspections at facilities that were involved in contingency operations important to the national security interests of the Parties unrelated to the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship. The Parties also agreed that such exemptions should be infrequent and would only be employed for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty. Examples of such circumstances include, but are not limited to, the involvement of an air base in support of on-going military operations or substantial damage and disruption of a facility due to a natural disaster. Such a temporary exemption would be notified to the other Party via diplomatic channels along with an explanation of the reason for the exemption.

Section II - Legal Status of Inspectors and Aircrew Members

Section II deals with the establishment of the list of agreed inspectors and aircrew members and the privileges and immunities enjoyed by these inspectors and aircrew members when carrying out inspection-related activities. The timing for the exchange of lists of inspectors and aircrew members and for the provision of visas and other documents that might be required for individuals on these lists is designed to enable inspection activities to begin within 60 days after entry into force of the Treaty as called for in paragraph 2 of Section I of Part Five of the Protocol.

Paragraph 1, read in conjunction with the definition of inspectors in Part One of the Protocol, provides that only inspectors included on the Treaty list of inspectors may conduct inspection activities. It also specifies that inspection airplanes, commercial flights, and Open Skies airplanes may be used to transport inspectors to and from the two designated points of entry on the territory of each inspected Party. Open Skies airplanes would be used in conjunction with the concurrent

conduct of an Open Skies mission; once at the point of entry, the New START inspection team would not participate in the Open Skies mission or vice versa.

Paragraph 2 sets a limit of 300 on the number of individuals on each Party's list of inspectors. It allows each Party to determine the number of aircrew members to be listed, taking into consideration that the maximum number of aircrew members for each inspection airplane transporting inspectors to and from the designated points of entry is limited to ten. Inspectors and aircrew members must be citizens of the inspecting Party.

Paragraph 3 provides procedures for amending the lists of inspectors and aircrew members. It sets forth the requirement that each time the lists are amended, the names entered on the amended list of inspectors may not exceed 30, and on the list of aircrew members may not exceed 25.

Paragraph 4 specifies the information that is to be provided for each inspector and aircrew member on their respective lists.

Paragraph 5 specifies that the initial exchange of lists of inspectors and aircrew members shall take place no later than 25 days after entry into force of the Treaty. These lists will be provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of Section VI of Part Four of the Protocol. It also specifies that visas and other documents that may be required by inspectors and aircrew members must be provided no later than 30 days after the exchange of the initial lists. These time periods allow inspection activities to begin no later than 60 days after entry into force of the Treaty as specified in paragraph 2 of Section I of Part Five of the Protocol.

Paragraph 6 specifies that an individual included on the list of inspectors may be objected to only if that individual is under indictment for a criminal offense on the territory of the inspected Party, if that individual has been convicted in a criminal prosecution or expelled by the Party reviewing the list, or if that individual has been previously deleted from the list at the request of the inspected Party for having violated the conditions governing inspection activities as provided for in this Part. An individual included on the list of aircrew members may be objected to if that individual is found unacceptable by the Party reviewing the list. Additional details are contained in paragraph 1 of Part Three of the Annex on Inspection Activities.

Paragraph 7 provides for the privileges and immunities that are to be accorded to inspectors and aircrew members and their papers and correspondence for the entire time that they are within the territory of the inspected Party. Inspection airplanes transporting inspection teams to and from the points of entry shall also be inviolable. Inspectors and aircrew members are obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the inspected Party and shall not engage in commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the inspected Party.

Paragraph 8 provides that the immunities provided to inspectors and aircrew members with regard to acts performed during the exercise of their official functions shall continue following the completion of their official functions on the territory of the inspected Party to the extent that immunity continues to subsist with respect to persons enjoying privileges and immunities in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

Section III - Arrangements for Air Transportation

Paragraph 1 provides that there will be two points of entry established by each Party. The points of entry, the airports associated with them, and the associated inspection activity sites for each point of entry will be listed in the database in accordance with the categories of data in Part Two of the Protocol.

Paragraph 2 establishes the right to use agreed types of inspection airplanes to transport inspectors and their equipment to and from the points of entry. Procedures for agreeing on types of inspection airplanes are contained in paragraph 1 of Part One of the Annex on Inspection Activities.

Paragraph 3 establishes the right to use regularly scheduled commercial flights to transport inspectors to points of entry served by commercial flights. The provisions of Part Five of the Protocol do not apply to the airplanes that are used for such commercial flights.

Paragraph 4 establishes the right to use Open Skies airplanes, arriving at the point of entry for an Open Skies mission over the territory of the inspected Party concurrent with a New START Treaty inspection, for transporting inspectors to and from the points of entry.

Paragraph 5 establishes that the routes for inspection airplanes are to be listed in the database in accordance with Part Two of the Protocol. It also specifies that flight plans are to be filed in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol.

Paragraph 6 specifies that the inspected Party shall provide certain services for inspection airplanes of the inspecting Party at the point of entry at the request of the inspecting Party, and that the costs of such services are to be paid by the inspecting Party.

Section IV - Activities Beginning Upon Arrival at the Point of Entry

Section IV contains provisions for activities that are carried out at the point of entry and certain obligations of the in-country escort that apply throughout the in-country period. These provisions deal primarily with the duties of the escorts for the inspectors and aircrew members, examination and storage of equipment, and mass media.

Paragraph 1 requires that the in-country escort meet the inspector and aircrew members at the point of entry and assist them throughout their stay in the country. It provides for the exemption from custom duties and related taxes and charges for the baggage and equipment intended for use during inspection activities. It also specifies that any storage of equipment and supplies at each point of entry be in a secure structure or room. Additional provisions for storage of equipment and supplies at points of entry are contained in Parts One and Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities.

Paragraph 2 requires that personnel from the inspecting Party's embassy or consulate meet the inspectors and aircrew members at the point of entry. These officials may accompany inspectors only during their stay at the point of entry, but may accompany aircrew members, who remain at the point of entry, during the entire in-country period.

Paragraph 3 specifies that inspectors are considered to have assumed the duties of an inspector starting at their arrival at the point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party and continuing throughout the in-country period until their departure from the territory of the inspected Party through the point of entry.

Paragraph 4 establishes the right of the inspected Party's in-country escort to examine equipment, in the presence of inspectors, each time any equipment is brought into the country. The examination is to take place at the point of entry. The purpose of the examination is to ascertain to the satisfaction of each Party that the equipment cannot perform functions unconnected with the requirements of inspection activities. The list of permitted inspection equipment as well as the relevant procedures for its examination and use are contained in Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol. There is a presumption that, if the equipment is a model listed in the Annex, it cannot perform functions unconnected with these requirements. However, this does not affect the right of the Parties to challenge such equipment on the grounds that it may have been modified to perform such functions.

Paragraph 5 requires the inspection team leader to designate in writing the type of inspection and the specific inspection site at or before the time that was specified for the designation of the inspection site in the notification of intent to conduct an inspection, which had been provided earlier. Part Four of the Protocol, on notifications, specifies that the inspection site will be designated within four hours of the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry.

Paragraph 6 requires that, for Type One inspections, a member of the in-country escort must inform the inspection team leader of the number of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs or deployed heavy bombers located at the designated inspection site. If less than 50% of the deployed ICBMs based at a designated ICBM base, less than 30% of the deployed SLBMs based at a designated SLBM base, or less than 70% of the deployed heavy bombers based at a designated air base are present, the inspection team leader can choose to carry out the inspection anyway, designate another inspection site associated with the same point of entry, or elect not to conduct the inspection and leave the territory of the inspected Party without any reduction in the number of such inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled each year. The procedures for applying this process in the case of sequential inspections from one inspection site directly to another are also specified. These provisions and rights ensure that during any inspection, inspectors are able to view a substantial portion of the deployed systems at a base.

Paragraph 7 specifies that the activities of the inspection teams during inspections may be covered by the mass media only at the point of entry.

Section V - General Rules for the Conduct
of Inspection Activities

Section V provides the general rules that apply to all inspection activities. These rules govern the behavior of the inspectors; the behavior of the in-country escort; activities at an inspection site; the time limits for transporting inspectors from the point of entry to an inspection site; the use of equipment, recording of measurements, and handling of ambiguities; the size thresholds for access during inspections; the limits on inspection team size; the general sequence of events during an inspection; and allocation of costs for services.

Paragraph 1 declares that inspectors are to discharge their functions in accordance with Part Five of the Protocol.

Paragraph 2 requires the inspected Party to provide meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services for the inspectors and aircrew members of the inspecting Party throughout the in-country period. Costs of all such services shall be borne by the inspected Party.

Paragraph 3 requires that the inspecting Party ensure that its inspectors not publicly disclose information obtained during inspection activities except with the express consent of their own government. Such consent is to be granted by the inspecting Party only with the express consent of the inspected Party. Inspectors are to remain bound by this obligation even after termination of their activities as inspectors.

Paragraph 4 specifies that the boundaries of the inspection sites where inspections are to be conducted are the boundaries that are depicted on the inspection site diagrams that are exchanged not later than 45 days after the signature of the Treaty as provided for in Part Two of the Protocol.

Paragraph 5 requires that, in discharging their functions, inspectors shall communicate with personnel of the inspected Party only through the in-country escort. This provision is intended to prevent a situation in which inspectors make requests directly to personnel of the inspected Party who are not part of the in-country escort, such as non-escort personnel from the facility being inspected. This paragraph also establishes the principle that the activities of inspectors should only interfere with the ongoing activities at an inspection site to the extent

necessary to carry out the agreed inspection procedures, and shall not hamper or delay the operation of the facility, nor compromise safety. The in-country escort is required to provide safety briefings. Individual protective gear shall be provided as necessary by the inspected Party.

Paragraph 6 provides that some members of the in-country escort at a facility must be representatives of the inspected facility to ensure that the escort is familiar with local conditions for safety as well as for security reasons. The inspected Party is also required to ensure that a member of the local in-country escort is continuously available to inspectors either in person or by telephone. Throughout the in-country period, the inspected Party must ensure that the inspectors can be in communication with the embassy of the inspecting Party located on the territory of the inspected Party, using communications equipment provided by the inspected Party. The inspected Party must also provide means of communication between inspection team subgroups at the inspection activity site. All such means of communication are under the control of the inspected Party. This paragraph also requires that the host ensure necessary lighting for inspectors at the inspection activity site to carry out the procedures provided for in the Protocol.

Paragraph 7 requires the host to transport the inspection team, as well as its equipment and documents, from the point of entry to the inspection site no later than 24 hours after the time of the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with subparagraph 14(a) of Section VI of Part Four of the Protocol. This time limit was established to allow for the safe transport of inspectors and to reduce the number of occasions when teams arrived past the deadline due to weather or transport contingencies.

Paragraph 8 establishes the right of inspectors to use equipment during inspection activities in accordance with Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol for specific kinds of inspection activities, except for cameras, which are to be used only by the inspected Party, at the request of the inspecting Party.

Paragraph 9 establishes that inspectors have the right to view and make linear measurements of items located at the inspection activity site in order to confirm that the item of inspection matches the technical data in the database established by paragraph 1 of Article VII of the Treaty and is, therefore, the item it is declared to be. Such measurements are to be recorded during inspection activities, are to be

certified by personnel of both Parties, and are to be included in the inspection activity report.

Paragraph 10 establishes what an item of inspection, about which technical data has been provided in accordance with Part Two of the Protocol, is understood to mean for the purposes of the Protocol. For inspections of heavy bombers at air bases, storage facilities for heavy bombers, and conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers within the boundaries of the inspection site diagram of the facility, the item of inspection is a heavy bomber of the inspected Party. For inspections at other facilities, the item of inspection is an ICBM or SLBM; a first stage of an ICBM or SLBM maintained, stored, and transported in stages; or a mobile launcher of ICBMs of the inspected Party.

Paragraph 11 establishes that the size criteria used during inspections to determine whether objects (covered or uncovered), containers, vehicles, and buildings are large enough to contain or to be items of inspection are to be provided in accordance with Part Two of the Protocol. These criteria are also used to determine whether inspectors can gain access into containers or buildings and are recorded in Part Nine of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol.

Paragraph 12 provides the right for inspectors to request clarifications through the in-country escort during an inspection. The in-country escort is required to provide clarifications that may be useful in resolving questions and ambiguities that arise during inspection activities. In the event questions and ambiguities relating to an object or building located within the inspection site are not resolved, this paragraph establishes the requirement for the inspected Party to photograph such an object or building at the request of the inspecting Party. A copy of the photograph is attached to the inspection activities report retained by each Party.

Paragraph 13 sets the number of inspectors on an inspection team to no more than ten. Upon arrival at the inspection activity site, the inspection team leader has the right to establish subgroups consisting of no fewer than two inspectors each.

Paragraph 14 provides that pre-inspection procedures, including safety briefings and the provision of information relating to the conduct of the inspection activities and the inspection activity site, are to begin upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection activity site and must be completed within one hour, after which the inspection activities begin immediately.

Paragraph 15 restricts the movement of objects, containers, or vehicles from the inspection site. Upon completion of pre-inspection procedures, no object, container, or vehicle large enough to be or contain an item of inspection is allowed to leave the inspection site until inspected by the inspection team or released by the inspection team if it does not intend to inspect such object, container, or vehicle. Such inspections are to be conducted so as not to hamper or delay the operation of the facility.

Paragraph 16 establishes the time period for the conduct of the various inspection activities.

Subparagraph 16(a) states that for Type One inspections at ICBM bases and submarine bases, inspection of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs can take as long as necessary to achieve the purpose of the inspection and terminates upon completion of the inspection procedures. If not already completed concurrently with the reentry vehicle portion of the inspection by a sub-group of the inspection team, the period of inspection for the inspection of non-deployed ICBMs, non-deployed SLBMs, and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs at ICBM bases and submarine bases will follow the reentry vehicle portion of the Type One inspection and must not exceed 24 hours.

Subparagraph 16(b) states that for Type One inspections at air bases, the period of inspection activities must not exceed 30 hours.

Subparagraph 16(c) states that for Type Two inspections, except for inspections to confirm conversions or eliminations of strategic offensive arms, the period of inspection activities must not exceed 24 hours.

Subparagraph 16(d) states that for Type Two inspections to confirm that solid-fueled ICBMs and solid-fueled SLBMs, silo launchers of ICBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs have been eliminated or to confirm that SLBM launchers or heavy bombers have been converted the period of inspection activities must not exceed 12 hours.

Subparagraph 16(e) states that for exhibitions, the period of inspection activities must not exceed the period of time necessary to achieve the

purpose of the exhibition. These requirements provide for sufficient time to conduct inspection activities, while ensuring that the operations of inspected bases are not unduly affected.

The paragraph further provides that for inspections, except for Type Two inspections to confirm that solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, and mobile launchers of ICBMs have been eliminated, the period of inspection activities may be extended for a period of up to eight hours by agreement between the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort.

Paragraph 17 requires that post-inspection procedures, which include completing the inspection activity report, begin when the period of inspection activities expires and they are to be completed as agreed by the Parties.

Paragraph 18 establishes the right of the inspection team to conduct sequential inspections. An inspection team that conducted an inspection at a facility does not have the right to designate the same facility for conducting a sequential inspection. The procedures for conducting sequential inspections are those set forth in Part Three of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol.

Paragraph 19 requires the inspection team to depart from the territory of the inspected Party no later than 24 hours after its return to the point of entry, unless otherwise agreed.

Section VI - Inspections of ICBMs and SLBMs Including the Warheads on Them,
Deployed Heavy Bombers Including the
Nuclear Armaments Located on Them, and Deployed and
Non-Deployed Launchers of ICBMs and Launchers of SLBMs,
Conducted in Accordance with
Paragraph 2 of Article XI of the Treaty
(Type One Inspections)

Section VI establishes the procedures for Type One inspections conducted at ICBM bases, submarine bases and heavy bomber air bases in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article XI of the Treaty.

Paragraph 1 establishes the right to conduct Type One inspections at ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases. Type One inspections may be performed in order

to confirm the accuracy of the declared data specified for such bases on the number and types of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, deployed heavy bombers, deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs or launchers of SLBMs, non-deployed ICBMs or non-deployed SLBMs, on the number of warheads located on deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs, or on the number of nuclear armaments located on deployed heavy bombers. At submarine bases, during Type One inspections, the inspecting Party also has the right to confirm, as provided for in the Second and the Ninth Agreed Statements of Part Nine of the Protocol, that converted launchers of SLBMs have not been reconverted and remain incapable of launching SLBMs. (This does not preclude the reversion and subsequent declaration of such launchers as launchers of existing or new types of SLBMs.) At air bases where deployed heavy bombers and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments are jointly based, Type One inspections may be conducted to confirm, as provided for in the Third Agreed Statement of Part Nine of the Protocol, that the heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments have not been reconverted and remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments.

Paragraph 2 establishes the right for each Party to conduct a total of no more than ten Type One inspections each year, with no more than two facilities being inspected twice each year. Neither Party may conduct a Type One inspection simultaneously with other kinds of inspection activities at the same facility.

Paragraph 3 establishes the requirement for the imposition of pre-inspection restrictions following the designation of an inspection site to prevent removal from the site of items that would be subject to inspection. The inspected Party is required to implement the pre-inspection restrictions specified in Part Six of the Annex on Inspection Activities at the ICBM base or submarine base, including the waters identified on the coastlines and waters diagram, or at the air base that has been designated for inspection. These pre-inspection restrictions must be implemented no later than one hour after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with subparagraph 14(a) of Section VI of Part Four of the Protocol.

In general, pre-inspection restrictions are designed to limit the movement of items of inspection, items large enough to contain or be items of inspection, and ballistic and guided missile submarines. In addition, pre-inspection restrictions restrict the opening of silo doors and launcher hatches, as well as work associated with reentry vehicles on ICBMs and SLBMs and with armaments on heavy bombers.

Paragraph 4 establishes that the purpose of inspections at ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases is to confirm:

- (a) The accuracy of the declared data on the number and types of deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs located at the ICBM base or on the number and types of deployed and non-deployed launchers of SLBMs located at the submarine base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented;
- (b) The accuracy of the declared data on the number and types of deployed and non-deployed ICBMs located at the ICBM base, or on the number and types of deployed and non-deployed SLBMs located at the submarine base, or on the number and types of deployed heavy bombers located at the air base, at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented; and
- (c) The actual number of reentry vehicles emplaced on a designated deployed ICBM or on a designated deployed SLBM, or the number of nuclear armaments located on three designated deployed heavy bombers.

Type One inspections will be central to verifying compliance with Treaty limits on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers; deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, launchers of SLBMs, and heavy bombers; and deployed warheads.

Paragraph 5 requires that upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort shall provide to the inspection team leader, in writing, information regarding:

For ICBM bases: the aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs based at the ICBM base; the number of deployed ICBMs of each type, based at the ICBM base; the number of deployed launchers of ICBMs of each type located at the ICBM base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented; the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on each deployed ICBM; the number of non-deployed launchers of ICBMs of each type located at the ICBM base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented; and the number of non-deployed ICBMs of each type, first stages of ICBMs of each type, and fixed structures for mobile launchers of

ICBMs located at the ICBM base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented.

For submarine bases: the aggregate number of warheads on deployed SLBMs contained in SLBM launchers installed on ballistic missile submarines based at the submarine base; the number of ballistic missile submarines of each type based at the submarine base and the number of deployed SLBMs of each type; the number of ballistic missile submarines of each type that contain deployed launchers of SLBMs and the number of deployed launchers of SLBMs of each type located at the submarine base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented; the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on each deployed SLBM; the number of ballistic missile submarines of each type based at the submarine base that contain non-deployed launchers of SLBMs and the number of non-deployed launchers of SLBMs of each type; the number of ballistic missile submarines of each type that contain non-deployed launchers of SLBMs and the number of non-deployed launchers of SLBMs of each type located at the submarine base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented; and the number of non-deployed SLBMs of each type and first stages of SLBMs of each type located at the submarine base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented.

For air bases: the aggregate number of nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers based at the air base; the number of deployed heavy bombers of each type based at the air base; the specific location inside the national territory or the specific geographic region outside the national territory of the inspected Party where each deployed heavy bomber based at the air base that was absent from that base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented is located; the number and types of deployed heavy bombers, test heavy bombers, and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments located at the air base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented; and the number of nuclear armaments located on each deployed heavy bomber located at the air base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented.

Paragraph 5 also requires the in-country escort to provide a copy of the relevant inspection site diagrams or coastlines and waters diagrams that depict the locations of the declared items that are located at the base at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented.

Paragraph 6 requires the inspection team leader to designate to the in-country escort in writing and upon completion of the pre-inspection procedures the items intended for inspection. For an ICBM base, the inspecting Party may designate for inspection one deployed ICBM launcher declared to contain the deployed ICBM intended for warhead inspection, as well as one non-deployed silo ICBM launcher or a fixed structure for mobile ICBMs declared not to contain a deployed mobile ICBM, if any are so declared. For submarine bases, the inspection team leader may designate for inspection one deployed SLBM launcher containing the deployed SLBM intended for warhead inspection and one non-deployed SLBM launcher, if any of the latter are so declared. The Second and Ninth Agreed Statements in Part Nine of the Protocol also provide for designating converted SLBM launchers on SSGNs or SSBNs for inspection. For air bases, the inspection team leader may select no more than three deployed heavy bombers for inspection. Additionally, per the Third Agreed Statement in Part Nine of the Protocol, for those air bases at which heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments are jointly based with those of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments, the inspection team leader may select no more than two heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments for inspection.

Paragraph 7 requires the in-country escort to transport the inspection team to the items designated for inspection within specified time periods. The timelines are based on distances to the items for inspection. Heavy bombers are located within a relatively confined area close to the probable location for the pre-inspection procedures. Submarines at the base during an inspection are, likewise, within close proximity. Silo launchers can be quite distant from the ICBM maintenance facility where pre-inspection procedures are carried out.

Paragraph 8 establishes the right of inspectors to read unique identifiers on all designated deployed ICBMs or designated deployed SLBMs, all non-deployed ICBMs, all non-deployed SLBMs, and designated heavy bombers that are located at the inspection site in accordance with the procedures provided for in Part Two of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol. This enables inspectors to confirm the accuracy of declared data regarding these systems and to spot check the unique identifiers declared for that facility.

Paragraph 9 establishes the right of inspectors to confirm that ICBMs or SLBMs declared to be training models of missiles are training models of missiles based on differences as provided for in Part Two of the Protocol, unless such items are

contained in silo training launchers. The exemption for silo training launchers is based on the physical difficulty in viewing a training model of a missile inside a silo launcher.

Paragraph 10 establishes that inspection teams have the right, at ICBM bases, to inspect:

(a) The designated deployed launcher of ICBMs in order to confirm that the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on the deployed ICBM contained on or in the launcher matches the number declared for that ICBM during the pre-inspection briefing, as provided for in Part Six of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol,

(b) If applicable, the designated non-deployed launcher of ICBMs or designated fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs declared not to contain a mobile launcher of ICBMs to confirm that it does not contain a missile or a launcher, respectively, as provided for in Part Six of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol, and

(c) The maintenance facility in order to confirm the accuracy of the declared data on the number and types of non-deployed items specified during pre-inspection procedures, to include the absence of undeclared items of inspection, as provided for in Part Six of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol.

