Globally Strengthening Nonproliferation and Disarmament

October 6-7, 2019

Millennium Hotel, New York City

MEETING SUMMARY

At the October 6-7 meeting of the Global Enterprise to Strengthen Nonproliferation and Disarmament (GE), held in New York City, participants engaged in a productive dialogue on possible commitments to action that countries could make in advance of, and/or during, the upcoming 2020 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) for each of the three GE focus areas - risk reduction, transparency, and fissile material management. This discussion drew on previous GE discussions and inputs from GE Working Groups in each of the focus areas. Participants also discussed the strategy, tactics, and implementing actions necessary for making progress on priority commitments. The following is a brief summary of the key takeaways that emerged from the discussions and a streamlined version of the priority options for possible action.

GE Proposed Priority Commitments for 2020 RevCon

- Participants emphasized the need for leadership and building momentum to help coordinate and achieve a practical outcome at the 2020 RevCon. This includes seeking creative approaches to turn ideas into action and to solve current challenges. It also requires cooperation among the P5 in support of the three NPT goals.
- Even in the current political environment, the discussion made clear that there are opportunities for action across risk reduction, transparency, and fissile material management to strengthen pursuit of the NPT’s goals.
- While there was overall agreement that achievement by states parties of a traditional RevCon consensus final document would be the best outcome, there was discussion and considerable interest in the concept of also pursuing “Voluntary Joint Commitments”.
- Such commitments would not necessarily be consensus-driven. Rather they would be commitments to specific actions in support of the NPT’s goals made by individual countries, or groups of countries, in addition to a consensus statement (or in the absence of such a statement). These “Voluntary Joint Commitments” could focus on new actions to be taken or be a way to help countries to implement more effectively commitments previously made. These commitments could be announced either in advance of the RevCon or during the RevCon to help build momentum and focus the discussion.


Risk Reduction

- Risk reduction actions, it was broadly agreed, cannot be viewed as a replacement for resumed progress toward nuclear disarmament. However, in today’s environment such actions are essential to help prevent the use of nuclear weapons, to reduce nuclear tensions, and to lay the groundwork for progress toward nuclear disarmament.

- Participants recognized that progress is being made on risk reduction under the P5 process. Nevertheless, further consideration is needed of possibilities to broaden that dialogue to help address a wider set of risk reduction measures as well as to ensure the sustainability of these efforts over time. Though largely linked to actions by NWS, some participants stressed the need to identify ways for NNWS to provide input and support such efforts.

- Several participants noted that further transparency into the P5 process would help states parties to understand the status of P5 discussions and actions being taken. This step would serve to reassure NNWS that progress is being made.

- Some participants pointed out that the P5 process itself is vulnerable to the dynamics and political relationships among the P5 states, and the process is not fully institutionalized and has no secretariat nor terms of reference or rules of procedures. It would therefore be helpful to find complementary mechanisms and formats where actions could be taken by NWS, either individually or together, independent of the ebb and flow of the formal P5 process. Voluntary Joint Commitments could be one option for an alternative format.

- With regard to specific commitments to action in the risk reduction area, the discussion focused on four ideas:
  - A statement reaffirming the commitment of the NWS to avoiding the use of nuclear weapons. Specific attention focused initially on reaffirming the language of the Reagan-Gorbachev 1985 statement that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” which some participants argued could serve to reassure NNWS and signal recognition of the responsibilities of countries with nuclear arsenals. In response to the view of some participants that reaffirming the Reagan-Gorbachev language would be challenging, the group considered whether a new statement on avoiding nuclear use could be useful to reflect the current context. Such a statement could be issued by different configurations of states – bilaterally by the United States and Russia, individually by each of the NPT NWS (or some subset of the five NWS), by all NPT Parties, or as a P5 statement. However, it was noted that it will be challenging to find an alternative statement that can be both agreed by NWS and supported by NNWS and that does not add qualifications to the original formulation.
  - Restore and strengthen crisis management and crisis communications. Such actions could be taken in advance of, or during, the 2020 RevCon by the United States and Russia and/or the United States and China. Such efforts/actions could also be developed and advanced within the P5 process.
Continued P5 dialogue – and greater transparency – on nuclear doctrines. Such work is important to clarify misunderstandings and misperceptions among the P5 as well as to build trust and predictability. Participants emphasized the need to sustain such dialogue, and called for NWS to provide greater transparency on their doctrines, including to NNWS. The P5 are planning to host a side event on doctrines during the RevCon. If this takes place, the NNWS should attend and use it to clarify their questions about the nuclear doctrines of P5 countries. To strengthen transparency on these issues, it was also suggested that the NWS prepare working papers based on any side events that they host and which could be placed formally into the RevCon record.

