POLICY MEMO
Global Enterprise Options for Cooperative Commitments to Strengthen Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament
January 2020

In 2018, NTI launched the Global Enterprise to Strengthen Nonproliferation and Disarmament (GE), a Track 1.5 initiative that has regularly convened officials from over 20 countries with the objective of strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and contributing to a successful 2020 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) by identifying practical commitments that demonstrate the ability of States to work together to advance the NPT’s goals. Based on initial discussions with GE participants, the focus was narrowed to risk reduction, transparency, and fissile material management. For each, the GE identified cooperative commitments (see below) that could be made prior to or at the RevCon by groups of countries as “Joint Voluntary Commitments” and/or be reflected in a RevCon Final Declaration. While all of the options may not ultimately enjoy consensus support, we believe they warrant consideration during the 2020 Review process as promising contributions to a productive RevCon.

Risk Reduction
Though not a replacement for resumed progress toward nuclear disarmament, risk reduction actions are increasingly viewed by NPT States Parties as essential interim measures that can provide a foundation for future steps on disarmament. Mutual uncertainties and misperceptions among nuclear-armed states about each other’s nuclear doctrines, postures, and activities are increasing the risk of a crisis involving nuclear weapons. Though crisis avoidance agreements and communications mechanisms exist among certain nuclear armed states, they are not universal, and those that do exist warrant review, both to close gaps and ensure existing mechanisms are functioning effectively. The following priority options were identified:

- **Strengthened dialogue among NPT nuclear-weapon states (NWS) on nuclear doctrine and strategic stability** within the P5 process (including creation of a Working Group), with a view to reducing misunderstandings, ambiguities, and possible misinterpretations that could heighten strategic competition and avoiding destabilizing activities;

- **Broadening the P5 dialogue to include crisis avoidance and management** (including creation of a Working Group) to identify actions in a crisis that could lead to misinterpretation, miscalculation, and possible escalation; to identify and pursue ways to lessen the risk of such misinterpretation and miscalculation; and to review existing crisis avoidance and management agreements and mechanisms to identify possible updates or additions;
• An affirmation by all NWS of their commitment to avoid the use of nuclear weapons by a reaffirmation of the Reagan-Gorbachev statement that a “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”; and

• A commitment by NWS to reinvigorate pursuit of nuclear disarmament as required by their repeatedly reaffirmed obligations under the NPT, including commitments by NWS to: work together and with other countries to make the international environment more conducive to disarmament progress; intensify bilateral government-to-government engagement to resolve outstanding issues preventing further reductions of nuclear weapons; and report to the 2022 Preparatory Committee meeting (PrepCom) for the 2025 RevCon on pathways to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

Transparency
Reporting on NPT implementation and interactive dialogue among states is critical to help safeguard the effectiveness of the NPT by building trust and confidence among States Parties and strengthening mutual understanding on key NPT obligations. There also is significant interest among non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to understand better the nuclear doctrines of NWS (and the evolving role of nuclear weapons) and how the P5 process is advancing the NPT’s goals.

The following priority options were identified:

• Strengthened mechanisms for sustained reporting on NPT implementation, to include national commitments to: submit implementation reports in a regular and timely manner (with opportunities provided for comments from NNWS on specific NWS reports prior to each RevCon); engage with other States Parties, on an ad hoc basis or within the Review process, to explore how to enhance the consistency of data across national reports as well as the feasibility of developing a user-friendly repository of countries’ reports and related documents; and cooperate among States Parties to assist national reporting activities;

• Strengthened interactive dialogue within the NPT Review process on national implementation reporting, including a RevCon decision to dedicate time at future PrepComs for discussion of national implementation reports and of updates to previously submitted national reports; and

• A commitment by NWS to enhance transparency into the P5 process (and its contribution to advancing NPT goals and reducing nuclear risks) as well as into their own nuclear doctrines, postures, and activities, including: use of joint presentations and interactive side events open to all NNWS during the Review process; increased mutual engagement of P5 countries with RevCon officials and with NNWS, including following P5 meetings as well as on a more ad hoc basis; and providing other opportunities for NNWS to raise specific questions and issues for information from NWS (and for responses).
**Fissile Material Management (FMM)**

Strong FMM is integral to achieving the NPT’s non-proliferation, peaceful uses, and nuclear disarmament goals. It includes effective physical protection to protect against access to nuclear weapon usable materials by terrorists; accounting, control, and safeguarding of fissile materials; and reporting of fissile civil and military stockpiles/infrastructure as part of development of a comprehensive baseline of information needed for the pursuit and sustainment of a nuclear-weapon free world. The following priority options were identified:

- **Support for incremental steps toward the development of a comprehensive baseline of information**, including submitting annual declarations of stocks of civilian fissile material under INFCIRC/549 (on the management of separated plutonium) and INFCIRC/912 (the Joint Statement on Minimizing and Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications), as well as encouraging discussions on the framework of a comprehensive baseline of fissile material stocks and additional international actions to create it;

- **Affirmation of support, accompanied by implementing actions, for robust and effective physical protection of nuclear material**, including: reaffirmed or new adherence by States Parties to INFCIRC/869, the “Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation”; commitment to issue annual national statements on progress made and future actions to strengthen physical protection; commitment to implement existing non-binding IAEA guidance documents and to host IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions; ratify or, if already ratified, fully implement the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM), including submitting information required by Article 14.1; and commit to minister-level participation at the IAEA International Conferences on Nuclear Security (ICONS);

- **Reaffirmation of the commitments made in INFCIRC/912, or announcement of decisions to undertake those commitments**, accompanied by announcement of readiness to join with other current or previous HEU possessing states to discuss a target date for the elimination of all use of HEU in civilian applications and specific pathways to that goal; and

- **Support for the work of the United Nations Group of Government Experts on Verification and the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV)**, with expressions of strong endorsement for the continuation of international efforts to develop needed concepts, tools, and procedures for nuclear disarmament verification as a vitally important contribution to achieving and sustaining a world free of nuclear weapons.