Paragraph 11 establishes that inspection teams have the right, at ballistic missile submarine bases, to inspect:

(a) The designated deployed launcher of SLBMs in order to confirm that the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on the deployed SLBM contained in the launcher matches the number declared for that launcher in the pre-inspection briefing, as provided for in Part Six of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol;

(b) If applicable, the designated non-deployed launcher of SLBMs to confirm that it does not contain a missile, as provided for in Part Six of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol;

- (c) If applicable, the designated converted launchers of SLBMs, as provided for in the Second and Ninth Agreed Statements in Part Nine of the Protocol and in Part Six of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol; and
- (d) The inspection site within the boundaries depicted on the inspection site diagram in order to confirm the accuracy of the declared data on the number and types of non-deployed items specified during pre-inspection procedures, to include the absence of undeclared items of inspection, as provided for in Part Six of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol.

Paragraph 12 establishes that inspection teams have the right, at air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, to inspect:

- (a) The three designated deployed heavy bombers in order to confirm that the number of nuclear armaments located on them is as declared for that heavy bomber during the pre-inspection procedures, as provided for in Part Six of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol;
- (b) The designated heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at certain air bases, as provided for in the Third Agreed Statement in Part Nine of the Protocol and in the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol; and
- (c) Structures within the boundaries of the inspection site diagram of the air base declared not to contain a heavy bomber in order to confirm that such structures do not contain any heavy bombers.

Paragraph 13 establishes the rights of an inspection team if it discovers an undeclared item of inspection during the course of an inspection. If an inspection team conducting an inspection of a designated launcher of ICBMs or launcher of SLBMs declared not to contain a deployed ICBM or deployed SLBM, or a fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs declared not to contain a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs, discovers that such a launcher or such a fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs contains a deployed ICBM or a deployed SLBM, the inspection team has the right to inspect the discovered ICBM or SLBM in order to determine the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on such a deployed ICBM or deployed SLBM in addition to the originally designated launchers, and to record the results of such an inspection in the inspection activity report. If an inspection

team conducting an inspection of a designated deployed heavy bomber declared not to contain nuclear armaments discovers that such a heavy bomber contains nuclear armaments, the inspection team has the right to inspect such a deployed heavy bomber in order to determine the number of nuclear armaments located on such a heavy bomber, as provided for in Part Six of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol, and to record the results of such an inspection in the inspection activity report.

Paragraph 14 provides for the right of the host country to use reentry vehicle covers during viewing of front sections for the inspection of reentry vehicles. For a deployed ICBM or deployed SLBM that was designated for the inspection of reentry vehicles, before the front section is viewed, the inspected Party has the right to cover reentry vehicles and other equipment, including the mounting platform, with individual covers in such a manner that the covers do not hamper inspectors in ascertaining that the front section contains the number of reentry vehicles equal to the number of reentry vehicles declared for the deployed ICBM or deployed SLBM. The paragraph establishes the right of inspectors to view such covers prior to their placement on the reentry vehicles. It also provides that the inspection team is to conduct an inspection of reentry vehicles emplaced on a deployed ICBM or deployed SLBM as provided for in the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol. Additional provisions regarding the inspection, the types of reentry vehicle covers, and the use of such covers are provided in Part Six of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol.

Paragraph 15 establishes that the time of completion of the reentry vehicle inspection portion of the Type One inspection is to be agreed by a member of the in-country escort and the inspection team leader and recorded in the inspection activity report. This time establishes the beginning of the 24 hour time limit for the remainder of the Type One inspection at the base as specified in paragraph 16 of Section V of Part Five of the Protocol, if the inspection of non-deployed ICBMs, non-deployed SLBMs, and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs has not been completed concurrently with the reentry vehicle portion of the inspection by a sub-group of the inspection team.

Paragraph 16 requires the inspected Party to transport the inspection team to the area where the post-inspection procedures are to be conducted.

Section VII - Inspections of Non-Deployed
Strategic Offensive Arms, Converted or Eliminated
Strategic Offensive Arms, Deployed Heavy Bombers at
Storage Facilities for Heavy Bombers, and Formerly Declared Facilities,
Conducted in Accordance with
Paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty
(Type Two Inspections)

Section VII establishes the procedures for Type Two inspections conducted in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty.

Paragraph 1 establishes the right to conduct Type Two inspections:

- (a) At ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; storage facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile launchers of ICBMs; repair facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile launchers of ICBMs; test ranges; and training facilities, in order to confirm the accuracy of declared technical characteristics and declared data specified for such facilities on the number and types of non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs, first stages of ICBMs and SLBMs, and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs to include the absence of undeclared items of inspection;
- (b) At formerly declared facilities, which are provided for in Part Two of the Protocol and were subject to inspection prior to their elimination, in order to confirm that such facilities are not being used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. If heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments are based at formerly declared facilities, inspections shall be conducted in accordance with the First Agreed Statement of Part Nine of the Protocol in order to confirm that such heavy bombers remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments;
- (c) At ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs in order to confirm that silo launchers of ICBMs have been eliminated in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol. During such inspections, no other items and no other portions of such ICBM bases are subject to inspection;
- (d) At submarine bases in order to confirm that former SLBM launchers installed on ballistic missile submarines have been converted in accordance

with Part Three of the Protocol. During such inspections, no other items and no other portions of such submarine bases are subject to inspection;

(e) At conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMS, or mobile launchers of ICBMs in order to confirm that solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs have been eliminated in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol;

(f) At conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers in order to confirm that heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments have been converted in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol; and

(g) At storage facilities for heavy bombers in order to confirm the accuracy of declared data specified for such facilities on the number and types of deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers and on the number of nuclear armaments located on such heavy bombers, in accordance with the Fourth Agreed Statement of Part Nine of the Protocol.

Paragraph 2 provides each Party with the right, except as provided for in Part Nine of the Protocol, to conduct a total of no more than eight Type Two inspections each year, with no more than two such inspections being conducted each year at the same facility.

Paragraph 3 establishes the requirement for pre-inspection restrictions, to prevent the removal from the site of items that would be subject to inspection, as specified in Part Seven of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol, which remain in effect until the pre-inspection procedures are completed. These pre-inspection restrictions are to be implemented no later than one hour after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with subparagraph 14(a) of Section VI of Part Four of the Protocol.

Paragraph 4 establishes the right to perform Type Two inspections to confirm that solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs have been eliminated after receiving notification in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol from the Party carrying out the elimination of such items:

(a) For a 30-day window from the time specified in the corresponding notification, when eliminated solid-fueled missiles or eliminated mobile

launchers of ICBMs are accumulated at a conversion or elimination facility in a quantity defined in this paragraph, or

(b) At any other period of time, not coinciding with the accumulation specified in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph. In such a case, eliminated solid-fuel missiles or eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs are not accumulated. Only those eliminated solid-fueled missiles or eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs located at the conversion or elimination facility and within their 30-day window for inspection at that time are subject to inspection.

Paragraph 4 also establishes the requirement that a Party carrying out an elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs must conduct, within each calendar year, two accumulations of eliminated solid-fueled missiles and two accumulations of eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs at the appropriate conversion or elimination facility. These accumulations are to be conducted in such a manner that no less than 50 percent of the total number of missiles and no less than 50 percent of the total number of mobile launchers of ICBMs scheduled for elimination during a calendar year will be made available for inspection during the two inspections at each appropriate facility. Each such accumulation is to contain approximately 25 percent of the total number of solid-fueled ICBMs or solid-fueled SLBMs or approximately 25 percent of the total number of mobile launchers of ICBMs scheduled for elimination during the corresponding calendar year. This framework ensures that a Party will have the opportunity to inspect at least half the solid-fueled missiles and mobile launchers declared by the other Party to be eliminated in any given year.

The paragraph establishes the requirement that a Party conducting the accumulation of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, or eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs provide a notification, in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol, of the beginning of such an accumulation. This information will be included in the notifications provided in accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of Section V of Part Four.

The paragraph further establishes the requirement that a Party conducting such an accumulation inform the other Party of the date of completion of the accumulation process, the number of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs or solid-fueled SLBMs, or the number of eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs, as well as the unique

identifiers of the eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs or solid-fueled SLBMs. This information also will be included in the notifications provided in accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of Section V of Part Four.

Paragraph 5 requires the host country to provide the inspection team leader, in writing and upon arrival of the inspection team at the site, information on the numbers of items of inspection for the inspection site. The host country is also required to provide a copy of an inspection site diagram that depicts the location of the declared items of inspection.

Paragraph 6 establishes the right of the inspection team to inspect specific facilities and items of inspection during Type Two inspections.

- (a) For ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; storage facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile launchers of ICBMs; repair facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile launchers of ICBMs; test ranges; training facilities; and formerly declared facilities other than those at which heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments are based, inspectors have the right to inspect the inspection site within the boundaries of the inspection site. For test ranges, the inspected Party is not required to remove non-deployed ICBMs or non-deployed SLBMs from test launchers or soft-site launchers. Such non-deployed ICBMs or SLBMs will not be subject to measurement. The inspection team may also inspect one silo test launcher declared not to contain an ICBM or a training model of a missile;
- (b) For formerly declared facilities at which heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments are based, inspectors have the right to inspect three designated converted heavy bombers in accordance with the First Agreed Statement of Part Nine of the Protocol;
- (c) For ICBM bases, inspectors have the right to inspect eliminated silo launchers of ICBMs that are subject to inspection to confirm that such silo launchers have been eliminated in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol;
- (d) For submarine bases, inspectors have the right to inspect converted launchers of SLBMs that are subject to inspection to confirm that such

SLBM launchers have been converted in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol;

(e) For conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs, inspectors have the right to inspect eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs, eliminated solid-fueled SLBMs, or eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs that are subject to inspection to confirm that such items have been eliminated in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol;

(f) For conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers, inspectors have the right to inspect converted heavy bombers that are subject to inspection to confirm that such heavy bombers have been converted in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol; and

(g) For storage facilities for heavy bombers, inspectors have the right to inspect all deployed heavy bombers in accordance with the Fourth Agreed Statement of Part Nine of the Protocol.

Paragraph 7 establishes the right of inspectors to read the unique identifiers on all non-deployed ICBMs, non-deployed SLBMs, eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs, and eliminated solid-fueled SLBMs, as well as on all heavy bombers, except for ICBMs or SLBMs contained in test launchers and in soft-site launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs. The use of the preposition “in” with regard to test launchers is significant because the Parties adopted a convention that missiles are “in” silo launchers of ICBMs and SLBM launchers, while missiles are “on” mobile launchers of ICBMs. This provision exempts missiles in test launchers (i.e., silo test launchers) and soft-site launchers due to the physical difficulty of accessing the unique identifier, but allows U.S. inspectors to read unique identifiers for all mobile ICBMs located on mobile test launchers of ICBMs because the unique identifier is easily readable on the launch canister.

Paragraph 8 establishes the right of the inspection team to confirm that all launch canisters located within the boundaries of the inspection site declared to be empty are, in fact, empty.

Paragraph 9 specifies that silo training launchers of ICBMs and test heavy bombers are not subject to inspection.

Paragraph 10 establishes the right of the inspection team to confirm that ICBMs or SLBMs declared to be training models of missiles are, in fact, training models of missiles, unless such items are contained in silo test launchers or in silo training launchers. This confirmation is to be based on differences as provided for in Part Two of the Protocol. As with paragraph 7 above, the use of the phrase “in test launchers” limits the exception such that it does not apply to mobile test launchers of ICBMs. This provision recognizes the physical difficulty of viewing, for a missile in a silo training launcher, the features that distinguish a training model of a missile from a real missile, but allows for confirmation of the type of training model of a missile located on mobile test launchers of ICBMs.

Section VIII - Exhibitions

Paragraph 1 provides that exhibitions are conducted at the invitation of the Party conducting the exhibition, separately from inspections, at the locations and times chosen by the Party conducting the exhibitions and in accordance with the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol. There is no quota on the number of such exhibitions that can be conducted each year.

Paragraph 2 establishes the requirements for a Party to conduct exhibitions and the right of the other Party to take part in the exhibitions for the purpose of demonstrating the distinguishing features and to confirm technical characteristics of each new type, variant, or version of an ICBM, SLBM, heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, and, as provided for in Part Two of the Protocol, an ICBM launcher. The latter clause captures mobile ICBM launchers, which are the only ICBM launchers for which technical characteristics will be in the database. This provision also accounts for the strategic offensive arms that were deployed under the START Treaty but were never exhibited (for the United States, the B-2A). Under the START Treaty, the B-2A was listed as an existing type of strategic offensive arm but was neither subject to inspection nor required to be exhibited. Additionally, this paragraph provides for an exhibition of those strategic offensive arms that were deployed following the expiration of the START Treaty but before entry into force of this Treaty. This provision ensures that the Russian Federation is required by the Treaty to exhibit the RS-24 mobile ICBM, which is listed in subparagraph 8(a)(ii) of Article III of the Treaty as a type of ICBM existing at the time of signature. Such exhibitions must be conducted no later than the date inspection activities may begin, which is 60 days after entry into force of this

Treaty, to enable the inspection teams to have the technical data of the items they will inspect.

Paragraph 3 establishes the requirements for a Party to conduct exhibitions and the right of the other Party to take part in the exhibitions for the purpose of demonstrating the results of the conversion of the first item of a type of ICBM launcher, SLBM launcher, or heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments. This exhibition will provide the basis for confirming subsequent conversions of such strategic offensive arms.

Paragraph 4 establishes the requirements for a Party to conduct exhibitions and the right of the other Party to take part in the exhibitions as provided for in Part Nine of the Protocol.

Section IX - Cancellation of Inspection Activities

Paragraph 1 provides for the cancellation of inspections and exhibitions due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure*. In such cases, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled will not be reduced. If exhibitions are cancelled, the Parties are to agree on the new periods of time for conducting such exhibitions.

Paragraph 2 provides for the right of an inspection team, in the case of a delay, including due to *force majeure*, that prevents an inspection team from arriving at the inspection site during the time specified in paragraph 7 of Section V of Part Five of the Protocol to either cancel or conduct the inspection. If an inspection is canceled for that reason, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled is not reduced.

Paragraph 3 specifies the rights of the inspection team if the time to transport an inspection team exceeds that allowed. In such cases, the inspection team leader can either cancel or conduct the inspection. If an inspection is canceled for that reason, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled is not reduced.

Paragraph 4 specifies the rights of the inspection team if, due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure*, it is necessary to remove items subject to pre-inspection restrictions from the inspection site. In such cases the inspection team

leader can either cancel or conduct the inspection. If an inspection is canceled for that reason, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled is not reduced.

Paragraph 5 specifies the rights of the inspection team if the inspected Party interrupts the inspection for reasons of personnel security or equipment safety. In such cases, the inspection team leader can either cancel or conduct the inspection. If an inspection is canceled for such reasons, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled is not reduced.

Section X - Inspection Activity Reports

Paragraph 1 establishes the requirement for an inspection activity report. During post-inspection procedures the inspection team leader is required to provide the in-country escort with an inspection activity report in written form, in two originals, each in English and in Russian.

Paragraph 2 specifies that the report is to contain factual information. It is to indicate the kind of inspection activities conducted, the inspection activity site, the type and number of strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty that were declared during the pre-inspection procedures and that were observed during the period of inspection activities, and all measurements recorded during the period of inspection activities.

Paragraph 3 specifies that site diagrams of facilities, coastlines and waters diagrams, and information provided in writing to the inspection team leader during pre-inspection procedures, as well as photographs taken during the period of inspection activities, are to be an integral part of the inspection activity report. The report is to be signed by the inspection team leader and by a member of the in-country escort. The paragraph also provides the inspecting Party the right to include in the report ambiguities or comments. The inspected Party has the right to include clarifications in the report. Each Party is to retain one original of the report.

Paragraph 4 specifies that the Parties will, when possible, clarify ambiguities regarding factual information contained in the inspection activity report. The paragraph establishes the requirement to record relevant clarifications in the report.

PART SIX – BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Structure and Overview

Part Six of the Protocol, which establishes the procedures and authority of the BCC, consists of eight sections. The enabling provision of the Treaty for the establishment of the BCC is Article XII. Article V, paragraph 2 also provides that a Party has the right to raise questions in the BCC concerning a new kind of strategic offensive arm, when that Party believes a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging.

The notifications concerning the BCC are provided in Section VII of Part Four of the Protocol.

The BCC is closely modeled on the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Implementation Commission (JCIC). The Parties have also drawn from their experiences with the Moscow Treaty's Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC) and the INF Treaty's Special Verification Commission (SVC).

The Parties agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply this Part of the Protocol from the date of signature of the Treaty.

Section I - Authority of the BCC

Section I provides five specific areas of the BCC's authority. The BCC has the authority to resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed by the Parties; to agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty; to discuss the unique features of missile defense interceptors and their launchers that distinguish them from ICBMs and ICBM launchers or SLBMs and SLBM launchers; to resolve questions related to the applicability of provisions of the Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm; and to discuss other issues raised by either Party.

The authority to agree on additional measures which would contribute to improving the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty was an important tool for the successful implementation of the START Treaty. Accordingly, Article XV of the New START Treaty provides that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in

the Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations, the Parties may use the BCC to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments to the Treaty.

Sections II through VIII - Procedures for the Operation of the BCC

The rules governing the operation of the BCC, set forth in Sections II through VIII of Part Six of the Protocol, are very similar to the rules governing the JCIC.

As with the JCIC, a session of the BCC must be convened if either Party so requests, and Section III provides that no fewer than two sessions of the BCC will be convened each year unless the Parties otherwise agree.

Section IV makes it clear that either Party may place any question it wishes to raise on the agenda of a session of the BCC consistent with the authorities specified in Section I of this Part.

Sections V and VI provide that the work of the BCC will be confidential and that each Party will bear its own costs for participation in the BCC.

Section VII establishes that the communications related to the BCC are to be through diplomatic channels or through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of the Parties.

Section VIII establishes the right to agree upon additional procedures governing the operation of the BCC.

PART SEVEN – TELEMETRIC INFORMATION

Part Seven of the Protocol consists of three paragraphs that establish the basis for the exchange of telemetric information on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs.

Paragraph 1 implements the provision in Article IX of the Treaty that the Parties, by mutual agreement, will exchange telemetric information on the basis of parity. The paragraph specifies that the Parties exchange telemetric information on an equal number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs each calendar year. It also sets a

ceiling of five on the number of launches of each Party for which telemetric information may be exchanged in any calendar year.

Paragraph 2 establishes the basic framework for the exchange of telemetric information. It provides that the Parties are to meet in the BCC within the first 65 days of each calendar year to discuss the exchange of telemetric information on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs. This meeting will provide the Parties with the opportunity to discuss launches for which telemetric information may be exchanged. Though the provision states that such discussion shall “focus” on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs conducted during the previous calendar year, it does not limit discussion to only those launches. It therefore provides flexibility should a Party seek to broaden discussion on the exchange of telemetric information. Subsequent to this discussion in the BCC, the Parties are to agree on the number of launches for which telemetric information will be exchanged, subject to the overall ceiling of five launches for the exchange each calendar year. Following this agreement, each Party will determine the specific launches for which it will provide telemetric information. While this structure gives the conducting Party the ultimate right to determine the launches for which it will exchange telemetric information, the framework also requires discussion in the BCC before a final determination is made and builds in flexibility for the Parties to structure and, if agreed, subsequently to modify the scope of the exchange.

Paragraph 3 establishes that the conditions of and procedures for the exchange and the amount of telemetric information provided will be determined in accordance with the Annex on Telemetric Information.

PART EIGHT – PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

Part Eight establishes the Parties’ agreement to provisionally apply certain provisions of the Treaty and Protocol from the date of signature of the Treaty.

Section I – General Provisions

Section I provides for the provisional application of specific provisions of the Treaty and Protocol from the date of signature of the Treaty, which occurred on April 8, 2010. The provisions listed in Sections II and III of this Part apply

provisionally during the interim between signature and entry into force of the Treaty.

Section II – The Treaty

Paragraph 1 provides for all the definitions of terms used in the Treaty and its Protocol provided in Part One of the Protocol to apply provisionally as identified in paragraph 2 of Article I of the Treaty.

Paragraph 2 provides for the provisional application of the list of existing types of ICBMs, SLBMs, launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy bombers for each Party that is found in paragraph 8 of Article III of the Treaty.

Paragraph 3 provides for provisional application of the right, in paragraph 2 of Article V, of a Party that believes a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the BCC.

Paragraph 4 provides for provisional application of paragraph 1 of Article VI, which provides that conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms and facilities will be carried out in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol. Neither the notifications and inspection activities related to conversion or elimination, nor the requirement to make converted or eliminated items visible to national technical means of verification are provisionally applied.

Paragraph 5 provisionally applies the requirement, established in paragraph 1 of Article VII, that a database pertaining to the obligations under the Treaty will be created in accordance with Parts Two and Four of the Protocol. Categories of data for the database are set forth in Part Two of the Protocol to the Treaty. No recurring data exchanges will take place, however, until after entry into force of the Treaty.

Paragraph 6 provisionally applies the obligation, established in paragraph 2 of Article VII, for each Party to notify the other Party about changes in data and provide notifications in a manner provided for in Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty, but only to the extent of providing nine specific notifications which are listed in Section III of this Part of the Protocol. These nine notifications relate to the movement of heavy bombers associated with major strategic exercises;

launches of ICBMs and SLBMs; and notifications concerning the BCC and additional messages.

Paragraph 7 provisionally applies paragraph 3 of Article VII, which provides for the use of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in order to provide and receive notifications.

Paragraph 8 provisionally applies paragraph 4 of Article VII of the Treaty, which provides that each Party may provide additional notifications on a voluntary basis, in addition to the notifications specified in paragraph 2 of Article VII of the Treaty if necessary to ensure confidence in the fulfillment of obligations assumed under the Treaty.

Paragraph 9 provisionally applies paragraph 5 of Article VII of the Treaty, which requires the Parties to hold consultations within the framework of the BCC on releasing to the public data and information obtained during the implementation of this Treaty. The Parties have the right to release to the public such data and information following agreement thereon within the framework of the BCC. Each Party has the right to release to the public data related to its own respective strategic offensive arms.

Paragraph 10 provisionally applies paragraph 6 of Article VII of the Treaty, which provides that geographic coordinates relating to data provided for in Part Two of the Protocol, unique identifiers, site diagrams of facilities provided by the Parties pursuant to the Treaty, as well as coastlines and waters diagrams provided by the Parties pursuant to the Treaty may not be released to the public unless otherwise agreed by the Parties within the framework of the BCC.

Paragraph 11 provides for provisional application of Article VIII of the Treaty, which contains the obligation of a Party that determines that its actions may lead to ambiguous situations, to take measures to ensure the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty and to enhance confidence, openness, and predictability concerning the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

Paragraph 12 provisionally applies Article X of the Treaty, which provides for the use of national technical means of verification by both Parties in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law for the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty and

prohibits the Parties from interfering with the national technical means of verification of the other that is operating in accordance with the Treaty.

Paragraph 13 provisionally applies Article XII of the Treaty, which establishes the BCC.

Section III – The Protocol

Paragraph 1 provisionally applies Part One of the Protocol, which contains the terms and their definitions.

Paragraph 2 provisionally applies certain paragraphs of Section I of Part Two of the Protocol, under which the Parties will provide no later than 45 days after signature of the Treaty, in accordance with the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol, site diagrams of facilities and, if applicable, coastlines and waters diagrams for each facility at which inspection activities may be conducted under the Treaty.

Paragraph 3 provisionally applies paragraph 2 of Section IX of Part Two of the Protocol, which establishes the categories of inspection activity sites associated with points of entry. The provisional application of this data will facilitate the identification of the facilities for which site diagrams of facilities and coastline and water diagrams will be provided 45 days after signature.

