GLOBAL ENTERPRISE TO STRENGTHEN NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT
February 4-5, 2019
Hotel California, Paris

MEETING SUMMARY

At the February 4-5 meeting of the Global Enterprise to Strengthen Nonproliferation and Disarmament (Global Enterprise), held in Paris, participants engaged in a productive dialogue on how to define success at the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 2020 Review Conference and on options for cooperative engagement in the areas of nuclear doctrine (including the role of political statements), nuclear risk reduction, transparency, and fissile material management. Participants discussed the status of existing initiatives and potential space for government action on each of these areas. The following is a summary of the key themes that emerged from the discussions, as well priority options advanced by participants. The summary concludes with some next steps for the Global Enterprise.

Defining Success at the 2020 NPT Review Conference (RevCon)

- The 2020 RevCon offers an opportunity for world leaders to demonstrate their commitment and support to advance all NPT goals—including pursuit of nuclear disarmament.
- As the NPT celebrates its 50th anniversary since entry into force it will be important for states parties to recall the progress that has been made over the past 50 years, as well as the important role the Treaty continues to play. The priority for all states parties should be helping to sustain and advance the success of the NPT.
- It will be important that states parties do not conflate the success of the RevCon and the success of the Treaty.
- There are many different views on the question of what would define a successful RevCon, including the importance of achieving a consensus final document or declaration. It will be important for all countries to approach 2020 with high expectations yet have flexibility in their approach to a final document.
- Important measures of a successful RevCon that were identified include:
  - Agreement(s) by groups of countries, if not all countries, on specific actions to advance the NPT goals and/or meet today’s core challenges to the NPT, such as
progress on reduction of global arsenals, including, importantly, extension of New START; progress on denuclearization of North Korea; and the further promotion of peaceful application of nuclear energy with benefits to all;

- Establishment of new opportunities for interactive and inclusive dialogue—both among the NPT nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and between the NWS and the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS)—to allow for a genuine exchange of views aimed at facilitating better understanding and helping build trust;
- Senior-level (i.e., Head of State/Government or Ministerial) commitments to the NPT’s goals; and
- Reviewing progress on past commitments that remain unfulfilled and agreeing on collective actions and pledges to implement or carry these forward. Doing so will help avoid back-sliding and focus on areas where progress can be made.

- Many participants commented that the NWS have a responsibility to demonstrate their ability to work together based on their shared commitment and stake in the NPT. States parties would welcome agreement at the RevCon among the P5 on actions and/or pledges that signal recognition of the importance of cooperative approaches to reduce nuclear risks, to sustain pursuit of Article VI goals, and to demonstrate understanding of the importance of the NPT to their own security and well-being. Such actions could be linked to steps to be achieved and reported on in the next review cycle (2020-2025).
- The 50th anniversary of the NPT will likely mean greater public focus on the RevCon. It will therefore be important to keep in mind what signals the RevCon will send to the public about the NPT, as well as to be prepared to engage with the public on the outcome.

**Options for Cooperative Engagement to Develop through the Global Enterprise**

- At the Paris meeting, participants discussed options for cooperative engagement that should be further explored by the Global Enterprise. These were focused on nuclear doctrine and the role of political statements, nuclear risk reduction, transparency, and fissile material management.
- To advance this discussion, background papers were provided to participants on each of these subjects. These papers surveyed the progress that has been made (and obstacles to progress), reviewed existing initiatives, and proposed options for collaborative next steps.
- Participants used the discussion to better understand different perspectives and priorities, identify areas of convergence, and identify a short list of options in each of the four areas of focus.
1. Nuclear Doctrine and the Role of Political Statements: Options for Cooperative Engagement

- With current tensions placing unprecedented pressure on the arms control architecture and concerns about the commitment of NWS to further progress of the disarmament goal of the NPT, it is important for the NWS to take cooperative action to create the conditions for disarmament, most notably by the United States and Russia extending New START.
- Political declarations issued by the NWS could play a valuable role at the RevCon. A declaration along the lines that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” issued by either the P5 or the United States and Russia, would be an important signal of intent to reduce nuclear tensions and reassuring for many NNWS.
- Questions remain about asking the NWS to reaffirm their support for Article VI at the RevCon. Concerns were raised that opening a discussion about Article VI could lead to different interpretations of the commitment or add to a sense of backsliding. With the NPT marking its 50th anniversary, it could however be helpful for all states parties to renew their commitment to all the NPT goals and to recall the important role the Treaty continues to play for stability.
- Current discussions among the P5 on their respective nuclear doctrines are highly welcome as a valuable contribution to the NPT and to building trust and deeper understanding among parties. This dialogue should be sustained and could be a means to reducing nuclear risks, including by addressing unknown or misinterpreted doctrine.