Dialogue among NWS and NNWS on pathways toward renewed reductions and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Several participants emphasized that risk reduction cannot replace steps toward nuclear disarmament and that there should be greater discussion of how to restore progress toward the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

**Transparency**

- Strengthening transparency among states on the implementation of the NPT remains critical for the continuing effectiveness and legitimacy of the Treaty.
- Reporting by states parties during the RevCon on actions that have been taken during the review cycle on all three pillars is important to help build trust and confidence. Participants strongly welcomed the positive example of the UK in this area and suggested that the UK approach could be a model for all NWS. (UK officials released a draft national report in advance of the 2018 PrepCom and subsequently engaged with many states parties through an interactive process to solicit reactions and feedback prior to submitting an updated national report during the RevCon.)
- In addition, some participants suggested it would be valuable to identify an organization or mechanism that would provide analysis and comparison of the data included by the NWS in their reports. There is currently a lack of consistency in the data provided, and there are no specific data requirements.
- It was agreed that more focus is needed on how to create opportunities for interactive dialogue among NWS and NNWS within the NPT process - beyond side events which are not recorded in official documents. The Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPD) continues to call for regular time to be carved out at the RevCon for a discussion on reporting.
- In order to drive more substantive interactive dialogue, NNWS should consider what specific questions and issues they want the NWS to engage on.
**Fissile Material Management**

- Overall, strengthening fissile material management – ensuring effective physical protection, accounting and control, safeguarding, and reporting of fissile material – is less controversial than other NPT goals. There are many actions that countries could take to build on and advance progress in this area.

- One way to proceed would be via Voluntary Joint Commitments by groups of countries to specific actions in this area, as well as issuing national statements during the RevCon that note the actions they have taken.

- States parties could take actions to adhere to and more effectively implement international agreements, IAEA INFCIRCs, and other mechanisms to strengthen physical protection of fissile materials.

- Participants also noted the February 2020 International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) as an opportunity for states to announce steps taken, which could then be recognized and welcomed at the NPT RevCon in April/May 2020.

- Participants discussed the importance of taking incremental steps toward a baseline of information about civil and military stocks of fissile materials as a building block for disarmament. These steps could include more complete implementation of existing reporting mechanisms for plutonium and highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian applications, reporting of military materials in the aggregate, establishing a dialogue on the information needed for such a baseline, and releasing a statement at the RevCon outlining what steps have been taken.

- One area that warrants sustained attention is minimizing and eliminating stockpiles of HEU in civilian applications. This step would impact all three NPT pillars. Countries could also seek to identify a target date to eliminate civilian HEU, and additional regions could seek to become regions free of HEU. Closely related, it was suggested that countries with plutonium stocks being used in civilian applications could lower them to the minimum level consistent with national requirements.

- More broadly, it would be helpful to continue to advance understanding of the importance of fissile material management for supporting nonproliferation and disarmament, for example by encouraging discussion in different fora on this subject (including in Geneva). One output from such discussions could be joint statements that identify priority actions to strengthen fissile material management.

- Further consideration is needed of how actions to strengthen fissile material management can be used as a pathway to a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Such a layered approach to the FMCT also would include continuing to address some of the technical issues that would eventually need to be resolved in treaty negotiations and strengthening transparency.
**GE Priority Options for Commitments on Risk Reduction, Transparency, and Fissile Material Management**

- Based on the continuing discussions within the Global Enterprise, the table below sets out possible priority options for commitments that governments could pursue and support during the 2020 NPT review process in the areas of risk reduction, transparency, and fissile material management. These options reflect a narrowing down of a wider set of options previously discussed. Any such commitments could be included as part of a final consensus document or they could be made as stand-alone Voluntary Joint Commitments by groups of countries, thereby acting as complements, supplements, and possible momentum-builders for a traditional consensus document.

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<tr>
<th>Options for Commitments on Risk Reduction</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Strengthened Dialogue on Doctrine and Strategic Stability Among P5 and Between P5 and NNWS</td>
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<td>• P5 affirm commitment to sustain and enhance exchanges on nuclear doctrine, with view to reducing misunderstanding, ambiguities, and possible misinterpretations, including by creating a “P5 Working Group on Nuclear Doctrine.”</td>
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<td>• P5 affirm intention to sustain and strengthen dialogue to include discussions of strategic stability, with goal of identifying, reducing, eliminating, and/or avoiding deployment of destabilizing systems, as well as reducing role of nuclear weapons.</td>
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<td>• NPT NWS affirm readiness to provide annual presentations about their respective nuclear policies, postures, and activities, with a particular reference to clarification of nuclear use and declaratory policies, the role and significance of nuclear weapons in doctrines, measures being taken to reduce nuclear arsenals, and perceptions of the strategic situation. The presentations are to be conducted in a format that allows for interaction with NNWS.</td>
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<td>2. Crisis Avoidance and Management</td>
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<td>• P5 initiate and strengthen crisis avoidance and management dialogue with a goal to identify actions that could lead to misinterpretation or escalation; to explore possibilities to renew, update, or put in place crisis avoidance and management mechanisms and agreements; and to ensure unambiguous pathways for crisis communications.</td>
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<td>• NPT NWS, individually and as part of risk reduction through the P5 process, commit to exercise restraint in rhetoric, posture, and activity.</td>
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<td>3. Declaratory Policy for Nuclear Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>• States parties issue declaratory statement(s) on avoiding nuclear weapons use. Such statement(s) could be issued collectively by all NPT states parties, by the NWS collectively, or by specific NWS on a national basis.</td>
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### 4. Reductions/Elimination as Risk Reduction Pathway