Paragraph 4 provisionally applies Part Three of the Protocol on conversion and elimination, but only to the extent required for the implementation of other provisionally applied portions of the Treaty. Provisional application of this Part does not require either Party to provide notifications on conversion or elimination or to make eliminated items visible to national technical means of verification. While neither Party is obligated to convert or eliminate items subject to the Treaty during the period of provisional application, should either Party choose to do so, they will use the conversion or elimination procedures provided for in this Part.

Paragraph 5 provisionally applies paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section I of Part Four of the Protocol, which provides that the time and date in notifications are to be expressed in Greenwich Mean Time. When providing the notifications, the date of provision of the notification will be the date of receipt by the receiving Party. The

effective date of the notifications will be the date the notification is received or the date of the occurrence of the event specified in the notification.

Paragraph 6 provisionally applies paragraphs 5 and 6 of Section III of Part Four of the Protocol, which provide for notifications concerning major strategic exercises.

Paragraph 7 provisionally applies paragraph 1 of Section IV of Part Four of the Protocol, which provides for notifications concerning launches of ICBMs or SLBMs.

Paragraph 8 provisionally applies Section VII of Part Four of the Protocol, which provides for notifications concerning activities of the BCC and additional messages.

Paragraph 9 provisionally applies Part Six of the Protocol, which provides the authority and procedures for the operation of the BCC.

Paragraph 10 makes it clear that these provisions of Part Eight of the Protocol have legal effect upon signature of the Treaty.

PART NINE – AGREED STATEMENTS

Structure and Overview of Part Nine of the Protocol

Part Nine of the Protocol consists of ten agreed statements. There is no significance to the order in which the statements appear in Part Nine of the Protocol.

The First Agreed Statement establishes the procedures that apply to B-1B heavy bombers that are converted from heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, and to the facilities at which they are based.

Paragraph 1 of the First Agreed Statement requires the United States to conduct an exhibition no later than one year after entry into force of the Treaty to demonstrate the features that distinguish a B-1B heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments from a B1B heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments when

converted in accordance with the procedures provided for in Part Three of the Protocol. The recorded distinguishing features will then be used to identify B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The agreed statement establishes that all B-1B heavy bombers that have been converted prior to the completion of such an exhibition and that have the recorded distinguishing features are to be included in the category of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. B-1B heavy bombers that are converted after the exhibition will then follow the procedures established in Part Three of the Protocol.

Paragraph 2 of the First Agreed Statement establishes the procedures that will apply when all B-1B heavy bombers have been converted to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The United States will notify Russia that Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, and Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, have been eliminated when all B-1B heavy bombers based there have been converted to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. These two bases will then be reported under the Treaty as formerly declared facilities. This paragraph provides Russia the right to conduct one Type Two inspection each year at either of these bases and provides the procedures to be used for the inspections. The single annual inspection may be either at Ellsworth Air Force Base or it may be at Dyess Air Force Base. Up to three B-1B heavy bombers may be designated for inspection by Russia to confirm the distinguishing features that indicate that the designated B-1B heavy bombers remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments. The B-1B heavy bombers may continue to be based at formerly declared facilities because, pursuant to subparagraph 7(c) of Article III of the Treaty, they will have ceased to be subject to the Treaty. Additionally, when the last B-1B is converted to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, the database created pursuant to Part Two of the Protocol will no longer include B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments.

Paragraph 3 of the First Agreed Statement provides that upon completion of the conversion of all B-1B heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, such converted heavy bombers are no longer subject to Type One inspections when the converted B-1B heavy bombers are present at an air base undergoing a Type One inspection at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented at the base.

Paragraph 4 of the First Agreed Statement establishes that the procedures of the agreed statement would also apply if either Party decides to convert all heavy

bombers of another type that are equipped for nuclear armaments to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments.

The Second Agreed Statement establishes the procedures that are to be applied to four U.S. submarines that have been converted from ballistic missile submarines to submarines equipped with launchers of cruise missiles, which are known as SSGNs.

Paragraph 1 of the Second Agreed Statement establishes procedures that may be used to provide assurances that the four SSGNs are incapable of launching SLBMs. No later than three years after entry into force of the Treaty, the United States will conduct a one-time exhibition for each of the four submarines to confirm that the launchers on the submarines are incapable of launching SLBMs. Following the exhibition and for the remainder of the duration of the Treaty, the Russian Federation has the right to conduct up to six inspections of these four SSGNs if they are located at a submarine base during a Type One inspection of that base. The inspecting Party has the option to designate for inspection two launchers on an SSGN instead of the one non-deployed launcher of SLBMs, as provided for in subparagraph 6(b) of Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol. No individual submarine may be inspected more than twice. The purpose of the inspection is to provide assurances that the individual launchers on the submarine have not been reconverted and they remain incapable of launching SLBMs. The procedures for conducting the inspection of the SSGNs are also provided in this paragraph.

Paragraph 2 of the Second Agreed Statement establishes that the procedures of the agreed statement would also apply to any future ballistic missile submarine that is converted to a submarine equipped with launchers of cruise missiles. The agreement on the number of allowed inspections for any such new converted submarines would be agreed within the framework of the BCC.

The Third Agreed Statement provides for an exception to the general prohibition in paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty against joint basing of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The statement establishes the right of each Party to carry out joint basing of heavy bombers of a type equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers of the same type that have been converted to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at an air base until the last heavy bomber of that type has

been converted to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. During the negotiations, the United States made clear that it would jointly base B-52H heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and B-52H heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments for the foreseeable future pursuant to this Agreed Statement.

Paragraph 1 of the Third Agreed Statement establishes that all heavy bombers of a type located at an air base at which joint basing of heavy bombers is carried out are subject to inspection until the last heavy bomber of that type equipped for nuclear armaments has been converted to a heavy bomber of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Inspection of heavy bombers declared to be equipped for nuclear armaments fall within the annual inspection quota for Type One inspections. During the same inspection, heavy bombers of the same type declared to be converted heavy bombers may be inspected in order to confirm that they have not been reconverted and remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments.

Paragraph 2 of the Third Agreed Statement provides the modifications to the Type One inspection procedures that are to be used for inspections performed pursuant to the agreed statement. These include provisions that heavy bombers converted into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments will be subject to pre-inspection restrictions, the number and type of such bombers will be provided to the inspecting Party and such heavy bombers will be included on the inspection site diagram of the air base provided by the inspected Party to the inspecting Party. No more than two heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments may be designated during the inspection for confirmation that the heavy bombers remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments.

The Fourth Agreed Statement acknowledges the right of the United States to locate heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments awaiting conversion or elimination at the storage facility for heavy bombers at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. These heavy bombers will be based at one of the declared air bases and will accordingly be listed in the database at that airbase. Such heavy bombers will be considered to be deployed heavy bombers until they are converted or eliminated. These heavy bombers will be considered to be visiting heavy bombers at the storage facility. The agreed statement specifies the inspection procedures that will be applied to these heavy bombers.

Paragraph 1 of the Fourth Agreed Statement establishes that the purpose of the inspections is to provide assurance that the deployed heavy bombers located at the storage facility for heavy bombers at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base do not have nuclear armaments located on them.

Paragraph 2 of the Fourth Agreed Statement defines, for the purposes of the agreed statement, the term “environmentally-sealed heavy bomber” as a heavy bomber that has undergone the process of comprehensive sealing in a manner that protects it from the effects of dust, humidity, sunlight, and extreme temperatures, which may include the sealing of access panels, doors, plates, and other small openings.

Paragraph 3 of the Fourth Agreed Statement requires the United States to conduct a one-time exhibition no later than 120 days after entry into force of the Treaty of one environmentally-sealed deployed heavy bomber of each type located at the storage facility at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base to confirm that these environmentally-sealed heavy bombers have no nuclear armaments located on them. The inspection team is allowed to select one heavy bomber of each type and to view the interior of the weapons bays of the heavy bomber in order to confirm that the heavy bomber does not have nuclear armaments located on it. For all remaining environmentally-sealed deployed heavy bombers, the inspection team has the right to view the exterior of each such heavy bomber in order to confirm the comprehensive sealing of the aircraft and to read the unique identifier on it. After the exhibition, the inspection team will apply unique tamper-proof seals to all weapons bays of each environmentally-sealed heavy bomber that has been inspected.

Paragraph 4 of the Fourth Agreed Statement establishes that after the exhibition has been conducted deployed heavy bombers located at the storage facility at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base are subject to Type Two inspections. During these inspections up to three deployed heavy bombers that are not environmentally-sealed may be selected for inspection. The Parties have agreed, for safety reasons, that such deployed heavy bombers may be inspected only to the extent that the condition of such heavy bombers allows. Environmentally-sealed heavy bombers will be inspected only by viewing the exterior of such heavy bombers to confirm that the tamper-proof seals applied during the exhibition remain intact.

Paragraph 5 of the Fourth Agreed Statement provides for the opportunity of applying the same procedures in the agreed statement to a different type of

deployed heavy bomber that has been environmentally-sealed after the first exhibition.

The Fifth Agreed Statement provides that the production, testing, or deployment of systems designed for the rapid reload of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers is unwarranted and should not be pursued by either Party. “Rapid reload” is not defined in the New START Treaty, unlike in the START Treaty. Discussions during the New START negotiations made clear that both sides consider “rapid reload” an unlikely scenario, and therefore could agree on this broad statement to rule it out. “Rapid reload” is understood to have a similar meaning to that of the START Treaty in which the term was defined to describe the capability of reloading a silo launcher of ICBMs in less than 12 hours or a mobile launcher of ICBMs in less than four hours. The concept is somewhat broader in this Treaty since it also applies to SLBM launchers.

The Sixth Agreed Statement addresses the use of telemetric information. In this statement, the Parties agree that the exchange of telemetric information under the Treaty is designed to help create a new strategic partnership between the Parties by providing transparency, not to undermine the potential of the Parties’ strategic offensive arms.

The Seventh Agreed Statement addresses silo launchers of ICBMs at Vandenberg Air Force Base that were converted to launchers of missile defense interceptors prior to signature of the Treaty. Paragraph 3 of Article V of the Treaty bans the conversion to or use of ICBM launchers or SLBM launchers as launchers of missile defense interceptors other than those converted prior to signature. This Agreed Statement requires the United States to conduct a one-time exhibition, within three years of entry into force of the Treaty, of the five converted silo launchers at Vandenberg Air Force Base to provide assurances that the converted ICBM launchers remain incapable of launching ICBMs and to record the distinguishing features of the converted launchers. The Agreed Statement also provides for one subsequent exhibition of the five launchers to confirm they have not been reconverted, within 30 days after a request from the Russian Federation.

The Eighth Agreed Statement addresses non-nuclear objects located on the front section of an ICBM or SLBM. The Parties agree that, considering military utility, only nuclear-armed reentry vehicles and non-nuclear objects other than

reentry vehicles may be simultaneously located on a front section of an ICBM or SLBM.

The Agreed Statement goes on to provide that such non-nuclear objects, if located on a front section that has been declared to be equipped with at least one nuclear-armed reentry vehicle, shall not be counted under the Treaty's aggregate limit of 1,550 deployed warheads. In practice, this means that objects such as penetration aids and inert ballast that may be carried on an ICBM or SLBM will not count toward the Treaty's warhead limit. The Parties have the right to confirm that the non-nuclear objects are not nuclear-armed reentry vehicles, using procedures contained in the Annex on Inspection Activities. At the discretion of the inspected Party, radiation detection equipment may be used to make that confirmation, and the procedures for the use of radiation detection equipment are in Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities.

The Ninth Agreed Statement establishes that individual SLBM launchers may be converted on ballistic missile submarines containing non-converted SLBM launchers. A ballistic missile submarine may therefore have a "mixed" group of deployed, non-deployed, and converted SLBM launchers. This statement also provides for an exhibition of a converted SLBM launcher and a non-converted SLBM launcher, on a ballistic missile submarine. The purpose of this exhibition is to demonstrate the distinguishing features of a converted launcher.

This statement also provides confirmation that the converted launchers are not counted against the central limits of the Treaty; that statement is included for emphasis. Converted SLBM launchers on ballistic missile submarines remain subject to Type One inspections throughout the life of the Treaty using modified inspection procedures provided in the Agreed Statement.

The Tenth Agreed Statement addresses customs duties and taxes. The statement exempts from customs duties and related taxes and charges all equipment, recording media and supporting documentation that a Party brings into the territory of the other Party for purposes of the Treaty.

PART TEN – FINAL PROVISIONS

Part Ten provides that the Parties may agree on additional procedures for the implementation of the Protocol, which will be contained in Annexes to the Protocol that will be integral parts of the Protocol and therefore also of the Treaty. Pursuant to this provision, the Parties negotiated three Annexes to the Protocol, containing additional procedures for inspection activities, notifications, and telemetric information. These Annexes are integral parts of the Protocol and have been provided for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification.

Part Ten further provides that the Protocol will enter into force when the Treaty enters into force and will remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.

**ARTICLE-BY ARTICLE ANALYSIS
OF THE ANNEXES TO THE TREATY BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS**

ANNEX ON INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

Structure and Overview

The Annex on Inspection Activities supplements Part Five of the Protocol and includes nine Parts. Part One addresses transportation procedures. Part Two addresses procedures relating to unique identifiers. Part Three addresses additional general rules for the conduct of inspection activities. Part Four addresses site diagrams of facilities and coastlines and waters diagrams. Part Five addresses inspection equipment and electronic equipment necessary for inspectors. Part Six addresses Type One inspection procedures. Part Seven addresses Type Two inspection procedures. Part Eight addresses exhibition procedures. Part Nine addresses inspection procedures for items of inspection, objects, covered objects, containers, vehicles, and structures during Type One and Type Two inspections.

PART ONE – TRANSPORTATION PROCEDURES

Part One contains provisions that address the details stemming from Section III of Part Five of the Protocol and sets forth procedures for the Parties to agree on specific types of inspection airplanes used to transport inspectors to the points of entry, changing points of entry, issuing standing diplomatic clearance numbers, approving flight plans, and designating assigned call signs. Additionally, this Part sets a limit on the number of aircrew members on an inspection airplane, addresses emergency evacuation, and provides for the resolution of costs for airplane servicing.

Paragraph 1 presents the mechanism by which both Parties will reach agreement, after entry into force of the Treaty, on the types of inspection airplanes that each

Party may use to transport its inspectors to points of entry. It stipulates that each Party shall provide a notification, five days after the Treaty's entry into force, containing the list of types of inspection airplanes it intends to use for transporting its inspectors to the territory of the other Party. The list of airplanes is considered agreed unless the other Party sends a notification of its objection on a type of inspection airplane within ten days after receipt of the notification. Objections will be resolved within the framework of the BCC. These notifications will use the "additional message" format provided for in paragraph 6 of Section VII of Part Four of the Protocol.

Paragraph 1 also grants each Party the right to replace its types of inspection airplanes or add to its list of types of inspection airplanes contained in the database. All changes are automatically effective three months after a Party has provided the information to the other Party unless there is disagreement. Disagreements will be resolved within the framework of the BCC.

Paragraph 2 provides each Party the right to change a point of entry on its territory. The Party making the change will notify the other Party in the six-month database update provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section II of Part Four of the Protocol and the change of the point of entry will become effective three months after such notification. The three-month delay provides the other Party the necessary time to perform flight planning functions and to properly orient and train aircrews.

Paragraph 3 establishes the obligation that each Party must issue standing diplomatic clearance numbers for inspection airplanes as specified in paragraph 1 of Section VI of Part Four of the Protocol.

Paragraph 4 requires the inspected Party to approve the flight plan submitted by the inspecting Party within a prescribed time frame so that the inspection airplane can arrive at the point of entry by the estimated time of arrival. Since the inspection airplane must follow flight routes provided by the inspected Party as specified in accordance with Part Two of the Protocol, the approval process should be timely and should not unnecessarily inhibit the inspecting Party from arriving at the point of entry at the established time of arrival.

Paragraph 5 directs the use of country-specific call signs for inspection airplanes. The term “START” is used in the call sign only because it is easier than “New START” for aircrews and air traffic controllers to verbally communicate.

Paragraph 6 establishes the maximum number of aircrew members for an inspection airplane at ten. Both Parties recognize that it is not uncommon for airplanes to require maintenance support that is not organic to the airplane’s aircrew. Therefore, this paragraph also permits, on a case-by-case basis and upon agreement with the inspected Party, to increase the maximum number of aircrew members to 15 to perform required repairs.

Paragraph 7 provides that, once on the territory of the inspected Party, all inspector and aircrew movement and travel will be controlled by the in-country escort. In the case of an emergency situation or unusual circumstances, the in-country escort and the inspection team leader will develop a mutually agreeable plan to address the situation.

Paragraph 8 specifies that all related servicing listed in Part Five of the Protocol for inspection airplanes that is to be provided by the inspected Party at the point of entry (e.g., fuel) will be paid by the aircraft commander upon receipt of such servicing. This provision is intended to expedite the payment process through the use of internationally accepted electronic charge cards for aircraft services and to align Treaty practices with established international norms of payment for aircraft services.

PART TWO – PROCEDURES RELATING TO UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS

Part Two directs each Party to use unique identifiers (UIDs) for each existing or newly-produced ICBM, existing or newly-produced SLBM, and existing or newly-produced heavy bomber. Part One of the Protocol defines a UID as a non-repeating alpha-numeric number that has been applied by the inspected Party to an ICBM, SLBM, or heavy bomber. This definition gives each Party the flexibility to use UIDs for its systems in a manner that is cost-effective and efficient. For certain inaccessible ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, Part Two provides provisions for replicating UIDs and displaying them on associated equipment or locations in order for inspectors to be able to confirm during inspections the data contained in the database.

Paragraph 1 specifies the general provisions governing UIDs. Each Party must affix UIDs to each of its existing or newly-produced ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers using its own technology. The intent is to permit each Party to have the maximum flexibility in determining the mode of application and size of its UIDs. Both sides recognize that procedures that work well for one Party may not necessarily be efficient or effective for the other Party. Once a UID is applied to an item and the data from it is provided in accordance with Parts Two and Four of the Protocol, the UID for that item may not be changed.

Paragraph 2 specifies that each Party is to provide the unique identifier data for each ICBM, each SLBM, and each heavy bomber to the other Party.

Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 specify the location on the item where the UID must be applied. Generally the UID will be applied on the first stage of all ICBMs and SLBMs. There may be instances, however, where inspectors will have difficulty confirming UIDs for deployed ICBMs and SLBMs due to accessibility difficulties. For example, for canisterized ballistic missiles, the UID on the first stage is not readable when a ballistic missile is inside the launch canister. Similarly, for the United States, an SLBM may be in a loading tube, described as a “container” in paragraph 4, which would make a UID on a first stage too difficult to read. Accordingly, for a type of ICBM or SLBM that is maintained, stored, and transported in a launch canister or other container, the UID must be replicated on the canister or other container associated with the ICBM or SLBM. The replicated UID will permit inspectors to view and read the UID without having the inspected Party remove the missile from its canister or container simply to read its first stage UID.

To meet the requirements of paragraph 5, the United States plans to use a heavy bomber’s aircraft tail number as its UID. Paragraph 5 enables each Party to use whatever non-repeating alpha-numeric identifier it deems appropriate for a heavy bomber UID, including a tail number, aircraft name, or aircraft production number. The location of the UID is also left to each Party’s discretion as long as the UID can be read in accordance with paragraph 7.

Paragraph 6 requires each Party to replicate the UID of a deployed ICBM or deployed SLBM either directly on its deployed launcher or somewhere near the deployed launcher where it can be read. This is needed because deployed ICBMs

and SLBMs in fixed launchers are not accessible without removing the missiles from the launchers and inspectors will not be able to read the UID on the ballistic missile directly. In both situations, inspectors have the right to read the ballistic missile's UID from a place designated by the in-country escort.

Paragraph 7 provides the right of inspectors to read an item's UID and also specifies that the UID must be visible to inspectors. The inspected Party designates the place from which inspectors can read an item's UID. This provision is related to the right of each Party to determine for itself the size of its UIDs. The inspected Party must apply UIDs that are large enough to be read from a place that the in-country escort designates for inspectors to read.

Paragraph 7 also provides that UIDs on non-deployed ICBMs or SLBMs contained in test launchers or in soft site launchers are not to be read by inspectors during Type Two inspections. This exception does not apply to ICBMs or SLBMs on mobile test launchers where the ICBM is carried on (rather than in) the test launcher.

PART THREE – ADDITIONAL GENERAL RULES FOR CONDUCT OF INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

Part Three provides procedures for addressing issues related to inspectors, aircrew members, and members of the in-country escort who are either under indictment for criminal offense or behave inconsistent with the general rules and procedures governing the conduct of inspection activities. This Part also provides additional general rules for inspection team composition, clothing requirements, and wearing of unique badges. Lastly, this Part addresses the basic goods and services to be provided by the inspected Party, storage of equipment and supplies, and the procedures for declaring sequential inspections.

Paragraph 1 provides the grounds for objecting to already agreed inspectors and aircrew members. While aircrew members may be objected to for any reason, specific serious reasons (i.e., being under indictment for a criminal offense on the territory of the inspected Party, having been convicted in a criminal prosecution, having been expelled by the inspected Party, or violating the conditions governing inspection activities) are required to object to already agreed inspectors. After receipt of notification of objection, the inspecting Party shall promptly recall the

inspector or aircrew member, as applicable, if that individual is there at that time, and subsequently remove that individual from the list of inspectors or aircrew members.

Paragraphs 2 and 3 address inspectors and members of the in-country escort who take actions that are not in accordance with the rules and procedures governing the conduct of inspection activities while performing their inspection or in-country escort duties. The intent of these provisions is to provide flexibility for the in-country escort and the inspection team leader to resolve behavioral issues. If there are questions or ambiguities that still remain, then both the inspection team leader and the in-country escort have the right to include a comment to that effect in the inspection activity report.

Paragraph 4 contains several general rules, addressing inspection team leadership, linguistic requirements, clothing and identification, and a limit on the number of inspection teams at an inspection activity site at any one time.

Paragraph 5 provides guidance on meals, lodging and transportation during inspection activities conducted in accordance with Part Five of the Protocol. Subparagraph (a) requires the inspected Party to provide meals as agreed with the inspection team leader. Subparagraph (b) provides that lodging for inspectors at inspection sites must permit inspectors to receive adequate rest. Due to the isolation of some inspection sites, these need not be hotel-type accommodations. Subparagraph (c) provides for a sufficient number of vehicles to transport the inspection team and any subgroups at the inspection site.

Paragraph 6 complements paragraph 3 of Section I of Part Five of this Annex and specifies that the inspecting Party may use locked or sealed containers for storing its equipment and supplies at the point of entry. This paragraph also directs that access to the equipment will be available only if representatives from both Parties are present.

Paragraph 7 specifies procedures for situations where non-contiguous inspection sites are located within the boundaries of a facility. The paragraph states that roads connecting the non-contiguous inspection sites (and which are depicted on the simplified site diagram for the facility) are not considered part of the inspection site. Containers, launch canisters, or vehicles located on such roads are not subject to pre-inspection restrictions or inspection until such items have entered the

inspection site during the inspection period. The paragraph also states that an item transported between two non-contiguous inspections sites is not considered to be in transit provided that the item is transported directly on roads that are depicted on the simplified site diagram.