PROPOSALS ON NUCLEAR DOCTRINE FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION

| Identify opportunities for the P5 to engage in dialogue and interactions beyond the current engagement with the Nonproliferation Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), including holding public events, either individually or collectively, on nuclear doctrines. It will be important that the P5 adopt a more transparent approach to their doctrines in public settings and in discussions with NNWS. |
| Explore ideas to enable/encourage the RevCon President-designate to liaise more effectively with the P5 in advance of the RevCon, particularly to help communicate the different perspectives and priorities among states parties. |
| Encourage states parties to engage proactively with the United States on the Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) initiative as a means to discussing pathways toward disarmament in advance of 2020. |

2. Nuclear Risk Reduction: Options for Cooperative Engagement

- The risk reduction debate is complex and overlaps with transparency and nuclear doctrine priorities. There are different perspectives among states on the nuclear risks that exist and what measures should be taken to address these risks.
• It is important to have more engagement from NWS on risk reduction—both within the P5 process and between the NWS and NNWS—and to have reassurance from the NWS about measures in place to prevent any use of nuclear weapons, either deliberate or accidental.

• As one step in 2020, NWS could focus on declarations and possibly a short statement of principles on “responsible” nuclear ownership, crafted in a way that supports and advances states’ obligations under Article VI and does not suggest that responsible ownership is a substitute for—or an excuse to delay—NWS obligations with regard to nuclear disarmament.

• An important way to reduce the risk of nuclear use in the longer term could be to take meaningful steps to reduce and remove capabilities that do not contribute to overall strategic stability.

• As states consider their approach to risk reduction, they should prioritize collaborative efforts between NWS and NNWS and emphasize diversity in terms of gender, age, geography, and civil society to support sustainable outcomes.

### PROPOSALS ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION

| Consider and further develop possible elements of a statement of principles on responsibilities of countries possessing nuclear weapons. It could be helpful to adopt an incremental approach, beginning with a discussion of how such a statement could be crafted to reflect the wider context of NPT obligations—especially Article VI—and how to label such an effort, and then addressing the core principles to be included in a statement. To attract broader buy-in for the value of such an effort, it will be essential to include NNWS in this process. Even if a comprehensive statement cannot be agreed in time for the RevCon, a discussion that includes both NWS and NNWS could be important in its own right. |
| Consider the potential contribution of—and possible mechanisms for—an agreed, senior-level (i.e., Head of State/Government or Ministerial) statement—among the P5 or just the United States and Russia—along the lines of “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” |
| Develop steps that states parties can take to advance implementation of past commitments in the 2000 and 2010 Action Plans related to nuclear weapon capabilities. |

### 3. Transparency: Options for Cooperative Engagement

• Efforts to strengthen transparency should be pursued in advance of 2020 and should focus on fostering constructive interactive dialogue between NNWS and NWS.
• The purpose of such a dialogue should be to rebuild trust among states by facilitating deeper mutual understanding of each other’s thinking about nuclear weapons as well as of NNWS concerns. In so doing, it could help provide reassurance to NNWS, foster greater NNWS inclusion in discussion of disarmament issues, and result in greater transparency of NWS activities. Dialogue should be interactive and respectful of each other’s views, ideally with high-level representation.

• Participants welcomed the current engagement among the P5. Based on various statements, the P5 have signaled that they are ready for constructive dialogue with other states. NNWS have also indicated that they would welcome additional information from the P5 beyond the current engagement with the NPDI.

• The substance of any dialogue and its contribution to greater transparency will depend on what NWS are prepared to discuss. Two broad approaches that were identified include: 1) an “accountant’s” approach where NWS are asked to provide greater information on the status of their nuclear forces, including numbers, deployment, and disposition; and/or 2) a “big issues/vision” approach where NWS focus on questions relating to the strategic situation and on their intentions/thinking/doctrine. The “big issues/vision” approach may be more promising in the current environment.