- NWS reaffirm “unequivocal undertaking” to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons” as well as their legal obligations to pursue disarmament and set out pathways for, and make progress toward, renewed reductions and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.
- NNWS (or a sub-group of NNWS) call for NWS to reaffirm their “unequivocal undertaking” to eliminate nuclear weapons and their legal obligation to nuclear disarmament as well as to set out pathways for, and make progress toward, renewed reductions and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

### 5. Nuclear Weapon Safety, Security, and Control

- NWS (or sub-group of NWS) affirm their commitment to sustain effective and reliable safety of nuclear weapons and take actions to provide greater transparency on the effectiveness of nuclear-weapon safety consistent with safety and security requirements as well as their non-proliferation obligations.

**Options for Commitments on Transparency**

### 6. Implementation of Specific NPT Obligations

- States parties reaffirm commitment to regular reporting during the review process to allow states parties to understand how NPT Articles are being implemented, to compare data on implementation, and to identify important updates/changes.
- States parties undertake to strengthen the process and value of reporting on NPT implementation, including timely release of reports to give countries an opportunity to review, steps to achieve greater consistency of data across reports from all states parties, and support for development of a user-friendly shared factual platform/repository of countries’ reports and related strategic documents.

### 7. Interactive Dialogue within the NPT Review Process

- States parties endorse efforts to make sustained interactive dialogue on NPT implementation, as well as more comprehensive NWS transparency, a more integral part of the NPT review process. To that end, states parties agree that time should be dedicated at future PrepCom meetings to discussion of national reports and other transparency matters that states parties may wish to raise.

### 8. Greater Transparency into the P5 Process and its Results

- NWS affirm support for additional actions to enhance transparency and dialogue with NNWS on how they are advancing NPT goals and reducing nuclear risks through the P5 process and in other ways, including to hold half day side events open to all NNWS at each PrepCom and RevCon meeting, as well as to consider inviting a wider group of countries to participate in the discussions after each P5 meeting.
- P5 announce their intention to explore ways to increase mutual engagement between the P5 and review process officials, including regularly briefing the designated RevCon President and the respective chairs of the PrepCom meetings (including following P5 conferences).

**Options for Commitments on Fissile Material Management (FMM)**

### 9. Incremental Steps Toward Fissile Materials Baseline

- States parties affirm their commitment to submit declarations of civil fissile material under INFCIRC/549 and/or INFCIRC/912 before the RevCon, if they have not already done so, and commit to future submissions.
- States parties announce the beginning of a dialogue on assessing what information is needed to establish a baseline for future disarmament as well as on steps countries can take to build such a baseline and welcome participation by other concerned states.

### 10. Physical Protection of Fissile Materials

- In the context of the IAEA International Conferences on Nuclear Security (ICONS), countries take actions and make commitments to strengthen physical protection, including: sign INFCIRC/869, issue national statements on progress made and future actions, request IPPAS missions, ratify CPPNM Amendment and submit information required by Article 14.1. Such actions and commitments are announced at the RevCon in context of national statements.
- The Conference endorses the work of the recent ICONS in identifying and implementing actions/commitments to strengthen nuclear security.

### 11. Minimizing and Eliminating Fissile Materials

- Countries sign, or announce their intention to sign, INFCIRC/912 on HEU minimization, as well as announce their readiness to join with other current or previous HEU possessing states to discuss a target date for elimination of all civilian HEU.
- States parties welcome the existence of regions free of HEU and urge other regions to move toward becoming HEU free.
  - The countries of these regions emphasize their status as a region free of HEU and urge other regions to move in this direction.
- States parties that still produce or use plutonium for civilian purposes announce their commitment to keep their stockpile of separated plutonium to the minimum level consistent with the requirements of such national civilian programs.

### 12. Advancing Understanding of FMM as Enabling Nonproliferation and Disarmament

- States parties welcome a discussion of the linkage between FMM and all three NPT pillars within the CD or other fora, acknowledge that linkage, and identify specific priority actions as reflected in the accompanying joint commitments to take in the areas of physical protection, establishing a fissile material baseline, safeguards, and verification.
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<th>13. Supporting Disarmament Verification</th>
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<td>• States parties acknowledge, welcome, or endorse the work of the United Nations Group of Government Experts on Verification and the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, and support the continuation of, and encourage participation in, international efforts to develop needed concepts, tools, and procedures for nuclear disarmament verification as a vitally important contribution to achieving and sustaining a world free of nuclear weapons.</td>
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