Paragraph 8 contains the procedures for declaring a sequential inspection. The inspection team leader must state his or her intention to conduct a sequential inspection at the time of designation of the first site to be inspected. If the inspection team notifies the intent to conduct a sequential inspection, the inspection team leader must also specify whether the inspection team intends to return to the POE prior to proceeding to the site of the sequential inspection or whether the inspection team intends to proceed to the second site directly from the first site. If the inspection team intends to conduct the sequential inspection without returning to the POE, the inspection team leader must designate the sequential inspection site upon completion of the previous inspection but prior to the completion of the post-inspection procedures. If the inspection team will return to the POE prior to notifying the sequential inspection site, it then has four hours after its arrival back at the POE to make the sequential site declaration.

The inspection team must be transported to the sequential inspection site within 24 hours of its designation whether it is traveling directly from one site to another or is returning to the POE prior to declaring the sequential inspection location. The details of the notifications that are required in writing are contained in paragraph 14 of Section VI of Part Four to the Protocol. However, both Parties wanted this provision included in this Part to provide inspectors and in-country escorts with a single source of reference regarding the process of sequential inspection declaration and notification.

PART FOUR – SITE DIAGRAMS OF FACILITIES AND COASTLINES AND WATERS DIAGRAMS

Part Four sets forth the requirements for diagrams that are exchanged by the Parties to support inspection activities. Site diagrams of facilities and coastlines and waters diagrams are to be exchanged by May 23, 2010, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section I of Part Two of the Protocol. As specified in paragraph 6 of Article VII of the Treaty, site diagrams of facilities and coastlines and waters diagrams may not be released to the public unless otherwise agreed by the Parties within the framework of the BCC.

Three general types of diagrams are used to support inspection activities: inspection site diagrams, simplified site diagrams, and coastlines and waters diagrams. The term “site diagrams of facilities” means both simplified site diagrams and inspection site diagrams.

Paragraph 1 sets forth the specific types of diagrams that must be provided for certain categories of facilities and what is required to be depicted on those diagrams. Any facility that will be listed in the database in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section IX of Part Two of the Protocol as a facility subject to inspection activities must have at least one type of diagram provided for that facility.

Generally, for any facility that consists of multiple, non-contiguous inspection sites, an inspection site diagram is provided for each individual inspection site, and a simplified site diagram is provided for the entire facility, which depicts the non-contiguous inspection sites, as well as the roads that are used to travel between them. A coastlines and waters diagram is required for each submarine base.

Paragraph 2 of this Part sets forth the requirements and rules for creating each type of diagram. These general rules standardize the diagrams for both of the Parties. This paragraph provides the rules for depicting roads, symbols, reference points, boundaries of inspection sites, and structures intended for items of inspection.

Paragraph 3 of this Part states that site diagrams of facilities and coastlines and waters diagrams must be provided for new facilities within 72 hours after a new facility notification is provided in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol.

Paragraphs 4 through 7 discuss different requirements for changes to existing site diagrams of facilities and coastlines and waters diagrams. The purpose for having different requirements for various changes was to require agreement between the Parties within the framework of the BCC on changes to diagrams that affect access during inspections, but at the same time allow for a flexible process to update diagrams when there is no impact on inspections.

Paragraph 4 of this Part requires the in-country escort to provide to the inspectors during pre-inspection procedures an updated inspection site diagram if there has been construction or elimination of structures intended for items of inspection

within the inspection site boundary, but only if there is no change to the inspection site boundary.

Paragraph 5 of this Part requires a Party to provide updated site diagrams of facilities or coastlines and waters diagrams through diplomatic channels if, for inspection site diagrams and coastlines and waters diagrams, there is no reduction to the boundaries depicted on the existing inspection site diagram or any reduction to the existing coastlines or waters within arcs with a radius of five kilometers from such coastlines. For changes to simplified site diagrams, such updated simplified site diagrams are always provided through diplomatic channels, regardless of the changes made by a Party.

Paragraph 6 of this Part requires discussion and agreement in the BCC for any changes to coastlines and waters diagrams that result in the exclusion of any portion of the existing coastlines or waters within arcs with a radius of five kilometers from such coastlines.

Paragraph 7 of this Part requires changes to inspection site diagrams that result in the exclusion of any portion of the inspection site from within the existing boundaries of the inspection site to be discussed and agreed upon in the BCC, unless the decrease in the boundary was as a result of the demolition or dismantlement of a structure previously depicted within the boundary of the inspection site, in which case such a change to the inspection site diagram may be provided via diplomatic channels.

PART FIVE – INSPECTION EQUIPMENT AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR INSPECTORS

Part Five lists inspection equipment and sets forth procedures for its use for making linear measurements, taking photographs, determining geographic coordinates, and carrying out radiation measurements.

The first section covers general provisions regarding inspection equipment and personal equipment, including its examination, storage, impoundment, and replacement. The second section provides the characteristics and lists of inspection equipment used during inspection activities. The third section addresses the methods and procedures for conducting linear measurements to confirm types

of ICBMs and SLBMs during Type One and Type Two inspections as well as at exhibitions. The fourth section addresses methods and procedures for use of equipment for photography and printing photographs. The fifth section deals with methods and procedures for using equipment to determine geographic coordinates. The final section addresses the methods and procedures for use of radiation detection equipment.

Section I. General Provisions

The first two paragraphs provide that the equipment listed in Section II of this Part is to be used during inspection activities in accordance with the procedures set forth in the following Sections and that each time the inspecting Party brings the equipment into the territory of the inspected Party it is subject to examination.

Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 address the right of inspectors to store inspection equipment at the point of entry and limits the amount of inspection equipment delivered to the inspection activity site to no more than the quantities listed in Section II. Inspectors also have the right to store their inspection equipment in the inspectors' work area at the inspection sites.

Paragraph 4 provides that the inspected Party may impound, at the location where it is examined, equipment that, in its opinion can perform functions that are unrelated to the requirements of the inspection activity. The inspected Party may elect not to permit its use by inspectors. Impounded equipment will remain in storage at the point of entry and the inspection team must remove it upon departure from the territory of the inspected Party. Any questions about impounded equipment are to be resolved within the framework of the BCC or by other means agreed upon by the Parties. This does not preclude the in-country escort and the inspection team leader from resolving issues about disputed inspection equipment rather than waiting for the BCC to address the issue.

Paragraph 5 permits inspectors to store inspection equipment in the inspectors' work area at the inspection site. During the in-country period, inspectors must provide the in-country escort the opportunity to view and observe the inspection equipment stored in the inspectors' work area.

Paragraph 6 provides for the replacement of inspection equipment. Should a Party need to replace equipment; the nature of the equipment will drive the notification

requirement and the timing of when the replacement equipment can be brought into the territory of the inspected Party. This paragraph provides flexibility so that equipment can be replaced when required. Even if the replacement equipment has a purpose and characteristics that differ from the purpose and characteristics of the equipment provided for in Section II, a Party is not prohibited from using such replacement equipment but the issue of its use must be agreed within the framework of the BCC.

Paragraph 7 specifies that inspectors have the right to use personal electronic equipment upon agreement with the inspected Party. Inspectors are permitted to bring their own personal electronic equipment to the territory of the inspected Party but such equipment is subject to examination each time it is brought to the point of entry. The same impoundment and removal procedures that apply to inspection equipment that the inspected Party believes can perform functions unconnected with the requirements of inspection activities apply to personal electronic equipment that the inspected Party decides can be used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. In all cases, personal electronic equipment may not be used at an inspection activity site and shall be under the control of the in-country escort.

Paragraph 8 provides that, at the request of the inspecting Party, the inspected Party is responsible for providing operable equipment for photography and printing of photographs. The inspected Party shall ensure the operability of all sets of such equipment.

Section II. Characteristics of Equipment for Inspection Activities

Paragraph 1 lists equipment for making linear measurements and additional equipment, such as batteries, seals, and flashlights, to be provided for use during inspection activities by the inspecting Party. The equipment listed will be carried to each inspection activity by the inspecting Party and will be examined by representatives of the inspected Party at the point of entry each time it is brought into the territory of the inspected Party in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of Part Five of the Protocol.

Paragraph 2 lists equipment for making linear measurements to be provided by the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party during inspection activities.

Paragraph 3 lists equipment used to take and print photographs. While inspectors have a right to use the equipment listed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section, paragraph 8 of Section V of Part Five of the Protocol specifies that cameras may be used only by the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party. Photographic equipment is also provided by the inspected Party.

Paragraph 4 requires that the inspected Party provide two sets of satellite system receivers for determining geographic coordinates during inspection activities. The paragraph lists the specific equipment that makes up a satellite system receiver set, which is to be employed using procedures in Section V of Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities.

Paragraph 5 lists radiation detection equipment and the technical requirements for such equipment for each Party. The equipment may be used during Type One inspections using the procedures in Section VI of Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities to demonstrate that objects declared to be non-nuclear objects on the front sections of deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs or on a designated heavy bomber are, in fact, non-nuclear.

Section III. Methods and Procedures for Use of Equipment for Making Linear Measurements

Paragraphs 1 and 2 specify the procedures for using inspection equipment to measure length, width, height and diameter of objects and items of inspection. Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 specify the number of times an object will be measured, the acceptable deviation between each resultant measurement, and the corresponding technical data provided in accordance with Part Two of the Protocol, and how the value of the measurement will be specified, to the nearest 0.01 meter or 0.1 meter, as applicable.

Paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 list the precise ways to measure the different classifications of ICBMs and SLBMs. Paragraph 6 specifies how to measure an assembled ICBM or SLBM without a front section that is in a launch canister. Paragraph 7 specifies how to measure an assembled ICBM or SLBM without a front section depending on whether or not the front section attached to the missile is visible to inspectors. Finally, paragraph 8 specifies how to measure an ICBM or SLBM first stage.

Paragraph 9 addresses the case of performing linear measurements of types of ICBM or SLBMs during an exhibition in accordance with subparagraphs 1(a)(i)(B), 1(a)(ii)(B), and 1(a)(iii)(B) of Section III of Part Eight of this Annex. Depending on the classification of the type of ICBM or SLBM being exhibited, additional measurements may be required. For Classification A types of ICBMs or SLBMs, paragraph 6 of this Section only specifies how to measure the assembled missile in the canister. During an exhibition of the same type of ICBM or SLBM, the assembled missile, the canister, and the first stage will all be displayed and inspectors have the right to measure each. Paragraph 9 provides the right to make additional linear measurements during exhibitions.

Paragraph 10 identifies the diameter measurements to be used for confirmation of a type of ICBM or SLBM during inspection activities.

Paragraph 11 authorizes the use of indirect measurement procedures using additional equipment to be provided by the inspected Party for items of inspection located in a container or in a vehicle.

Section IV. Methods and Procedures for Use of Equipment for Photography and Printing of Photographs

Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 detail the procedures and requirements for taking and printing digital photographs. Subparagraphs 2(e) and 3(e) specify the size of the digital photographs taken during an inspection and exhibition, respectively. The smaller photograph size specified in subparagraph 2(e) is to accommodate transporting a smaller color printer to remote inspection activity sites. During exhibitions, the actual exhibition is planned in advance and the photographs can be printed without having to transport a printer to the exhibition site.

Section V. Methods and Procedures for Use of Equipment for Determining Geographic Coordinates

This Section sets forth the procedures for use of satellite systems receivers (SSRs) with the satellite navigation systems of either the United States (NAVSTAR) or Russia (GLONASS), commonly known as geographic positioning system (GPS) receivers.

Paragraph 1 states that during Type One or Type Two inspections SSRs may be used only to confirm geographic coordinates of silo launchers of ICBMs.

Paragraph 2 allows for the operability check of SSRs at any point of entry that has a facility associated with silo launchers of ICBMs at which a Type One or Type Two inspection may be conducted.

Paragraph 3 sets forth the requirement that the Parties must exchange the four reference points for each point of entry, no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. These reference points are used during the operability check of an SSR at the point of entry to confirm that the SSR functions properly.

Paragraph 4 allows for changing reference points after they have been agreed.

Paragraph 5 defines the term “agree with” when performing an operability check of an SSR at a point of entry.

Paragraph 6 defines the term “agree with” when comparing an SSR reading with the listed geographic coordinates for a silo launcher of ICBMs.

Paragraph 7 defines the term “navigation system” and specifies the type of navigation system in use by each Party.

Paragraph 8 sets forth the procedures for reaching agreement on the geographic coordinates of a reference point, the information for which was provided pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Section. The Russian Federation requested the flexibility to use multiple navigation systems on their own territory in the event that either navigation system was found to be unreliable during an inspection. Consequently, the phrase “using no more than two navigation systems” means that a Party may choose to test the operability of its SSRs using multiple navigation systems, or it may choose to use just one, which is expected to be the case for inspections conducted on the territory of the United States.

Paragraph 9 sets forth the procedures to confirm the operability of an SSR at the point of entry.

Paragraph 10 states that after the operability check has been performed, the SSRs must be sealed in a container until such time as they are used at the inspection site.

Paragraph 11 states that the inspected Party will designate which navigation system will be used at the inspection site to determine geographic coordinates. The navigation system chosen must be one of the systems checked at the point of entry.

Paragraph 12 sets forth the procedures for obtaining an SSR reading at the silo launcher of ICBMs designated for inspection.

Paragraph 13 states that, if a sequential inspection will be conducted, the SSR must be re-sealed in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section.

Paragraph 14 requires that, for the purposes of determining geographic coordinates at reference points and at an inspection site, the Parties may not interfere with the operation of a navigation system, may not introduce special, or encrypted, modes of transmission of navigation systems, nor undertake any other actions to prevent authentic determination of geographic coordinates.

Section VI. Methods and Procedures for Use of Radiation Detection Equipment

This Section sets forth the procedures on how radiation detection equipment will be used to confirm that objects declared by the inspected Party to be non-nuclear objects are, in fact, non-nuclear. The Section consists of three sets of procedures. The first set, which consists of paragraphs 3-6, are the procedures to be used for the initial validation of the equipment as well as the procedures to be used at the point of entry that are unique to using the radiation detection equipment of the inspected Party. This approach will only be used if agreement is reached within the framework of the BCC to use the inspected Party's radiation detection equipment. The second set of procedures, consisting of paragraphs 7-12, are the procedures to be used for the initial validation of the equipment as well as the procedures to be used at the point of entry that are unique to using radiation detection equipment provided by the inspecting Party. These procedures are consistent with START procedures and will be used unless an agreement is reached in the BCC to use the inspected Party's equipment. The third set of procedures, consisting of paragraphs 13-16, are to be used while at the inspection site and are common to both sets of equipment.

Paragraph 1 states the purpose for using radiation detection equipment. Specifically, the purpose of radiation detection equipment is to demonstrate that, during a Type One inspection, an object declared by the inspected Party to be a non-nuclear object is, in fact, non-nuclear. The paragraph also states that radiation detection equipment provided by the inspected Party may only be used if agreed upon within the framework of the BCC. Otherwise, the radiation detection equipment will be provided by the inspecting Party.

Paragraph 2 states that the Parties will discuss and decide in the BCC whether to use radiation detection equipment provided by the inspected Party.

Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6 set forth the procedures for examination, operability check, and storage of radiation detection equipment at the point of entry when such radiation detection equipment is provided by the inspected Party.

Paragraph 3 states that if the decision to use equipment provided by the inspected Party is made in the BCC, the inspected Party will provide a set of equipment to the inspecting Party for its examination. The inspecting Party must then inform the inspected Party within 30 days of its agreement or disagreement that such equipment may be used.

Paragraph 4 provides for the initial delivery, examination, and operability check of radiation detection equipment at a point of entry. After the operability check has been performed the equipment will be stored in tamper-proof containers.

Paragraph 5 provides an opportunity for inspectors to view the spare and rechargeable batteries associated with the radiation detection equipment since these components will be routinely replaced, unlike other components of the sets of radiation detection equipment.

Paragraph 6 sets forth the procedures for determining the operability of the equipment at the point of entry prior to an inspection. Inspectors will first examine the tamper-proof containers and then select one or more sets of radiation detection equipment to confirm their operability.

Subparagraph 6(a) states that the counting time for the measurement (i.e., the time allowed for neutron detection) will be agreed in the BCC, consistent with the equipment chosen.

Subparagraphs 6(b) and 6(c) stipulate that the operability of each neutron detector in a selected set will be confirmed and then the neutron detector selected for use will be placed in an agreed location for the measurements to be performed.

Subparagraph 6(d) describes the process for confirming the operability of the radiation detection equipment. During the initial examination and at approximately two-year intervals after that, a neutron source will be used to confirm operability. In all other cases, natural background will be used to confirm operability in lieu of a neutron source. Before each use, operability will be checked using two or three background measurements. If the values of any two of three background measurements are sufficiently close together, the radiation detection system would pass this portion of the operability check. For those cases in which an additional check with the neutron source is performed, two measurements are then made with the detector in the same location and the source one meter away. The values of these measurements, either as a total neutron count or an amount over the background count, are recorded as the operability indicator. The operability indicator measurements are used for comparison on future measurements. The results of the background measurements and the neutron source measurements, if performed, are then recorded in the inspection activity report.

Subparagraph 6(e) stipulates that if the containers for at least one set of radiation detection equipment have not been tampered with and the equipment has been shown to be operable, that set will then be used to perform the measurements on the object or objects in question at the inspection site.

Subparagraph 6(f) states that if all of the containers have been tampered with, one or all of the sets of the radiation detection equipment may be examined over a period of up to 12 hours.

Subparagraph 6(g) addresses the case where there are no signs that the containers have been tampered with and none of the sets of equipment is operable. This fact will be noted in the inspection activity report and the inspected Party will be responsible for reporting on the cause of the malfunction and measures taken to preclude such malfunctions in the future.

Subparagraph 6(h) allows for the use of several operable detectors during the inspection at the discretion of the inspected Party.

Paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 set forth the procedures for examination, operability check, and storage of radiation detection equipment at the point of entry when such radiation detection equipment is provided by the inspecting Party.

Paragraph 7 establishes the use of equipment provided by the inspecting Party on the territory of the inspected Party as the default if the Parties do not agree in the BCC on the use of equipment provided by the inspected Party.

Paragraphs 8 and 9 provide for the initial delivery of radiation detection equipment to a point of entry.

Paragraph 8 states that prior to the time when radiation detection equipment will be brought to a point of entry of the inspected Party, the inspecting Party will provide the inspected Party a set of such equipment for examination. The inspected Party must then inform the inspecting Party within 30 days as to whether the inspecting Party is permitted to use such equipment.

Paragraph 9 permits, after the approval of the inspected Party, the inspecting Party to bring one to three sets of radiation detection equipment to be stored at the point of entry for use in inspections. The equipment is subject to examination, including partial disassembly by the inspected Party, and will be stored in tamper-proof containers after the examination is completed.

Paragraph 10 allows the inspection team to bring calibration sources, spare batteries, and an additional set of radiation detection equipment to the point of entry as well as to remove and replace inoperable equipment.

Paragraphs 11 and 12 set forth the requirements for selecting a set of radiation detection equipment for use, determining that its container has not been tampered with, and confirming the operability of the equipment at the point of entry prior to an inspection.

Subparagraph 11(a) stipulates that if the containers for at least one set of radiation detection equipment have not been tampered with and the equipment is shown to be operable, that set will then be used to perform the measurements on the object or objects in question during the inspection.

Subparagraphs 11(b) and 11(c) state that if all of the containers have been tampered with or, for containers that have not been tampered with, if all of the sets of radiation detection equipment stored therein are not operable, the inspection team can use an additional set of radiation detection equipment brought by the inspection team and examined by the inspected Party.

Subparagraph 11(d) allows for the removal of equipment found to be inoperable and reporting by the inspecting Party on the cause of the malfunction.

Subparagraphs 11(e) and 11(f) allow for the use of only one set of operable equipment in the inspection process, storage of any radiation detection equipment that is brought and not used in the inspection, and removal of that unused equipment after the inspection.

Paragraph 12 sets forth the procedures for determining the operability of the equipment prior to an inspection.

Subparagraphs 12(a) and 12(b) stipulate that the operability of each neutron detector in a selected set will be confirmed. Following the successful completion of this operability check, the neutron detector to be used will be placed in an agreed location where the radiation measurements will be performed.

Subparagraph 12(c) states that the operability will be checked using two or three background measurements with the calibration source at least three meters from the neutron detector. If the values of any two of three background measurements are sufficiently close together, the radiation detection system passes this portion of the operability check.

Subparagraphs 12(d) and 12(e) state that two additional measurements will then be made with the detector in the same location and the source in contact with the sensitive surface of the neutron detector. The average of these measurements is recorded as the average calibration measurement value.

Subparagraph 12(f) describes the process for calculating the sensitivity of the neutron detector based on the measured calibration and background values, the counting time for each measurement, and the equivalent flux shown on the calibration source.

Subparagraph 12(g) then provides criteria for declaring the radiation detection equipment to be operable based on the calibration measurements and the calculated sensitivity of the neutron detector and for recording the results in the inspection activity report.

Paragraphs 13, 14, 15, and 16 of this Section set forth the common procedures for radiation detection equipment use during Type One inspections.

Paragraph 13 states that the procedures described in paragraphs 14 through 16 are to be used regardless of the decision to use the equipment of the inspected or inspecting Party.

Paragraph 14 establishes general procedures to be performed upon arrival at the inspection site.

Subparagraph 14(a) sets forth the process for determining the counting time for measurements. If the equipment is supplied by the inspected Party, the counting time will be agreed within the framework of the BCC to ensure that both Parties have confidence in the measurement results. If the equipment is supplied by the inspecting Party, the inspecting Party will select the counting time from a range specified with the equipment.

Subparagraph 14(b) provides that inspectors can observe the use of the equipment to confirm that the appropriate procedures are carried out.

Subparagraph 14(c) provides for an operability check of the neutron detector at the inspection site.

Subparagraph 14(d) states that neutron measurements of an object designated by the inspection team will take place at a location selected by the in-country escort.

Subparagraph 14(e) describes the process for taking background radiation measurements. At a distance of at least 50 meters from an ICBM, SLBM, or heavy bomber, the inspection team specifies how the neutron detector is positioned for the measurements. Pairs of background measurements are carried out in different locations, if necessary, until an average of 450 counts or less is obtained. A comparison number is calculated based on the average background value for use in evaluating measurements obtained during the inspection.

Paragraph 15 establishes the procedures to be used during inspections of deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs.

Subparagraph 15(a) states that measurements of an object declared to be a non-nuclear object can be made either with the object removed from the front section and placed at a distance at least 50 meters away from the front section of the ICBM or SLBM or while it is located on the front section. If the object is measured while on the front section, special shields can be used to prevent neutrons from nearby reentry vehicles from striking the detector as long as the shields do not block the inspected object from the neutron detector.

Subparagraph 15(b) allows for the removal of the inspected object or reentry vehicles from the front section outside the field of view of the inspectors in such a way that they can ascertain that the object is the inspected object. While paragraph 2 of Section II of Part Six of this Annex provides a general prohibition against removing reentry vehicles until completion of the inspection of the front section, this subparagraph provides a narrow exception to that rule for purposes of confirming that a non-nuclear object on a front section is non-nuclear. The inspectors also have the right to observe or seal all exits of the site during this process.

Subparagraph 15(c) states that the inspectors will select the point on the object where measurements will be taken and will record that on a diagram in the inspection report.

Subparagraphs 15(d) and 15(e) prescribe that the detector be placed between seven centimeters and two meters from the object and that two neutron measurements be taken at this position.

Subparagraph 15(f) dictates that if the average of these measurements is less than or equal to the comparison number calculated in paragraph 14, the object is declared non-nuclear and recorded as such in the inspection activity report.

Subparagraph 15(g) allows for the case of a measurement value higher than the comparison number and the recording of this fact in the report.

Subparagraph 15(h) allows for the use of multipliers, to be agreed within the framework of the BCC, to account for configuration and background radiation differences in cases of measurements made on objects while still located on the front section.