**PROPOSALS ON TRANSPARENCY FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION**

Consider how to advance a constructive interactive process between NWS and NNWS. This should include states parties beginning a discussion at the 2019 PrepCom on how to prepare for such a dialogue, and asking the RevCon President-designate to include this issue in his consultations. Pursuit of this type of dialogue should be undertaken without reopening the RevCon agenda, but could take advantage of flexibility within the agenda, including the Subsidiary Body on Strengthening the Review Process.

Encourage the P5 to hold public events on the margins of the PrepCom and RevCon regarding their respective nuclear doctrines, policies, and/or postures. P5 states could each convene their own events signaling their readiness to engage more fully.

Identify possible “big issues/vision” questions for consideration, such as perceptions of the security environment and what changes would facilitate resumption of the disarmament process. There might be some overlap with questions to be covered under the U.S. CEND initiative.

4. Fissile Material Management: Options for Cooperative Engagement

• Absent effective safeguards, security, and other regulatory measures, fissile material stocks, both civilian and military, continue to pose a global threat. The challenge is not just ending production of new materials for nuclear weapons, but addressing the
extremely large existing stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian and the military sectors.

- Ultimate progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons cannot be separated from accounting, securing, safeguarding, and minimizing, and in some cases, eliminating fissile materials.
- More effort needs to be focused on understanding the full set of issues related to the fissile material dimension of a sustained disarmament process and how states can cooperate to deal with those issues.
- There are many ways to think about the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), from banning future production of fissile materials to creating a disarmament instrument by reducing existing stocks. A key challenge is to develop a treaty framework that balances the different potential goals in a way that makes it possible to begin negotiations and eventually for a majority of states to join. An important step would also be to identify and understand the political and security barriers to beginning negotiations of an FMCT.
- In the context of the FMCT, the sequencing over the next year will inform next steps. The status of any progress would be considered again at the end of the 2019, perhaps resulting in consideration of other options for making progress, including outside of the CD.
- A high-level expert group (HLEG) report has been submitted to the Conference on Disarmament (CD). A next step to demonstrate serious and urgent consideration of the report could include the establishment of subsidiary bodies to examine political issues, different treaty models (e.g., a framework agreement), and technical and confidence-building measures. A strong statement of commitment at the 2019 NPT PrepCom to continuing negotiations of an FMCT and addressing barriers to negotiation would also be an indicator of progress.

### PROPOSALS ON FISSION MATERIAL MANAGEMENT FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis focused on developing a shared understanding of the full set of issues related to the fissile materials management dimension of a sustained disarmament process (e.g., transparency, safeguards, and verification) and how states can cooperate to deal with those issues.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Additional steps to become more transparent about fissile materials stocks, including declarations of stocks similar to the United States and (to a lesser extent) the United Kingdom; universalizing INFCIRC/549 to improve accountability around stocks of plutonium; and encouraging state implementation of INFCIRC/912 by fulfilling a commitment to submit historical reports about HEU activities and current HEU stocks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Specific actions that states parties could take to strengthen existing nuclear security mechanisms, given that strong nuclear security measures are an important facilitator</td>
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and enabler for the NPT. Actions could include unilateral voluntary measures, such as committing to sign and implement INFCIRC/869 on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation.

Options for states parties to overcome the political and security barriers that prevent negotiation of an FMCT, including further exploration of the model for a framework agreement as proposed in the Brazilian working group paper and accountability and transparency in support of an FMCT.

Reaffirming a moratorium on production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes and a strong statement at the 2019 PrepCom and 2020 RevCon by states parties, including the P5, reiterating support for negotiation of an FMCT. Such a statement could include specific commitments to strengthen the accountability of fissile materials as well as to create the conditions for negotiation of an FMCT in the CD or an alternative forum.

A side event on the FMCT at the 2019 PrepCom or 2020 RevCon introducing the findings of the high-level expert group report to raise the FMCT profile.

Identify technical and confidence-building measures that could be steps moving toward implementation of an FMCT.

**Next Steps**

- NTI is planning to host an informal dinner on **Sunday 28, April** in **New York** on the margins of the 2019 NPT PrepCom in April/May 2019. More details on agenda and location will be sent in the coming weeks.
- We will decide on the next steps to advance thinking and analysis on the short list of proposals identified above. For certain options and issues we may create informal, virtual working groups. For others we may commission short papers. We also plan to engage with other topics not covered in Paris, e.g. Middle East WMDFZ.
- The next full meeting of the Global Enterprise will take place in September/October 2019.