Subparagraph 15(i) allows for average background measurements and derived comparison numbers, as described in paragraph 14, to be calculated automatically by the electronic counter. These values would be displayed on the screen of the counter and recorded in the inspection activity report.

Subparagraph 15(j) states that, upon request of the inspected Party, the result obtained automatically in subparagraph 15(i) above must be verified by use of the manual calculations described in subparagraphs 14(e)(ii) and 14(e)(iv) of this Section.

Paragraph 16 establishes the procedures to be used during inspections of deployed heavy bombers.

Subparagraph 16(a) states that measurements of an object declared to be a non-nuclear object can be made either with the object removed from the heavy bomber to a distance of at least 50 meters or while it is located on or in the heavy bomber. If the object is measured while on or in the heavy bomber, the in-country escort may use special shields to prevent neutrons from nearby nuclear armaments from striking the detector as long as the shields do not block the inspected object from the neutron detector.

Subparagraph 16(b) allows for the removal of the inspected object from the heavy bomber outside the field of view of the inspectors in such a way that they can ascertain that the object is the inspected object. The inspectors also have the right to observe or seal all exits of the site during this process.

Subparagraph 16(c) states that the inspectors will select the point on the object where measurements will be taken and will record that on a diagram in the inspection report.

Subparagraphs 16(d) and 16(e) prescribe that the detector be placed between seven centimeters and two meters from the object and that two neutron measurements be taken at this position.

Subparagraph 16(f) dictates that if the average of these measurements is less than or equal to the comparison number calculated in paragraph 14, the object is declared non-nuclear and recorded as such in the inspection activity report.

Subparagraph 16(g) allows for the case of a measurement value higher than the comparison number and the recording of this fact in the report.

Subparagraph 16(h) allows for the use of multipliers, to be agreed within the framework of the BCC, to account for configuration and background radiation differences in cases of measurements made on objects while still located on or in the heavy bomber.

Subparagraph 16(i) allows for average background measurements and derived comparison numbers, as described in paragraph 14, to be calculated automatically by the electronic counter. These values would be displayed on the screen of the counter and recorded in the inspection activity report.

Subparagraph 16(j) states that, upon request of the inspected Party, the result obtained automatically in subparagraph 16(i) above will be verified by use of the manual calculations described in subparagraphs 14(e)(ii) and 14(e)(iv) of this Section.

Subparagraph 16(k) allows for the simultaneous measurement of several objects on or in a heavy bomber, if it is agreed between the inspection team leader and the in-country escort.

Subparagraph 16(l) allows a Party to cover an inspected object with a soft cover incapable of masking a neutron emission prior to making a radiation measurement but prohibits the placement of inspected objects into containers during such procedures.

PART SIX – TYPE ONE INSPECTION PROCEDURES

This Part outlines procedures for the conduct of Type One inspections conducted at ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article XI of the Treaty.

Section I. Pre-inspection Restrictions
at the Inspection Site

Section I specifies the pre-inspection restrictions imposed at the inspection site in advance of the arrival of an inspection team. Such restrictions are imposed in order to ensure that inspectors have the opportunity to inspect those items of inspection present at the base at the time it was designated for inspection, which typically occurs within four hours after the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry for the inspection.

Paragraph 1 establishes that, no later than one hour after the time for the designation of an inspection site by an inspection team at the point of entry, the inspected Party may not: remove from the site ICBMs or SLBMs, first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, containers or closed vehicles large enough to contain an item of inspection; or covered objects large enough to contain or to be such an item; remove heavy bombers from the site; open silo doors or submarine hatches; begin any work associated with removal of ICBMs or SLBMs from ICBM launchers or SLBM launchers; begin any work associated with installation or removal of reentry vehicles or front sections on deployed ICBMs or SLBMs; remove mobile launchers of ICBMs from basing areas; move ballistic missile submarines or nuclear-powered guided missile submarines (SSGNs) out of the waters within arcs with a radius of five kilometers from the coastlines depicted on the coastlines and waters diagram or move such submarines into dry dock; or begin any work associated with the installation or removal of armaments on heavy bombers.

Paragraph 2 provides that, upon arrival of the inspection team, the inspected Party shall not move, within the boundaries of the inspection site, mobile launchers of ICBMs or heavy bombers, or within the waters within arcs with a radius of five kilometers from coastlines depicted on a coastlines and waters diagram, ballistic missile submarines or SSGNs at the time pre-inspection restrictions were implemented.

Paragraph 3 states that, once the inspection team has designated specific items to be inspected, those items shall continue to be subject to pre-inspection restrictions until the inspection team has arrived at such designated items. Once designation of items for inspection has occurred, pre-inspection restrictions will cease for those items not designated for inspection.

Paragraph 4 provides that work undertaken in response to an emergency involving a submarine, launcher, missile, or heavy bomber shall not be subject to pre-inspection restrictions. If the inspected Party exercises this right, the inspecting Party may elect to cancel or conduct the inspection in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IX of Part Five of the Protocol.

Section II. Inspection Procedures for
Reentry Vehicles Emplaced on
Deployed ICBMs and Deployed SLBMs

Section II covers inspection procedures for reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs.

Paragraph 1 provides that for a deployed ICBM or deployed SLBM designated for inspection of reentry vehicles, the inspected Party has the right to prepare the front section for viewing in its launcher, outside its launcher, in close proximity to the launcher, in a vehicle, or at a specially allocated site.

Paragraph 2 prohibits the inspected Party from removing any reentry vehicles from the front section of a designated ICBM or SLBM throughout the period of time from the inspection team's arrival at the designated launcher until the completion of the inspection of the front section. This general provision is not intended to prevent the inspected Party from removing objects, including reentry vehicles, from the front section of a designated ICBM or SLBM in accordance with the specific provisions of subparagraph 15(b) of Section VI of Part Five of this Annex for the purpose of using radiation detection equipment to demonstrate that objects declared by the inspected Party to be non-nuclear objects are, in fact, non-nuclear.

Paragraph 3 establishes inspectors' right to view the interior of vehicles, objects, containers, and structures used to remove a front section, ICBM, or SLBM, or to prepare a front section for viewing. The purpose of this right is to confirm that such items do not contain another ICBM, SLBM, or front section, or other reentry vehicles.

Paragraph 4 provides general procedures for the inspection of the front sections of ICBMs or SLBMs on deployed silo launchers of ICBMs and deployed launchers of SLBMs.

Subparagraph 4(a) provides that, for silo launchers of ICBMs, inspectors have the right to confirm by using a satellite system receiver that the silo launcher to which inspectors are transported is the designated silo launcher by comparing the geographic coordinates acquired by the SSR with those provided in accordance with Part Two of the Protocol.

Subparagraph 4(b) states that, for both silo launchers of ICBMs and SLBM launchers, the in-country escort designates locations from which inspectors may view the launchers, but specifies that such locations must enable inspectors to observe the upper edge of the silo ICBM launcher or the submarine's upper launch tube edge as well as any vehicles, containers, or objects that enter or leave the launcher's vicinity. The boundaries of the launcher's vicinity are determined by the in-country escort. These locations may be no more than 50 meters from the designated launcher unless the inspection team leader and the in-country escort agree to locations greater than 50 meters that still provide a clear view.

Subparagraph 4(c) provides that inspectors will be informed in advance of the opening of a silo door or SLBM launcher hatch. Inspectors have the right to observe the opening of the silo door or SLBM launcher hatch. The time of opening the silo door or SLBM launcher hatch will be determined by the inspected Party.

Subparagraph 4(d) grants inspectors the right to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with the upper edge of a designated silo or SLBM launcher as well as vehicles, devices, or structures used for removing or preparing a missile or front section. This right exists from the time of the opening of the silo door or SLBM hatch to the completion of the preparation of the front section for viewing or the removal of the missile or front section.

Subparagraph 4(e) establishes that inspectors have the right to determine to their satisfaction that any vehicles, containers, or objects that enter the vicinity of the designated launcher do not contain reentry vehicles. This right exists from the opening of the silo door or SLBM hatch to the completion of the preparation of the front section or removal of the missile or front section.

Paragraph 5 establishes that the inspected Party may move a designated deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs or a submarine containing the designated deployed SLBM launcher to a specially allocated site for the preparation and then the viewing of the front section. Inspectors have the right to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with the mobile launcher or submarine during such movements. Such a submarine must proceed on the surface to the specially allocated site.

Paragraph 6 provides that, if the viewing of the front section is done in the ICBM or SLBM launcher, inspectors have the right to view vehicles or devices used in preparation for the viewing in order to confirm they do not contain another front section or reentry vehicles. For SLBMs, inspectors have the right to inspect temporary structures used for preparing or for viewing of the SLBM front sections to ensure that such structures do not contain additional front sections or reentry vehicles.

Paragraph 7 states that, for viewing of a front section that is carried out outside of a designated launcher, the inspected Party shall separate the front section and remove it from the designated launcher or remove the missile with its front section from its designated launcher.

Subparagraph 7(a) provides that the inspected Party determines the manner of viewing the interior of the launcher once the front section has been separated and that such viewing shall be carried out by one subgroup of inspectors. Each member of the subgroup may view the top portion of the deployed ICBM or SLBM for no more than three minutes from a location determined by the in-country escort to confirm that the front section has been fully separated.

Subparagraph 7(b) grants inspectors the right to view the interior of vehicles and devices used to remove or transport ICBMs, SLBMs, or front sections from such launchers prior to and after their use.

Subparagraph 7(c) enables inspectors to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with a vehicle transporting a front section of an ICBM or SLBM to a specially allocated site.

Paragraph 8 provides that the preparation of the front section for viewing may be conducted outside the field of view of inspectors.

Paragraph 9 states that, if the viewing of a separated front section is carried out in a vehicle, inspectors have the right to observe the vehicle throughout the entire period of time in which the front section is in the vehicle until the viewing of the front section is completed.

Paragraph 10 sets out procedures for the viewing of a front section at a specially allocated site.

Subparagraph 10(a) provides that, before the shroud of the ICBM or SLBM is removed, inspectors have the right to view the site inside an enclosed space to ensure the site does not contain another front section or reentry vehicle

Subparagraph 10(b) grants inspectors the right to observe or seal all accesses of the enclosed space at the specially allocated site where the conduct of the reentry vehicle inspection will take place. The method of controlling accesses will be agreed upon by the inspection team leader and the in-country escort. The inspected Party is prohibited from removing objects, vehicles, or containers large enough to contain an ICBM, SLBM, front section, or reentry vehicle from the site during the preparation of the front section unless an inspector inspects or releases it.

Paragraph 11 addresses covers for reentry vehicles. It establishes the inspected Party's right to cover reentry vehicles and other equipment with individual covers, but with the caveat that such covers must not hamper inspectors in accurately identifying the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on a front section. This provision is intended to ensure that covers are not used in such a manner that would obscure the true number of reentry vehicles on a front section. The paragraph also allows the inspected Party to use hard, soft, and combined covers.

Subparagraph 11(a) defines a "hard cover" as a cover that consists entirely of structurally hard elements and has a fixed shape. It also outlines how such covers may be used as well as establishing the right of inspectors to view and measure such hard covers prior to their placement on the front section. The inspected Party may use individual hard covers or a single hard cover consisting of a base portion, individual conically-shaped elements that cover each reentry vehicle, and individual components that cover other

objects located on the front section. As defined in this section, the U.S. Navy's practice during START of using a single unitary hard cover continues to be permitted in this treaty.

Subparagraph 11(b) defines a "soft cover" as a cover that does not have a fixed shape or structurally hard elements except for hard elements that cover and protect only the reentry vehicle nose tip. This paragraph also provides inspectors the right to view such covers prior to their placement to identify their general shape. No measurements are permitted for soft covers.

Subparagraph 11(c) defines a "combined cover" as a cover, the structure of which has hard elements and a soft outer covering and, when fully assembled, has a fixed shape. This paragraph grants inspectors the right to view the fully-assembled combined cover and make measurements of its base diameter and height prior to its placement on the front section.

Subparagraph 11(d) requires that a Party demonstrate a hard or fully-assembled combined cover during the first Type One inspection during which the cover is used. Inspectors have the right to view and make measurements of the base diameter and height of such covers.

Paragraph 12 grants the inspected Party the right to determine the manner of viewing a front section of a designated deployed ICBM or SLBM, and provides that such inspections may be carried out in a single group or subgroups. Regardless of how such groups are arranged, each inspector has the right to view the front section for no more than 15 minutes in order to ascertain that the front section contains the number of reentry vehicles declared for that deployed ICBM or SLBM. Inspectors must be afforded a clear view of the covered reentry vehicles from locations designated by the in-country escort at a distance of no more than five meters from the front section.

Paragraph 13 establishes that, if the inspected Party declares that a front section with no less than one nuclear-armed reentry vehicle also contains non-nuclear objects that the inspected Party declares not to be reentry vehicles, the inspection team leader may designate all such non-nuclear objects for inspection. The inspected Party must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the inspectors that such objects are non-nuclear objects. Radiation detection equipment may be used, at the discretion of the inspected Party, to demonstrate that such objects on the front

section of an ICBM or SLBM that are declared to be non-nuclear objects are, in fact, non-nuclear. Such radiation detection equipment will be used in accordance with Part Five of this Annex.

Paragraph 14 gives inspectors the right to view a vehicle or specially allocated site where the viewing of a front section was carried out, including the space under the shroud, if the missile being inspected has a shroud, if the preparation for viewing was undertaken outside the inspectors' field of view, in order to confirm the absence of reentry vehicles outside the front section. This viewing shall occur upon completion of the viewing of the front section and prior to the reinstallation of the shroud, if applicable.

Paragraph 15 establishes that, for designated ICBMs or SLBMs declared not to contain a front section, the inspected Party will determine the manner of preparing the ICBM or SLBM for viewing and of carrying out the viewing of the interior of the ICBM or SLBM launcher. Inspectors may conduct such an inspection in a single group or subgroups, but in either case each inspector has the right to view the upper edge of the deployed ICBM or SLBM in its launcher for no more than three minutes to confirm the absence of a front section. Inspectors must be given a clear view of the interior of the launcher.

Section III. Inspection Procedures for a Designated
Non-deployed Launcher of ICBMs or Launcher of SLBMs and
a Designated Fixed Structure for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs
Declared Not to Contain a Deployed Mobile Launcher of ICBMs

Section III establishes procedures for inspections of non-deployed launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs and for a designated fixed structure declared not to contain a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs. In accordance with subparagraphs 10(b) and 11(b) of Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol, inspectors have the right to inspect one non-deployed launcher or one fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs declared to be empty during each Type One inspection at an ICBM base or submarine base.

Paragraph 1 provides the right of inspectors to confirm that the inspected silo launcher is the designated one, using a satellite system receiver. After the silo door is opened, inspectors have the right to view the interior of the launcher from a

location designated by the in-country escort in order to confirm that the launcher does not contain an ICBM.

Paragraph 2 establishes that, for a designated fixed structure declared to be empty, upon arrival of the inspection team, the inspected Party will open the doors of the fixed structure. Inspectors have the right to view the interior of the fixed structure from a location designated by the in-country escort to confirm that the structure does not contain a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs.

Paragraph 3 provides that, for a designated non-deployed SLBM launcher, upon arrival of the inspection team, the inspected Party will open the designated SLBM launcher hatch. Inspectors have the right to view the interior of the launcher from a location designated by the in-country escort in order to confirm that the launcher does not contain an SLBM.

Paragraph 4 states that, if a launcher or fixed structure declared to be empty is found to contain a deployed ICBM or SLBM, the inspection team has the right to inspect the discovered ICBM or SLBM to identify the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on it. In such a case the procedures provided for in Section II of this Part will be used to prepare the front section or missile for viewing.

Section IV. Inspection Procedures for a Designated Converted Launcher of SLBMs Installed on a Ballistic Missile Submarine

Section IV sets out procedures for the inspection of designated converted launchers of SLBMs that are installed on ballistic missile submarines. The requirements for such inspections are in the Ninth Agreed Statement on “Conversion of Individual Launchers of SLBMs” contained in Part Nine of the Protocol.

Paragraph 1 requires that, upon arrival of the inspection team at the launcher, the inspected Party begin preparing a designated converted launcher of SLBMs for viewing.

Paragraph 2 gives inspectors the right to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with the designated converted launcher during its preparation for inspection. During the inspection, which begins with the opening of the launch tube hatch and concludes with the completion of the inspection procedures, inspectors have the right to

inspect all objects and equipment removed from the launcher in order to confirm they are not an SLBM first stage and were not used to make such a launcher capable of launching an SLBM.

Paragraph 3 provides that a subgroup of no more than five inspectors has the right to: view the launcher from a location offering a clear view; confirm the presence of distinguishing features; and confirm that the launcher remains incapable of launching an SLBM using these distinguishing features. These distinguishing features will be declared and confirmed during the exhibition of the first converted launcher in accordance with the Ninth Agreed Statement contained in Part Nine of the Protocol.

Paragraph 4 provides that the inspected Party must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the inspectors that any object contained within the launcher declared not to be the first stage of an SLBM is not, in fact, a first stage of an SLBM. This demonstration may require the removal of the object from the launcher.

Section V. Inspection Procedures for Designated Launchers Installed on SSGNs

Section V outlines the procedures for inspection of designated launchers on guided missile submarines (SSGNs). The requirements for such inspections are in the Second Agreed Statement on “U.S. Submarines Equipped with Launchers of Cruise Missiles Converted from Ballistic Missile Submarines” contained in Part Nine of the Protocol.

Paragraph 1 requires that, upon arrival of the inspection team at the launcher, the inspected Party begin preparing a designated launcher on an SSGN for viewing.

Paragraph 2 allows for the inspected Party to move the SSGN to a specially allocated site located in waters within arcs with a radius of five kilometers from the coastlines depicted on the coastlines and waters diagram to conduct the viewing of the designated launchers. Such movements must be conducted while the SSGN is surfaced and must be subject to uninterrupted visual contact by the inspectors.

Paragraph 3 specifies that, during preparation of the designated launcher for viewing, the inspected Party is to open the hatch of that launcher. Inspectors have

the right to view the interior of that converted launcher from a location designated by the in-country escort to confirm that the launcher does not contain an SLBM.

Paragraph 4 gives inspectors the right to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with the upper tube edge of the launcher during its preparation for inspection. During the inspection, which begins with the opening of the launcher tube hatch and concludes with the completion of the inspection procedures, inspectors have the right to inspect all objects and equipment removed from the launcher in order to confirm they are not an SLBM first stage and were not used to make such a launcher capable of launching an SLBM. Inspectors shall also have the right to confirm that any objects or equipment installed on the launcher during preparation for the inspection are not used to make it incapable of launching an SLBM.

Paragraph 5 establishes the inspectors' right to view the interior of a designated launcher from locations determined by the in-country escort affording them a clear view of the launcher. For objects contained in the launcher declared not to be an SLBM first stage, the in-country escort must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the inspectors that such an object is not the first stage of an SLBM, including, if necessary, by removing the object from the launcher. Inspectors shall also have the right to confirm that the launcher has not undergone reconversion and thus remains incapable of launching an SLBM by confirming the absence of critical components, as demonstrated during the exhibitions of converted launchers on SSGNs conducted in accordance with the Second Agreed Statement contained in Part Nine of the Protocol.

Section VI. Inspection Procedures for Deployed Heavy Bombers

Section VI sets out the inspection procedures for deployed heavy bombers.

Paragraph 1 provides that inspectors shall have the right to view designated deployed heavy bombers from a location determined by the in-country escort in order to confirm their types, read their UIDs, view their distinguishing features, if applicable, and confirm the number of nuclear armaments declared to be located on them.

Paragraph 2 establishes the right of the inspected Party to prepare heavy bombers for inspection at a location of its own choosing and to cover nuclear armaments

with soft covers that allow inspectors to confirm the number of such armaments. Any relocation of a bomber must be conducted such that inspectors may maintain uninterrupted visual contact with the deployed heavy bomber during its movement.

Paragraph 3 prohibits the inspected Party from removing any armaments or other objects from designated deployed heavy bombers throughout the period of inspection. The purpose of this prohibition is to allow inspectors to confirm the number of nuclear armaments declared to be located on such designated heavy bombers. This general provision is not intended to prevent the inspected Party from removing objects from the designated deployed heavy bomber in accordance with the specific provisions of subparagraph 16(b) of Section VI of Part Five of this Annex for the purpose of using radiation detection equipment to demonstrate that objects declared by the inspected Party to be non-nuclear objects are, in fact, non-nuclear.

Paragraph 4 grants the inspected Party the right to determine the manner of viewing heavy bombers. Such inspections may be carried out in a single group or subgroups, and each inspector has the right to view a designated deployed heavy bomber for no more than 15 minutes. Inspectors also have the right to view a designated heavy bomber's weapons bay from a location designated by the in-country escort in order to confirm the number of nuclear armaments declared to be on the bomber. Since some deployed heavy bombers have the capability to carry nuclear armaments loaded on pylons attached to the wings, as well as in the heavy bomber's weapons bay, this viewing applies to the exterior and interior of such deployed heavy bombers.

Paragraph 5 provides that, if the inspected Party declares that objects located on a designated deployed heavy bomber are non-nuclear objects, the inspection team leader has the right to designate all such objects for further inspection. The in-country escort is then required to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the inspection team that such objects are, in fact, non-nuclear objects. Radiation detection equipment may be used, at the discretion of the inspected Party, to demonstrate that such objects are non-nuclear objects. Such radiation detection equipment will be used in accordance with Part Five of this Annex.

Section VII. Inspection Procedures at ICBM Bases and Submarine Bases

Section VII addresses inspection procedures at ICBM and submarine bases for the inspection of non-deployed items of inspection.

Paragraph 1 grants inspectors the right at an ICBM base to inspect the maintenance facility within the boundaries of the inspection site to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the number, UIDs, types, variants, and versions of items of inspection.

Paragraph 2 grants inspectors the right at a submarine base to inspect within the boundaries of the inspection site of the submarine base in order to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the number, UIDs, types, and variants of items of inspection.

Paragraph 3 grants inspectors the right to inspect items of inspection as well as objects, covered objects, containers, vehicles, and structures large enough to be or to contain an item of inspection located within the boundaries of an inspection site. This right enables inspectors to confirm the presence and absence of declared and undeclared items of inspection that are located within the boundaries of the inspection site. Inspection of such items will be conducted in accordance with Part Nine of this Annex.

PART SEVEN – TYPE TWO INSPECTION PROCEDURES

This Part outlines procedures for the conduct of Type Two inspections conducted in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty.

Section I. Pre-inspection Restrictions at the Inspection Site

Section I specifies the pre-inspection restrictions imposed at the inspection site in advance of the arrival of an inspection team. Such restrictions are imposed in order to ensure that inspectors have the opportunity to inspect all those items of inspection present at the base at the time it was designated for inspection at the point of entry.

Paragraph 1 establishes restrictions that begin no later than one hour after the time for the designation of an inspection site by an inspection team at the point of entry. This designation typically occurs no later than four hours after the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry.

Subparagraph 1(a) provides that, for ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; storage facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile launchers of ICBMs; repair facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile launchers of ICBMs; test ranges; training facilities; and formerly declared facilities other than formerly declared facilities at which heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments are based, the inspected Party may not remove from the inspection site non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs, first stages of ICBMs and SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, containers and closed vehicles large enough to contain an item of inspection and covered objects large enough to contain or to be an item of inspection.

Subparagraph 1(b) provides that, for formerly declared facilities at which heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments are based, the inspected Party may not remove any such heavy bombers from the inspection site and may not install or remove any equipment on such heavy bombers.

Subparagraph 1(c) provides that, for submarine bases, the inspected Party may not move ballistic missile submarines on which are installed converted launchers of SLBMs from the waters within arcs with a radius of five kilometers from the coastlines depicted on the coastlines and waters diagram of the submarine base, may not move such submarines into dry dock, and may not install or remove equipment on such converted launchers of SLBMs.

Subparagraph 1(d) provides that, for conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs, the inspected Party may not remove from the inspection site eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs, eliminated solid-fueled SLBMs, or eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs that are subject to inspection.

Subparagraph 1(e) provides that, for conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers, the inspected Party may not remove from the inspection site converted heavy bombers that are subject to inspection.

Subparagraph 1(f) provides that, for storage facilities for heavy bombers, the inspected Party may not remove any heavy bombers from the inspection site and may not locate or remove armaments on heavy bombers.

Paragraph 2 provides that, upon arrival of the inspection team at a formerly declared facility for converted heavy bombers, the inspected Party may not move, within the boundaries of the inspection site, such bombers present at the time of commencement of pre-inspection restrictions.

Paragraph 3 establishes that pre-inspection restrictions continue for converted heavy bombers designated for inspection until the arrival of inspectors at such bombers, but cease for those bombers not designated for inspection at the conclusion of designation procedures.

Paragraph 4 provides that work undertaken in response to an emergency involving a submarine, launcher, missile, or heavy bomber is not subject to pre-inspection restrictions. If the inspected Party exercises this right, the inspecting Party may elect to cancel or conduct the inspection in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IX of Part Five of the Protocol.

Section II. Inspection Procedures at
ICBM Loading Facilities; SLBM Loading Facilities;
Storage Facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and Mobile Launchers of
ICBMs; Repair Facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and Mobile Launchers
of ICBMs; Test Ranges; Training Facilities; and Formerly
Declared Facilities Other Than Formerly Declared Facilities
at Which Heavy Bombers Converted For
Non-nuclear Armaments Are Based

Section II covers inspection procedures at a range of facilities where non-deployed ICBMs, non-deployed SLBMs, and non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be located, as well as procedures for inspecting formerly declared facilities other than those at which heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments are based.

Paragraph 1 grants inspectors the right to read unique identifiers and to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the number, types, and, if applicable, variants or versions of items of inspection that are specified for the designated inspection site.

Paragraph 2 provides that, for test ranges, inspectors have the right to inspect one silo test launcher that is declared not to contain an ICBM or a training model of a missile. Upon arrival of the inspection team at such a silo test launcher of ICBMs, inspectors have the right to confirm that the silo test launcher of ICBMs is the silo test launcher designated by comparing its geographic coordinates, determined using a satellite system receiver, with those provided in accordance with Part Two of the Protocol. Following the opening of the silo door of the launcher, inspectors have the right to view the launcher's interior to confirm that it does not contain an ICBM or a training model of a missile.

Section III. Inspection Procedures for Deployed Heavy Bombers at Storage Facilities for Heavy Bombers

Section III establishes procedures for inspections of deployed heavy bombers at storage facilities. This section applies to the storage facility for heavy bombers located at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, AZ and corresponds to the procedures established in the Fourth Agreed Statement of Part Nine of the Protocol on "Deployed Heavy Bombers Located at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base."

Paragraph 1 provides that inspectors have the right, within the boundaries of the inspection site, to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the number, types, and, if applicable, variants of deployed heavy bombers that are specified for the designated inspection site and to confirm the number of nuclear armaments located on designated deployed heavy bombers. Although this type of inspection applies to all deployed heavy bombers, there are no nuclear weapons currently stored at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, where these bombers are located, nor are there plans to store nuclear weapons there in the future. Consequently, the deployed heavy bombers stored at that base will never, in fact, be loaded with nuclear armaments.

Paragraph 2 establishes that inspectors have the right to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with a heavy bomber that is being relocated or prepared for inspection.

Paragraph 3 grants inspectors the right to view all deployed heavy bombers, including those that are environmentally-sealed, from locations designated by the in-country escort in order to confirm their types, read their unique identifiers, and verify that unique tamper-proof seals have not been damaged on the weapons bays of all environmentally-sealed deployed heavy bombers. The Fourth Agreed Statement provides for an initial exhibition of each type of environmentally-sealed deployed heavy bomber located at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base. During this exhibition, inspectors have the right to apply tamper-proof seals on the weapons bays of all environmentally-sealed deployed heavy bombers. During the subsequent Type Two inspections at the heavy bomber storage facility at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, inspectors have the right to confirm that these tamper-proof seals are not damaged.

Paragraph 4 excludes from inspection the interiors of all deployed heavy bombers other than the three heavy bombers that are designated for inspection. The Fourth Agreed Statement provides for the inspection of the interior of the weapons bays of three non-environmentally-sealed deployed bombers.

Paragraph 5 provides that, with respect to the unique tamper-proof seals that were applied to the weapons bay of all environmentally-sealed deployed heavy bombers following the initial exhibition of such bombers, if any of the seals on a heavy bomber's weapons bay have been damaged, inspectors have the right to inspect the interior of the weapons bay of such a heavy bomber and to re-apply tamper-proof seals to the weapons bay.

Paragraph 6 establishes that, for structures within the boundaries of the inspection site that are large enough to contain a heavy bomber, inspectors have the right to ascertain whether the structure contains a deployed heavy bomber. If a heavy bomber is discovered in such a structure, inspectors have the right to confirm all of the distinguishing features of that heavy bomber.

Section IV. Inspection Procedures in Order to Confirm
That Solid-Fueled ICBMs, Solid-Fueled SLBMs,
Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, and Silo Launchers of ICBMs
Have Been Eliminated

Section IV sets out procedures to confirm eliminations of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, and silo launchers of ICBMs.

Paragraph 1 gives inspectors the right, with respect to eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs, to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the number, types, and, if applicable, variants and versions of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs, eliminated first stages of ICBMs and SLBMs, and eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs by viewing and measuring such items and, if applicable, to read the unique identifiers on eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and on eliminated first stages of ICBMs and SLBMs. It also gives inspectors the right to view such items to confirm that they have been eliminated. Inspectors are limited to inspecting only those eliminated items that are declared to be in their 30-day inspection window in accordance with a notification of completion of elimination provided in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol, as well as the provisions on elimination provided for in Part Three of the Protocol.

Paragraph 2 pertains to eliminated silo launchers of ICBMs and gives inspectors the right, upon their arrival at such launchers, to confirm that the silo launcher to be inspected is the silo launcher declared to be eliminated by comparing its geographic coordinates, determined using a satellite system receiver, with those provided in accordance with Part Two of the Protocol. Inspectors have the right to view the eliminated silo launcher of ICBMs from a location designated by the in-country escort in order to confirm that it has been eliminated.

Section V. Inspection Procedures for
Converted Launchers of SLBMs and Converted Heavy Bombers

Section V outlines the procedures for inspection of converted launchers of SLBMs and converted heavy bombers.

Paragraph 1 states that, for a converted launcher of SLBMs, upon arrival of the inspection team at a declared converted launcher of SLBMs, the in-country escort

will prepare the converted launcher of SLBMs for viewing. During the period of preparation for viewing, inspectors have the right to maintain uninterrupted visual contact of the declared converted launcher of SLBMs. In addition, inspectors have the right, as applicable, to: view and make measurements of the interior of the converted launcher of SLBMs; ascertain the absence of critical components of the launcher that are required to launch an SLBM in order to confirm that conversion procedures have been carried out in full; and confirm the presence of each of the distinguishing features recorded during the initial exhibition conducted in accordance with the Ninth Agreed Statement contained in Part Nine of the Protocol on “Conversion of Individual Launchers of SLBMs.” The scope of such inspections will be determined by the one-time exhibition conducted for such a converted launcher.

Paragraph 2 states that, for converted heavy bombers that are located at conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers, inspectors have the right to: read the unique identifiers on the converted heavy bombers declared during pre-inspection procedures; view such converted heavy bombers in order to confirm that they have been converted; and view such converted heavy bombers and confirm the presence of each of the distinguishing features recorded during the initial exhibition of such a converted heavy bomber.

Paragraph 3 states that, for converted heavy bombers at a formerly declared facility at which such bombers are based, during pre-inspection procedures, the in-country escort must provide to the inspection team leader, in writing, information on the number of converted heavy bombers located at the facility, their location on the inspection site diagram, and the tail number for each converted heavy bomber. The tail number of each converted heavy bomber must be provided in such a manner that clearly establishes a correlation to the location of the corresponding heavy bomber depicted on the inspection site diagram. Inspectors have the right to read the tail number of each converted heavy bomber designated for inspection, view such designated converted heavy bombers in order to confirm that such heavy bombers remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments, and view such designated converted heavy bombers and confirm the presence of each of the distinguishing features recorded during the initial exhibition of such a converted heavy bomber. In accordance with the First Agreed Statement contained in Part Nine of the Protocol, these inspections may not begin until all heavy bombers of that type have been converted to bombers equipped solely for non-nuclear armaments and their air bases have been eliminated for the purposes of the Treaty.

The United States will provide the tail numbers of these heavy bombers during these Type Two inspections as a way to assist the inspecting Party to avoid unintentionally re-inspecting the same heavy bomber during subsequent inspections, as well as to provide a measure of added transparency that such heavy bombers have not been reconverted.

PART EIGHT – EXHIBITION PROCEDURES

This Part outlines procedures for the conduct of three distinct types of exhibitions: exhibitions for a new type, variant, or version of an ICBM, SLBM, ICBM launcher, or heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments; exhibitions of the conversion of the first item of a type of ICBM launcher, SLBM launcher, or heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments; and exhibitions conducted in accordance with Part Nine of the Protocol.

Section I. General Provisions

Section I specifies the general provisions governing the arrival of an inspection team for all types of exhibitions. Section VI of Part Four of the Protocol details the two applicable notifications for exhibitions: the notification of the intent to conduct an exhibition and notification of intent to take part in an exhibition. Following the exchange of these notifications, the inspection team will arrive at the point of entry on the territory of the Party conducting the exhibition no more than two days and no less than one day in advance of the exhibition date. Since exhibitions do not have a short notice character, more precise requirements for the timing are not needed.

Section II. Pre-Inspection Procedures and Exhibitions

Section II covers pre-inspection procedures for all types of exhibitions.

Paragraph 1 lists the information provided by the in-country escort during pre-inspection procedures. This information includes the purpose of the exhibition; a list of the items to be exhibited along with their types, variants, and versions; the technical data of the items to be exhibited; and their distinguishing features, using photographs and drawings. The in-country escort will also describe the procedures

for conducting the exhibition and any additional information that could be needed for the conduct of the exhibition.

Paragraph 2 states that the in-country escort must provide one photograph of each distinguishing feature declared for the item to be exhibited. These photographs are used during the exhibition by the inspection team to compare the distinguishing feature being exhibited to the image in the photograph. This paragraph also includes a provision that the inspection team has the right to request that a photograph of a distinguishing feature be retaken if any picture is deemed unsatisfactory. A list of such photographs will be recorded in the inspection activity report and such photographs will be attached to the report. Distinguishing features are not required for all exhibited items. They are specifically required in order to distinguish between launch canisters for different types and variants of ICBMs and SLBMs, between different variants of the same type of heavy bombers, between heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments of the same type, as well as for SLBM launchers that have been converted in accordance with the Ninth Agreed Statement contained in Part Nine of the Protocol, so that during subsequent inspections, they are distinguishable from an SLBM launcher of the same type that has not been converted.

Section III. Exhibition Procedures to Demonstrate
Distinguishing Features and to Confirm Technical Characteristics
of Each New Type, Variant, or Version of an ICBM, SLBM,
ICBM Launcher, and Heavy Bomber Equipped for Nuclear Armaments

Section III covers exhibition procedures to demonstrate distinguishing features and to confirm technical characteristics of each new type, variant, or version of an ICBM, SLBM, ICBM launcher, and heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments.

Paragraph 1 outlines the procedures for an exhibition of each new type or variant of an ICBM or SLBM or version of an ICBM launcher, as applicable.

Subparagraph 1(a) specifies the procedures applicable for each new type or variant of ICBM or SLBM, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section VIII of Part Five of the Protocol. Differing procedures are outlined depending on

how the new type or variant of ICBM or SLBM is maintained, stored, and transported.

Subparagraph 1(a)(i) applies to an ICBM or SLBM that is maintained, stored, and transported as an assembled missile in a launch canister. For such a Classification A missile, the exhibiting Party must exhibit a first stage of the ICBM or SLBM, the assembled missile, and the launch canister associated with the ICBM or SLBM.

Subparagraph 1(a)(ii) applies to an ICBM or SLBM that is maintained, stored, and transported as an assembled missile without a launch canister. For such a Classification B missile, the exhibiting Party must exhibit the assembled missile.

Subparagraph 1(a)(iii) applies to an ICBM or SLBM that is maintained, stored, and transported in stages. For such a Classification C missile, the exhibiting Party must exhibit a first stage of the ICBM or SLBM, the self-contained dispensing mechanism, and an assembled missile. The self-contained dispensing mechanism may be exhibited separately or assembled with the ICBM or SLBM.

In order to confirm the technical data of such ICBMs or SLBMs, the inspection team is afforded two rights in these subparagraphs. First, the inspection team has the right to view the exhibited items in order to confirm each of the declared distinguishing features of the exhibited items. Second, the inspection team has the right to make measurements of the exhibited first stage, assembled missile, self-contained dispensing mechanism, and launch canister, as applicable, in order to confirm the technical data provided in the notification in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol.

Subparagraph 1(b) notes that the Party conducting the exhibition of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs may also exhibit the mobile launcher of ICBMs associated with that ICBM. If the new ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs used a new type or version of mobile launcher of ICBMs, this paragraph allows the Party conducting the exhibition to exhibit the new ICBM and its launcher simultaneously.

Subparagraph 1(c) states that inspectors have the right to make measurements of each exhibited item in accordance with Part Five of this Annex in order to confirm the technical data provided in the notification in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol.

Paragraph 2 outlines the procedures for an exhibition of each new type or variant of heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments. Inspectors have the right to view the heavy bomber, make measurements in order to confirm any technical data for recognition of heavy bombers provided in the notification in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol, and view, confirm, and record each of the distinguishing features.

Paragraph 3 allows inspectors to obtain three photographs of each exhibited item. These photographs must satisfy the requirements provided for in Part Five of this Annex which not only specifies quality requirements of each photograph, but also the placement of the camera in relation to the item being photographed. The in-country escort shall provide one copy of each such photograph to the inspection team leader prior to the completion of the exhibition.

Paragraph 4 notes that inspectors shall make measurements in accordance with Part Five of this Annex.

Paragraph 5 states that distinguishing features, technical data, and measurements of each item for which an exhibition was conducted will be recorded in the inspection activity report.

Section IV. Exhibition Procedures to Demonstrate the
Results of Conversion of the First Item of any Type of
ICBM Launcher, SLBM Launcher, or Heavy Bomber
Equipped for Nuclear Armaments

Section IV covers the exhibition procedures to demonstrate the results of conversion of the first item of any type of ICBM launcher, SLBM launcher, or heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments.

Paragraph 1 states that the in-country escort will demonstrate the results of the conversion to confirm that the procedures provided for in Part Three of the Protocol have been carried out in full. These conversion procedures are outlined in

Section III of Part Three of the Protocol for ICBM launchers, Section IV of Part Three of the Protocol for SLBM launchers, and Section V of Part Three of the Protocol for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

Paragraph 2 provides inspectors two rights during these types of exhibitions. First, inspectors have the right to view the exhibited converted item and, if applicable, an exhibited item of the same type that has not been converted, to confirm each of the declared distinguishing features. Second, inspectors have the right to make measurements of the distinguishing features. The Ninth Agreed Statement contained in Part Nine of the Protocol specifies that during the exhibition of the first converted SLBM launcher, an SLBM launcher that has not been converted will also be exhibited.

Section V. Other Exhibitions to be Conducted
in Accordance with Part Nine of the Protocol

Section V notes that other exhibitions referred to in the agreed statements will be conducted in accordance with this Part and with the procedures provided for in Part Nine of the Protocol. The general provisions provided for in Sections I and II of Part Eight of this Annex will apply to these exhibitions.

**PART NINE – INSPECTION PROCEDURES FOR ITEMS OF
INSPECTION, OBJECTS, COVERED OBJECTS, CONTAINERS,
VEHICLES, AND STRUCTURES DURING TYPE ONE AND TYPE TWO
INSPECTIONS**

This Part outlines procedures to be used to confirm the accuracy of declared data during Type One and Type Two inspections. During the course of these inspections, these procedures may be used to confirm whether items or objects encountered during the course of the inspection are items of inspection. They also may be used to inspect covered objects, containers, vehicles, and structures.

Paragraph 1 states that inspectors have the right to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the number, types and, if applicable, variants or versions of items of inspection subject to Type One or Type Two inspections within the boundaries of the inspection site depicted on the inspection site diagram.

Paragraph 2 clarifies that, in this Part, the term “item of inspection” refers to an item listed in paragraph 10 of Section V of Part Five of the Protocol. At appropriate facilities, a heavy bomber, an ICBM or SLBM, a first stage of an ICBM or SLBM maintained, stored, and transported in stages, or a mobile launcher of ICBMs can all be items of inspection.

Paragraph 3 lists the specific size criteria agreed by the Parties that are to be used during Type One and Type Two inspections in order to determine whether objects, covered objects, containers, vehicles, and structures are large enough to contain or to be an item of inspection. As specified in paragraph 5 of Section III of Part Five of this Annex, dimensions less than 2 meters are given to the nearest centimeter; dimensions greater than or equal to 2 meters, to the nearest tenth of a meter.

Subparagraph 3(a) provides the size criteria for inspectable ICBM-related facilities. For inspections within the United States, the dimensions of the first stage of a Minuteman III ICBM establish the size criteria as they are the smallest length and diameter of an ICBM declared by the United States. Since U.S. ICBMs are Classification C missiles that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, a first stage represents the smallest item of inspection that inspectors expect to encounter at ICBM facilities. For inspections conducted within the Russian Federation, the dimensions of the launch canister for the silo-based RS-12M2 (SS-27) ICBM, which has the smallest length and diameter of an ICBM declared by the Russian Federation, establish the size criteria. Since Russian ICBMs are Classification A missiles that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, the launch canister represents the smallest item that inspectors expect to encounter at all ICBM facilities except for conversion or elimination facilities.

Subparagraph 3(b) provides the size criteria for inspectable SLBM-related facilities. For inspections within the United States, the dimensions of the first stage of a Trident II SLBM establish the size criteria as the Trident II SLBM is the only SLBM declared by the United States and is a Classification C missile. For inspections within the Russian Federation, the diameter of the RSM-50 (SS-N-18) SLBM and the length of the launch canister for the RSM-56 SLBM were used to establish the composite size criteria as together they are the smallest dimensions for Russian SLBMs. Since the RSM-56 is a Classification A missile that is maintained, stored,

and transported as an assembled missile in a launch canister and the SS-N-18 is a Classification B missile that is maintained, stored, and transported as an assembled missile without a launch canister, the launch canister or the assembled missile represent the smallest items that inspectors expect to encounter at all facilities.

Subparagraph 3(c) provides the size criteria for air bases and storage facilities for heavy bombers. For inspections within the United States, the composite size criteria were derived from the smallest dimensions of the B-1A and B-2 heavy bombers. For inspections in the Russian Federation, the composite size criteria were derived from the smallest dimensions of the TU-95MS and the TU-160 heavy bombers. These agreed dimensions were generally rounded down to the nearest meter from the actual dimensions of the heavy bombers.

Subparagraph 3(d) clarifies that the size criteria were derived using data for ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers existing as of the date of the signature of the Treaty. If a new type of ICBM, SLBM, or heavy bomber is deployed or in the event that any type of ICBM, SLBM, or heavy bomber is retired, these size criteria may be changed, if necessary. The Parties shall propose any changes to the size criteria using data for the smallest ICBM, SLBM, or heavy bomber declared by the Parties and provided in accordance with Part Two of the Protocol.

Paragraph 4 provides the definition of the phrases “large enough to contain an item of inspection” and “large enough to be an item of inspection” used throughout Part Nine of the Annex. To be considered “large enough,” each of the linear dimensions of the length, width, height, and diameter, as applicable, of an object, covered object, container, vehicle, or structure must be no less than 97 percent of the corresponding linear dimensions of the specified size criteria listed in paragraph 3 of this Part.

Paragraph 5 states that during Type One and Type Two inspections and as specified in Part Five of the Protocol, inspectors have the right to apply the procedures of this Part within the boundaries of the inspection site to covered objects, containers, vehicles and structures. The purpose of these procedures is to determine whether these covered objects, containers, vehicles, and structures are large enough to contain or to be an item of inspection in order to determine the

presence of an item of inspection in them. When these procedures apply within the boundaries of the entire inspection site as required by Section VI or Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol, inspectors have the right to confirm not only the presence of items of inspection declared to be located at the site, but also to confirm the absence of any additional items of inspection.

Paragraph 6 contains procedures for inspecting items of inspection that are out in the open (i.e., not covered or in a container). Inspectors have the right to confirm that an item is an item of inspection of the declared type, variant, or version by viewing it and by making measurements of its external dimensions at points designated by the in-country escort. The locations of these points are the same locations at which measurements were taken in confirming the dimensions for the technical characteristics of the item of inspection during initial exhibitions.

Paragraph 7 details procedures for covered objects and containers. Several options are presented, providing the inspected Party and inspection team flexibility in determining the correct procedure for satisfying the requirement of confirming the accuracy of declared data.

If an object is covered or located in a container, inspectors have the right to view and make measurements of the dimensions of such a covered object or container to determine whether it is large enough to contain or to be an item of inspection using the applicable size criteria.

If a covered object or container is determined to be large enough to contain or to be an item of inspection, inspectors have the right to view and make measurements of such an object after the in-country escort has partially uncovered it or view and make measurements of the object within a container to determine whether such an object is an item of inspection.

If, following these two procedures, inspectors are still unable to determine whether the object is an item of inspection, inspectors have the right to view the object and make measurements of its external dimensions after the in-country escort has fully uncovered the object or removed it from the container.

Paragraph 8 highlights the procedures for a container known as a “loading tube,” which is a container declared by the inspected Party to contain an SLBM of an

existing type. This procedure refers specifically to Trident-II (D5) SLBMs which are stored in loading tubes at the two U.S. submarine bases.

Subparagraph 8(a) provides the inspection team leader with the right to request the removal of an access hatch in the middle of the loading tube, in addition to two normally removed hatches located on the ends of the loading tube, on no more than two such loading tubes designated for inspection during each inspection. A Trident II SLBM located in a loading tube is normally presented with at least one cover removed on each end of the loading tube. This middle hatch refers to the interstage access hatch on a loading tube that allows inspectors to view the middle portion of a Trident II SLBM in a loading tube and to make measurements of the diameter of the SLBM.

Subparagraph 8(b) provides inspectors the right to use the reference material provided by the in-country escort together with indirect measurements of the first stage of the SLBM to confirm the type of SLBM declared to be contained within the loading tube. Under the START Treaty, the United States provided the "Trident Reference Aid" book to the Russian Federation to help facilitate inspectors in identifying a Trident II contained in a loading tube. The reference aid contains drawings and photographs of the Trident II SLBM in a loading tube including views through various access hatches as a way to assist inspectors in confirming the type of SLBM contained in the loading tube.

Subparagraph 8(c) specifies that if inspectors make external measurements of the loading tube and indirect measurements of the SLBM declared to be contained inside and determine that the first stage of the SLBM is an SLBM of the declared type, the loading tube and the SLBM therein are not subject to further inspection.

Subparagraph 8(d) provides the inspection team leader with the right to request the removal of one SLBM designated for inspection from its loading tube no more than once each year in order to confirm the declared type of such an SLBM. Since the process of removing the SLBM from its loading tube is time consuming and burdensome, the Parties agreed to exercise this right once a year to minimize the impact of the inspection while preserving the inspector's ability to confirm the accuracy of declared data for the site.

Paragraph 9 details procedures for objects located inside vehicles or structures. As with covered objects and containers, several options are presented that provide the inspected Party and inspection team leeway in determining the correct procedure for satisfying the requirement on confirming the accuracy of the data.

Inspectors have the right to first determine whether the access criteria are applicable for this vehicle or structure. Inspectors also have the right to view and make measurements of the dimensions of any accesses to the vehicle or structure to determine whether any access meets the applicable size criteria.

If an access is determined to be large enough to allow passage of an item of inspection into the vehicle or structure, inspectors have the right to determine whether the vehicle or structure is large enough to contain an item of inspection. Inspectors have the right to view and make measurements of the external dimensions of the vehicle or structure in order to make this determination.

If both access and external dimensions are determined to be large enough, inspectors have the right to inspect the interior of a vehicle or structure to determine the presence or absence of an item of inspection in it.

Similar procedures on access and external dimensions are applied to any partitioned or enclosed space within a vehicle or structure. If an access and the partitioned or enclosed space are determined to be large enough, inspectors have the right to inspect the interior of the partitioned or enclosed space to determine the presence of an item of inspection in it. Any object discovered inside a vehicle or structure may be inspected using the procedures provided in paragraph 6 of this Part.

Paragraph 10 provides that once an object, covered object, container, vehicle, or structure is determined, by viewing or measuring, not to be large enough to contain or to be an item of inspection, such objects, covered objects, containers, vehicles, and structures are not subject to further inspection.

Paragraph 11 provides inspectors with the right to view and to make measurements of the dimensions of items of inspection located within the boundaries of the inspection site in order to confirm that these items are items of inspection of the declared type. Measurements are made to confirm that the dimensions of an item

correspond to the technical data provided in accordance with Part Two of the Protocol for such an item. This right only applies to items of inspection that are subject to such inspection in accordance with Section VI or Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol.

Paragraph 12 allows for indirect measurement procedures to be used to facilitate obtaining the dimensions of items of inspection or objects. This right is necessary since items can be located inside containers, vehicles, or structures which prevent the making of direct measurements of dimensions of such items. Indirect measurements entail taking measurements of the container, vehicle, or structure in order to obtain the dimensions of the item of inspection.

Paragraph 13 provides the inspection team with the right to request additional equipment to make measurements.

Paragraph 14 specifies that inspectors have the right to request photographs of an object, covered object, container, vehicle, or structure located within the boundaries of the inspection site, if questions or ambiguities remain. These photographs will be recorded in the inspection activity report, with unresolved issues discussed in the BCC.

ANNEX ON NOTIFICATIONS

Structure and Overview

The Annex on Notifications consists of eight sections. The Annex on Notifications establishes “formats” for the notifications provided for in Part Four of the Protocol. These formats establish an organizational structure for the information required in each notification and require the notifying Party to complete the specified data fields. During the New START negotiations, both Parties agreed, to the extent possible, to use the relevant formats and data fields that were used in the START Treaty.

Section I. General Provisions

Paragraph 1 establishes that “standard formats contained in this Annex” will be used to transmit the notifications provided in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol. The paragraph also establishes two important requirements: 1) all data fields in each format must be completed unless marked with the phrase “if applicable”; and 2) the “Content” section, paragraph 3 for each and every format, may have multiple content options. When this is the case, only the applicable data fields must be completed; other inapplicable sections may be left blank. For example, when providing data concerning a change in status of a heavy bomber, sections concerning submarines do not need to be completed.

Paragraph 2 contains three subparagraphs that detail the data elements of the format that are used when transmitting the notification. Subparagraph 2(a) describes the identification data for each notification. Paragraph 1 of every format transmitted should contain the following information: 1) how each Party is referenced; 2) the calendar year being referenced; 3) the notification number, in sequential order, in that calendar year; and 4) the specific format number being transmitted. Subparagraph 2(b) allows for previously transmitted or received notifications to be referenced. Subparagraph 2(c) describes how added or subtracted items are indicated and how those items are enumerated.

Paragraph 3 establishes the geographic locations to be used when notifying heavy bomber movements outside the national territory in Formats 11 and 12. The United States understands that the “Oceania” region encompasses the lands of the central and South Pacific to include Australia, New Zealand, Micronesia, Melanesia, Polynesia and the Malay island group.

Paragraph 4 allows additional, clarifying information to be provided in the remarks field of a format.

Paragraph 5 provides a mechanism for a Party to provide additional information upon request by the other Party. This paragraph employs Formats 41 (Notification Containing a Request for Clarification of a Notification) and 42 (Notification Containing Clarification, Correction, or Modification of a Notification).

Paragraph 6 establishes a mechanism to provide additional information in a free text format via use of Format 43, “Notification of Additional Message with Respect to the Treaty.”

Section II. Notification Formats to Be Provided In Accordance With Section II of Part Four of the Protocol

Section II contains seven paragraphs each illustrating formats focusing on updates to data in the Treaty’s database.

Paragraph 1 illustrates Format 2: Notification Containing Updated Data for Each Category of Data Contained In Part Two of the Protocol. This format is established for the semi-annual database update provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section II of Part Four of the Protocol.

There is no “Format 1” in the Annex on Notifications. Paragraph 1 of Section II of Part Four of the Protocol requires that each Party provide its data current as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty for each category of data contained in Part Two of the Protocol, and each Party must provide that data no later than 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty. This is the initial exchange of data that will be provided only once. As such, there was no need for a recurring notification format to transmit the initial data.

Paragraph 2 illustrates Format 3: Notification of Each Change in Data for Each Category of Data Contained In Part Two of the Protocol. This format is to be transmitted no later than five days after the occurrence of an event if such an event results in a change in data in either the database or in other agreed categories of data. The information provided in Format 3 must be sufficient for the receiving Party to make all the requisite changes in the relevant database categories. The information provided in Format 3 includes the change in data, by number, and, as applicable, type, category, variant, and version of the item(s); the location of the item(s), to include geographic coordinates; the date on which such a change occurred; the facility that was changed, if applicable; and, the unique identifier (UID) of the deployed or non-deployed items, if applicable. The format also contains a remarks section if a Party determines that further information is necessary. In the case of a movement of an item, the format would include two

sections, one for its departure from a given declared facility and one for its arrival at its new location.

Paragraph 3 illustrates Format 4: Notification of Arrival of the First Prototype ICBM or Prototype SLBM of a New Type at a Declared Facility. This format is used to transmit technical data concerning either a fully assembled first prototype ICBM or SLBM or a prototype's first stage, specifically, its length, width and other technical data, the prototype's UID, the location of the declared facility at which the prototype is located, and the date of change. The remarks section allows the notifying Party to provide a statement of emergence of a prototype.

Paragraph 4 illustrates Format 5: Notification of Declaration of an ICBM or SLBM of a New Type. This format requires the notifying Party to provide the system designator for the new type of ICBM or SLBM, the new ICBM or SLBM technical data by categories of data provided for in Section VII of Part Two of the Protocol, and the exhibition location and date.

Paragraph 5 illustrates Format 6: Notification of Cessation of Development of a Prototype ICBM or Prototype SLBM of a New Type. This format requires the notifying Party to provide the type of prototype ICBM or SLBM and the date the decision was made to cease its development.

Paragraph 6 illustrates Format 7: Notification of Transfer of Items to or from a Third State. This format is specific to the U.S./U.K. established pattern of cooperation. This format requires the notifying Party to provide the number, type and category (and variant or version if applicable), date of transfer, the UID(s), and the location from which the transfer took place.

Paragraph 7 illustrates Format 8: Notification Concerning a New Kind of Strategic Offensive Arm. This format provides a mechanism for a Party to raise questions concerning the emergence of what it believes may be a new kind of strategic offensive arm, as well as a mechanism to provide responses to such questions.

Section III. Notification Formats to Be Provided In Accordance With Section III
of Part Four of the Protocol

Section III contains six paragraphs each illustrating formats focused on the movement of strategic offensive arms, specifically ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.

Paragraph 1 illustrates Format 9: Notification of the Exit of Solid-Fueled ICBMs or Solid-Fueled SLBMs from a Production Facility. The type (and variant, if applicable) of ICBM or SLBM, the number of items, the UID(s), the name and coordinates of the production facility, and the date the ICBM or SLBM will exit will be provided.

Paragraph 2 illustrates Format 10: Notification of Movement of ICBMs to or from a Test Range Located Outside a Party's National Territory, Which Was Used by the Party for Conducting Launches of ICBMs Between December 5, 1994 and December 4, 2009. The Russian Federation will transmit this format when moving an ICBM to the Leninsk test range in Kazakhstan. The format includes information concerning the type (and variant if applicable) and number of ICBMs, the relevant UID(s), the date the ICBM moved from its location within Russia, the facility at which the ICBM will be listed in the database during its time at Leninsk, and, if applicable, the date of the return of the ICBM to that base in Russia. If an ICBM is returned to a different facility than the one from which it left for Leninsk, a Format 3 notification will provide the declared facility where the returned ICBM has been located.

Paragraph 3 illustrates Format 11: Notification of Visit of a Heavy Bomber of a Type Subject to the Treaty to a Specific Location or Geographic Region When Visit Exceeds 24 Hours. This format includes the heavy bomber type and category (and, if applicable, the variant), the number of heavy bombers involved, the UID(s), the date and time of arrival, the facility at which the heavy bomber is based, and the geographic region where the heavy bomber is visiting, as outlined in paragraph 3 of Section I of this Annex.

Paragraph 4 illustrates Format 12: Notification of Conclusion of a Visit of a Heavy Bomber of a Type Subject to the Treaty. This format closes-out Format 11. All data is the same with date and time of arrival in Format 11 changed to "data and time of departure" in Format 12.

Paragraph 5 illustrates Format 13: Notification of Beginning of a Major Strategic Exercise Involving Heavy Bombers. This format includes data concerning the air bases for the heavy bombers involved in the exercise, specifically, the name and coordinates from which the heavy bombers are based and the time and date that the exercise is to begin. This notification also satisfies the notification requirement found in the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises of September 23, 1989.

Paragraph 6 illustrates Format 14: Notification of Completion of a Major Strategic Exercise Involving Heavy Bombers. This format includes the date and time of the completion of a major strategic exercise.

Section IV. Notification Formats to Be Provided In Accordance With Section IV of Part Four of the Protocol

Section IV contains six paragraphs. One paragraph covers launches of ICBMs and SLBMs while the remaining five paragraphs cover the exchange of telemetric information.

Paragraph 1 illustrates Format 15: Notification of Launch of an ICBM or SLBM. This format includes data concerning the planned date of the launch, the name of the launch area, the reentry vehicle impact area using either a latitude/longitude or the coordinates and radius of a circle, whether the launch will be a single or multiple launch, and, if applicable for those launches that a Party intends to consider for the exchange of telemetric data, the telemetry broadcast frequencies and modulation methods to be used for the telemetric information that is considered for exchange. Providing an impact area is not required for launches that place an object into the upper atmosphere or space. This notification also satisfies the advance notification requirement of a launch of an ICBM or SLBM in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988 (the Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement).

Paragraph 2 illustrates Format 16: Notification of Incompleteness or Insufficient Quality of Recording Media Provided, Telemetric Information Recorded on it, or

Interpretive Data. This format includes data concerning the type of ICBM or SLBM, the date of launch, the recording medium number, the time intervals during which incomplete or insufficient quality recordings of telemetric information were received, and a description of problems that arose during processing of the information provided.

Paragraph 3 illustrates Format 17: Notification Containing Explanation of Incompleteness or Insufficient Quality of Telemetric Information Recording Media Provided, Telemetric Information Recorded on it, or Interpretive Data. This format responds to the request made in Format 16 and includes the type of ICBM or SLBM, the date of launch, the recording medium number, and an explanation of the incompleteness or insufficient quality of the telemetric information recording media provided, the telemetric information recorded on it, or the interpretive data.

Paragraph 4 illustrates Format 18: Notification of Proposed Date and Place of Demonstration of Telemetric Information Recording Media and/or Telemetric Information Playback Equipment. This format contains three data fields: the proposed date of the demonstration, the proposed demonstration location, and the point of entry to be used by the Party that is to receive the demonstration.

Paragraph 5 illustrates Format 19: Notification Containing a Request to Acquire Telemetric Information Playback Equipment or Spare Parts, or Response to Such a Request. This format allows a Party to either submit a request or respond to a previous request from the other Party. In such cases where a request is being made, the Party provides the name of the equipment or spare part, the spare part identification number, and the quantity needed. When a response to a request is being made, the Party provides the estimated delivery date of the equipment or spare parts, the approximate cost of the equipment or spare parts, and the size and weight of the equipment or spare parts. This format is also used to provide an affirmation or negation of agreement to acquire the noted equipment or spare parts.

Paragraph 6 illustrates Format 20: Notification Containing a Request for Maintenance or Training in the Operation and Maintenance of Telemetric Information Playback Equipment or Response to Such a Request. This format allows a Party to either submit a request for training or maintenance or respond to a previous request for training or maintenance made by the other Party. In such cases where a request for training is being made, the Party provides the specific equipment for which training is being requested, the number and gender of team

members to be trained, and the proposed date that the requestor would like to be trained. When a response to a request for training is being made, the Party provides the proposed point of entry, the proposed date of arrival, the proposed date the training is to begin, and the duration, location, and approximate cost of the training. The Party requesting either training or maintenance has the right to accept or deny the replying Party's response. The format provides, as a contingency, a data field concerning a request for maintenance. The Parties expect that the training provided will obviate the need for this data field.

Section V. Notification Formats to Be Provided In Accordance With Section V of Part Four of the Protocol

Section V contains four paragraphs covering the intent, initiation, and the completion of conversion or elimination activities as well as the provision of an annual plan for conversion or elimination Activities.

Paragraph 1 illustrates Format 21: Notification of Intent to Carry out Conversion or Elimination. Each Party provides the following information in this format: the type of conversion or elimination process to be used, the type and category (and variant or version, if applicable) of the item(s), the number of items, the UID(s) of the items, the location, specifically the name and coordinates, where the conversion or elimination process is taking place, and the scheduled date of the initiation of the conversion or elimination process.

Paragraph 2 illustrates Format 22: Notification of Initiation of Conversion or Elimination. This format provides for the following information: the type of conversion or elimination process, the type and category (and variant or version, if applicable) of the item(s), the number of items, the UID(s) of the items, the location, specifically the name and coordinates, where the process is taking place, the date of the initiation, and the conversion or elimination procedures being used.

Paragraph 3 illustrates Format 23: Notification of Completion of Conversion or Elimination Procedures. This format provides for the following information: the type of conversion or elimination process, the type and category (and variant or version, if applicable) of the item(s), the number of items, the UID(s) of the items, the location, specifically the name and coordinates, where the process is taking place, the date of completion of the conversion or elimination process, the viewing site coordinates, if applicable, information about the beginning, continuation, or

completion of the accumulation of eliminated items, if applicable, and the number of eliminated items that are accumulated and awaiting inspection, if applicable. The date of this notification is the beginning of the availability of eliminated items for inspection or viewing by national technical means of verification.

Paragraph 4 illustrates Format 24: Notification of Annual Plan for Conversion or Elimination. This format contains data fields for: The type and category (and variant or version, if applicable) of the items, the number of items, and an indication whether the process for each specific item will be conversion or elimination.

Section VI. Notification Formats to Be Provided In Accordance With Section VI of Part Four of the Protocol

Section VI contains 13 paragraphs that deal with the administrative aspects of inspection activities.

Paragraph 1 illustrates Format 25: Notification of Standing Diplomatic Clearance Number for Inspection Airplanes. The notifying Party provides the standing diplomatic clearance number as well as the calendar year for which the submission is being made.

Paragraph 2 illustrates Format 26: Notification Containing Flight Plan for an Inspection Airplane. This format contains the following data fields to be completed by the Party providing this notification: type of airplane, last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the inspected Party, the scheduled departure time from that airfield, the point of entry to be used, the call sign of the airplane, and the flight plan, to include the route, standing diplomatic clearance number and estimated time of arrival.

Paragraph 3 illustrates Format 27: Notification of Flight Plan Approval for an Inspection Airplane. This format is a response to Format 26, and as such, contains one data field, Approved Flight Plan, that is provided by the approving Party.

Paragraph 4 illustrates Format 28: Notification of Change to a Flight Route. This format covers both changes in a flight route to and from a point of entry. The required information in both instances is the same: the territory from (or to) which

an inspection airplane follows a changed flight route, changed flight route to (or from) a point of entry, and the effective date of the change.

Paragraph 5 illustrates Format 29: Notification Containing Initial Lists of Inspectors and Aircrew Members. This format will be delivered no later than 25 days after entry into force and contains the following information: The first, middle (or patronymic), and last name, the date and place of birth, and the passport number of a Party's proposed inspectors and aircrew members.

Paragraph 6 illustrates Format 30: Notification of Amendments to Lists of Inspectors and Aircrew Members. This format can be provided by either Party every 45 days after the initial lists of inspectors and aircrew members in Format 29 have been delivered. In addition to providing personal information about the inspector or aircrew member (name, date/place of birth and passport number), four data fields provide the option to add or delete inspectors and aircrew members already on the initial list in Format 29, and two data fields allow for updates to the name or passport information of an inspector and aircrew member on the initial list provided via Format 29.

Paragraph 7 illustrates Format 31: Notification of Agreement with or Objection to Inspectors or Aircrew Members. This format contains the response to Formats 29 and 30, and conveys two main pieces of information: 1) the agreement with or objection to inspectors or aircrew members proposed on the list contained in Format 29 or 30; and 2) an objection to an inspector or aircrew member already on the list anytime during the life of the Treaty.

Paragraph 8 illustrates Format 32: Notification of Agreed List of Inspectors and Aircrew Members. This format is used for the requirement of Paragraph 8 of Section VI of Part Four of the Protocol that the Parties update the inspector and aircrew list semi-annually, to coincide with the required six-month database update.

Paragraph 9 illustrates Format 33: Notification of Intention to Conduct Inspection. The notifying Party provides the following information in Format 23: the point of entry (POE), the date and estimated time of arrival at the POE, basic information (name and passport number) on the inspectors and aircrew members, and individual inspectors or aircrew members with passports that have been updated

since provision of the agreed list of inspectors or aircrew members in Formats 29-31.

Paragraph 10 illustrates Format 34: Notification of Geographic Coordinates of Reference Points at a Point of Entry. This format allows the Parties to either provide new or modified geographic coordinates. In the New Coordinates data field, up to four reference points can be provided, to include the coordinates and a physical description of each reference point. For modified geographic coordinates three data fields should be completed: the agreed geographic coordinates of the reference point to be changed, the new geographic coordinates of the reference point, and the proposed effective date of change for the modified coordinates.

Paragraph 11 illustrates Format 35: Notification of Changes to Site Diagrams of Facilities or Coastlines and Waters Diagrams. This format states the requirement that “A revised simplified site diagram of a facility, inspection site diagram, or coastlines and waters diagram is to be provided through diplomatic channels no later than 72 hours after this notification is provided.” It also contains a data field requesting information on the following: name and location of the facility, type of diagram, function of the facility, effective date of change, and, if applicable, a reference to the Bilateral Consultative Commission document number recording the change.

Paragraph 12 illustrates Format 36: Notification of Intent to Conduct an Exhibition. The notifying Party provides the following information in the format: the item to be exhibited, the date and estimated time of the exhibition, the POE, and the location and purpose of the exhibition.

Paragraph 13 illustrates Format 37: Notification of Intent to Participate in an Exhibition. This format contains the response to Format 36. The participating Party is to provide the following information: the POE, the date and estimated time of arrival at the POE, inspectors and data about them (name and passport number), and individual inspectors with passports that have been updated since provision of the agreed list of inspectors or aircrew members in Formats 29-31.

Section VII. Notification Formats To Be Provided In Accordance With Section VII of Part Four of the Protocol

Section VII contains six paragraphs with formats concerning the BCC and additional Treaty messages.

Paragraph 1 illustrates Format 38: Notification Containing a Request to Convene a Session of the BCC. This format contains four data fields: the proposed date and proposed location for a future meeting of the BCC, questions the Party intends to raise, and the name of its head representative.

Paragraph 2 illustrates Format 39: Notification Containing the Response to a Request to Convene a Session of the BCC. This format contains the response to Format 38. The responding Party provides: the acceptance of the proposed date or an alternate date, the acceptance of the proposed location or an alternative location, questions the responding Party intends to raise, and the name of its head representative.

Paragraph 3 illustrates Format 40: Notification Relating to the Activities of the BCC – Other Messages. This format is a “free text” format allowing a Party to provide other messages related to the BCC.

Paragraph 4 illustrates Format 41: Notification Containing a Request for Clarification of a Notification. This format allows a Party to request clarification of any Treaty notification. Specifically, the Party must provide the elements of the specific notification in question and the clarification requested.

Paragraph 5 illustrates Format 42: Notification Containing Clarification, Correction, or Modification of a Notification. This format contains the response to a request for the clarification of a notification referenced in Format 41.

Paragraph 6 illustrates Format 43: Notification of Additional Message with Respect to the Treaty. This format provides for a free text notification and allows either Party to transmit text for additional Treaty messages.

Section VIII. Notifications to be Provided in Accordance with
Paragraph 14 of Section VI of Part Four of the Protocol

Section VIII contains three paragraphs that outline the information to be exchanged between the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort during on-site inspections. They are not notifications transmitted through the Parties' respective NRRCs. Because they are used during on-site inspections these written notifications include both the English and Russian languages on the form.

Paragraph 1: Designation of the Type of Inspection and the Inspection Site. This paragraph contains a form that the inspection team leader provides to the in-country escort and contains the following information: the type of inspection, the site to be inspected, the geographic coordinates, an indication of the intent to conduct a sequential inspection, an indication of the intent to return to the POE to designate the type of inspection and the inspection site, and a block with the date, time and location where the form was completed. The form contains signature blocks for both the inspection team leader and the in-country escort. This notification is provided in accordance with subparagraphs 14(a) and 14(b) of Section VI of Part Four of the Protocol.

Paragraph 2: Cancellation of Inspection. This paragraph contains a form that the inspection team leader provides to the in-country escort and contains the following information: the type of inspection (Type One or Type Two Inspection), the inspection site, the geographic coordinates, the reason for the cancellation, and a block with the date, time and location where the form was completed. The form contains signature blocks for both the inspection team leader and the in-country escort. This notification is provided in accordance with sub-paragraph 14(c) of Section VI of Part Four of the Protocol.

Paragraph 3: Designation of ICBM Launchers, SLBM Launchers, Basing Area, Fixed Structure for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, or Deployed Heavy Bombers for Inspection During Inspection. This paragraph contains a form that the inspection team leader provides to the in-country escort to designate items for inspection. Depending on the items of inspection indicated, he/she will use one of the following forms to provide further information to the in-country escort:

For ICBM Launchers, the form contains the following sections: the name of the facility, the coordinates, designation, and UIDs, the deployed or non-

deployed launchers to be inspected, a fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs (declared not to contain a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs) to be inspected, the date and time, and a signature block for the inspection team leader and member of the in-country escort.

For SLBM Launchers, the form contains the following sections: the name of the facility, the submarine, its designation, and UID, the deployed or non-deployed launchers to be inspected, the launchers on a specific SSGN to be inspected, a converted SLBM launcher on a ballistic missile submarine to be inspected, the date and time, and a signature block for the inspection team leader and member of the in-country escort.

For an Air Base, the form contains the following sections: the name of the facility, the type, designation, and UID, the deployed heavy bombers to be inspected, heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments to be inspected, the date and time, and a signature block for the inspection team leader and member of the in-country escort.

For a Formerly Declared Facility, the form contains the following sections: the facility to be inspected, the type, designation, and UID, the heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments to be inspected, the date and time, and a signature block for the inspection team leader and member of the in-country escort.

For a Storage Facility for Heavy Bombers, the form contains the following sections: the facility to be inspected, the type, designation, and UID, the deployed heavy bombers to be inspected, the date and time, and a signature block for the inspection team leader and member of the in-country escort.

For a Test Range, the form contains the following sections: the facility to be inspected, the coordinates and designation, the silo test launchers of ICBMs to be inspected, the date and time, and a signature block for the inspection team leader and member of the in-country escort.

ANNEX ON TELEMETRIC INFORMATION

The Annex on Telemetric Information consists of six parts which provide the procedures and technical provisions associated with the exchange of telemetric information conducted in accordance with Article IX of the Treaty and Part Seven of the Protocol to the Treaty.

PART ONE - DEFINITIONS

Part One defines three terms that are specific to the Annex on Telemetric Information. These terms clarify key concepts in the exchange of telemetric information. The “providing Party” is the Party that provides telemetric information on its launches of ICBMs or SLBMs, provides telemetric information playback equipment and its spare parts, conducts demonstrations of recording media and playback equipment or provides training in the operation or maintenance of telemetric information playback equipment. The “receiving Party” is the Party that receives telemetric information on launches of ICBMs or SLBMs of the other Party, acquires telemetric information playback equipment and its spare parts, participates in demonstrations of recording media and telemetric information playback equipment, and receives training from the other Party in the operation and maintenance of such equipment. The “trainee team” is the group of individuals assigned by the receiving Party to obtain training in the operation and maintenance of telemetric information playback equipment on the territory of the providing Party.

PART TWO – GENERAL PROVISIONS

Paragraph 1 identifies the additional information that the providing Party is required to include in the launch notification required by Section IV of Part Four of the Protocol. This paragraph requires the notifying Party, for those launches of ICBMs and SLBMs that it intends to consider for the exchange of telemetric information with the receiving Party, to specify all frequencies and modulation methods to be used to broadcast telemetric information subject to provision to the other Party. If a Party does not intend to include a particular notified launch in the pool of candidate launches from which it intends to consider providing telemetric information, then it is not obligated to provide this additional data on broadcast

information in its launch notification. Provision of broadcast frequencies and modulation methods for a particular launch does not obligate the providing Party to provide the telemetric information for that launch. The purpose of the additional data is to aid the receiving Party in its independent collections of the broadcast signal so that it can confirm that the telemetric information provided on the recordings is the same as the information that was broadcast. The decisions on the launches for which telemetric information will be provided will be made after the annual review of the telemetric information exchange is conducted in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).

Broadcast frequencies and modulation methods associated with telemetric information that originates in reentry vehicles or in other objects installed on an ICBM or SLBM to be delivered into the upper atmosphere or space will not be provided to the other Party as part of a launch notification because this telemetric information is not subject to exchange with the other Party, as set forth in Paragraph 5 of Part Two of the Annex.

Paragraph 2 specifies that the Party conducting a launch of an ICBM or SLBM that it intends to consider for the exchange of telemetric information with the other Party may not take any measures to deny that Party access to the telemetric information that is broadcast during the launch that is subject to exchange. This provision prohibits the use of encryption, jamming, narrow directional beaming, or any other means of denial of access to the portion of the telemetry signal broadcast during such launches that is subject to exchange. Paragraph 2 specifically states that encryption may not be applied to telemetric information that may be provided to the other Party. Because telemetric information that originates in and is broadcast from reentry vehicles or other objects installed on an ICBM or SLBM to be delivered into the upper atmosphere or space is not subject to exchange, as set forth in Paragraph 5 of Part Two of this Annex, encryption and other methods of data denial may be applied to telemetric information originating in and broadcast from these sources.

Paragraph 3 states that the Party conducting a launch of an ICBM or SLBM may use any method to deny access to the telemetric information that is broadcast from the missile if the Party does not intend to consider providing the telemetric information to the other Party as part of the annual exchange of telemetric information. This provision does not foreclose the possibility that, following discussion during the annual review of telemetric information within the

framework of the BCC, a Party may decide to exchange the telemetric information from a launch to which it applied data denial measures. The modalities for such an exchange would also be discussed in the BCC.

Paragraph 4 states that the Parties will begin the exchange of telemetric information once agreement is reached within the framework of the BCC on the amount of telemetric information from ICBM and SLBM launches to be exchanged. The Parties may agree within the framework of the BCC to exchange all telemetric information that originates in and is broadcast from a missile with the exception of telemetric information that originates in reentry vehicles or in other objects installed on an ICBM or SLBM for delivery into the upper atmosphere or space, as set forth in Paragraph 5 of Part Two of this Annex. The Parties may also agree on a lesser amount. Discussion of the telemetry exchange will take place on an annual basis within the BCC. This allows for an initial agreement on the information to be exchanged at the beginning of Treaty implementation and re-evaluation on an annual basis.

Paragraph 5 exempts from exchange any telemetric information that originates in reentry vehicles or in other objects installed on an ICBM or SLBM for delivery into the upper atmosphere or space. This provision specifically removes from consideration the exchange of information originating in the reentry vehicle or objects delivered into the upper atmosphere or space employing ICBMs and SLBMs covered by the Treaty or launch systems containing the first stage of such ICBMs or SLBMs. Objects delivered into the upper atmosphere or space could include space payloads, atmospheric experiments, and various sensors.

Paragraph 6 specifies that, during the exchange of telemetric information the providing Party will provide recording media containing telemetric information, a summary of the recording media to facilitate its playback, and interpretive data associated with the analysis of the recording media. This provision ensures that the agreed amount of the telemetric information and all the associated information necessary to play back and interpret that information is provided for each launch for which telemetric information is provided. The obligation to provide “telemetric information” rather than specific original recording media allows each Party to make appropriate copies for provision to the other Party.

Paragraph 7 specifies that the Parties must provide the full set of telemetric information described in Paragraph 6 for each launch for which telemetric

information will be exchanged no later than 60 days after the decision reached within the framework of the BCC, which must meet during the first 65 days of the calendar year, to discuss the exchange of telemetric information on launches conducted in the previous calendar year. The paragraph additionally clarifies that written materials may be provided in either the English or Russian language, at the discretion of the providing Party.

Paragraph 8 describes the steps the Parties must take to enable each other to play back recording media containing telemetric information. These steps include conducting an initial demonstration of the recording media that a Party intends to use and the applicable telemetric information playback equipment; providing future demonstrations for different recording media and applicable playback equipment as it is introduced; and providing the opportunity to acquire the playback equipment that has been demonstrated, including training in the operation and maintenance of the equipment and spare parts.

Subparagraph 8(e) requires that the providing Party use recording techniques that allow the receiving Party to play back the telemetric information provided using playback equipment that has been demonstrated. Such techniques include the types of modulation, methods, modes, and formats used to record the information, as well as the method of encoding the telemetric information on the recording media. In addition, the summaries of the recording media must contain information the receiving Party needs to play back the telemetric information. These requirements prevent the testing Party from denying access to the recorded information by using recording techniques that the receiving Party cannot read or by withholding information about the recording media or its recording techniques required to use the playback equipment. This subparagraph clarifies that playing back the recording means converting the telemetric information on the medium to the same form (format) that originated on board the missile before it was broadcast. The format originating on board the missile refers to the sequencing and structure of the real time physical digital bit stream as it went into the transmitter.

Paragraph 9 specifies that telemetric information shall be exchanged for launches of ICBMs and SLBMs conducted after the Treaty enters into force. Data from launches conducted prior to the date of entry into force are not subject to exchange.

**PART THREE – PROVISION OF RECORDING MEDIA, SUMMARIES OF
RECORDING MEDIA, AND INTERPRETIVE DATA FOR TELEMETRIC
INFORMATION**

Paragraph 1 establishes the right of each Party to use any media containing a recording of telemetric information for which a demonstration has been conducted and that is compatible with playback equipment for which a demonstration has been conducted. This provision gives the Party conducting the launch the right to determine the method of recording the telemetric information on recording media, as long as the media contain a recording of all telemetric information agreed for exchange and such information can be played back using demonstrated playback equipment.

Paragraph 2 specifies the minimum information to be included in recording media summaries. These summaries are necessary to identify the media and play back their data. Each summary must include basic information identifying the medium and the launch, including an identifying number, the type of ICBM or SLBM, date of the launch, frequency and modulation method used to broadcast the telemetric information, and starting and ending times of the recording. Summaries must also include information describing how the telemetric information was recorded, including the recorder type, recording mode, recording speed and information for each track (if the recording medium is a tape), the type of filing system, including information on the structure of the file and the information words in the file (if the information is in a file), digital data encoding methods employed, which describe how individual data bits are represented, and digital recording formats. Since missing or unreadable portions of telemetric information sometimes occur, the Party supplying the recording media must also identify and explain the periods (keyed to a time standard) during the launch for which no telemetric information was obtained or for which recorded media are of inferior quality.

Paragraph 3 provides the opportunity for the receiving Party to provide notification to the providing Party if the receiving Party determines that the information contained on the recording media is incomplete, or that the information contained on the recording media or the recording summary is of insufficient quality to convert the telemetric information to the format that originated on board the missile prior to broadcast.

Paragraph 4 establishes the obligation for the providing Party to respond to the notification described in Paragraph 3 with an explanation concerning the deficiencies in the information provided or with new recording media or new recording summaries.

Paragraph 5 identifies the minimum interpretive data to be provided with the recordings for analysis of its telemetric information. The basic obligation is to provide a description of the format for the telemetry frame and the encoding methods used for all telemetric information that is provided. Telemetry data bits are usually organized into a hierarchy of groupings; a group of individual data bits make up a standard word, and a group of standard words make up a frame. The beginning or end of a frame is identified by a unique pattern of bits known as synchronization words or bits.

Subparagraphs 5(a) through 5(d) require that the description include basic formatting information, specifically the number of bits per standard word, the number of words per frame, the number of frames per second, and the location of synchronization words or synchronization bits.

Subparagraph 5(e) requires that the description include the location of information in the frame describing its formatting. For example, specific words may contain information that specifies how or when the frame format has changed from the previous frame.

Subparagraphs 5(f) and 5(g) require that the description include information regarding data elements. Data elements are units of information such as an onboard technical measurement or a formatting aid within the telemetry frame. Data elements may or may not be recorded on each frame, may or may not be in the same location in the frame throughout the launch, and may be represented numerically by one of several possible arrangements of bits. Subparagraph 5(f) requires that the description include a designator and the location of each data element within the frame throughout the interval of telemetric information provided and, if a given word location uses a time-sharing mode for two or more data elements, the structure for such time-sharing. The designator called for in this subparagraph is a means of identifying each data element, not necessarily a name or description. Subparagraph 5(g) requires that the description include the method of representing each data element, including the location of each bit in each

element, the order of the bits from least to most significant, and the method for representing negative values.

Subparagraph 5(h) requires that the providing Party give to the receiving Party all information regarding encoding algorithms for the telemetric information provided. Encoding algorithms are processes that are applied within the telemetry equipment and are known to the providing Party. Encoding algorithms include error detection and correction, data compression, and any conversion processes that are applied in the telemetry equipment to onboard measured parameter values prior to their broadcast.

Paragraph 6 obligates the Parties to provide a complete set of interpretive data in accordance with paragraph 5 for each launch of an ICBM or SLBM for which telemetric information is provided. This means that the practice of referring to previous interpretive data associated with telemetric information from another launch of an ICBM or SLBM is not permitted.

Paragraph 7 emphasizes that the combination of the recording media summaries provided and the playback of telemetric information contained on recording media, played back using equipment previously demonstrated, must provide the receiving Party the opportunity to convert the telemetric information provided to the format that originated on board the missile before broadcast.

Paragraph 8 provides the receiving Party the opportunity to notify the providing Party if it determines that the interpretive data do not meet the requirements set forth in Paragraph 5. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section IV of Part Four of the Protocol, such notifications are to be provided no later than 180 days after receipt of the interpretive data.

Paragraph 9 obligates the providing Party to respond to the notification described in Paragraph 8 with an explanation concerning the incompleteness or insufficient quality of the interpretive data or to provide through diplomatic channels revised interpretive data for telemetric information. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section IV of Part Four of the Protocol, this response is to be provided no later 60 days after receipt of such notification.

**PART FOUR – ARRANGING AND CONDUCTING DEMONSTRATIONS
OF RECORDING MEDIA AND TELEMETRIC INFORMATION
PLAYBACK EQUIPMENT**

Paragraph 1 obligates each Party to conduct within 180 days after entry into force of the Treaty the initial demonstration of the recording media and playback equipment they will use to provide telemetric information to the other Party.

Paragraph 2 obligates each Party to conduct subsequent demonstrations of recording media and relevant playback equipment if there are changes to the recording medium, type of modulation, mode, recording format, or method of encoding telemetric information from that used previously that require the use of different telemetric information playback equipment or a modification of existing playback equipment. The demonstration must be conducted no less than 60 days in advance of the beginning of the calendar year during which such recording medium will be provided or no later than 60 days after receipt of the request described in Paragraph 4 of this Part.

Paragraph 3 addresses the case of changes as described in Paragraph 2 that do not require new or modified playback equipment. This provision obligates the providing Party to send information through diplomatic channels describing the differences in recording medium, type of modulation, mode, recording format, or method of encoding telemetric information, from what was previously demonstrated. The providing Party is also obligated to provide media with a recording of test telemetric information to make it possible for the receiving Party to ascertain that the descriptions provided are sufficient.

Paragraph 4 provides the receiving Party the right to request a demonstration of recording media and telemetric information playback equipment if it believes the information provided as set forth in Paragraph 3 is insufficient.

Paragraph 5 establishes that notifications concerning the planned date and location of a demonstration of recording media and telemetric information playback equipment will be provided no less than 30 days in advance of the demonstration as set forth in paragraph 4 of Section IV of Part Four of the Protocol to the Treaty.

Paragraph 6 establishes that the providing Party will determine the location for the demonstration of recording media and telemetric information playback equipment.

Paragraph 7 provides an opportunity for the providing Party to supplement the recording media summaries it provides as set forth in Paragraph 2 of Part Three of the Annex with additional information that has been agreed between the Parties during the conduct of a recording medium demonstration or within the framework of the BCC.

Paragraph 8 provides an opportunity for the Parties to agree upon, within the framework of the BCC, the detailed procedures for conducting demonstrations of recording media and telemetric information playback equipment.

Paragraph 9 establishes the cost-sharing practices to be followed in conducting the demonstrations described in this Part of the Annex, specifying that the costs associated with transporting individuals of the receiving Party to and from the point of entry of the providing Party to participate in a demonstration of recording media or playback equipment are to be borne by the receiving Party. Paragraph 9 further specifies that costs associated with arranging and conducting demonstrations of recording media and telemetric information playback equipment are to be borne by the providing Party.

PART FIVE – PROVISION OF PLAYBACK EQUIPMENT AND SPARE PARTS

Paragraph 1 obligates each Party to provide the other Party the opportunity to acquire the equipment demonstrated for the playback of telemetric information, together with the appropriate software and technical documentation. This provision establishes that notifications pertaining to a request for such equipment, and subsequent responses are to be provided as set forth in Paragraph 5 of Section IV of Part Four of the Protocol, taking into account a prescribed sequence as outlined in Subparagraphs 1(a) through 1(c). This sequence begins with a request by the receiving Party to obtain telemetric information playback equipment for which a demonstration has been conducted. The providing Party then responds, no later than 30 days after receipt of the request, with the estimated time frame for delivery of such equipment, its cost, and weight and size of the equipment in the transport packaging. Finally, the receiving Party notifies the providing Party of its agreement or refusal to purchase the playback equipment.

Paragraph 2 requires the providing Party to provide telemetric information playback equipment to the receiving Party within 120 days of receipt of notification that the receiving Party agrees to acquire the playback equipment through the process described in Paragraph 1, unless the Parties agree otherwise.

Paragraph 3 obligates each Party to provide to the other Party the opportunity to acquire spare parts for previously purchased telemetric information playback equipment, with detailed instructions on installation of the specified spare parts. Paragraph 3 also establishes that notifications pertaining to a request for spare parts, and subsequent responses are to be provided as set forth in Paragraph 5 of Section IV of Part Four of the Protocol, taking into account a prescribed sequence as outlined in Subparagraphs 3(a) through 3(c). This sequence begins with a request by the receiving Party to obtain spare parts for playback equipment, for which a demonstration was previously conducted. The providing Party then responds, no later than 30 days after receipt of the request, with the estimated time frame for delivery of spare parts, their cost, and weight and size of the parts in transport packaging. Finally, the receiving Party notifies the providing Party of its agreement or refusal to purchase the spare parts.

Paragraph 4 requires the providing Party to provide spare parts for playback equipment to the receiving Party within 90 days of receipt of notification that the receiving Party agrees to acquire the spare parts through the process described in Paragraph 3, unless the Parties agree otherwise.

Paragraph 5 establishes that in the event of two or more malfunctions of the same components of telemetric information playback equipment, the receiving Party may request an explanation from the providing Party. The providing Party is to respond with a detailed explanation, to include an analysis of the possible cause of the malfunction of the equipment and recommendations for the prevention of such malfunctions in the future. Paragraph 5 obligates the Parties to use diplomatic channels to request and provide this information.

Paragraph 6 specifies that the costs associated with the acquisition of the telemetric information playback equipment and/or its spare parts, including their delivery and installation, are to be borne by the receiving Party.

**PART SIX – TRAINING IN THE OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF
TELEMETRIC INFORMATION PLAYBACK EQUIPMENT FOR
PERSONNEL OF THE RECEIVING PARTY**

Paragraph 1 obligates the providing Party to conduct training for the receiving Party in the operation and maintenance of telemetric information playback equipment for which a demonstration has been conducted. This training takes place on the territory of the providing Party. Such training is requested in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section IV of Part Four of the Protocol.

Paragraph 2 addresses the size of the trainee team and the responsibilities of the receiving and providing Parties in preparation for the arrival of the trainee team.

Subparagraph 2(a) sets the limit of 14 as the maximum number of team members.

Subparagraph 2(b) requires that the receiving Party provide the list of team members in advance of their arrival. The providing Party then is required to provide notification of any objection to the listed team members within 15 days after receiving the list, following the same provisions for objection to a team member as are applied to the list of inspectors for an inspection.

Subparagraph 2(c) obligates the providing Party to provide visas and any other documents required for the team members to enter and remain on its territory during the training period.

Paragraph 3 describes the responsibilities of the providing Party with respect to the trainee team during the period of the training.

Subparagraph 3(a) requires that necessary assistance, to include safety briefings, be provided to the trainee team members.

Subparagraph 3(b) stipulates that each member of the trainee team be provided training materials in the language of the receiving Party and that one set of the training materials be provided for the entire team in the language of the providing Party.

Subparagraph 3(c) requires that the same provisions for movement, travel, and emergency evacuation that apply for inspection activities will apply for the trainee team leader and representatives of the providing Party. The rationale for referring only to the trainee team leader is that it is only the trainee team leader (“inspection team leader” in the inspection context) for which the annex establishes a specific legal right, which is the right to reach agreement with the representatives of the providing Party (“in-country escort” in the inspection context) for emergency evacuation. It is understood that the provisions of paragraph 7 of Part One of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol are to be interpreted by substituting “trainee team members” for “inspectors and aircrew members.”

Subparagraph 3(d) ensures that the trainee team can be in communication with its own embassy during the period it is on the territory of the providing Party.

Subparagraph 3(e) stipulates that the providing Party treat the members of the trainee team with due respect and take appropriate measures to protect them.

Paragraph 4 specifies the arrangements for air transportation for the trainee team. Subparagraph 4(a) permits the use of inspection airplanes, commercial flights, or Open Skies airplanes for transportation of the team members. Subparagraph 4(b) requires notification of expected time of arrival and necessary information about each team member no less than 72 hours prior to the arrival of the trainee team members.

Paragraph 5 states the requirements for reporting and confidentiality related to the training provided. Subparagraph 5(a) requires that the trainee team leader and a representative of the providing Party record the training activities that were carried out in a written report before leaving the location where the training was conducted. Subparagraph 5(b) stipulates that the receiving Party ensure that its team members not publicly disclose the information obtained during training without the express consent of the receiving Party, and that the receiving Party may only grant such consent with the express consent of the providing Party.

Paragraph 6 states that the providing Party will provide meals, lodging, and other necessary services for the trainee team during the time they are on the territory of the providing Party.

Paragraph 7 requires that training materials be provided to the receiving Party at no cost.

Paragraph 8 provides that the receiving Party will bear the costs of transportation to and from the territory of the providing Party as well as any costs associated with Paragraph 6 of this Part of the Annex.

ANALYSIS OF UNILATERAL STATEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE TREATY

There are three unilateral statements associated with the Treaty. The Russian Federation and the United States each made a unilateral statement concerning missile defense. The United States also made a unilateral statement concerning Trident I SLBMs. These statements are not integral parts of the Treaty, and they are not legally binding. They are presented solely for the information of the Senate.

Statement of the Russian Federation Concerning Missile Defense

On April 7, 2010, the Russian Federation made a unilateral statement on missile defense, in which it recorded its view that the Treaty may be effective and viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative and quantitative build-up in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States. The Russian Federation further noted its position that the “extraordinary events” that could justify withdrawal from the Treaty, pursuant to Article XIV, include a build-up in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States that would give rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear forces potential of the Russian Federation.

The withdrawal standard in Article XIV contains language identical to the withdrawal provisions in many arms control agreements, including the START Treaty, the INF Treaty, and the NPT. The withdrawal provision is self-judging in that each Party may decide when extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Accordingly the Russian statement merely records that the circumstances described in its statement would, in its view, justify such a decision on its part. It does not change the legal rights or obligations of the Parties under the Treaty.

As a historical matter, the Soviet Union made a similar unilateral statement regarding withdrawal from the START Treaty. In that statement, the Soviet Union noted its position that the “extraordinary events” in the withdrawal provision included U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. When the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2001, however, the Russian Federation (as a successor state to the Soviet Union) did not withdraw from the START Treaty.

Statement by the United States of America Concerning Missile Defense

On April 7, 2010, the United States made a unilateral statement in response to the statement of the Russian Federation Concerning Missile Defense. In the statement, the United States took note of the Russian statement, and recorded the U.S. position that U.S. missile defense systems are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia. U.S. missile defense systems would be employed to defend the United States against limited missile launches, and to defend its deployed forces, allies and partners against regional threats. The United States further noted its intent to continue improving and deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend itself against limited attack and as part of our collaborative approach to strengthening stability in key regions.

Statement of the United States of America on Trident I SLBMs

On April 7, 2010, the United States made a unilateral statement that Trident I SLBMs are not SLBMs of an existing type for purposes of the Treaty. Trident I SLBMs were previously contained in Ohio-class SSBNs. In this statement, the United States declared that the launchers that were at one time capable of launching Trident I SLBMs have all been converted and are now incapable of launching Trident I ballistic missiles. The United States further declared that the remaining Trident I SLBMs will not be used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty.